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ACTA ASIATICA VARSOVIENSIA

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

Professor Roman Sławiński
(1932–2014)

Contens

FIELD STUDY REPORT

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Introduction

Dear Readers!

We are presenting you yet another, already the 28th, issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* devoted to the countries and culture of Asia. Over the years of its activity the journal started to be issued in English and it has hosted on its pages many eminent experts on Asia, yet still it remained faithful to its formula which was proposed thirty years ago by Professor Roman Sławiński, the founder of the journal and its permanent editor in chief. This formula stipulated that the Asian cultures should present themselves in the journal and talk directly with their own voice. The idea was both: to include in the group of authors and editors of the magazine scientists who grew up in Asian cultures, as well as to publish materials based on or referring to the texts – philosophical, linguistic, historical, sociological, religious studies or political studies – which were created by the Asian culture. These could be proper names as an object of linguistic research, religious texts, political documents, ideological declarations, but also biographical materials, historiographical elaborations, experience of meeting other cultures and mutual acculturation phenomenon resulting from the relations.

Professor Roman Sławiński left us in November 2014. The more time passes from his death, the more I feel his absence and the more I realize how unique a character he was in the world of research on China. Professor Marianne Bastid-Bruguière, a prominent French scholar from Institut de France in Paris, who met Roman Sławiński in the times of his studies in Beijing, writes about that fact. Most striking is the variety of interests and multidimensionality of research on China which he ran. He was trained as a linguist, and he knew perfectly well not only the classical language, but also many dialects. There was even a time it was appreciated by Mao Zedong himself. Roman Sławiński was interpreting a conversation of the Chinese leader with the Polish state authorities. During the conversation Mao Zedong changed as usual from the classical language to the dialect of Hunan province, which was his place of origin. When he realized he was using the dialect, he noticed that it was not a slightest problem for the interpreter to understand his statements. Then he asked: „Who is that young man who understands the Hunan dialect?" It was known that many Chinese from the surroundings of the Chairman did not understand him when he spoke in the native dialect. It so happened, that Roman Sławiński knew the dialect.

He was interested not only in the language. History, politics, culture as well as China's economy were the subject of his interest and research. His views, opinions and insights on these matters were the inspiration for many researchers of China, some of which are the authors of the materials contained in this issue. Of the many research interests of Professor Sławiński in recent years at least two may be mentioned. First one became Confucianism, especially its latest colours and shades. Professor persistently sought and discovered them in the texts of Chinese scientists, government documents, archives and everyday citizens of China. In this regard he was a dedicated explorer and a keen observer. Even the slightest detail was important to him. Minor personnel changes on the bureaucratic ladder were important for the formation

of general conclusions. From my conversations with him, I got the impression that he was rather skeptical about the possibility of a revival of Confucianism under the supervision of the communist authorities. So he concluded after examining many texts of the so-called new wave of Confucianism in China. His works on the latest Chinese historiography constitute an invaluable contribution to global research on contemporary China. His second passion was the research on the minorities of China Southern. The field research among the peoples of Miao and Tujia that he ran and in which I had the opportunity to participate assumed getting to know the nature of change in the cultural identity of these minorities in the era of globalization and accelerated socio-economic transformation in China. These studies had not been completed, and we can only hope that one of the students of Professor will continue them in the near future.

The arrangement of contents offered to you in the 28th issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* refers to the research passions of Professor Sławiński. The first article, written by Stanisław Tokarski – Indologist and long-time associate of Professor Sławiński, concerns dialogue between the East and the West and the possibility of mutual understanding and agreement. Understanding another culture is also the ability to read the symbols contained in the letters and that aspect of the intercultural dialogue interested Professor Sławiński in particular. The question of so-called Asian values – presented in the articles written by Adam Jelonek, Adam Raszewski, Artur Kościański and Larisa Zabrovskaia – was very close to Professor Sławiński and he dealt with it for many years as part of his research on the so-called new Confucianism. The issue of Chinese migration in the world was also in the interests of Professor – mainly in the context of global economic and social phenomena. This part of the research on China is presented in the article on the Chinese migration to France by Nicolas Levi. The issue of Chinese language was obviously important for Professor Sławiński as a linguist and he always welcomed in the columns of *Acta* the authors writing about language and linguistic issues. This area of research is presented in the current issue in the article on Chinese names written by Irena Kałużyńska. On the other hand, the artistic part of the culture is referred to in the articles by Izabella Łabędzka, Lidia Kasarełło, Ewa Chmielowska, Fu-sheng Shih and Diana Wolańska. The first three of these articles relate to Taiwan, where Professor conducted research for many years which resulted among others in a monograph *History of Taiwan*. The further three articles penned by Waldemar Dziak, Iwona Grabowska-Lipińska and Anna Mrozek-Dumanowska refer to the political sphere. Political sphere is inextricably linked with the ideology which was also the case of China. Confucianism and the new Confucianism emerged and developed in the shadow of the emperors, presidents and chairmen of the Chinese Communist Party. Researching them without the analysis of the political scene was not possible. The part of articles is closed by two texts unrelated with China, but with the Middle East. Their authors – Dorota Rudnicka-Kassem and Marcin Styszyński present materials based on the Middle Eastern sources and thus relate to the traditions of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*. The issue is closed by the report from field research in southern China by Professor Sławiński and me. For me it was a unique opportunity to get to know at least a little piece of China – a unique one, because my guide was Professor Sławiński – such a great scholar and such a seasoned expert on Asia.

I would like to thank the authors – students, colleagues and friends – for participation in the preparation of the issue, and the Directorate of the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences for the possibility to dedicate the anniversary issue of *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia* to Professor Sławiński.

Jerzy Zdanowski

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MARIANNE BASTID-BRUGUIÈRE[1]

In Memory of Roman Sławiński

It was a great sadness to learn of Roman Sławiński's untimely death from a phone call of our common friend former Ambassador to China Ksawery Burski. Then came a kind message from Roman's colleague Nicolas Levi, in early August 2015. Roman had been a friend for many years, and I thought he would be always moving around among sinological circles in China and Europe, switching with everlasting elegance and bewildering ease from one language to another on a large range of topics in tune with changing times and audiences.

I met Roman for the first time in January 1968 in Paris. He was spending there two or three months for research under some agreement with the Polish Science Academy. Jean Chesneaux, the French specialist of the Chinese worker movement, who was then directeur d'études at the 6th Section of the École pratique des hautes études (that section is today the École des hautes études en sciences sociales), was preparing a collective volume on popular movements and secret societies in 19th and 20th century China, and had requested Roman to provide a contribution on his current research about the Red Spears Society (*Hong qiang hui* 红枪会) in the 1920's.[2]

I do not know exactly how Chesneaux made contact with Roman. As a very talented intellectual and one of the rare historians of contemporary China affiliated with the French Communist party, Chesneaux was well acquainted with many noted China scholars in Eastern Europe, in the Soviet Union, as well as in Western Europe and the United States. He was also actively involved in the Junior Sinologists activities. That organization had started in 1948, on the initiative of a few Dutch and British scholars, with a conference convened in Cambridge in order to bring together European China scholars who had been isolated by the tragedies of war, so that they could exchange information and rebuild an academic community. A conference was then scheduled every year in a different sinological centre. West Germans participated in 1949. From 1953 on, scholars from East Germany, other East European countries and the Soviet Union joined also. In 1955, in Leiden, Jian Bozan and Zhou Yiliang were sent from China to participate. The next year, in Paris, a Chinese delegation made of Jian Bozan, Zhou Yiliang, Xia Nai and Zhang Zhilian attended. It was probably on the occasion of one of those conferences that Chesneaux first met Roman Sławiński. In fact, his collective volume on popular movements and secret societies was based on the papers presented at the conference of Junior Sinologists held in Leeds in 1965.

[1] Membre de l'Académie des sciences morales et politiques, Institut de France.

[2] The book was published as *Mouvements populaires et sociétés secrètes en Chine aux XIXe et XXe siècles*, Paris: Maspero, 1970. Roman Sławiński's contribution appears pp. 393–406, «Les Piques Rouges et la révolution chinoise de 1925–1927». An English translation, *Popular Movements and Secret Societies in China, 1840–1950*, was published by Stanford University Press in 1972.

While in Paris, Roman Sławiński attended dutifully Chesneaux's seminar, rue de Varennes, in a lovely 18th century building overlooking private gardens, rented from the Paris archbishop. I attended it too, as the only place at the time to get some advanced training in Chinese contemporary history. Jean Chesneaux was not yet entitled to supervise postgraduate work, but had agreed to help his friend Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, who was the supervisor of my Ph D at the Sorbonne. The audience of Chesneaux's seminar was an odd gathering of some twenty people, eventually over thirty for hot topics, around a large oval table covered with dark green felt fabric. There were a few ordinary students in their twenties, some former or active militants of various leftist obedience in their thirties and forties, and older or retired activists in their fifties and beyond. All of them, beside their private political commitment of one sort or the other, had an intellectual pursuit related to Chesneaux's own interests, which extended from India to Japan, with strong emphasis on revolution in Vietnam and China.

Among the audience wearing mostly black polo jumpers, Roman Sławiński with his finely combed curled blond hair, his blue suit and tie was perhaps the only one attuned to the aristocratic setting of the place, all the more queer since he was the only one to come directly from a socialist country. He gave a presentation of his research in very elegant and fluent French, on 25th January 1968. I found back in my files the notes I took on that occasion. His account of the Red Spears Society was very factual and detailed. It scrutinized closely and critically all available sources. He did not put forward any especially Marxist interpretation, but seemed more interested in identifying the religious elements that could link the movement to one or the other well-known religious sects active in North China since the 17th century, and in tracing accurately its differences with other movements and groups. He defined the Red Spears Society as one local leader of a widely spread self-defence movement of peasants. However, he skilfully eschewed any general theoretical or philosophical conclusions, and even the idea of a "model" as Lucien Bianco's questions tried to press upon him. After the lecture, I talked with him and discovered he knew Jan Rowiński and Ksawery Burski, the two most brilliant young sinologists at the Polish Embassy in Peking, whom I had the chance to meet during my stay in China in 1964–1966. I told him of unforgettable picnics in the midst of Peking summer heat at the unique swimming-pool of the Polish Embassy, where a joyful team of British, Indian, Russian and French diplomats and students would be kindly invited by their Polish friends, and would engage in endless discussions about China. I found that I even kept in my file Roman's address in Warsaw, which he wrote down for me on a sheet of paper.

During that stay in Paris, Roman Sławiński also attended at Chesneaux's seminar a session on the policies of the Indonesian Communist Party under Aïdit in 1963, another one with a paper by Okamoto Sae from Tokyo University on literati and foreign science in 17th and 18th century South China, and one on the beginnings of the Communist Party and its leadership in Vietnam from 1930 to 1936, with a paper by Georges Boudarel, then a peaceful academic, who was later put on trial as one of the most cruel political commissars against French prisoners in Vietminh's camps during the Indochina War. Roman had left back to Poland several weeks before the May 1968 tempest stormed the French academic world, and well beyond.

In January and February, Chesneaux had strongly advised the audience at his seminar to attend the next Junior Sinologists Conference to be held in Prague in early September, and featuring the Chinese 1919 May Fourth Movement as its main theme. However, the Soviet

tanks entered Prague on 20th August. Many of our Czech colleagues were put in jail or sent down to clean the streets. The conference was cancelled. Four other Junior Sinologists Conferences were held later, the last one in 1972. I did not attend, and I don't know whether Roman Sławiński attended any. Those meetings were held in a strained atmosphere with a steadily declining number of people, so that they were dropped altogether.

When Kristopher Schipper and Professor Yves Hervouet joined hands to rebuild a proper scholarly organization among European sinologists under the name of European Association for Chinese Studies, Poland was represented by Janusz Chmielewski in the provisional Board that convened in Paris in February 1975. However, Roman Sławiński attended the first conference of the new EACS held in Paris on 5–11 September 1976, and presented a paper on the Red Spears Society on 10 September. The EACS Conferences would take place every two years. I met him again at the next conference in Italy, in Ortisei, in September 1978, where he was elected on the EACS Board. We met also at the Zürich conference in September 1980. There, to my great astonishment, I discovered that he had completely abandoned the Red Spears peasants. He presented a purely aesthetic paper on the Tang poet Wang Wei and his poem on the principles of chromatic landscape. He told me he had switched his interest to Chinese classical literature and art, which he found more palatable than peasant revolution. I think that I saw him again at the EACS conference in Cambridge two years later. However, he then dropped his membership, and did not attend the EACS conferences any more. I would eventually get some news about him from other Polish colleagues.

Therefore, it was a happy surprise when I received a phone call from him in May 1994. He had come to Paris on honeymoon with his new wife, a charming young lady with blond hair and blue eyes, whom he told me came from a Tatar family established in Poland on the Baltic shore since the 14th century. They both came for dinner at my home, and kindly brought wonderful smoked eels from the Baltic. It was a real feast! Roman seemed rejuvenated, with many new projects, but not so much related to China. He was more involved in Polish intellectual, artistic and academic life. At the time, I had a very brilliant Polish Ph D student with whom I had long discussions about sinology and intellectual developments in Poland. I could very well understand Roman's enthusiasm for broader perspectives and unknown fields. I enjoyed very much the evening with him and his wife. Then we lost contact for several years.

In September 2000, China gave us the opportunity to meet once again. We were both invited to a conference on "Modern China and the World" organized by the Institute of Modern History of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It was held in a most fancy place, a kind of recreation park in Peking suburbs where various pavilions had been built, each with a different foreign architectural style: there was the Italian villa, the French castle, the English Oxford college, the Alhambra, the American ranch, a swimming-pool, and the like. We received lavish treatment. Chinese institutions in social sciences were just beginning to receive fairly generous funding for entertaining guests, and our Chinese colleagues were clearly enjoying the new luxury immensely. Roman and I, who could well remember former conditions of Chinese academic life, would smile at their pleasure and exchange some jokes about the spell of feudal and colonial lifestyles. Roman presented a very nice paper on Chinese relations with Poland in the 19th century.

After the conference he stayed a few days at the Embassy with his friend Jan Rowiński. Ksawery Burski, who was then the Polish Ambassador to China, managed to invite us for an unforgettable private dinner at his home. Each of us would remember his own memories

of China and Chinese through the years. We would make and remake Chinese past and future, compare China again and again with various other countries. We drank toasts in Chinese Shaoxing yellow wine and in Polish vodka. We all agreed that studying China was an endless task that brought a lot of meaning and delight in our lives, and had also enlightened our common European feeling. I keep pictures of this dinner.

The next day, Roman took me to the Panjiayuan antique market newly opened in the eastern suburb of Peking city. There he gave me a fine demonstration of his stupendous ability in Chinese. He was interested in porcelain, which he had been collecting randomly for many years, he told me. His infallible eye soon spotted a teapot in a very average junk shop. While looking at other odd pieces, he engaged conversation with the shopkeeper in a very soft and courteous tone. The shopkeeper, who did not draw much attention from the crowd of Chinese and foreign passers-by, was obviously delighted to be able to communicate so easily with such a distinguished foreign customer. They talked heartily about life, business and changes in Peking. Roman asked eventually about the price of the teapot, which was fairly high. I was startled and asked him in French whether he really wanted to buy it. He replied that it was a rare "eggshell" sample, a very thin type of chinaware, which he did not have in his collection. Then he went on talking with the shopkeeper on the world, art, and porcelain, the three of us sitting down and commenting the various pieces in the shop. At the end, the shopkeeper sold the coveted teapot for a price ten times less than the original price. The teapot was carefully wrapped, and Roman brought it back to Warsaw the following day. I expressed my admiration at the utter chineseness of his Chinese, so fluent, idiomatic and with the right intonation, which very few foreigners are able to grasp adequately. He then told me laughingly that he was never able to learn tones properly, but that it was not essential for being understood, since many Chinese themselves, being used to their own dialect, did not know the tones in the common language. What was really important was tonic accent, as a Chinese teacher taught him, it was a music in the sentence, and he enjoyed it, especially when talking with ordinary folks in Peking.

Our last encounter was in Paris on 5 February 2013. Roman was in Paris for a short stay. He came for dinner at my home with a friend of his, Leszek Kanczugowski. They had some project of organizing a conference at UNESCO on Chinese cultural and artistic influence in Poland, Korea and Japan from the 18th to the 20th century. I introduced them to some of my colleagues in Chinese art history and history of Chinese thought. A few months later, they had to drop the idea because Roman had retired from Lublin University, which was supposed to provide some funds. We spent, nevertheless, a very lively evening. Roman would discuss literature, painting, and gardens in a subtle way, as telling secrets which he had long kept for himself. It was his way all along. He would hold a very special relationship to China, as well as nourish fondness for life in Paris. He could fit in with so many different surroundings, and remain a scholar in his own way, always under a haze of mystery.

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STANISŁAW TOKARSKI

Westernization and Easternization. At the Crossroads of Multicultural Dialogue

Remembering Professor Roman Sławiński as an outstanding scholar and a very experienced researcher, deeply understanding of the divergent aspects of intercultural encounters of Europe with China, I think about the visit of the Head of the Chinese Academy of Science in our Centre for Studies on non-European Countries (PAN Warsaw) more than a dozen years ago. He was followed by his official interpreter and guide carrying some recent Chinese publications. After a short introduction the eminent guest made a speech. He talked about the latest trends and fields of scholarly research in China. Then the time came for some questions and I asked about over two millennials of Chinese logistical experience with state control – extraordinary in the country with the biggest population in the world. It is very important for us, I continued, at the crucial moment of our access to the European Union and NATO, to learn how to deal with rapid change in such new perspectives. Of course, it was not mentioned that such a topic had been discreetly suggested by the Professor, for the reason of his position as the translator of the the speech having rendered him 'outside' the of debate.

The Chinese VIP liked my question so much that he even wrote my name in his notebook. And at the end of his visit to our centre he gave me not only most of his prospects but also a cute silver bell. "What does it mean ?" I asked Professor Sławiński afterwards. "He liked your question so much – he explained – that he gave you the talisman against the evil ghosts". There was some ambivalence, though, connected with his good intentions. He wanted to show that he wished you well, he continued, but as a leading member of the Communist Party of China he could not tell you much about the purpose of this very special gift, no matter how much he believed it could be helpful.

And for some more details Professor directed me to the famous Chinese bestseller *The Journey to the West* (the film version is entitled *Monkey*) dealing with the travel of the pious Buddhist Monk to a famous Tibet Monastery in order to get the original Buddhist Scriptures. In his travels he is guided by the Monkey bodyguard – a legendary Master of Kung Fu from the Sacred Mountains. As a Saint mainly experienced with meditation, he did not know how to deal with the crowds of malicious sorcerers, vicious devils and hungry vampires they encountered on their way, very soon the Monkey has become the main hero of the of the story. Written in the 19th Century somewhere in China it has been performed everywhere in the region of the Far East. Killing dragons, ghosts, and fighting the evil he met in their journey through the Himalaya Montains, the Monkey bodyguard

has been remembered in the Buddhist legendary world as the fabulous Chinese Hero, who succesfully hit the road to Tibet.[1]

Such an interpretation of an ambiguous context of Chinese beliefs highly resistant to change, where obvious superstitions meet ancient trends of rational praxiology and philosophy – bound with mystic horizons – and thoroughly linked with the prevailing trends of common life, lead me to study the background of mystic art in ancient China. Some traces of it can be found in my editorial review of "Confucianism" – the scholarly book written by Xinzhong Yao, in 2000 published by Cambridge University Press. After my review it was translated by the Jagiellonian Publishing House in Cracow in 2009.[2] Bearing this superstitious dimension in mind I also sent an essay for the collective work *Ex Oriente Lux* (Jubilee of Roman Sławiński, Kraków, ed. Roman Kapiszewski) entitled "The Symbol of Shaolin in the Chinese tradition".[3] Many other publications, not only mine, have been inspired, directly or indirectly, by Roman Sławiński, some of them printed in *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, a journal for many years under his guidance and leadership. Our cooperation in the Council of this periodical was not the beginning of our friendship. We met long before this, even before the time when studying the Far East region was not so appreciated in our country, primarily because the two giants controlling Eastern Asia – China and Soviet Union – had stopped being "the best friends forever".

In 1996 Samuel Huntington published his famous book *The Clash of Civilisations,* not even suspecting that the beginning of the third millennium would give this title the most dramatic of connotations. Around the same time I had issued the collective work *The Cultural Encouters, Conflicts and Dialogues*[4] – with a very controversial cover: the map of world coloured green. Although such a design had not been consulted with me as the scientific editor, the drawing has sometimes been wrongly interpreted as the forecast of the total Islamisation of the West, especially in light of the M. Qadafi prediction of a demographic conquering of Europe or in the contexts of the recent waves of mass migrations from the region of the Near East.

Before the disastrous radical plans to attack the symbols of US domination in the modern world – the aim to destroy the World Trade Center, White House, and Pentagon – the whole story seemed to belong to the realms of science fiction and so was taken for granted on the first glance at the TV news. Analysed from Hungtinton's perspective these unbelievable "UFO attacks" seen on the channels of CNN were afterwards perceived as the dramatic defence of values of the most harassed non-European civilisations characterised

[1] This widely known tale in 19th-century China has been recently published in Polish in two volumes. See Wu Cheng'en, *Wędrówka na Zachód* [Journey to West], Warszawa: Czytelnik, 1984 as the second volume and *Małpi bunt* [Monkey Riot], Warszawa, 1976 as the first one. Both were translated by professor Tadeusz Żbikowski from the Chinese Department of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw.

[2] Xinzhong Yao, *Konfucjanizm,* Kraków: Wydawnictwo UJ. This book begins with a chronological account entitled 'Confucianism in History', followed by some precious information, 'Confucianism East and West'.

[3] Entitled in the Polish version 'Tygrys i smok. Mit Szaolinu w tradycji i symbolice chińskiej' in *Ex Oriente Lux,* Kraków. See also the essay of R. Sławiński, 'Secret Society the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom'. The whole book has a special flavour. It begins with the passage of Zhuangzi 'Radość doskonała' [Perfect Happiness].

[4] S. Tokarski (ed.), *Kraje pozaeuropejskie w konfrontacjach kultur. Spotkania, konflikty, dialogi* [Non-European Countries in Cultural Confrontations. Encounters, Conflicts, Dialogues], Łódź, 1996.

by demographic explosions and breaking the coherency of traditions. The smooth shift of military, economic, and political power to the West, argued Hungtington, has been thoroghly linked with a naive belief and wishful thinking. So the understood notion of democratization, identified with Westernization, might have become a challenge for Islam and possibly for postcommunist China. In such a scenario the Westernization of some Eastern regions would have an unexpected happy end : the dramatic rapid Easternization of the Western World. Asked for some detailed explanation of such a perspective of a new world order, Professor Sławiński advised me to study the Olympic Games performance in Peking in order to find these trends expressed in the most spectacular symbols.

The crucial question, he argued, is the continuity of post-Confucian traditions in the Chinese post-communict world. In order to prove such trends he invited me to study the collective book of Huntington and Lawrence Hamilton (eds) *The Culture Matters. How the Values Shape Human Progress* (NewYork 2001). Appearing in this context was the cultural, economic and political expansion of China in the 21st century – which when considering the new order in the world – can be viewed as exemplary. Some traces of this lecture can be found in the essay "The Westernization of Chinese culture"[5] written by Roman Sławiński for the collective book *Kultury pozaeuropejskie a globalizacja* ("Globalization and Non-European Countries", ed. J. Zdanowski, Warszawa 2000).

Paradoxically, with the culture shock after the traumatic experience of the American tragedy still fresh in people's minds, the Chinese presence in the Western hemisphere stopped to exist as a hidden truth. And the unquestionable domination of Western values in the world had begun to be perceived by some of the most renowned researchers as another myth of the modern world. The paradox of the theory of globalization gives the priority of Easternization before the unquestionable Westernization of the world order as a final goal. What is more, the dramatic defense of local values has become the present trend in recent decades, sometimes labelled in the glocalisation context, sometimes declared as jihad or the quest for regional autonomy.

In such circumstances, the question of cultural encounters, conflicts, and dialogues can be the crucial question for future civilisations. In such cases, the front of a defence of Western values as a strategy for our survival will also become important for Western culture. The dialogue can be maintained not necessarily by economic or military force. Founded in some cultural issues it should strongly increase tolerance and mutual understanding. Expressed by C. Geertz as "the possibility of discourse between people, difficult in this crowded world",[6] has some strong links with "the open attitude to the other".[7] Such an attitude makes it possible to study the mutual understanding not only in a rational dimension. In his book *The Intrareligious dialogue* (New York 1978) Raymondo Panikkar distinguishes the notion of 'dialectic dialogue' from 'dialogic dialogue', the sphere of the latter notion recently prevailing and situating mainly in intercultural religious areas.

"Beware the people getting their knowledge from one source" wrote A.C. Benjamin in his book *Tolerance, its Foundations, Theory and Practice.*[8] Sławiński analysed this open attitude in some classic Chinese contexts, explaining a temporary lack of tolerance with

[5] Polish title: 'Westermizacja chińskiej kultury – blaski i cienie'.

[6] In the collective book *Komunikacja międzykulturowa* [Intracultural Communication], ed. by L. Korporowicz, Warszawa, 1995, p. 137.

[7] T. Pilch, 'Interview with B. Wizimirska', *UNESCO i MY*, No. 3, 1995.

[8] London 1963, p. 5.

language barriers in China – in his essay *Chinese people and the others.*[9] Such ideas have also been promoted in Poland more widespread, together with the expanding activities of the Confucian Society. The sound foundations for its expansion have been recently laid in Cracow. Although the institutional structure has been sponsored by the Chinese People's Republic, the role of Professor Roman Sławiński as the pioneer of such activities in academic circles cannot be denied.

The reflection on "the other" has always been connected with mass migrations. Our attitudes towards the recently increased wanderings of the refugees from the areas of civil wars in Asia, the phenomenon witnessed long ago by Roman Sławinski during his studies in China, has developed into an unfolding event that has captured his latest interest. Generally, these isues have been carefully studied in works edited year by year by professor Jan Zamoyski, for many years the Director of IH PAN, and the results have been published year by year in the periodical of the Institute entittled *Migrations.* Situated in Warsaw on the Old Market Square, the aforementioned Institut of Polish Academy of Sciences in the late 1990s organised several conferences oriented on past and present demographic change, not necessarily connected with the ancient history of the rapidly expanding Moghul Empire and Arabic Caliphate, the European Crusades to the Holy Land, or the encounters in the era of extensive European colonization. The interest of these gatherings of scholars did not belong mainly to the ancient traditions, but emphasized the topics belonging to the modern ages, especially connected with a new world order and the phenomenon of decolonisation. Among the scholarly reflections of the shocking experiences of mass migrations in the 20th Century was the traumatic remembrance at the beginning of India's Independence: the mass exodus of Islam believers to the recently created Pakistan, and the mass migration of Hindu believers to the Indian Republic. Mixed up with the third directon, the journey to the West,as Mahatma Gandhi preached, where God revealed himself as he promised of work and bread, "The Indian Holocaust", has been the milestone for national integration since the dawn of Indian Independence. Its experience has been laid as a backdrop for the contemporary myth of the Promised Land situated in the Shining Future of India.

In the context of China, as Roman Sławiński taught, the mass migrations perceived in shocking the West with the enigmatic landscapes of Cultural Revolution, at first were preceded by the Long March of Mao and then – the Exodus for Taiwan. Its history, modern culture and the search for a new identity were thorougly described by Roman Sławiński in his final books. The shortest outline was realized in his essay "Migracje na Tajwan a tożsamość kulturowa Tajwańczyków" published in the collective work *Globalizacja a tożsamość* (ed. J. Zdanowski, Warszawa 2002). He continued his reflection in his article 'The Cultural Identity of the Taiwanese People in the Globalisation Era' (*Hemispheres* 2002). The Professor maintained that in China was the 'Centre of the World' and its mythology has never been identified with in the West. The Exodus of Chinese pre-communist elites to Taiwan created several dilemmas for the reconstruction of the Chinese *universum* in the new re-orientation of time and space. The key for the traditional structure, Chinese symbols constructing the milestones for identity – the archives of ancient libraries, the documents of scholarly studies – all of this has been taken over during the Exodus to the new Promissed Land of non-communist elites situated in the periphery of the Asian

[9] The Polish tittle 'Chińczycy i inni' [Chinese People and the Others] in the collective work *Między konfrontacją a tolerancją* [Between Confrontation and Tolerance], A. Mrozek (ed.), Warsaw: PAN, 1995.

continent and marginalised politically in continental China during the rules of Mao, the new leader in the traditional geographic landscape. For the political refugees the Island situated somewhere on the Chinese sea meant the 'real China', especially after the events of the Cultural Revolution aimed at the total destruction of the foundations of old values.

Such orientations, maintained Roman Sławiński, did not have the sound background – both for Taiwan and for continental China. The Chinese People's Republic had to cope for two decades with the problems of a communist version of Westernisation grounded in Marxism, and widely promoted by the Soviet Union in Asia. On the other hand, the extensive help by the US for the elites of Taiwanese refugees for subsequent generations, developing the framework of a rapid Westernization with an American background – produced the orientation of Taiwanese youth educated in America, to welcome the American lifestyle. What is more, the mosaic of ethnic minorities after the wartime Japanese occupation of the Pacific islands, was the source of the third, multicultural trend in the search of the new identity for Taiwan. Adding the last but not least dimension to this very complicated demographic landscape, citing Roman Sławiński, we cannot forget about some intensive Taiwanese scholarly research about the native Aborigines,[10] together with studies of the multicultural ethnic landscape of the Island building barriers of different identity thresholds for Chinese claims on Taiwanese territory.

Such a situation changed with the end of Cold War, when the specialised experts became aware of the gradual expansion of Taiwanese capital to continental China, whether directly or indirectly. At the same time, at the end of the Cultural Revolution and its consequences, the world witnessed a renaissance of extensive studies on Chinese tradition, not only popular in some Western centres often headed by renowned, exiled Chinese scholars, but also among those residing in post-communist China and in other post-communist countries. Poland has not been absent in such research. As an example, Roman Sławiński cited the history of Chinese migrations, reconstructed within the framework of the Polish Academy of Science by German born Karin Tomala; extensive research on the Chinese political economy done by Piotr Ostaszewski, the vice-chancellor of SGH; the philosophical studies of T. Zbikowski; research on Chinese literature by Mieczysław Kunstler at Warsaw University, and scholarly work on Chinese theatre done by Lidia Kasarełło at Warsaw and Jagiellonian Universities.

The cross-cultural encounters of recent decades exemplified tolerance, and are present in our conscience in many ways as a natural outcome of the 'global village' era. In spite of building walls in Europe we witness nowadays the opening of Europe, questioned within the framework of the controversial issues connected with the mass migrations of the refugees coming from the Near East to the European Union. Europe is destroying walls and frontiers but the danger of building new boundaries still exists. This topic has been present in some Polish publications even before the recent issues raised concerns over European Union security. In the collective book published in Kraków by T. Paleczny (ed.), *Dialog na pograniczach kultur i cywilizacji* [Dialog at the Frontiers of Civilizations and Cultures][11] the debate on shifting historical group stereotypes was not necessarily attributed to some political clashes or cultural tourism. To serve as a reminder of the ancient journeys of the Europeans the authors would like to cite the old saying: "Sailing is necessity, life is

[10] See R. Sławiński, *History of Taiwan* and also the essay 'The Aborigines of Taiwan' written by Ch'ang-hue Juan in a Chinese language version, and published in the collective memorial book *Ex Oriente Lux* mentioned above.

[11] Ibidem.

not" (*Navigare necesse est, vivere non est necesse*). Another search for identity has been exemplified by several writers of the modern age. Such was the case of some of the bestsellers of Herman Hesse, *Journey to the East,* Paulo Coelho, *The Alchemis*t, E.M. Forster, *Passage to India*, and John Blofeld, *My Journey to the Mystic China,* C.G. Jung essays *Journey to East.* For Roman Sławiński it meant a compulsion to constantly visit the Far East and return to old research. As a result he chose Poland to spend the autumn of his years, but still travelled regularly with lectures alternating between Warsaw and Cracow, a factor which kept him open minded to new ideas. But the centre of his research was always China and the publication closest to his heart seemed to be the periodical *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia.*

Orientalist scholar Heinrich Zimmer wrote a story about a poor Rabbi from Cracow who was repeatedly dreaming about some treasure buried under a gate in Prague. Then one day he decided to go to a Royal Castle far away in the capital of a neighbouring country. As he had walked many days, the journey was very tiresome and the result was disappointing. Because the main gate to Prague was guarded day and night, he has attracted the attention of a captain. When he narrated his dream to the guard, the officer burst out with laughter. "Poor man", he said, "who believes in dreams today? You have worn your old shoes only to walk a long way from Cracow? I heard a voice in a dream that the treasure has been hidden in the house of Rabbi Eisik, the son of Jekel from Cracow". The Rabbi did not say a word. He returned home and found the gold buried in the corner behind the stove.[12] Commenting on this passage, Professor Sławiński emphasised the necessity of travel for our scientific self-realisation. But the real treasure is not very far away. There is no need to migrate to a distant land for ever. But the journey matters, with two conditions to fulfil. You have to meet a stranger from a different land, and a believer in a different God.

The quest for new identity has been discussed recently in several inter-discipinary debates. Reflecting on multicultural encounters in the modern world, the authors of a book recently published in Cracow (M. Banaś et al, eds, *Kulturowe i społeczne wyzwania współczesności,* Kraków: Wyd. UJ, 2010), draw from the perspective of cross-cultural co-existence in the context of global defiance. Secularised cultural tourism and economic migration, they maintain, have become the new 'backbone', a kind of travel to the Promised Land situated in different times and places. A journey becomes a form of regeneration of physical shape but also a renovation of spiritual force. It becomes the important element of the modern pattern of life. Because of its dynamic growth, cultural tourism becomes an important component of the process of modernisation. For several decades it has been combined with the latest modern technology. In this context, the Indian anthropologist Arjun Appadurai talks about "the neighbourhood in the global net".[13] Even the tribal dwellers in remote areas of India now have mobiles phones, and satellite communication with the whole world became possible even for the impoverished. For this reason, the marginalised classes are no longer seen as provincial. Every conflict on a local scale, from its inception, becomes a part of cybernetic space, backed up or controlled by an informatic diaspora (S. Tokarski, *The Frontiers of Modernity in Anthropological Reserches on India*, Kraków: Wyd. UJ, 2010).

Such intercontinental encounters were foretold long ago by some serious scholars. Half a century ago the historian of religion Mircea Eliade, maintained that Japan became more

[12] See M. Eliade, *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries*, London: Harper and Row, 1960.

[13] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity At Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.

'Western' than the whole of the westernised world in the dimension of electronics and quality control. So was India in the realm of modern philosophy, and China in the organisation of labour. Such unquestioned priority due to the 'modernity of tradition'[14] puts the Old World in danger. To make these kind of views more spectacular, Rudolph Otto from the University of Chicago entitled his handbook of the political economy of India (issued in 1986) *In the Pursuit of Lakshmi,* appealing to the Goddess of wealth and prosperity in Hindu religion.

And in doing so, he was by no means alone. Cross-cultural encounters in economic terms are an important topic for some native scholars of Asia. In *Modernity at Large,* the anthropologist Arjun Appadurai organised a quest for the imperial relict of the British rule in the Indian Republic, after independence and its developing democratic system being a sign of the times in the second part of the 20th Century. He found more of them in India than in Great Britain. For many the most spectacular import from Britain, even considering the omnipresence now of cricket in the whole area of The Indian Subcontinent,would be the nostalgia surrounding the 'fabulous' British Raj, epitomized in the works of Kipling, Conrad, and other English writers highly estimated in the literary world.

The prognostics of the spectacular modernising of Asia in many different fields have been predicted long ago. "Western culture – wrote Mircea Eliade in *Myths, Dreams and Mysteries* – will be in danger of decline into a sterilizing provincialism, if it despises or neglects the dialogue with other cultures. In fact the West is forced [one might say: condemned] into this encounter and confrontation with the cultural values of the 'other'. Fortunately – he adds – certain discoveries of this century, deep psychology, several revivals of religion, the discoveries of surrealism by modern paintings, the research of ethnology and anthropology – have prepared the ground for such reopening to the East. As a result, the ground for mutual understanding has been prepared. And the 'exotic strangeness' of non-Western civilisations did not seem inferior today even to those less acquainted with such 'otherness', in particular Western politicians and economists".

As foretold by Mircea Eliade long ago, the new perspective of cross-cultural encounters created an unpredicted situation. Modern man of the West, he argued, is no longer the only authority to compare the traditions of different civilisations. Western values are not exemplary any more, from now on they have been carefully studied, evaluated and compared to non-European worlds.[15]

Such a task has been taken and carefully studied by several outstanding scholars. Aurelie Chone published her synthetic outcome of research in her book *Transformation de savoir sur L'Orient dans l'espace germanophone* (Strassburg: University Press, 2009). William Halbfass from Basel University has made the grand synthesis of Indian and European philosophies, comparing them from the point of view of an Asian background in the book *India and Europe. On the Possibility of Mutual Understanding* (Polish translation Warsaw 2005, Dialogue Publ. House). Professor Roman Sławiński made such comparison on the grounds of Chinese modern traditions. As the editor of the book *Confucianism and its Modern Interpretations* (Warszawa: PAN, 2013) he maintained that Confucianist writings and perceptions created a sound background for the identity and integration of Chinese people, who had been divided politically, geographically and culturally, and living in

[14] The concept used by Rudolph Otto in his book entittled *Modernity of Tradition*, Chicago: Chicago University Press 1973.

[15] M. Eliade, *The Ques*t, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 8.

different societies and socio-political systems such as the Chinese People's Republic, the Republic of Taiwan, the United States of America, Western Europe and Australia, places where Confucian heritage was highly if not equally estimated.

Such ideas and strong beliefs may have been derived from his books edited earlier, especially from the collective work entitled *The Modern History of China* (Kraków, 2006), comparing the views of outstanding Asian scholars from the three continents (Ch'ao-jan Wang, Zhang Haipeng, Li Chang, Russian researcher Vitaly Kozyriew, German born Karin Tomala, and well-known in Poland Teresa Halik and Lidia Kasarełło). He also situated the rapid developments of Chinese studies in a very wide perspective as an important part of the new cultural fashions connected with the trend of the "Pacific shift", conditioned with the realities of the Second World War, the American occupation of Japan and the consequences of the end of the Cold War.

In many important academic studies of Western origin contemporary China became the "Centre of World". This category, as Professor Sławiński argued, has always been proclaimed as the background for the classic, mainly Confucianist orientation. But in the worldview of ancient Chinese scholars, he continued, the notion of an Asia was in fact more a literary and psychological construct than a geographical one. For this reason it provided the framework of identification for huge groups of humans, although it might be perceived as a vague category for many foreigners visiting China in ancient and modern times. But it served in some intuitive way, with all their connotations, for the search of associations with the deepest social emotions and the quest of common values, drawing the boundary between 'we' and 'them' in the Chinese search for identity.

For the same reason Roman Sławiński opposing the trend for formal divisions of Chinese people according to geographical regions with the socio-political conditionings of the world order visibly collapsing at the beginning of the third milennium – also strictly opposed the supperficial 'Westernization', of the myths of civilisation, which in reality have been overwhelmed by the Chinese omnipresence the old bureaucratic spirit, where the notion of state is uncontested and organisation wins over competition.

Another dimension of such trends seem to be 'the cheap Easternisation' of the spheres believed to be 'Asian imports', with the spirit of Dao contesting a high degree of predominantly totalitarian societies on the roads to unquestionable freedom. It explains, as shown by Roman Sławiński, the spectacular examples and editorial success of books such as *The Tao of Physic* written by Frijof Capra (10 editions), *The Dancing with Wu Li Masters. An Overview of the New Physics* published by Gary Zukav, *The Tao of Psychology* by Jean Shinoda Bolen, (see also in Poland *Tao Kubusia Puchatka* (Tao of Winnie-the-Pooh), not excluding the extensive political, economic and cultural studies of China in the West. The creation of common platforms of cross-cultural dialogue as a result of the Westernization or Easternization of many fields, has been an important condition in the promotion of many topics of scholarly work.

Professor Sławiński has inspired not only authentic research on Chinese economic and political success. I remember our debates about the true meaning of the Western expansion of Asian martial arts being an important part of my student life and character formation. He pointed out the priority of the Chinese road to the West in this respect, long before the Western explosion of the spectacular myth that was Bruce Lee, an iconic Hollywood actor. Prior to the unquestionable explosion of Chinese 'Easterns' (term opposite to Westerns) dealing with the martial arts of Wu Shu, he had shown the preparatory organic work done by the

count of Jigoro Kano, who became the first Asian member of the World Olympic Comittee and the outstanding spokesman of Japonese pedagogy for many centuries and applied in samurai schools (Ryu). The martial arts phenomenon was based on such philosophical texts as the *Book of Five Rings*, written by the legendary master of the sword Miyamoto Musashi, the unbeatable warrior and uncontested painter and poet. Such legendary personalities, maintained Professor Sławiński, together with their renaissance in the world in modern film (see the creations of Toshiro Mifune in Kurosawa movies) enveloped the West through the imaginary Silk Road. To find other such trails of modern myths (see Andrew L. March, *The Idea of China. Myth and Theory in Geographical Thought,* London 1974) is surely just a question of time. The New Millennium has seen the pursuit of the quest for building bridges of mutual understanding. For this reason the promotion of Confucius Societies in Europe should be reflected as a very important necessity.

Examples of mutual cooperation of Eastern and Western scholars in such contexts are fairly limited in the Polish dimension. Professor Roman Sławiński was among the pioneers. We should also remember the Japanese grants for professor Ewa Pałasz Rutkowska (Director of Japanese Department of Oriental Studies, University of Warsaw), for the collective work *In Search of Polish Graves in Japan* (Warszawa 2010) issued in three language versions: Polish, Japanese, and English, with the extensive co-operation and help by the Polish Ministry of Culture, the Department of Cultural Heritage, and the collaboration of highly specialised Japanese scholars such as Matsumoto Teruo and co-editor Inaba Chiharu. The book has been recognized by Western and Eastern researchers, starting from scholars dealing with accounts of missionaries in the Far East region and ending with the Gatherings of Japanese Combatants Union.

Since becoming widely recognized in Asia, the outcome of these works has been compared to the role of Chopin's music bridging the gap between Japan and Poland. In the book *Chopin gra w duszy japońskiej* (Lech Niekrasz ed. Chopin Echoes in Japanese Soul, Warszawa 2010, Rytm, 2010), the Japanese Ambasador to Poland,Yuichi Sakamoto, regarded the International Piano Tournament in Warsaw as a key to the Japanese soul. It is a pity that such a "bridge" for mutual understanding has not been used for the promotion of similiar research by a group of Polish scholars headed by Jerzy Skowronek (later the Director of Polish Archives whom I met at the end of the 80s in Paris on my French grant at the CRNS in Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales), who for many years compiled documentary work on Polish graves in France. We walked through Parisien boulevards to taste the air of street painting reflected in the imaginary patterns *sur la Seine*. Maybe for these reasons Professor Roman Sławiński also painted landscapes in the Eastern manner, trying to find the key to understanding the Chinese soul.

I remember our walks along the Cracow walls and in the Warsaw passage from the Polish Academy of Science to the University, as a very precious time when the silence had many flavours and words mattered. The true debates took place during our travels in express trains to the Jagiellonian *Alma Mater*. We often talked about the changing relations of India and China. It happens that some of the outcomes of these long journeys waited for better times to be published, and some can be found in *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia,* headed by Professor Sławiński and supported by my presence on the Advisory Council. He strongly emphasized his view of totally misunderstood Chinese interpretations of 'recent happenings' published in native newspapers as a Chinese language version, which differed greatly from official Chinese publications in Western languages and designed for Western readers. To bridge

the gap caused by such polarisation, he compared the same news with entirely different explanations in divergent language versions, with the Chinese press, published together in post-communist China under the supervision of the same censorship. It is worth finding the reminiscences of such lines of arguments in his article, 'Rola jednostki w społeczeństwie konfucjańskim' [The Role of the Individual in Confucian Society], written for the collective book *Uniwersalizm praw człowieka* (Universalism of Human Rights), Warsaw: PAN, 1998) and sponsored by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Foundation. My essay about Gandhism included there can be used as an explanation of the half-forgotten background of the Indian struggle, and the perspective for human rights at the dawn of Indian Independence, rarely questionned nowadays in an India pre-occupied in the quest for economic power.

Commemorating the inspiration of Professor Sławiński, I cannot hide the fact that during my school years we were close neighbours. After the completion of the Palace of Culture construction, the Rector of the University together with forty barracks of students were given the same number of small houses, the "Centre of Friendship" (Osiedle Przyjaźń), constructed for several years by Russian builders living in Poland at the end of the 1950s. Fairly soon it became a kind of unique University Campus, for many years surrounded by beautiful gardens. Situated on the outskirts of Wola, in the 1950s they were designed for Russian engineers and in the 1960s for some outstanding but homeless academic researchers. For this reason my father Jan Tokarski, professor of Warsaw University in lingustic issues, and Roman Sławiński, an Orientalist specializing in Chinese issues could stand in their gardens close to a very low wooden fence, and chat about the possiblilities of publishing a Polish-Chinese dictionary. As the Polish champion of judo I was highly estimated by some Asian residents of our district, mistakenly taken for Master of Kung fu/Wu Shu. Summertime – as the honorary member of Chinese team – I often played basketball with Chinese students attending many Polish universities, living temporarily on holidays in empty barracks, and every afternoon seriously performing their sporting activities considered as a "political duty". Maybe the best outcome of these *rencontres* was my orientation and gravitation towards Asian studies. I chose, as the first faculty of my protracted lifetime studies, the Oriental Department. For this reason, I sometimes return there full of nostalgia. The "Centre of Friendship" is still alive, the wooden houses of Siberian origin and Scandinavian design still look well. But my Father and Roman Sławiński have gone.

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On the So-Called Asian Values Once Again

Abstract

Over the period of the last two or three decades, East Asia has achieved remarkable success. It is hard to imagine today that yet in the 1960s this region was among the poorest in the world. Since then, a fierce discussion has started over the direction s of Asian modernity. With some influences of the Huntingtonian thesis placing cultural differences at the forefront in explaining international instabilities, several scholars have started quite seriously asking questions about the potential linkages between cultural values and political change in East Asia. In this article, I shall attempt to answer how important the role of cultural factors was in bringing about the general change of image of contemporary Asian communities and economies. After making a few preliminary comments on the theoretical relations between culture and development, I shall proceed to indicate some basic elements of both scientific and political discourse, concerning a concept of the so-called Asian values, which is presented as an example of a highly-ideological attempt at contrasting the two following cultural and social contexts: Asian and Western. In the conclusion, I shall try to contrast some myths about the cultural differences with the results of empirical research

Key words: Asian values, East Asian societies, cultural traditions, history experiences, occidentalisation, diversity.

