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How Do the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas Fit into Udayana's Statement of Universal Worship? On *Nyāya-kusumâñjali* 17,3: *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ*

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Abstract: In his influential work concerned with rational argumentation in defence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism, the *Nyāya-kusumâñjali*, Udayana (10th–11th cent.) makes a puzzling claim that all seekers of *puruṣârtha*, theist or not, worship God, albeit under a different form or name. Included in the provided enumeration of different traditions of Indian thought is the irreligious school of the Cārvākas (also known as the Lokāyatas), declared by Udayana to be worshipping God as *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* (lit. '(the) established by common usage'). In this paper, I attempt to shed light on the meaning behind both *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* and the statement of universal worship as a whole. Specifically, I argue that Udayana imposes on non-theists and atheists the need to resort to (broadly understood) belief, and in the case of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas this is manifested in their acceptance of everyday inference warranted by mere common usage. I reject the interpretations by Udayana's commentators and by the modern scholar of Indian materialism, Ramkrishna Bhattacharya.

Keywords: Udayana, Lokāyata, Cārvāka, *lokavyavahārasiddha*, *lokavyavahāra*

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The present paper attempts to shed light on a passage from Udayana's (10th–11th cent.) *Nyāya-kusumâñjali* (*A Handful of Flowers of Logic*, or *The Offering of Flowers that are Logical Arguments*, henceforth NKus) wherein the irreligious school of Indian thought commonly referred to as the Cārvākas or the Lokāyatas (fl. around the 8th cent.)[1] is declared to be worshipping

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[1]   In this paper I refer to 'the school of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas', although it should be noted that while the former of the two names, *cārvāka*, refers specifically to representatives of this particular thought-current which flourished around the 8th cent., the name *lokāyata* – used for

loka-vyavahāra-siddha, lit. '(the) established by common usage, or common practice'. The passage belongs to an argument – which I shall refer to as the statement of universal worship – per which doubt in the existence of God[2] has no ground in as much as all of the many (religio-)philosophical Indian traditions (as well as 'even the artisans') worship God, albeit under a different form or name. The identity of the referent of *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* is a major problem to be addressed, which, however, ought not to be abstracted from a broader conundrum, namely the fact that the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas have an object of worship ascribed to them in the first place.

Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, a prolific scholar of Indian materialist thought, has already attempted to clarify Udayana's words in an essay entitled 'What Does Udayana Mean by *lokavyavahārasiddha iti cārvākāḥ?*', included in his 2009 published collection of papers, *Studies on the Cārvāka/Lokāyata*. In this succinct three-page essay, Bhattacharya dismisses the two interpretations found in the commentaries: according to one, *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* is a qualification of a monarch, and according to the other, it points to idolatry. The scholar, however, provides no explicit justification for his rejection of those as he puts forward an interpretation of his own. Furthermore, Bhattacharya refrains from consulting the most relevant source at his disposal, namely, the NKus itself. As a result, he never actually answers the question he asks in the title of his paper: 'What does *Udayana mean* […]' (emphasis mine). Needless to say, as an earlier take on the matter, Bhattacharya's proposition comes below under consideration.

1. The statement of universal worship

Composed by the renowned Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika author Udayana, the NKus is a revered and influential five-chapter verse-and-prose exercise in rational argu-mentation in defence of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theism.[3] The passage 'identifying' *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* as the object of Cārvāka/Lokāyata worship is found at the very beginning of the treatise. In order to (attempt to) make sense of Udayana's words it is imperative that we consider them as part of a broader statement, and indeed of a more complex problem.

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both the members of the school and the school itself – has a much longer (and an intricate) history of usage. Thus, whenever I speak of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas, the latter denomination is used only in the meaning it shares with the former one. Throughout this paper, both names are also used as adjectives.

[2]   I consistently use the word 'God' written with a capital 'G' merely to refer to the notion of a supreme being.

[3]   On the importance of Udayana's contribution to the Īśvara doctrine, see in particular Chemparathy 1972: 25–33; see also, e.g., Bhattacharya 1958: 37–42.

Following the opening praise verse, Udayana states his primary objective and elaborates on it:[4]

> 1.2. Here is ascertained the Supreme Self (*paramâtman*), whose worship the wise hand down (*ā-√mnā*) as the path to heaven and liberation.
>
> With regard to this [ascertainment of the Supreme Self], whence does doubt (*sandeha*) come, [doubt] in [the existence of] this Lordly Being whom [all those] striving to obtain a particular aim of human life (*puruṣârtha*) worship (*upa-√ās*) – the Vedāntins as one of pure and enlightened nature; the Sāṃkhyas as the perfected first knower; the followers of Yoga as the untouched by afflictions, actions, fruitions and residues [of former actions], who, having assumed the manifestation body, reveals the Vedic tradition and bestows grace; the Mahāpāśupatas as the independent and undefiled by what is opposed by people and what is opposed by the Veda; the Śaivas as Śiva; the Vaiṣṇavas as the Supreme Person; the Paurāṇikas as the Grand-father; scholars of the sacrifice as the Sacrificial Person; the Buddhists as the omniscient one; the Digambaras as one without obstructions; the Mīmāṃsakas as one who is instructed to be worshipped; the Cārvākas as the established by common usage (*loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ*); the Naiyāyikas as one who is endowed with what has been mentioned thus far; why say more?, whom even the artisans worship as the Creator of All – and whose authority (*anubhāva*) is thus well-established (*prasiddha*) across all of the world (*āsaṃsāram*)[5], like in the case of birth, *gotra*, *pravara*,

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4   NKus 11,1–20,4:
>   svargâpavargayor mārgam āmananti manīṣiṇaḥ |
>   yad-upāstim asāv atra paramâtmā nirūpyate || 1.2 ||
> *iha yady api yaṃ kam api puruṣârtham arthayamānāḥ, śuddha-buddha-svabhāva ity aupaniṣadāḥ, ādi-vidvān siddha iti kāpilāḥ, kleśa-karma-vipākâśayair aparāmṛṣṭo nirmāṇa-kāyam adhiṣṭhāya sampradāya-pradyotako 'nugrāhakaś cêti pātañjalāḥ, loka-veda-viruddhair api nirlepaḥ svatantraś cêti mahāpāśupatāḥ, śiva iti śaivāḥ, puruṣôttama iti vaiṣṇavāḥ, pitāmaha iti paurāṇikāḥ, yajña-puruṣa iti yājñikāḥ, sarvajña iti saugatāḥ, nirāvaraṇa iti digambarāḥ, upāsyatvena deśita iti mīmāṃsakāḥ, loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ, yāvad-uktôpapanna iti naiyāyikāḥ, kiṃ bahunā, kāravo 'pi yaṃ viśva-karmêty upāsate, tasminn evaṃ jāti-gotra-pravara-caraṇa-kula-dharmâdi-vad āsaṃsāraṃ prasiddhânubhāve bhagavati bhave sandeha eva kutaḥ | kiṃ nirūpaṇīyam | tathâpi,*
>   nyāya-carcêyam īśasya manana-vyapadeśa-bhāk |
>   upāsanaîva kriyate śravaṇânantarāgatā || 1.3 ||
> *śruto hi bhagavān bahuśaḥ śruti-smṛtîtihāsa-purāṇeṣv idānīṃ mantavyo bhavati, śrotavyo mantavya iti śruteḥ,*
>   āgamenânumānena dhyānâbhyāsa-rasena ca |
>   tridhā prakalpayan prajñāṃ labhate yogam uttamam ||
> *iti smṛteś ca ||*

5   I take *āsaṃsāram* to be used in a spatial meaning, cf. Apte s.v. *āsaṃsāra* (MW gives temporal expressions alone).

Vedic branch, family duties, etc.? What is there to ascertain? Even though [this is the case], still,

1.3. This logical inquiry (*nyāya-carcā*) is carried out only as an act of worship (*upāsanā*) of God, which (the act of worship) falls under reflection (*manana*),[6] one that follows the hearing (*śravaṇa*).

