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NO. 28

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Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures
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ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA
NO. 28

Professor Roman Sławiński
(1932–2014)

Contens

FIELD STUDY REPORT

Introduction

Dear Readers!

We are presenting you yet another, already the 28th, issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* devoted to the countries and culture of Asia. Over the years of its activity the journal started to be issued in English and it has hosted on its pages many eminent experts on Asia, yet still it remained faithful to its formula which was proposed thirty years ago by Professor Roman Sławiński, the founder of the journal and its permanent editor in chief. This formula stipulated that the Asian cultures should present themselves in the journal and talk directly with their own voice. The idea was both: to include in the group of authors and editors of the magazine scientists who grew up in Asian cultures, as well as to publish materials based on or referring to the texts – philosophical, linguistic, historical, sociological, religious studies or political studies – which were created by the Asian culture. These could be proper names as an object of linguistic research, religious texts, political documents, ideological declarations, but also biographical materials, historiographical elaborations, experience of meeting other cultures and mutual acculturation phenomenon resulting from the relations.

Professor Roman Sławiński left us in November 2014. The more time passes from his death, the more I feel his absence and the more I realize how unique a character he was in the world of research on China. Professor Marianne Bastid-Bruguière, a prominent French scholar from Institut de France in Paris, who met Roman Sławiński in the times of his studies in Beijing, writes about that fact. Most striking is the variety of interests and multidimensionality of research on China which he ran. He was trained as a linguist, and he knew perfectly well not only the classical language, but also many dialects. There was even a time it was appreciated by Mao Zedong himself. Roman Sławiński was interpreting a conversation of the Chinese leader with the Polish state authorities. During the conversation Mao Zedong changed as usual from the classical language to the dialect of Hunan province, which was his place of origin. When he realized he was using the dialect, he noticed that it was not a slightest problem for the interpreter to understand his statements. Then he asked: „Who is that young man who understands the Hunan dialect?" It was known that many Chinese from the surroundings of the Chairman did not understand him when he spoke in the native dialect. It so happened, that Roman Sławiński knew the dialect.

He was interested not only in the language. History, politics, culture as well as China's economy were the subject of his interest and research. His views, opinions and insights on these matters were the inspiration for many researchers of China, some of which are the authors of the materials contained in this issue. Of the many research interests of Professor Sławiński in recent years at least two may be mentioned. First one became Confucianism, especially its latest colours and shades. Professor persistently sought and discovered them in the texts of Chinese scientists, government documents, archives and everyday citizens of China. In this regard he was a dedicated explorer and a keen observer. Even the slightest detail was important to him. Minor personnel changes on the bureaucratic ladder were important for the formation

of general conclusions. From my conversations with him, I got the impression that he was rather skeptical about the possibility of a revival of Confucianism under the supervision of the communist authorities. So he concluded after examining many texts of the so-called new wave of Confucianism in China. His works on the latest Chinese historiography constitute an invaluable contribution to global research on contemporary China. His second passion was the research on the minorities of China Southern. The field research among the peoples of Miao and Tujia that he ran and in which I had the opportunity to participate assumed getting to know the nature of change in the cultural identity of these minorities in the era of globalization and accelerated socio-economic transformation in China. These studies had not been completed, and we can only hope that one of the students of Professor will continue them in the near future.