At least, prior to the financial crisis of the late 1990s, East Asia had become a synonym for spectacular economic success. No surprise. If we travel back in time to the 1960s and compare then with current condition of Asian economies, we will be able to fully appreciate the full scale of this success. In 1960, Asia was producing only 4% of the global GNP (gross national product), at the beginning of the 1990s that figure had risen to as much as 25%. Half a century ago, the income of an average inhabitant of Japan, at that time the richest country of the region, amounted to no more than 15% of the average US citizen's income. South Korea was no wealthier than Sudan, whereas Taiwan was almost as poor as Zaire during that time. Back then, the countries of East Asia boasted an impressive rate of growth, reaching 10% per annum. In the middle of the 90s, one-third of the global currency reserves were located in Asia. It started to gradually dawn on the Western population that the image of Asia as one of the world's peripheries was a thing of the past.[1]

As has been noted by the World Bank specialists, the dynamics of developmental pace in East Asia is unprecedented on the global scale. Within a quarter of a century, the average

[1] J. Rohwer, *Asia Rising*, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995, p. 28.

national income in the region's countries rose by four times. The states of the region had quickly managed to integrate their local markets with the world economy, minimise the areas of social poverty and evidently improve their living standards. Following closely behind the success of the so-called Asian Tigers, another group appeared, broader in scope, consisting of rapidly industrialising and dynamically growing economies, which – like the Chinese economy – gradually began to be seen as fostering global growth.[2]

For years, the attempts at explaining the reasons behind the surprising dynamics of East Asian development have been subject to keyareas analysis, undertaken by economists, anthropologists, sociologists, as well as by economic *insiders*. Some specialist argued that a reason for the Eastern Asian civilizational leap lies in the existence of the principal differences in the cultural and social systems of East Asia and "the old world" countries, including the United States and Western Europe, as the most dominant players on the global market.

* * *

The notion of culture has been evolving to take on more and more attributes. More than a century ago, Edward Tylor, in his classical work entitled, *Primitive cultures,* defined culture as being "the complex whole, which includes knowledge, beliefs, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by virtue of the fact that one is a member of a particular society".[3] In the middle of the last century, Alfred Kroeber, in his work *Anthropology*, described culture as a phenomenon encompassing speech, knowledge, beliefs, customs, arts and technologies, ideals and rules inherited through intergenerational communication. Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, in their classic work, *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, supplemented the notion of culture with another essential statement. What they noticed is that culture encompasses a set of rules and modes of behaviour acquired and passed on by means of symbols. The cultural system, specific to a given society, may be thus understood not only as being the sum of experiences acquired by man in a given society, but also – and more so – it may constitute a basis for determining his or her future behaviours and configurations.[4]

* * *

It happened in April, 1994. The Court of the Republic of Singapore was examining the case of an American teenager, Michael Peter Fay, who had been accused of vandalism. Fay, almost a year e, together with a group of his colleagues, had painted graffiti over the cars parked at Chatsworth Road. The judge, Yong Pung How, after hearing the testimonies of the involved parties, made his decision. The American was to be punished by inflicting six cane strokes on his buttocks. This incident of seemingly little importance gave rise to a genuine media event: "the clash of civilisations". The Singapore authorities, despite explicit pressure exerted by the White House, refused to renounce the punishment. The

[2] D.M. Leipziger, T. Vinod, *The Lessons of East Asia: An Overview of Country Experience*, Washington: World Bank, 1993, p. 1.

[3] K.C. Alexander, P.P. Kumaran, *Culture and Development: Cultural Patterns in Areas of Uneven Development*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992, p. 11.

[4] A.L. Kroeber, C. Kluckhohn, 'Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions,' *Papers of the Peabody Museum of American Archaeology and Ethnology*, Vol. XLVII, No. 1, 1952.

case had taken on a symbolic meaning. Asia, through the words of the Singapore Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong, defended its image, its Asian social order and values. Asia raised accusations against immoral Western youth. The West was deeply indignant at the barbarity of Asian regimes. In the wake of this negligible, though dramatic, incident the essence of civilizational disputes over Asian values came to the fore of public attention.

The first symptoms of Asians' growing awareness of their new place in geopolitics had been noted even prior to this incident within Asia itself. In 1989, a book by a Japanese politician and publisher, Shintaro Ishihara, entitled, *The Japan That Can Say No*[5] turned out to be a great success. Ishihara, relinquishing all diplomatic conventions, put forward the argument that Japan ought to take its rightful place, equal to that of the United States, in the system of world geopolitics. In so arguing, he provided much evidence for the existence of the huge, though still unexploited, potential of Asia. Some of Ishihara's comments were truly surprising. American strategists dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima, instead of some German city, solely because they were guided by purely racist premises. The Empire of Japan, in its conquest of particular Asian states, had brought civilisation and freedom to them; American colonisation resulted only in enslavement and backwardness. The book, which sold millions in the United States, was acclaimed as "a racist manifest and a call for bloody confrontation". Asian readers though, received it in a more moderate way – as an attempt at recovering Japan's national pride and a reminder that not only Japan, but also the entire region, is now in the power to say "no".

At the turn of the 80s and the 90s, the economic success achieved by East and Southeast Asia countries triggered a fierce debate over the changes taking place in the contemporary world. Asian countries were facing very serious historical dilemmas. The improvement of living standards generated fundamental discussions as to the nature of social, cultural and finally political changes on the continent. The questions were raised regarding the democratisation of political life, the legitimisation of government, as well as – and often neglected by Western observers – the identity of the people and nations inhabiting the East. For many people, the ongoing processes of globalisation meant the inevitability of the gradual 'occidentalization' of the region – a relinquishing of former points of reference, an annihilation of traditional social organisation, and an ensuing loss of a sense of identity.

Many ideological concepts, referred to as the Asian values programme, fit into this discourse. The Singapore Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew, recognised the concepts of Asian values as a new ideology of Asian rebirth. The concepts were further promoted, with great success, by the Malaysian leader, Mahathir bin Mohamad. A well-known Vietnam political scientist, Nguyen Gia King, observed with sarcasm that it did not escape his attention that both the Prime Minister Lee Kwan Yew and Mahathir Mohamad – the two forerunners of Asian values – were themselves descended from deeply westernised elites of their respective countries, and both of them, and particularly Mahathir, played essential roles in the processes of westernisation in their countries. The Asian values programme was nevertheless, too advantageous for those pragmatic Asian politicians to disregard it.

The peak of its popularity was in the period of the region's highest economic prosperity. The fundamental theses underlining Asian values found their expression in the so-called Bangkok Declaration, signed in April 1993 by a series of leaders from East and Southeast Asia countries, including China, Malaysia and Singapore. The Bangkok Declaration,

[5] Sh. Ishihara, *The Japan That Can Say No. Why Japan Will Be First Among Equals*, New York: Touchstone Books, 1992.

which was meant to codify the essence of Asian values ideology, oscillated between a few interrelated issues, which are worth mentioning. Firstly, the declaration authors raised a simple *cultural* argument that any definition of an individual's role in a society would not be complete without due consideration given to his or her special historical, social, economic and political context, in short – it was to be civilisation-specific. Secondly, the declaration also listed arguments for a *communitarian* nature of Asian societies. According to this view, an individual's duties towards his family and society constitute the core of social life, contrary to Western individualism and an atomistic comprehension of Western society. If community interests override individual interests, then consequently any demonstration of an individual's right would pose a threat to the order and harmonious functioning of a society. The declaration states further arguments to support a notion of citizens' voluntary subjection to discipline in all dimensions of social life, including family and workplace relations, as well as politics. The self-discipline of Asian societies, according to the authors of the declaration, is a result of their culturally conditioned needs to achieve economic success. The conclusion that stems from such suppositions is a preferential treatment of social and economic rights over citizen and political rights – with a high value placed on "a right to develop". Finally, *an organic* argument is propounded, according to which state and society constitute one integral body – with the government exerting its authority in the interest of common good. A simple consequence of this line of thinking is to admit that any criticism of government is in conflict with the interest of people at large.

The arguments presented in the Bangkok Declaration were interpreted by the majority of observers as being in line with Confucian tradition, as it glorified the state and its structures. Confucianism, as the amalgamation of religious and philosophical thought, has a natural correspondence with Chinese tradition. Although, a large part of East Asia was directly affected by these teachings, it would be an exaggeration to say that Chinese political values were prevalent in Southeast Asia and, more so, Asia in general. Many enthusiasts of the Asian values and ideology that Confucianism spread throughout the entire region in a belief – by an analogy with Weber's idea of protestant ethics – that their adherence to this philosophy would secure economic success for the region. Moreover, Confucianism called for an acceptance of hierarchy, a necessity to maintain social harmony, respect for and subjection to family and government, which were seen as a natural extension of the former. This concept – one of the basic premises of the Asian values programme – demonstrated the inadequacy of Western democratic rule for Asian countries. The Asian concept of power is based on the supposition that there exists some special quality, attributed to specific individuals or social groups, rather than on the necessity to achieve special goals, important for a society. Consequently, for an individual to achieve success within governmental structures, it is sufficient to live in accordance with his or her status. Any opposition to authority is regarded as an attack against the social system, and one cannot expect to be supported by society in his or her rebellion against the system, because society constitutes such a system.

Religion is an integral element of Asian cultural values. In fact, it does not only accompany the life of each Asian, but it also rules their existence from birth to death. It defines the value systems at work and in social, economic and political life. This remains true, regardless of the obvious multiplicity of religions in East Asia (Buddhism, Islam or Christianity) and noticeable secularisation processes at work. Asian leaders claim that the consistent separation of church and state that took place in the West – which restricted religion to private life – has resulted in a complete absence of moral values in public life and a harmful growth of

individualistic tendencies. In Asia, religion was attached to the sphere of politics. Under Asian tradition, both God and rulers are notions that are very closely linked, if not equivalent. In Confucian China, the emperor was the God; in the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia the God is the ruler; in Hindu India or Buddhist Thailand the ruler is God's envoy.

The politicised nature of the debate on Asian values was not only motivated by the differentiation of basic cultural elements. The essence of the matter was that "Asian values" were, and still frequently are, mistakenly contrasted with "Western values" – a different, not wholly defined concept. Some politicians, such as Mahathir bin Mohamad, used these contrasting strategies in the context of Asian values regeneration, by contrasting them, in a moral and economic sense, with the decadent West. The power of Asian values consisted of the fact that they were antagonistic to liberal, Christian and cosmopolitan values flooding in from the West. Asian values are frequently discussed in the context of East-West dichotomy, which increases a tendency of exaggeration and generalisation. Asian values – contrary to the intentions of their creators – with their commitment to community and family as the foundations of society, with respect for science, hard work and social obligations – were often shown in opposition to the West, specifically the breakdown of the notion of family, and the destructive forces of decadence, hedonism, exuberant individualism, and moral degeneration contributing to the inevitable fall of Western civilisation.

This rhetoric was often resorted to in the absence of real arguments. The West was described as a hotbed of decadence and depravity. Asia was to triumph over the West because of its "superior" value system. The arrogance and imperialism demonstrated by Western civilisation, which was trying to impose its own rules over the world, were to come to an end. The future was to belong to the Asians. A Singapore ambassador at UNO, Kishore Mahbubani, was the master of rhetoric in Asian values. He exclaimed: "Go East, young people! We've reached the end of a 500year period of Western dominance. The Mediterranean Sea was the ocean of the past, the Atlantic is the ocean of today, the Pacific will become the ocean of tomorrow".

A slightly more moderate position in that regard was taken by a new generation of Thai politicians. One of the Thai ministers, Surin Pitsuwan, expressed this new stance in the following words: "I say to Americans: look at us, we are developing the same as you are. In many aspects, we are almost like your mirror reflection. But you should understand that we also have the right to differ from you in some respects".

The economic crisis of the late 90s, brought about by a rapid decrease of exports in the region, and the subsequent breakdown of the currency system of East and Southeast Asian countries, contributed to lowering the temperature of the debate on Asian values, and sharp edged rhetoric figures gave way to much more moderate statements by Asian leaders and intellectuals.

* * *

The discourse, concerned with relations between traditional Confucian values and modernisation processes in East Asia, has gradually become a matter of interest for scholars and researchers. Apart from considering the theoretical aspects of these interrelations, some of them undertook complex field observations, which would verify the nature of the interdependence between models and the actual attitudes of respondents. One of the first scientists who raised the issue of Asian values in the context of their influence on the organisation of social relations and political life in contemporary East Asian countries, was

an American scholar, David I. Hitchcock, from the Washington Centre for Strategic and International Studies.[6]

In his study on Asian values (Figure 1 and 2), he asked one hundred respondents from the United States and seven East Asian countries (China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) to rank what personal and social values or traits, from the two presented lists, they believed were particularly important to their countrymen. Two out of five of the most frequently indicated values or personal traits and correspondingly, two out of the six most popular social values were on the priority list of both Asians and Americans. The answers supplied by the Americans and Asians differed most significantly with respect to the relative importance that both sides attached to such issues as "social order and harmony", "personal liberty" and "individual rights". The first of the aforementioned items was marked as "particularly important" by 11% of Americans and 71% of Asians, whereas the two remaining variables were indicated by 82 % of Americans and 32% of Asians, and 78% of Americans and 29% of Asians, respectively.

In a further part of his study, Hitchcock once again interviewed one hundred respondents from East Asia and eighteen Americans, by asking them to carefully examine twelve different ruling practices. The respondents were to mark those items on the list which in their opinion, were the most important and those which were considered the least important. While compiling the list of practises, Hitchcock avoided using expressions, such as "right to something" or "freedom of something", trying to formulate his questions in such a way as to obtain the highest possible level of objectivity.

Fig. 1. Social values as shown by Hitchcock's research: Asians and Americans



Source: study on the basis of D.I. Hitchcock. 1994. *Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

[6] D.I. Hitchcock, *Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?,* Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1994.

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

Source: study on the basis of D.I. Hitchcock. 1994. *Asian Values and the United States: How Much Conflict?*, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Three out of twelve positions, i.e. "freedom of speech", "choosing leaders in free elections" and "lack of discrimination due to race, religious faith, and skin colour, gender, age or physical disability" were marked as the most important by 100% of Americans. With regards to the Asian respondents, the most frequently indicated items were: "free elections", "honest work" (with reference to local conditions), "humanitarian terms and conditions of work and working hours", and subsequently "lack of discrimination". In comparison with the Americans, the Asians placed a higher value on social order and harmony, respect for authorities, maintaining the *status quo* with respect to harmony, and a respect for knowledge. At the same time, both the Americans and the Asians showed considerable appreciation for hard work, honesty, self-realisation, responsibility in public officials and innovativeness.

In summarising the results of his studies, Hitchcock arrived at roughly the same conclusion as the spokesmen for relativistic order, according to whom there is a fundamental difference in the hierarchy of values between Asian and American respondents. Apart from evident differences in the scope relating to "the ruling practises", what emerges from Hitchcock's questionnaires is a fundamental difference in the so-called "world of hidden convictions", relating to personal and social values. Hitchcock's research studies had wide repercussions among the groups of scholars dealing with Asian values, and their results were used, more than once, to justify the legitimacy of different social systems in Western and East Asian civilisations, as well as to prove their possibly different evolutionary directions.

However, some serious methodological objections have been raised against the research made by Hitchcock, contesting a 'too universal' nature of the received results. The sample analysed by Hitchcock was too small to formulate such far reaching conclusions. Hitchcock, an American, had conducted his research in person, a fact which undoubtedly affected the contents of the answers given. Furthermore, questionnaires (the fact which the American researcher was open about)

were submitted for answers to the so-called opinion leaders – politicians and representatives of scientific and business circles. The opinion leaders of East Asia, with a few exceptions, at the time of conducting the research, were in the middle of a great ideological, inter-civilizational debate, in which the universality of Western values was shown in opposition to the relativistic view presented by the East. These groups, by the natural course of things, projected such an image of the value system as they would wish for their own communities. This programmatic subjectivism of the examined group, was certainly not conducive to showing the actual condition and scope of the traditional Asian values embedded in the contemporary societies of this region.

By means of comparable research instruments, a team of students from the Sociology Institute of Warsaw University, together with the Social Sciences Faculty of Hanoi University, took up in 2003 under my guidance, research into the value system of Hanoi University students. In our studies, we tried to avoid making excessive generalisations on civilisations, as Hitchcock did, planning to make our project a small scale endeavour. While conducting our research, we tried to provide maximum anonymity. What is more, the questionnaires in Vietnam were carried out by local co-workers, and each respondent was informed that the sole organiser of the research was the Social Sciences Faculty at Hanoi University, which allowed for a reduction of possible answer distortions.[7]

Having analysed our research, we noticed the essential similarities, as well as no less important differences, in the respondents' comprehension of values hierarchy, when compared with the published results of David Hitchcock's questionnaires. These discrepancies, reaching now and then 30%, have a bearing on the configuration of the values most frequently declared as essential. Inasmuch as the most frequently indicated personal values in Hitchcock's research were: "hard work", "respect for science", "individual achievements", "honesty" and "self-discipline", a set of the most frequently declared values, as revealed by our research, were as follows: "independence", "achieving success in life", "helping others" and "honesty".

Basically, the traditional model of individual beliefs and conduct is undermined only by a drastic fall in the number of people who consider "self-discipline" as an essential value.[8] At the same time, the young Vietnamese respondents regard values promoting an exceptional role of community, such as "helping others" and "respect for parents", fundamental in Confucian tradition, with even more seriousness than the Asian elites examined by Hitchcock.

In light of the above, we may ask ourselves if there is any essential change taking place in the way individuals define themselves and in the way they perceive social reality. It seems that the results of the research allow for a positive answer to this question – the proof is the high position assigned to the variable "being successful in life". This value has been indicated by respondents almost as many times as "hard work", "respect for knowledge" or "independence". (The Asian elites examined by Hitchcock indicated "success" far less often than "hard work": 26% and 76%, respectively). What can then be a meaning of such change?

Basic personal values, which attest to the vitality of tradition, including the Confucian tradition, seemingly still have many followers in contemporary Vietnam society. The same as before, a considerable number of our respondents set much store by such traits as" hard work", "respect for knowledge", "independence", "honesty" and "obedience to and respect

[7] See: A.W. Jelonek, *Młodzież wietnamska. Systemy wartości. Stereotypy Zachodu* [Vietnamese Youth. System of Values. Stereotypes of the West], Warszawa: Scholar, 2004.

[8] See K. Tomala, 'Prawa człowieka w Chińskiej Republice Ludowej', in *Chiny. Przemiany państwa i społeczeństwa w okresie reform 1978–2000* [Human Rights in the People's Republic of China, in China. Changes of State and Society in the Period of Reforms 1978–2000], Warszawa: TRIO, 2001, p. 141.

for parents". Although, in comparison with the results obtained by Hitchcock, such values as "hard work", "respect for knowledge" and "honesty" have received a slightly lower percentage of indications, there are still no grounds to say that this scope of values lost its social significance, to any larger degree. The more so if we assume that, in as much as the age and status of the people examined by Hitchcock created a bias towards a conservative estimation of social significance attached to traditional values, the relatively young age of the Vietnamese respondents inclined them towards more radical judgements.

From the point of view of the relations existing between the traditional system of Confucian values and modernisation processes, the results of the Vietnamese research, in comparison to Hitchcock's analysis, yield slightly different conclusions. We are dealing at this point with a process of supplementing traditional values with new values. In this way, a new cohesive and logical whole is formed, within the framework of which traditional values are, contrary to expectations, not being superseded by new, Western specific values, but are just becoming more entrenched, because of their connection with the goals set by a new reality. Thus, obligations rooted in tradition become in this model, interconnected with rights – in this case the right to achieve success. Success, in the eyes of young Vietnamese students, is not inevitably seen as stemming from individual achievements. The individualisation of goals, manifest in an individual's striving for his or her own success and in an individual's awareness of his or her rights, does not entail an individualisation of actions, although, theoreticians of individualism often interrelate an individual perspective of goals with an individual model of action (based on self-steering responses and self-reliance). Under Vietnamese conditions, the most pragmatically convenient way to realize one's goals is still apparently, as part of a collective action – an attitude which is treated not so much as a value in itself, but as a convenient and effective method of action.

A considerable shift, in comparison with Hitchcock's results, can also be noticed with respect to a set of social values, most frequently declared as essential. The most highly estimated values of the Hitchcock research, such as "harmony" and "social order", in the Hanoi results give way to such notions as "community rights" and "individual freedom". On the other hand, "respect for public officials" occupies third position in terms of the frequency of indications in both studies. A similarly high position is taken, in comparable results, by such variables as "respect for government" and "innovativeness". A substantial, 20% difference between the respective indications for "individual freedom" leads to the conclusion that this value, in the opinion of Vietnamese students, should not be included in the catalogue of values considered as the most essential. In turn, 48% of the indications for the "resolution of disputes by means of a public debate" means that this social value occupies the fifth position in terms of the number of indications.

As much as 65% of the indications for "individual freedom" (in comparison with 31% from the Hitchcock research) may be taken as a harbinger of a growing importance attached to the ethics of rights; in the results from the Vietnamese research, it is the most frequently marked value as well. It is also important to note that the surveyed Vietnamese students passed over the values highly estimated by the respondents from the Hitchcock research. Such omitted values include: "harmony" (28% against 58% in Hitchcock's research), "social order" (28% against 71%) and "consensus" (12.3% against 39%). The special importance attached to these values was, according to the American scholar, perhaps the most fundamental feature of the Asian view of the public sphere, in addition to being a key to understanding the role of an individual in East Asian society.

In light of the Vietnamese research, some new scientific hypotheses claims our attention. A simplistic version of the "relativism" of political systems, emerging from Hitchcock's

research, does not seem to find confirmation in this case. Global transformations and their impact on Vietnamese youth, both seem to attest to the ongoing hybridisation process, by which traditional Confucian values are being supplemented with the selectively treated values, borrowed from the liberal West.

* * *

I have decided to additionally verify the hypothesis on the deep divisions between the value systems of Western and Confucian traditions, by analysing the durability of the traditional Confucian value system in an Asian country, undergoing the most advanced processes of social, political and economic modernisation, namely Taiwan. My point of reference for the Taiwan research was the measurement applied to the value system of Polish society – as a representative of Western civilisation.

Taiwan, one of the famous Asian Tigers, apart from achieving spectacular economic success over the recent years, has become the arena for fundamental transformations in political life. The rapidly advancing reforms of the main public life institutions, began in 1996, were tantamount to the transformation of a political stage model – from an authoritarian state, through various intermediate stages (the so-called, 'limited democracy'), to a fully democratic system, based entirely on models derived from the West. Such a revolutionary change of the country system is considered by politologists to be a historically unprecedented event.[9]

In 1949, the activists from the Nationalist Party (*Kuomindang* – KMD), having suffered defeat at the hands of communist forces and having escaped from continental China, made an attempt to establish their strategic abutment in Taiwan. Few observers believed that they would ever succeed in establishing in Taiwan an efficiently operating economy and civil administrative structures, let alone the foundations of a democratic system. These fears as it later turned out, proved unjustified to a large extent.

The applied research procedure did not basically differ from the one adopted for the aforementioned research in 2003. It was also based on a questionnaire model, as was previously applied by Hitchcock, which consisted of contrasting traditional Confucian values with idealised liberal values of the West. The Taiwanese research was performed over the period from October to December 2007, and involved a quota sample of 418 students (215 women and 203 men). It covered the three biggest academic centres in the city (two public ones: the National Taiwan University and the National Chengchi University and one private, Tamkang University). The second part of the research relied on questionnaires, which were carried out among the students of Warsaw universities. Within the period from March to May 2008, 463 people were examined, including 240 women and 223 men. The studies covered the greatest public universities in the capital city of Warsaw, including Warsaw University, Warsaw University of Technology and Warsaw School of Economics, as well as the private school, B. Jański Higher School.

Although, the conducted studies registered only a state of facts at one specific moment in time, which does not provide grounds for making legitimate statements on the course of the processes of social change and political values modernisation, it would be reasonable to expect that, within two decades of democratic rule, the interactions between a sphere of axiology and political *praxis* should take place.

[9] L. Chao, R.H. Myers, *The First Chinese Democracy: Political Life in the Republic of China on Taiwan*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.

Fig. 3. Personal values as shown by the research into the preferences of Taiwanese and Polish students



Source: own work.

The research results yield very interesting conclusions. As far as personal values are concerned (figure 3), almost all the answers given by Taiwan respondents reveal their tendency to indicate traditional Confucian values equally frequently or even more frequently than the respondents of both the Hitchcock and the Hanoi research. And thus, 74.3% of the examined subjects opted for "hard work", i.e. slightly fewer than in Hitchcock's research, though far more than in the Vietnam research. The indications of the typically Confucian values, such as "respect for education" (71.1%), "obedience to parents" (41.1%), "self-discipline" (33.2%) or "fulfilling one's obligations towards others" (47.2%), are more frequent or noticeably more frequent among the Taiwanese respondents than it is the case in both the Vietnamese research and the research conducted by the American scholar. The values from within the scope of Western liberal values, which were indicated as essential by Taiwanese respondents, are similar to the answers indicated in the previous research carried out in the territory of East Asia. "Self-discipline" was indicated by 49.2% of the examined persons, "self-realisation" – 36.3%, "individual achievements" – 34.8%, and "success in life" – 31.7%.

It is necessary to note at this point that the value system chosen by the comparative group of Polish students, paradoxically bears greater resemblance, in many respects, to the idealised model of traditional Confucian values, than to the model of 'the liberal West'. With regard to such issues as "independence" (77.3%), "meeting one's obligations" (14.6%) or "individual success in life" (59.4%), Polish students are, in actual fact, catching up with

American respondents. However, in the case of such values as "respect for education" (56.4%), "hard work" (52.8%) or "obedience to parents" (32%), the Polish respondents appear to be, on the basis of their answers at least, very Confucian-like.

Coming back, however, to the analysed issue of the influence of the democratisation process on a hypothetical transformation of the system, it seems that, within the observed time horizon, the system has remained largely unchanged. What is also worth highlighting at this point is that the respondents in both studies were students, that is to say, people who were born, or at least brought up, in a new democratic reality.

Even more interesting conclusions on the relations between Asian values and liberal democracy can be drawn from the second part of the questionnaire, concerned with the analysis of social values. It is evident at first sight that the value system of Taiwanese youth, on most dimensions, is not essentially different from the value systems held by the respondents from the Hitchcock or Vietnamese research. For example, a relatively high number of indications of Confucian values among Taiwan respondents were noticed with reference to such variables as: "respect for authorities" (39.1%), "harmony" (44%), "consensus" (37.2%) or "society rights" (42.4%), as well as a relatively low position for "resolution of debates by means of a public debate" (31.6%) or "independent thinking" (25.4%) from the set of liberal values. At the same time, one can notice a considerable growth in the area of such variables of liberal values as: "making decisions by majority" (46.7%), "individual freedom" (73.3%) or "freedom of speech" (67.4%).

Fig. 4. Personal values as shown by the research into the preferences of Taiwanese and Polish students



Source: own work.

In comparison with the values estimated highly by Polish youth, Taiwanese students are still the adherents of the considerably different values of a traditional Confucian type. The most notable differences between the two could be observed within the scope of the meaning attributed to such variables as "social order" (49%), "harmony" (35%), "society rights" or "consensus" (each 29%). The probable reason is that the terminology used in the questionnaire could be partly incomprehensible for Polish respondents. Additionally, the non-existence of such terms in the public discourse could lead to their meaning being distorted by subjective perspectives or interpreted differently, in accordance with distinct cultural contexts (for example, "resolution of disputes by means of private settlements"). What really deserves to be highlighted in our analysis of the relations between traditional Confucian values and procedural democracy is the fact that most of the values presented to respondents as belonging to a liberal sphere are considered, by both societies, as very important. With regard to the above, both societies differ only negligently (except for the variable "decisions made by majority"), taking into account that the two groups of students come from completely different cultural contexts and political traditions. The occurrence of such discrepancies may be a result of the deeply rooted Confucian tradition, but other explanations are also possible.

The results of the comparative studies carried out in both Taipei and Warsaw, as well as the conclusions from the previous Hitchcock research and the "Vietnam 2003" project, shed some interesting light on the changes occurring in East Asia. These results also reveal an interesting correlation of Confucianism and liberal democracy, or at least its constitutional procedures. On the basis of the collected scientific samples, it is hard to believe unreservedly in a vision of two completely different cultures, the liberal West and Confucian East, as proposed by cultural relativists. Similarly, it is hard to convince oneself that the existence of the alleged internal obstacles to democracy development in traditional Asian value systems, is an indelible fact.

The obtained results prove the applicability of a modernity model, according to which value systems are subject to slowly, though inevitably, advancing convergence processes. It is not advisable, however, to reach unambiguous conclusions on this point. An essentially binary vision of the communal, hierarchical reality of Eastern society, promoted first by cultural relativists and then by Hitchcock, contrasted with the individualistic and liberal Western society, does not suffice in making an accurate analysis of the changes on an axiology plane. In as much as the obtained statistical data provides grounds to observe that a traditional model of society, based on harmony and social consent, has partially lost its impact. The obtained data does not allow for stating unequivocally that the change in this case consisted of a noticeable shift in the subjects' indications of a Western value system. Due to the multiplicity and variety of relations between different cultural and social-organisational aspects, it is insufficient to discuss them solely in terms of models' undertaking and adaptation to the context of a domestic culture.

* * *

What are Asian values in essence? To what roots can East Asian societies, now at a crossroads, own up to? The fact that this issue is exploited for political ends both by Asians themselves and external critics alike often leads to very convenient generalisations. Professor Krzysztof Gawlikowski, one of the Polish scholars specialising in Asian values, states in one of his works: "The distinctiveness of philosophical and religious traditions of Asia is basically indubitable". There is a general consent on this point. Nevertheless, if we care to take a closer look at the phenomenon of Asian values, we will see that it is based on a whole series of premises which

cannot be defended on methodological grounds. In fact, the term "Asian values" is in itself suggestive of some uniform social, economic and political systems; that we can determine and distinguish a set of values shared by inhabitants of Asian states, which reaches beyond the dividing lines of national states and of religious and ideological influences. Is this really the case?

First and foremost, if we look at the issue of Asian values outside of their special context, we can notice that they are similar to a set of conservative values, which are absolutely commonplace and prevalent not only in the analysed area, but are also frequently attributed to societies in general as well as non-modernised societies. Such values include strong leadership, respect for governments, law and order, communitarian orientation placing emphasis on the priority of community interests over individual interests, and stressing the importance of family. In light of the above, it is difficult to answer the question whether or not Asian values are merely a stage in the modernisation process in the "taking-shape" of Eastern societies.

A similar ambiguity accompanies the consideration of the second issue. Asian countries were founded on the basis of very distinct and mutually independent traditions. We can roughly assume that East Asia, with respect to culture, bears an unmistakable mark of Chinese influence and is imbued, to varying degrees, with elements of Confucian philosophy. Western Asia is a mixture of Hindi and Muslim culture. Southern countries, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, are Islamic to a considerable extent. On the other hand, Thai and Burmese cultures are shaped by Buddhist influences, whereas the Philippine reality would be difficult to understand without a reference to Catholicism. In any case, Western culture put down its roots globally, particularly from the beginning of the 20th century. The respective countries know very little about each other. Even an educated Japanese citizen may find it difficult to answer the question as to whether Iran and Iraq are located in Asia.

The meandering of history adds more complexity to this situation. It is difficult to find any trace of Asian solidarity. The Japanese still consider themselves as the elite, superior to the rest of the Asian nations. The inhabitants of Thailand regard any concept of "common values" with great distrust, perceiving it not so much as a sign of a Western cultural invasion, but more so as an expression of Malaysian or Chinese imperialism. The Chinese, regardless of the dramatic historical events of the last century, did not quite renounce their ancestors' belief that Chinese people are the centre of any perceived civilised world, surrounded by prevalently barbarian nations, deprived of any value system. The great Chinese Diaspora, which plays an essential role in the economy of almost all regional states, is seen by local populations as a natural enemy. The studies show that an average Malay, when asked about a potential threat to his or her own traditions, is certain to point to the "excessive presence of Chinese culture", rather than to occidentalisation.[10] The idea of Asia, as one entity with uniform value systems, raises serious doubts even if only confronted with these arguments.

To summarise, Asia is too large and too diversified – considering its richness of cultural and historical traditions, and its multiplicity of colonial and modern history experiences – to be reduced to a common denominator. What is more, culture itself is too dynamic and creative a phenomenon to allow for very stereotypical constructions. It is so, because each culture covers independent, historically co-occurring traditions and interpretations, as well as competing values and constant intercultural exchanges with other systems. Such diversity does not only pertain to entire geographical regions or civilizational areas, but also to states, nations or even local groups themselves.

[10] H. Wan, *Race Relations in Malaysia*, Kuala Lumpur: Heinemann Educational Books, 1983, p. 84.

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Human Rights in China and the Philosophical Perspective

Abstract

In today's socio-political reality, human rights take an important place as part of the debate on the relationship between the citizen and the state. Against this background, we can distinguish those states which do not belong to the circle of Western culture, including China. The author raises the question of a presence of human rights in China, treating it as a philosophical issue. He points to the need for taking on a perspective of economic development as an opportunity to improve the situation of the individual. The author considers the possibility of an implementation of a new political model and indicates the threats to human rights in China.

Key words: human rights, China, economic freedom, Western culture, liberty of individual

Introduction

Human rights are an issue, which has recently described the events functioning in a socio-political reality. They are present in the discourse of political science as both a desideratum of the relations between the state and the individual, as well as in the space of concepts verifying a qualitative dimension of legislation. Due to a perception of the legality of political regimes through a prism of human rights, they are included in the scope of a normative critique of forms of organization of the political sphere. The teleological function of a state in today's reality should take into account the legal grounds for a demand of individual rights in interactions with the institutions of public authority.

The social sciences list many definitions of human rights.[1] In my analysis, I will refer to a definition proposed by the *Encyclopedia of Public International Law* that recognizes[1] this

[1] "Human rights are the qualified form of rights and freedoms of the individual, projected to protect their interests, attributable to each human person, regardless of nationality and of any differentiating characteristics", Wiesław Skrzydło (ed.), *Polskie prawo konstytucyjne* [Polish Constitutional Law], Lublin: Verba, 2003, p. 154. This definition would suggest an objective and intercultural nature of human rights, which, however, does not apply outside a circle of Western civilization in the West. In addition, Wiktor Osiatyński states: 'human rights are universal, moral laws of a fundamental nature, associated with each individual in their dealings with a state. The concept of human rights is based on three arguments: first, that every authority is limited, and second, that each person has a sphere of autonomy, to which no power has access; and thirdly, that each individual can claim a state to protect their rights', Wiktor Osiatyński, *Szkoła Praw Człowieka. Teksty wykładów* [School of Human Rights. The Texts of Lectures], Vol. 1, Warszawa: Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka, 1998, p. 16. This statement accentuates a limitation of the state's power as a source of human rights. Katarzyna

category as a 'means of protection and the services which should be respected according to currently accepted freedoms; all people should be able to claim them from the society they live in.[2] It seems to be valuable due to the emphasis of the temporal and historical nature of human rights. Human rights are not absolute and universal; and furthermore, they are not rooted in a transcendent, normative system. They take the form of an incarnation of the current ideas on the individual's freedom, approaching the Hegelian conception of truth as the variable value over time and depending on the beliefs of the community.[3] In my article I see human rights as a system of rules governing the liberties of those individuals that do not possess supernatural sanctions and are not a result of natural law, but should be treated as a projection of the rationalist and restitutionary ideas concerning a human person.

In my analysis, I refer to the perception of human rights as a category which belong to the philosophical rather than the legal sphere; the aim of this article is to examine the chances of an implementation of human rights in China. I am aware of the fact that this category is a part of two different traditions (i.e. the West and East) of political and social philosophy. I pay special attention to these economic issues as an important category for an analysis of bilateral relations. The thesis of my paper is one that through liberal economic solutions and focusing the government's attention primarily on an economic sphere, it is possible to strengthen the position of Chinese citizens in their relations with the state, which to the highest extent expresses the spirit of their human rights.

Human rights as a philosophical category

Theorists of human rights perceive this category as inherently related to a human person and associated with man at birth. C. Wellman points out that the real nature of human rights result from the humanity of man.[4] This interpretation points to the integral nature of human rights and its autonomy in relation to positive law. However, it is a lack of rootedness in transcendence, highlighting the subjective nature of a human person with respect to power and dealing with the sphere of the community as a common good, which has contributed to the discretionary treatment of certain groups of citizens.

Philosophically, human rights arise from a separation of reason and faith. The foundation of this epistemological diversification is the thirteenth century's revolution of Averroism. The belief in the eternity of the world and the unity of souls (a form of mono-psychism) was a breach of the orthodoxy, but also the greatest importance that should be attributed to the concept of two truths, both religious and philosophical; the religious truth by Averroes was seen as a more accessible interpretation of philosophical truth,[5] the simultaneous

Koszewska emphasizes the contextual nature of human rights, describing them as 'basic, universal and inherent rights of the human being in their relations with the public authorities', Katarzyna Koszewska (ed.), *Prawa człowieka – poradnik nauczyciela* [Human Rights – a Teacher's Guide], Warszawa: Centralny Ośrodek Doskonalenia Nauczycieli, 2002, p. 11.

[2] *Encyclopedia of Public International Law*, Vol. 8, Human Rights and the Individual in International Law. International Economic Relations, Amsterdam–New York–Oxford: North Holland Publishing Company, 1985, p. 268.

[3] Heinrich Rickert, *Die probleme der Geschichtsphilosophie*, Heidelberg: Winter, 1924, p. 90.

[4] Carl Wellman, *An Approach to Rights: Studies in the Philosophy of Laws and Morals*, Dordrecht: Springer Science & Business Media, 1997, p. 81.

[5] Bonnie Kent, *Virtues of the Will: the Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century*, Michigan: Catholic University of America Press, 1995, p. 41.

existence of the religious truth, as revealed by grace and through the teaching of the Church, and philosophical truth, experienced cognitively, which would suggest a possibility of a simultaneous existence of the two of these contrary to one and another.[6] An intellectual separation of reason and faith has led to the undermining of the Church's authority in shaping rationalistic truths. The modern conflict between faith and reason first resulted in the Enlightenment's agnosticism of state institutions and secondly – in the twentieth century's totalitarianisms, arising from a supremacy of ideology (understood as a holistic vision of the world, creating also its own ethics and new concept of man)[7] over a natural law. When ideology ceased to be coherent with traditional morality, it rejected religious truth, proclaiming that only philosophy has the legitimacy to represent the temporal perceptions of an individual. The sphere of the dogmatic gave way to reason, which, however, by not having supernatural sanctions, was unable to design a fair idea of social relationships.

The separation of the philosophical truths of the eschatological and ethical foundation, being a consequence of Revelation, has caused the emancipation of the human mind as a separate entity to build its own reality, as an alternative to the traditional, socio-political order. Thus the modern trend towards the creation of ideology was born. Soon we could experience the evolution of ideas on the law. Modern ideologues have introduced the concept of a state of nature as a category aimed at describing a certain reality existing before founding a state, in which individuals had specific permissions associated with them due to their humanity.[8] Furthermore, these rights were not a consequence of the restrictions of the freedom of others, but had a positive connotation, as the birthright of freedom for abstract people.

Human rights emerge as an ideology, due also to its wishful nature. Ideology, as Hannah Arendt emphasized, is a result of modernity, while assuming the postulated reality[9] one that should arise as a result of the implementation of theoretical assumptions of philosophers engaged in social engineering. Arbitrarily, a prior reality – according to the ideologues – should be established in order to achieve the main goal of humanity: a temporal happiness. Human rights, like ideology, ignore the empirical judgment of man's political and social nature; they do not lend themselves to verification, but seek to replace the current reality with a kind of counter-reality, and believe in the amelioration of the *status quo*. Human rights are not a recent vision, but a chiliastic one.

Human rights are also a political utopia. As noted by Thomas Molnar, the cause of political utopia is the abandonment of faith in God and his commandments[10] when a human mind doubts the legitimacy of revelation, it starts looking for support in accordance with its own theoretical concepts. The individual mind wants to create the Kingdom of Heaven on earth. Similarly, human rights do not refer to the Ten Commandments, but are a rationalist and secularist result of the destruction of the traditional order – both religious and political. This

[6] Adam Wielomski, *Konserwatyzm – między Atenami a Jerozolimą* [Conservatism – between Athens and Jerusalem], Warszawa: Fijor Publishing Company, 2009, p. 13.

[7] Idem, *Filozofia polityczna francuskiego tradycjonalizmu 1796–1830* [Political Philosophy of the French Traditionalism 1796–1830], Warszawa: Capital, 2013, p. 18.

[8] Pierre Jurieu, *Les soupirs de la France esclave, qui aspire apr*ès la liberté [Sighs of a French Slave Who Longs for Liberty], 1689, John Locke, *Dwa traktaty o rządzie* [Two Treatises of Government], p. 136.

[9] Hannah Arendt, *Korzenie totalitaryzmu* [The Origins of Totalitarianism], Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, 2008, pp. 233–235, 241.

[10] Thomas Molnar, *L' Utopie. Eternelle* Hérésie [Utopia. Eternal Heresy], Paris: Beauchesne, 1973, p. 249.

concept was put into practice by the French Jacobins and revolutionaries of the twentieth century. Wishing happiness for the new man, they all wanted to demolish the existing order, with its roots in human nature and the objective laws described by social physics.

Human rights do not take a universal form, and are not common either, as modern culture considers abortion as a human right, while accepting the exclusion of older people from the group of individuals possessing an unfettered right to life. Narrowing the circle of those with the inalienable rights of individuals, human rights theorists reject the Christian concept of the individual as a being with a soul, implying a human dignity.[11] They stress the Cartesian formula *Cogito, ergo sum*, indicating the identification of humanity with an existence of thought processes. Unborn children and the elderly, i.e. those who cannot demonstrate the aforementioned features, do not have the natural rights of man.

Human rights as a freedom through economy

It seems that the beginning of economic relations between China and an integral Europe could be considered as the agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China, signed on April 3rd, 1978. The result of this bilateral co-operation was the 'Joint Committee on Trade Co-operation'. As a long – term result, the closer economic relations of the two entities is shown by the access of Chinese products to most markets in the European Economic Community.[12] At present, China is one of the most important economic partners of the European Union. China is the second-largest trading partner of the European Union.[13] In 2005 trade turnover was recorded at 210 billion euros, which is sixty times greater than that compared to the 1970's and the beginning of bilateral economic relations. Only the co-operation between the Community and the United States take on a larger proportion Chinese import modern technologies on a massive scale – The European Union's participation factor in this case is 50%.[14] An important document also was the report *The European Union – China: Closer Partners, Growing Responsibilities*, published by the European Union in 2006. It pointed to the crucial role of mutual economic relations and stressed the political importance of China as a key player on the global political stage. The significant effect was the power China had to lead to a strategic partnership with the European Union and in particular in the field of trade and investment (document *Competition and Partnership*). Joint arrangements were made to promote a free market, contributing to the implementation of the obligations arising from China's membership in the World Trade Organization and ensuring respect for intellectual property.[15] Mutual co-

[11] *Katechizm Kościoła Katolickiego* [Catechism of the Catholic Church], Warszawa: Pallottinum, 1994, paragraphs 2270, 2274.

[12] Tomasz Białowąs, Magdalena Kąkol, 'Stosunki handlowe Unii Europejskiej z Chinami w latach 1995–2007' [Trade Relations between the European Union and China] in *Pozycja Unii Europejskiej w handlu międzynarodowym* [Position of the European Union in International Trade], Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko (ed.), Lublin: UMSC, 2009, p. 139.

[13] Tomasz Kamieński, 'Miejsce Chin w polityce bezpieczeństwa Unii Europejskiej' [China's Place in the Security Policy of the European Union], *Azja – Pacyfik*, No. 9, 2006, p. 31.

[14] Xinning Song, 'EU-China Strategic Partnership: Domestic and International Perspectives', materials from the conference *International Politics of EU-China Relations*, organized in London on 20–21.04.2006 by the British Academy and Chinese Academy of Social Science.

[15] Katarzyna Hołdak, Anna Konarzewska, 'Stosunki Unii Europejskiej z Chinami' [Relations between the European Union and China], *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, No. 5–6, 2007, pp. 279–280.

operation is the subject of the annual summit devoted to economic development. The year 2008 saw the establishing of the High Level Economic and Trade Dialogue as a formula for mutual negotiations and the seeking of opportunities to strengthen bilateral economic relations. In dealing with China, the European Union mainly focuses on improving the quality of products and services, the marketing of the yuan and increasing the transparency of business procedures. The Chinese economy enjoys preferential conditions of access to the European Union's market and operates in frameworks of a significant, often unilateral, system of exemptions and allowances.[16]

The creation of an effective system of human rights protection seems, in the case of different civilization conditions, extremely difficult. Therefore, we should look for other ways in which to build mutual trust and strengthen the position of the individual in Chinese society. The author of this article advocates a promotion of a free market as a way of creating alternative solutions to shape the ethos of public space and sanction the subjective position of the human being in China. The desire to build a strong society, which is the primary goal of the theorists of human rights, should flow from a will to release the social energy of citizens. The way to create a subjective nature of society, which in fact is a sum of individuals and may be a reference to organizational and commercial talents as a natural function for each individuals desire for freedom. Only the person who has entered into an enriching community has a real chance of improving their own feelings towards members of another nation. The political freedom in countries with a short democratic tradition usually take the form of a short-term implementation of solutions including society in decision-making processes; the lack of a civil society mentality contributes in such places to a rapid collapse of democratic political legitimacy and a refutation of the election procedures. Therefore, the competitive solution seems to be striving to build a large, strong middle class through participation in the fruits of economic development.

Human rights in the Chinese context should therefore primarily take the form of economic freedom, treated as a duty, which is based on a will of creation of a just system, and also as a consequence of the presence of free market elements in this cultural environment, at least with respect to Shanghai or Hong Kong. Economic efficiency stems both from external factors (fiscal burden, transparency of a tax system, the ability to obtain foreign investment), as well as internal, which are endogenously related to the moral condition of the units; joint success builds awareness of the citizen and a need for participation in the community, the commitment to property rights as inherently linked to a human person; therefore, Chinese human rights should primarily stem from a holistic and substantial respect for fundamental ethical categories: developed, objective cultural norms and a binding concept of a man with generated wealth. Ownership does not result from a positive law, but it is derived from the laws of nature; the human person is sovereign in respect of any item a man possesses; this is why everyone should be able to freely dispose of their own goods. Moreover, it is impossible to separate the ownership of a man's identity without violating the integral formula of dual, spirituality and the material nature of a human being. The guiding principle of a good political regime is a fair system of an allocation of the burden to the community and the legitimate right, founded on a relatively widespread belief in the

[16] Tadeusz Sporek, 'Analiza stosunków handlowych pomiędzy Chińską Republiką Ludową a Unią Europejską' [Analysis of Trade Relations between the People's Republic of China and the European Union], *Studia Ekonomiczne*, No. 123, 2012, pp. 28, 34–35.

universality of certain legal and moral categories. With regards to the economy, a vision of common good is being performed by a ban on tax progression and an effective system providing a criminalization of the violations of a private property. The appropriation of another human being's property is, as in the case of Locke's thought,[17] a violation of an indisputable relationship of ownership and the complementary state of a man, in which this person is open to the forces of nature.

The protection of economic freedom becomes one of the desiderata, and also provides the basic condition of release of Chinese entrepreneurship. Economic activity is directly proportional to the degree of state control of economic relations; with an increasing size of government, a freedom of the individual, and an axiological foundation of the market game as it decreases. Freedom is understood as inseparable from the category of a human being and is a part of Bacon's tradition of perception of freedom as a category built on the empirical analysis of human behavior and nature[18] which are the main starting points for formulating generalizations about the philosophical concept of an individual. Participation in the area of trade is based on a free participation of citizens; each of them has a right to become rich, assuming a sole criterion limiting this activity – i.e. similar privileges to another entity. The empowerment of the citizen implies their sovereignty in terms of ownership and a power of transmission of the fruits of their own work. Human rights in the Chinese model should become the free use of property and an unfettered opportunity to hand gifts to another person; the relationship between a state and a citizen should generate an attachment of a human to the goods of that person, out of which a respecting of the common good and a sense of responsibility as members of the community arises.