For the Lord, spoken of[7] much in the Śruti, the Smṛti, the Itihāsas, and the Purāṇas, comes now to be reflected upon, because [according to] the Śruti, '[He] is to be heard, [He] is to be reflected upon'[8], and because [according to] the Smṛti, 'through scripture, through inference, and through eagerness for repeated practice of meditation – cultivating wisdom in [this] threefold manner, one attains the highest Yoga'.[9]

Subsequently, Udayana gives a brief presentation of those five objections to the Īśvara doctrine which he tackles in the five chapters (*stabaka/stavaka*, lit. 'a bunch of flowers') of his work.[10] Following this, the investigation commences.

The prose fragment which follows verse two of chapter one contains what I refer to as Udayana's statement of universal worship.[11] While Udayana primarily operates on the plane of rational apologetics, this statement does not belong to this plane. It serves no purpose for Udayana's proper inquiry. That is, the statement does not prove the existence of *this particular* God which Udayana seeks to establish, nor does it anticipate a later proper proof, nor does it, lastly, defend the Īśvara doctrine against any particular objection. It is an obscure statement which, among other things, appears to claim that the irreligious Cārvākas/Lokāyatas do worship God, or that the Buddhists' reverence of the omniscient one (i.e., the Buddha) is, as implied, *in principle*

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[6]   Lit. 'which belongs to what is called reflection' (*manana-vyapadeśa-bhāj*), or 'which partakes of the designation of reflection', as CHEMPARATHY 1972: 34 renders it.

[7]   Lit. 'heard of' (*śruta*).

[8]   This is a quotation from BĀU, see below.

[9]   See YBh ad *Yoga-sūtra* 1.48.

[10]   See NKus 29,1–40,2.

[11]   For George Chemparathy, this statement is in fact of the nature of a proof for the existence of Īśvara, one which the scholar considers to be 'a historic or ethnological proof' (CHEMPARATHY 1972: 81). The major problem with this kind of proofs for the existence of God is that at best – through the admission of fuzzy evidence and the leaving out of contradictory evidence – they establish the ubiquitousness of religious worldview *from which*, then, a jump is made to an illegitimate conclusion about the existence of God ('if we all say it is so, then it must be so'). This God is necessarily nameless, agenda-less, and so on, since *different* theist parties are free to employ the very same argument (which speaks volumes of the theological value of such proofs, let alone of their probative value).

the same as the Śaivas' reverence of Śiva. Taken at its face value, the statement lumps non-theists and atheists with theists in some radical version of 'we all really pray to the same God',[12] which surely lays Udayana open to a formidable attack already at the outset. In my view, the statement ought not to be read literally, that is, as genuinely positing that God is worshipped by all. Rather, the statement serves as a mockery of Udayana's adversaries designed to please, or even amuse, the author's allies.

It is understandable that an ardent theist[13] might want to cloak a logical inquiry into the existence of God in the robes of a display of devotion. And although Udayana need not conceal the rational character of his approach – as he seeks, after all, to *dispel criticism of theism* on logical grounds – he nonetheless gladly induces a particular delight in the theist auditor/reader. First of all, he invokes the Upaniṣadic tripartite process of scriptural study – hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflecting upon (*manana*), and meditating (*nididhyāsana*)[14] – and identifies the logical inquiry, which the NKus verily consists in, with said reflecting upon. The entirety of the treatise – and not just the occasional prayers – is, then, made into an act of worship. Second, Udayana says there is actually no reason for the undertaking of his investigation. He does not explicitly declare God's existence to be obvious. Instead, he suggests that doubt in God's existence is groundless, and – as Vardhamāna (14th cent.) remarks in his *Prakāśa* on the NKus (NKusP) – doubt (*sandeha=saṃśaya*) is one of the prerequisites of logical argumentation (*nyāya-pūrvâṅga*).[15] The

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[12] It is one thing to claim that some/all theists worship the same God and a whole different thing to announce unity of all truth-seekers – both godly and godless – under one God, especially if the godless ones rebel at the idea. Cf., however, the following brief take on Udayana's statement by PHILLIPS 1997: 69:

> [Udayana claims] that what *each and every individual faction* [emphasis mine – SJK] sees as the Supreme [...], is nothing other than the one God [...]. [C]oncerning classical Nyāya, [...] nowhere that I know of does Udayana or any Naiyāyika produce a theology that synthesizes – or even seriously attempts to synthesize – the diverse classical conceptions of a supreme being or transcendent reality. My impression is that a vague theological universalism was honored culturally, and that Udayana's apparent endorsement of it is mostly hand-waving.

  I confess that I do not understand what '*mostly* hand-waving' (emphasis mine) amounts to, that is, whether Udayana – per Phillips' understanding – does genuinely make this baffling (because it includes non-theists and atheists) claim that God is universally worshipped, or does not (in which case *nothing* about the point made by Udayana is being spoken of here).

[13] And Udayana most certainly is one. On several occasions in the NKus he expresses, in inspired words, his faith in and adoration for God. See CHEMPARATHY 1972: 29–30.

[14] See BĀU 2.4.5: *ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyo maitreyi |* – 'O Maitreyī, verily the Self is to be recognized: It is to be heard, It is to be reflected upon, It is to be meditated upon.'

[15] NKusP 14,15: *sandeha eva nyāya-pūrvâṅgaṃ kutaḥ |*

point is not that there is no doubt (because, clearly, there is some), but that it
is preposterous that it is there, as it *should not* be since everyone 'worships'
God. A strong indication that this is not to be read literally is found in the other
claim by Udayana, viz., that God's authority is 'well-established across all
of the world'. This claim is undeniably a mockery, which is signalled by the
consciously employed fallacious example of *jāti*, *gotra*, *pravara*, *caraṇa*, and
kula-dharma. These are all elements of the age-old social order the heterodox
traditions of Veda-deniers and home-forsakers opposed, and which they
ultimately failed to dismantle. In the times of Udayana, Brahmins, once facing
the dread of extinction, had long begun taking India back. The current was
certainly favourable, but the social order referred to here was by no means
'well-established across all of the world'. This passage bears the marks of
ridicule, and suggests that the entire fragment adopts this very tone.

How are we, then, to read the statement of universal worship? A proposition
that immediately comes to mind is that what is worshipped is simply that which
is regarded in a particular worldview as supreme. In a theist tradition this is
God, whereas in non-theist and atheist traditions this could be, for instance, the
person of the founder or another teacher, or a teaching, a dogma, and so on.[16]
But if this were the case, Udayana could not connect this kind of argument to
the question of reasonableness of doubt in the existence of God. Also, why
refer to the object of worship of, e.g., the Sāṃkhyas obscurely as 'the perfected
first knower', and not simply as Kapila?[17] Why refer to the god of the Śaivas
as Śiva, but to the god of the Vaiṣṇavas as *puruṣôttama*, 'the Supreme Person',
and not simply as Viṣṇu?