The arrangement of contents offered to you in the 28th issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* refers to the research passions of Professor Sławiński. The first article, written by Stanisław Tokarski – Indologist and long-time associate of Professor Sławiński, concerns dialogue between the East and the West and the possibility of mutual understanding and agreement. Understanding another culture is also the ability to read the symbols contained in the letters and that aspect of the intercultural dialogue interested Professor Sławiński in particular. The question of so-called Asian values – presented in the articles written by Adam Jelonek, Adam Raszewski, Artur Kościański and Larisa Zabrovskaia – was very close to Professor Sławiński and he dealt with it for many years as part of his research on the so-called new Confucianism. The issue of Chinese migration in the world was also in the interests of Professor – mainly in the context of global economic and social phenomena. This part of the research on China is presented in the article on the Chinese migration to France by Nicolas Levi. The issue of Chinese language was obviously important for Professor Sławiński as a linguist and he always welcomed in the columns of *Acta* the authors writing about language and linguistic issues. This area of research is presented in the current issue in the article on Chinese names written by Irena Kałużyńska. On the other hand, the artistic part of the culture is referred to in the articles by Izabella Łabędzka, Lidia Kasarełło, Ewa Chmielowska, Fu-sheng Shih and Diana Wolańska. The first three of these articles relate to Taiwan, where Professor conducted research for many years which resulted among others in a monograph *History of Taiwan*. The further three articles penned by Waldemar Dziak, Iwona Grabowska-Lipińska and Anna Mrozek-Dumanowska refer to the political sphere. Political sphere is inextricably linked with the ideology which was also the case of China. Confucianism and the new Confucianism emerged and developed in the shadow of the emperors, presidents and chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party. Researching them without the analysis of the political scene was not possible. The part of articles is closed by two texts unrelated with China, but with the Middle East. Their authors – Dorota Rudnicka-Kassem and Marcin Styszyński present materials based on the Middle Eastern sources and thus relate to the traditions of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*. The issue is closed by the report from field research in southern China by Professor Sławiński and me. For me it was a unique opportunity to get to know at least a little piece of China – a unique one, because my guide was Professor Sławiński – such a great scholar and such a seasoned expert on Asia.

I would like to thank the authors – students, colleagues and friends – for participation in the preparation of the issue, and the Directorate of the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the possibility to dedicate the anniversary issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* to Professor Sławiński.

Jerzy Zdanowski

ARTUR KOŚCIAŃSKI

Becoming Citizens: The Taiwanese Civil Society[1]

In Memory of My Teachers and Friends,
Karin Tomala and Roman M. Sławiński

Abstract

The paper rises the question, as to what extent civility/civil society in Taiwan (indigenous or implemented by the Republic of China) ties in with the aforementioned theoretical approaches, and what is the foundational myth of Taiwanese civil culture.

The pattern of being a citizen in Taiwan puts special emphasis on the moral (civil) responsibilities in situations of conflict and inside state-society relations. Civil socialization is the central feature of such pattern. This is because civil socialization principle, especialy from the perspective of traditional Chinese culture, may serve as an important signpost for individuals and groups who happen to be living in a democratic mass society.

Author emphasizes that Taiwanese civil society consists of both modern institutionalized forms of civil actions, realized by NGOs and/or local governments, and semi-civil actions that are realized outside the institutions through the resurrective networks of citizens whom share the same moral order and the same common 'public good'. Those resurrective networks emerge when causes of mobilization appear, and become hibernated when the common goal is reached or the mobilization causes have vanished.

Key words: Taiwanese civil society, modern Taiwan, non-for-profit organizations, democratic values in Taiwanese society

Introduction

Academic studies with regards to Taiwanese civil society are still a fashionable subject of scholarly interest. Usually researchers using the term "Taiwanese civil society" are referring to something identified as Taiwanese civility or citizenship. One may easily realize that they pay only slight attention to the phenomenon and that they may really have only a limited understanding of it.

If for example we bring popular knowledge to Taiwan's democratic development from a perspective of properly defined civility or citizenship; would we be ready to raise the

important question, whether we speak about the Taiwanese civility that emerged among local people during the historical process of culture development on the island, or of the Chinese citizenship which was established by the polity of the Republic of China (ROC) and later adopted by Taiwan? The answer to this question brings about many implications for discussion and studies on the civil values and practices utilized by Taiwanese society.

We should start our interpretations with a short presentation of the definition of modern (and democratic) citizenship which denotes the people's citizenship as a part of an institutionalized structure of public life, manifesting itself in certain norms and practices of a given community.