An example of the Chinese idea to empower individuals through the economy has become an open door policy, conducted since 1978 by Deng Xiaoping. It stemmed from the awareness of the Chinese leaders in terms of a need for European technology. Furthermore, China urgently needed foreign investment, which in a closed, isolated China presented themselves with a deficit. The situation changed with the opening to Western business. Soon, the authorities set up four special economic zones (including the Shenzhen, which was initially a fishing village and now can be perceived as one of the most developed cities in China)[19] which are now the more dynamic developments of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The economic zones have become a symbol of the dynamic changes, built by the release of energy of the Chinese citizens. It should be noted that these areas have empirically demonstrated the ineffectiveness of bureaucratic activity in the economy and a supremacy of the elemental forces of the market. In rural areas, since farmers became tenants of land, crops yields from year to year started to increase.[20]

Deng's reforms not only undermined the system of state management of the economy, but also due to the liberalization of trade, allowed many individuals to feel hope for change. China's rural community gained the opportunity for social transformation and a participation in the fruits of change. That spontaneous, unorganized, non-ideological,

[17] Zbigniew Rau, 'Wstęp' [Introduction], *Dwa traktaty o rządzie* [Two Treatises of Government], John Locke, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1992, p. 46.

[18] Antoni Podsiad (ed.), *Mały słownik terminów i pojęć filozoficznych dla studiujących filozofię chrześcijańską* [A Little Dictionary of Terms and Concepts for Students of Christian Philosophy], Warszawa: PAX, 1983, pp. 426–427.

[19] Retrieved from: http://www.esquire.com/features/china0807 (accessed 18 November 2014).

[20] Jean-François Dufour, *Géopolitique de la Chine* [Geopolitics of China], Paris: Complexe, 1999, p. 31.

apolitical movement devoid of leadership[21] contributed to the advancement of civilization, but also ushered in a new perspective perception of Chinese society: as a community capable of breaking objective conditions and creating a sphere for the common good with respect to their traditions and a context of civilization. Human rights understood through the prism of economic promotion should be based on respect for the free will of an individual, which is a contribution to economic success. They have a strong foundation of indeterminism, in which an ethical dimension primarily focuses on the sovereignty of a human soul and free will as the basis of conscious action; and material success which is always preceded by a teleological activity of a human person. In terms of indeterminism, free will is independent of the external conditions; is able to imply doing a good deed, which is reflected in the moral condition of man and the durability of his efforts.[22]

Freedom of the individual is also a right of association, by gathering together other representatives of the same profession. The communities created within the same profession are a social phenomenon known in ancient times; they express the spirit of anteriority in relation to the state, which is a product of modernity. Economic freedom should manifest itself in pre-state independent bodies – family, state, clan, and group expressing the interests of the community. Human rights, understood as an expression of the separate nature of citizens, consistent with the spirit of a given cultural region, in the economic sphere is a focus on developing a culture of ethical capitalism, and thus built on values such as respect for their own and others' work, the integrity of the effects of that activity, Ulpian's meaning of justice (regarded by the Roman writer and jurist as a virtue)[23] is given to anyone to which it rightfully belongs. Free man produces more and more efficiently, as exemplified by the economic successes of the nineteenth century; a citizen enslaved by of the state's activity works inefficiently, increasingly limiting examples of their own initiative and entrepreneurship (as in Soviet Russia).[24] The labor freedom also means striving to develop the most effective solutions in the economic sphere; this should happen not only because of the sheer pragmatics, but also with regard to work as an ontological category of common good and importance *per se.*

Morally the legitimate factor is also an expectation of the understanding and fair assessment of the products of human labor. Personal economic benefit is an axiom of action, although it may not take an absolute form. The Chinese authorities should make an effort to minimize the desire for a social explosion of energy and cultivate in their own citizens a virtue of entrepreneurship, manifesting itself in an effort to create maximum possible relations in the sphere of private business. The Latin word *dignitas* perfectly describes the value of a citizen's own good, which is an incentive to work harder for themselves and for the community.

Cicero defined justice as a virtue, seeing it as a spiritual factor, giving a chance of insight into the foundations of an individual right of action.[25] From the point of view of economic freedom, the Ciceronian category of justice is of particular importance, being a generator of perception of each individual. Thus, the validity of the citizen's involvement is measured both by the internal compliance with the standards of conduct that has been previously internalized and the fruit of external effort, axiologically verified by the other participants of a social reality.

[21] Retrieved from: http://www.kapitalizm.republika.pl/chiny.html (accessed 18 November 2014).

[22] Podsiad, *Mały słownik terminów....* p. 427.

[23] Cicero, *De virtutibus* [On virtues], p. 7.

[24] Richard Pipes, *Rewolucja rosyjska* [Russian Revolution], Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1994, p. 535.

[25] Cicero, *De inventione* [On Invention] II, p. 160.

Threats to economic freedom

The main threat to economic freedom, preventing it from the instauration of an individual rights protection system is a complex and omnipotent state, interfering in economic life. As Anthony Szymański posits 'state control is limiting an individuals' economic freedom of action and associations, and thus expands too much the economic power of the state, allowing for an intervention of the state and its lower organizations. The state's engagement deprives mankind of their liberty due to killing the advantages of the self-host, which is being replaced by the clerical or collective management, which is economically poorer, less cost-effective, less laborious, and prone to abuse. This state control, where state authorities engage directly in the economic process, creates a political dependence on the citizens (employees, suppliers, buyers, independent farmers, who must obtain a permit from the authorities) from the government and political parties, resulting in a decline of civic morality and the civilization level.[26] A presence of the state in the economy generates extensive administrative costs while implying a reduction in the free play of the market. Citizens are forced to compete with state entities, all with the support of an apparatus of power; this unequal fight discourages the individual to a state, subconsciously forcing them into a circle of black economy. The existence of this phenomenon is what a state should be blamed for the more actively it is running, the more that citizens are trying to protect themselves against the expansion of a Leviathan. The citizens independence requires the withdrawal by the state from the vast majority of areas of economic life.

The level of economic freedom in China can be easily measured, inter-alia, by reference to the *Index of Economic Freedom*, published annually by The Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation. The document includes an analysis of the limitations of economic freedom and the stringency of regulations affecting the economy of a given state. In particular the report examines the tax burden on property rights the advancement of the black economy and the quality of trade policy. In 2013 China occupied 140th place in the ranking of countries and has been classified as a country where economic freedom is very limited (the so-called *mostly unfree* category).[27] It is a very symptomatic observation. The Report of The Wall Street Journal and Heritage Foundation has long proved a correlation between economic freedom and per capita income; independence from the state creates the legal framework, institutional growth and social development; the consequences of such phenomena are the limitation of poverty, an increase in prosperity and an advancement of environmental protection.[28] With the resignation of the state from regulating the economy, we can see the added value, which is a manifestation of creating market institutions and expanding the circle of prosperity. Capital accumulation promotes respect for property; allows for the entrenchment of a stable layer of citizens capable of making investments, which in turn yields prosperity and creates additional jobs.

This tool is not perfect, as an attempt to verify the complex socio-political phenomena. Sometimes the individual countries involved in the ranking occupy different places other to those we would normally attribute them in the analysis based on empirical observation.

[26] Retrieved from: http://krakowskie.nazwa.pl/test/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=177:antoni-szymaski-qetatyzm-i-wolno-gospodarczaq&catid=6:klasycy-o-wolnym-rynku-i-roli-pastwa-w-gospodarce&Itemid=7 (accessed 21 November 2014).

[27] Retrieved from: http://www.heritage.org/index/ranking (accessed 21 November 2014).

[28] James Gwartney, Robert Lawson, Joshua Hall, *Economic Freedom of the World: 2013 Annual Report*, Vancouver: Fraser Institute, 2013, p. 2.

However, this is a charge that can be drawn to each study as a subject of falsification. The Chinese path should primarily emerge through the ability to convince foreign investors to engage in economic activity in China with a reduction of the state's presence in the economy; the level of sophistication of state actions, the dependence of mechanisms on party decisions and common interventionism[29] – all these factors slow down the pace of development, which is a leading factor in relation to the Chinese dream of building a strong society.

China's problem is also due to a poorly developed system of personal data protection. There is no single document that would regulate the issue of access to personal data. This function was to be served by the Personal Information Protection Law of 2008; however, the aforementioned document remained in the realm of its projects. Communicational effectiveness requires an urgent legislative activity in the use of information and the simplifying of the decision-making procedures. Currently, China is considered to be an attractive place for foreign investments, despite the high levels of corruption, which can be observed in China every day. The transition from a planned economy to a market economy has enabled China to obtain not only exceptional economic growth, with high growth opportunities, but also has created situations in which corruption in the public and private sector is booming. The Chinese government openly admits that corruption is a problem that can shake economic growth in the long term, and therefore an anti-corruption campaign was launched across the country. Unfortunately, it did not bring the desired effect, despite such measures as the strengthening of legislation, higher penalties and more control on companies and government offices.[30] Corruption in China often takes a systemic character as the only effective tool for a positive outcome of civil applications. This situation generates a moral decadence in society. Corruption muddles a certain normative order within the community, helping to undermine any developed habits and entering into the area of subconscious behavior. At this point, it is worth recalling the concept of *habitus*, which is present in the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas. A key development of this concept is attributed to Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu's term is recognized as a system of beliefs, aptitudes and thought patterns, determining a specific course of action.[31] The group of those internalized believe the effects of the perception of moral standards, resulting in an impact on the community. Corruption is a social problem, beyond the moral sense of an individual; it reduces the authority of power, implying the creation of a division and separation between citizens and public officers.

Conclusions and recommendations

The issue of human rights in China is still a delicate phenomenon and continues to be in a development phase. The chances of a political transformation should be estimated as slight, as indicated by the failed attempts to liberalize the political system that took place in the twentieth century. The Chinese mentality, strongly pro-state and denying an adaptation of Western standards, maintains the existing political model. This is why the only way of transformation is an economic path: through the marketization of a public sphere and a reduction of bureaucracy. The foundation of human rights is a strong position for an individual. It is impossible to establish such an important role for a human being without an effective opposition to the

[29] Jean C. Oi, *The State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of Village Government*, Berkeley – Los Angeles – Oxford: University of California Press, 1991, p. 102.

[30] Retrieved from: http://www.chinskiraport.pl/blog/handel-z-chinami-korupcja-w-chinach/ (accessed 21 November 2014).

[31] Pierre Bourdieu, *The Logic of Practice*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990.

processes substantially damaging the social fabric. This phenomenon reinforces criticism of the transformation of the economic system, resulting in a weakening of the sense of identity of their own state. Due to the lack of a transparent implementation of privatization, an individual may feel alienated from the ruling class; at the same time, an atrophy of faith in the objective nature of socio-political processes implies a moral stagnation and erosion of pro-state attitudes, enhancing public antinomy to the institutions of power. Corruption must be fought primarily due to the evil that infects the moral layer. It is an example of a very strong debilitation on the interests of citizens, especially those who are at a stage of capital accumulation. Along with economic capital, social capital is weakened, regarded as an emanation of energy and the willingness of citizens to public engagement. The anti-developmental nature of corruption relies on binding itself with the phenomenon of social stratification; in the current situation of those people who are capable, but do not participate in the system of governing, of corruption, being deprived of the chance of promotion; corruption reduces labor mobility, generating a social disintegration and affecting the quality of the political elite.

China should fight corruption, taking care of the interests of its own citizens. Human rights *de facto* mean an organization of society in which to the greatest extent an efficiently functioning community is possible. They should develop a consistent, transparent business model, being the fruits of a joint effort by society and the elites. At the same time, the authorities should firmly enforce these solutions by both parties. Corruption not only slows down the pace of development, but also kills the soul, destroying attachment to the authority, which in strongly traditional Chinese society, is of great importance. Corruption leads to a loss of individulization within social relations and a creation of opposition to the elites; resulting in, citizens losing their trust in public authorities and a seeking of support in the collective as an effective entity to bilateral relations.

The Chinese state as sovereign in its political and economic fields, should encourage the free market and protect the property of the citizens. The inviolability of property contributes to the multiplication of wealth, which in turn creates an area of common good. The scope of freedom of the individual should be subject to restrictions, primarily due to the moral condition of individuals.[32] Entrepreneurship may quickly turn into greed, freedom of mismanagement and lead to abuse. In this case, the state appears as a guarantor of public order and an arbitrator of social disputes. Economic freedom should be supported by the state, promoted in the mental sphere, but also limited by the common interest and objective values so treated as ontological categories. Human rights are based on freedom, which cannot be regarded as anything otherwise than as the right of every human being. The presumption of freedom, not official intervention, should be the principle of public institutions. So it must be the axiom or the starting point of the perception of an individual in the community. The state's involvement in the economy should take place in case of the violation of an axiological order, and remind us of Carl Schmitt's idea of establishing a new order by sovereign power.

Chinese human rights at the beginning of the twenty-first century, are rooted in the concept of economic advancement. This success can occur primarily by limiting the amount of rules and social stimulations of an individual's instincts. Human nature leads each of us to optimizing our own place in a community and a desire for happiness. The social philosophy of a man makes each of us perceive this as a collection of specific talents and

[32] Tom Palmer (ed.), *Why Liberty? Your Life. Your Choices. Your Future*, Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books Inc., 2013.

aptitudes. An example of a prudent policy towards its own citizens should be given by the Chinese authorities. They have a mission to cultivate the virtues of thrift, as elements which are the normative foundations of wealth and intellectual development. These effects may be achieved by imposing high standards by rule of law and law enforcement, created as a consequence of an ideological compromise[33] and consistent with the spirit of national traditions. Honesty is the best policy, Benjamin Franklin once said.[34] This idea should guide the contemporary hosts of China in their concern for a common good.

[33] The relationships between the economy and axiological categories were described in: Idem, *After the Welfare State*, Ottawa, Illinois: Jameson Books Inc., 2012.

[34] Andrzej Kojder, 'Korupcja i poczucie moralne Polaków' [Corruption and the Poles' Sense of Moral] in *Kondycja moralna społeczeństwa polskiego*, Janusz Mariański (ed.), Kraków: Wydawnictwo WAM, Polska Akademia Nauk – Komitet Socjologii 2002, p. 249.

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ARTUR KOŚCIAŃSKI

Becoming Citizens: The Taiwanese Civil Society[1]

In Memory of My Teachers and Friends,
Karin Tomala and Roman M. Sławiński

Abstract

The paper rises the question, as to what extent civility/civil society in Taiwan (indigenous or implemented by the Republic of China) ties in with the aforementioned theoretical approaches, and what is the foundational myth of Taiwanese civil culture.

The pattern of being a citizen in Taiwan puts special emphasis on the moral (civil) responsibilities in situations of conflict and inside state-society relations. Civil socialization is the central feature of such pattern. This is because civil socialization principle, especialy from the perspective of traditional Chinese culture, may serve as an important signpost for individuals and groups who happen to be living in a democratic mass society.

Author emphasizes that Taiwanese civil society consists of both modern institutionalized forms of civil actions, realized by NGOs and/or local governments, and semi-civil actions that are realized outside the institutions through the resurrective networks of citizens whom share the same moral order and the same common 'public good'. Those resurrective networks emerge when causes of mobilization appear, and become hibernated when the common goal is reached or the mobilization causes have vanished.

Key words: Taiwanese civil society, modern Taiwan, non-for-profit organizations, democratic values in Taiwanese society

Introduction

Academic studies with regards to Taiwanese civil society are still a fashionable subject of scholarly interest. Usually researchers using the term "Taiwanese civil society" are referring to something identified as Taiwanese civility or citizenship. One may easily realize that they pay only slight attention to the phenomenon and that they may really have only a limited understanding of it.

If for example we bring popular knowledge to Taiwan's democratic development from a perspective of properly defined civility or citizenship; would we be ready to raise the

[1] This paper has been written under support of the Center for Chinese Studies of the National Central Library of the Republic of China. All materials utilized for the presented research have been collected under the Taiwan Fellowship program of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs ROC, Taiwan (2011, 2014).

important question, whether we speak about the Taiwanese civility that emerged among local people during the historical process of culture development on the island, or of the Chinese citizenship which was established by the polity of the Republic of China (ROC) and later adopted by Taiwan? The answer to this question brings about many implications for discussion and studies on the civil values and practices utilized by Taiwanese society.

We should start our interpretations with a short presentation of the definition of modern (and democratic) citizenship which denotes the people's citizenship as a part of an institutionalized structure of public life, manifesting itself in certain norms and practices of a given community.

"The definition of citizenship (civil society), is constructed on the basis of all the major trends and theoretical propositions deriving from a rich and heterogeneous tradition, including contemporary ones, and is rather complicated and multidimensional. Its nature is structural-normative and it refers to at least twenty structural-residual attributes and cultural-social norms (civic skills and abilities) such as: location in the intermediate zone, between small primal groups such as the family, and great structures such as the state or Gramsci's political society; the horizontal networking of social bonds;[2] the freedom and independence of civil actors; the maturity of collective social identities; openness (in Popper's sense); the status of social acceptance; acceptance of democratic 'rules of the game' (democracy's basic functional principles); respect for the rule of law (with the exception of the institution of civil disobedience;[3] individual and group social activity; a high level of tolerance; negotiation and mediation skills (institutions), public debate; an economy based on effectiveness; ethical order (sense of social equity and dignity); civil virtues both indirect – the ability to achieve public gains by realizing private interests – and directly – involving all human virtues leading to the development of positive interpersonal relations and responsibility for the collective in which we function; a sense of having political representation; a sense of empowerment; a certain level of awareness or civil knowledge ('informedness'); a functioning of the principle of subsidiaries; a certain level of social capital (with generalized rules of reciprocity and social trust).[4]

Civil society is also a moral idea referring to the social conduct of individuals and groups, legitimizing their public presence, with participation in political decisions and self-organization in matters, which are important for them personally or for their social environment. This conceptualization of the presence of specific individuals and groups in society is the outcome of two immutable moral principles: the principle of individual sovereignty and the principle of individual empowerment.

Such ethical interpretations can be found in twentieth-century Polish sociological ideology. Andrzej Siciński conceptualized civil society as the most important sphere of an individual's or group's public actions chosen from a repertory of values and behaviors available to democratic society at a given time.[5]

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[2] See A. Siciński, 'Społeczeństwo obywatelskie jako przedmiot badań społecznych w Polsce' [Civil Society as an Object of Social Research in Poland] in *Socjologia polityki w Polsce* [The Sociology of Politics in Poland], O. Sochacki (ed.), Gdańsk: Gdańskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1991.

[3] See R. Skrzypiec, *W poszukiwaniu sprawiedliwości. Obywatelskie nieposłuszeństwo. Filozofia i działanie* [In Search of Justice. Civil Disobedience. Philosophy and Action], Kraków: Wydawnictwo Zielone Brygady, 1999.

[4] P. Gliński, 'The Self-governing Republic in the Third Republic', *Polish Sociological Review*, No. 1, 2006, p. 433.

[5] See A. Siciński, *Styl życia, kultura, wybór* [Style of Life, Culture, Choice], Warszawa: Wydawnictwo IFIS PAN, 2002.

The repertory usually contains a catalogue of normative civil traits which, could serve as a foundation to an ethical project for models of citizenship. This catalogue could include such normative civil virtues as: open-mindedness (the ability to change one's opinions when confronted by the facts), criticism which inoculates against intoxication by persistently demanding explanations; intellectual integrity (as opposed to hypocrisy and all sorts of "self-deception"), self-discipline in the name of something, for example the realization of goals requiring prolonged effort; the ability to make choices, aesthetic sensitivity because it facilitates ethical culture (the choice between a moral and amoral act is often a matter of aesthetic sophistication), a sense of humor which makes it more difficult for dictatorships to take hold of society, and tolerance of other peoples needs and opinions. According to this catalogue, citizens are also obliged to think independently, improve their conditions of life, view civil courage as the basis of their actions, even at the price of jeopardizing one's interests or personal safety. Finally, citizens should possess a set of traits jointly covered by the umbrella term of "socialization" such as: the ability to overcome ones egocentricity and egoism with the ability to make sacrifices for the common good (a social service to which citizens in democratic systems should feel obliged), the ability to co-operate with other people on equal terms (forms of co-operation undertaken in order to dominate others, exploit them, showing no concern for other people's interests and the common good are out of the question.[6]

This catalogue puts special emphasis on the moral (civil) responsibilities in situations of conflict. Even in the face of antagonism and conflict, citizens should be chivalrous and know how to win and lose. Socialization is the central feature of such catalogues.[7] This is because the socialization principle may serve as an important signpost for individuals and groups who happen to be living in a democratic mass society.

We can raise the question, as to what extent civility/civil society in Taiwan (indigenous or implemented by the Republic of China) ties in with the aforementioned theoretical approaches, and what is the foundational myth of Taiwanese civil culture, and whether such a myth exists at all.

Historical background of the Taiwanese Civil Society

Western normative-structural models and moral self-regulating models of citizenship cannot fully reconstruct the whole practice of civil society that was adopted by Taiwan's social and political culture at the end of 20th century. It's easy to see that, following Chinese traditions of governance and institutionalized state practice, the earlier modernization of Chinese polity tended to link state and civil society as one.[8] Such a model did not differentiate between legality and publicity, and it resisted their relocation into single spheres of institutional life (state and civil [society] related areas). Perhaps such an institutional splitting up could only be possible when, at the very beginning of modernization, Chinese republican polity would develop itself

[6] See M. Ossowska, 'Wzór obywatela w ustroju demokratycznym' [The Model of the Citizen in the Democratic System] in: idem, *O człowieku, moralności i nauce. Miscellanea* [On Man, Morality and Science: Miscellanies], Warszawa: PWN, 1983.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] T. Gold, 'Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest for Identity' in *Culture Changes in Postwar Taiwan*, S. Harell, C.C. Huang (eds), New York: Westview Press, 1994; J. Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son, Chiang Ching-kuo and Revolutions in China and Taiwan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000.

as a pluralistic, corporate organization of civil-political society;[9] and the classical approaches of Gramscii.[10] Of course the Western institutional framework has been adopted by the Republic of China, and it serves to all the empowerments of democratic order now in Taiwan, but certain tensions between state and civil society, that appeared as a result of conservative Chinese political culture, can still be observed.[11]

An interesting point of view on Taiwanese civil society is presented by Thomas Gold. He wrote that the approaches to Taiwan's civil and political development *must* start with the Kuomintang (KMT) party-state. In his analyses the KMT party-state was not isolated from society, and it created a unique structure of relations between the different spheres of social and political functioning. "The *state* is a relational concept expressing to a certain degree the balance among social forces in any society. The most powerful social forces try to influence state policy, but the members of government – the organizations that comprise the state may have their own agenda, which, in some instances, might bring them into conflict with social forces. In theory, then, the state can attempt to preserve some degree of autonomy from social forces, including foreign economic and political interests".[12] Gold also argues that the state-society relationship is not a static one. "Especially in a society undergoing rapid structural change, new social forces emerge which might present demands on the state that it never faced before. The state very likely has no institutional mechanisms for dealing with such demands from below. In a prolonged period of structural change, the state and the societal elites have problems reproducing themselves or selecting suitable successors to deal with unprecedented problems. Mobilized social forces might compel new policies, form alliances with segments of the state, and introduce members into state organizations".[13]

In 1912 the KMT was established as an association of leftist and progressive forces opposing the conservative (rightist) and royalist powers led by Kang Youwei, after the successful Xinhai Revolution. As a political party the KMT was rare and unusual for political and public life at the beginning of the 20th century in China. No KMT-outsider could correctly identify what the KMT was at that time (neither was it a confederation of powerful landed gentry, nor an association of the common people: it was something in between the two). In 1913 the KMT became the prime political power in the first parliamentary system in the history of China. For the majority of Chinese people the ideas of the political parties rose as external, modern (neither grass-root nor endogenous) social movements, and it was naturalized to the accepted form of a social organization. The KMT by its public openness caused an explosion of civil, 'bottom-up' activity that opened the way to a new Chinese liberalism, humanism, and social welfare and then via these notions, to communism and finally to democracy in Taiwan. The political parties became inclusive and started publicly to represent different citizens' interests.[14] Developing its identity, the KMT did not support any of the defined citizens' interests but it utilized a combination of different philosophical streams (Christian, Neo-Confucian, Marxist and Liberal) expressed

[9] See N. Luhmann, *The Differentiation of Society*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1982; J.L. Cohen, A. Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995.

[10] A. Gramscii, *Prison Notebook*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971.

[11] W.T. de Bary, *Sources of Chinese Traditions*, Vol. I–II; New York: Columbia University Press, 1970; L. Pye, *The Spirit of Chinese Politics*, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1968.

[12] Gold, 'Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest...', p. 47.

[13] Ibid., p. 48.

[14] See A. Keating, *The Struggle of a Democracy*, Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 2006, pp. 36–41.

in the 'Sunnist' ideology[15] of *the government of the people, by the people and for the people* that could mobilize larger social circles.

The lack of political stability in China in the 1920's and 30's inhibited the development of popular democratic culture and caused the KMT to radically change its course as the people's representative and became a military-oriented counter-revolutionary association.[16] In 1921 the KMT became a centralized, Leninist organized party transforming its ideological foundations into a radical, social-nationalist and oriented political force. The next move was to empower a revolutionary rhetoric amongst KMT's activists, whose political direction drew the struggle against every symptom of "liberal revolt" among the open-minded Chinese intellectual elite of that time.[17]

The domestic counter-revolution and destructive movements of the warlords together with the destabilizing actions of foreign powers (mainly Soviet Russia) bore anxiety and caused a necessity for protection of the achievement of a "new order". In other words, once recognized by the West in 1928 as the legal power governing China, the KMT became 'the government of the people, by the people and for the people' up and turned to hard-core authoritarian rule. The struggle for a republic and a republican modernized China, became one for saving the political power over China. The corruption and power oriented activities of the divided (rightist and leftist) KMT elites led Chinese people to support the KMT's conquerors, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The split between the KMT and the CCP (1927–1937 including the Guangzhou Uprising, the Shanghai Massacre of 1927, and the Maoists' Long March 1934–1936) and also extreme antagonism after the Sino-Japanese War in 1945 pushed both parties to civil war.

At the end of 1949 the victorious communists proclaimed the People's Republic of China, and the KMT regime, sheltered in Taiwan, had to put aside its long-term revolutionary agenda in the interests of the survival of the ROC.[18]

Because initially the KMT regime was only slightly rooted in Taiwanese society, the party-state, in terms of Gold's approach, was close to full state autonomy. The political power of the KMT was autonomous from the pressures of any kind of social forces. While the pre-civil-war KMT advocated a corporate civil-state system, the post-civil-war KMT transferred the Taiwanese (the new ROC) state into an oligarchy of military elites interested in the rejection of any alternative political forces. The KMT took control over the media and educational systems to coerce propaganda onto Taiwanese society. Only the mainland Chinese and supporters of the government have been rewarded by the KMT polity. Gold described the KMT as a party that: 1) does not perceive itself as representing the interests of any particular class (it is above the classes, representing the nation as a whole); 2) promotes the achievement of democracy (through stages of military rule, tutelage and constitutional democracy without any concept of proletarian dictatorship); 3) does not advocate building socialism or communism; and 4) grants wide scope for legally protected private business. For more than four decades until 1987, the KMT suppressed internal resistance from Taiwanese society. A quasi-corporate, party-state destroyed civil consciousness, a pluralistic

[15] See Sun, Y.S., *The Three Principles of the People*, Taipei: Government Information Office, 1924/1990.

[16] See Keating, *The Struggle of a Democracy...*

[17] See J. Manthorpe, *Forbidden Nation. History of Taiwan*, London: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2009.

[18] See Gold, 'Civil Society and Taiwan's Quest...'; Manthrope, *Forbidden Nation. History of Taiwan...;* Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son, Chiang Ching-kuo...*

public sphere and eliminated the political opposition that could balance the mainlanders' influences over Taiwan's polity.

At the beginning of the 1970's in Taiwan there was a great change concerning the economy, which had shifted significantly from agriculture to different branches of modern industry and services. The KMT ran its great project of the *developmental state* that became a 'shining pattern' for all Asian countries.[19] The state regime created a set of conditions to promote the meritocratic system of social stratification. The education-based success of the social policy of the KMT led to an emergence of new social actors such as private capital holders, professionals and a Taiwanese intelligentsia. With a shift in quality of life during that time, feelings of sovereignty prevailed and took hold of a well-educated and rewarded society. People started to think independently and question the decisions of government. A 'whispered' resistance emerged amongst them. The need for a relocation of state, party and social civility (including the need of a resurgent Taiwanese identity) appeared.[20]

We can find a lot of adjectives describing Taiwanese civil society during the transition period (1970–2000), but we are sure that one seems to be adequate for the reality of Chinese political culture: 'civilless'. Why give such a name? The answer is rather simple. After the early 1990s civil institutions became the facades of effective and transparent governance. The Taiwanese people (no matter if they were mainlanders or islanders), were trained in social apathy with a rational dependency upon the authorities who did not empower a sovereign consciousness of being into the state co-governors.

The sociopolitical model of Civil Society on Taiwan

Before the democratization of Taiwan had been initiated the disconnection between civil and political spheres was unlikely, especially under conditions of an authoritarian state. Moreover the Chinese traditions of leadership and state nationalism affected an enormous scope of social and economic limitations inside Taiwan's society.

Although the KMT was linked to actual processes for more or less modern governance, it did so only under the latent [modernized] Confucian traditions inhibiting social resistance against the party-state polity. Only prior to the emergence of a public sphere during the late 1980's, when a strong position of the state yielded a democratic consensus, did a raw popular civil consciousness move society to dissolve the need for centralized state control with purposely oriented social movements.[21]

The Taiwanese civil society, rising from the situation of a strong state authority, has been correlated with a traditional society that respects authoritarian political leadership legitimized in a certain moral order and bases it on local, direct ties similar

[19] See M. Greene, *The Origins of the Developmental State in Taiwan*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008.

[20] See H.M. Hsiao, 'Emerging Social Movements and the Rise of a Demanding Civil Society in Taiwan', *Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs*, No. 24, 1989; H.M. Hsiao, 'The Non-profit Sector in Taiwan: Current State, New Trends and Future Prospects', Online: www.tpic.org.tw/ NPOInfo/ index1–2.asp., 1994; H.M. Hsiao, 'The Growing Asian Pacific Concern Among Taiwan's NGOs.' in *Emerging Civil Society in the Asia Pacific Community: Non-governmental Underpinnings of the Emerging Asia Pacific Regional Community: a 25th Anniversary Project of JCIE*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and Asia Pacific Philanthropy Consortium (APPC), 1995.

[21] M.T. Huang, *The Great Transition*, Taipei: SMC Publishing Inc., 1989; Hsiao, 'Emerging Social Movements...'.

to those often described as an endogenous civility or locality.[22] Civil society thus existed as certain folk practiced inside the state system of Taiwan, particularly as a collective guardian of lawfulness and the traditional Chinese way of life.

The socio-historical interpretation of the rise of Taiwan's civil society responds to the problem of the modernization and institutionalization of society in Taiwan, far better than any other description, which roots the model of Taiwanese civil society outside the heir of cultural influences of the local and Chinese 'life-worlds'. The differentiation between the two patterns of civility (institutional and moral) not only indicates the sources of civil society but also allows researchers to indicate the basic characteristics of Taiwan's civil society as a practice placed between the traditional, post-Confucian state and the institutions of a modern democratic polity, as well as being placed between Chinese and Taiwanese socio-cultural identities. What should be the choice for Taiwan? Should it be an institutionally organized, civil society based on democratic rights and citizens' commitments, incorporating a Sino-Formosan identity or a structure of political and ethnic differentiation that has no place for actual civil society, except by separated and atomized local communities or personal networks aimed at non-political issues?

As Cohen and Arato have showed the constitutional bounds of a civil society do not lie on the levels of institution, organization, or even a shared, unquestioned normative order. Authors have pointed out that the cultural-linguistic background as a source of cultural perception of the 'life-world' (they call it "unity" of life-word), is neither an institution nor an organization but a network of resources for institutions and organizations. Additionally they said that it can have a shared, unquestioned normative content only in traditional society, and even then, this is not necessary. Traditional society (in our case Taiwanese society) is in fact defined not in terms of a common tradition but by its relation to traditions and ultimately to the 'life-world' itself.[23]

The modernization of the 'life-world' or it may be better to say the de-fundamentalization of the "generalized cultural explanation of social ties" that is shared by the given community, implies – Cohen and Arato added – two interlocking processes: a differentiation and internal rationalization of the structural and institutional components of the 'life-world'; and the rationalization of the cultural-linguistic constitution of the life-world. In this case the rationalization means basically the process of institutionalization and a consolidation of a moral and cultural-linguistic constitution of the 'life-world', within a clear, secularized and open system of public rights and commitments of citizenry. The direct effect of such a process is the rise of the public sphere and growth of institutionalized secondary ties which are reflecting different social interests, and which have been built upon the basis of the indirect presence of members and a generalized social trust. However the fact of Taiwanese modernization on the life-world cannot be negated, the specifics of Taiwanese Confucianism, conservative culture and public-political life highlighted the ongoing conflict of values between institutional (modern) and non-institutional ([semi]traditional) modes of civil identities that are deeply rooted in everyday life.[24]

[22] See R. Weller, *Alternate Civilities*, Oxford: Westview Press, 1998.

[23] Cohen, Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory...*, p. 45.

[24] Ibidem.

Usually when we ask about the cultural and social modernity influence on individuals' and groups' capacities for forcing the political and civil conduct in Taiwanese social and political systems, generally we are focused on the expectations toward the positive results of such modernizing transitions. This method of analyses leads us to simplistic conclusions that, in Taiwan, civil society should be utilized not only in terms of the current politics of the well-established life-world (the "positive relation" entered by the government's latent-state-Confucianism) but mainly as a resource of the political critics, which is breaking down the ties of Confucian traditions in a public life (the "negative relation" forced by oppositionists circles of intellectual elites).

For modern political theory covering civil society, the process of cultural modernization was the most important factor of the emergence of civil co-governance in Europe in bygone centuries. But it should be said very clearly that the potential for such modernization never occurs as a full repertoire of possible practices. Even the best practical institutionalized model of civil society, inherited from developed democracies at the end of the twentieth century, could not fulfill the utopian hope of a common civil activation in Taiwan. This is happening because of the several contradictory forces affecting the island's everyday life, politics and economy.

As today's practice of Taiwanese civil society shows there is still an existing dichotomous approach to the state-society relationship. One can easily recognize that this approach is borrowed directly from the Marxist (social liberalistic) heir of defining the role of modernizing social forces that it is deeply rooted in an early revolutionary (through Sun Yatsen's principles), anti-absolutist and republican manifesto. But this dichotomy is not a simple result of the linear development of a republican state.

Taiwanese democracy, although less specific in that it does not provide a mature institutional framework for its acting citizens, comes closer to the point in which there are appearing circumstances 'empowering' peoples' social apathy and passiveness. This is what gives the reason to accentuate the need to reissue the Taiwanese civil society not just as an indigenous and exclusive grass-roots movement, purposely oriented, but also as the main force of co-governing the state, controlling powers and maintaining the Taiwanese national identity. What Taiwanese society needs is a project of civil society that can, on the one side, reflect the atomized identities built on the local (folk) communities injected by Chinese cultural (religious) syncretism and a semi-Confucian moral order, and on the other side, a capability that can empower the peoples' sovereignty behind the state. The project should articulate the peoples' motivations within which the civil society, adopting a local context, can contribute to decreasing the cultural tensions or struggles that appeared on the island during its turmoil of modern history.

Half consciously, and half unconsciously, most Taiwanese people have carried about the idea of public activism in "the hopeful periods of liberalization", but especially during the first years of the transition after 1987.[25] They imagine that in the new opening even a single person can act independently from the party's, government's or influential business holders' principles as a subject of the public sphere, the citizen. That is how the myth of democracy and civil society describes the citizens basic right to sovereignty. But this form of consciousness shows the never-ending conflict between tradition and the modernity of "cultura sinica".

[25] See M.K. Chang, *Social Movements and Political Transition*, Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research, 1989/1994.

As long as we remain on the grounds of t democracy, we should emphasize that sovereignty and political equality are constant for everyone. Whatever the member of a given democratic community (having received its membership) may have been, his relationship with the community is issued for a long time and without any doubts and limitations (this refers to the indirect participation in elections of ruling bodies and in the decisions concerning the life-issues of the community). The social shock of transition sometimes affects people's consciousness so deeply that it creates a mental resistance to any changes that allow people to govern their lives and it causes a feeling of hopelessness for the people who have lost their chance to fully utilize political equality and sovereignty. This happens particularly when the rules of the transition's outcome are not clearly expressed in practice and the ideas of the new order accept the double standard of the political game.

For a person socialized in the Confucian culture, recognizing an orthodoxy of "the common public good", it may be hard to understand, how and why Western people are bound together in an abstract civil society by each other, and if such a person conceals this perception from themselves. The person born into a group which confesses to traditional cultural values, receives a conventional-world view and conventional patterns of public behavior. But each individual is not by nature constituted to grow up as a matured citizen, or as a political one. One of the basic conditions of being political is the simultaneous presence of a number of people interrelated politically, such as the supporters or antagonists of given political or civil ideas.

No myth of civil society is needed for the Taiwanese to make a compressive society related to the citizenry. If somebody depends on a life with other people then even that somebody would not call this life a civil one. People may be very different through their civil constitutions. But only in a civil society entering its new members into a relatively undifferentiated civil consciousness, is one turned into a more complex political being. Only in relation to other civil beings does the weak newcomer become the civilly and politically developed person, with the character of an individual and deserving the name of an adult citizen. Cut off from such relations an individual grows at best into a non-political slave. Such a person would grow up as a politically passive consumer of the 'life-world' projected by rulers. Let us paraphrase Norbert Elias' words: only if an individual grows up in a democratic and civil society does the small human begin to learn to speak in a political logic; only in a society of other, older citizens does he gradual1y develop a specific kind of far-sightedness and instinct control; and the political language he learns, and to which pattern of public life he would choose, depends on the civil moral order and cultural-linguistic constitution of the group in which he grows up.

The so-called cultural rationalization, as mentioned earlier, begins the modernization of the next level, a linguistic-cultural realm of everyday life. The republican revolution in China in 1911 pushed the rationalization of Confucian culture and involved the differentiation of the cultural spheres into sets of institutions, grouped around the instrumental and practical values or forms of validity and therefore transferred into the legal framework of polity. The emergence of new classes in the ROC at that time, particularly the bourgeoisie, meant the rise of reformists cultural movements, and what Gold refers directly to as modern Taiwan, with alternative routes to an upward civil mobility and the formation of new elites.

The actual model of the Taiwanese civil society is typical, in our opinion, of societies that have an unfinished transition from authoritarian to a "co-governmental" mode of

state organization. As in the case of other transitional systems, Taiwanese civil society has been shaped by movements and other unstructured civic initiatives by an active intellectual elite,[26] under the scope of conditions where the most important contracts of civil rights and institutions rested under construction. This is still unfolding, because it is still coming from the stage of conflict between tradition and modernity.[27]

Conclusion

In Taiwan the authoritarian state has penetrated almost all aspects of its citizens' personal lives and controlled the social allocation of valid resources. Such a situation has resulted in the people's constant search for irregular channels, allowing contacts with those who might be prepared to overcome the official distribution of goods. Both sides of this relationship needed a certain degree of balance between trust and mistrust.

The immoderation of the authoritarian regime actually delegitimized the nationalist ethic of collective society and left people a *moral support* that legitimized the searching for their own advantages. The anthropologist, Yan Yunxiang characterizes such a moral justification as the local moral world in which common people live. Inside this society they realize personal interests by the fulfilment of moral obligations, or mutual aid to provide social support when it is needed. Yan calls this *the primary form of networking* made up of known fellow participants who play the role of community guides and judges. Beyond this world, they also pragmatically cultivate an *extended form of networking* with strangers that are developed instrumentally to pursue one's interests. They do not carry the same moral force as those in the primary world. The extended networking maintains community boundaries, but actually it is serious obstacle to a modern civil society.

The first type of *network relations* is similar with traditionally formed local cultures inside small communities in Taiwan. The primary form of *it* is also observed by scholars as a symptom of the citizens' escape to the sphere of quasi-civil society activities. The civil society – that arose from the modern society driven via contracts and civil agreements between strangers – is no longer able to pursue the interests of citizens. The cause of this is rooted in a weak social trust and social capital as was described in Putnam's works. Only the community of familiar members has an ability to perform an art of trust, and build a matured form of civil society on this basis.

Civil society in Taiwan does exist. In many cases it is the only force governing and providing solutions for serious social problems. The Taiwanese civil society is "handy crafted". It is also networked as a result of the traditional foundations of society. In the end we should emphasize that Taiwanese civil society consists of both modern institutionalized forms of civil actions, realized by NGOs and/or local governments, and semi-civil actions that are realized outside the institutions through the resurrective networks of citizens whom share the same moral order and the same common 'public good'. Those resurrective networks emerge when causes of mobilization appear, and become hibernated when the common goal is reached or the mobilization causes have vanished.

[26] See Hsiao, 'Emerging Social Movements...'; Chang, *Social Movements...*; M.S. Ho, 'Understanding the Trajectory of Social Movements in Taiwan (1980–2010)', *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, No. 39, 2010.

[27] See K.P. Yu, *Democracy is A Good Thing*, Washington DC: Brookings, 2009.

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Women in Confucian Society: Traditions and Developing New Trends

Abstract

The article is devoted to the urgent problem of women's status and their level of social position in countries with Confucian traditions. The article analyzes how gender identity is constructed out of social and political forces. It was supplemented by comparative studies of the gender policies provided by the contemporary authorities of Korea, China and Japan and discovers a new tendency in their internal policies. The author reveals the historical roots of women's low positions in Confucian societies and shows the present changes of women's social status. It was underlined that the real gender situation leaves much to be desired in Japan. China's authorities try to overcome negative traditions in family life and build the modern nation-state with high global competitive abilities. The authorities of the two parts of Korea are going to raise women's social status. The Korean states have made outstanding progress in their gender policies. The authorities of all states with Confucian traditions have an aim to involve more women in economic activity, to increase the effectiveness of their economies. Doing this they may avoid the invitation of a big number of foreign workers.

Key words: women, Korea, China, Japan, gender policy, Confucian traditions

Introduction

Confucian traditions and ideologies continue to dominate in many East Asian countries. This kind of ideology persists in keeping women in low social positions, not allowing them to take the leading positions in policies and the economy, and not letting them make considerable influences in all spheres of social life. According to a Confucian rule, "women must obey fathers before, and husbands after marriage, and sons in old times". This rule worked for centuries. However, at present this rule has some changes.

On the one side, the contemporary authorities of states with strong Confucian traditions (China, Korea, Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam) proclaimed the equal rights between men and women, but, on the other side, there are few women at the top holding political positions. Very few women became the head of states, ministers, districts or mayors of cities. As usual, societies with strong Confucian traditions have especially powerful militaries, which do not permit women to become really equal.

Besides, every country with Confucian traditions has its own specifics that negatively reflect on the social positions of women. Therefore, the main aim of the article is to study

the general situation and specific moments in gender policies of states with Confucian traditions, to analyze the evolution of historical traditions and to understand how the new social trends will permit the consolidation of nations and make them more competitive in the contemporary global economy. The author understands 'gender' inclusively as 'women', incorporates relationships between men and women, and gender ideology.

Japan: how to overcome traditional barriers

Japan is a country with an advanced economy and a high level of life. Japanese authorities proclaimed equal rights for men and women, but the real gender situation leaves much to be desired, as married women are deprived of many opportunities. As a result, young Japanese girls don't want to be married, women postpone their marriages and after marriage they prefer not to change their family names into those of their husbands. It is a kind of protest against old traditions, which preserve the low social position of Japanese women.

Japan was the first of the East Asian states in to involve more women in economic activity. In the mid-1980s the Japanese government passed a series of initiatives to expand female employment and career opportunities. Foremost among these was the 1985 passage of Japan's Equal Employment Opportunity Law (*Danjo koyo kikai kintoho*, herein referred to as EEOL), which came into effect in April 1986. When the EEOL was passed, the government also established a special committee, entitled "Planning and Promotion of Policies for Women" and created the Institute for Advancement of Women in Employment as a co-operative endeavor between industry and the Ministry of Labor. The American researcher Millie R. Creighton suggests that these changes reflect a desire to participate in international life, rather than an internal shift in Japanese social values regarding women's social roles. She concluded that "had Japan not made such changes by the end of the United Nation's Decade for Women (1975–1985), Japan would not have been allowed to ratify the U.N. Resolution on Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women".[1]

The EEOL has had little effect on changing the traditions in Japanese society. Year by year the Japanese government's White Papers on Gender Equality show a low level of advancement by Japanese women in politics, government and business compared with other countries. The situation will not change unless political, business and labor leaders get serious about the issue because the success or barriers of success for Japanese women depend, in part, on male attitudes. On the other hand, women should be more active in raising their social status.

Japan ranks 42nd among the 75 countries on the gender empowerment index. Women's participation and decision-making authority in political and economic activities continues to be low. It ranks 80th among 115 countries on the gender equality gap index. In Japan, women occupy 10 percent of managerial positions in business, somewhat higher than South Korea's 7.8 percent but much lower than the USA's 42.5 percent which is the highest level.[2]

Nevertheless, some Japanese women have very quietly but steadily made their careers and have become top managers. While many of them have made their way up the corporate ladder, they, as usual, faced any difficulties and have successfully overcome them. As a result,

[1] Millie R. Creighton, 'Marriage, Motherhood, and Career Management in a Japanese "Counter Culture", in Anne E. Imamura (ed.), *Re-Imaging Japanese Women*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996, p. 192.

[2] Murayama Mayumi (ed.), *Gender and Development: The Japanese Experience in Comparative Perspective*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, pp. 117–131.

it makes a correction in the former trend of business research that has traditionally ignored women's roles, let alone the existence of women managers in Japanese corporations.

Japanese women workers average wage, as a percentage of men's, is 67 percent, a little higher than South Korea's 62.6 percent and Malaysia's 63 percent but lower than America's 81 percent and Britain's 82.6 percent.

In Japan, men contribute to only 12.5 percent of the total housework and child rearing hours (South Korea, 12.2 percent), compared with a range of 37 to 40 percent in the U.S.A., Sweden, Finland and Australia. At the very least, Japan should consider setting concrete numerical targets for gender equality. There is female discrimination in the Japanese Imperial family, as according to Confucian traditions, only the male heir has the rights to be a successor to the Emperor. Only the birth of a male heir to the Emperor's younger son helped to settle the dynastic crisis during the 2000s. This shows us, that old traditions preserve the social structure and do not permit the provision of changes in Japan's society.

Women have been active in the Japanese labor force in fairly high numbers throughout most of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century. Whereas women's employment was once concentrated in agricultural and later in manufacturing work, it has overwhelmingly shifted to the service sector. Within this sector, female employees have tended to concentrate in banks, securities firms, department stores and other companies involved in rental and distribution. Although the percentage of women in the Japanese labor force has been comparable to that of their counterparts in other industrialized countries, Japanese women have faced greater obstacles because of preserving societal traditions.