In my view, these references are necessarily obscure, otherwise Udayana
could not make his point. The key to grasping the statement of universal worship
lies in the designation of the Naiyāyika God as *yāvad-uktôpapanna*, 'endowed
with what has been mentioned thus far'. This designation is puzzling, to be
sure. Varadarāja Miśra (mid-12th cent.), the author of the *Bodhanī* (NKusB),
a lengthy elaboration on the first three chapters of the NKus, puts forward two
possible interpretations:[18]

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[16] This is how BRONKHORST 1983 understands the statement of universal worship. He writes
(p. 160): 'Udayana's point is clearly this, that everyone has something, or someone, whom he
considers highest and to be worshiped.'

[17] That *ādi-vidvān siddha* designates Kapila has been hinted by KAVIRAJ 1923: 173, and decisively
shown by WEZLER 1969–1970.

[18] NKusB 17,9–18,4: *yāvad-uktôpapanno mayā yāni viśeṣaṇāny uktāni teṣu yāvad upapannaṃ
tenôpapannaḥ | yad vā, yāvad-uktena yathā-śrutena na tu vyākhyātenôpapannaḥ.*

yāvad-uktôpapannaḥ means either 'with regard to the characteristics (*viśeṣaṇa*) which have been mentioned by me [i.e., Udayana], so long as [a particular characteristic] is fit (*upapanna*) [to describe God], with that [characteristic He] is endowed (*upapanna*)', or 'endowed with *yāvad-ukta*, i.e., with what is handed down in the Śruti, and not endowed with [those characteristics] which have been named [here by me]'.

The putting forward of those two interpretations betrays Varadarāja's uncertainty with regard to the meaning of Udayana's words. According to Varadarāja's first interpretation, Udayana is playing with two of the many meanings of the participle *upapanna*, i.e., 'endowed with, or possessed of', and 'fit, or tenable'. The second interpretation is self-explanatory. Both are certainly farfetched propositions, attempts to escape the problem of the theologically challenging, so to speak, ascribing of all of the mentioned characteristics to the same God.[19] The fact that the *yāvad-uktôpapanna...* passage occupies the final position (the passage on the artisans is merely an additional witty remark) in this list suggests a literal reading of *yāvad-ukta*°.

The statement of universal worship is, thus, substantially different from a universalist 'we all really pray to the same God' declaration. Every mentioned tradition other than Udayana's worships a particular quality which belongs to Udayana's God. For instance, the Buddhists worship 'the omniscient one'. For the Buddhists, the quality of omniscience belongs to the Buddha. For Udayana, it belongs to his God.[20] The Vaiṣṇavas worship the Supreme Person. For the Vaiṣṇavas, this is Viṣṇu. For Udayana, this is his God. And so on. It is not surprising that *the only object of worship mentioned explicitly* is Śiva, because this is the deity to which the author himself is devoted.

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[19] The *yāvad-uktôpapanna...* passage proved troublesome also to some of the translators of the text. Cowell 1864: 3 renders the passage as follows: 'the followers of the Nyāya as Him who is all that is said worthy of Him', Tirtha 1946: 2 translates: 'the Logicians as he who will be established by what is set forth (in this work)', and Potter 1977: 558 in his summary of chapters 1–4 has: 'the Naiyāyikas as He who is about to be spoken of here'. Closer to the meaning of the Sanskrit text, but at the same time cautiously vague, is the translation by Chemparathy 1972: 82: 'the Naiyāyikas as one endowed with all (those attributes) that have been ascribed (to him)'. Kaviraj 1923: 166, clearly following Varadarāja's lead, renders the passage as follows: 'the Naiyāyikas as the Being who is endowed with all the attributes (among those mentioned above) which befit Him'. In his very free (and aimed at the popular reader) translation, Dravid 1996: 4 renders the passage in a similar fashion: 'if he is a Nyāya scholar he thinks of God as a Being who is endowed with only those of the above-mentioned attributes which can be rationally ascribed to Him'. Also, it should be noted that in his commentary on the various attributes enumerated by Udayana, Kaviraj fails to elaborate on the meaning of *yāvad-uktôpapanna*. This passage, as well as *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ*, is regrettably passed over by Kaviraj in silence.

[20] What the quality of omniscience actually entails in Buddhism is irrelevant for the argument.

The inclusion of non-theists and atheists in the statement of universal worship is no longer problematic. What, then, does Udayana actually mean by 'worshipping' (*upa-√ās*)?

All of the mentioned traditions come together under a common denominator in the *kam api puruṣârtham arthayamānāḥ* passage, which I render as 'striving to obtain a particular aim of human life'. The classical Indian concept of *puruṣârtha* distinguishes four aims of human life, or better: four objects the pursuit of which is beneficial to human existence. These four are wealth (*artha*), pleasure (*kāma*), righteousness (*dharma*), and liberation (*mokṣa*). Now, should the Śaivas' worship of Śiva be *principally the same* as 'worship' of *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* (whatever that is) by the irreligious Cārvākas/ Lokāyatas, then worship per se, tied to a shared strive for *puruṣârtha*, is reduced to pragmatism. Surely, this is not what Udayana wishes to convey. It is rather, that in the eyes of Udayana, atheists and non-theists *have to* resort to what is referred to as worship in order to pursue the obtainment of their goals.[21]

To my understanding, by way of making all of the traditions draw from the pool of godly attributes, Udayana suggests that they operate, intentionally or not, within the realm of belief, i.e., of taking certain things on faith, or appealing to the suprarational. In this way, his argument is similar to some theists' well-known method of throwing an atheist off guard by declaring the latter a believer in disbelief. The intention of such a declaration is to push the claims of a 'self-proclaimed anti-irrationalist' beyond the realm of the rational, and to argue that a definitive rejection of God's existence requires the same thing atheists demand from theists, i.e., evidence.[22] It is, thus, unreasonable for the Buddhists or the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas to *doubt* the existence of God, because, per Udayana's argument, they nonetheless *accept the suprarational*.

All things considered, the *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ* passage ought not to be abstracted from the broader context. It belongs to a fragment

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[21]   Kaviraj 1923: 168 puts forward another interpretation: 'What [Udayana] means to say is that whatever fruit a man may desire comes really from God, so that in whatever form he may worship, the giver of his fruit is verily God Himself. It is immaterial whether the worshipper consciously resorts to Him or is even theoretically opposed to His existence, but, the fact is that it is God, and God alone, so Udayana thinks, who responds to the prayer.' This interpretation is, in my opinion, significantly problematic. The obvious response from the adversary is this: 'if God is to grant me *mokṣa* irrespective of my beliefs and doings, why not remain, say, a Cārvāka?' Worship becomes meaningless.

[22]   This is how the employers of this argument see it. For the atheist, the rejection of God's existence comes down to a refusal to accept something for which one cannot present any rational proof.

designed to deride Udayana's adversaries, and the choice to indirectly refer to the (alleged) objects of worship is consciously made. *Loka-vyavahāra-siddha* might not, thus, constitute a qualification which *best* describes whatever it is that Udayana alludes to as the object of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 'worship', just like, for instance, *sarvajña* is not *the most important* characteristic of the Buddha. This surely comes to further complicate the search for the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 'God'. On the other hand, if the above interpretation holds true, we may now expect *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* to be a passable description of God – even though it may seem a rather problematic qualification[23] – and to be something to be 'worshipped' in the above-explained sense.