"The definition of citizenship (civil society), is constructed on the basis of all the major trends and theoretical propositions deriving from a rich and heterogeneous tradition, including contemporary ones, and is rather complicated and multidimensional. Its nature is structural-normative and it refers to at least twenty structural-residual attributes and cultural-social norms (civic skills and abilities) such as: location in the intermediate zone, between small primal groups such as the family, and great structures such as the state or Gramsci's political society; the horizontal networking of social bonds;[2] the freedom and independence of civil actors; the maturity of collective social identities; openness (in Popper's sense); the status of social acceptance; acceptance of democratic 'rules of the game' (democracy's basic functional principles); respect for the rule of law (with the exception of the institution of civil disobedience;[3] individual and group social activity; a high level of tolerance; negotiation and mediation skills (institutions), public debate; an economy based on effectiveness; ethical order (sense of social equity and dignity); civil virtues both indirect – the ability to achieve public gains by realizing private interests – and directly – involving all human virtues leading to the development of positive interpersonal relations and responsibility for the collective in which we function; a sense of having political representation; a sense of empowerment; a certain level of awareness or civil knowledge ('informedness'); a functioning of the principle of subsidiaries; a certain level of social capital (with generalized rules of reciprocity and social trust).[4]

Civil society is also a moral idea referring to the social conduct of individuals and groups, legitimizing their public presence, with participation in political decisions and self-organization in matters, which are important for them personally or for their social environment. This conceptualization of the presence of specific individuals and groups in society is the outcome of two immutable moral principles: the principle of individual sovereignty and the principle of individual empowerment.

Such ethical interpretations can be found in twentieth-century Polish sociological ideology. Andrzej Siciński conceptualized civil society as the most important sphere of an individual's or group's public actions chosen from a repertoire of values and behaviors available to democratic society at a given time.[5]

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[2] See A. Siciński, 'Społeczeństwo obywatelskie jako przedmiot badań społecznych w Polsce' [Civil Society as an Object of Social Research in Poland] in *Socjologia polityki w Polsce* [The Sociology of Politics in Poland], O. Sochacki (ed.), Gdańsk: Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1991.

[3] See R. Skrzypiec, *W poszukiwaniu sprawiedliwości. Obywatelskie nieposłuszeństwo. Filozofia i działanie* [In Search of Justice. Civil Disobedience. Philosophy and Action], Kraków: Wydawnictwo Zielone Brygady, 1999.

[4] P. Gliński, 'The Self-governing Republic in the Third Republic', *Polish Sociological Review*, No. 1, 2006, p. 433.

[5] See A. Siciński, *Styl życia, kultura, wybór* [Style of Life, Culture, Choice], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFIS PAN, 2002.

The repertory usually contains a catalogue of normative civil traits which, could serve as a foundation to an ethical project for models of citizenship. This catalogue could include such normative civil virtues as: open-mindedness (the ability to change one's opinions when confronted by the facts), criticism which inoculates against intoxication by persistently demanding explanations; intellectual integrity (as opposed to hypocrisy and all sorts of "self-deception"), self-discipline in the name of something, for example the realization of goals requiring prolonged effort; the ability to make choices, aesthetic sensitivity because it facilitates ethical culture (the choice between a moral and amoral act is often a matter of aesthetic sophistication), a sense of humor which makes it more difficult for dictatorships to take hold of society, and tolerance of other peoples needs and opinions. According to this catalogue, citizens are also obliged to think independently, improve their conditions of life, view civil courage as the basis of their actions, even at the price of jeopardizing one's interests or personal safety. Finally, citizens should possess a set of traits jointly covered by the umbrella term of "socialization" such as: the ability to overcome ones egocentricity and egoism with the ability to make sacrifices for the common good (a social service to which citizens in democratic systems should feel obliged), the ability to co-operate with other people on equal terms (forms of co-operation undertaken in order to dominate others, exploit them, showing no concern for other people's interests and the common good are out of the question.[6]

This catalogue puts special emphasis on the moral (civil) responsibilities in situations of conflict. Even in the face of antagonism and conflict, citizens should be chivalrous and know how to win and lose. Socialization is the central feature of such catalogues.[7] This is because the socialization principle may serve as an important signpost for individuals and groups who happen to be living in a democratic mass society.

We can raise the question, as to what extent civility/civil society in Taiwan (indigenous or implemented by the Republic of China) ties in with the aforementioned theoretical approaches, and what is the foundational myth of Taiwanese civil culture, and whether such a myth exists at all.