At present, the Japanese authorities permitted women to be in the military, but they continue to stay in low positions in Japanese armed forces. There are consequences of the former military history, which tries to preserve Japanese women's place at home.

As Japanese society becomes more elderly, Japanese authorities must therefore invite more foreign workers. The Japanese government may solve the problem by changing gender policies and give Japanese women a chance to make careers in the economy and to be able to realize themselves in their professions. Japan needs to involve more women in high positions in politics and the economy. It would make Japanese foreign policy really peace loving.

The famous Japanese public figure Fukuzawa Yukichi said, "a strong nation could only be formed when independent individuals came together through human relations".[3] He consistently criticized a confirmation that only married women were expected to be faithful, and insisted on the idea of male-female equality. His ideas continue to be very urgent for contemporary Japanese society.

China: the struggle against gender violence

In East Asian socialist states, which officially replaced Confucian traditions with communist ideology, "right laws" hide gender policies. In contemporary China the official propaganda proclaims a great role for women and gives respect to "labor heroines", "iron girls", "March 8th red flag women", and "a mode of resisting arranged marriage". Chinese

[3] Naoko Nishizawa, 'The Formation of Women's Network and the Development of Class Divisions at a Time of Rapid Change in Modern Japanese History', *Women and History*, December 2013, Vol. 19, p. 194.

authorities' main concern is to create a new image for working women and their contribution in "a Chinese dream" and developing a new Chinese society.[4]

Nevertheless, Confucian traditions continue to be alive and, as a result, the social practice continues to be uncomfortable for women. The cause of women's self-expression and emancipation is still constrained by the historical burden of lower-status women's work. This means that women continue to be concentrated in areas such as culture, education and health care rather than in the masculine areas of finance, economics, industry and the military. At the same time, although teaching in China as elsewhere is a "feminised profession" with minimal career prospects and low pay, the emergence of new technological media in education has strengthened the professional status of the IT-competent woman teacher, who increasingly has taken on the role of "a technologically skilled communicator". This fact may show that there is some evolution in Chinese women becoming more modern and active in the spheres where men previously dominated.

Although it is 'under-recognized' and 'under-reported', it is one of the most significant epidemics in China today. It is gender violence. This kind of violence occurs in all regions in China. It affects families of all ethnic backgrounds and social spheres, and impacts not only families but also society, as a whole.

According to a national survey (the China Law Institute), one-third of the country's 270 million households cope with domestic violence, both physical and psychological. A survey carried out in the Gansu, Hunan and Zhejiang, provinces which are the most economically developed, said that one-third of the surveyed families had witnessed family violence, and that 85 percent of the victims were women. Because not only men but also many women consider violence as a normal part of family life, only 5 percent among those surveyed said that their marriage was unhappy.[5]

A survey conducted by the All-China Women's Federation found that domestic violence in China takes place predominantly in rural areas, in young families and in households with lower educational levels. This tendency is correlated with other developing countries and China isn't an exception in this question.

Although Chinese women have experienced significant progress in recent times, the Confucian ideas that women should be in subordinate positions to men in the household and in society still persists. Also, because men consider themselves the main breadwinners, they think that they have the right to maintain order in home by using violence. Various cultural, economic and social factors, including shame and fear of retaliation from their partners, contribute to Chinese women's reluctance to denounce these facts.

In China, as in other countries, domestic violence is not only widespread, but also considered a private matter, which makes it very difficult for women to obtain appropriate, judicial and police responses. In recent years, there has been some progress regarding this issue in China. Among those efforts to call attention to the situation are some roadside and subway advertisements stressing the scourge that domestic violence represents to Chinese society. At the same time, special refuges and community support groups for victims of domestic violence are becoming more numerous.

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[4] J. Judge, *The Precious Raft of History: the Past, the West, and the Women Question in China*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, pp. 10–38.

[5] J. Kaufman, 'The Global Women's Movement and Chinese Women's Rights', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 76 (July), 2012, p. 598.

The All-China Women's Federation has been playing a significant role in bringing domestic violence into legislation and policymaking processes. In addition, an alliance of civil society organizations has been established under a project called "Domestic Violence in China: Research, Intervention and Prevention", which has carried out some innovative actions towards the elimination of domestic violence. Chinese domestic violence is a threat to equality and justice that no civilized society should be allowed to exist.

In 2008, the Chinese government developed pilot courts defining what domestic violence is and established protection for women. However, Chinese authorities did not permit the establishment of shelters for women as they were afraid that they would be overcrowded.[6]

The other Chinese problem is the huge amount of illegal prostitution that in many cases is unofficially supported by the police and local authorities. This fact shows that the authorities are guilty of a dereliction of duty and have a poor gender policy. In addition, some of the local authorities, for example, Mu Suixin, the mayor of Shenyang, an industrial city in China's North-East, openly said, that prostitution provides a means to stave off chronic unemployment and to permit the levy of a 30 percent of tax. According to Chinese unofficial sources, "at least" 14 Chinese cities were taxing prostitution despite the fact that the sex trade remained illegal.

All these facts are troubling for the central authorities. In 2001, Mu Suixin was convicted and given a death sentence. Cases like that of Mu Suixin have piqued Xi Jinping's interest, which tries to root out all criminal activities and corruption in the country. However, the illegal practice is too deeply ingrained in the Chinese economy, as well as a culture of doing business that the crackdown on which will drive the sex trade underground. Some Chinese lawyers insist on its legalization. But it would be a step back after Mao Zedong successfully weeded out the sex trade in the 1950s. Legalization would be a blow to the reputation of the fifth generation of Chinese communist leaders. Therefore, the Chinese authorities must look carefully at the gender policy and avoid doing mistakes.

By the way, the complicated economic situation in Chinese rural areas has forced women to migrate to big cities and to work outside the home. This raises women's status in the family and may begin to change traditional negative attitudes towards newborn girls.

At the same time, Chinese women continue to be discriminated against in working places. They receive low payment. The economic restructuring of state industries has laid off more women than men. Female college graduates have a harder time finding employment than men as employers don't want to pay maternity benefits.[7] Nevertheless, Chinese women benefit from laws' protection and social investments in health and education. Rural women have also been freed by birth control policy from a life of child bearing. This fact permits us to conclude that China's gender policy is going forward by short steps.

Korea: new trends in gender policy

North (the DPRK) and South (the ROK) Korea are the two parts of the former feudal Korea, where Confucian traditions took a main part of social life. As a rule, the women's social position continues to be unequal with men. Old traditions continue to be very hardy, and South Korean husbands prefer to see their wives at home and not call her a wife or by her name, but a "home person".

[6] Ibid., p. 600.

[7] Kaufman, 'The Global Women's Movement...', p. 588.

At present, North Korean society and the government's gender policy are more different than in South Korea. The North Korean economic situation continues to be very complicated, and the number of working women is increasing. The North Korean government even proclaimed an order that all young and middle aged women must work at state enterprises. Therefore, North Korean working women became more economically independent than those in South Korea, but this fact does not improve the situation on the whole.

The spouse and the sister of the young head of state Kim Jong Un, who although do not hold high leading posts, became the women's face of the new North Korean management, and set the tone in carrying out a certain gender policy.

North Korean authorities have endowed women with the same equal rights which men have, giving them some social privileges – to have a rest-time period before and after the birth of a child, to be allowed to have a pension, amongst others there are many kinder gardens in North Korea. Many North Korean women were rewarded by medals and received honorary titles. All these measures helped to raise women's social prestige to a certain level, but not to permit them to be in leading positions in policy making and the economy or becoming members of the ruling party. The last is the men's privilege. Many North Korean women are in the military, but there is no female General in the North Korean Armed Forces. All these measures promote an increase of the social status of women, but do not allow them to take the leading positions in policy making or the economy, become party members, or to serve in the army in high positions. All of this indicates that a considerable level of control still remains against women reaching high positions.

On the contrary, South Korean society continues to be a Confucian one and women's social positions remain low. As a rule, married women do not work and stay at home. Only in the middle of the 1990s did the South Korean authorities begin to take the first steps in formulating a gender policy. It was proclaimed that a male and a female's payment for the same work must be equal. There was also a declaration about the construction of the pension system and the medical insurance system, as well.[8] Moreover, South Korean authorities revised the electoral system and established a quota for female candidates. All these measures may have become a model for other countries with Confucian traditions and to show how women can find a greater voice in society.

Nevertheless, the new social policy of the South Korean government did not make a wide impression on the social situation. Equal payments and pensions were only for people who work at the state's factories. There was a preservation of women's kind of work and men's kind of work in private enterprises. Women can work in restaurants, hotels, hospitals and schools, and men – in industry, science, political spheres and the military.

The South Korean woman, who all her life was merely a "home person", as usual would say that she did not have a pension, but instead she "has a husband". In other words, the women agree to depend on their husbands' hospitality.

In an ideal situation, South Korean women must leave their job after marriage and give birth to a mail heir, as according to Confucian traditions, only mail successors can make tributes to their ancestors. As a result, South Korean society continues to be a real masculine society and mainly takes into account the interests of males.

[8] Kye Woo Lee, 'Evolution of Women's Employment and Gender Discrimination in Korea', *Korea Focus*, September–October 2005, Vol. 13, No. 5, 2005, pp. 136–148.

Many young Korean young women are well educated and their activity in the job market may result in a big profit for the country's economy. According to Confucian traditions after reaching their 30s and getting married women quit their jobs and continue to stay at home while the children grow up. As a result, the departure of the female workforce after marriage led to a loss of 128 trillion won, which accounted for about 14.2 percent of the country's gross domestic product in 2008.[9]

Therefore, President Park Geun-hye's administration decided to improve the situation and start a program for working women. It established the Ministry of Gender Equality and Family. The state-run Korean Women's Development Institute conducts research on gender issues and gives recommendations to authorities. The government's aim is to return married women to work. For this aim the government plans to inject 4.6 trillion won and makes efforts to help working mothers continue their careers. The authorities expected the employment of young mothers to rise to 70 percent. Both parents receive a right to leave their job for the purpose of child rearing. The government also plans to build 150 state-run day care centers and make a parental system more attractive for both parents, as it will allow them to work part-time and spend more time with their children. Besides, the government provides a state-sponsored nannies' policy.[10]

Korean TV-programs make shows about fathers and their children, explaining how fathers may spend time and have a rest with their children. All these measures may permit Korea to avoid quickly becoming an aging society with a shrinking working-age population.

At present, we can see some positive results from this comfortable for women policy. South Korea has experienced a rise in the proportion of women among teachers, lawyers, medical doctors and senior officials at central government agencies. Women make up 15.7 percent of the lawmakers at the current 300-member National Assembly.[11]

However, the female presence in politics and corporate boardrooms has remained low, suggesting that there are still 'glass ceilings' that have yet to be 'smashed'. This phenomenon shows that a male dominated culture remains stronger in provincial politics and governance. There is a need to step up efforts to field more female contenders in local polls, making it obligatory to fill a certain proportion of their candidate lists with women.

At the same time, the young generation of rich women changed their life targets and decided to become involved in economic activity. Many daughters and especially granddaughters of owners of Korean *chaebol* continue their work after marriage. As usual, they are in the top positions in the luxury business.[12] Maybe other Korean women would follow them and establish their own business.

The next index of the level of a gender policy concerns equal rights in military service. Later South Korean governments had not increased the number of females in military service. In the last ten years women may serve as soldiers and non-commissioned officers especially in the medical divisions. In 2014, the authorities permitted female soldiers and non-commissioned officers to apply for the artillery, armored units and air defense

[9] Cho Chun-un, 'Work and Life Balance Tall Order for Korean working Moms', *Korea Herald,* February 3, 2014, p. 4, www.koreaherald.co.kr (accessed 14 June 2014).

[10] Kim Da-ye, 'Bonus for Husbands taking Parental leave', *Korea Times*, February 5, 2014, p. 2. www.koreatimes.co.kr (accessed 18 April 2014).

[11] *Korea Herald*, March 12, 2014, p. 14.

[12] Lee, Ji-yoon, '*Chaebol* Daughters Build Luxury Empires of Their Own', *Korea Herald*, January 8, 2014, p. 10.

forces in a bid to lower the gender barrier. At the same time female soldiers received more opportunities for child care.[13]

The Army Military Academy began inviting female cadets. The government plans to increase the number of female officers to 7 percent of the total forces by 2015. All these measures testify that President Park Geun-hye's administration occupies a strong position in changing the role of women in Korean society, making it more active in the realization their own careers. President Park Geun-hye's administration has made great progress in the gender policies that permit Korean society to be more balanced and stable.

In international forums, Korean women's issues are represented and activated as specific political issues, unlike other current problems such as constructing a peace regime and the economic and political situation in North East Asia. In the1990s meetings began between South and North Korean academic-based subject groups of women, which met in Yanbian, China and Tokyo.[14] Looking forward to the process of future Korean re-unification it is very important to continue the international exchange of opinions between South and North Korean women.

Conclusion

Contrary to the submissive status of females, women leaders have dominated in South and South-East Asian states for much of the past four decades. These states have other political and religious traditions. It creates an illusion that the gender situation in these states is more comfortable for women. However, we may take into consideration the dynastic links that brought these women to power. Each of them belongs to the elite of society, their fathers or husbands being descendants of their countries recognized founding persons. The cases of these women leaders are not typical for other South Asian women.

Thus the modern process of increasing the social status of women in the nations with Confucian traditions has many common features and goes actually according to one scenario: the tone is set by the women belonging to the local elites. Under pressure from economic factors these nations take similar measures for the involvement of married women in economic activity, by creating new opportunities for their work in previously prohibited zones, for example, to serve in the army in high ranking officer positions.

The great changes in the economic situation of the nations with Confucian traditions would force women to continue to work after marriage. This would permit them to be financially independent, and conversely, this would give a lot of profits for the countries' economy, which would slow down the demographic trend towards an aging society and negate the need to invite foreign workers. At the same time, this would involve more men in housekeeping tasks and childcare and make social life more equal for men and women.

The countries of Confucian civilizations may give fresh ideas to the Confucian way of life and not only continue to maintain traditions, but also to think about contemporary economic interests and also the consolidation of their nations.

[13] *Korea Herald*, March 12, 2014, p. 3.

[14] Kim Young-Sun, 'The Historical Trajectory of Academic Exchange between North and South Korean Women and its Tasks', *Women and History*, December 2013, Vol. 19, p. 329.

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La minorité chinoise à Paris

Résumé

Le texte suivant se donne pour but de présenter les minorités originaires de la Chine qui habitent à Paris, la capitale française. L'approche de ce texte sera dans un premier point chronologique. Y-sera présenté les vagues de migrations chinoises à Paris. Dans un second temps seront mis en avant les quartiers chinois à Paris, ceux du passé et ceux d'aujourd'hui. Il sera par la suite particulièrement démontré que ces minorités sont dynamiques et qu'elles cherchent à quitter la ville de Paris pour aller vivre dans les zones géographiques avoisinantes. Le sujet de l'intégration des minorités chinoises sera également abordé au cœur des lignes suivantes.

Mots clés: Arts et Métiers, Belleville, Îlot-Châlon, minorité chinoise, dongbei, Paris, Teochew, Wenzhou.

Introduction

L'article premier de la Constitution de la Cinquième République française stipule clairement que "La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion. Elle respecte toutes les croyances. Son organisation est décentralisée".[1]

C'est par cet article constitutionnel que je souhaiterais revenir à la notion de minorité. Celle-ci, à l'échelle nationale, est utilisée dans divers documents internationaux, notamment dans la Convention-cadre du Conseil de l'Europe pour la protection des minorités nationales (ouverte à la signature depuis 1995) ainsi que dans la Convention européenne des droits de l'Homme. En fait, il faut savoir que toutes les tentatives pour formuler une définition unanimement acceptée de minorité se sont soldées par un échec. Il existe toutefois une définition assez largement répandue et qui, malgré son caractère officieux en matière internationale, semble faire autorité.

L'expression "minorité nationale" désigne un groupe de personnes dans un État qui:

a. résident sur le territoire de cet État et en sont citoyens;
b. entretiennent des liens anciens, solides et durables avec cet État;
c. présentent des caractéristiques ethniques, culturelles, religieuses ou linguistiques spécifiques;

[1] http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/connaissance/constitution.asp (accès le 11 mai 2014).

d. sont suffisamment représentatives, tout en étant moins nombreuses que le reste de la population de cet État ou d'une région de cet État;
e. sont animées de la volonté de préserver ensemble ce qui fait leur identité commune, notamment leur culture, leurs traditions, leur religion ou leur langue.[2]

Le sujet des minorités est donc un sujet bien que défini et par la même c'est un sujet qui devient clé non seulement à l'échelle française mais également européenne. En 1954 il y'avait 50 000 chinois en Europe et actuellement ils sont plus de 3 millions[3] ce qui fait soixante fois plus en soixante ans.[4] Pour débuter je propose un petit rappel historique: les premiers groupes d'étrangers arrivent en France au XVIIIème siècle. Ce furent tout particulièrement des groupes de travailleurs qualifiés: d'Espagne d'Hollande, d'Allemagne et d'Italie.[5] Jusqu'à la Révolution Française qui prit place en 1789, il y'avait en France deux minorités officielles : la minorité allemande et la minorité italienne qui jouissaient de droits autonomiques[6]. S'arrêter un temps sur les Chinois de Paris c'est s'arrêter sur une minorité qui a participé, qui participe et qui participera au développement de la capitale française. Au jour d'aujourd'hui, la minorité grandissante de chinois à Paris (400 000 personnes en France, dont 40% habitant à Paris (160 000 personnes) ce qui représente 7% de la population parisienne totale et 0,7% de la population de l'Ile de France)[7] développe un nouveau cadre dans le domaine de l'inter-culturalité au sein de la capitale française. Cette minorité chinoise est essentielle à la vie de Paris néanmoins ce groupe ethnique est plus représenté en Grande Bretagne qu'en France.[8] Il faut savoir qu'avant toute chose en raison d'une loi historique chinoise, jusqu'au 19ème siècle, un nombre limité de chinois pouvait se rendre en France. La véritable première migration chinoise date du XXème siècle.

Premiers chinois en Europe

Les premiers chinois à se rendre en Europe ont commencé à arriver à la fin du XVIIème siècle. Très peu de commerçants se rendirent en Europe à l'instar de Choi-A-Fuk (譯音) qui fit un voyage en Scandinavie à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. Celui-ci était un invité de la cour suédoise et était chargé de vérifier la société des Indes Orientales Olof Lindahl.

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[2] *Qu'est-ce qu'une "minorité nationale"?*, "Plateforme d'information humanrights.ch", 23 aout 2007, (accès le 2 mai 2014). Texte téléchargeable au lien suivant: http://www.humanrights.ch/fr/Dossiers/Droits-des-minorites/Questions-conceptuelles/Definitions/idart_2331-content.html.

[3] 50% des Wenzhou en Europe habiterait en France ce qui porterait à 400 000, le nombre de Wenzhou en Europe. Richard Teraha, 'Les chinois du Wenzhou, une diaspora singulière et si semblables à d'autres', *Diasporiques*, décembre 2007, nr 44, p. 4.

[4] Philippe Ratte, *La route de la Soie*, Paris: Gingko, 2014, p. 81.

[5] Przemysław Grzybowski, 'Ku społeczeństwu międzykulturowemu – mniejszości etniczne i kulturowe we Francji', p. 238 [dans:] Z. Jasiński, T. Lewowicki (red.), *Kultura mniejszości narodowych i grup etnicznych w Europie*, Opole: Institut des Etudes Pédagogiques de l'Université d'Opole, 2004, pp. 237–253.

[6] Grzybowski, *Ku społeczeństwu międzykulturowemu...*, pp. 237–253.

[7] Ratte, *La route...,* p. 82.

[8] Michelle Guillon, 'La localisation des Asiatiques en région parisienne', *Perspectives chinoises, V*ol. 27 nr 27, 1995, p. 43. Document disponible au lien suivant http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/perch_1021-9013_1995_num_27_1_1834. (accès le 23 fevrier 2014).

Dans un même temps, Shen Fuzong (沈福宗, 1657–1692), un chinois arrivé en France au XVIIème siècle aurait appris au roi Louis XIV de idéogrammes ainsi que comment manier les baguettes le 15 septembre 1684. Shen Fuzong était un mandarin de Nankin qui converti au catholicisme était parti rencontrer le pape à Rome. Son voyage en Europe a duré de 1681 à 1692, il parlait différentes langues européennes notamment le latin, l'italien ainsi que le portugais.

Entre 1684 et 1916, il y'aurait eu 45 chinois en France. Ce qui est à la fois faible et considérable. Faible car ce ne sont que 45 personnes, considérable car auparavant il n'y avait pas de chinois en France. Au XIXème siècle, ce sont 200 chinois qui étaient dénombrés en terre française.[9]

La chrétienté a également fait venir des chinois en France. La congrégation des Lazaristes à notamment chercher des représentants en Chine.[10] Rappelons tout d'abord que les Lazaristes sont les membres (qu'ils soient frères ou prêtres) de la congrégation de la Mission qui a été fondée en 1625 à Paris par saint Vincent de Paul (né en 1581-décédé en 1660).

Ce sont ainsi quatre étudiants qui auraient vécus chez les Lazaristes rue de Sèvres a Paris. Notamment Joseph Ly, Mathieu Liu et François Kiou. Les lazaristes sont partis pour des missions lointaines en Chine, pour remplacer les jésuites à la fin du XVIIIème siècle. Ils y-ont entrepris des œuvres d'éducation. C'est pourquoi les Lazaristes tenteront de relancer leur mission en Chine au XIXème siècle néanmoins leurs représentants seront massacrés (ce sera notamment le cas de Jean Gabriel Perboyre, martyrisé en Chine en 1840).[11]

Dans le cadre relations entre la Chine et la France, citons également la fille de l'écrivain français Théophile Gauthier. Judith Gauthier (né en 1845 – décédé en 1917), fille de Théophile Gaultier eut un enseignement de chinois, langue qu'elle parlait parfaitement grâce aux enseignements prodigieux de Tin-Tun-Ling, un chinois qui fut réfugié politique en France recueilli par Théophile Gauthier.[12] Théophile Gautier recueillit un jour un lettré chinois du nom de Ding Dunling, réfugié politique en France, qui apprit à Judith la langue chinoise et l'initia à la civilisation, notamment la littérature, de l'Empire du Milieu. À vingt-deux ans, elle publia Le Livre de Jade, une collection d'anciens poèmes chinois.

En 1888 arriva le premier colporteur chinois en France, selon les archives de la ville de Qingtian, originaire de Russie, ce chinois vendait la marchandise qu'il trouva tout au long de son fastidieux périple. Il fut le premier qui donna des idées à de nombreux autres colporteurs chinois.[13]

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[9] Intervention de Nathalie Monnet (Conservateur en chef, chargée des manuscrits de Dunhuang et des fonds chinois), lors du forum interculturel de Taihu qui s'est tenu à Paris au Musée Guimet le 1er et 2 avril 2014.

[10] L'histoire des missions des Jésuites en Chine fait partie de l'histoire des relations entre la Chine et le Monde Occidental. Les Jésuites ont dès 1552 par le biais de Saint Francis Xavier d'atteindre sans succès la Chine. Certains de ces jésuites sont même devenus des conseillers de l'empereur chinois. Jusqu'en 1800, ce sont 800 jésuites qui ont participé à ces missions en Chine.

[11] Intervention de l'auteur de ce texte Nicolas Levi (Chercheur associé à l'Académie des Sciences Polonaise, Institut des Etudes Méditerranéennes et Orientales), lors du forum interculturel de Taihu qui s'est tenu à Paris au Musée Guimet le 1er et 2 avril 2014.

[12] Maria Rubins, 'Dialogues across Cultures: Adaptation of Chinese Verse by Judith Gauthier and Nikolai Gumilev', *Comparative Literature*, printemps 2002, nr 54, p. 145.

[13] Sandrine Maurot, 'Les communautés chinoises à Paris – Les leviers d'action de la municipalité', *Les Cahiers du Pôle* – Rencontre du jeudi 19 octobre 2010, p. 9.

Première émigration et premier quartier chinois de Paris

Paris a toujours été une terre d'immigration: alors que les immigrés en France représentent 9,4% de la population française totale, ramené à Paris cette proportion atteindrait les 17,5%.[14]

L'Îlot-Châlon, une enceinte parisienne près de la gare de Lyon, le plus ancien des quartiers chinois, a aujourd'hui disparu. Ce quartier qui était à l'origine italien a au début du XXème siècle accueilli la première vague d'immigration chinoise. C'est de ce quartier dont il sera ici question.

Il a été rasé dans les années 70 quand la gare fut agrandie. Ce quartier abritait autrefois une population essentiellement Qingtian et quelques Wenzhou (une région ou plus précisément un district chinois localisé à 500 kilomètres au sud de Shanghai). Ce groupe de chinois, dont la langue est la 10ème la plus parlée au monde[15] a toujours eu pour habitude de migrer, que ce soit dans les frontières internes de la Chine ou que ce soit hors de l'empire du milieu. C'est donc ainsi qu'à l'étranger que ces chinois ont tout d'abord émigrés en Russie jusqu'au XVIIème siècle puis se sont déplacés jusqu'à l'Europe occidentale qu'ils ont atteints vers le XIXème siècle et de manière plus accentuée depuis l'établissement de relations diplomatiques entre la France via le Général Charles de Gaulle et le Grand Timonier Mao.

Au recensement de 1911, on comptait officiellement 283 Chinois en France (dont 280 à Paris)[16] néanmoins il semblerait qu'il y'ait eu plus de chinois pendant la période de la première guerre mondiale dans la mesure où de nombreux chinois du nord de la Chine ont participé à la première guerre mondiale (1914–1918). Ces chinois participèrent d'une part de manière directe au sanglant conflit que fut la première guerre mondiale et d'autre part ils durcissement les rangs des ouvriers qui travaillaient dans le domaine de l'armement français (en travaillant notamment chez Renault).[17] Ces chinois étaient en effet originaires de la province de Shandong, réputés pour être plus fort et plus vigoureux que les chinois du sud et cela selon les dires du Général Foch. Ces chinois furent après utilisés par l'armée française pour nettoyer les terrains des Batailles des Ardennes et déminer les zones considérées.[18] Ces chinois qui n'étaient hélas pas volontaires mais qui voulaient gagner de l'argent se sont enfuis du train qui devaient les amener à Marseille. Finalement ils s'installèrent dans le quartier de l'Îlot-Châlon avec des chinois originaires de Russie ou du Xinjiang.

Ces chinois s'installèrent dans ce quartier et se mirent à développer des activités de commerce.[19] Ce groupe de Qingtians ont été rejoints par la suite par des Wenzhou, géographiquement proche des Qingtians. Ils s'installèrent dans le même quartier ainsi que dans celui des arts et métiers. Ceux-ci disposaient de plus de capitaux que les Qingtians et

[14] Guillon, 'La localisation...', p. 42.

[15] Richard Teraha, 'Les chinois du Wenzhou, une diaspora singulière et si semblables à d'autres', *Diasporiques*, décembre 2007, nr 44, p. 4.

[16] Ratte, *La route...,* p. 82.

[17] Guillon, 'La localisation...', p. 42.

[18] Pierre Picquart, *L'Empire chinois*, Paris: Favre, 2004, p. 39.

[19] Rue Chrétien-de-Troyes, une plaque relate cette histoire. Ces Chinois, de la montagne du Qingtian, sont des hommes célibataires venus pour gagner de l'argent. Ils restaient le moins longtemps possible en France. Entre-temps, ils permettaient à deux ou trois membres de la famille – au sens large – de venir à leur tour en France. Exposé, par Donatien Schramm, Association Chinois dans Sandrine Maurot, intitulé 'Les différentes vagues migratoires à Paris: l'histoire de l'immigration chinoise' dans 'Les communautés chinoises à Paris – Les leviers d'action de la municipalité', *Les Cahiers du Pôle* – Rencontre du jeudi 19 octobre 2010 de France – Français de Chine, p. 11.

purent par la suite monter de plus grosses affaires commerciales. Les Wenzhou ont rejoint en vérité des proches des Qingtians. De manière générale les Wenzhou fonctionnent au sein de leur groupe ethnique et par un système de dons intergénérationnel[20] et par les réseaux *guanzi*[21] qui assurent la pérennité du système. On peut également en déduire que le *moi* français a peu à voir avec le *nous* des Wenzhou.

C'est pour cela que les données statistiques du recensement de 1936 furent complètement différentes de ce qu'il en ressortait du recensement de 1911. Ce sont plus de 2000 chinois qui se reconnaissent au recensement de 1936 ce qui est 9 fois plus que le chiffre obtenu au comptage statistique de 1911.[22] Les chinois furent alors à l'époque tout particulièrement des commerçants du IIIème arrondissement de Paris et travaillèrent dans l'industrie de la Maroquinerie de Paris (tout particulièrement dans les alentours de l rue Saint-Denis).

Deuxième immigration

Lorsque la Chine commença à s'ouvrir dans les années 70, il fut plus aiser pour les chinois de se rendre en France. A nouveau se furent les Qingtians et les Wenzhou qui arrivèrent en France. Le quartier qui fut alors occupé ne fut ceux de l'Îlot-Châlon et des Arts et Métiers mais celui de Belleville qui à l'époque encore était relativement moins habité qu'aujourd'hui.

Cette vague d'immigration qui plus riche que les Qingtians cités auparavant, mais pas assez encore pour pouvoir acheter des appartements dans Paris Intra-muros. C'est pourquoi les acteurs de cette vague ont commencé à acquérir de l'immobilier en proche banlieue parisienne, tout particulièrement du coté d'Aubervilliers, de Pantin puis plus en Seine et Marne du coté de Chelles, de Torcy et des villes des alentours (y-compris le Val de Marne).

L'ouverture de la Chine a aussi entrainé l'arrivée d'autres communautés que celles indiquées ci-dessus. Par exemple les Dongbei (du nord de la Chine, principalement des femmes sans éducation des provinces suivantes: Heilongjiang, Jilin et Liaoning) et les Fujian (de la région des Wenzhou) qui arrivèrent sur Belleville à partir des années 90.

Le nord de la Chine a fait l'objet de restructurations industrielles monstres, avec un chômage inégalé ailleurs parallèlement il y a eu une forte progression des divorces. Ces pourquoi les Dongbei se sont exiler et côtoient les Teochew, ces chinois du sud ouest, du coté de Belleville. Ces minorités (ainsi que d'autres) profitèrent de l'arrivée de migrants laotiens, kampuchéens etc. pour se faire passer pour des réfugiés politiques. Les analyses sociologiques affirment que les Dongbei représentent la majorité des prostituées de Belleville ce qui témoignerait des difficultés d'intégration des femmes Dongbei à Paris.[23] Il est difficile d'estimer le nombre de Teochew de Paris car un certain nombre de chinois d'origine vietnamienne ou laotienne ont immédiatement obtenu la nationalité française.[24] A Paris séjournent également des chinois issus de la minorité coréenne en Chine (on dénombrerait également quelques réfugiés nord-coréens qui se seraient fait passés pour des

[20] Pour des détails plus amples à propos de ce sujet veuillez consulter le document suivant: Estelle Auguin, *Le don et la face:Au fondement de l'économie de la diaspora chinoise originaire de la région de Wenzhou*, Colloque International MIGRINTER, 6 juillet 2006.

[21] Teraha, 'Les chinois...', p. 7.

[22] Guillon, 'La localisation...', p. 46.

[23] Florence Levy, Marylène Lieber, 'Northern Chinese women in Paris: the illegal immigration – prostitution nexus', *Social Science Information,* December 2008, nr 47, p. 632.

[24] Guillon, 'La localisation...', p. 46.

chinois du Nord de la Chine). Concernant les Teochew, les plus nombreux sont ceux qui sont originaires du Cambodge et du Laos. Arrivés pour la plupart dans les années 70 (en raison des infractions abominables du régime de Pol Pot au Cambodge, et dès 1975 après la victoire communiste au Vietnam et au Cambodge, une vague de réfugiés, les *boat-people*, arrivent de manière indirecte en région parisienne).[25] ils obtiennent de manière rapide le statut de réfugié politique en raison de la guerre dans leur pays d'origine. Ce sont ainsi plus de 100 000 réfugiés sud-est asiatiques qui sont arrivés en France.[26] Citons par exemples les célèbres 'Frères Tang' de Paris qui originaire du Laos, ont obtenu rapidement la nationalité française mais se considèrent plus comme chinois que laotiens. A titre d'information le nom Tang est chinois.

Les Dongbei qui arrivent à Paris ne s'intègrent pas aisément avec les autres diasporas chinoises à Paris. Pas question de parler de solidarité entre les Dongbei et les Wenzhou qui restent plutôt n'entre eux. Quand aux Dongbei, n'ayant pas de tradition de migration, disposant d'un bon statut en Chine, ils n'avaient pas besoin d'immigrer que ce soit en France ou ailleurs. Les réformes du système chinois qui commencèrent à s'opérer à partir de 1978, la chute des sociétés étatiques, le chômage croissant dans les usines de la Chine du Nord forcèrent les Dongbei à chercher de meilleurs horizons. En effet les réformes économiques eurent pour conséquences de créer des groupes de chinois sans travail mais ces réformes ont également simplifiées les procédures de voyages à l'étranger des chinois. C'est pourquoi les facilités départ étaient également pour quelque chose en ce qui concerne ces vagues d'immigrations. Ces facilités de déplacements ont également fait fleurir le nombre d'agences de voyages s'occupant de gérer les déplacements des chinois à l'étranger. Cela explique donc le nombre croissant de Dongbei en France. En effet un voyage de Chine vers l'Europe coute trois fois moins cher pour des Dongbei que pour des chinois Wenzhou.[27] Les chinois dont il est ici question arrivent en France pour différentes raisons:[28] pour un travail, pour des études, pour compléter leur famille déjà régulariser en France et enfin pour des visites à durée déterminée.

De manière globale, il est possible d'estimer que les Wenzhou représentent 50% (200 000 personnes)[29] de la communauté chinoise à Paris, les Teochew compteraient pour 20% (80 000 personnes) et les Dongbei pour 5% (20 000 personnes) de la population parisienne.[30] Les 25% restants seraient constitués par d'autres groupes ethniques chinois. Néanmoins soulignons-le fortement : il est difficile d'estimer qui est vraiment chinois, car les nouvelles générations (celles qui sont nées dans les 80 et 90) disent de plus en plus souvent qu'elles se sentent françaises.[31]

[25] 'Les modalités d'entrée des ressortissants chinois en France', *Migrations Etudes*, juillet-août 2002, nr 108, p. 2.

[26] Sandrine Maurot, 'Les communautés chinoises à Paris – Les leviers d'action de la municipalité', *Les Cahiers du Pôle* – Rencontre du jeudi 19 octobre 2010, p. 9.

[27] Charlotte Rotman, 'Les Dongbei, du nord de la Chine au nord de Paris', *Libération*, 15 février 2012.

[28] 'Les modalités d'entrée des ressortissants chinois en France', *Migrations Etudes*, juillet-aout 2002, nr 108, p. 2.

[29] En 2007, le chercheur français Richard Teraha estimait le nombre de Wenzhou en France dans un intervalle allant de 130 à 200 000, Teraha, 'Les chinois...', p. 4.

[30] Annabelle Laurent, 'Chinois de France ne veut rien dire', *slate.fr*, 28 juin 2010. Article disponible au lien suivant: http://www.slate.fr/story/23827/chinois-de-france-ne-veut-rien-dire (accès le 10 avril 2014).

[31] Guillon, 'La localisation...', p. 46.

Les autres quartiers chinois de Paris

De manière générale, la minorité chinoise est éparpillée sur trois zones à Paris.[32] Chacune de ces zones possède ses propres caractéristiques et par là-même, dans chacun de ces quartiers, la population chinoise se voit dotée de caractéristiques propres d'ou on peut parler de trois villes chinoises sur l'étendue de Paris.

Le XIIIème arrondissement

Le XIIIème arrondissement de Paris est le plus chinois des quartiers asiatiques de la capitale française.[33] Bien que ne disposant pas d'une architecture asiatique (à la différence des Chinatown de San Francisco et d'autres villes américaines), c'est ici que ce sont retrouvés les premiers chinois issus de la seconde immigration. A noté également: le XIIIème n'a pas été été construit spécialement pour les asiatiques. Localisé dans le "triangle de Choisy", ces Chinois venaient pour nombre d'entre eux de l'est de la province de Guangdong, notamment des villes de Chaozhou ou de Shantou, tout près de l'île de Taïwan. Ces chinois étaient au début basé dans l'Îlot-Châlon puis ont migré dans le XIIIème arrondissement. Cette minorité a développé de nombreuses activités commerciales. De nombreuses sociétés chinoises, tout particulièrement dans le domaine de l'agroalimentaire, y-sont présentes. Les chinois côtoient dans ce quartier d'autres minorités asiatiques (originaires du Vietnam, du Laos) qui y-sont installées depuis les années 60 du siècle dernier. La population du 13ème est donc fortement à connotation asiatique dans lequel résident uniquement de 10 à 15% de chinois. C'est donc ainsi que 60% de la population de ce quartier asiatique est cambodgienne et laotienne[34].

Le XIXème arrondissement

Le second quartier chinois à Paris se délimite au XIXème arrondissement de Paris. La partie nord-est de la capitale a une forte population chinoise qui côtoie des minorités à la fois asiatiques mais également africaines et arabes (tout particulièrement des anciennes colonies françaises). C'est dans ce quartier qu'ont eu lieu les premiers défilés parisiens du nouvel an chinois. Les chinois y-sont éparpillés que ce soit du coté de Crimée ou de Belleville et Couronnes ou ils côtoient d'autres minorités, particulièrement arabes du coté de Belleville. Les chinois qui y habitent y ont migré dans les années 70 car les emplacements de vie se faisaient de plus en plus rare du coté du "Triangle de Choisy". Au jour d'aujourd'hui

[32] Ibid., p. 43.

[33] Les autres asiatiques de Paris, à savoir les japonais et les coréens, se concentrent autour du premier et du second arrondissement de la capitale francaise. C'est en effet ici que se retrouvent principalement les supérettes de ces pays ainsi que les restaurants. Il y'aurait de 10 à 20 000 japonais à Paris. Pour plus d'informations à ce sujet, je conseille d'en venir à la thèse d'Hadrien Dubucs intitulée *Habiter une ville lointaine: le cas des migrants japonais à Paris* soutenue à l'Université de Poitiers le 30 novembre 2009. Au jour du 6 juin 2014 une version téléchargable est disponible au lien suivant: http://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/44/11/42/PDF/these_hadrien_dubucs.pdf. Quant aux coréens (du Sud et du Nord) ils seraient moins de 10 000 en France. A ce sujet, lisez le document écris par Hélène Zinck et intitulé *La communauté Coréenne de Paris: petite introduction*. Au jour du 6 juin 2014 une version téléchargable est disponible au lien suivant: http://www.hommes-et-migrations.fr/docannexe/file/1233/1233_05.pdf.

[34] Guillon, 'La localisation...', p. 43.

le quartier de Belleville est la zone géographique où la concentration de Dongbei et de Wenzhou est la plus importante sur Paris.[35]

Le IIIème arrondissement

Le troisième quartier chinois de Paris balance dans les rues du 3ème arrondissement de Paris où de nombreux chinois (tout particulièrement de la région de Wenzhou) développent des activités commerciales à petite échelle. Dans les années 30 ils auraient représentés 90% de la population chinoise à Paris.[36] A noter que cette population a tendance à migrer aux portes de Paris. Il faut savoir qu'un millier de grossistes chinois en confection résident du coté d'Aubervilliers. Selon Richard Beraha, 90 % des Chinois d'Aubervilliers viennent de la province de Wenzhou. Les Wenzhou sont de véritables hommes d'affaires qui propulsent le milieu des affaires chinois en France. Il est également important de noter qu'un certain nombre est en situation irrégulière en France ou travaillent dans des conditions difficiles de travail qui ne répondent pas aux normes applicables à Paris par exemple dans le XIème arrondissement de Paris.[37]

Conclusion

Malgré leur présence depuis XVIIème siècle, les chinois font partis des nouvelles immigrations en France jusqu'en 1974. Auparavant la France puisait dans les pays étrangers afin de trouver des soldats pour l'armée française (que ce soit la flotte marine ou l'armée de terre ou de l'air) ou de la main d'œuvre peu qualifiée pour par exemple le domaine du Bâtiment. Parmi ces groupes minoritaires à Paris, on peut distinguer deux groupes de chinois (au sens large sans à avoir à effectuer de découpages ethnographiques). Il y'a ainsi les chinois de Wenzhou et d'autre part les chinois de l'ancienne Indochine française.

Le Paris grandit, Paris respire, Paris inspire. C'est peut-être pour ces raisons que les minorités chinoises qui s'étouffent dans les zones mentionnées ci-dessus sont à la recherché d'un nouveau pouls qu'elles prendront dans les banlieues de Paris (tout particulièrement en Seine et Marne, Seine Saint-Denis et dans le Val de Marne) où se développe des zones chinoises à la manière de celles qui existent à Paris. Ceux-ci y ont migré pour des raisons financières, les administrations municipales y octroient plus facilement des prêts que dans Paris Intra Muros. Les zones chinoises regroupent plusieurs minorités chinoises, c'est la Chine plurielle qui est à Paris et non la Chine unie. L'unité chinoise à Paris n'est que factice, plusieurs groupes ethniques chinois sont à Paris (les Dongbei, les chinois de Wenzhou, du Guangdong, etc.)

Chinois de Paris ou chinois à Paris ? Malgré tout et en raison d'antécédents historiques et culturelles, les chinois (tout comme d'autres minorités à Paris) gardent leur identité culturelle et ne tendent à se fondre dans une culture 100% française. "Les valeurs chrétiennes diffèrent fortement des valeurs du confucianisme ce qui ne permet pas à la minorité chinoise de se rapprocher de l'Europe. En effet les valeurs du confucianisme sont concrètes : travailler dur, honorer ses parents, à la différence de l'idéologie chrétienne qui cherche plus un rapprochement avec Dieu''.[38]

[35] Gao Yun et Véronique Poisson, *Le Trafic et l'exploitation des immigrants chinois en France*, Bureau International du Travail, Genève, mars 2005, p. 14.

[36] Laurent, 'Chinois...'.

[37] Gao Yun et Poisson, *Le Trafic...,* p. 7.

[38] Ratte, *La route...,* p. 80.

Il en ressort malgré tout que les plus jeunes des familles chinoises ont tendance à mieux se fondre dans la réalité française. Les plus jeunes arborent en effet des prénoms européens et apprécient nettement plus les éléments forts de la culture française que leurs ancêtres qui ont vécu en France. D'un autre coté ces asiatiques continuent d'avoir des difficultés à s'insérer dans le monde des entreprises françaises et un grand nombre d'entre eux préfèrent travailler avec des sociétés chinoises. Les difficultés d'intégration émergent donc des deux côtés: chinois et français.

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Chinese Naming – Substitution by Homophones

Abstract

The paper deals with the method of the substitution by homophones, that is extensively used in Chinese onomastic fields, like toponymy or anthroponymy. The method of the substitution by homophones is mainly aimed at reshaping already existing names by replacing their previous form, for some reasons unwanted. However, it is also broadly applied to create new names by using words which are homophonic with the words denoting the idea they symbolize. The paper presents some various reasons and aims of the use of the method in the field of Chinese geographical names (place names, toponyms), and these are: personal name taboo, unwanted place names, simplification of the Chinese writing system, adaptation of foreign geographical names. The paper also analyses the use of the method in the field of Chinese personal names (anthroponyms), and these are: creation of so-called good Chinese names, dealing with some troublesome Chinese surnames, creating of Chinese female counter-commendatory names and Chinese given names as equivalents of foreign given names.

Key words: substitution by homophones, Chinese homophonic words, Chinese reshaping of names, Chinese toponyms and anthroponyms resulting from the method of the substitution by homophones

Introduction

There are many Chinese proper names (place names, personal names and others) making use of or resulting from the method of substitution by homophones, in Chinese generally termed *tóngyīnzì dàitǐ* 同音字代替[1], or *xiéyīn zhuǎnyì biànhuà* 谐音转义变化.[2] In the case of proper names some other terms for the substitution of homophones occur, and these are, for example, *yǐ yīn gēngmíng fǎ* 以音更名法 'the method of phonetic changing of names',[3] or *xiéyīn huàn míng*

[1] Wang Wenzhou 王文周, 'Diming zhuanyongzi de xiangsi tongyinzi daiti' 地名专用字的相似同音字代替 [Substitution by Homophones of the Characters Words for the Special Toponymic Use], *Xinyang Shifan Xueyuan Xuebao* 信阳师范学院学报 [Scientific Bulletin of Xinyang Teachers'College], No. 3, 1984, p.110.

[2] Liu Jianbin 刘建斌, 'Beijing yixie jiexiang mingcheng de xieyin zhuanyi bianhua' 北京一些街巷名称的谐音转义变化 [Change of Meaning by Substitution by Homophones in Street Names in Beijing], *Diming zhishi* 地名知识 [Toponymic Knowledge], No. 5, 1982, p. 25.

[3] Qin Ying 秦樱, 'Lüelun Mingdai diming de geng, ming ming' 略论明代的更,命名 [Outline of names renamed or established during the Ming Dynasty], *Diming zhishi* 地名知识 [Toponymic Knowledge], No. 1, 1980, p. 3.

谐音换名 'a changing of names by homophones'.[4] The method of substitution by homophones is mainly used in order to reshape already existing names by replacing their previous form, which for some reasons is unwanted. However, it is also broadly applied to create new names by using words which are homophonic with the words denoting the idea they symbolize.[5]

The homophonic nature of the Chinese language

Every language contains a certain amount of homophones, i.e. words pronounced alike but spelt/written differently and bearing different meanings. The Chinese language has long contained a considerable amount of homophones, termed *tóngyīnyìyìcí* 同音异义词, *tóngyīnyìxíngcí* 同音异形词,[6] *tóngyīnyìzì* 同音异字,[7] or *xiéyīn* 谐音.[8] Nowadays, one can consider that homophony is pervasive in Chinese. This situation results from two main factors: the nature of the Chinese language and the historical sound changes of the Chinese spoken language, i.e. a strong tendency to sound simplification in the evolution of the language.

Certain major characteristics of the Chinese language are responsible for the existence of a limited amount of distinct syllables and thus the abundance of homophones. These main characteristics are the monosyllabic, isolating, non-inflectional nature of the Chinese language, its phonological system of a limited number of initials and endings of syllables, the limited number of its tonal categories, and thus the limited number of possible syllables.

In written Chinese, a character or grapheme, *zì* 字, is the linguistic equivalent of a monosyllabic morpheme/word. As a morpho-syllabic writing system, the Chinese graphemic structure maps onto meaningful morphemes in the spoken language. Thus, a character has a more direct association with its meaning, while its association with phonology is rather arbitrary and only defined over the character at the syllable level.

In 'Middle' Chinese (equating approximately to the 6th century) there were four tones, 36 initials and 293 endings, which provided 1,033 possible combinations of the initials and finals, which – multiplied by four tones – yielded 4,132 possible syllables. *Qieyun* 切韵, a pronunciation dictionary compiled in AD 601, contained about 12,000 characters, which means that on average each character/word had 3 homophones. In fact, cases are found where up to 47 characters/words share the same pronunciation.[9]

[4] Zhang Shaoqi 张绍麒, 'Diming yanbian zhong de xieyin huanming' 地名演变中的谐音换名 [Homophonic changes in the development of place names], *Diming zhishi* 地名知识 [Toponymic Knowledge], No. 4, 1988, p. 3.