2. On Varadarāja Miśra's propositions

As mentioned earlier, two interpretations of the *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ* passage are found in the commentarial literature. According to one, it is a king who is established by common usage. According to the other, it is an idol. Both propositions are offered as *alternatives* by Varadarāja:[24]

> '(The) established by common usage' = either the visible (*dṛśyamāna*, 'being now seen') king and the like, or an idol in a four-armed or other form.

BHATTACHARYA 2009: 159–160 mentions six other commentators, posterior to Varadarāja, who either reproduce both alternatives, or follow the second one.[25]

Varadarāja's weighing in of two possible readings proves his uncertainty. Bhattacharya's understanding is that the commentator is simply not sure of Udayana's intention, which is why he produces two propositions he regards as 'equally appropriate to the context and/or equally logical' (BHATTACHARYA 2009: 160). But in my opinion, the uncertainty pertains in the first place to a different issue. To explain, what is clear in Varadarāja's dilemma, is that he seeks to identify *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* with something that the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas can connect with *without making them turn their thoughts to*

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[23]   It certainly proved as such to Kaviraj, as the *loka-vyavahāra-siddha*... passage is swapped in his translation with the *yāvad-uktôpapanna*... passage, so that *yāvad-ukta°* does not at any rate include this particular qualification. KAVIRAJ 1923: 166: '[...] the Naiyāyikas as the Being who is endowed with all the attributes (among those mentioned above) which befit Him, the Chārvākas as One whose authority is established by the convention of the world [...].' Dravid does the same thing, presumably following Kaviraj's lead. Clearly, for Kaviraj it does not 'befit' God. This switching of places, however, cannot be justified.

[24]   NKusB 17,9: *loka-vyavahāra-siddho rājādir dṛśyamānaś catur-bhujâdi-rūpā pratimā vā |*

[25]   The earlier-mentioned Vardhamāna belongs to the latter group (see NKusP 17,13: *lokêti yathā loke vyavahriyate catur-bhujâdy-upeta-dehavān na tv adṛśya ity arthaḥ |*).

something suprasensual. So what can a Cārvāka/Lokāyata worship, *in some way*, that is perceptible? A king, surely. The highest authority on this earth is the highest authority in all of existence, because this earth is the sum of all existence. So why consider this wild possibility that Udayana ascribes religious practice to the members of an unequivocally irreligious school, claiming they worship idols? In my view, this is because Varadarāja is not only unsure as to what *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* designates, but he struggles with the interpretation of the meaning of worship in Udayana's statement.

The king interpretation is, obviously, the more sensible interpretation. But for this interpretation to work, Udayana needs to refer to *any kind of worship*. And if that is the case, then why bring up the issue of doubt in the existence of God? Is it, then, religious worship? If so, why bring the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas into the argument? The idol interpretation seems to me a desperate way to fit the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas into the thus understood statement of universal worship.

For the evaluation of those two propositions it is a crucial observation, because the strength of each of these propositions is now not only diminished by the fact they are presented as alternatives, but also by a greater uncertainty. Simply speaking, Varadarāja is not sure of either the meaning or the context.

We can safely discard the idol interpretation. The fact that some of the other commentators have *favoured* this proposition is truly flabbergasting and it bears witness to just how misconceived the 'mysterious' school of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas might have been to (some of) the later authors.[26] The trouble with the king interpretation, in turn, is that *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* can hardly describe a king.

Loka-vyavahāra (*loka°*, 'common, worldly, ordinary, etc.' + *°vyavahāra*, 'usage, convention, practical activity, transaction, etc.') is a commonly encountered term used in a variety of authors and contexts. For instance, in discussions on the use of language, it denotes 'ordinary transactions' pertaining to the meaning in which words are used, or ordinary language,[27] whereas in the Mādhyamika Buddhist literature, *loka-vyavahāra-satya* equals *saṃvṛti-satya*, 'conventional truth'.[28] The term denotes general 'truths' of the everyday world, everyday practices, certain agreements among people, and so on. Arnold 2005:

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[26] Or perhaps the commentators simply preferred not to confess to uncertainty/ignorance, and instead gave a dubious, or even nonsensical, answer to the problem, *but still an answer*.

[27] Cf., e.g., Katsura 2011: 131.

[28] Cf., e.g., Garfield 2015: 57–58.

416–417 remarks: 'the term also has an eminently mercantile connotation that I think is nicely captured by "business as usual"'. Now, kingship is hardly a matter of everyday practice, and a king does not become one customarily,[29] nor is he proven to exist based on a common agreement that he is real, or that kings in general are real. Should he be spoken of as real *in contrast to God*, who – in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata – is not real, would he not be established as existent simply by means of perception?

The king interpretation *seems at first* to be supported by a fragment from Mādhava's (14th cent.) famous doxographic work, the *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha* (SDS), which contains a well-known presentation of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata tradition acknowledged as a comprehensive system of thought (*darśana*).[30] Mādhava says:[31]

> From this it follows that [in the Cārvāka/Lokāyata] the only hell is [earthly] suffering, [which is] caused by thorns and such; the Supreme Lord (*paramêśvara*) is the world-established (*loka-siddha*) king; [and] liberation is the annihilation of the body.

Dealing briefly with the *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ* passage, BRONKHORST 1983: 160 follows the king interpretation, and, elaborating on the issue, he refers to the above fragment from Mādhava. I shall argue that Mādhava's words ought not to be read as validating the king interpretation. Rather, as I wish to suggest, Mādhava (assuming that he is the author of the

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[29] Even in the Ganges River Valley oligarchies of mid-first millennium BCE an elected king could hardly have been spoken of as established by a *common* agreement, i.e., an agreement of *loka*, people in general.

[30] The presentation makes up the first chapter of the SDS. It is an evidence of limited reliability. Mādhava openly ridicules the subject of his exposition, produces no Cārvāka/Lokāyata names or titles of works, and offers a rather simplistic review of selected positions. It is, however, possible that this presentation simply reflects the notion of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata prevalent in Mādhava's times (suffice to say, composing as late as in the 14th cent., Mādhava finds himself reconstructing, in a way, the school of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas, and in doing so he inexorably relies on others' testimonies). Although it should be noted that in the *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā* (TRD) on Haribhadra's (8th cent.) *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya* (ṢDS), Mādhava's semi-contemporary Guṇaratna shows significantly less moderation, to put it mildly, in his treatment of this subject, for instance, when he ascribes a *fais-ce-que-tu-voudras* life philosophy to the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas by making some truly preposterous references to various carnal practices, some of them illicit, other undertaken on a particular day of the year (see TRD 451,2–3).