Historical background of the Taiwanese Civil Society

Western normative-structural models and moral self-regulating models of citizenship cannot fully reconstruct the whole practice of civil society that was adopted by Taiwan's social and political culture at the end of 20th century. It's easy to see that, following Chinese traditions of governance and institutionalized state practice, the earlier modernization of Chinese polity tended to link state and civil society as one.[8] Such a model did not differentiate between legality and publicity, and it resisted their relocation into single spheres of institutional life (state and civil [society] related areas). Perhaps such an institutional splitting up could only be possible when, at the very beginning of modernization, Chinese republican polity would develop itself

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[6] See M. Ossowska, 'Wzór obywatela w ustroju demokratycznym' [The Model of the Citizen in the Democratic System] in: idem, *O człowieku, moralności i nauce. Miscellanea* [On Man, Morality and Science: Miscellanies], Warszawa: PWN, 1983.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] T. Gold, 'Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity' in *Culture Changes in Postwar Taiwan*, S. Harell, C.C. Huang (eds), New York: Westview Press, 1994; J. Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son, Chiang Ching-kuo and Revolutions in China and Taiwan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

as a pluralistic, corporate organization of civil-political society;[9] and the classical approaches of Gramscii.[10] Of course the Western institutional framework has been adopted by the Republic of China, and it serves to all the empowerments of democratic order now in Taiwan, but certain tensions between state and civil society, that appeared as a result of conservative Chinese political culture, can still be observed.[11]

An interesting point of view on Taiwanese civil society is presented by Thomas Gold. He wrote that the approaches to Taiwan's civil and political development *must* start with the Kuomintang (KMT) party-state. In his analyses the KMT party-state was not isolated from society, and it created a unique structure of relations between the different spheres of social and political functioning. "The *state* is a relational concept expressing to a certain degree the balance among social forces in any society. The most powerful social forces try to influence state policy, but the members of government – the organizations that comprise the state may have their own agenda, which, in some instances, might bring them into conflict with social forces. In theory, then, the state can attempt to preserve some degree of autonomy from social forces, including foreign economic and political interests".[12] Gold also argues that the state-society relationship is not a static one. "Especially in a society undergoing rapid structural change, new social forces emerge which might present demands on the state that it never faced before. The state very likely has no institutional mechanisms for dealing with such demands from below. In a prolonged period of structural change, the state and the societal elites have problems reproducing themselves or selecting suitable successors to deal with unprecedented problems. Mobilized social forces might compel new policies, form alliances with segments of the state, and introduce members into state organizations".[13]

In 1912 the KMT was established as an association of leftist and progressive forces opposing the conservative (rightist) and royalist powers led by Kang Youwei, after the successful Xinhai Revolution. As a political party the KMT was rare and unusual for political and public life at the beginning of the 20th century in China. No KMT-outsider could correctly identify what the KMT was at that time (neither was it a confederation of powerful landed gentry, nor an association of the common people: it was something in between the two). In 1913 the KMT became the prime political power in the first parliamentary system in the history of China. For the majority of Chinese people the ideas of the political parties rose as external, modern (neither grass-root nor endogenous) social movements, and it was naturalized to the accepted form of a social organization. The KMT by its public openness caused an explosion of civil, 'bottom-up' activity that opened the way to a new Chinese liberalism, humanism, and social welfare and then via these notions, to communism and finally to democracy in Taiwan. The political parties became inclusive and started publicly to represent different citizens' interests.[14] Developing its identity, the KMT did not support any of the defined citizens' interests but it utilized a combination of different philosophical streams (Christian, Neo-Confucian, Marxist and Liberal) expressed

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[9] See N. Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982; J.L. Cohen, A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

[10] A. Gramscii, *Prison Notebook*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

[11] W.T. de Bary, *Sources of Chinese Traditions*, Vol. I–II; New York: Columbia University Press, 1970; L. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968.

[12] Gold, 'Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest...', p. 47.

[13] Ibid., p. 48.

[14] See A. Keating, *The Struggle of a Democracy*, Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2006, pp. 36–41.

in the 'Sunnist' ideology[15] of *the government of the people, by the people and for the people* that could mobilize larger social circles.