[5] I. Kałużyńska, *Contemporary Chinese Place Names. Names of Administrative Divisions at County and City Level*, Bern, Berlin, Brussels, Frankfurt am Main, New York, Oxford, Vienna: Peter Lang AG, *Schweizer Asiatische Studien*, Monographien, Vol. 33, 2002, pp. 222–225; I. Kałużyńska, *Chinese Female Namings. Past and Present*, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo AGADE, 2008, pp. 37–38.

[6] R.R.K. Hartman, F.C. Stork, *Dictionary of Language and Linguistics*, London 1972, Chinese translation: *Yuyan yu yuyanxue cidian* 语言与语言学词典, Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 1981.

[7] Qin Ying, 'Lüelun Mingdai diming de geng, ming ming...', p. 3.

[8] Liu Jianbin 刘建斌, 'Beijing yixie jiexiang mingcheng de xieyin zhuanyi bianhua' 北京一些街巷名称的谐音转义变化 [Change of Meaning by Substitution by Homophones in Street Names in Beijing], *Diming zhishi* 地名知识 [Toponymic Knowledge], No. 5, 1982, p. 25; Ren Chuanxing 任传兴, 'Tantan diming de yanbian' 谈谈地名的演变 [Talking About the Evolution of Place Names], *Diming zhishi* 地名知识 [Toponymic Knowledge], No. 1, 1984, p.12; Zhang Shaoqi, 'Diming yanbianzhong de xieyin huanming...', p. 3.

[9] M.M.Y. Sung, 'Chinese Language and Culture: A Study of Homonyms, Lucky Words and Taboos', *Journal of Chinese Linguistics*, No. 7, 1979, p. 16.

As the Middle Chinese language already possessed an inconvenient number of homophones, the further simplification of sounds aggravated the difficulty level even further. In Modern Standard Chinese there are four tones, 21 initials and 35 endings. The initials and endings have 415 possible combinations that multiplied by four tones yield 1,660 possible syllables. According to *Xin Xiandai Hanyu Cidian* 新现代汉语词典 (The New Dictionary of the Modern Chinese Language), published in 1992,[10] which includes about 13,000 characters, every character/morpheme/word can have about eight homophones. However, these characters/morphemes/words are not uniformly distributed among the syllables, therefore the number of homophones in a series is sometimes smaller, sometimes larger. One can find up to 70 characters/words sharing the same pronunciation. In comparison, the English language has many times more syllables, estimated to be around 158,000.[11]

The great number of homophones is harmful to the intelligibility of the Chinese spoken language, and especially with proper names as mainly monosyllabic or bisyllabic forms occurring out of context. Therefore, Chinese names can fully reveal their intended meaning or meanings when they are written down. The spoken form of a name can be misunderstood or misconstrued, due to the abundance of homophones in the Chinese language and the variety of Chinese dialects and languages. However, the Chinese symbolic (and not strictly phonetic) writing distinguishes to the eye what is homophonous to the ear. The written form distinguishes the morpheme/word out of several homophonous ones, because almost every single morpheme/word has its own character indicating the meaning of the word without direct reference to the pronunciation or to the subsequent changes in the pronunciation. For example, there are 14 Chinese morphemes/words spelt *yī*, all having various meanings and written in different characters: 一, 衣, 伊, 医, 依, 咿, 铱, 猗, 揖, 壹, 漪, 噫, 繄, 黟.[12]

The pervasive homophony of the Chinese spoken language plays, however, an important role in the people's naming behaviour and daily activities. The Chinese commonly apply the semantic ambiguity of homophones in expressing their desires of happiness, wealth, proliferation of male children and so on by using words which are homophonic with the words denoting the idea they symbolize, and in expressing their fear of ill omens by avoiding saying words which happen to share the same pronunciation as words for ill omens, bad things or unfortunate situations.

Homophones and the substitution by homophones in the field of Chinese geographical names (place names, toponyms)

The homophones have played a very important role in the field of Chinese geographical names. The substitution by homophones has been treated as a very convenient means for changing already existing names. This kind of substitution preserved only the sound of the name, blurred its etymological and semantic clarity, and resulted in a different way of writing the name by using a different character or characters.[13]

[10] *Xin Xiandai Hanyu Cidian* 新现代汉语词典 [A New Dictionary of Modern Chinese Language], Haikou: Hainan Chubanshe, 1992.

[11] Otto Jespersen, 'Monosyllabism in English: Biennial Lecture on English Philology', *Proceedings of the British Academy*, London: British Academy, Vol. 14, 1930, p. 347.

[12] *Han-Ying cidian* 汉英词典 [A Chinese-English Dictionary], Beijing: Waiyu Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu Chubanshe, 1995.

[13] I. Kałużyńska, *Contemporary...*, pp. 220–237.

Chinese scholars usually treat all place names resulting from changes by substitution by homophones, as mainly alterations of the written form of the former toponyms. However, some divisions of Chinese place names have a separate group for such names, namely "place names originated as homophones", *yuán yú xiéshēng de dìmíng* 源于谐声的地名.[14]

In China changes of already existing place names were largely a matter of custom, and sometimes it is almost impossible to ascertain the real reasons for such changes. However, as the main reasons for changing toponyms are considered here: (1) taboos concerning personal names; (2) efforts to eliminate some reminiscences of previous times deemed unpleasant or undesirable from a political or social point of view; (3) efforts to simplify Chinese writing.[15]

Chinese geographical names as equivalents of foreign geographical names can also be treated as specific forms of the substitution by homophones. Foreign names, having their pronunciation and meaning, are usually divided into syllables, and each syllable is adapted as a Chinese morpheme/word of a homophonous or similar pronunciation. The meaning of Chinese equivalents of foreign geographical names usually have nothing in common with their originals.

(a) Personal name taboos and substitution by homophones

The phenomenon of the personal name taboo, *bìhui* 避讳 or *bìjì* 避忌, i.e. an avoidance of using the private name, *míng* 名, of a ruler, an elder or one of higher rank in speech and writing, caused these words and characters used for writing down the sacred private names to be avoided, so that the private names could not be used in inauspicious circumstances. If these particular characters/words were used for other proper names or appellatives, they had to be substituted by other characters/words. It was a quite common practice that these new characters/words were homophones of the original ones.[16]

The method of the substitution of a taboo character by another one which was used for a homophonous or nearly homophonous word, preserved the original pronunciation of the toponym, but blurred its etymological clarity and resulted in its different written form. For example, during the reign of the emperor Taizong (976–997) of the Song Dynasty (960–1279), as the emperor's private name was Guāngyì 光义, there were executed changes of the following names:[17]

- Yìxìng Xiàn 义兴县 'Justice and Prosperity County' into Yíxìng Xiàn 宜兴县 'Adequacy and Prosperity County', now in the Jiangsu Province;
- Yìzhāng Xiàn 义章县 'Justice and Order County' into Yízhāng Xiàn 宜章县 'Adequacy and Order County', now in the Hunan Province;
- Xīnyì Xiàn 信义县 'Confidence and Justice County' into Xīnyí Xiàn 信宜县 'Confidence and Adequacy County', now in the Guangdong Province.

[14] Rong Rong 容熔, 'Qiantan Taiwan de diming' 浅谈台湾的地名 [A Preliminary Discussion on Taiwan Place Names], *Diming zhishi* 地名知识 [Toponymic Knowledge], No. 3, 1984, p. 10.

[15] I. Kałużyńska, 'The Substitution by Homophones in Chinese Geographical Names', *Rocznik Orientalistyczny*, Vol. 50, z. 1, 1995, p. 126.

[16] I. Sulikowska, 'Z zagadnień toponomastyki chińskiej: Zjawisko tabu a nazwy geograficzne. Nazwy er panowania cesarzy w nazewnictwie geograficznym' [Chinese Toponymic Issues: Taboo and Geographical Names. Names of Imperial Eras in Geographical Names], *Przegląd Orientalistyczny*, Vol. 142, No. 2, 1987, pp. 175–182; Kałużyńska, 'The Substitution...', p. 128–129; Idem, *Contemporary...*, pp. 145–147, 229–232.

[17] Kałużyńska, 'The Substitution...', pp. 128–129.

Since the Jin Dynasty (265–420) it had been necessary to eliminate from Chinese geographical names not only characters/words that were identical with the banned ones, but also characters used for words homophonous or similar in sound to the taboo ones. For example, during the reign of the emperor Taizu (960–976) of the Song Dynasty, as the private name of his grandfather was Jìng 镜, there was performed the following change of the name:[18]

Shíjìng Xiàn 石镜县 'Stone Mirror County' into Shízhào Xiàn 石照县 'Stone Reflect County', now Héchuān Xiàn 合川县 in the Sichuan Province.

In the cases such as the aforementioned one, the method of substitution by homophones was of course not applicable whilst eliminating characters for words homophonous to the forbidden ones. These characters were substituted by characters different in form, pronunciation and meaning or by characters used for synonymous words.

The personal name taboo, which appeared at the beginning of Chinese statehood and was done away with in the Revolution of 1911, affected may fields of Chinese linguistic activity. Its traces can be seen in names of persons, places and things, as well as in the vocabulary of poetry and proverbs.

(b) The changing of unwanted place names and the substitution by homophones

Numerous changes of already existing place names in China were caused by various efforts to eliminate some reminiscences of previous reigns deemed unpleasant or undesirable from a political, administrative or social point of view. Such changes accompanied the settlement of a new dynasty or a new ruler within a dynasty, or a very significant event occurring in the given area. The changes of names could be undertaken as some efforts to eliminate duplicate place names, and they could also be a result of social reasons or changes in the mentality of Chinese society. There are a few examples of changing the names by the use of substitution by homophones. For example, at the beginning of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1911) the Manchu ruler ordered a change of name, previously settled under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644):

Pínglǔ Xiàn 平虏县 'County, where Northern Slaves Were Pacified' into Pínglǔ Xiàn 平鲁县'Calm and Common County', now in the Shanxi Province.[19]

Many examples of changes of street names by the method of substitution by homophones are to be found among names of streets in Beijing (*hùtóng* 胡同 'small street, lane, alley', *jiē* 街 'street'). Old, original names were considered not elegant enough and improper for the capital of a new China, so after the establishment of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 they have been changed. Below there are some examples of these changes:[20]

- Shǐkelàng Hùtóng 屎壳郎胡同 'Dung Beetle Hutong' into Shíkè Liàng Hùtóng 时刻亮胡同 'Bright Time Hutong';
- Gǒu Wěiba Hùtóng 狗尾巴胡同 'Dog's Tail Hutong' into Gāo Yì Bó Hùtóng 高义伯胡同 'High Justice Earl/Uncle Hutong';
- Lǘshì Jiē 驴市街 'Donkey Market Street' into Lǐshì Hùtóng 礼士胡同 'Ceremony Master Hutong';
- Niúxuè Hùtóng 牛血胡同 'Cow's Blood Hutong' into Liúxué Hùtóng留学胡同 'Studying Abroad Hutong'.

[18] Ibid., p. 129.

[19] Ibid., p. 126.

[20] Weng Li 翁立, *Beijing de hutong* 北京的胡同 [Streets of Beijing], Beijing: Beijing Yanshan Chubanshe, 1997, p. 17.

Changes of already existing names were often caused by important events occurring at those places. A good illustration of such names, as resulting from the use of the method of substitution by homophones, is the change in 1385, under the Ming Dynasty, of:

Liánchéng Xiàn 莲城县 'Lotus Town County' into Liánchéng Xiàn连城县 'Incorporated Town County', now in the Fujian Province.[21]

The change was caused by the occupation of the area by peasant rebels, called *cǎokòu* 草寇 'grass robbers; robbers in the greenwood'. Having pacified the rebellion, the name was changed by the means of substitution by homophones and by the elimination of the radical 艹 'grass' from the previous character, used for the word *lián* 莲 'lotus'. This was intended to mean: 'to get rid of *cǎo*, i.e. of *cǎokòu*, the rebels'.

Amongst Chinese toponyms one can find many duplicates. This situation has resulted from the lack, in the past, of effective administration controls over place names in this great country. For example, after the foundation of the Republic of China in 1911, there were 92 duplicate names of administrative divisions at county level. Therefore, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in 1914 decided to rename these duplicate toponyms. One of the methods used was the substitution by homophones. For example, the change in 1928 of the name:

Qīngyuán Xiàn 清源县 'Clear Stream County', Liaoning Province, into Qīngyuán Xiàn 清原县 'Clear Origin County', because there was already a Qīngyuán Xiàn 清源县 in the Shanxi Province.[22]

In contemporary China there are no duplicate names of larger administrative units, however duplicates can still be found among the names of smaller administrative divisions or geographical features.

(c) Simplifying the Chinese writing system and the substitution by homophones

In China, especially after the foundation of the Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 there was a strong tendency to simplify Chinese writing. In the PRC, the State Council in 1956 issued "The Scheme for Simplifying Chinese Characters". One of the main directions of the reform of the Chinese script was the reduction of rarely used characters/words, *shēngpìzì* 生僻字 or *piānpìzì* 偏僻字, by use of the method of substitution by homophones.

'The List of Simplified Chinese Characters' (Jianhuazi zongbiao 简化字总表), published in 1964,[23] contains an Appendix which comprised 34 names of administrative divisions of China, changed by the method of the substitution by homophones. The reformers eliminated from these names rarely used characters/words and characters/words used only in the field of geographical names, *dímìng zhuānyòngzì* 地名专用字. One can distinguish two main types of substitution.

The first type was the substitution of the eliminated character/word by another one, homophonous or nearly homophonous in sound, easy to write, but different in form and meaning. For example, the change in 1964 of the name of:

Qiányáng Xiàn 汧阳县 'County Situated South of the Qian Mountain' into Qiányáng Xiàn千阳县 'One Thousand Positives County', Shanxi Province.[24]

[21] Kałużyńska, 'The Substitution...', p. 127.

[22] Ibid., p. 129.

[23] *Jianhuazi zongbiao* 简化字总表 [The List of the Simplified Chinese Characters], Beijing, 1964.

[24] Kałużyńska, 'The Substitution...', p. 130.

The second type deals with the simplification of unwanted, complicated in form characters, which belonged to the category of the 'phonetic-radical compounds' (consisting of a phonetic part, indicating the pronunciation of the word and a significant part, the 'radical', referring to the meaning of the word). The simplification was performed by eliminating the radical. The radical was the only element allowed to distinguish the character from the others having the same phonetic, or consisting only of the phonetic, and used for homophonous or nearly homophonous words of various meanings. For example, the change in 1964 of the name:

Xúnyì Xiàn 栒邑县 'County of the Cross-beam City' into Xúnyì Xiàn旬邑县 'County of Ten-days City', in the Shanxi Province.[25]

The changes caused by the efforts to reform the Chinese writing system, simplified the form of some characters used to write down several place names, preserved the original pronunciation of toponyms, but also influenced their etymological meaning.

(d) The adaptation of foreign geographical names and the substitution by homophones

Foreign geographical names, as adapted to the Chinese language system, can also be treated as specific forms of the substitution by homophones. Foreign names, having their pronunciation and a kind of meaning, are usually divided into syllables, and each syllable is adapted as a Chinese morpheme/word of a homophonous or similar pronunciation. The meanings of these new names, i.e. Chinese equivalents of foreign geographical names, evidently differ from the originals. Below there are some adapted Chinese toponyms as the forms resulting from the substitution by homophones:[26]

- Davenport – Dáwénbōté 达文波特 (*dá* 'to reach', *wén* 'civilzation; culture; writing', *bō* 'wave', *té* 'specific');
- Fitchburg – Fēiqíbǎo 菲奇堡 (*fēi* 'luxuriant', *qí* 'strange', *bǎo* 'fort');
- Glasgow – Gélásīgē 格拉斯哥 (*gé* 'standard; division', *lá* 'to pull', *sī* 'this', *gē* 'elder brother');
- Gliwice – Gélìjìcǎi 格利继采 (*gé* 'standard; division', *lì* 'profit', *jì* 'to continue', *cǎi* 'to pick, pluck or gather');
- Michigan – Mìxiēgēn 密歇根 (*mì* 'close; dense', *xiē* 'have a rest'; *gēn* 'root');
- Oranienburg – Àoláníngbǎo 奥拉宁堡 (*ào* 'profound', *lá* 'to pull', *níng* 'calm; peaceful', *bǎo* 'fort');
- Paris – Bālí 巴黎 (*bā* 'to hope; be close to', *lí* 'multitude; host');
- Seattle – Xīyǎtú 西雅图 (*xī* 'west', *yǎ* 'proper; elegant', *tú* 'picture; map; scheme').

Evidently the aforementioned Chinese adapted geographic names have some meaning, because all Chinese syllables/morphemes are meaningful. However, the possible meaning of adapted toponyms is practically ignored by the native speakers, and the forms are treated as simple phonetic adaptations of foreign names.

[25] Ibid., p. 131.

[26] Jin Pingtuo 靳平妥 (ed.), *Ying Han zhuanming cidian* 英汉专名词典 [English-Chinese Dictionary of Proper Names], Beijing: Waiyu Jiaoxue yu Yanjiu Chubanshe, 1990.

Homophones and the substitution by homophones in the field of Chinese personal names (anthroponyms)

The substitution by homophones in the field of Chinese personal names functions mainly as a conscious method for creating new names and sometimes, as a good means of changing already existing names.

A typical Chinese (Han nationality) personal name consists of a surname followed by a given name, so the basic pattern is 'family name + given name'. The original standard given name, bestowed by parents in infancy, was considered private and sacred, and thus needed to be 'tabooed', cf. p. 82. Therefore, in the past a Chinese citizen (especially a noble Chinese male) could have a number of other names for use in different situations. Additionally, rulers and notables were granted certain names posthumously as their memorial or temple titles. In contemporary China, Chinese person usually has only one official given name, but he/she may also use other informal names, nicknames or pseudonyms.

Name formation or name giving is a process of assigning a particular word or phrase to a particular object. The most important elements of the naming process in the case of personal names in each society are: the name-givers, the person named (the bearer), the time and circumstances of the name giving, and the meaning and associations of the name. A newly born child possesses minimal individuality, so the first given name is inevitably bestowed on him/her by others (by parents or family members). As the name givers were people who usually wished the new-born well, the name of the new-born in any society was rather a culture oriented "good" one, whether chosen because of religious feelings, family pride, cultural or social conventions, fashion, or simple practicality. Other names or appellations differ in their nature and the manner in which they are given. They may be bestowed by the person himself or by his/her well-wishers, or by the community conceived as 'non-neutral' in its feelings towards the individual.

It is evident that given names are not treated by Chinese society as purely onymic units, solely identifying people, but rather as semantically motivated lexical units, and as those more typical for the appellative sphere of the language. For the Chinese society the semantic-functional relation between a given name and an appellative practically exists, and names still preserve their appellative content. It happens that some appellatives occurring in personal names have lost their inherent lexical meaning and presently they function as "special lexemes/characters used in proper names". It also happens that some given names arose by the process of transonymization and for their creation, the name of a town or a province, or of a family benefactor or the surname of the bearer's mother was chosen. However, given Chinese names are predominantly, semantically transparent and motivated, and they have lexical and associative meanings resulting from the usage of the appellatives and proper names they consist of in various linguistic functions and contexts.[27]

The Chinese approach to names as being not only labels helpful in the identification of people, but almost tangible as 'real facts', has resulted in their culture-oriented desires being expressed through the deliberate formatting of their personal names. They believed that by means of the appropriate naming of a person, his constitution and fate could be improved. This belief is still alive. The specific feature of the Chinese language, i.e. a large number of homophones, makes name formation much more complicated in some respects.

[27] Kałużyńska, *Chinese...*, pp. 44–52.

An appropriate name, as a final product of the conscious and proper name formation process, can make use of the homophony of the language in order to have many good connotations. However, an inappropriate name, the product of the unconscious or careless name formation process, regardless its good lexical meaning, can cause unpleasant associations, which can be unfortunate for its bearer. For example, the following personal names:[28]

Bì Yúntāo 毕云涛 (*Bì* – a surname, *Yúntāo* – the given name meaning 'Wave of Clouds') can unfortunately, due to the homophony of Chinese words, be associated with the homophonous word, *bìyùntào* 避孕套 'a condom, a contraceptive sheath';

Zēng Táoyàn 曾桃燕 (*Zēng* – a surname, *Táoyàn* – the given name meaning 'Peach Swallow') is almost the same in pronunciation as the phrase *zhēn tǎoyàn* 真讨厌 'really disgusting';

Chén Jiǔpíng 陈久平 (*Chén* – a surname, *Jiǔpíng* – the given name meaning 'Long peace') is similar in pronunciation as the phrase *chéngjiǔpíng* 盛酒瓶 'a wine bottle'.

Thus, while creating a Chinese name it is very important to analyse all its component words and the whole name according to the possible homophonous relations with other appellatives and their collocations. Inappropriate names may be used by others to make fun of their bearers. The conscious use of the substitution by homophones as a method of creating new personal names, especially given names, can be seen in various groupings of Chinese given names. The main groups are considered here as, (1) good, meaningful personal names with the meaning expressed implicitly, (2) names improving the negative influence of one's surname (3) counter-commendatory female given names with "male" terms, (4) Chinese equivalents of foreign names.

(a) The creation of good names and the substitution by homophones

Using homophones is considered an effective method of naming "that produces good, meaningful names".[29] Naming children according to one's values, outlook on life, aspirations and character is a commendable method in China. However, care must be taken to avoid poor taste. A good name should be refined and subtle, and the meaning should be expressed implicitly. For example the names:[30]

Péng Yǒu 彭酉 (*Péng* – the surname, *Yǒu* – the given name, meaning 'The Tenth of the Twelve Earthy Branches') is the same in pronunciation as the word *péngyou* 朋友 'friend';

Tián Shànglái 田尚来 (*Tián* – the surname, *Shànglái* – the given name, meaning 'still to come') is similar in pronunciation to the phrase *tiān shànglái* 天上来, meaning 'from the heavens';

Qián Wànlǐ 钱万里 (*Qián* – the surname and an appellative meaning 'money', *Wànlǐ* – the given name, meaning 'ten thousand miles'); the name is drawn from the phrase *qián chéng wàn lǐ* 前程万里, which means 'having splendid prospects'.

When making use of homophones one can choose words that have a pronunciation similar to, or likely to be associated with, notions or phrases of good moral or social value, and thus the name expresses them implicitly.

[28] Liu Xiaoyan, *Best Chinese Names*, Singapore: An Asiapac Publication, 1997, pp. 6, 13.

[29] Ibid., p. 7.

[30] Ibid., pp. 7–8.

(b) Troublesome Chinese surnames and the substitution by homophones

Chinese surnames are hereditary, and usually they cannot be changed. It happens that some surnames are homophonous with words having a derogatory meaning and thus it is not easy to find good names for those whose family name is, for example, Wú 吴 (*Wú* – the surname, which is homophonous with the appellative *wú* 无, meaning 'nothing'; 'not have'; 'without'; 'not').

There is a story[31] about an ambitious young man called Wu Shiping 吴事平 (*Wú* – the surname, *Shìpíng* – the given name, which can mean 'all things/endeavours in peace; all things/endeavours are mediocre'; *shì* 'thing; matter; affair; endeavour'; *píng* 'calm; peaceful; quiet; flat; level; mediocre; smooth; equal'). Every time he tried to achieve something, his efforts ended in failure. He wanted to find the reason for this, and he considered that it was all caused by his given name, which he interpreted as "all his endeavours result in mediocrity". He decided to change his given name to Déshèng 得胜 (*Déshèng* means 'win success'). But success still did not come. The young man went to ask a fortune-teller what was wrong with him. The fortune-teller asked him what his personal name was. After the answer the fortune-teller started laughing, and then he said that with this surname the young man had no chance of success. As his surname was homophonous with *wú* 无 'no; without; not', his new name could be interpreted as "no chance of winning success".

The story shows that when *wú* 吴/无 is combined with other words, it gives them a negative meaning. To prevent this, it is advisable to apply the principle of "double negatives" (negative plus negative becomes positive). For example, having the surname Wu吴, it is advisable to have names, e.g.:

Tiānxiǎn 天险 (*tiān xiǎn* means 'natural barrier', which has an inauspicious meaning, but when coupled with *wú* 无 'no; without; not', it would mean "there is no barrier");

Kěnán可难 (*kě nán* means 'can be difficult', but when coupled with *wú* 无 'no; without; not', it would mean "cannot be difficult").

The above story and the examples of personal names are very instructive. As it has been said, the Chinese believe that by means of the appropriate naming of a person, his constitution and fate could be improved.

(c) Chinese female counter-commendatory names and the substitution by homophones

Some Chinese female counter-commendatory names can be formed by the use of general terms denoting 'man' or other terms of male kinship and rank (or words homophonous with these terms). Female names with such terms are simply known by Chinese scholars as *nǚren nánmíng* 女人男名 'male names of females'.[32]

The most typical names of this type are those revealing that not a girl, but rather a male heir is desired. When a couple after having one or more daughters still does not have a son, the couple in the hope that their next child would be a son may give the latest daughter a name such as the term *dì* 弟 'younger brother; brother', e.g.:

Láidì 來弟 'Make a Younger Brother Come' (*lái* 'to come; to arrive');

Zhāodì 招弟 'Attract a Younger Brother' (*zhāo* 'to attract; to beckon').

[31] Ibid., p. 22.

[32] Ji Xiuqin 籍秀琴, *Zhongguo renming tanxi* 中国人名探析 [Research on Chinese Personal Names], Beijing: Zhongguo Guangbo Dianshi Chubanshe, 1993, p. 221; Wanyan Shaoyuan 完顏紹元, *Zhao Qian Sun Li, Zhongguo xingming wenhua* 趙錢孫李,中国姓名文化 [Zhao, Qian, Sun, Li, Culture of Chinese Personal Names], Shanghai: Shanghai Guji Chubanshe, 1994, p. 78.

Examples of such female names are to be found in some works on Chinese personal names.[33] However, the name of a daughter can also be formed by terms that are only homophonous with the aforementioned names or their parts. In some female names instead of the term *dì* 弟 'younger brother; brother', the typical "female" term *dì* 娣 'sister-in-law; girl' can occur, e.g.:

Zhāodì 昭娣, literally 'Attract a Sister-in-law/ a Girl', 'suspected' as 'Attract a Younger Brother' (*zhāo* 'to attract; to beckon');

Zhāodì昭娣, literally 'Bright Sister-in-law'/Girl', 'suspected' as 'Attract a Younger Brother' (*zhāo* 'bright; clear').

Another similar term that can be used in such female names is *dì* 棣 '*Kerria japonica*; Japanese kerria; younger brother', e.g.:

Hòudì 厚棣, literally 'Strong Kerria', suspected as 'Strong Younger Brother' (*hòu* 'great; strong').

Some names given to girls reveal that they are considered somewhat worse than boys or almost as good as boys, and sporadically, better than boys. The typical names of this type are those formed with the use of the term *nán* 男 'man; male'. Several examples of such female names are to be found in some works on Chinese personal names,[34] e.g.:

Cìnán 次男 'Secondary/Inferior Man' (*cì* 'second; secondary');

Shèngnán 胜男 'Defeating/Superior to Man' (*shèng* 'to win; to defeat; to be superior');

Yànán 亚男 'Second/ Inferior Man' (*yà* 'second; inferior').

The name of a daughter can also contain the term *nán* 楠 'nanmu tree; cedar wood', homophonous with the term *nán* 男 'man; male', and presumably used with the same intention, e.g.:

[Xǔ] Nányīng [许] 楠英, literally 'Cedar Flower', suspected as 'Male Flower/ Hero' (*yīng* 'flower; hero'; surname *Xǔ* can also be treated as an appellative *xǔ* 'to allow; to hope for', and the whole personal name is suspected to mean 'Hope for Male Hero');

Yǎnán 雅楠, literally 'Refined Cedar', suspected as 'Refined Man' (*yǎ* 'refined; elegant').

The term *nán* 南 'south', being homophonous with the term *nán* 男 'man; male' can also perform the similar semantic function of denoting 'man', e.g.:

Yàonán 耀南, literally 'Shining South', suspected as 'Shining Man' (*yào* 'to shine; to illuminate'), or even 'Man Wanted' (*yào* 耀 is homophonous with *yào* 要 'to want; to desire').

The occurring cases of the inverse use of the terms reveal the additional significance of such formed names, as designated commendatory or counter-commendatory names for the purpose of covering up what really exists, being goal-oriented, and thus making

[33] Viviane Alleton, *Les Chinois et la passion des noms,* Paris: Aubier, 1993, p. 174; Ji Xiuqin, *Zhongguo renming tanxi...*, pp. 221–223; Wanyan Shaoyuan, *Zhao Qian Sun Li, Zhongguo xingming wenhua...*, pp. 78–79; R.S. Watson, 'The Named and the Nameless: Gender and Person in Chinese Society', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 13, No. 4, 1986, p. 621.

[34] Feng Shu 冯舒; Ding Fei 丁菲; Yin Li 殷 丽, *Mingzheng yanshun – Zhongguo mingzide wenhua aomiao yu jiedu* 名正言顺 – 中国名字的文化奥妙与解读 [Secrets and Abilities of Chinese Naming Culture], Urumqi: Xinjiang Qingshaonian Chubanshe, 1997, p. 6; Ji Xiuqin, *Zhongguo renming tanxi*, pp. 221–223; Wanyan Shaoyuan, *Zhao Qian Sun Li, Zhongguo xingming wenhua*, pp. 78–79; I. Kałużyńska, 'Male Names of Women and Female Names of Men in the Chinese Society', in *Els noms en la vida quotidian /Names in daily life. Proceedings of the XXIV ICOS International Congress of Onomastic Sciences*, Biblioteca Tecnica de Politica. Linguistica. Onomastica, J. Tort, I. Donada, M. Montagut i Montagut, Generalitat de Catalunya (eds), 2014, pp. 791–797.

improvements on reality, preventing troubles or influencing the future for the better. They are based on the belief that names can create the reality, and bring fortune or misfortune. As a result, such motivated female names to a certain extent reflect the inferior status of women in Chinese society.

(d) Chinese given names as equivalents of foreign given names and the substitution by homophones

Chinese given names as equivalents of foreign given names can also be treated as specific forms of the substitution by homophones. Foreign given names, having their pronunciation and kinds of meaning, are usually divided into syllables, and each syllable is adapted as a Chinese morpheme/word of a homophonous or similar pronunciation. The meaning of Chinese equivalents of foreign names usually has nothing in common with their originals. Chinese scholars often categorize these adapted names, according their new meaning, into several groupings.[35] Below there are some adapted Chinese male names indicating good values of their bearers:

a) bringing honour to one's ancestors and perpetuating the family business, e.g.:
Jim, Jimmy, James – Jìmíng 继明 'carry forward the light';
Samuel, Samson – Shàoshèng 绍盛 'successor to a flourishing family';
Ward, Walter – Wàngtíng 旺庭 'achieving prosperity for the family';
b) having lofty aspirations, e.g.:
Ivan – Yìwàng 意旺 'having high spirits';
Karl – Kāilái 开来 'creating the future';
Stephen, Stanford – Sīfèn 思奋 'a diligent thinker';
c) having good moral qualities, e.g.:
Oliver, Howard – Háolì 豪立 'heroic and upright';
Leonard – Lǐ'ān 理安 'serene and reasonable';
Randy – Rénhuī 仁迪 'enlightened by benevolence';
d) being dedicated to serving one's country and people, e.g.:
Abe, Abel – Ānbāng 安邦 'strive to bring peace to the country';
George – Guózhì 国治 'managing the country';
Percy – Píngshì 平世 'strive for peace and security in the country';
e) having strong willpower, e.g.:
Charley – Chílì 持立 'man of perseverance and self-reliance';
Harley, Henry – Hénglì 恒励 'man with constancy of purpose';
Ziegler – Zìkè 自克 'capable of overcoming difficulties by self-reliance;
f) having ability to assume responsibility, e.g.:
Doyle, Dudley – Dòngliáng 栋梁 'pillar of the state'
Justin, Justus – Zhǔtíng 主廷 'a person of great importance';
William, Willie, Wiley – Wěirèn 伟任 'shouldering great task';
g) having good health, high spirits and being broad-minded, e.g.:
Clark, Claude – Kāilǎng 开朗 'open and optimistic';
Johnny – Jiànyīng 健英 'vigorous and handsome';
Werner – Wēiruò 威若 'dignified and forceful';

[35] Liu Xiaoyan..., pp. 107–117.

h) having unusual wisdom and ability, e.g.:
Bill, Billy – Bǐnglǐ 秉理 ‘having a good grasp of reason’;
Colin – Kēlíng 科灵 ‘inspired by science’;
David – Dáwù 达悟 ‘being enlightened’.

Chinese given names as equivalents of foreign given names are specific forms resulting from the substitution by homophones, preserving to some extent the original pronunciation of foreign names, but having completely different meanings.

Conclusion

The method of the substitution by homophones is extensively used in Chinese onomastic fields, like toponymy or anthroponymy. It is mainly used to reshape already existing names by replacing their previous form, for some reasons deemed inconvenient or unwanted. However, it is also broadly applied to create new names by using words which are homophonous with the words denoting the idea they symbolize

While forming Chinese names it is very important to analyse all their component words and all the names according to the possible homophonous relations with other appellatives and their collocations. The unconscious use of the substitution by homophones can result in inappropriate names that may be used by others to make fun of their bearers.

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Taiwanese Contemporary Dance: From the Chinese Body to Intercultural Corporality[1]

Abstract

This paper is devoted to three "Chinese" dances from the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan (Yunmen Wuji) choreographed by Lin Huaimin: *The Tale of the White Serpent* (*Baishe zhuan*, 1975), *Dream of the Red Chamber* (*Honglou meng*, 1983) and *Nine Songs* (*Jiuge*, 1993). The author analyses the dances and their cultural context. The paper traces how the Taiwanese choreographer reaches not only for Chinese topics taken from traditional poetry, prose and religion / mythology but also uses the movement and gestic conventions typical of the Beijing opera. The focal point of the analysis is to show how Lin Huaimin merges them with the Western modern / contemporary dance and classical ballet techniques, Asian dancing traditions, and Japanese *butō*, thus creating a new form of inter-cultural body aesthetics and a dance theatre which crosses the borders of the arts.

Key words: dance, theatre, Taiwan, body, corporality

The Tale of the White Serpent

Almost forty years' long, the choreographic career of Lin Huaimin[2] abounded with dances inspired by traditional Chinese culture, literature, theatre and dance. His drive towards the "sinicization of contemporary dance"[3] was particularly noticeable in the first stage of Cloud Gate's development, in the years 1973–1976. The choreographies created in that period included *Wulong Yuan* (1973), *Han Shi* (1974) and *Na Zha* (1974). Lin Huaimin reached not only for Chinese topics but above all he used the movement and gestic conventions of the Beijing opera, creating *Revenge of a Lonely Ghost* (*Qiyuan bao*, orig. *Tiandao renxin*, 1974), *The Tale of the White Serpent* (*Baishe zhuan*, orig. *Xu Xian*, 1975) and *Little*

[1] This article is derived from research conducted as part of a three-year (2009–2012) research project (No. N N105 022 636) funded by the Polish Ministry of Science and Academic Education/ National Centre of Science.

[2] A contemporary Taiwanese dancer and choreographer, founder of the famous Cloud Gate Dance Theatre of Taiwan (Yunmen Wuji, 1973) and its artistic director.

[3] A phrase used by Chan Hung Chi, quoted by Chao Yu-ling, 'Embodying Identity: The Socio-cultural Significance of the Cloud Gate Dance Theatre Repertoire (1973–1997) in Taiwanese Society', in *Lin Huaimin – Wudao Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui lunwenji. Lin Hwai-min. International Dance Conference Proceedings. 2005.8.2–3*, Taibei 2005, p. 7.

Drummer (*Xiao gushou*, 1976). The choreographer was inspired by ancient customs, local tales, as well as poetic and prose works. 1983 saw the performance of one of the classic Cloud Gate choreographies, *Dream of the Red Chamber* (*Honglou meng*), based on a well known Qing (1644–1911) novel by Cao Xueqin, and ten years later the company created *Nine Songs (Jiuge*) referring to the ancient poetic work from the anthology *Songs of Chu* (*Chuci*). Elements of Chinese culture were ever-present in Lin Huaimin's choreographies, not only as topical references and dance movement aesthetics, but also in costumes, stage sets and music. They hardly ever appeared in pure form and usually were combined with elements of local Taiwanese culture, other Asian traditions and primarily with aspects of Western culture. The resulting forms were intentionally mixed, multi-cultural, and resisting easy classification.

The Tale of the White Serpent became one of the classics in Cloud Gate's repertoire.[4] This time the inspiration came from the local folk literature. The Snake/serpent is one of the twelve animals of the Chinese zodiac. This venomous animal was the embodiment of many negative features in Chinese tradition. It was seen as clever and treacherous at the same time, gifted with an ambivalent nature. It could harm people but also bring them good luck. In Chinese fairy tales, serpents often brought valuable jewels to people (e.g. pearls) but also – being river deities – they could demand sacrifices in the form of young girls. Even today, Taiwanese people consider snake meat and liver as having medicinal properties, while snake skin is supposed to bring wealth. According to tales, demons with the bodies of serpents and human heads lived in Mainland China, in Guangxi province, and it was ominous to respond to their call.[5]

It might be worth noting that Nüwa, one of the most important characters of Chinese mythology, the cultural hero and mother of mankind, was depicted in early Chinese writings as a snake with a human head. On sepulchre paintings of the Han era she was often shown with her brother Fuxi, painted as a man with a snake's body. "Both had human heads and serpent bodies, with their tails often weaving together."[6] It cannot be excluded that the cult of the serpent developed in ancient China under the influence of Indian culture, in which *nagas* (Sanskrit: snake, most often a cobra) were considered to be mystical, semi-divine beings with human faces, serpent tails and characteristic, cobra-like hoods.[7]

The vivid presence of serpent motives in Chinese folk culture was reflected in *The Tale of the White Serpe*nt − a tale which had been known for many centuries and enjoyed particular popularity in the Ming era. The plot focuses on the metamorphosis of a serpent into a beautiful woman who married a man for love and made him rich. When she was expecting a baby, a Buddhist monk persuaded her husband that she was evil. After delivering the baby,

[4] My analysis of the dance is based on the DVD recording *The Tale of the White Serpent/Baishe zhuan*, Taibei: Jingo Records, 2003.

[5] See entry 'Wąż', in W. Eberhard, *Symbole chińskie. Słownik. Obrazkowy język Chińczyków* (original title: *Lexicon chinesischer Symbole. Die Bildsprache der Chinesen*), Kraków: Universitas, 1996. pp. 277–278.

[6] See entry 'Nüwa', in Li Huiyang, Deming An, J. Anderson Turner, *Handbook of Chinese Mythology*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 174.

[7] See entry 'Naga', in S. Schuhmacher, G. Woerner (eds), *Encyklopedia mądrości Wschodu* (original title: *Lexicon der östlichen Weisheitslehren*), Warszawa: Warszawski Dom Wydawniczy, 1997, p. 225.

the woman was expelled to a pagoda on the famous Western Lake (Xihu) in Hangzhou. Her grown-up son who became a renowned scholar visited her mother showing her due respect.[8]

Before Lin Huaimin created his dance version of *The Tale of the White Serpent* in 1975, he made two choreographies adapting two Beijing operas: *Wulong Yuan* (1973) and *Revenge of the Lonely Ghost,* (1974). Both of these choreographies, inspired by traditional Chinese music drama, were considered to be the most valuable part of early period of Cloud Gate Dance Theatre. At the beginning of the 1970s, before creating these performances, Lin embarked on an intensive study of the Beijing Opera. He not only watched such operas, but he also studied the secrets of that theatre under the guidance of Yu Ta-kang (Yu Dagang), a Taiwanese historian of Chinese theatre. As a result, Lin created an original dance style merging elements of Martha Graham's technique with gestic and movement conventions of the Beijing opera. In her dissertation, Chen Ya-ping provided a clear explanation concerning the merger of these two choreographic conventions and named reasons for which the dramatic, expressive and psychologically complex aesthetics of Graham's dance was so well rooted in Taiwan during the initial stage of the development of modern dance there. She also quoted a fragment of Lin Huaimin's interview granted to the *New York Times* in 1971 in which he had described his strategy of composition: "Abstract dance is against the Chinese nature. The Chinese like to know what's going on – we are very meaning-oriented."[9] Chen Ya-ping pointed not only to the preferences of the audience of that time, for whom Lin created his works, aware that his spectators were brought up in the tradition of Taiwanese opera, puppet theatre and TV soap operas and appreciated good plots and dramatic expression. She also specified certain reasons of a more practical nature. She rightly noted that Lin Huaimin began his dance and choreographic career very late, as a man of more than twenty years of age:

> "(...) Lin did not have the technical prowess to compose sophisticated choreography in pure spatial and somatic terms. Yet, as a former fiction writer, he had an excellent command of narrative structure as well as a superb mastery of literary techniques such as symbolism and metaphor and the construction of imagery. To facilitate the transfer of his story-telling skill from words to movement, Lin first turned to the Peking Opera for inspiration. The theatre's highly stylized body language and symbolic stage presentation proved to be convenient for an adaptation into the dramatic dance idiom. However, its codified character types and conventionalized expressive modes, formulated centuries before, were not only distant from the modern viewers' experience but insufficient in conveying the emotional range Lin desired. At this critical juncture, the appearance of Graham's work on Taiwan's stage provided Lin with the crucial link between symbolic language and psychological depth, between tradition and innovation, in other words between Chinese theatre and modern dance. Influenced by Asian traditional theatre forms, especially in the economic yet highly suggestive stage settings designed by Noguchi and the dramatic expressions of tragic characters such as Medea, Graham's dance theatre would prove to be a congruous match with the histrionic conventions of Peking Opera".[10]

[8] Eberhard, *Symbole chińskie...*, p. 278.

[9] Chen Ya-ping, *Dance History and Cultural Politics: A Study of Contemporary Dance in Taiwan, 1930s–1997* (unpublished PhD dissertation), New York University 2003, p. 89.

[10] Ibid., p. 91.

Chen suggested that the serpent-like movements of Medea's body in *Cave of the Heart* directly inspired Lin Huaimin and his project of telling the story of passionate love, using for the purpose a well-known Chinese folk tale adapted for choreography. According to her, dances of female characters were constructed by Lin based on the key principle of Graham's techniques − contraction and release, and located the dancer's energy centre in the pelvis and torso, as Graham advocated.[11]

The ancient tale was used by Lin Huaimin as a pretext for telling, in the language of dance, his own story about passionate feelings which are defeated by a clash with different values and different dimensions of human existence. The Taiwanese choreographer, a master of the dramatic short story, based his compact narrative on the conflict of two models of life: sensual and spiritual. He juxtaposed life in which people are mastered by others and in which they are their own masters. The tale was told by simple, yet sophisticated means. The choreographer preferred precisely structured, appealing images which deeply impressed his audience. The stage was almost empty, with hardly any stage set. This minimalism was naturally bringing to mind the sparse stage settings in the Beijing opera which left plenty of freedom for the imagination of the audience, using just a few stage props, single pieces of furniture or decorative items which were used to build most complex imaginary realms.

A striking feature of Lin's dance was the contrast between intensive colours: dancers were clad in blue, white, green, red and yellow. Simple stage sets consisted of a few tree boughs, curved like snakes and cleared of bark, a semi-transparent bamboo mat and a naked framework of a Chinese umbrella – all in the natural colour of bamboo. Chen Ya-ping suggested that it might have been inspired by one of Graham's dances: "The rattan sculpture, made by the famous sculptor Yang Ying-feng, reminds one of the brass wire 'tree' in Graham's *Cave of the Heart*. Yang's creation, though distinctly Chinese in its formal design and use of material, was very possibly inspired by Noguchi's modernist piece for Graham. While the metallic coldness and spiky shape of Medea's 'tree' signifies the heroine's supra-human nature as the embodiment of hate and evil, the snaky contour of the rattan sculpture in *The Tale of the White Serpent* not only suggests the identity of Lin's heroines, White Snake and Green Snake, but resonates with their serpentine body movement in the choreography."[12] The semi-transparency of the set gave the impression of ethereal lightness, which the dance itself was often and intentionally missing. Many sequences of the dance were rather full of sensual heaviness and violence.

The main characters of Lin Huaimin's version of the tale were a young man, a monk, and two serpent ladies – green and white. Both of them appeared before the man. The white one symbolized grace, elegance and noble behaviour. The dance of the green one was full of mischief, playfulness and joy. Critics often underlined the contrasting features of both characters. According to them, the Green Serpent had more animal features and personified the primeval liveliness of an animal. This part was performed mostly in a horizontal position. The White Serpent had more human features and her seducing technique was more subtle. She used for the purpose an elegant stage prop – a white fan. She was most frequently dancing in a vertical position.[13] However, both proved to be able rivals in their struggle for the man.

[11] Ibid., pp. 97–99.

[12] Ibid., p. 92.

[13] Yu Dagang, 'Cong dongwu zai Zhongguo de diwei tan Yunmen Wuji de xin wuju 'Xu Xian'' (Animals in China. About 'Xu Xian' − a New Dance of Yunmen Wuji), in Yao Yiwei et al., *Yunmen wuhua* (On Yunmen's dances), Taibei: Yuanliu Chubanshe, 1981, p. 12.

Creating perfectly co-ordinated White and Green Serpent dances, the choreographer used many hand gestures and steps characteristic of the Beijing opera and classical Chinese dance. The white fan in the hand of the white dancer was used to emphasize lightness and elegance of hand and arm gestures, in a similar fashion to the Beijing opera, and the gestures themselves were sophisticated and precise, reminiscent of the codified gesticulation of traditional Chinese theatre forms. A simple stage prop – the fan – was given by the choreographer variable symbolic meanings, depending on the phase and character of the dance. According to Chen Ya-ping, "(...) the fan stands for authority when White Snake snaps it open sharply at Green Snake to stop the latter's flirtation with Hsu behind her back. Then, it becomes an object of charm and seduction when she flutters it like a butterfly to lure the indecisive hero away from the side of Green Snake and later when she twirls it enchantingly with a finger, followed by Hsu and his wheeling umbrella, across the stage, creating one of the most beautifully designed moments of the choreography. Finally, White Snake folds the fan and tucks it into Hsu's robe belt as a token of love before the two consummate their marriage symbolically in a duet behind a bamboo shade lowering down from the ceiling".[14]

The gesticulation was correlated with background music which consisted of traditional-like or traditional music accompanying classical music dramas. The music provided dance rhythm and emphasized dance positions. In addition to the gestures, many steps and mannerisms of circling the stage, the positioning of the bodies and adopted poses were based on the Beijing opera. Chen Ya-ping provided a detailed list of all the borrowings.[15] Among others, they included the convention according to which a character first appearing on the stage was supposed to introduce him-or herself to the audience. In this case, Lin Huaimin replaced words with brief dance self-presentations. The dancer acting as Xu Xian walked in a circle, which, similarly to the Beijing opera, symbolized a long journey. Some Beijing opera gestures and steps reflected the features of character of the protagonists, such as their femininity, indecision or hesitation. The fight scenes t between the monk Fahai and the snake ladies were also stylized after the fashion of traditional Chinese music drama. Chen Ya-ping noted also the relationship between the music accompaniment and traditional instruments with Lin Huaimin's choreographic style in the dance: "Echoing the musical texture of Lai's [Te-he] composition, Lin's method of choreography can be best described as a 'writing' of dance sentences that often end with a dramatic moment of a frozen gesture known in Peking Opera as 'liangxiang,' a theatrical convention similar in effect to 'mie' in Kabuki. This distinct rhythmic structure gives the dance narrative a sense of dramatic tension that is unambiguously indebted to the theatrical aesthetics of Peking Opera".[16]

In spite of these obvious borrowings, *The Tale of the White Serpent* complied with the aesthetics of modern dance. Gestures and movements typical of the Beijing opera were particularly useful whenever it was necessary to express seductive finesse through the dancing body. Chinese beliefs associated snakes with sensuality. The increasing passion and amorous rivalry between the White and Green Serpent was expressed by more and more violent, accelerated, almost trance-like movements, both in solo and in duo dances. The dance changed its character in different sequences of the performance. Elements of traditional Chinese dance were replaced with choreography typical of modern dance. The

[14] Chen Ya-ping, *Dance History and Cultural Politics...*, p. 96.