[31] SDS 6,1–2: *ata eva kaṇṭakâdi-janyaṃ duḥkham eva narakaḥ | loka-siddho rājā paramêśvaraḥ | dehôcchedo mokṣaḥ |* Cf. also Mādhava's versification of this statement given a little further into the text (SDS 6,6–7,2):
> *kaṇṭakâdi-vyathā-janyaṃ duḥkhaṃ niraya ucyate ||*
> *loka-siddho bhaved rājā pareśo nâparaḥ smṛtaḥ |*
> *dehasya nāśo muktis tu na jñānān muktir iṣyate ||*

above-quoted statement and he does not in fact draw here from another text) paraphrases Udayana and the king interpretation.[32]

The Cārvākas/Lokāyatas do not admit the existence of other-worldly and suprasensual entities. According to Mādhava, should they make use of such terms as 'hell', 'God', or 'liberation' – which regularly signify or relate to other-worldly and transcendent entities constructed in other traditions – the only designations of those could be this-worldly and perceptible entities. And so the sole candidate for the referent of *paramêśvara* is the king, holding power over all of this-worldly entities. But if all of those mentioned entities – suffering, the king, death of the body – are this-worldly entities, and the whole point of this fragment is to highlight this rejection of the intangible, why would Mādhava indicate this-worldliness explicitly only in the case of the king? *Loka-siddha* is a redundant qualification. And all this assumes that *loka-siddha* more or less conveys the meaning of this-worldliness and perceptibility. I render the tat-puruṣa as neutrally as possible, i.e., 'world-established' (Bronkhorst: 'established in the world'), but the compound generally carries such meanings as 'commonly accepted', or 'generally established', and in some contexts it is used in the meaning of 'pre-existent in the world'. Now, confer Cowell and Gough's attempt to make good sense of the compound in their translation of *loka-siddho rājā paramêśvaraḥ* as '[s]upreme is the earthly monarch whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight' (COWELL and GOUGH 1882: 4). Why, of all of those three entities mentioned, i.e., suffering, the king, and the death of the body, would a king need to be spoken of as *admitted to actually exist*?

The only explanation for the describing of *rājan* as *loka-siddha* that seems plausible to me is that Mādhava, collecting the bits and pieces on the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas for the sake of his doxographic presentation, drew from the passage from the NKus, which, read literally, claims that the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas worship *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* as their 'supreme being', and according to some of the commentaries, this is likely the person of the king. The fact that the middle member of the compound *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* is elided here does not speak against the proposition that Mādhava draws from Udayana. The elision might be made in an attempt to make better sense of the king interpretation (as explained, a king is hardly *loka-vyavahāra-siddha*).

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[32] Given the import of Udayana's treatise on Indian philosophy, it is hardly surprising that Mādhava, another eminent Indian thinker, knows it and comes under its influence. The NKus is quoted verbatim on a few occasions in the SDS (see, e.g., SDS 17,1; 20,7–8), and several times in his work Mādhava mentions explicitly the NKus and/or Udayana (see, e.g., SDS 254,9–10; 278,4), whom at one point he declares to be an Ācārya of glory, or fame (*kīrti*), known to all (SDS 235,8–9: *viśva-vikhyāta-kīrtir udayanâcāryo…*).

The result, *loka-siddha*, nonetheless remains an unfortunate qualification. The wording of this fragment as I see it – bizarre and needlessly troublesome – is not coincidental.

On a side note, of Varadarāja's two propositions, the idol interpretation is the only one that can be argued to work on the semantic level. An idol is indeed something *agreed on* as a representation of a particular deity. Without this particular usage, it is only an ordinary object devoid of religious significance.

3. On Ramkrishna Bhattacharya's proposition

The propositions by Udayana's commentators are dismissed by BHATTACHARYA 2009: 159–161. In an attempt to elucidate the *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ* passage, the scholar first evokes the distinction between two types of logical reason (*hetu*) – commonly well-established (*loka-prasiddha*) and established in treatises (*tantra-siddha*) – spoken of by Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa (ca. 800), as recorded in the *Syād-vāda-ratnâkāra* (SVR) of Vādideva Sūri (12th cent.). Udbhaṭa Bhaṭṭa was an ingenious author with suspected ties both to the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas and to Nyāya. He was likely also a grammarian and is, perhaps, identical to a drama scholar by the same name. In connection to the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas, Udbhaṭa is mentioned by name in one other text, the *Nyāya-mañjarī-granthi-bhaṅga* (NMGBh) of Cakradhara (ca. 11th cent.), being a commentary on the *Nyāya-mañjarī* of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (ca. 9th cent.), who, according to Cakradhara, refers to Udbhaṭa implicitly on several occasions.[33]

The passage from the SVR, which Bhattacharya quotes in an abridged form, records Udbhaṭa's original interpretation of the famous aphorism by the Cārvāka/Lokāyata Purandara on the secondariness of inference. The (unabridged) passage is as follows:[34]

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[33] On Udbhaṭa(s) see in particular SOLOMON 1977–1978, BRONKHORST 2008; see also BRONNER 2016. For Udbhaṭa's reinterpretations of Cārvāka/Lokāyata aphorisms, see NMGBh 43,5–9 and 197,6–7, SVR 1087,1–3.

[34] SVR 265,19–266,8: *yat tu* (I leave *yat tu* untranslated) *tenaîva parama-lokāyataṃ-manyena loka-vyavahāraîka-pakṣa-pātinā loka-prasiddha-dhūmâdy-anumānāni puras-kṛtya śāstrīya-svargâdi-sādhakânumānāni nirācikīrṣatā pramāṇasyâgauṇatvād* (Ed.: *pramāṇasya gauṇatvād*) *anumānād artha-niścayo durlabha iti paurandaraṃ sūtraṃ pūrvâcārya-vyākhyāna-tiras-kāreṇa vyākhyānayatêdam abhihitam | hetoḥ svasâdhya-niyama-grahaṇe prakāra-trayam iṣṭaṃ darśanābhyām aviśiṣṭâbhyāṃ darśanena viśiṣṭânupalabdhi-sahitena bhūyo-darśana-pravṛttyā ca loka-vyavahāra-patitayā | tatrâdyena grahaṇôpāyena ye hetor gamakatvam icchanti tān pratîdaṃ sūtram | loka-prasiddheṣv api hetuṣu vyabhicârâdarśanam asti tantra-siddheṣv api tena vyabhicârâdarśana-lakṣaṇa-guṇa-sādharmyatas tantra-siddha-hetūnāṃ tathā-bhāvo vyavasthāpyata iti gauṇatvam anumānasya | avyabhicārâvagamo*

This same [Udbhaṭa], who fancies himself a superior Lokāyata [and] who favours common usage (*loka-vyavahāra*)[35], accepts inferences from smoke and other commonly well-established [logical reasons[36] and] wishes to repudiate inferences taught in treatises, which (the inferences) establish heaven and such things. [He] sets aside the earlier teachers' (*pūrvâcārya*) elaboration on Purandara's aphorism: 'Ascertainment of an object by means of inference is impossible (*durlabha*, lit. 'hard to obtain'), because a means of valid cognition is not secondary', and elaborating [on it in a new way, he] says: 'In the grasping of invariable concomitance (*niyama* = *vyāpti*) between logical reason and its [property] to be proved (*sādhya*), three modes are admitted: (1) by two unqualified perceptions, (2) by a perception together with a qualified non-apprehension, and (3) through the process of repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*), which falls under common usage (*loka-vyavahāra*).[37] This aphorism [of Purandara] is directed against those who admit logical reason as indicative (*gamaka*)[38] based on the first of those modes of grasping. Deviation (*vyabhicāra*) is not observed even with regard to commonly established logical reasons (*loka-prasiddho hetu*), therefore [it is not observed] also with regard to logical reasons established in treatises (*tantra-siddha-hetu*), [and] based on [the fact that] they share the quality which consists in non-observation of deviation, it is established that logical reasons established in treatises are of this nature (i.e., are indicative). This is why inference is secondary. For comprehension of non-deviation in the case of common logical reasons (*laukika-hetu*) is instrumental (*nimitta*) in [the obtaining of] comprehension of the inferred, [but] it is not [so] in the case of logical reasons established in treatises. Thus, comprehension of objects which are not directly cognized by the senses (*parokṣârtha*)

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hi laukika-hetūnām anumeyâvagame nimittaṃ sa nâsti tantra-siddheṣv iti na tebhyaḥ parokṣârthâvagamo nyāyo 'ta idam uktam anumānād artha-niścayo durlabha itîti |

[35] *Loka-vyavahāraîka-pakṣa-pātin*, lit. 'falling (*pātin*) to the side of an argument (*eka-pakṣa*) [which admits] common usage'.