The lack of political stability in China in the 1920's and 30's inhibited the development of popular democratic culture and caused the KMT to radically change its course as the people's representative and became a military-oriented counter-revolutionary association.[16] In 1921 the KMT became a centralized, Leninist organized party transforming its ideological foundations into a radical, social-nationalist and oriented political force. The next move was to empower a revolutionary rhetoric amongst KMT's activists, whose political direction drew the struggle against every symptom of "liberal revolt" among the open-minded Chinese intellectual elite of that time.[17]

The domestic counter-revolution and destructive movements of the warlords together with the destabilizing actions of foreign powers (mainly Soviet Russia) bore anxiety and caused a necessity for protection of the achievement of a "new order". In other words, once recognized by the West in 1928 as the legal power governing China, the KMT became 'the government of the people, by the people and for the people' up and turned to hard-core authoritarian rule. The struggle for a republic and a republican modernized China, became one for saving the political power over China. The corruption and power oriented activities of the divided (rightist and leftist) KMT elites led Chinese people to support the KMT's conquerors, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The split between the KMT and the CCP (1927–1937 including the Guangzhou Uprising, the Shanghai Massacre of 1927, and the Maoists' Long March 1934–1936) and also extreme antagonism after the Sino-Japanese War in 1945 pushed both parties to civil war.

At the end of 1949 the victorious communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China, and the KMT regime, sheltered in Taiwan, had to put aside its long-term revolutionary agenda in the interests of the survival of the ROC.[18]

Because initially the KMT regime was only slightly rooted in Taiwanese society, the party-state, in terms of Gold's approach, was close to full state autonomy. The political power of the KMT was autonomous from the pressures of any kind of social forces. While the pre-civil-war KMT advocated a corporate civil-state system, the post-civil-war KMT transferred the Taiwanese (the new ROC) state into an oligarchy of military elites interested in the rejection of any alternative political forces. The KMT took control over the media and educational systems to coerce propaganda onto Taiwanese society. Only the mainland Chinese and supporters of the government have been rewarded by the KMT polity. Gold described the KMT as a party that: 1) does not perceive itself as representing the interests of any particular class (it is above the classes, representing the nation as a whole); 2) promotes the achievement of democracy (through stages of military rule, tutelage and constitutional democracy without any concept of proletarian dictatorship); 3) does not advocate building socialism or communism; and 4) grants wide scope for legally protected private business. For more than four decades until 1987, the KMT suppressed internal resistance from Taiwanese society. A quasi-corporate, party-state destroyed civil consciousness, a pluralistic

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[15] See Sun, Y.S., *The Three Principles of the People*, Taipei: Government Information Office, 1924/1990.

[16] See Keating, *The Struggle of a Democracy...*

[17] See J. Manthorpe, *Forbidden Nation. History of Taiwan*, London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009.

[18] See Gold, 'Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest...'; Manthrope, *Forbidden Nation. History of Taiwan...;* Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son, Chiang Ching-kuo...*

public sphere and eliminated the political opposition that could balance the mainlanders' influences over Taiwan's polity.

At the beginning of the 1970's in Taiwan there was a great change concerning the economy, which had shifted significantly from agriculture to different branches of modern industry and services. The KMT ran its great project of the *developmental state* that became a 'shining pattern' for all Asian countries.[19] The state regime created a set of conditions to promote the meritocratic system of social stratification. The education-based success of the social policy of the KMT led to an emergence of new social actors such as private capital holders, professionals and a Taiwanese intelligentsia. With a shift in quality of life during that time, feelings of sovereignty prevailed and took hold of a well-educated and rewarded society. People started to think independently and question the decisions of government. A 'whispered' resistance emerged amongst them. The need for a relocation of state, party and social civility (including the need of a resurgent Taiwanese identity) appeared.[20]

We can find a lot of adjectives describing Taiwanese civil society during the transition period (1970–2000), but we are sure that one seems to be adequate for the reality of Chinese political culture: 'civilless'. Why give such a name? The answer is rather simple. After the early 1990s civil institutions became the facades of effective and transparent governance. The Taiwanese people (no matter if they were mainlanders or islanders), were trained in social apathy with a rational dependency upon the authorities who did not empower a sovereign consciousness of being into the state co-governors.