[15] Ibid., pp. 93–100.

[16] Ibid., p. 95.

character of the music also changed: in the first part of the performance it chiefly marked the rhythm and underlined the gestures/movement of the dancers. Afterwards, classical music was combined with modern tunes, played on traditional instruments and based on traditional scales. This gap between tradition and modernity was the entrance point for the Buddhist monk. This character, with his dryness and stiffness which resulted from intentional restrictions on his motion dynamics, reminded the audience of the gap between all the things sensual, bodily and passionate and things of the mind and spirit. His static figure performed from time to time clumsy, sweeping motions, with which the monk fought with nimble, whirling, swift as lightning snake women. Finally, the static figure "defeated" the dynamic ones. The White and Green Snake were sent away, one after the other and they hid behind the tattered bamboo mat. And the young man? He was left alone, unsure of his future, although a moment ago, when he tore the bamboo shade, it seemed that he had left the world of the White Snake for good, leaving the bodily and sensory world behind. However, afterwards when he was hiding behind the Monk who seemed to defend him against excessive involvement in the world of colours and shapes, he gradually lost his confidence. He slouched and extended his hand helplessly as if unsure of what to do now.

Dream of the Red Chamber

Another of Lin Huaimin's dances, *Dream of the Red Chamber* (*Honglou meng*, 1983), was based on a well-known Qing novel of the same title, authored by Cao Xueqin (ca. 1715–1763/4). That dance, which had already become legendary, was a realm of intensive colours. The stage set was ascetic, as usual.[17] It was made of horizontal screens of varying width, positioned at the back of the stage, displaying a variety of colours in the course of the dance tale of the history of a rich family, through its days of glory and into its decline. Initially the screens were bright grey, after which they acquired the hue of mature red wine and in the end, turned grey and black. Huang Yin-ying noted that Lin used in his work the empty space principle, developed and perfected by traditional Chinese painting:

> "Rather than attempt to represent the magnificent architecture, pavilion and garden of the book in a realistic fashion, his stage is almost empty, leaving much to the imagination. It is through the moving image of the performers as they dance that the audience can picture the setting for each scene. The only actual sets are six semi-transparent pieces of cloth, each of a different colour, positioned horizontally at the back of the stage. These pieces of cloth are elevated or lowered at different moments during the piece, suggesting the rise and fall of the family. Perhaps just as important, is Lin's borrowing of the "less is more" philosophy from Chinese art which also results in giving the dancers more room to move".[18]

The curtain went up, revealing a figure of a monk in a bright red gauze robe. The floor was brightened with a blue-red circle made of silk. Among these intensive blue and red colours, Nüwa, the mother of mankind, delivered a young man Baoyu. The short prologue

[17] My analysis of the dance is based on the DVD recording provided by the Yunmen Wuji Archive in Taibei in 2011. The première: October 31st, 1983 (revised version: 1994), Taibei Shejiaoguan, choreography: Lin Huaimin, music: Lai Te-he (Lai Dehe), stage set: Ming Cho Lee (Li Mingjue), lighting: Lin Keh-hua (Lin Kehua), costumes: Li Jingru.

[18] Huang Yin-ying, 'Lin Hwai-min's Dance Works Inspired by Literature': *Nine Songs* (1992) and *Dream of the Red Chamber* (1983), in *Lin Huaimin – Wudao Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui lunwenji*, p. 49.

included both elements of Chinese and Western culture: the figure of the Buddhist monk, the positions of dancers alluding to Pietà, and local folk characters. The medley of various dance conventions was the basic feature of the whole performance.

Huang Yin-ying noted Lin Huaimin's masterful skill of distilling the essence of the long and complex, multi-thread narrative written by Cao Xueqin and the arranging of selected episodes in chronological order according to seasons of the year: spring-summer-autumn-winter. This order reflected the growth and decline of a traditional Chinese family of Jia Baoyu, described in Cao Xueqin's work. Huang Yin-ying posed an interesting thesis that the seasonal succession was inspired by horizontal scrolls of Chinese paintings. The story developed from a spring full of vital energy, through a hot and sensuous summer, into an autumn which heralded decline and withering, and inevitably towards a winter which is the season of chill, death and decay.[19]

"Spring" was a reverie of light and colours, personified by willowy dancers in multi-coloured capes decorated with floral and flower motives (plum and peony) with symbolic meaning. Whirling their capes, they looked like blossoming flowers or fluttering butterflies. They moved around the stage with tiny steps, as if swimming or whirling in space. The dynamics of their movements, the flow, momentary slow-downs and sudden accelerations increased the impression of a fairy-like, elusive, female world. Their dance, performed along the axis of a circle seemed to be an allusion to the aesthetics of traditional Chinese group dance. Duos of Bayou and his love Daiyu, included many elements from classical ballet. The combination of these two significantly different styles created a chilly elegance of the episode, along with lightness and subtlety which characterized not only the season but also the awakening of feelings.

"Summer" had a distinctly different character. Summer was the season of awakened sensuality, a theme which dominated the duos performance of this episode. Conventions of classical ballet were replaced here by modern dance techniques, with dominating horizontal sequences. The partners danced in close proximity, the distance between them disappeared, dance sequences almost imperceptibly evolved towards horizontal arrangements and curved, bent lines. Extreme body bends emphasized the sensuality of the dance. Summer was the domain of a sensuous, slowed-down body, which was lazily revealed in the physical presence of the partner. The atmosphere of sensuality was enhanced by the red wine hue of the lighting at the back.

"Autumn" brought about inevitable reverie and sadness. The episode began with fog and smoke. Dancers moved across the scene as if dispersed by some chaotic event. The duo of Daiyu and Baoyu once again acquired a ballet-like chill and elegance. It entered a world of different feelings and different means of expressing them. The monk, sitting motionlessly in a prayer position and a strange, unsettling group of three characters who majestically crossed the scene under a bamboo umbrella[20] with a dry tree bough, inescapably heralded the arrival of winter, the time of death. The colour hue, costumes and stylization referred to the convention of Japanese *ukyo-e* woodcuttings (images of the floating world).[21] This

[19] Ibid., p. 49.

[20] The umbrella ia s Buddhist symbol. In China it symbolizes the purity and dignity of an official; during the wedding ceremonies it is used by a bridegroom on his ritualistic way to his bride; umbrellas are believed to shield people from demons. See Eberhard, *Symbole chińskie...*, pp. 190–191.

[21] *Ukyo-e* is one of the main genres of Japanese art during the Tokugawa era (1603–1867). The images of the floating world, true to their name, depicted life in entertainment districts, figures of

part of the choreography was permeated by a skilfully built up atmosphere of horror. Daiyu, wearing a figure-hugging beige costume was throwing petals on the floor, with mechanical movements, as if she were absent. Crouching behind her, was an ominous figure in a loose black skirt/cap, with a face painted in white and with long black hair – Death. Death wrapped the girl in her cape and, with the assistance of another character clad in black, lifted her high, with her hands spread. The girl seemed to be naked and helpless, as if crucified. The contrast of natural, body-colour beige and blackness was immensely powerful. It was additionally amplified by the red robe of the monk who remained on stage.

The dance had many more painting-like images built of contrasting colours, set to remain in the memory, a phenomenon further accentuated by the minimised and slowed down motions. Among them was the image of a woman walking with dignity under a Chinese umbrella carried by her servant. The umbrella, being a particularly expressive stage prop, had already been used in *The Tale of the White Serpent*. A powerful counterpoint was also the figure of the monk in his red robe who seemed to be a character from another world, immersed in the tale of human passions and the illusionary nature of the world. The meditating or praying monk seemed to be an indifferent observer of the events rather than a participant. Huang Yin-ying thought that the character was derived from traditional Chinese painting, and served as a kind of authorial comment. The choreographer expanded the part of Zhen Baoyu, which was a secondary figure in the original novel. The critic said: "While '*Jia*' means 'unreal' in Chinese, '*chen*' [*zhen*] means 'real'. Chen is thus the protagonist's alter-ego, and Chen Pao-yu becomes more of an observer of the various scenes of Jia Pao-yu's life and there is even a moment when they meet. I believe that, as he appears in the dance, Chen can be interpreted as the choreographer himself. The role of Chen is effectively Lin's 'signature' in his dance piece."[22] In the final scenes, Baoyu appeared against a white-and-bluish, waving cloth which was spread out into the horizon, as if it were a patch of snow. Standing in the centre of the immeasurable whiteness, silence and emptiness, wearing his red robe, he stood immobile in a bowing position. "With the entire stage covered with white cloth symbolizing snow and emptiness, Pao-yu bids farewell to his Parents and decides to become a monk. The 'scroll' has fully unfolded"[23] − wrote Huang Yin-ying.

Nine Songs

Nine Songs, (Jiuge, 1993) was another example of a hybrid dance form which merged elements of Western modern dance and Asian dance traditions, both old and new. Lin Huaimin drew his inspiration from Javanese court dances, the gestic and movement conventions of the Beijing Opera, Japanese *butō* and also Martha Graham's dance techniques and contact improvisation. The bodies of the Cloud Gate dancers could present in this performance all their mastery, versatility and extraordinary fitness. The episodic structure of the choreography facilitated the introduction of diverse dance techniques. The music was equally diversified, merging harmoniously the instrumental and vocal pieces by Taiwanese aborigines, the prayer chants of Buddhist monks, the characteristic sounds of a traditional Javanese orchestra and the muffled sounds of an Indian flute.

courtesans, and city life scenes. They were usually woodblock prints which skilfully merged realistic and decorative elements.

[22] Huang Yin-ying, 'Lin Hwai-min's Dance Works Inspired by Literature...', p. 49

[23] Ibid., p. 49.

The work, with its diversified form, was inspired by Lin Huaimin's travels across Asia between 1988−1991 and also by his metaphorical journey through dance history and traditions in Asia and the West. One should also remember about the broader, metaphysical dimension of any journey, and particularly shamanistic journeys, leading to faraway, strange realms, which always symbolize a quest for knowledge, transgressing the borders and limitations of one's body, mind and imagination.

Nine Songs consisted of eight separate episodes which unambiguously referred to an ancient collection of poetic texts under the same title, which formed a part of the *Songs of Chu* (*Chuci*) anthology, traditionally associated with an outstanding pre-Han poet, Qu Yuan. The dance was inspired by the rich traditions of shamanistic and exorcist cultures of Southern and South-Eastern China, but it was also a very special dialogue of the choreographer and his dancers with modernity. *Nine Songs* was an artistic tribute to those that fell in Tian'anmen Square on June 4, 1989 and also to the victims of the 'February 28 Incident' (1947) and the uncountable victims of persecution, harassment and repression in the long history of continental China and Taiwan, which was strongly emphasized by the final episode of the performance.

The *Jiuge* poetic anthology is an invaluable source of knowledge about Chinese shamanism, ceremonies, dances and performances in the basin of Changjiang. It consists of eleven pieces: nine shamanistic songs, a hymn to the fallen and a short poem ending the shamanistic ceremony. In ancient times, the digit nine was probably a general name referring to ritual songs. Research on the local dialect proved that the number nine from the title (*jiu*) actually meant the ghost (*gui*), the deity (*shen*) and divine ancestor (*zushen*). In light of this interpretation, the name *Jiuge* would mean *Songs about Ghosts / Gods / Ancestors*. Their numerous ranks included gods of the sun, mountains and waters. The most numerous were water deities, with many references to travelling by sea and descriptions of a palace located on the Eastern Sea. Such a cult was considered typical of farming cultures in which the vegetation of the basic crop, rice, depended on the supply of water. The mythology of people living in Southern China, between its eastern coast and western regions, was rich in myths and characters related to water. Lin Huaimin introduced into his performance yet another water-related symbol: the lotus flower. However, this concept was not inspired by shamanism but by Buddhism. Lin Yatin wrote: "Dancers are dressed in white robes, as if participating in a ritual, part of the orchestra pit is transformed into a lotus pond, and the proscenium stage is framed with enlarged lotus drawings by the Taiwanese painter Lin Yu-shan. The lotus, which represents the life cycle of birth and rebirth in Buddhism, was in fact inspired by Lin's visit to Bali".[24]

The symbolism of the lotus in Chinese tradition, particularly the Buddhist one, was extremely rich. The lotus (*Nelumbo nucifera*) – a type of water lily from the *Nelumbonaceae* family – was a symbol of purity, as a plant born in mud yet remaining pure. Its round leaf symbolized a lack of attachment, as it was floating on the water and yet remained dry. Just as the lotus leaf, the adept in spiritual development should live in the world yet remain unmoved by the world. In Buddhist iconography, the lotus was also the symbol of beauty and holiness,

[24] Lin Yatin C., 'Dancing in the Age of Globalisation – the Cloud gate Dance Theatre and the Political Economy of Touring', in Chen Ya-ping, Chao Chi-fang (eds), *Dance Studies and Taiwan: The Prospect of a New Generation*, Taibei: Guoli Zhong Zheng Wenhua Zhongxin/National Chang Kai-Shek Cultural Center, 2001, p. 205.

the true nature of man unblemished by the mud of this world and realized by enlightenment.[25] Water was the universal symbol of transformation and purification; due to its life-giving and fertilizing powers, it represented the female aspect in many cultures.[26] It was similar in China, where water symbolized *yin* which was the female primeval power. When united with *yang* which symbolized masculinity and fire, it created "ten thousand things".[27]

The songs making up *Jiuge* came from various regions of Southern China and their literary form was perfected in the process of creating the anthology. They were diametrically different from the poetic works from the North shaped by court ceremonies and etiquette. Also, *Jiuge* differed from the northern traditional works by its richness of imagination and characteristic symbolism inspired by plant and animal life. *Jiuge* absorbed many features of local shamanistic culture with its deities, rituals and props.

Shamanism was one of the oldest and most fascinating forms of religions developed by the people of China. In ancient times, under the Shang (XVI–XI century B.C.) and Zhou (XI–III century B.C.) dynasties, magic ceremonies were performed by shamans, or medicine men. Their main tasks were to intercede between the world of gods and people, maintain the link with ghosts of the deceased, the calling of the rain, explaining dreams, healing, and predicting the future. To do so, they performed a variety of ceremonies which were often accompanied by dances, songs and music. Even in the most ancient times, there existed a clear division of functions. Female shamans (*wu*) were primarily performing rituals related to the cult of fertility. In matriarchal communities, they were responsible for calling the rain. During the Shang dynasty, these women impersonated the 'demon of drought' who had a female form. Under the Zhous, the ceremony of exposing female shamans to the sun became an official ritual. The ecstatic dance of female shamans in the burning sun or in a circle of fire was supposed to stop drought.[28] In contrast to female shamans, their male equivalents (*xi*) were mostly involved in exorcising evil spirits. However, these divisions disappeared with the passage of time. Male shamans took over the functions of female ones and dominated them in later centuries. The role of shamans in ancient China stemmed from their ability to mediate in contacts between Heaven and Earth, between divine and human spheres and their skill in maintaining the delicate equilibrium of the Cosmos. People thought that in the times of chaos the division into the two spheres disappeared and ghosts mixed with people who lost respect for them. As a result, mankind suffered various disasters. Shamans were also venerated as depositories of divine wisdom indispensable to wielding political power. Ancient kings actually possessed shamanistic features.[29] Shamans could exorcise because they themselves were thought to be possessed by ghosts (*shen*) who had divine

[25] See entry 'Lotos', in S. Schuhmacher, G. Woerner (eds), *Encyklopedia mądrości Wschodu...*, pp. 198–199.

[26] See entry 'Woda', in W. Kopaliński, *Słownik symboli*, Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1990, pp. 475–479.

[27] See entry 'Woda', in Eberhard, *Symbole chińskie...*, pp. 287–288.

[28] See J. Needham, *Science and Civilisation in China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980, Vol. 2, p. 132–139 and L. Wasiliew, *Kulty, religie i tradycje Chin,* Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1974, pp. 74–78.

[29] See the chapter 'Shamanism and Politics', in K.C. Chang, *Art, Myth and Ritual. The Path to Political Authority in Ancient China*, London: Cambridge, Mass., 1953, pp. 44–53 and M. Eliade, *Szamanizm i archaiczne techniki ekstazy* (original title: *Le chamanisme et les techniques archaïques de l'extase*), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1994, p. 442–444.

abilities to oppose, exorcise or destroy demons (*gui*). This ability was expressed, amongst others, by ecstatic dance. People also believed that shamans were able to accumulate huge quantities of *yang* which was associated with the sun, brightness, energy and masculinity.[30] That feature enabled them to penetrate the world of darkness and notice demons. Young men were thought to have particularly vast quantities of the male element, and therefore very young teenage boys were appointed as shamans or they accompanied adult men during the ceremonies. They performed ecstatic dances in full sunshine during drought-combating rituals or participated in exorcist ceremonies which were regularly arranged in palaces of dukes. Shamans-exorcists were also considered to be skilful doctors. This was understandable, because shamanistic tribes always believed that diseases were the effect of possession by demons. An exorcist used spells and fakir's feats to defeat demons and heal patients, which was equivalent to freeing them from demonic power.

The physical and spiritual abilities, as well as the skills and abilities of Chinese shamans, particularly female ones, must have been awesome, as one of the descriptions of their work, coming from the 4th century A.D, showed them as women of striking beauty, wonderfully dressed, singing and dancing beautifully, possessing the ability to turn invisible and skilled in fakir-like tricks such as driving swords through their tongues without bleeding, swallowing knives and spluttering with fire.[31] One can find traces of such theatrical, dance and circus-like abilities in ancient *Jiuge*. According to research, these songs were sung and performed as a masked 'dumb-show' during rituals celebrated in the palaces of rulers, while their original folk performances were a significant element of local religious ceremonies. The songs of the discussed cycle were formed as an invocation of male or female shamans to deities and often had a clear erotic undertone. Shamans met gods as lovers did. They created idealized images of the being whom they were expecting, wore seductive clothes and behaved as lovers would. The structure of the text reveals elements of proto-theatre: dance, songs, music, basic acting and costumes.

In his *Nine Songs* Lin Huaimin mixed the elements of ancient shamanistic culture with contemporary ideas and figures.[32] Some of characters of Lin Huaimin's choreography seemed to be incongruous with the performance as if they were alien to the plot and other characters. The 'Traveller', wearing a dark suit and holding a suitcase, crossed the stage slowly in silence. The young man on roller skates was going around in circles, waving a flag with symbolic paintings of clouds; a boy and girl were cycling. These unsettling characters coming from our contemporary world, penetrated Lin Huaimin's choreographies, yet often stayed incompatible with the ritualized reality of the stage world. Huang Yin-ying described the 'Traveller' in the following way: "The traveller is Lin's invention; there is no such role in Chu Yuan's [Qu Yuan's] work, the literary text. I believe that the 'traveller' can be seen as representing the choreographer himself, Lin, a modern Taiwanese person who travels back to the world of ancient dance rituals described by Chu Yuan in *Nine Songs*. In my opinion,

[30] See J.J.M. de Groot, *The Religious System of China*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, Vol. VI, p. 1195.

[31] A. Waley, *The Nine Songs. A Study of Shamanism in Ancient China*, London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1956, p. 11.

[32] My analysis of the dance is based on the DVD recording *Jiuge/Nine Songs*, Taibei 2003, Jingo Records. The première: August 10th, 1993, Taibei Guojia Juchang/National Theatre in Taibei, choreography: Lin Huaimin, music: Taiwanese and Asian folk music, music arrangement: Qu Xiaosong, stage set: Ming Cho Lee (Li Mingjue), lighting: Lin Keh-hua (Lin Kehua), costumes: Lin Huaimin, Lo Ruey-chi (Luo Ruiqi), masks: Lin Shufen, Wang Junyao, projections: Zhang Huiwen.

the insertion of this traveller in dance echoes the idea of inserting the painter's voice in a traditional Chinese painting, the technique of 'inserting of the self'".[33] However, none of these characters could be considered only as a link between two orders: the past and the present. The past and present world, although similar to each other and filled with similar suffering, dreams and desires, existed independently, or perhaps parallel one to another. The Traveller did not participate in events occurring in spaces through which he passed, but he seemed to be rather an observer who looked coldly and indifferently at the persons and events. This mysterious and silent character was a reminder of the situation of all of us – people who appeared here for a brief moment, witnessing rather than fully participating. The characters of the 'Traveller', 'Cyclist' and 'Roller Skater' were a reference to typical, meta-theatrical techniques and constituted an attempt to change the perspective of the audience who was reminded of the illusive character of art and life, of the play of appearances and masks, of the manipulation of others and being subject to manipulation, but also of the painful reality of sacrifice and suffering. The simple technique which disturbed the stage illusion made the spectator stop, consider and reflect: one could pass through the world in haste, looking at it from a distance, or turn into a person full of empathy, a sensitive participant in the reality in which he or she happened to live.

At the beginning of the performance, the Traveller in a modern-style suit crossed the dark stage, holding a suitcase in his hand. Before he reached backstage, a dancer in a white, long, loose robe tied at his waist appeared. He was followed by another dozen similarly dressed dancers. They sat cross-legged in a circle, leaving its centre empty. Soon a woman Shaman appeared, dressed in a bright red, long dress with one arm naked. Her long hair was adorned with small flowers. She washed her hands in the lotus pool on the proscenium and entered the circle of dancers dressed in white. She began a trance-like dance, bending her body more and more violently. The onlookers encouraged her with a rhythmic beat of long twigs stomping the floor and increasingly loud, wild cries. Finally, the Shaman fell on the floor, exhausted with her dance. The curtain at the back of the stage opened and the Ruler of the East (Dongjun, the Sun God) appeared in the bright opening. He was carried in standing position by two dancers supported on bamboo sticks. The Ruler of the East appeared on the Earth by jumping down from the arms of the other dancers. Clad only in a loincloth, wearing a stylized mask with solar motives he began a dignified dance over the Shaman, still lying on the floor in her red dress.

Dancers in white, bearing their long twigs, gathered centrally on stage and squatted, waving their twigs. The Shaman and Ruler of the East began their duo dance, first at the side and then centrally. Its violent moments intertwined with peaceful ones, and the whole sequence was permeated with eroticism and passion. This encounter of lovers kept them strangely apart, distant and away from each other. During their ever-changing dance, the white dancers moved along the stage, as if creating a background. Their dance was generally static, but sometimes it accelerated. During the culmination, when the dance of Shaman and Ruler of the East turned into a struggle of lovers, the onlooking dancers began to cheer them with violent shouts and a fast stomping of their twigs on the floor. After the culmination, the sun god danced alone with twigs in his hands which symbolized sunshine rays, surrounded by white-clad dancers. Suddenly, the Shaman appeared. The young man in an unbuttoned cloak cycled between the performers. The movements of the white dancers

[33] Huang Yin-ying, 'Lin Hwai-min's Dance Works Inspired by Literature...', pp. 47–48.

turned more violent and slightly off-rhythm. Their behaviour was contrasted with the static, dignified movement of the Shaman who headed towards the proscenium. With a group of dancers whirling behind, she slowly poured over herself the water from the lotus pond and then gathered the twigs ('rays') left on the floor. The group turned their backs against her and stood motionless. She slowly crossed the stage, still holding the twigs. The Traveller appeared from the side, cycling across the stage space with his suitcase.

Lin Yatin noted that the choreography of these two sequences was strongly influenced not only by Martha Graham's technique but also by local religious traditions. She wrote about the Shaman's dance: "She displays her deeply inscribed Graham contraction technique, while also echoing a Taiwanese shaman gone into a trance".[34] Discussing the duo of the Shaman and the Ruler of the East, particularly the bent body of the Shaman and the straight, angular motions of Dongjun, she saw a clear reference to the duo of Jason and Medea from Graham's *Cave of the Heart,* staged in 1946.[35] Both episodes were based on strong visual contrasts, also with respect to the costumes and stage set. The background of the stage was dark and neutral, adding expressiveness to the juxtaposition of white and red costumes. The kinetic sphere also followed the principle of contrast. The rhythm of the dance of soloists and accompanying groups was slow or accelerated; the static movements of groups clashed with dynamic soloists. Contrary to the opinion of the author of the book on *Nine Songs*, the dancers in white costumes did not seem to be mere observers of the ceremony who did not participate in it.[36] Their role was more ambiguous. At times, they seemed to be just observers creating a neutral background, but they also turned into active participants. Therefore, their role ranged between cold indifference and active involvement. Their white costumes may naturally lead to associations with the robes and traditions of Chinese men of letters and science. Although it would be tempting to juxtapose Confucian rationalism, intellectualism and transparency to shamanistic entanglement, imagination and sensuality, such a thesis – choreographic layer of the dance considered – seems difficult to defend.

In another episode of the performance, "The Lord of Fate" ('Siming'), the dancers clad in white went through a sudden metamorphosis. Some of them were running and removed their costumes. Their faces turned stone-like, expressionless, uniform, fierce, intense and empty. Their eyes seemed unable to see and understand. Their dance turned into a series of acts of violence, aggression, blackmail and manipulation. Men manipulated women, women manipulated one another, men manipulated other men, the strong manipulated the weak. The manipulators pushed, lifted and threw the manipulated. The manipulated imitated mannequins or puppets adopting poses enforced on them by the manipulators. No sphere of human existence was left free from the overwhelming power of manipulation, which embraced even love and sexual encounters. It seemed to be a self-propelling, never-stopping mechanism. In this section, the choreographer used strategies typical of contact improvisation. Lin Yatin wrote: "Lin depicts male dancers' harsh manipulation of female dancers. Lin achieves such effects by adding context to a formerly 'meaning-neutral' contact improvisation exercise known as 'Moulding Your Partner' – where one person passively accepts the instructions given by the partner's push or tug. Originally used to explore how

[34] Lin Yatin C., 'Dancing in the Age of Globalisation...', p. 205–206.

[35] Ibid., p. 206.

[36] Jiang Xun, *Wudong* Jiuge (Dancing *Nine Songs*), Taibei: Yuanliu Chuban Shiye Gufen Youxian Gongsi, 2007, p. 126.

a different point of initiation can shape bodies, as well as to enhance understanding between dance partners, his exercise was cleverly transformed to depict inequality between male and female, colonizer and colonized".[37] The episode might also remind the audience of Pina Bausch's dance aesthetics.

Then, two Lords of Fate appeared on the stage: one was black and the other red, one was small and the other big, as folk tradition had it. Siming was the god of death, although in this case the literal translation "the Lord of Fate" seemed more adequate. Siming belonged to the most important gods of religious Daoism, but its roots went back to Chinese shamanism. He was venerated by Chinese shamans eight centuries before the birth of Christ. Being the Lord of Fate, he had the power to determine the life expectation of every human. He made records in a book of merits and vices of people which was a register of human lives used to decide whether life should be prolonged or cut short.[38] 'Small Siming' (Xiao Siming) made decisions on the death of young people, while 'Big Siming' (Da Siming) was the lord of death for old people. Both 'Lords of Fate' tied black and red girdles around their waists and wearing symbolic masks, performed a dance duo. Their movements were sweeping, broad, violent and angular. These characters came from folk tradition, and for that reason their movements brought to mind crude, clumsy motions of dancers performing during religious parades and ceremonies. Meanwhile, the other performers ended their dance of manipulation and violence. The cruel game came to its end. They began to roll on the floor to the right and left with their legs up in the air, unable to stand up. The bodies tangled helplessly, not knowing which direction to take. This fragment brought to mind paintings of the Last Judgement. Man was suddenly reduced to the size of a tiny figurine from a Breughel or Bosch painting, thrown into the endless universe, forced to hasten by others or by unidentifiable, mysterious forces. Two huge figures of scaffoldings/dolls clumsily entered the stage, carried by two dancers positioned in the centre of their empty frameworks made of sticks. The figures moved around, swaying to the right and left, with hands hanging powerlessly down. They were met by the Traveller with his suitcase, shaded by an umbrella. However, he did not pass them by, but looked carefully at them and at the tangled bodies on the floor. Perhaps he saw the end of his journey or observed from a distance his own life, this amazing and repetitive parade of acts of manipulation, violence, powerlessness and despair.

"The Lord of the Fate" episode was governed by repetitions. Just as in human life, all events on stage repeated themselves: gestures, movements and sounds. The lethal oppressiveness of repetitions was amplified by the monotonous incantations of Buddhist monks and depressive, and the low tone of their voices. The Traveller, with his ridiculously big suitcase and slightly absurd, open umbrella, who passed with uncertain steps the tangle of bodies appearing before his eyes, actually proved to be the only truly human persona among the sad crowd of puppets, mannequins and 'body-things' which were left behind, being of no use to anybody.

The appearance of 'Lady of the Xiang River' (Xiang Furen) was announced by the entrance of five women in floating dresses who carried flowers in their hands. They approached the lotus pond at the proscenium and washed their hands. Two servants carried in the Lady on horizontal bamboo sticks. The woman, supported by willow tree sticks was covered with

[37] Lin Yatin C., 'Dancing in the Age of Globalisation...', p. 206.

[38] See entry 'Siming', in Schuhmacher, Woerner (eds), *Encyklopedia mądrości Wschodu*, pp. 306–307.

a veil several meters long. A court lady helped her down and removed the veil, but soon it proved that the face of Xiang Furen was doubly hidden; the veil was covering a mask. It was strikingly simple: the chalk-white face had only tiny, black openings for the eyes, nose and mouth. The mask was expressionless. This dead and flat surface contrasted with the dignified, light and noble movements of the dancer who performed this role; conversely, the lifeless mask paradoxically complemented the elegant gestures, amplifying the impression of distance and the gap between this ethereal character and the real world. A static dance began on the side of the lotus pond, against a background of a full moon hidden behind clouds. It was modelled on Javanese court dances performed to gamelan music.[39] It created a harmony of subtle hand gestures and body bending, with swaying movements similar to floating on a watery surface. The dancer's body escaped the law of gravity, belonging to the element of water with its incessant waving and swaying, rising and falling, approaching and regressing. The Lady of the Xiang River was truly a river goddess.

"Water as the natural element has properties which can be experienced directly with the senses: it can be seen, heard, smelled, tasted and touched. Referring to the ancient meaning of the world *aisthesis* which was the sensual experience, one can conclude that water and earth are the most aesthetic of the elements."[40] Watching a video recording of the performance, one could hear the murmurs of the water. Dancers washed their hands in the lotus pond. Small droplets went down their arms and torsos. One could almost smell the fresh aroma of water. According to experts on the water element: "The world of water is not built of fragments, separate items to which we are used to while living on land, but it is made of forces, energies and joint relations with all the other parts of the cosmos. In the water world, all things are inherently related and continuous. Even time and space are felt as more closely related and interdependent. In the water world, movement is slower, due to the higher density of the element."[41] The dance of the river goddess reflected the "watery" continuity, slowness and rhythmic wave motion. However, even that dance was not free from contrasts: the upper part of the dancer's body along with her hands were moving according to the rules of Javanese dance, but here movements from the waist down followed the principles of modern dance. Her static dance, full of peaceful energy was juxtaposed with the dynamic dance episode performed by a few male and female dancers. This sequence was also a striking merger of various dance styles: Javanese dance and

[39] Gamelan – 'the indigenous orchestra type of the islands of Java and Bali, in Indonesia, consisting largely of several varieties of gongs and various sets of tuned metal instruments that are struck with mallets. The gongs are either suspended vertically or, as with the case of the 'knobbed-centre', kettle-shaped gongs of the *bonang* are placed flat. Percussive melodic instruments include the *bonang*, the xylophone (*gambang kayu*), and various metallophones (instruments with a series of tuned metal plates, either suspended over a resonance trough or on resonance tubes). A sustained melody is played either by the bamboo flute (*suling*) or by a bowed stringed instrument (*rebab)* or is sung – he last especially when, as often occurs, the gamelan is used to accompany theatrical performances, or *wayang.* The voice is then part of the orchestral texture. Dominating these two groups of instruments is the drum (*kendang*), which unites them and acts as a leader.' [*Encyclopaedia Britannica*, 2002, CD-ROM.]

[40] See Z. Kalnická, 'Woda', in K. Wilkoszewska (ed.), *Estetyka czterech żywiołów. Ziemia, woda, ogień, powietrze* (Aesthetics of Four Elements. Earth,Water, Fire, Air), Kraków: Universitas, 2002, p. 78.

[41] Ibid., p. 80.

modern style fused together with lifts and poses from classical ballet. The Shaman in red, known from the earlier parts of "Welcome to the Gods" ("Yingshen") and the "Lord of the East"("Dongjun"), introduced yet l another dance element. It was the element of earth. The Shaman removed the mask from Xiang Furen's face and put it on. She imitated the dance of the goddess, but her movements were more sensual, intentionally stripped of the ethereal, floating charm. Her lowered centre of gravity moved her dance closer to the earth and subjected it to the earthly principles. One could notice in the dance of the Shaman some elements of Martha Graham's style. The sequence ended with a background dance of female and male dancers holding the veil of the goddess. The Shaman disappeared leaving the goddess alone. The scene was witnessed by the equally lone Traveller who crossed the stage again with his inseparable suitcase.

"Xiang Furen" was a subtle and sophisticated story about loneliness and a futile wait for someone and something. For love? For a lover? It was a tale about focusing on one's own reflection in the water and on looking inside oneself. The dancer performing the part of the goddess performed her final dance with the veil, wrapped herself into it, lay on the floor and separated herself from the outer world. The veil fulfilled a symbolic role in the dance. "As it was explained by Eses, the veil means the symbolic retaining of things, in contrast to releasing them to any person who asks for them; it adds strength during times of loneliness, refers to one's potential and protects the internal 'I' of a woman against unwanted intruders".[42] However, the veil was also the symbol of the river/water ruled by Xiang Furen. That peaceful, strangely distanced woman was looking melancholically at her reflection mirrored in the peaceful water surface, as if she was asking: "Who am I?" Her frail, elusive and meek character was of a watery nature. The dance of three court ladies heralded the departure of the goddess. Servants with bamboo sticks which served as a litter reappeared on stage. Xiang Furen, covered with her veil, departed quietly, with dignity, carried away by her servants. She flowed away unnoticeably like water, into invisible, distant realms.

Joyce Liu placed the two women – the Shaman and Lady of the Xiang River – against a broader context of artistic transformation which occurred at the beginning of the 1990s in Lin Huaimin's work. *Nine Songs* – said she, recalling words of the choreographer – was created as a result of reconsidering the carious events of the second half of the 1980s, both of a global nature (the downfall of the USSR, the demolition of the Berlin Wall, the abolition of Marshall Law on Taiwan) and of a local and personal character (the death of a prominent Cloud Gate member, and suspending the work of the group for financial reasons). The performance was created after Lin Huaimin had to stop and consider the point of life, death and rebirth. The Lady of the Xiang River and the Shaman became symbolic characters in the aforementioned context. They represented two opposing traditions and two feminine models. "The Lady of Xiang River", said Joyce Liu, "wearing a piece of long white cloth, represents the traditional Confucian virtues of modesty, obeying order and place in the ideological hierarchy, while the priestess, with her shamanistic wild and forceful body movements, represents power from the southern part of China, power from the margin, and the power of the regeneration."[43] The Shaman was also the symbol of

[42] Ibid., p. 96.

[43] Joyce Chi-hui Liu, 'Religious Icons in Culture and the Goddess in the Contemporary Taiwan Dance Theatre', www.srcs.nctu.edu/tw/JoyceLiu/mworks/mw-taiwantheatre/dancetheater.htm (accessed 10 February 2010).

mature femininity, with its expansive power which was pushed to the margin, reminiscent of shamanistic culture which had been ignored and despised for centuries by the dominating Confucian ideology. Liu continued her discussion on the new model of spirited femininity which was prioritized in Lin Huaimin's choreography:

She dances happily because she takes the fortune of the people as her own. When the priestess sits besides the lotus pond, holding the dead body on her lap and cleansing it with lotus pond water, Lin specifies that this scene should echo the pose of the mother in the Pietà, full of pity and great love. Therefore, we can see clearly that the duty of regenerating the culture, according to Lin the choreographer, is carried by the mother-likes priestess.[...] To be more precise, this 'mother' created by Lin Huaimin in *Nine Hymns* is not a mother who suffers and endures all burdens, but a 'mother-goddess-priestess-witch' of different faces who is skilled in seduction, ecstasy, procreation, destruction and rebirth. An artist who attempts to create and bring forth new cultures, in terms of Lin's definition of new culture, should act like a goddess and re-enact the process of creation, destruction and recreation. When Lin deals with Oriental religious icons on his stage, we notice that he tends to either use it as an icon to signal the aeons and remoteness of the ancient Chinese culture to his Taiwanese audience, or to rely on the vocabulary of the folk religion, especially that of the goddess, so as to subvert the canonistic Confucian tradition. This borrowing of the folk religion and of the goddess images shows an underlying intention to resist the male-dominated, mainland [Chinese] culture. To my mind, the goddess in Lin Huaimin's dance texts discloses the artist's design to endow Taiwanese culture with the power of regeneration. I would call it 'the culture of the goddess' in contemporary Taiwanese. Such a 'culture of the goddess' deviates from the past 'culture of [an]orphan' which is based upon loyalty to a certain ideology, i.e. forever seeking its parents. The 'culture of the goddess' allows the artist to dance playfully as a mature woman, changing the masks and the identities all the time, stimulating new desires, and breeding new lives.[44]

> The following episode entitled "The Lord in the Clouds" ("Yunzhongjun") was a unique display of equilibrium and acrobatic/gymnastic skills from the Cloud Gate dancers. Among billowing clouds and fog, carried on the arms of two dancers in modern dark suits, Yunzhongjun appeared on stage, wearing only a loincloth and hiding his face under a rectangular mask. The rhythm of the dance remained unchanged, without acceleration or slowed-down moments. Its tempo was determined by the fact that the dance was performed on the arms of the two dancers, more than 1.5 m above the floor. The successful performance of all the acrobatic figures depended on the harmonious co-operation of the three dancers. The supporting dancers were responsible for keeping balance and stability. To further complicate matters, the sequence included difficult, high lifts and forward rolls performed on the arms and backs of the supporting dancers. The pair, wearing their dark suits, were reminiscent of stage props or puppet operators performing in other forms of Far Eastern theatre. They did not attract attention, although they were indispensable for performing the sequence. They looked rather like gymnasts, more so than dancers, focusing on the correct performance of their task. In contrast, most of the gestures and movements of the dancer acting as Yunzhongjun were based on conventions from the Beijing opera and dances performed during religious, Taiwanese

[44] Ibidem.

> street processions, with angular gestures of hands, sweeping movements of legs, movements preceded by the backward swinging of a leg or hand etc. The dancer eagerly covered the space with his whole body. His dance was heavy, subject to gravity and struggling to overcome it. In spite of the fact that it was performed "in the clouds" it was by no means light, floating or ethereal, although the air is considered to be the most subtle of the elements. The heaviness was due to the special character of the "transport vehicle" used by Yunzhongjun. His two dancer-assistants were ascribed to the element of earth and subjected to the restricting power of gravitation. They moved with great physical effort. The audience could see their shivering hands, legs and deeply bent backs. Nobody tried to hide that effort or subject it to useless stylization. In spite of this, Yunzhongjun's heavenly stroll symbolized a yearning for freedom and the desire to free oneself from the earth. It was a manifestation of power, but a power which was mindful about retaining safe points of support.

The beauty of that difficult episode was disturbed only by the appearance of the young man on roller skates, who circled the stage, bearing a flag with stylized clouds. Such symbolic drawings on a piece of cloth were used by the Beijing opera. However, the roller skater was an unnecessary intruder, a dreadful clash, an all too easy and obtrusive merger of the past and the present. Jiang Xun who interpreted that dance perceived the young man who sped along streets of a modern city as the opposite of the assistants in black clerical suits and saw him as a symbol close to the 'Lord in the Clouds'. The young man was seen as close to god-like by his love of unlimited freedom, liberty and power.[45]

The next episode, "The Mountain Ghost" ("Shangui") referred to the stylistics of Japanese *butō* dance. A sparsely clad dancer attracted attention of the audience with his sculpted body and cat-like nimbleness, softness and flexibility. His face, painted in white, shone in the darkness of the stage with the only set item being a greenish full moon half-hidden behind the clouds. The dancer's torso was also marked with a green dash. White faces and a dark stage typify *butō* convention. Susan Blakley Klein, a renowned expert, explained them in the following way: "originally these bizarre encrustations were part of the attempt to turn the dancer into some alien 'other'".[46] Further on, she added: "At the same time, the white make-up and shaved head, and often the lack of costumes, strip the body of the usual identifying characteristics of the individual, i.e. any expression of personal 'taste', leaving only the body's movement as the marker of difference."[47] Klein also pointed to the fact that the white powder made the actor more visible in the darkness on stage, while the darkness itself lent mysterious beauty to the created images. In "Shangui" the choreographer, following *butō* and *nō* theatre conventions, skilfully contrasted light and darkness, building up the extraordinary, unsettling atmosphere. The rhythm of the dance was a sequence of accelerating and slowed-down moments. Movements which were initially slow and lazy, acquired violent and animal-like qualities. Softness turned into acrobatic, gymnastic skill. No wonder, as Shangui was a strange, half-human and half-animal character, and also an androgynous being. This duality was reflected by different ways in which the Mountain

[45] Jiang Xun, *Wudong Jiuge...,* pp. 152–159.

[46] S. Blakeley Klein, *Ankoku Butō. The Premodern and Postmodern Influence on the Dance of Utter Darkness*, Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988, p. 47.

[47] Ibid., pp. 47–48.

Ghost moved: female delicacy and flexibility was contrasted with male, predatory violence. The dance had much more contrasting elements. The beautiful, fit body of the dancer was set against the ugliness of his white-painted face with its strange, over-expressive facial expressions. His sad, alien face was twisted by a grimace. Then it turned immovable with its mouth remaining open for a long time, as if in a silent scream. Gestures and facial expressions reflected fear, anxiety, fatigue and also insecurity, undefined desire and sadness.

The dance also had other characteristics of *butō* aesthetics, specified by Sondra Fraleigh in her work: deliberate laziness and zen-like slow patience, together with elements of surprise.[48] The American researcher pointed to the cathartic function of *butō*: "Likewise, catharsis is the aesthetic heart of Butoh, the reason behind its exposure of clumsiness, its distorted faces, and sublime emptying of the self. 'Killing the body", they call it. Like Dogen Zen, Butoh 'casts off the body and the mind.' It plays between emptiness and form, light and dark, beauty and ugliness in its cathartic transformations of the body, tendering the Eastern metaphysical origins of Zen".[49]

After a while, the mood changed dramatically. Dancers clad in white entered the stage. A girl cycled in. A dancer in a white dress with a sword in his hand, washed himself with water from the lotus pond. He bowed respectfully to the group of dancers, who were also wearing white and held swords. He adopted a pose expressing concentration, typical of sword-wielding martial arts. The dancers in white crowded around in concentration and stood motionless. The scene marked a transition to the final sequences of the performance.

Backstage partition walls were set on both sides of the stage, decorated with paintings of dim-emerald lotus leaves set against a goldish background. The modest, symbolic stage set – let us not forget that the lotus symbolizes purity – and dancers standing in pairs on the right side of the stage (as viewed by the audience), in long white robes, with their hands stretched out and bent at the elbows and the hands joined on their chests in a characteristic pose, expressing concentration, attention and respect, served as background for a soloist who performed an elegant and precise dance – a series of martial arts postures with the sword. At the end of that presentation, the dancers bowed low and knelt on the floor. Suddenly, they jumped up to run. Their motions became violent and panicky. Dry sounds were heard of increasingly loud gunshots. The stage was crowded with convicts with bared torsos, wearing black pants and wicker baskets on their heads. With crossed or rather tied hands, they moved in a long, slow file across the stage and back. They stopped, turned towards the audience and approached the proscenium. A long list of the names of victims and convicts in the long history of China and Taiwan was recited like a litany. Bodies of dancers shook in convulsions; one by one, they fell on the floor and the wicker baskets rolled on the floor. Then they stood up, slowly walked again towards the proscenium and regrouped. Then they fell again on the floor as if shot once more. They jumped up to run and fell down again. The sequence was repeated. The poses of the actors were full of pathos. Bodies of killed men covered the floor. A woman dressed in red came running to hold a wounded man. The positions of their bodies reminiscent of Pietà. A man slumped down with his arms spread wide. The woman, overwhelmed with pain, rose and bowed again, went around the body and carefully arranged it in a peaceful pose with hands crossed over

[48] S. Horton Fraleigh, *Dancing into Darkness. Butoh, Zen and Japan*, Piitsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1999, p. 26.

[49] Ibid., p. 25.

the chest. The traveller with his suitcase, indifferently crossed the stage. The woman in red departed slowly and performed a fragment of her shamanistic trance-like dance, just as in the first part of *Nine Songs*; this time, however, it had none of its former violence and passion. Each of the victims was commemorated by a cemetery light placed on the stage; finally, flickering lamps created a glimmering, meandering path/river which led towards the horizon. A Taiwanese aboriginal song commemorating the dead resounded.

Lin Huaimin's *Nine Songs* were a sacrificial ritual, a recurrent story about dreams and desires, loneliness and sadness, violence and death. It was a tale of the desire to transgress the limits of earthly existence, knowledge and contacts with the imponderable and inaccessible. It was also a dream about love and dissatisfaction. It showed brutality, violence and manipulation which destroyed human plans, and pure, sublime things defeated in a clash with reality. Nearing the end of their wanderings, humans either encountered a beautiful and dignified death, or just an incongruous ragtag kind of demise. *Nine Songs* was a dark tale which sometimes turned horrifying, but it was also surrounded by the aura of mystery, built not only by varied choreography but also by musical diversity – a collage of sounds, songs, litanies and noises which were always perfectly correlated with the dance and emphasizing its character. In *Nine Songs*, high and noble resonance merged with more grounded lowly tones, pathos and dignity juxtaposed everyday, common things, sophistication and subtlety existed side by side with simplicity and roughness. "We can sense in *Nine Songs* a kind of vitality and unadorned beauty often seen in primitive art",[50] said Huang Yin-ying. Seeking a new "tone" for his choreographic work, Lin Huaimin drew from ancient Chinese literature and culture, but he also enriched it – as the researcher noted – with elements of local Taiwanese culture and elements of many Asian traditions. As a result, he created an inter-cultural work in the good sense of the word.

[50] Huang Yin-ying, 'Lin Hwai-min's Dance Works Inspired by Literature...', p. 51.