[36] Solomon reads *loka-prasiddha°* as qualifying °*anumānāni*: 'keeping in view the well-known popular inferences from smoke, etc.' (Solomon 1977–1978: 986), which is by no means an incorrect interpretation, cf. *loka-prasiddham anumānaṃ* in the fragment from Purandara quoted in the *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā* (see below). To my understanding, an inference from a logical reason which is commonly established is exactly this, i.e., a 'commonly well-established' inference.

[37] In other words, the process of repeated observation is classifiable as common usage. Cf., however, Solomon 1977–1978: 986: 'and by the process of repeated perception as found in worldly behaviour'.

[38] I.e., indicative of the property to be proved, in other words, one that does lead to the comprehension of the property to be proved.

is not proper, for which reason [Purandara] says [that] ascertainment of an object by means of inference is impossible.'

In his paper, Bhattacharya also quotes a passage from Purandara which has survived in the *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā* (TSP) of Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795), being a commentary on Śāntarakṣita's (ca. 725–788) *Tattva-saṅgraha*.[39] Kamalaśīla says:[40]

> Purandara said: 'Commonly well-established inference (*loka-prasiddham anumāna*) is accepted by the Cārvākas as well. However, rejected [by us] is that [kind of] inference which is declared [to be a means of valid cognition] by some [thinkers] who have transgressed the worldly path (*laukiko mārga*).'

The transgression of the worldly path is to be understood as recourse to inferences which establish the existence of imperceptible objects such as heaven or soul. Both Purandara and Udbhaṭa juxtapose the empirical (inferences which deal with perceptible objects, and thus allow their results to be verified by perception) with the purely theoretical (inferences 'established in treatises', i.e., operating within the realm of philosophical speculation which escapes empirical confirmation). The various interpretations of Purandara's aphorism, or the so-called *Paurandara-sūtra*, have been dealt with by FRANCO 1991. I shall at this point refer only to the scholar's conclusions to his own proposition, which is based on both the aphorism and the passage quoted by Kamalaśīla. FRANCO 1991: 159 writes:

> [T]he *sūtra*'s aim is not to discard inference altogether, but to limit its scope to worldly affairs. By denying inference an independent status, that is, by emphasizing its dependence (*gauṇa*) on perception, Purandara wanted to restrict the field of operation (*viṣaya*) of inference to that of perceptible objects. This is probably the most significant contribution of Purandara to the Lokāyata (at least it is the one for which he is remembered) [...].

Based on the above-quoted two fragments from Udbhaṭa and Purandara, BHATTACHARYA 2009: 160 remarks that *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* 'is a term used to distinguish between two kinds of probanses'. But in neither of the fragments produced by Bhattacharya does the compound *loka-vyavahāra-*

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[39] The passage from Purandara, which is a prose one, is quoted in the commentary on verses 1481–82 of the *Tattva-saṅgraha* (Chapter 18. *Anumāna-parīkṣā*, or 'Examination of Inference').

[40] TSP 431,26–27: *purandaras tv* (I leave *tv* untranslated) *āha | loka-prasiddham anumānaṃ cārvākair apîṣyata eva | yat tu kaiścil laukikaṃ mārgam atikramyânumānam ucyate tan niṣidhyata iti |*

siddha actually appear. Perhaps, the scholar actually has *loka-vyavahāra* in mind.[41] Ultimately, Bhattacharya proposes to translate *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* as 'what is established in worldly practice, i.e., perceptible and hence followed by all in actual life'. However, he does not specify who or what the intended referent in the passage from Udayana is. In his view, the Cārvāka/Lokāyata 'God' in Udayana is 'their insistence on perception: whatever is not and cannot be perceived in this world is rejected by them' (Bhattacharya 2009: 161).

Aside from the *loka-vyavahāra-siddha iti cārvākāḥ* passage, the NKus is not consulted by Bhattacharya. Instead, in an attempt to elucidate the meaning of *loka-vyavahāra-siddha*, the scholar elects to reference two popular maxims: 'The worldly path should be followed' (*laukiko mārgo 'nusartavyaḥ*), and 'With respect to common usage, an ignorant and a scholar are the same' (*loka-vyavahāraṃ prati sadṛśau bāla-paṇḍitau*).[42] Both maxims are found in the opening passages of the *Tattvôpaplava-siṃha* (TUS) of Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa (fl. ca. 800).[43] They are accepted as Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragments by Namai 1996: 9, who takes the two sentences to be a single verse. Franco, however, argues that the second of the maxims recorded by Jayarāśi is not a Cārvāka/Lokāyata fragment, as it is also quoted twice in the *Vyomavatī* by the Vaiśeṣika Vyomaśiva, and never in a Cārvāka/Lokāyata context.[44] Bhattacharya does refer to these remarks by Franco. Said remarks and the fact that Bhattacharya does not acknowledge Jayarāśi as a Cārvāka/Lokāyata do not stop the Indian scholar from elucidating his proposition through the lens of, i.a., indeed *popular* maxims.

On the contrary, Bhattacharya removes *loka-vyavahāra* from the religio-philosophical plane by reducing it to a certain general commonsensical approach *universally* followed regardless of one's worldview, as it constitutes the foundation of everyday activity (for instance, even if one considers food to be ultimately unreal, one still has to eat).[45] An example of this kind of common everyday practice is found by Bhattacharya in the Buddhist conventional truth (*saṃvṛti-satya*, sometimes referred to as *loka-vyavahāra-satya*). The

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[41] In a different paper, included in the same 2009 collection of essays, Bhattacharya confuses *loka-vyavahāra* with *loka-vyavahāra-siddha*, claiming first, that the former has been interpreted by Udayana's commentators as referring to either a king, or an idol, and second, that common usage 'suits the context better' (Bhattacharya 2009: 151).

[42] Bhattacharya 2009: 160–161.

[43] TUS 68,4–8: *uktaṃ ca paramārtha-vidbhir api laukiko mārgo 'nusartavyaḥ a. . . | loka-vyavahāraṃ prati sadṛśau bāla-paṇḍitau || ity-ādi |*

[44] See Franco 1994: 42–44, 299.