The sociopolitical model of Civil Society on Taiwan

Before the democratization of Taiwan had been initiated the disconnection between civil and political spheres was unlikely, especially under conditions of an authoritarian state. Moreover the Chinese traditions of leadership and state nationalism affected an enormous scope of social and economic limitations inside Taiwan's society.

Although the KMT was linked to actual processes for more or less modern governance, it did so only under the latent [modernized] Confucian traditions inhibiting social resistance against the party-state polity. Only prior to the emergence of a public sphere during the late 1980's, when a strong position of the state yielded a democratic consensus, did a raw popular civil consciousness move society to dissolve the need for centralized state control with purposely oriented social movements.[21]

The Taiwanese civil society, rising from the situation of a strong state authority, has been correlated with a traditional society that respects authoritarian political leadership legitimized in a certain moral order and bases it on local, direct ties similar

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[19] See M. Greene, *The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.

[20] See H.M. Hsiao, 'Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan', *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 24, 1989; H.M. Hsiao, 'The Non-profit Sector in Taiwan: Current State, New Trends and Future Prospects', Online: www.tpic.org.tw/NPOInfo/ index1–2.asp., 1994; H.M. Hsiao, 'The Growing Asian Pacific Concern Among Taiwan's NGOs.' in *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Non-governmental Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community: a 25th Anniversary Project of JCIE*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (APPC), 1995.

[21] M.T. Huang, *The Great Transition*, Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1989; Hsiao, 'Emerging Social Movements...'.

to those often described as an endogenous civility or locality.[22] Civil society thus existed as certain folk practiced inside the state system of Taiwan, particularly as a collective guardian of lawfulness and the traditional Chinese way of life.

The socio-historical interpretation of the rise of Taiwan's civil society responds to the problem of the modernization and institutionalization of society in Taiwan, far better than any other description, which roots the model of Taiwanese civil society outside the heir of cultural influences of the local and Chinese 'life-worlds'. The differentiation between the two patterns of civility (institutional and moral) not only indicates the sources of civil society but also allows researchers to indicate the basic characteristics of Taiwan's civil society as a practice placed between the traditional, post-Confucian state and the institutions of a modern democratic polity, as well as being placed between Chinese and Taiwanese socio-cultural identities. What should be the choice for Taiwan? Should it be an institutionally organized, civil society based on democratic rights and citizens' commitments, incorporating a Sino-Formosan identity or a structure of political and ethnic differentiation that has no place for actual civil society, except by separated and atomized local communities or personal networks aimed at non-political issues?

As Cohen and Arato have showed the constitutional bounds of a civil society do not lie on the levels of institution, organization, or even a shared, unquestioned normative order. Authors have pointed out that the cultural-linguistic background as a source of cultural perception of the 'life-world' (they call it "unity" of life-word), is neither an institution nor an organization but a network of resources for institutions and organizations. Additionally they said that it can have a shared, unquestioned normative content only in traditional society, and even then, this is not necessary. Traditional society (in our case Taiwanese society) is in fact defined not in terms of a common tradition but by its relation to traditions and ultimately to the 'life-world' itself.[23]

The modernization of the 'life-world' or it may be better to say the de-fundamentalization of the "generalized cultural explanation of social ties" that is shared by the given community, implies – Cohen and Arato added – two interlocking processes: a differentiation and internal rationalization of the structural and institutional components of the 'life-world'; and the rationalization of the cultural-linguistic constitution of the life-world. In this case the rationalization means basically the process of institutionalization and a consolidation of a moral and cultural-linguistic constitution of the 'life-world', within a clear, secularized and open system of public rights and commitments of citizenry. The direct effect of such a process is the rise of the public sphere and growth of institutionalized secondary ties which are reflecting different social interests, and which have been built upon the basis of the indirect presence of members and a generalized social trust. However the fact of Taiwanese modernization on the life-world cannot be negated, the specifics of Taiwanese Confucianism, conservative culture and public-political life highlighted the ongoing conflict of values between institutional (modern) and non-institutional ([semi]traditional) modes of civil identities that are deeply rooted in everyday life.[24]

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[22] See R. Weller, *Alternate Civilities*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998.
[23] Cohen, Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory...*, p. 45.
[24] Ibidem.