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The Pop-Cultural Phenomenon of Taiwanese TV Drama: Remodelled Fairy Tales and Playing with Virtues[1]

Abstract

This paper attempt to define and classify Taiwanese drama in terms of its genre, origin, audience, structure and meaning, placing the phenomenon in broader cultural and historical context. The main textual study subject here is reduced to idol drama and some prime-time drama (except history drama) representing main types of *lianxuju*. Taiwanese drama as a form of imaginary reality embodies several characteristics of a fairy tale,which are recreated and rewritten. Narrative paradigm of *lianxuju* related to (fairy) tale is universal, whereas its syntagmatic code is regional (Taiwanese). Articulating tension between Confucian virtues and the modern values of individual emancipation Taiwanese drama reflect at the syntagmatic level mixture of old and new ideologies.

Key words: Taiwan, TV drama, idol drama, *xiangtu* drama, audience, soap opera, fairy tales, melodramatic structure, Confucian vs. modern values, *yuanfen.*

One of the most popular types of TV program in Taiwan are *lianxuju* (連續劇), in English called drama. This term is used only for television series produced in Taiwan (*taiju* 台劇), Japan (*ruju*日劇), Korea (*hanju* 韓劇), China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaysia, and differs from American or other western series', called *guoyu* (國 語) *dianshi yingji* (電視影劇) mini-series). Taiwanese drama has not only became one of the main elements of teenage pop culture, but also an important cultural commodity distributed to ordinary TV viewers. As a mass produced and mass consumed text of popular culture, it remains a very interesting research object, although some investigators maybe convinced that such a form of 'low' culture is not worth studying.[2]

Despite the value judgments of popular culture, the most important impulse and motivation to explore the topic is the growing popularity of Taiwanese drama among Taiwanese, East

[1] This is a longer, more detailed and changed version of the position paper presented at the International Symposium 'Discovering Taiwan in Europe', 22–23 October 2015, Charles University: Prague.

[2] Filoteo, *Placing Reality TV in the Cultural Spectrum: Making a Case for Studying the World of Reality Television* (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 13–16.07.2013 http://citation.allacademic.com/meta/p23432_index.html (accessed 10 September 2015).

Asian and European audiences. Ten years ago bilingual fans from abroad started to create internet services to watch Asian dramas in English, Spanish, or Russian. Websites such as *dramacrazy.eu, gooddrama.net,* and *dramago.com*, not only offer watching series' in their original or foreign languages, but also their reviewing, recommending and rating according to a scale of 1–10.

Through the translations of volunteers some Taiwanese dramas crossed the hermetic language barriers and opened their cultural transmission to totally new audiences, albeit still marginal compared to the Chinese speaking community in Taiwan, Asian expatriates, and transnational TV audiences in East and South Asia, where these series are mostly admired. With that in mind, we can investigate the subject from the perspective of different recipients by stressing cultural otherness (Western versus Eastern) or cultural hybridism in the age of transnational media flows.Taiwanese drama has become fashionable among the young generations abroad (in Asia and Europe) due to the increasing popularity of Japanese manga, anime, 'j-pop', 'k-pop' and Korean and Japanese 'Fever'.

The question of *lianxuju* analysed as a narrative form, social discourse, or tradable commodity should be put in the context of trans-cultural diffusion, the exotic "Other" and the consumption of symbolic cultural meanings and commodities, but it requires more analysis and that is for the longer term.

This paper attempts to define and classify Taiwanese drama in terms of its genre, origin, audience, structure and meaning, placing the phenomenon in a broader cultural and historical context. It is to be precise, that the main textual study subject herein is reduced to 'idol drama' and some 'prime-time' drama (except history drama) representing the main types of *lianxuju*. In contrast to *danyuanju* (單元劇)[3], the stories of which refer to a more independent stand-alone format, *lianxuju* is based on continuously evolving stories, spread over multiple episodes with a set of characters.

It is known, that the Taiwanese drama originated in local operas about life in the countryside. The first Taiwanese prime-time drama appeared on Chinese Television on December 11th, 1990, first in Taiwanese (*Taiyu*台語) and then changed to Chinese due to policy regulations, and was called *Love* (*Ai* 愛) and represented Xiangtu drama (*taiyu xiangtuju*台語鄉土劇).[4]

If we put the history of the Taiwanese TV series into a broader socio-political context, it is not hard to see that the political situation in Taiwan plays a significant role in determining the position of *Taiyu xiangtuju* in the media market and society.[5]

The popularity of Xiangtu drama in the nineties mainly resulted from the democratisation process and essentially from the Bentuhua movement (*bentuhua yundong* 本土化運動), which was engaged in the construction of a new Taiwanese identity. Minnan TV dramas (台語劇) were criticised for being in poor taste and of low quality, factors automatically associated with the elderly, uneducated, *Taiyu* speaking audience. As a result, this situation strengthened cultural, ethnic and political diversity. Even though *Taiyu* drama retained a local position and its own audience, it was unable to compete with international productions.

[3] One of the best known *danyuanju* is a criminal TV series, made with the cooperation of the FTV and the Ministry of Justice, and is known as *Independent heroes* (*Lianzheng yingxiong* 廉正英雄).

[4] *The Family Fengshui* (*Fengshui Shijia* 風水師世家) is one of the most popular Taiwanese Xiangtu dramas.

[5] Fang Chih, Irene Yang, 'Engaging with Korean Dramas: Discourses of Gender, Media, and Class Formation in Taiwan', *Asian Journal of Communication*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2008, p. 178.

Because of neo-liberalisation and media privatisation, and also the dominance of Chinese language market, Xiangtu drama stepped aside and gave way to a TV industry controlled by leaders from GMD.[6]

As the result, culture became an economic resource. By making use of an open door policy Taiwanese filmmakers went to China to produce a series in cooperation with PRC (*Liang'an hepai ju* 兩岸合拍劇). Apart from reducing costs, producers were mostly interested in promoting and bringing Taiwanese dramas to the Chinese market. The story of this co-production often takes place simultaneously in Shanghai and Taipei, linking romantic drama with economic and cultural co-operation between mainland China and Taiwan. The most popular series produced in co-operation with China was the 24 episode drama *Destined to Love You* (*Pian pian xihuan ni* 偏偏喜歡你) broadcasted in 2008 by SETTV and TTV, and in 2010 by Hunan TV. Fang-Chih Irena argues that since the times of neo-liberal globalisation in Taiwan, "Chinese culture through the economic rhetoric of the Chinese language market became a leverage for a mainlander elite, who has dominated the TV industry since its inception".[7]

However, the first decade of the 21st century belonged to 'idol drama' (*Ouxiangju* 偶像劇). Before the phenomenon started in 2001 in Taiwan with *Meteor Garden* (*Liuxing huayuan* 流 星花園), which is based on a Japanese 'shojo-manga' book entitled *Hana yori dango* (*Boys Before Flowers*), Japanese cable channels were established and fashionable, Japanese dramas were imported. In a very short time their scripts and formats were copied and remodelled into Taiwanese 'idol' dramas. From 2001, the more that was produced, the more success was realized.

Taiwanese 'idol' dramas are chiefly an eclectic form composed of various cultural components. They employ the most popular singers and actors or actresses from the Taiwanese entertainment industry, sometimes joining celebrities from Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and China. Many storylines are based on Japanese *manga* series' and adapted to Taiwanese settings and realities, representing typical cartoon aesthetics, which are converted directly into cinematic language.

From the very beginning Taiwanese idol dramas were produced to attract young teenage audiences, fascinated with Japanese TV dramas, 'j-pop', 'k-pop', comic books, and good-looking actors and singers.

As Chua suggests, the term "idols" has begun to characterise the particular segment of popular cultural products[8] in East Asian media markets.

Describing the fame of *Meteor Garden* in Taiwan, Hsiu-Chuang Deppman (2009) argues that Taiwanese idol dramas combine two similar genres in Japanese TV programmes: "trendy dramas" and "post-trendy dramas". Promoting a modish urban lifestyle, with all its fashionable gadgets, home design, clothes and pop music scenes, trendy dramas reflect and protect materialistic consumerism.[9]

Taiwanese drama undoubtedly shares more similarities with "post-trendy dramas", which focus on depicting young people's interest in love, friendship and careers.

[6] Ibid., p. 173.

[7] Ibid., p. 178.

[8] B.H. Chua, 'Conceptualising an East Asian Popular Culture', *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* Vol. 5, No. 2, 2004, p. 203.

[9] K. Iwabuchi (ed.), *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004, p. 9.

Most of the Taiwanese idol dramas incorporate and combine romantic and comedic elements in a distinctive way for the romantic comedy genre. Many of these series' concentrate on family, work, everyday experiences, or life concentrated around celebrities, representing different subgenres such as 'urban romance', 'pink drama' or comedy.

Analysing idol drama, we should take into consideration how the media consumption of Japanese and Korean TV dramas shapes the cultural tastes of Taiwanese youth.

According to Hsiu-Chin Hung, "Japanese and Korean TV dramas and their pop culture as 'cultural others' have become a form of "everydayness" embedded in [Taiwanese] young daily life".[10]

It is worth pointing out that the process seems to be mutually beneficial to the partners involved. Since 2000 many Taiwanese idol productions have become an inspiration for Japanese and Korean dramas (e.g. the Taiwanese drama *Fated to Love You* (*Ming zhong zhu ding wo ai ni* 命中注定我愛你) from 2008 was remade in Korean in 2014 with *Unmyeongcheoreom Neol Saranghae*).

The popularity of idol dramas among young Taiwanese audiences in recent years has attracted the attention of many researchers.[11]

They try to identify the causes of this intra-Asian cultural flow and its interaction in the construction of regional cultural consciousness. As part of the viewing process, the young university audiences in Taiwan acquire knowledge about Japanese and Korean popular youth cultures and their lifestyles. A fundamental factor behind the reason why Japanese and Korean idol dramas have charmed young viewers in Taiwan, is directly linked to Japanophiles (*Harizu* 哈日族) and Koreanophiles (*Hanliu/Hallyu* 韓流).

Japanese and Korean dramas as media commodities evidently reflect ideas of Asian modernisation and an urban aesthetic way of life.[12]

According to Appadurai, they combine three important elements of the postmodern media scene: "the image, the imagined and the imaginary".[13]

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[10] Hsiu-Chin Hung, *Transnational Media Consumption and Cultural Negotiations: Taiwanese Youth Look at Japanese and South Korean Television Dramas*. A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London, http://research.gold.ac.uk/8853/1/MED_PHDHung_2013.pdf. (accessed 19 September 2015).

[11] Fang-Chih Irene Yang, 'Exploring the Politics of Gender, Class, and Ethnicity in Loser-Dog Queen 2 in Taiwan', *The Journal of Popular Culture*, Vol. 46, No. 5, 2013; Sang-Yeon Sung, 'Constructing a New Image Hallyu in Taiwan', *European Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 9 (1), 2013, pp. 25–45; Hsiu-Chin Hung, *Transnational Media Consumption and Cultural Negotiations: Taiwanese Youth Look at Japanese and South Korean Television Dramas*. A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Media and Communications, Goldsmiths, University of London, 2013, http://research.gold.ac.uk/8853/1/MED_PHDHung_2013.pdf. (accessed 19 September 2015); S. Chiou, 'Cultural Imagination: Japanese Trendy Drama in Taiwan', *Envisage: A Journal Book of Chinese Media Studies*, Vol. 1, 2002, pp. 50–67; H-C. Deppman, *Made in Taiwan: an Analysis of Meteor Garden as an East Asian Idol Drama*, C. Berry and Y. Zhu (eds), TV China, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009, pp. 90–110.

[12] According to local news reports in Taiwan, Korean TV dramas are now more widely circulated and distributed than Japanese ones. Younger people prefer Japanese dramas whereas middle-aged women are more likely to stick with Korean ones. I. Ang, 'The Cultural Intimacy of TV Drama', in: K. Iwabuchi (ed.) *Feeling Asian Modernities: Transnational Consumption of Japanese TV Dramas*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2004, pp. 306–307.

[13] A. Appadurai, *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalisation*, London&Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 3.

Focusing on urban romance they depict luxurious lifestyles, beautiful settings, pop idols and the search for individuality and love in a modern consumer society.

Taiwanese idol dramas with their emphasis on love, individual happiness and familial relationships as key themes, appeal to those aged between 18 and 35. Nevertheless if the drama (usually a soap opera) is based on history or a well known family saga, set over 50 or even 100 episodes, more adults will be attracted to them.[14]

From a generic point of view, Taiwanese drama generally seems to be a 'near cousin' of American soap operas and 'younger sister' of Korean and Japanese drama.

Despite a significant global (western) influence and advanced processes of acculturation, Taiwanese dramas vary from American soap operas. However, by overlooking the generic and historical differences between the two, some researchers tend to treat Taiwanese drama as a type of soap opera. Taking into account the specificities of audiences and structures, only prime time dramas (*badian dang* 八點檔) and early *xiangtu ju* (鄉土劇) can be categorized as pure soap operas. The Taiwanese TV series' being broadcast during prime time, generally found success among women (although not working women) and elderly audiences. The age of audiences watching Taiwanese soap operas vary from 40 to 65. However, the 'exaggerated stories' also attract many young people in the 20 to 30 age bracket. Among the most popular are *Two Fathers* (*Liang ge baba* 兩個爸爸) from 2012, and *The Choice of Happiness* (*Xingfu xuanze ti* 幸福 選擇題) from 2013. Performed as a series on daytime television, because of the long-running and open structure, a Taiwanese prime-time soap opera often goes on for years. Taiwanese soap operas commonly portray romantic storylines about the lives of a multitude of characters. Plots are generally sensational and designed to appeal strongly to emotions. In comparison to idol dramas, which are characterised by evident comedic factors and slapstick humour, soap operas encapsulate pure melodramatic attributes. Many of the stories unfold as the episodes are shown. Family life, personal relationships, emotional and moral conflicts make up their central subject matter. Although the overwhelming majority of soap operas stories are composed within a domestic sphere, a broader social context is easy to reconstruct.

In general Taiwanese soap operas are dialogue based, while serialized romantic comedies are more visually portrayed. Though soap operas share with idol dramas similar melodramatic and sentimental aspects, along with strongly stereotypical characters and situations, it is clear that their producers appeal to different audiences.

Likewise, there are distinguishing elements between Taiwanese and Japanese/ Korean idol dramas. Despite the cultural proximity (meta Confucian) and cultural connection with Japan and Korea, they do differ slightly from their transnational prototype. Even if both share the same or similar narratives, the epic and theatrical tradition (of China), as well as similar aesthetic principles (of Japan and Korea), there are still some slightly different interpretations of tradition concerning moral values and ethical order.[15] Leung sygnalised that Confucian values and conservatism are the two main points that make distinctions between Japanese and Taiwanese TV dramas. Conservative tendencies can be seen not only in the quite prudish expression of erotic and sexuality issues, but also in the more evident

[14] Li Jingyi, Chen Yujing, Huang Xinyi 李靜衣, 陳盈靜, 黃馨逸, *The Comparison of Taiwanese Soap Operas and Korean Soap Operas,* 2011, p. 6, http://www.shs.edu.tw/works/essay/2011/11/2011110911515410.pdf (accessed 15 June 2015).

[15] Ch. Leung, L.Y.M., *An Asian Formula? Comparative Reading of Japanese and Korean TV Drama*s, 13th JAMCO Online International Symposium, 2004.

articulation of Confucian ethics. Additionally, elements such as lifestyle, the behavioural pattern of villagers, a promotion of local investment, and language differentiation (ordinary people speaks *Taiyu*, townsfolk – *guoyu*) all denote a Taiwanese specificity.

Faced with the commoditization and globalization of culture, audiences in Taiwan have a potentially free choice of product. According to Gordon Mathews, despite the notion of a "cultural supermarket*"*, Taiwanese audiences feel that they belong to their own national culture. At the same time they consume from the global cultural supermarket, were they can buy Japanese and Korean drama, American soap operas or European romantic comedies and believe (albeit falsely) that they can buy, do, or 'be' anything in the world that they want to.[16] Gordon's conviction that, "we can't have it both ways. We can't have all the world's cultures to choose from and our own"[17] takes into context the particular importance Taiwanese TV audiences' cultural identity.

By articulating views of different audience groups and by representing diverse aesthetic tastes, the Taiwanese *lianxuju* have differentiated into a variety of subcategories like comedy, romantic comedy, romance, crime, and historical drama.

Taiwanese teenagers, housewives, middle-aged and elderly audiences alike, are generally over-exposed to a thematically feminine agenda of love, romance and the family sphere. Viewing these dramas female audiences can identify with, one can learn a lot about an alluring cosmopolitan urban lifestyle infected with consumerist desire.

This is a reason enough to recognise why so many studies on Taiwanese popular culture and world mass media, demonstrate a gender oriented "pattern of cultural construction".[18]

A brief analysis of several lists of Taiwanese drama linked on websites providing information about Asian TV dramas, such as www.dramafever.com, www.sugoideas.com, www.spcnet.tv, and www.gooddrama.net indicates the absolute favouritism given to titles related to love, happiness, family, zodiac, stars, marriage, kings, princes, queens and flowers. This tendency concerns Chinese titles as well as their English version, which often differ from each other. Here are some examples:

Love: Love Contract (*Aiqing heyue*愛情合約); Bump Off Lover (*Aisha*愛殺17; *Love Queen* (*Bianai nüwang*恋愛女王); The Magicians of Love (*Aiqing mofa shi*愛情魔髮師 ;The Spirit of Love (Ai愛); Love together (*Airang women zai yiqi* 愛讓我們在一起; Love You (*Zuihou jueding aishang ni* 醉後決定愛上你) ; Fall In Love With Me (*Aishang liang ge wo*愛上兩個我) ; Love Family (*You ai 1 jiaren*有愛1家人); Love Around (*Zhen ai heibai pei*真愛黑白配); Love SOS (*Aiqing ji zheng shi*愛情急整室) ; Endless Love (*Ai wuxian*愛無限); Love Buffet (*Aisi bai hui*愛似百匯); That love comes (*Huanying ai guanglin*歡迎愛光臨) ;Way Back Into Love (Ai.Huilai愛。回來).

[16] G. Mathews, *Global Culture/Individual Identity. Searching for Home in the Cultural Supermarket*, London: Routledge, 2006.

[17] Ibidem.

[18] Ch. Geraghty, 'Women's Fiction Still? The Study of Soap Opera in Television Studies The Study of Soap Opera', in J. Wasko (ed.), *A Companion to Television,* Blackwell Publishing, 2005, Y. Tsai, 'Cultural Identity in an Era of Globalisation. The Structure and Content of Taiwanese Soap Operas', in J. Tay, G. Turner (eds), *Television Histories in Asia: Issues and Contexts* (*Media, Culture and Social Change in Asia Series*) London: Routledge, 2015; Fang-Chih Irene Yang, 'From Korean Wave to Korean Living: Meteor Garden and the Politics of Love Fantasies in Taiwan', *Korea Observer*, Vol. 43, No. 3, 2012, pp.19–44, http://www.tobiashubinette.se/hallyu_4.pdf (accessed 20 September 2015).

Happiness: The Year of Happiness and Love (*Nayi nian de xingfushiguang*那一年的幸福時光); Happy and Love Forever (*Xingfu yidingqiang*幸福一定強), *Easy Fortune Happy Life* (*Fuqi you ankang*福氣又安康), Sunny Happiness (*Xingfu zui qingtian*幸福最晴天), Happy 300 Days (*Yujian xingfu300 tian* 遇見幸福300天), Happy Michelin Kitchen (*Xingfu san ke xing*幸福三顆星).

Kingdom: *Poor Prince* (*Pinqiong gui gong*貧窮貴公); The Prince Who Turns into a Frog, *Wangzi bian qingwa* 王子變青蛙); Prince and Princess 2 (*Zikanjian er gongzhu* 子看見二公主); My Queen (*Baiquan nüwang*敗犬女王); The Queen of S.O.P (S.O.P nüwang女王); The Queen! (*Nüwangde dansheng*女王的誕生).

Relatives: I, My Brother (*Wo he wo de xiongdi*我和我的兄弟); Two Fathers (*Liangge baba* 兩個爸爸); Golden Dad (*Jin pai laoba*金牌老爸); Kiss Me Mom!(*Ma,qin yixia* 媽，親一下！; Our Mother (*Ama*阿母); Baby Daddy (*Chang bu da de baba* 長不大的爸爸).

The website 'dramafever.com' provides a very useful instrument to grasp the main motifs and strains of the storylines. According to the typology filtered by theme, this website has organised the whole content of Taiwanese drama into such categories as: destiny, twists of fate, first love, love/hate relationships, love triangles, office romances, true love, tough love, jealousy, marriage, arranged marriage, family relationships, parenting, work relationships, food, wealth and money. Supplemented with such topos' and motifs as terminal illness, memory loss, bankruptcy, careers, business profits, separated lovers, revenge, secrets about the birth or identities of characters, extramarital affairs and marriage break-ups, we get a catalogue of motifs specific to romance, romantic comedy, love stories and melodrama.

Critical studies of the content and structures reveal that Taiwanese dramas represent qualities of morality, repetition, intimacy and schematised storyline, cardinal attributes of melodramatic form.[19]

The same generic connotation acknowledge Singer characterisation of contemporary melodrama: "pathos, overwrought or heightened emotion, moral polarization (good vs. evil), non-classical narrative structure (e.g., use of extreme coincidence and "deus ex machine"), and sensationalism (emphasis on action, violence, and thrills).[20]

Facing repeated criticism due to rigid character, over stylisation, over reliance on romantic scenery, sentiments and nostalgic emotions, *lianxuju* step by step conquer Taiwanese TV audience. Its secret lies in narrative and visual apparatus, which are used to construct and support the melodramatic and romantic-comedic format. In narrative terms, the whole structure have dichotomic nature organised around conflict pattern. This binary system facilitate and support process of meaning decrypting, that even uneducated audience can easily grasp the story, categorise the character and understand moral notion. At the same time some participants of high culture, according to the concept of omnivorousness so-called *professionals* (Peterson) because of this kind of simplification exactly choose TV drama for "brain resting".[21]

[19] E. Lozano, A. Singhal, 'Melodramatic Television Serials: Mythical Narratives for Education', *Communications: The European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 18 (1), 1993, p. 116.

[20] B. Singer, *Melodrama and Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 48.

[21] According to the concept of, we observe today a shift from an elite-to-mass status hierarchy to an omnivore-to-univore status hierarchy. It means that the real audience of pop cultural soap operas, Asian dramas etc. may include omnivorousness category (for example high educated class, etc.). See R.A. Peterson, 'Understanding Audience Segmentation: From Elite and Mass to Omnivore and Univore', *Poetics*, Vol. 21, No. 4, 1992, pp. 243–258.

Applying Chen Yanru and Hao Xiaoming proposition[22] to Taiwanese (love) drama, it is already apparent that difference between them and Chinese love-story series is not so great or so relevant. By examining content of many *lianxuju* there are classes of conflict to specify like: conflict between career aspirations and familial duties, conflict between love and betrayal, conflict between arranged marriages, conflict caused by different social and economic status, conflict between different life objectives, conflict reflecting search for independence and filial piety, conflict between past and present caused by memory lost.

In my opinion Taiwanese drama as a form of imaginary reality embodies several characteristics of a fairy tale (or within larger category – folktale except fable). Although Lozano & Singhal[23] argue that this kind of drama has mythical character, and Yean Tsai[24] try do apply Propp's theoretical proposition[25], fairy tale convention seems to be more useful and precise to categorise Taiwanese idol drama and prime time drama.

Despite of evident lack of magical (fairy) elements as the feature by which fairy tales can be distinguished from other sorts of folktales[26] another constitutive elements like: schematic construction of fictional events, motifs and characters (mostly stylised), victory of love and justice, triumph of good over evil, happy ending – are still present. It is also worth remembering, that due to diachronic and cross-cultural transmission many fairy tales are recreated, rewritten and became the palimpsest for another texts.

Like a myth, fairy tales "transcends any of its particular versions; in other words it is a story matrix from witch different narrations can be generated."[27]

Taiwanese drama is just one of the narrative form which employs old tales – pattern of Cinderella (*Fated to Love You, Autumn Concerto*, *Xia yidian, xingfu*下一站，幸福); Big Red Ridding Hood (*Because of you or Fairy Tale Under the Starlight*, *Xingguang xia de tonghua* 星光下的童話); Sleeping Beauty (*Queen of S.O.P*) ; The Frog King (The Prince Who Turns into a Frog); The Swineheard (*Boysitter*, *Qiao mo nü qiang tou hun* 俏摩女搶頭婚). According to Lozano this kind of (melodramatic) series is very flexible syntagmatically, and highly structured paradigmally.[28]

It means that the narrative paradigm of *lianxuju* related to (fairy) tale is universal, whereas its syntagmatic code is regional (Taiwanese). At the paradigmatic level *lianxuju* is embodied with all the quality mentioned above. At the syntagmatic level traditional values and elements representing Taiwanese reality, distinguish it from rest of romances, soap operas, melodramas and romantic comedies produced in America or Europe. Articulating tension between Confucian virtues and the modern values of individual emancipation,

[22] See Chen Yanru, Hao Xiaoming (1997/8-8), Conflict Resolution in Love Triangles: Perspectives Offered by Chinese TV Dramas', *Intercultural Communication Studies*, VII: 1., http://web.uri.edu/iaics/files/08-Chen-Yanru-Hao-Xiaoming.pdf (accessed 15.09.2015).

[23] Lozano, Singhal, 'Melodramatic Television...', p. 116.

[24] Yean Tsai, 'Cultural Identity in the Era of Globalization: the Structure and Content of Taiwanese Soap Operas', in G. Wang, J. Servaes, A. Goonasekera (eds), *The New Communications Landscape: Demystifying Media Globalization*, London: Routledge, 2000, p. 182.

[25] Yean Tsai have selected and reviewed 14 *xiangtuju* and *lishiju* (歷史劇)on theoretical basis of Propp's *Morfology of the Folktale*. Propp used his method to analyse Russian folktales, included fairy tales and fables.

[26] S.S. Jones, *The Fairy Tale: The Magic Mirror of the Imagination*, London: Routledge, 2002, p. 8.

[27] Lozano, Singhal, 'Melodramatic Television...', p. 116.

[28] Ibid., pp. 115–128.

Taiwanese drama de facto reflect mixture of old and new ideas. Among large number of images, which are ideologically supported by Confucian cultural values, representation of traditional concept of community and family, gender and elders status is dominating. Many Taiwanese drama retell the story preserving model of obedient wife or women, which sacrifice their own interests for the sake of their husband, partner or family (*Fated to Love, Autumn Concerto*, *Sunny Happiness*). There are also many which express traditional views on marriage, social hierarchy in workplace, parenting, especially manifesting idea of filial piety or *yuanfen* 緣分. It is interesting that the concept of destiny *yuanfen* originating from Buddhist philosophy plays leading role not only in all melodramas, but also in many comedic oriented idol dramas. Though routinely it is associated with romantic love and "written in the stars" (*tiansheng yi dui* 天生一對) happy marriage, traditional connotation to *yuanfen* – invisible force intertwining individual fate still retains (*You're My Destiny*, *Autumn Concerto*, *Just you* (*Jiu shi yao ni ai shang wo* 就是要你愛上我). I would argue, that *yuanfen* perform hidden function of magical helper (donor), which possesses an extraordinary kind of power and share with *yuanfen* the possibility of transforming the human fate.

At the same time Taiwanese drama (syntagmaticaly) exploit the narrative device to incorporate into the stories modern values, fashionable gadgets, westernised customs and habits, European songs and arts, new slang derived from English or Japanese language.

Despite the binary model constructed to expose the conflict pattern, which allow to juxtapose Taiwanese tradition to all these virtues and attributes reflecting contemporary global, modern and mostly urban life, in my opinion in series praxis operate an trichotomy order. The third category indicate liminality or confusion (in) between value system of tradition and global/postmodern/postcolonial word.

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Reshaping the Tradition: Postpartum Care in Modern Taiwan

Abstract

The modern phenomenon of Taiwanese *Zuo Yuezi* has exceptional features, such as a Chinese Medicinal system background and recent commercialization. After its millennia-lasting history, we may wonder, what is the modern shape of this tradition, and how it impacts on modern life. The purpose of this research is to describe the Taiwan Chinese medical Gynecologists' attitude towards *Zuo Yuezi* tradition, and to describe contemporary *Zuo Yuezi* through their practical knowledge and experience. Questionnaires have been used as a tool in this survey consisting of and including information such as respondents' attitudes to 68 elements of *Zuo Yuezi* and its assignment to four different categories of consideration. Results showed that: 1) *Zuo Yuezi* is considered as very important as contributing to the postpartum mother's health. 2) Transitions in *Zuo Yuezi* manner include: resignation from the traditional restrictions concerning hygiene, like body and hair washing, preferences for the commercial locations and services of Zuo Yuezi Centers for postpartum rest, and a shifting in family members' ways of participation in *Zuo Yuezi*. 3) The impact of western medical education on respondents' attitudes is clearly visible.

Key words: Taiwan, *Zuo Yuezi* 'doing the month', postpartum care, Chinese Medicine

1. Introduction

In human societies throughout history, different kinds of postpartum care for women and offspring have been commonly observed. In Taiwan, traditional postpartum care or *Zuo Yuezi* is still a common practice despite industrialization and westernization (globalization) which has changed the face of Taiwanese society within the last century.

The *Zuo Yuezi* tradition is a conventional type of wisdom for most Taiwanese. It was introduced by immigrants from continental China along with Traditional Chinese medicine, cuisine and other elements of Han culture. Contemporary *Zuo Yuezi* in Taiwan is, however, shifting along with the needs of postpartum women. Regardless of treating it as a rite of passage, traditional nursing methods, diet modification, and the impact of *Zuo Yuezi* on reproductive physiology and woman's health remains unclear.

This traditional postpartum care involves not only parturient women, but also other family members and health care practitioners. Practitioners of Traditional Medicine (Chinese medicine) are usually those, who supervise and support women by prescribing herbs and advice in diet adjustments.

The purpose of this research is to obtain a broader image of contemporary *Zuo Yuezi* tradition in Taiwan. This research tries to answer following questions:

a) What is the character of a *Zuo Yuezi* background?
b) Who and how participate in *Zuo Yuezi*?
c) Which elements are contemporary *Zuo Yuezi* customs composed of?

Literature reviews and questionnaire surveys provide the main methods of this research. The questionnaire survey was conducted in 2011 and 39 professional Traditional Chinese medicine Practitioners were sampled as respondents. The respondents' age ranged between 28 and 64 years. The mean age was 42.3 years. The respondents were divided according to age range into four groups: those aged from 28 to 32, 33 to 42, 43 to 52 and over 52. The group of 33-42 year olds was the most numerous. Among respondents, 69.2% of them were women. The work experience of respondents in the field of Traditional Chinese gynecology ranged between less than one year and thirty five years, with the average experience being around 12.7 years. Almost 60 percent of respondents graduated from a School of Traditional Chinese medicine. The second significant group (33%) was the practitioners educated in the School of Post-baccalaureate Chinese medicine, and only three respondents followed a different path of education and obtained their license through the Special License Qualifying Exam.

2. Traditional Chinese postpartum care of *Zuo Yuezi* in Taiwan

In ancient Chinese tradition confinement was based not just only on medical premises, religious factors were also important. The Confucian *Book of Rites* (禮記) sets the regulations, that are similar to modern *Zuo Yuezi*, and confinement started one month before parturition. Such customs, however, functioned only in rich families, where the woman was not obliged to work, and related taboos were obeyed during this period as well.

2.1. The way of *Zuo Yuezi*

The discourse of *Zuo Yuezi* incorporates many concepts from Traditional Chinese medicine: the rule of polarity in nature (yin-yang theory), the concepts of moods, known through a theory of five phases, and regarding food taboos during the postpartum period, the "hot-cold" differentiation discourse is employed.

The necessity of *Zuo Yuezi* is dictated by the belief that during pregnancy and after delivery, a woman's body is in a state of illness or abnormality (coldness and vacuity). Some authors[1] state, that this specific way of considering pregnancy and parturition through pathological processes is an element of traditional Chinese culture, while others[2] argue that the modern medicalization of postpartum care contributes to this phenomenon.

The tradition of *Zuo Yuezi* is related to certain ritual practices, however during the month of confinement, there are also several rites performed, for instance the rites of the 3rd day, 12th day, name giving, and the rite of cutting fetal hair. The medical purpose of *Zuo Yuezi* is to ease postpartum healing, and to replenish the nutrients consumed during pregnancy and parturition. *Zuo Yuezi* has also the social function of regulating relations between family

[1] F. Dikötter, *Sex, Culture and Modernity in China: Medical Science and the Construction of Sexual Identities in the Early Republican Period,* London: Hurst; 1995, p. 79.

[2] Mu-Lan Lu, 呂木蘭,現代坐月子的女性觀點—以坐月子中心的產婦為例, 國立清華大學碩士論文 [*The Feminist Perspectives of Tso Yuei Tze*], master thesis of National Tsing Hua University, 1998, p. 109.

members. It may also be considered as a rite of passage. It has to be emphasized, that it also involves women's female family members, especially the mother-in-law.

The literature review resulted in identifying 68 elements, which make up an image of traditional *Zuo Yuezi*. These elements may be divided into two categories: behavioral regulations (Table 1) and dietary (Table 2). These categories include both positive and negative (taboo) guidance.

Regarding traditional behavioral adaptations, it is clear, that during the postpartum period the woman is supposed to rest, avoid physical activities, house chores, or even caring for the newborn (however here the guidance is somewhat contradictive). She restrains herself from sexual activity. She must avoid eye fatigue and actively suppress mood swings, e.g. avoid crying. She is not allowed to go out, or even to expose herself to wind or cold. She cannot use electrical fans and air-conditioners, she also must not touch cold water. Water taboo includes bathing, hair washing, hand laundry, or even hand washing. To avoid cold, puerperal woman must wear long sleeves, head coverage and make sure to wrap the abdomen. Tradition advises against colostrum feeding, however breastfeeding itself is promoted by a special diet and use of herbs. The puerperal woman and her clothes are considered "dirty", thus she is not allowed to participate in religious ceremonies, social gatherings or even family life. No one, but the closest family, is allowed to see her during the confinement.

Table 1. *Zuo Yuezi* elements related to lifestyle and social and religious behavior

1	Postpartum women should sit and not recline
2	Postpartum women should lie down and rest a lot
3	Postpartum women should avoid walking
4	Postpartum women should avoid climbing stairs, bending the lumbar spine, squatting, standing
5	Postpartum women should avoid working, e.g. house work
6	Postpartum women should maintain sexual abstinence
7	Postpartum women should avoid mood swings and crying
8	Postpartum women should avoid eye-straining activities such as reading, watching TV, knitting
9	Postpartum women must not be exposed to the wind / drafts, cannot use air conditioning and fans
10	Postpartum women should wear clothing with long sleeves / trousers
11	Postpartum women should wear a head scarf or hat
12	Postpartum women should constrain the abdomen
13	Postpartum women should not wash their hands in cold water
14	Postpartum women should not wash themselves
15	Postpartum women are not allowed to wash hair
16	Postpartum women cannot apply makeup
17	Postpartum women should avoid going out

18	Postpartum women should not expose themselves to sunlight
19	Family members should help them to maintain body cleanliness
20	Postpartum women should care for the newborn themselves
21	Their clothing should be washed and dried in a different place to the clothing of other family members
22	Children cannot walk under postpartum women‘s drying clothes
23	Postpartum women should not eat the meals at the same table as other household members
24	The newborn and the mother shall dwell alone, apart from feeding time
25	No one except close family may enter the rooms of postpartum women
26	Postpartum women cannot enter the kitchen
27	Postpartum women are not allowed to lose weight during *Zuo Yuezi*
28	Postpartum women should start breastfeeding on the third day after birth
29	Postpartum women shall not communicate with people outside of the closest family
30	Postpartum women are not allowed to attend funerals, weddings and other special celebrations
31	Postpartum women are not allowed to go to temples and churches
32	Postpartum women shall not cross other people‘s doorsteps
33	Postpartum women shall not pray or burn incense

Table 2 presents dietary taboos and guidance for postpartum women. Special dietary treatment begins immediately after birth, when the parturient is fed with small amounts of food, usually fried eggs with sesame oil, which in Chinese is called *ya fu*, and in Minnan phonetics *dei-bak* (墊腹/壓腹), and it has the meaning of refilling an emptied abdomen[3]. During the first part of the postpartum period, a woman’s diet is supposed to be light. It helps in excreting lochia, and excess bodily fluids. It includes such products as rice gruel. Food cannot be hard to bite, sour, oily, astringent, or belong to a ‘hot-dry’ category (according to Chinese medicine typology).The postpartum woman shall not drink water, but is supposed to replace it with herbal concoctions. Neither food nor beverages should be cold.

In latter stages of puerperium, the concept of *bu* (補) is applied to arrange a diet, which means to “mend” or “nourish”. Thus, the postpartum woman consumes food rich in nutrients, especially protein, iron, calcium, zinc and vitamins. It includes eggs, fish, shrimps, crabs, mutton, chicken, pig liver, heart, etc., as well as certain herbs, like ginger, *du zhong* (杜仲), and sesame oil. The postpartum diet in the latter stages should provide a high amount of energy, thus there is a very limited group of vegetables and fruits that are allowed. Women consume noodles, dumplings, candied tangerines, etc. One of special feature of the postpartum diet is the use of rice wine for cooking. Along with traditional herbs, alcohol that

[3] Wong Ling-ling, 翁玲玲, 麻油雞之外, 台北; 稻香出版社 [*Besides Sesame Oil Chicken*], Taipei: Dawshiang 1994, p. 37; Shieh,Yu-Ping, 謝玉萍, 金門傳統生育禮俗之探討, 銘傳大學碩士論文 [*A Study on the Traditional Kinmen Birth Custom*], master thesis of Ming Chuan University, 2004, pp. 89–95.

is ingested this way is supposed to ease blood circulation and the absorption of nutrients. The postpartum woman consumes herbal concoctions, which are personalized, to meet the specific needs of each new mother.

Table 2. *Zuo Yuezi* elements related to diet modification

34	Postpartum women immediately after birth must eat *ya fu*
35	Postpartum women should replace water with special drinks
36	Postpartum women should adapt a light diet
37	Postpartum women should eat and drink warm or hot
38	Postpartum women should eat food of a high nutritional value
39	Postpartum women should complement (replete) nutritional deficiencies
40	Postpartum women should use TCM tonics and meals prepared with the use of Chinese herbs
41	Postpartum women should use *Shenghua Tang* (生化湯) decotion
42	Postpartum women should consume *duzhong* (杜仲, Eucommia ulmoides)
43	Postpartum women should eat plenty of mutton
44	Postpartum women should eat more candied tangerine or tangerine peel
45	Postpartum women should eat oily rice
46	Postpartum women should eat more fish
47	Postpartum women should eat more rice gruel
48	Postpartum women should eat foods with red sugar
49	Postpartum women should eat dumplings
50	Postpartum women should eat pasta
51	Postpartum women should eat foods with added ginger
52	Postpartum women should eat chicken with sesame oil, chicken soup, essence of chicken
53	Postpartum women should eat lots of chicken eggs
54	Postpartum women should eat more vegetables
55	Postpartum women should eat more fruit
56	Postpartum women should eat pork heart
57	Postpartum women should consume pork liver
58	Postpartum women should consume pork kidney
59	Postpartum women should eat pork knuckle
60	Postpartum women during the first week should avoid taking meals cooked with the alcohol

61	Postpartum women during the first week should avoid taking meals cooked with sesame oil
62	Postpartum women should not use ginseng
63	Postpartum women should not eat cold dishes
64	Postpartum women should not eat fatty foods
65	Postpartum women should not eat foods that traditionally are considered toxic, such as certain species of fish, duck, goose
66	Postpartum women should not eat hard foods
67	Postpartum women should not consume 'dry-hot' dishes
68	Postpartum women should limit consumption of foods with a sour taste or vinegar added

Traditional *Zuo Yuezi* is not an evidence-based practice, and there is still no sufficient evidence of its positive impact on woman's physiology. The research arguing that the consumption of Chinese herbs *shenghua tang* (生化湯) and *duzhong* (杜仲) during postpartum results in faster uterine involution is still not convincing.[4] Moreover, there are reports of some adverse effects from *Zuo Yuezi* practices. Other research on *shenghua tang* consumption[5] shows that this concoction may have a positive impact on postpartum women in both physical and mental terms, but only when it is administered for one month. Prolonged usage may have an opposite effect.

2.2. Attitude towards guidance of *Zuo Yuezi*

Research in Taiwan suggests that the adherence to *Zuo Yuezi* rules was positively correlated with a lower occurrence of postpartum morbidities.[6]

In Wong's field study in fisherman's villages, she finds that regardless of the economic situation of the family, women try to follow the basic rules of the postpartum rite of passage: confinement, repletion, labor avoidance. She emphasizes the ritual and social aspects of *Zuo Yuezi* suggesting its positive influence on postpartum women's psychology.

Quality of life during *Zuo Yuezi*

Further research[7] explores the influence of the *Zuo Yuezi* discourse on the concept of women's health. The author analyses this influence in three dimensions: avoidance of

[4] M. Ho, T.C. Li and S.Y. Su, 'The Association between Traditional Chinese Dietary and Herbal Therapies and Uterine Involution in Postpartum Women Evidence-Based Complementary and Alternative Medicine', eCAM Volume 2011, Article ID 918291.

[5] P.J. Chang, Y.C. Tseng, C.H. Chuang, Y.C. Chen, W.S. Hsieh, B.S. Hurng, S.J. Lin, & P.C. Chen, 'Use of Sheng-Hua-Tang and Health-related Quality of Life in Postpartum Women: A Population-based Cohort Study in Taiwan', *International Journal of Nursing Studies*, Vol. 47 (1), 2010; pp.13–19.

[6] Huang Chou-Hua, 黃久華,,產婦執行坐月子習俗遵循度與產後健康狀態之相關性研究, 陽明大學碩士論文 [*A Correlational Study on Adherence to Doing Monthly Practices and the Health Status Among Postpartum Woman*], master thesis of National Yang-ming University, 2009, p. 94.

[7] Shu-ling Yang, 楊淑玲, 生育習俗對中老年婦女保健觀念之影響, 高雄醫學大學碩士論文 [*The Influences of Progeniture Convention on Middle-aged and Elderly Women's Health Concepts*], master thesis of Kaohsiung Medical University, 2004, p. 126.

physical and psychological lesion, different locations of postpartum confinement, physical and psychological morbidities caused by failure of realizing *Zuo Yuezi*.

In this research the subjects of the survey were Taiwanese women, who gave birth in the 60's. It clarifies women's attitudes to postpartum taboos and explains the causal relationship between the quality of *Zuo Yuezi* and its health outcomes. Respondents believe, for example, that vision impairment may be a consequence of shedding tears; incorrect posture or excessive labor may cause uterus prolapse; other problems may occur as a result of labor or exposure to wind and cold. The location of *Zuo Yuezi*, according to respondents, is also very important.

Stress and support during the postpartum period

Another aspect of *Zuo Yuezi*[8] is its impact on stress levels, that onset after parturition. Some aspects of postpartum care may ease tension and decrease stress levels. Childbirth and motherhood as a transition stage requires adaptation and rearrangement. Constant supervision, practical help and emotional support from families are essential for a woman in her new role of being a mother. *Zuo Yuezi* is designed to make this support easy to achieve and sustain. It may be also taken as a reward for women's contribution to family continuation.

***Zuo Yuezi* significance for women and families**

Wong illustrated that through the postpartum ritual, the family could re-regulate the relationships between the mother and other family members, especially the mother-in-law. However, due to the changes of modern family structure, the function of familial relationships has declined. The liaison between the daughter-in-law and mother-in-law has weakened, but simultaneously, relations between married woman and their mothers has strengthened and appreciated. Such relations have been analyzed through the context of food.[9] Mothers care for their daughters in the postpartum period. The daughter's reactions were increasing intimacy, nostalgia, and expressions of appreciation.

Taiwanese living conditions

In 2009 the Taiwan population was an estimated 23,016,000.[10] Very low birth rates and an increasing number of children born from foreign (mainly from China and Vietnam) parents is a special feature of the Taiwan population. Taiwan is composed of several ethnic entities: manly immigrants from the coast of China, but also Austronesian people native to Formosa Island.[11] According to the 'World Factbook' of the CIA,[12] Taiwan Han people make up 98% of the total population and the aborigines – 2 %.

[8] S.S. Heh, 'Doing the Month and Social Support', *Fu-Jen Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 2 (2), 2004.

[9] S.F. Tien, 'Mother-Daughter Relationships Expressed in the Food Context of Postpartum Convalescence, Findings From a Preliminary Study', *Journal of Nursing Research*, Vol. 11, 2003, p. 1.

[10] *The Republic of China Yearbook 2010* (electronic publication), Taipei: Government Information Office; 2010, source: http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/contents.htm (accessed 20 May 2011).

[11] *The Republic of China Yearbook 2010* (electronic publication), Taipei: Government Information Office, 2010, source: http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/contents.htm (accessed 20 May 2011).

[12] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2075.html (accessed November 2015).

The population in Taiwan started to grow steadily after the Japanese occupation period,[13] due to control of the mortality rate and a constantly increasing birth rate. After World War II as a result of industrialization and (the decline of birth family structure in Taiwan, family transformed rapidly from extended family toward stem and nuclear family) during the period between the 1950s and 1980s.[14]

The traditional Han culture predominantly influences the Taiwanese family. Nowadays[15] only around 4% of children in Taiwan are born out of marriage, compared to 37% in the USA in 2005.[16] The family planning policy introduced in 1865 resulted in highly effective fertility control. Due to modernization processes, the average marriage age for urban women in Taiwan in the years 1955–1964 was 20.72 (after 'higher' education) and 20.61 (after 'lower' education). These figures rose to 27.61 and 25.06 respectively in the period between years 1995–2004.

According to the same source, the concept of lineage preservation is expressed by the desire to have male offspring, a characteristic in Han culture which is less eminent in higher educated families, and the male-female ratio in 2005 in Taiwan was 1.0312,[17] which is close to natural.

The childbearing age in Taiwan changed rapidly within the last 60 years, as well as the parity rate between males and females In 1953 Taiwan reproduction rates started to decline. The cohort of women aged 25–34 contributed most to fertility rates in 2003, however the number women giving birth in their late thirties is also an important phenomenon.[18]

Women, who are co-residing with parents or parents-in-law are more likely to have their first child shortly after getting married. Another factor contributing to reducing the number of children is a "quantity-quality tradeoff"[19], which may be related to the higher costs of raising and educating children. The constantly decreasing birth rate, e.g. 0.83% in 2009, is an issue of great concern and the main reason for the lower population increase rate, which was 0.21% in the same year.[20]

The results of NAHSIT, a Nutrition and Health Survey carried out in 1993–1996[21] show that mean dietary intakes of vitamin E, iron and calcium in women were not above the recommended values (RDNA). Dietary intakes of vitamin A and ascorbic acid were far higher

[13] E. Tu, C. Jow, V.A. Freedman and D.A.Wolf, 'Kinship and Family Support in Taiwan: A Micro-simulation Approach', *Research on Aging*, Vol. 15, 1993, pp. 465–486.

[14] Chieh Chun Wu, 吳介尊, 日治時代以來臺灣地區疾病轉型模式之探討 長庚大學碩士論文 [*The Epidemiologic Transition in Taiwan, 1906–2003*] master thesis of Chang Gung University, 2006, p. 4.