[45] See his remark given in a different article, 'Perception and Inference', included in the same collection of essays: 'Excepting the extreme idealists [...], all systems of philosophy in India accept the validity of the worldly way' (Bhattacharya 2009: 59).

idea of a provisional level of reality is, however, fundamentally different from the approach of an ontological realist, let alone from some practice which is common to both scholars and ignorants. My major problem with this proposition is that a supposedly *universally* followed approach does not relate to the distinction of two logical reasons in the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas. If anything, it only implies that the same things are *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* for all.[46]

Finally, Bhattacharya refers to Mādhava's *loka-siddho rājā paramêśvaraḥ* passage, proposing that it alludes to the same idea the two maxims refer to. The scholar argues that *loka-siddha* conveys in Mādhava that the king is existent because he is perceived, while the gods are non-existent because they are not perceived.[47] With this remark Bhattacharya nolens volens assigns plausibility to the king interpretation. And this begs two questions: why does Bhattacharya dismiss the king interpretation after all?, and why are *we* to dismiss it in favour of his problematic proposition?

4. Everyday inference as God

A major problem with our sources on the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas is their reliability. Adversaries of the universally denounced tradition of thought (may have) resorted to distortion, simplification, twisting, confusion, etc., of Cārvāka/Lokāyata positions. And given that some of the available source material is based on second-hand testimony, even a doxographer with the best of intentions may have simply misunderstood the discussed matter, or relied on dubious or plainly bogus sources. There is no certainty that Udayana possessed sufficient comprehension of Cārvāka/Lokāyata positions to be able to represent their views accurately. Thus, in the examining of the meaning of Udayana's passage we must first look into Udayana's account of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata. Based on other fragments from the NKus, I shall argue now that *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* in the discussed passage refers to the kind of inference which was accepted in (some representatives of) the school of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas as carrying out cognitive function without being a *pramāṇa*. Namely, this inference is the perceptually verifiable everyday inference referred to by Purandara as commonly well-established inference, or by Udbhaṭa as inference from commonly well-established logical reasons.

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[46]   On a different note, how does the notion of common usage referred to, i.a., by *a Vaiśeṣika author* shed light on the significance of common usage *in the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas* (especially given that this significance manifests itself in epistemological critique, as attested in the SVR)?

[47]   Again, are suffering and the death of the body not real?

As mentioned earlier, an interpretation of the meaning behind *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* in Udayana must meet two requirements to be at least compatible with my elaboration on the statement of universal worship. First, *loka-vyavahāra-siddha* must make some sense when used to refer to God, and second, the compound must denote an entity the acceptance of which makes the Cārvāka/Lokāyata appeal to the suprarational. In the NKus, Udayana evokes the term *loka-vyavahāra* in the context of the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas on two occasions: first, in a brief fragment which partly serves to mock the irreligious school, and then again in a fictitious exchange with a Cārvāka/Lokāyata adversary concerned with inference. One fragment confirms the meeting of one of the requirements, and the other confirms the meeting of the other one. I shall begin with the fragment from the discussion with the Cārvāka/Lokāyata adversary.

In a prose fragment preceding verse six of chapter three, Udayana's Cārvāka/Lokāyata adversary states a rule (*nyāya*) for the determining of the existence or non-existence of things:[48]

[The adversary:] 'What is not apprehended, that does not exist. The opposite (i.e., what is apprehended) exists. And [entities] such as God are not like that (i.e., are not apprehended). Therefore they do not exist. This alone [serves as] the rule [for the determining of existence or non-existence of things.] One may object that in this way inference and other [means of valid cognition except for perception][49] are destroyed. [But this is] not [an applicable objection, because for us] there is nothing wrong with that.[50] [Again,] one may object that common usage (*loka-vyavahāra*) is thus annihilated. [But it is] not [right], because it (i.e., common usage) is established based on assumption (*sambhāvanā*) alone, and because there is a false notion of cognitive validity based on agreement [of what was expected with what has been cognized].'

Udayana replies:[51]

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[48] NKus 334,2–6: *yan nôpalabhyate tan nâsti | viparītam asti | na cêśvarâdayas tathā | tato na santîty etad eva nyāyaḥ* (Ed.: *jyāyaḥ*) *| evam anumânâdi-vilopa iti cet | nêdam aniṣṭam | tathā ca loka-vyavahārôccheda iti cet | na sambhāvanā-mātreṇa tat-siddheḥ saṃvādena ca prāmāṇyâbhimānād iti |*

[49] The expression 'inference etc.' never includes perception. Literally, *anumânâdi* translates into 'beginning with inference', and in any enumeration of *pramāṇa*s perception comes first, followed by inference.

[50] *Nêdam aniṣṭam*, lit. 'this is not undesired'.

[51] NKus 334,9–335,3: *atrôcyate*
    dṛṣṭy-adṛṣṭyoḥ kva sandeho bhāvâbhava-viniścayāt |
    adṛṣṭi-bādhite hetau pratyakṣam api durlabham || 3.6 ||

To this [we] say:

3.6. When [a thing] is either observed or not observed, whence [could] doubt come from? [There can be none,] because [you posit] determination of existence and non-existence [of things merely based on their observation and non-observation. Furthermore,] even perception is [thus] impossible, because its cause is invalidated by non-observation.[52]

For assumption is nothing but [a form of] doubt.[53] And therefore, when there is [doubt in the form of assumption], there is usage. But where could this [doubt] itself come from? [In your system, there cannot be doubt in the form of assumption,] because upon observation [of an entity its] existence is ascertained, and upon non-observation [of an entity its] non-existence is determined. For instance, a wretched (*varāka*[54]) Cārvāka who has left [his] house would not return. Instead, he would cry, beating his chest, defeated by sorrow, because [not observing] his children, wife and property, he would have determined [that they] do not exist [anymore].

In the adversary's statement, what is meant by the destruction of inference and so on is that those means of valid cognition are denied cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*); and what is meant by the annihilation of common usage, is that it is rendered untenable. But for the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas common usage is not untenable. Inference grounded in common usage is of pragmatic value to us,

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sambhāvanā hi sandeha eva | tasmāc ca vyavahāras tasmin sati syāt | sa eva tu kutaḥ | darśana-daśāyāṃ bhāva-niścayāt | adarśana-daśāyām abhāvâvadhāraṇāt | tathā ca gṛhād bahir-gataś cārvāko varāko na nivarteta | praty uta putra-dāra-dhanâdy-abhāvâvadhāraṇāt sôras-tāḍaṃ śoka-viphalo vikrośet |

[52] The argument is that if we cannot observe our faculties of sight, hearing, etc., we should not see, hear, etc., because those faculties are, as per the absurd consequence, not there. Cf. Varadarāja's elaboration: 'Not only are inference and other [means of valid cognition impossible,] but so is perception. If its cause [in the shape of] the faculty of sight etc., is invalidated based on [its] mere non-apprehension, [then] there is no [perception-qua-]effect because there is no [faculty-qua-]cause. According to this argumentation, [perception] is impossible. Consequently, everything is annihilated.' (NKusB 334,23–24: *na kevalam anumānâdikam eva pratyakṣam api tad-dhetau cakṣur-ādāv anupalabdhi-mātreṇa bādhite kāraṇâbhāvāt kāryâbhāva iti nyāyena durlabham iti sarvôpaplava iti* |).

[53] Cf. Vardhamāna's gloss on *sambhāvanā[-mātreṇa]* in the fragment containing the objection by the adversary: '"Based on assumption [alone]" = based merely on [a form of] doubt in which one of the alternatives is superior.' (NKusP 334,27: *sambhāvanêti | utkaṭa-koṭika-saṃśaya-mātreṇêty arthaḥ* |).