Usually when we ask about the cultural and social modernity influence on individuals' and groups' capacities for forcing the political and civil conduct in Taiwanese social and political systems, generally we are focused on the expectations toward the positive results of such modernizing transitions. This method of analyses leads us to simplistic conclusions that, in Taiwan, civil society should be utilized not only in terms of the current politics of the well-established life-world (the "positive relation" entered by the government's latent-state-Confucianism) but mainly as a resource of the political critics, which is breaking down the ties of Confucian traditions in a public life (the "negative relation" forced by oppositionists circles of intellectual elites).

For modern political theory covering civil society, the process of cultural modernization was the most important factor of the emergence of civil co-governance in Europe in bygone centuries. But it should be said very clearly that the potential for such modernization never occurs as a full repertoire of possible practices. Even the best practical institutionalized model of civil society, inherited from developed democracies at the end of the twentieth century, could not fulfill the utopian hope of a common civil activation in Taiwan. This is happening because of the several contradictory forces affecting the island's everyday life, politics and economy.

As today's practice of Taiwanese civil society shows there is still an existing dichotomous approach to the state-society relationship. One can easily recognize that this approach is borrowed directly from the Marxist (social liberalistic) heir of defining the role of modernizing social forces that it is deeply rooted in an early revolutionary (through Sun Yatsen's principles), anti-absolutist and republican manifesto. But this dichotomy is not a simple result of the linear development of a republican state.

Taiwanese democracy, although less specific in that it does not provide a mature institutional framework for its acting citizens, comes closer to the point in which there are appearing circumstances 'empowering' peoples' social apathy and passiveness. This is what gives the reason to accentuate the need to reissue the Taiwanese civil society not just as an indigenous and exclusive grass-roots movement, purposely oriented, but also as the main force of co-governing the state, controlling powers and maintaining the Taiwanese national identity. What Taiwanese society needs is a project of civil society that can, on the one side, reflect the atomized identities built on the local (folk) communities injected by Chinese cultural (religious) syncretism and a semi-Confucian moral order, and on the other side, a capability that can empower the peoples' sovereignty behind the state. The project should articulate the peoples' motivations within which the civil society, adopting a local context, can contribute to decreasing the cultural tensions or struggles that appeared on the island during its turmoil of modern history.

Half consciously, and half unconsciously, most Taiwanese people have carried about the idea of public activism in "the hopeful periods of liberalization", but especially during the first years of the transition after 1987.[25] They imagine that in the new opening even a single person can act independently from the party's, government's or influential business holders' principles as a subject of the public sphere, the citizen. That is how the myth of democracy and civil society describes the citizens basic right to sovereignty. But this form of consciousness shows the never-ending conflict between tradition and the modernity of "cultura sinica".

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[25] See M.K. Chang, *Social Movements and Political Transition*, Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1989/1994.

As long as we remain on the grounds of t democracy, we should emphasize that sovereignty and political equality are constant for everyone. Whatever the member of a given democratic community (having received its membership) may have been, his relationship with the community is issued for a long time and without any doubts and limitations (this refers to the indirect participation in elections of ruling bodies and in the decisions concerning the life-issues of the community). The social shock of transition sometimes affects people's consciousness so deeply that it creates a mental resistance to any changes that allow people to govern their lives and it causes a feeling of hopelessness for the people who have lost their chance to fully utilize political equality and sovereignty. This happens particularly when the rules of the transition's outcome are not clearly expressed in practice and the ideas of the new order accept the double standard of the political game.

For a person socialized in the Confucian culture, recognizing an orthodoxy of "the common public good", it may be hard to understand, how and why Western people are bound together in an abstract civil society by each other, and if such a person conceals this perception from themselves. The person born into a group which confesses to traditional cultural values, receives a conventional-world view and conventional patterns of public behavior. But each individual is not by nature constituted to grow up as a matured citizen, or as a political one. One of the basic conditions of being political is the simultaneous presence of a number of people interrelated politically, such as the supporters or antagonists of given political or civil ideas.

No myth of civil society is needed for the Taiwanese to make a compressive society related to the citizenry. If somebody depends on a life with other people then even that somebody would not call this life a civil one. People may be very different through their civil constitutions. But only in a civil society entering its new members into a relatively undifferentiated civil consciousness, is one turned into a more complex political being. Only in relation to other civil beings does the weak newcomer become the civilly and politically developed person, with the character of an individual and deserving the name of an adult citizen. Cut off from such relations an individual grows at best into a non-political slave. Such a person would grow up as a politically passive consumer of the 'life-world' projected by rulers. Let us paraphrase Norbert Elias' words: only if an individual grows up in a democratic and civil society does the small human begin to learn to speak in a political logic; only in a society of other, older citizens does he gradual1y develop a specific kind of far-sightedness and instinct control; and the political language he learns, and to which pattern of public life he would choose, depends on the civil moral order and cultural-linguistic constitution of the group in which he grows up.

The so-called cultural rationalization, as mentioned earlier, begins the modernization of the next level, a linguistic-cultural realm of everyday life. The republican revolution in China in 1911 pushed the rationalization of Confucian culture and involved the differentiation of the cultural spheres into sets of institutions, grouped around the instrumental and practical values or forms of validity and therefore transferred into the legal framework of polity. The emergence of new classes in the ROC at that time, particularly the bourgeoisie, meant the rise of reformists cultural movements, and what Gold refers directly to as modern Taiwan, with alternative routes to an upward civil mobility and the formation of new elites.

The actual model of the Taiwanese civil society is typical, in our opinion, of societies that have an unfinished transition from authoritarian to a "co-governmental" mode of

state organization. As in the case of other transitional systems, Taiwanese civil society has been shaped by movements and other unstructured civic initiatives by an active intellectual elite,[26] under the scope of conditions where the most important contracts of civil rights and institutions rested under construction. This is still unfolding, because it is still coming from the stage of conflict between tradition and modernity.[27]

Conclusion

In Taiwan the authoritarian state has penetrated almost all aspects of its citizens' personal lives and controlled the social allocation of valid resources. Such a situation has resulted in the people's constant search for irregular channels, allowing contacts with those who might be prepared to overcome the official distribution of goods. Both sides of this relationship needed a certain degree of balance between trust and mistrust.

The immoderation of the authoritarian regime actually delegitimized the nationalist ethic of collective society and left people a *moral support* that legitimized the searching for their own advantages. The anthropologist, Yan Yunxiang characterizes such a moral justification as the local moral world in which common people live. Inside this society they realize personal interests by the fulfilment of moral obligations, or mutual aid to provide social support when it is needed. Yan calls this *the primary form of networking* made up of known fellow participants who play the role of community guides and judges. Beyond this world, they also pragmatically cultivate an *extended form of networking* with strangers that are developed instrumentally to pursue one's interests. They do not carry the same moral force as those in the primary world. The extended networking maintains community boundaries, but actually it is serious obstacle to a modern civil society.

The first type of *network relations* is similar with traditionally formed local cultures inside small communities in Taiwan. The primary form of *it* is also observed by scholars as a symptom of the citizens' escape to the sphere of quasi-civil society activities. The civil society – that arose from the modern society driven via contracts and civil agreements between strangers – is no longer able to pursue the interests of citizens. The cause of this is rooted in a weak social trust and social capital as was described in Putnam's works. Only the community of familiar members has an ability to perform an art of trust, and build a matured form of civil society on this basis.

Civil society in Taiwan does exist. In many cases it is the only force governing and providing solutions for serious social problems. The Taiwanese civil society is "handy crafted". It is also networked as a result of the traditional foundations of society. In the end we should emphasize that Taiwanese civil society consists of both modern institutionalized forms of civil actions, realized by NGOs and/or local governments, and semi-civil actions that are realized outside the institutions through the resurrective networks of citizens whom share the same moral order and the same common 'public good'. Those resurrective networks emerge when causes of mobilization appear, and become hibernated when the common goal is reached or the mobilization causes have vanished.

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[26] See Hsiao, 'Emerging Social Movements...'; Chang, *Social Movements...*; M.S. Ho, 'Understanding the Trajectory of Social Movements in Taiwan (1980–2010)', *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, No. 39, 2010.

[27] See K.P. Yu, *Democracy is A Good Thing*, Washington DC: Brookings, 2009.

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