[54] This is a very pejorative appellation. Udayana does not simply reveal the (alleged) absurdity of Cārvāka/Lokāyata positions, he openly displays his contempt for this particular strand of thought.

according to the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas, because while it is devoid of probative force, it nonetheless gives us *probable* knowledge. It is simply that we should not attribute cognitive validity to it based on positive empirical verifications of its results, because common usage is not a *logical ground* for inference.

This logical ground, i.e., *vyāpti*, or invariable concomitance of the logical reason with the property to be proved, is not accepted by the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas because it cannot be established. For instance, repeated observation (*bhūyo-darśana*) of the arising of smoke upon the arising of fire is not enough to prove that in every instance of the arising of smoke there must also be fire present. The possibility of deviation (*vyabhicāra*) can never really be eliminated. Now, in the fragment from Udbhaṭa preserved in the SVR, the final of the mentioned modes of ascertaining *vyāpti* is repeated observation which is here dubbed a mere form of common usage. For a Cārvāka/Lokāyata such common usage, i.e., a commonly shared experience-based agreement that, e.g., the presence of smoke is indicative of the presence of fire, is enough to enable the carrying out of everyday activities. That is, the repeated observation of smoke arising upon the arising of fire is enough that a person seeing smoke coming from their household should call their neighbours to aid them in putting out a fire, even though it is not *true knowledge* obtained through a *means of valid cognition*.

Favouring common usage, as the passage from the SVR tells us, Udbhaṭa accepts inference from commonly well-established (*loka-prasiddha*) logical reasons, while rejecting inferences from logical reasons which are established in treatises (*tantra-siddha*). Logical reasons of the former kind are those the invariable concomitance of which with the property to be proved is 'ascertained' through common usage. Smoke, indicative of fire, is one such logical reason. Logical reasons of the latter kind, in turn, are unverifiable by means of perception. As Vādideva says, those are logical reasons which are used to establish things like heaven.

To my understanding, in the statement of universal worship Udayana refers to the Cārvāka/Lokāyata acceptance of inference limited to worldly affairs and verifiable by perception, which (the acceptance) – although not strictly speaking rational – is dictated by pragmatic reasons. 'Established by common usage' is this 'commonly well-established' inference, referred to by Purandara, or inference from 'commonly well-established' logical reasons, referred to by Udbhaṭa. By reason of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata rejection of cognitive validity of inference, the employment of inference of any kind is not grounded in reason, but rather is justified merely by experience and common agreement. This is how inference established by common usage meets the requirement of suprarationality.

As for the earlier-mentioned second requirement, cf. the following passage from a prose fragment from chapter one:[55]

> Objection: '[A person] acts in this way (i.e., performs religious observance) for the sake of pleasure.'

> This is not [right], because it would undesirably follow (*prasaṅga*) that even the *nāstika*s would be acting in this way, like in the case of carnal enjoyment, because [it would] be established by common usage (*loka-vyavahāra-siddhatvāt*).

> Objection: '[A person] performs [religious observance] even if [it] is fruitless, because it is established by the Vedic usage, like in the case of the *sandhyā* worship.' [...]

The *nāstika*s, 'disbelievers', referred to here, are obviously the Cārvākas/ Lokāyatas, regularly accused of hedonism.[56] Again, Udayana resorts here to mockery of this irreligious school. The argument is that should religious observances be considered as bringing pleasure, just like physical union, then the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas would surely be religious people. Why? Because they follow common usage. *Loka-vyavahāra-siddhatva* is aptly juxtaposed with *veda-vyavahāra-siddhatva*: religious people would perform sacred rites because the scriptures tell them to do so. Similarly, God can be spoken of as *loka-vyavahāra-siddha*, as he is, after all, *commonly* admitted to exist. Perhaps there is a pun in this: should the Cārvākas/Lokāyatas, favouring common usage, not acknowledge Him if most people do?

Acknowledgements

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[55] NKus 98,3–5: *sukhârthaṃ tathā karotîti cet | na nāstikair api tathā-karaṇa-prasaṅgāt sambhoga-vat | loka-vyavahāra-siddhatvād | aphalam api kriyate veda-vyavahāra-siddhatvāt sandhyôpāsana-vad iti cet |*

[56] Cf., e.g., ŚDS 86d: *dharmaḥ kāmāt paro na hi ||*, TRD 460,1: *kāma eva paramo dharmaḥ*. See also TRD 451,2–3 referred to in an earlier footnote.

MW Monier-Williams, Monier 1899. *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. Etymologically and Philologically Arranged with Special Reference to Cognate Indo-European Languages.* Enlarged edition. Oxford: The Clarendon Press [reprinted: 2005, New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass].

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NKus Udayana: *Nyāya-kusumâñjali.* [In:] Upādhyāya, P. and Dh. Śāstrī, eds 1957. *The Nyāyakusumāñjali of Śrī Udayanāchārya with four commentaries – the Bodhinī* [spelling original – SJK]*, Prakāśa, Prakāśikā (Jalada) and Makaranda by Varadarāja, Vardhamāṇopādhyāya, Megha Thakkura and Ruchidaṭṭopādhyāya and notes by Śrī Dharmadatta (Bachchā Jhā).* Kashi Sanskrit Series 30. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office.

NKusB Varadarāja Miśra: *Bodhanī* on *Nyāya-kusumâñjali.* See NKus.

NKusP Vardhamāna: *Prakāśa* on *Nyāya-kusumâñjali.* See NKus.

NMGBh Cakradhara: *Nyāya-mañjarī-granthi-bhaṅga.* [In:] Shah, N. J., ed. 1972. *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga.* L. D. Series 35. Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology.

SDS Mādhava: *Sarva-darśana-saṅgraha.* [In:] Abhyankar, Vasudev Shastri, ed. 1978. *Sarvadarśanasaṅgrahaḥ* (third edition). Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute.

ṢDS Haribhadra: *Ṣaḍ-darśana-samuccaya.* [In:] Jain, M. K., ed. 1989. *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya of Haribhadra Sūri [With the Commentary Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā of Guṇaratna Sūri and Laghuvṛtti of Somatilaka Sūri and an Avacūrṇi]* (third edition). New Delhi: Bharatiya Jnanpith Publication.

SVR Vādideva Sūri: *Syād-vāda-ratnâkara.* [In:] Osvāl, M. L., ed. 1926–1930. *Śrīmadvādidevasūriviracitaḥ Pramāṇanayatattvā-lokālaṅkāraḥ: tadvyākhyā ca Syādvādaratnākaraḥ* (2 Vols.). Arhatamataprabhākara 4. Poona [reprinted: 1988, Delhi: Bharatiya Book Corporation].

TRD Guṇaratna: *Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā.* See ṢDS.

TSP Kamalaśīla: *Tattva-saṅgraha-pañjikā.* [In:] Krishnamacharya, E., ed. 1926. *Tattvasaṅgraha of Śāntarakṣita. With the Commentary of*

> *Kamalaśīla* (2 Vols.). Gaekwad's Oriental Series 30–31. Baroda: Oriental Institute [reprinted: 1984, 1988].

TUS   Jayarāśi Bhaṭṭa: *Tattvôpaplava-siṃha*. Critical edition of the first half in: Franco 1994.

YBh   Vyāsa: *Yoga-bhāṣya*. [In:] Āpṭe, H. N., ed. 1904. *Pātañjalayoga-sūtrāṇi*. Poona: Ananda Ashram Press.

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