[15] C.Y. Chu, R. Yu, *Understanding Chinese Families: A Comparative Study of Taiwan and South-east China*, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 66.

[16] S. Lundberg, R.A. Pollak, 'The American Family and Family Economics', *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, American Economic Association, Spring, 21 (2), 2007.

[17] *The Republic of China Yearbook 2010* (electronic publication), Taipei: Government Information Office, source: http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/contents.htm (accessed 20 May 2011).

[18] Chu, Yu, *Understanding...*, p. 66.

[19] Ibid., p. 78.

[20] *Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2010* (electronic publication), Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, R.O.C., source: http://www.cepd.gov.tw/att/0014212/0014212_1.pdf (accessed 20 May 2011).

[21] W. Pan, Y. Chang, J. Chen, S. Wu, M. Kao Tzeng, 'Nutrition and Health Survey in Taiwan (NAHSIT) master thesis of Chang Gung University', 2006, in *Nutritional Sciences Journal* (臺灣營養學會雜誌), Vol. 24 (1), 1999, pp. 11–39.

than the RDNA. Women aged 13–24 and men aged 13-15 had the lowest values in % RDNA of several vitamins and minerals of all age-sex groups. If we consider the iron intake level as an example factor, according to NAHSIT iron deficiency rates for females were around 10.7%. 2.1% of Taiwanese females older than four years displayed clinical symptoms of anemia which may have an impact on their general health status, as well as fertility related issues.

There are factors specific to Taiwanese nutrition, such as a high prevalence of vegans and vegetarians (a cultural factor), postpartum confinement that may result in vitamin D deficiencies[22], and supplementation of Traditional Chinese Medicinal. There are reports on such medicinal utilization during pregnancy and the postpartum period[23]. Chinese herbal medicine was used by 33.6% and 87.7% of pregnant and postpartum Taiwanese women, respectively. The most common medicines used during pregnancy were *An-Tai-Yin* (安胎飲), Pearl powder (珍珠粉) and *Huanglian* (黃連), *Shen-Hua-Tang* (生化湯) and *Si-Wu-Tang* (四物湯) were the most commonly used medicines by postpartum women.

The usage of herbs during pregnancy and the postpartum period was positively correlated with respondents with a higher education background, and was more common for primiparous women.

However, one of the *Zuo Yuezi* related foods is sesame-chicken soup (麻油雞), which is prepared with rice alcohol. The safe use of this dish needs to be taken into consideration. Related research on this topic finds out that alcohol appears in milk[24] after the consumption of "sesame chicken". Other research[25] has concluded that the "consumption of "sesame chicken" affects not only the composition of maternal blood and milk, but also deteriorates lactation performance".

The modern medical care system in Taiwan – NHI

In recent times over 99% of ROC nationals have been covered by the National Health Insurance (NHI) system. The Taiwanese National Health Insurance program provides a quality of health care, which is comparable or even exceeds those in western countries.[26] Life expectancy from birth increased during this period (1965 to 2009) by over ten years.[27]

[22] M. Strand, J. Perry, J. Guo, J. Zhao, C. Janes, 'Doing the Month: Rickets and Post-partum Convalescence in Rural China', *Midwifery*, Vol. 25 (5), pp. 588–596.

[23] C.H. Chuang, P.J. Chang, W.S. Hsieh, Y.J. Tsai, S.J. Lin & P.C. Chen, 'Chinese Herbal Medicine Use in Taiwan During Pregnancy and the Postpartum Period: a Population-based Cohort Study', *International Journal of Nursing Studies,* Vol. 46 (6), 2009, pp. 787–795.

[24] Y. Chien, J. Liu, Y. Huang, C. Hsu, J. Chao J. 2005, 'Alcohol Levels in Chinese Lactating Mothers after the Consumption of an Alcoholic Diet During Postpartum 'Doing-the-month' Ritual', *Alcohol*, Vol. 37 (3), 2005, pp. 143–150.

[25] Y. Chien, Y. Huang, C. Hsu, J.C.J. Chao, J. Liu, 'Maternal Lactation Characteristics after Consumption of an Alcoholic Soup During the Postpartum 'Doing-the-month' Ritual', *Public Health Nutrition,* March 12 (03), 2009, pp. 382–388.

[26] Y.Y. Kuo, 'Cross-National Comparison of Taiwan, Japan, US and UK's Health Insurance System' presented in Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management (APPAM). Singapore Conference1/7-1/9/2009, Asian Social Protection in Comparative Perspective, National University of Singapore, http://www.umdcipe.org/conferences/policy_exchanges/conf_papers/Papers/1301.pdf (accessed 22 June 2011).

[27] *Taiwan Statistical Data Book*, http://www.cepd.gov.tw/att/0014212/0014212_1.pdf (accessed 29 July 2011).

4.1. Chinese medicine in Taiwan

Chinese medicine in Taiwan is the part of a modern health care system– it is covered by the National Health Insurance (NHI) program. It is addressed as a "traditional medicine" to The Committee on Chinese Medicine and Pharmacies (CCMP – 中醫藥委員會) that oversees its practice. As of 2009, Taiwan had 5,290 practitioners and 3,235 institutions of Chinese medicine.

Practitioners of traditional medicine (Chinese medicine) are obliged to pass the National Examination in order to receive a practitioner's license.

4.2. Chinese medical interventions during puerperium

Traditional Chinese gynecology is a clinical discipline specializing in women's physiology, features of pathology and the prevention of gynecological disease with the application of Chinese medical theory. However, historically speaking, the main concerns of Chinese medicine were infectious diseases, and the woman's body was subjected to many cultural restrictions. As result the doctors would not intervene in normal parturition– this was the role of a midwife (接生婆).[28] Only when the life of a mother was in danger, would a medic appear. Thus the original theories and practice of Chinese gynecology were not interested in uncomplicated parturition and postpartum.

4.3. Postpartum care centers

There is a new industry related to and relying on postpartum care in Taiwan, specifically the formation of *Zuo Yuezi* Centers. Postpartum women may choose to rest in such a commercial facility, rather than at home. In 2011, there were 105 Postpartum Nursing Institutions (產後護理之家), known colloquially as *Zuo Yuezi* Centers, in Taiwan[29].

The distribution of these institutions is similar in spatial terms to the urban population density distribution in Taiwan. In 2010 for the registered 194,489 births in Taiwan, the utilization of postpartum care services amounted to 571,971 days. Provided that the average stay was 28 days, it may be estimated that 20,427 postpartum women (more than 10%) choose to use this service. The popularity of this service may explain the rise in number of *Zuo Yuezi* Centers from three in 1996 to 105 in 2011.

Zuo Yuezi centers changed *Zuo Yuezi* traditions, by shifting hygiene standards, and introducing western medical care. The women, who choose to recuperate in a *Zuo Yuezi* Center under the professional care of medical and nursing staff, will ignore many of traditional taboos, and choose from a wide range of activities, including physical exercises or use of a spa.[30]

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[28] A.H. Travis, 'Childbirth in China' in H. Selin, P.K. Stone (eds), *Childbirth Across Cultures. Ideas and Practices of Pregnancy, Childbirth and the Postpartum,* Dordrecht: Springer Science + Business Media B.V., 2009, p. 56.

[29] Departament of Health, Executive Yuan, R.O.C. http://www.doh.gov.tw/DOHS/ (accessed 20 May 2011).

[30] C.P. Huang, *Postpartum Rest and Postpartum Rest Center: A New Industry from Old Customs*, 民俗曲藝 [*Theatre and Folklore*], 2006, pp. 139–174.

5. Reshaping *Zuo Yuezi* in modern Taiwan

5.1. Modern elements of *Zuo Yuezi*

Among the 68 elements of the survey, 66 were considered by at least 25% (N=10) of doctors as being related to a postpartum mother's health, 46 as cultural factors, only three as religious factors, and just two as being related to a newborn's health. Only four elements, the confinement and reduction of social interaction, as well as the taboos of body and hair washing, were considered as cultural.

The most approved elements may be considered as a part of a basic, universal prescription for proper *Zuo Yuezi* in Taiwan. Such elements were mainly concerned with dietary needs and sexual abstinence. There were no elements regarding social activity in this group. A unique feature of *Zuo Yuezi* is that a postpartum woman should actively "avoid mood swings and crying".

Two of the three most disapproved elements concerned taboos related to a lack of cleanliness. It is of contemporary professional opinion, that the woman is allowed to dine with her family, and her clothes are not "dirty". It suggests that modern *Zuo Yuezi* is gradually more and more derived from its cultural context, and is based more on rationalized medical theories. However, the element most disapproved of by the respondents is the separation of the newborn and the mother for a considerable amount of time. Whilst almost all professionals were against this practice, this is still a common occurrence in postpartum care centers.

What is interesting is that 76.9% of respondents disapproved of the body washing taboo, and 71.8% disapproved of the hair washing taboo. These two rules, strictly related to water avoidance taboos, were widely cited in *Zuo Yuezi* related literature. Such changes were documented in Huang's research from 1999.[31] In her thesis, the postpartum women carers restrictively demanded restraint from washing, but respondents were already predisposed to disobey this requirement.

A delay in beginning breastfeeding is another interesting issue. 15.4% of doctors believed that breastfeeding should begin on third day after parturition. The belief that colostrum feeding is a harmful practice and thus accounts for the delay in the beginning of breastfeeding, is common in many Asian cultures.[32] Modern western science, on the contrary, emphasizes the value of colostrum feeding as an important stimulant for a baby's immune system, and as a factor lowering the risk of neo-natal death.[33] Also interesting, is that most respondents considered this taboo as being important for a mother's health. Because there is no evidence that retaining colostrum feeding has any impact on a woman's health, the psychological factor may have the leading role in this case– psychosomatic consequences may have a great impact on a person that breaks this taboo.[34] Different approaches towards

[31] C.H. Huang, *A Correlational Study on Adherence to Doing the Month Practices and Health Status Among Postpartum Woman*, master thesis of National Yang-Ming University, 2003, p. 88.

[32] G. Dixon, 'Colostrum Avoidance and Early Infant Feeding in Asian Societies', *Asia Pacific J Clin Nutr*, No. 1, 1992, pp. 225–229.

[33] K.M. Edmond, C. Zandoh, M.A. Quigley, S. Amenga-Etego, S. Owusu-Agyei and B.R. Kirkwood, 'Delayed Breastfeeding Initiation Increases Risk of Neonatal Mortality', *Pediatrics*, No. 117, 2006, pp. 380–386.

[34] S. Daviau, 'Beliefs, Taboos, Practices and Behaviors Around Birth in Lao PDR', presented to the World Health Organization, 2003, p. 54.

breastfeeding may be considered as a result of two different medical paradigms that impact on Chinese medical Gynecologists, who are molded by education within the "western medicine" paradigm, and by traditional Chinese systems at the same time.

5.2. How to *Zuo Yuezi*?

When "Doing the Month", the pregnant Taiwanese woman, together with her mother and mother-in-law, will decide how the *Zuo Yuezi* should look like. Modern women may seek *Zuo Yuezi* related information from many sources such as books, the internet, the press and Television coverage, but all these sources may be considered as inferior to their elders' records of their own experiences.

The pattern of *Zuo Yuezi* participation has changed with time. Tien[35] conducted research on three groups of Taiwanese woman in different age; in her research, women older than 55 years, mostly took care of their newborn babies by themselves. According to respondents, in contemporary times it is the woman herself who mainly looks after the newborn (100%), however a mother or mother-in-law, as well as a husband will support her. Mothers-in-law or mothers took care of postpartum women who were aged between 35–54 years at the time of Tien's survey. For the youngest puerperal women, besides the care from mothers-in-law (51.7%) and mothers (33.8%), there was also the alternative of opting for a commercial postpartum care provider. This research however, conversely proved that it is the postpartum woman's mother, who is the main carer (100%). It may be estimated, that if the respondents average clinical practice time was 12.7 years, and the average age for the first pregnancy was nearly 30 years (29.4 years in 2003)[36] it means that the respondents were meeting most frequently women who were aged around 43 years or less nowadays. It covered only the youngest subject from Tien's research, as well as a group of woman that had given birth within the last five years since 2011.

There was not one concordant answer concerning the length of *Zuo Yuezi*. The respondents suggested that it should last between 20 and 60 days, with the mean time of *Zuo Yuezi*, calculated at around 37.7 days. The most frequently given value however was 40 days.

Most of respondents also believed that the postpartum period was not the only occasion when *Zuo Yuezi* should be employed. The special treatment and care after a miscarriage, although different in nature from postpartum care, is also called *Zuo Yuezi* and was regarded as advisable by almost all the respondents.

It was very difficult to assess the actual benefits of *Zuo Yuezi* in terms of physiology – this is because *Zuo Yuezi* is almost obligatory in Taiwan, and there was no possibility to run any clinical comparison between those women who participated and those who did not conduct *Zuo Yuezi*. The aspect regarding limited contacts with the outside world presents another difficulty. In this situation, the opinion of experienced Chinese medical Gynecologists is a valuable source of such information. In this survey, the respondents were asked two questions concerning any negative outcomes of improper *Zuo Yuezi*. The first two questions addressed any complaints from the respondent's patients that were related to "bad *Zuo Yuezi*", and the second question concerned the respondents' own opinions regarding this

[35] Sheng-Fang Tien, *The Postpartum Care Change among Taiwanese Women-With an Example of the North Region,* PhD dissertation of National Taiwan University, 2006, p. 119.

[36] T.T. Hsieh, J.D. Liou, J.J. Hsu, L.M. Lo, S.F. Chen, T.H. Hung, 'Advanced Maternal Age and Adverse Perinatal Outcomes in an Asian Population', *Eur J Obstet Gynecol Reprod Biol,* Vol. 148 (1), 2010, pp. 21–26.

issue. Another two subsequent questions were designed to determine the onset time of such ailments and to define "improper *Zuo Yuezi*" itself. For the first two questions, the most frequent outcome of improper *Zuo Yuezi* was the lower back pain (腰酸背痛). Parity at a younger age, and some psychological factors also influence the increased prevalence of backache after pregnancy.[37] Generally speaking, by comparing women's complaints reported by respondents, and the respondents' observations, the professionals emphasized changes in constitution and irregular periods as a negative outcome, while the patients concentrated on headaches and premature ageing as negative consequences of neglecting *Zuo Yuezi* prescriptions. The onset time of *Zuo Yuezi* – related health problems (should they occur), has not been defined precisely, some respondents placed it directly after the postpartum period, whereas some suggested several years later. The so-called "inappropriate *Zuo Yuezi*" and its negative outcomes were defined as *Zuo Yuezi* without a carer, with excessive labor, and exposure to wind and cold. It is also said to affect a woman's subsequent pregnancies and offspring, specifically in that insufficient lactation may weaken the constitution of the next child. Bad *Zuo Yuezi* may be the result of: a lack of carers, excessive labor, exposure to cold and wind, inadequate (insufficient or excessive) nourishment, violation of food taboos or an inadequately short period of confinement. Under such threat of taboo violations, most Taiwanese woman makes efforts to ensure a good *Zuo Yuezi*. If by any chance it is not possible, and a woman has suffered any negative consequences, she only has two ways to improve her health: she may wait until menopause, or she may decide to become pregnant again– after birth she has another chance to rectify her general health. One of the most interesting findings of this study was the fact that 54% of respondents met women who considered *Zuo Yuezi* as a method of regaining health and decided to become pregnant again for the benefits of *Zuo Yuezi*. In such cases, we should consider the health benefits of "*Zuo Yuezi*" as a fertility moderator.

This part may be concluded by a question about the importance of *Zuo Yuezi*. The results show that 85% of respondents considered *Zuo Yuezi* as very important or important, and only 15% stated that for some woman it may not be so important.

Conclusion

This research is a snapshot of current *Zuo Yuezi* postpartum care in Taiwan from the point of view of Chinese medical doctors. Chinese and Taiwanese culture provided the background for the *Zuo Yuezi* tradition, and the reasons for such a practice were the associated benefits for woman's reproductive health and the perceived necessity for cultural continuation. However, the modernization of *Zuo Yuezi* was seen in terms of a limitation of its ritual and social role. This process helped to limit harmful practices and misconceptions, but in the same time simplified this tradition and distanced it from folklore and its cultural background.

A prominent majority of distinguished *Zuo Yuezi* elements were considered to have an impact on postpartum women's health. The widespread and ubiquitous experiences of *Zuo Yuezi* serve as a prophetic indicator for *Zuo Yuezi* treatment remaining important for the future newborn. The taboos of body hygiene, a lack of cleanliness and the practice of confinement as separation from others were all looked upon with disapproval. Furthermore,

[37] R. Russell, F. Reynolds, 'Back Pain, Pregnancy, and Childbirth', *BMJ,* No. 314, 1997, pp. 1062–1062.

most of the contemporarily approved elements are related to diet. In addition to this, *Zuo Yuezi Centers* were said to play an important role in the commercialized postpartum care system in Taiwan.

In its current form, *Zuo Yuezi* in Taiwan will remain a result of ancient tradition, modern culture and pharmaceutical industry involvement and interference. And as such it will remain a fascinating subject for further research in the medical and social sciences.

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Musical Inspirations in Japanese Culture

Abstract

The aim of this article is to picture how Japanese music evolved across the centuries, and how it influenced cultural development in that region. It is a small compendium of knowledge about musical inspirations in Japanese culture from ancient to modern times. It explores fantastic nooks and crannies of the art., full of traditional forms and incredible symbolism. Starting with traditional music, which initiated *gagaku* court music, a most characteristic form for the region, and ending on modern music, this article shows individuals stages of Japanese musical development. The reader learns about how the philosophical and religious systems are connected to the incredibly diverse, exotic culture. We discover the strong impact of Confucianism in how the musical forms emerged. Yet despite significant influences of Chinese music, the Land of the Rising Sun developed its own, individual music style, rich with originality, diversity, and despite such great advances and interest in European music, the cult of the past and traditional music lives on. That makes the Land of the Rising Sun one of a kind.

Key words: music, culture, Japan, tradition, *gagaku,* Confucianism

Musical culture development in Japan can be divided into six or seven periods, beginning with the *Choyey* culture period, dated around 250 BC. The sources are scarce and not much is known about those times. The only sources mention instruments like stone whistles, bells, gongs and plates meant to be hit against each other. The amount of sources increased greatly between the 3rd and 7th century AD when figurines and instruments like the zither and drums with sticks became more common. The main sources were the chronicles in which customs, musical culture and the specific Japanese symbolism were written. The next period saw the emergence of the main musical directions Japan has taken, and also the distinct influence of Chinese music between 671 and 794 AD.[1] At that time the first documented songs appear and the stratum of society responsible for social music emerged. As in China or Vietnam, music was divided into a few types, depending on who played it. Japanese music encompasses a wide set of styles and streams which can be grouped into secular, sacral, court (including *gagaku*), folk, theatrical and popular solo music. Music for grand instrumental groups was called *bugaku* and music for a small band of instruments with flutes and drums was called *gigaku.*[2] Regarding

[1] E. Schneider, *A History of Japanese Music*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973, p. 55.

[2] L. Zielińska, *Gagaku – muzyka dworska Japonii* [Gagaku– Courtly Music of Japan], Vol. 16–17, Toruń: Adam Marszałek, 1997, p. 42.

norms, measurements and particular rules, as well as cosmological properties, the Japanese have taken these values from the Chinese. The case was similar with the tonal system (this of course refers to the Chinese pentatonic system), dance and even the shade of lipstick used by the dancers. Faith had a great role in Japanese musical culture. What they did not borrow from the Chinese, they filled up with various forms of shamanism, especially Shintoism, the faith norms (*kagira*) of which established a base for music of that period.[3]

Japanese music, much like in China, can be divided into 'genres' such as cult, court, folk, chamber and drama. *Gagaku* court music was the most important though, and it has survived into our age. It would be impossible not to mention the very diverse cult music for Shinto and Buddhist ceremonies.

Traditional Japanese music preserved its originality despite a strong Chinese influence, especially in the Heian period and the years preceding it. These influences greatly affected cult forms of music such as 'court' and 'drama'. Japanese musical culture is very rich and diverse, and apart from elementary Chinese music characteristics we can find traces of the old Tunguska and pre-Mongolian culture, even some paleo-Asiatic (Ainu). One should also notice some similarities to Korean, Mongolian, Tibetan and more recent Indian music.[4]

Despite such great diversity, Japan created its own individual music style which can not be mistaken with any other region, and which will become increasingly familiar, the more this article is read.

Traditional Japanese music

Traditional Japanese music is called *hōgaku*, which literally means land music, and spans a plethora of styles and musical directions which emerged on the Japanese archipelago in the two millenia. This rich musical tradition appeared as early as neo-lithic times, during the ceramic *jōmon* period, which is around the 12th – 4th century B.C. We know about this from ceramic crafts made by the people of this time, and also *dōgu* figurines, which depict people and animals. Regarding the musical culture of the time, sources refer to stone whistles and round flutes, and later on *yayoi*, or 'metallophones', and *dōtaku* bells. All evidence points towards the shamanic and cult ritual utilization of said instruments. During the *kofun* period the mid 3rd – 7th century A.D, when great barrows were built and the Yamato country blossomed, clay *honiwa* figurines were made. They are especially interesting, because they were magical ornaments for burial places, and now serve as a source of knowledge about how these people lived, what they did and what they believed in.[5]

One of the most important sources about traditional Japanese music are the poetic descriptions in the *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* chronicles, dated between the 5th and 6th century A.D. *Kojiki* is a book of old events and *Nihonshoki* is a work led by *Toneri Shinnō*, and it is a collection of thirty one scrolls about Japanese mythology and the imperial dynasty, beginning with the legendary emperor Jimmu and ending with the days of the empress Jitō.[6] Since ancient times music has accompanied Shinto and Buddhist rituals, especially during religious celebrations called *matsuri*, organized by temples to gain favour with the gods.

[3] Schneider, *A History of Japanese Music...*, p. 82.

[4] A. Czekanowska, *Kultury muzyczne Azji* [Asian Music Culture], Kraków: Polskie Wydawnictwo Muzyczne, 1981, p. 49.

[5] M. Wesołowska M., *Gagaku. Dzieje i symbolika japońskiej muzyki dworskiej* [Gagaku. The History and Symbolism of Japanese Court Music], Warszawa: Trio, 2012, p. 19.

[6] Shigeo Kishibe, *The Traditional Music of Japan*, Tokyo: Ongaki No Tomo Sha, 1984, p. 40.

An indispensable element of *matsuri* was the *kagura* show, which literally means 'God's music'. The first mention of this kind of show can be observed in the *Kojiki* chronicles, in the cosmologic myth about the goddess Ame no Uzume and the sun goddess Amaterasu. After some time, as well as the religious *kagura*, two more types of this show emerged[7]. The first is the 'court' *kagura* performed during imperial court celebrations. The other is the 'folk' *kagura*, also called *satokagura,* is performed in the provinces. This type of kagura played a huge role in the development of other musical forms and genres, *gagaku* among others. The core element of *kagura* were songs which, depending on purpose, were divided into *tormino* and *saibara*. *Tormino* were hymns for praise and prayers to the gods, and *saibara* were songs to encourage horses to get moving. *Kagura* is reminiscent of the oldest prayer invocations, *norito,* which were performed *a capella*, in a way resembling recitatives. The orchestra was situated depending on cult requirements, much like in ancient China. The ancient Chinese musical culture contributed holy number cults, measurements, norms, tonal systems and scales.[8]

Another form of traditional Japanese music, which stems from the Buddhist religion and was brought into the Yamato country by Korean missionaries in the 6th century A.D, is the *shōmyō.* They are sacral songs which, content wise, resemble Buddhist hymns and sutras. Despite being reminiscent of *norito* songs they are more mature, which has manifested itself in a more 'crystallized' music theory based on Chinese scales and known as *ritsu* and *ryo* in Japan. Ceremonial *gigaku* dance music was inspired by many, stylistically different Buddhist folk songs, among which the most attention should be paid to *bushi* hymns, *goeika* pilgrimage songs and folk *ondo* songs, often used to accompany dances during the Buddhist all saints ceremony.[9]

Kagura, shōmyō and *gigaku* are forms which played a great role in the creation of the traditional Japanese culture, and most importantly started court *gagaku* music. Equally popular was solo music for the four string lute or *biwa*, which led to the creation of the *biwa gaku* musical genre. Singing with an accompanying lute spans back to ancient times, when it was performed by nomadic monks. The oldest form of this kind is *gakubiwa*, meant for court music *gagaku.*[10]

Development of courtly music – *gagaku* history

The first stage of *gagaku* started in the 5th century. It was a time of extensive contact with the mainland, during which many shows from the Korean peninsula, China and southeast Asia made their way to Japan. They were gradually adopted in accordance with indigenous tastes and incorporated into vocal and dance traditions, which in turn created its own style. Such combinations of song and dance were later called *kuniburi no utamai* and were strongly connected to the cult of gods[11].

Continental music brought into Yamato stemmed from the Korean kingdom of Silla, with which they hand longstanding relations. According to the Nihonshoki chronicle, when

[7] Ibid., p. 44.

[8] R. Garfias, 'Gradual Modifications of the Gagaku Tradition', *Ethnomusicology*, Vol. 4, No. 1, 1960, p. 16–19.

[9] Ibid., p. 19.

[10] N. Jofan, *Dawna kultura Japonii* [The Old Culture of Japan], Warszawa: Państwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1977, p. 168.

[11] Schneider, *A History of Japanese Music...*, p. 78.

emperor *Ingyō* died king Silli paid tribute by sending eighty well-dressed musicians to honour the mourning ceremonies. They were most likely the primary source of continental instruments making their way to Japan. Among them were flutes, four string lutes *biwa* and a few wooden *shakubyōshi* clappers. The chronicles state that the saying of farewell to the dead in the form of song and music goes back many thousands of years. This leads us to believe that *gagaku* is rooted in funeral music.[12]

The next century saw the introduction of Buddhism and the adoption of many Chinese philosophies, as well as medicine, astronomy and music. Along with Buddhism which came from Korea, *shōmyō* (sung and recited sutras), Korean Paekche and Silla kingdom courtly music was introduced into Japanese music. Despite contradicting territorial claims, Korean and Japanese relations were friendly. This allowed cultural exchange and many valuable items like *hichiriki* oboes, Chinese *konghou* harps and various zithers were introduced. Both Buddhism and the musical cultures of Korea and China gained importance in the imperial court of Yamato. A testament to this is the building of the *Shitennōji* temple. The initiator of this endeavour was prince Umayado, who became a great supporter of the Chinese way of thinking and an ardent Buddhist. He claimed that every Buddhist's true virtue is the knowledge of music, not just books and sutras. This is why he initiated the import of musical traditions from the mainland. He is attributed to many pieces from *gagaku*, like the *Bairo* composition, with which the prince tried to predict success or failure in battle. One of the legends says: "Prince *Shōtōku* decided to climb the Shigi mountain, close to Nara. Suddenly he was enchanted by his surroundings and started playing the flute. As he played the first few notes the mountain god Yamagami appeared and started doing a beautiful dance to the rythm of the flute, and when the prince, frightened by the rare sight, decided to turn back the mountain god became cross and showed him its tongue".[13] From that day until now *Somakusha* dancers perform in yellow masks with tongues painted on them. The scenes also require a flute player to resemble the prince.[14]

A great influence on courtly music was the Paekche – Mimashi kingdom, which created the musical dance show *gigaku*, which translates to 'masterful music'[15]. It was quite unheard of in that it contained humour, grotesque, masked ritual dances, acrobatic performances and pantomime, which were meant to illustrate Buddhist truths. Tied to Buddhist philosophy, the shows were staged in temples affording gravitas to ceremonies and celebrations. The main part of the show was the parade (*gyōdō)*, which was meant to praise Buddha through dance and music. The front of the parade was made up of dancers in long nosed masks *(tendu)*, after them came the musicians (with flutes, metal percussion instruments and drums), the singers and then the *shishi no mai* performers (lion dance). The end of the parade was made up of musicians and monks. Their performances were as splendid as their colourfull appearance.[16]

It was thanks to *gagaku* that Japan took on the continental music fashion, which introduced an influx of musicians from Korea, Vietnam, China and India to teach their trade and show their instruments, some of which made their way to trade from the furthest reaches of Asia via 'the Silk Road'. It was a similar scenario for musical forms which were imported from the Korean country of Palhae, situated in Manchuria (7th–10th century), in which a splendid

[12] Wesołowska, *Gagaku...,* pp. 32–33.
[13] Y. Torrimoto, *Gagaku. Jiků wo koeta harukana shirabe*, Tokio, 2007, p. 15.
[14] Ibid., pp. 32–33.
[15] Wesołowska, *Gagaku...*, p. 34.
[16] Ibid., pp. 34–35.

musical culture had risen. After a while the Japanese decided to select which genres they imported and change them to suit their needs. Apart from *gagaku*, secular shows of Chinese origin *sarugaku* were popular. This form was a syncretic blend of dance, acrobatics, juggling, comedy, duels and songs with accompanying instruments. In spite of many genres and forms being imported from the mainland, Japan kept its indigenous folk music and the Korean court music too (*sankangaku),* as well as music of Chinese origin (*tōgaku*).[17]

Without doubt *gagaku* had its roots in the Confucian and Taoist philosophies of the Tang dynasty. The cult of Heaven, the ancient belief of China, had a big impact on music. It must be mentioned that during the Tang dynasty in China, the Chinese emperor made *gagaku* the most important form and decided to collect all the songs and dances from China, ordering them according to origin and purpose. The Chinese used *gagaku* as banquet music and in that form it made its way to Japan.[18]

It was not only the Chinese *togaku* that formed the basis of *gagaku*. Other forms like *rin'yugaku, toragaku* or *kaigaku* had their influence as well. The emergence of many musical forms and styles cannot be easily categorized by region of origin. There were obviously too many of them and some are simply not known. Japan's musical culture can be called a collection, because it copied other styles and changed them to suit Japanese needs, but it would not be fair to call them copies. They are their own forms. By selecting what they perceived as beautiful and getting rid of what they did not like, the Japanese have created something unique – the courtly music *gagaku.*[19]

Gagaku styles and genres

Currently, traditional Japanese music genres are often presented instrumentally. They were a syncretic element of ceremonial art however, and its elements are song, dance and pantomime. Such was the case with *gagaku*, which grew and has survived through to modern times.This music can be divided into four main genres; orchestra music *kangen,* instrumental dance music *bugaku*, indigenous song and dance – *kuniburi no utamai,* and the Heian period *utaimono* songs.[20]

Kangen – instrumental music – has foreign, mostly Chinese instruments. Despite being presented in Chinese (*togaku*) and Korean (*komagaku*) styles, the only remaining style is *togaku.* The orchestra is comprised of three wind instruments (*shō, hichiriki, ryuteki*), which play the main melodic line, creating harmony. Next are two string instruments (*gakusō, biwa),* and three percussion instruments (*skōko, kakko, taiko*). Musicians who played the percussion instruments had a great responsibility. They were conductors and it was them who signalled changes in tempo in rhythmic pieces.[21]

Bugaku instrumental dance music was centered around ceremonial dances accompanied by an instrumental orchestra. Performers were masked depicting humans, animals and demons. The origin of this genre allows a division into *samai* and *umai. Samai* were Indian-Chinese dances of 'the left side' performed with Chinese *tōgaku* music*,* whereas *umai* were dances on 'the right side', of Japanese, Korean and Manchurian origin. The orchestra was a little

[17] Zielińska, *Gagaku – muzyka dworska Japonii...,* p. 25.

[18] E. Schneider, *The Rhythmical Patterns in Gagaku and Bugaku*, Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1954, p. 15.

[19] Zielińska, *Gagaku – muzyka dworska Japonii...*, p. 38.

[20] Kishibe, *The Traditional...*, p. 50.

[21] W. Deal, *Handbook to Life in Medieval and Early Modern Japan*, New York: Fast and File, 2006, pp. 275–276.

different than in *samai*. The *ryuteki* flute is replaced with the *kamabue*, and the percussion section has a Korean *tsuzumi* drum.[22]

Bugaku dances are varied in terms of the meaning and symbolism of the choreography. They are divided into court dances – simple and fluent, military dances – and fast, energetic, children's dances. The former are performed without any extra props and are very fluid in motion. The dance of five Confucian virtues (*goshōraku* and *seigaiha)* can be assigned to this group.

The military dances are the most spectacular though. They are performed in decorative armor and with various props. With regards to the children's dances there are the *kocho*, or butterfly dance, and *karyōbin.* The costumes were very important. Every performer had a different one and all were highly embellished and made from the finest materials in a wide range of colors.

Kuniburi no utamai is the only genre of dance which represents traditional Japanese music. With strong ties to Shinto traditions, this genre consists of old songs and dances which were performed with accompanying traditional Japanese instruments, along with instruments from China, Korea or India. Compared to *bugaku* costumes, the attire of *kuniburi no utamai* was somewhat frugal in ornamentation and embroidery and the style was very simple. This genre has a somewhat ascetic choreography compared to the dynamic, motion-rich *tōgaku,* which gives a feeling of a lack of complexity. The form is very dignified and classy, which makes it look highly refined. This is why it is the most valuable genre of *gagaku*. The content of *kaniburi no utamai* was borrowed from Japanese mythology written down in the *Kojiki* and *Nihonshoki* chronicles, and hence is closely tied to the beliefs and views of the Japanese people.

This genre includes the following songs and dances: ceremonial Shinto *kagurauta* songs, ancient songs and dances known as *kumeuta* and games from the eastern provinces called *azuma asobi*, performed by four dancers in military costumes, a choir and an orchestra. The choir sang Yamato songs or mourning songs *ruika* of Shinto origin, which praised the dead and were only performed during appropriate events; *yuki* and *suki songs,* which were sung during the first harvest of rice after the enthronement of the new emperor.[23]

Utaimono songs are popular Japanese songs partially inspired by continental music, and are divided into two types: *saibara* and *rōei*. The first stems from old Japanese folk songs and the melic poetry *waka*. They were customary songs which eventually made their way into the court. They were accompanied by the *biwa, gagusō, ryuuteki, hichiriki, shō* and *shakubyōshi,*[24]

Sung recitations *rōei* which emerged in the Heian period, were based on Chinese literature recited in Japanese with accompanying instruments. In time, they were adapted to court music.[25]

The differences between different styles of *gagaku* were embellished by the colour of the dancer's clothes as well as the musician's. The Korean brand is predominantly green which refers to prosperity, whereas the Chinese version is in red which symbolizes the hero's happy life.

[22] Wesołowska, *Gagaku*..., p. 56.

[23] R. Tennyson, *Gagaku, the Music and Dances of the Japanese Imperial Household*, New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1959, p. 66.

[24] Wesołowska, *Gagaku*..., pp. 58–59.

[25] R. Tennyson, *Gagaku*..., p. 69.

The meaning of Confucianism in *gagaku* court music

Confucianism, whose creator was Confucius, is one of the philosophical belief systems that shaped the progress of spiritual and social consciousness in China and the south-east Asian countries. This system showed a love of tradition and humanitarianism in the world, taking a permanent place in the thought systems of east Asian people, giving them examples of how to conduct their lives. The master himself said, that only by fulfilling one's responsibilities and following tradition can society be saved and spread peace in the world. This led Confucius to create an ethics system based on ancestor worship, respect for the elderly, loyalty and humanitarian virtues. He paid special attention to the relationship to ancient Heaven and ancestor cult ceremonies and rituals. They were given excellent music, etiquette and spiritual conditioning for the people. The effect was a highly polished ceremony with a rich form and grand atmosphere, all created by Confucius.[26]

As it turns out, by reading *Analects*, Confucius gave the highest esteem to music. He saw it as an incredible art, beautiful and full of grandeur, with a magical power of affecting humans and the world around them – it was a source of aesthetic experiences. He said that music is the link between the *sacrum* and the *profanum*, and believed it to be therapeutic and moving, which allowed a harmony and inner peace of both soul and mind[27]. Confucius was also a music critic and a strict one to boot. He was severely critical of folk-party music and valued dignified, serious, majestic court music. The role music played in Confucius' life can be seen in this part of *Analects:*

> When the Master was in Ch'i, he heard the Shao, and for three months
> did not know the taste of flesh.
> "I did not think'' he said, "that music could have been made so excellent as this".[28]

According to Confucius music was part of the Tao way and one concept of the five elements that make up the world, assigning a five note pentatonic scale. As far as numbers are concerned, they are of great importance in Confucian rituals. This is why the ceremony was performed by a set number of people and items for the ceremony, as well as a specific repertoire. The master's main goal was to cleanse the music of simple, ridiculous and refined forms to give it a lofty, perfect character. Confucius' reforms in court music led to perfecting those forms and gave them strict rules as well. These rules constricted full formal development. As for straying from the norm, Confucius considered this to be a breach of the ethic system and an affront to the ancestors.[29] The rules created by the great philosopher Confucius also played a part in Japanese court music – *gagaku*. Its development was based on the imported Chinese *togaku* music. This can be seen primarily in a very precisely set repertoire, method of playing and placement of musicians in the orchestra[30]. Confucian conservatism can also be observed in etiquette and mutual relations in the musician world, where the set role was not based on skill but rather on age. We could find a couple more

[26] Liu Wu–Chi, *A Short History of Confucian Philosophy*, New York: A Penguin Books, 1955, p. 582.

[27] R. Tennyson, *A Dictionary of Traditional Japanese Musical Instruments: From Prehistory to the Edo Period*, Tokyo: Eideru, 2012, p. 75.

[28] K. Czyżewska-Madajewicz, M.J. Künstler, Z. Tłumski, *Dialogi konfucjańskie* (Lun Yu, The Analects, attrib. to Confucius), Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1976, p. 80.

[29] Liu Wu–Chi, *A Short History...*, pp. 581–582.

[30] Wesołowska, *Gagaku...*, p. 9.

characteristics of Confucianism in traditional Japanese music, but we should not be surprised that Chinese influences were so strong in that region.

Contemporary *gagaku*

The last century saw a time of intensive European and American culture permeation into 'the land of the rising sun'. Interest in classical western music rose so much, that indigenous, traditional court music lost its 'pole position'.[31] A breakthrough came at the end of the last century, when the Japanese went back to their traditional ways and discovered the beauty of their music and culture anew. It also caused the *gagaku* court music to gain grandeur and be played outside of the palace. Now the form was accessible to all, no matter how rich or poor and from what family of origin. This was possible thanks to the Shinto and Buddhist temples and various schools taking over concerts and education. One such institution was *Nihon Gagakuikai*, which comprised of a group of fifteen *gagaku* masters, the leader was called Oshida Yoshihisa. This man was an excellent expert on *gagaku,* his main premise was to spread the word of this musical form to children, youths and adults alike. He organized regular symposiums and invited the best musicians and teachers from the imperial office of *Kunaichō Gakubu.*[32]

Interest in *gagaku* spread among classical music composers, who were enthralled by its unusual sound. They decided to use traditional Japanese instruments and the *ritsu ryo* scales and created great scores fit for modern times, at the same time preserving their old, individual style. This led to another form of modern *gagaku – gendai gagaku.*[33] One of the greatest Japanese composers was Takemitsu Tōru who, on commission from the Japanese National Theatre, composed *Shuteiga,* an orchestra piece, which was a testament to the creator's supreme understanding of Japanese music. The old compositions, dating back centuries, are still at the core of the *gagaku* repertoire and are merely affirmed by contemporary music.[34]

Tōgi Hideki – an outstanding *hichiriki* instrumentalist from the emperor's *Kunaichō Gakubu*, was a descendant and keeper of the musical tradition of the 1,000 year old house *Tōgi*. He popularized gagaku both in his country and abroad by organizing concerts, recitals and by publishing many works on the subject. He was the first to attempt a fusion of classical courtly and popular music. This was done in the 90s and many beautiful arrangements were made, smashing the myth that *gagaku* is anachronistic and cannot be understood by the modern world. The effects were stunning and *gagaku* was at the center of attention once again, and not only in Japan. It became popular with music fans all around the world, and they too could appreciate the true beauty of its sound. This music enchanted with exotic sounds previously unheard of.[35]

Since the beginning of its existence, *gagaku*, so praised and cared for by the emperor's court, did not allow any innovation, because it was decided its current form was ideal and even perfect. This made it so popular around the world and is considered a cornerstone of human cultural heritage. It also served as an inspiration for many contemporary composers who use its tones, melodies and wide array of execution methods.[36]

[31] Kishibe, *The Traditional...*, pp. 27–33.
[32] Y. Torrimoto, *Gagaku. Jiků wo koeta harukana shirabe*, Tokyo 2007, p. 50.
[33] Wesołowska, *Gagaku....*, p. 53.
[34] Kishibe, *The Traditional...*, p. 33.
[35] Tennyson, *Gagaku...*, p. 57.
[36] Czekanowska, *Kultury muzyczne...*, p. 49.

The European musical influence on Japanese music culture

The strong European influence on Japanese music which could be seen as early as the 19th century, did not however result in a loss of traditions. As previously mentioned, this period saw quite a large renaissance in courtly *gagaku* music, which was consolidated by tabulature notation. As it turns out, apart from *gagaku*, other forms such as chamber music, virtuoso music and popular music emerged around that time in the land of the rising sun.[37]

In 1878 the Music Academy was created. The style is modern and the organization resembles something more European. This is where European music was first played and where it started to appear in various concerts and plays. More students became virtuosos of both traditional Japanese and European instruments alike. A great symphonic orchestra was created in Tokyo which to this day takes part in the most prestigious international music festivals. If we listen to the Japanese playing European music, we can hear specific execution details and a great diversity in tone. The European music they play is most intimate and has some content from traditional Japanese music.[38]

In spite of such great interest in European music, the cult of the past and traditional Japanese music lives on, which makes the musical culture of the Land of the Rising Sun one of a kind.

[37] R. Provine, *Garland Encyclopedia of World Music,* Vol. 7: *East Asia: China, Japan and Korea*, Garland, 2001, p. 245.

[38] Czekanowska, *Kultury muzyczne...*, p. 49.

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China and the October ‘56 Events in Poland

Abstract

The situation in Poland and Hungary in 1956 caused resulted in increased political activity within the Communist Party of China. The aim of Mao Zedong’s strategy was for China to attain a significant position within the communist bloc. China supported the changes taking place in Poland with a focus on its own political gains with its relations with the USSR.

Key words: Mao, Khrushchev, Gomulka, October ‘56

The attitude of Chinese executives to the Polish October and more broadly to the whole process of the so-called renewal may be the best illustration of their future tactics. The events in 1956 in Poland, as well as during the whole post-October process, were received with a lively and enthusiastic acceptance by the Chinese leaders.

Years ago, in the volume *Albania między Belgradem, Moskwą i Pekinem*[1] a point was made, regarding the situation in Poland, that Chinese leaders had from the beginning formulated two diametrically different assessments and interpretations – a negative one for the internal use within the party, and a positive one, being presented externally and internationally. With newly acquired knowledge, and armed with previously unknown archival documents, the author no longer retains such a categorical assessment. It was basically correct, but the essence of the matter, as usual, lay in the details. The Chinese leadership circles differed in their evaluation of the events in Poland, and Soviet interference in the internal affairs of the fraternal party. It seems that the key note was defined from the policy adopted by Chairman Mao Zedong. Presumably the official support for the Polish transformation, as well as for Gomulka was to be attributed to his assessments and far-reaching plans.

China with great satisfaction realized that the Polish Communists were fighting only to widen the scope of their autonomy, and not for freedom from a doctrinal orthodoxy. It was then when the Chairman was to declare that “China and Poland were unified, without even knowing it. It’s a good union, one with which we are satisfied”.[2]

Returning to strict political leadership Wladyslaw Gomulka, the ex-secretary general of the Polish Workers’ Party, who, was accused of rightist-nationalistic deviations, had been removed from his position on Stalin’s inspiration, and shortly after placed under house

[1] W.J. Dziak, *Albania między Belgradem, Moskwą i Pekinem* [Albania between Belgrade, Moscow and Beijing], Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1991.

[2] R. Terrill, *Mao. Biografia* [Mao. A Biography], Warszawa: Iskry, 2001, p. 288.

arrest. But his returning to the rank of First Secretary to the Central Committee of the PUWP greatly excited the Chinese to the highest degree. Fortunately for Poland, the reaction of the Soviet leadership to such a course of events, as well as the announcement of a forceful solution of the problem turned out to be important and crucial for China and its leaders. Mao was not indifferent to the issue should Khrushchev, returning to the old Stalinist methods of leadership in the socialist bloc, subdue an unruly ally by a military invasion, or seek other ways to solve the emerging contradictions among these countries.

In light of the disclosed Polish documents it seems indisputable that during September–October 1956 Mao and the other Chinese leaders, indoctrinated by Khrushchev and his immediate acolytes were convinced that Gomulka was a right-wing usurper ready to deny obedience to Moscow. In subsequent letters addressed directly to Mao and the CPC Central Committee, Moscow informed Beijing that Gomulka was pushing for a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and an ostentatious limitation of the Soviet influence in the country, which was a "clear action in favour of imperialism". The charges were serious and the Chinese leaders, including Chairman Mao, tended to support the Soviet invasion of Poland. On the 20th October 1956, in a conversation with the Soviet Ambassador in Beijing, Mao supposedly said: "If the conditions become such that you will need to enter Poland with the Soviet army, you are free to do it".[3]

According to Edgar Snow's reports, the Moscow generals were strongly supported by the Chinese military with Defense Minister, Marshal Peng Dehuai, and that "was supposed to cool down the Polish revisionists".[4] Meanwhile, between the 18th and 22nd October the CPC (Central Committee Political Bureau) was literally flooded with information from Moscow, which in a simplified, schematic, and sometimes intentionally false way created the situation for the PUWP in the Polish state and society. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet Union dated October 18th, addressed also to the Central Committees of the fraternal parties, also certainly including the Chinese Party, the Soviets sought to "draw their comrades' attention to the fact that the situation in Poland raises serious apprehension in connection with the special meaning of Poland's position for the socialistic camp, particularly for the Soviet Union". These words were intended to communicate a real threat from Poland's exit from the Warsaw Pact, which, as we know, was completely far from the truth.[5]

The most significant point of these attacks was that the Soviet comrades did not approve the program of the VIII Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee and negatively assessed the transformation in Poland. The Chinese party and its leader Mao Zedong, having received "comprehensive" information from the Chinese embassy in Warsaw, came to the conclusion that Khrushchev and the CPSU had both wrongly diagnosed the situation in the PUWP elites, as well as the new party leader, Władysław Gomułka. According to information recently disclosed by Chinese historians, the actions taken by the Polish government against the workers' strikes were considered as a sign of "serious bureaucracy", which inevitably

[3] An excerpt from the conversation between Deng Xiaoping and F. Kozlov regarding the situation in Poland and Hungary in autumn 1956, PUWP Archives of Modern History Documentation, 2509 K. 19–21, p. 3.

[4] E. Snow, *China, Russia and the USA*, New York: Marzani & Munsell, 1962, p. 648; see also V. Micunovic, *Dziennik moskiewski 1936* [A Moscow Diary 1936] Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza NOVA, 1988, p. 142.

[5] A. Paczkowski (ed.), *Centrum władzy w Polsce 1948–1970* [Center of Power in Poland 1948–1970], Warszawa: ISP PAN, 2003.

justified the protests and Gomulka's attempts to reform socialism, and thereby contributed to a diametrically different assessment of the events in Poznań and tensions in Poland. The new stance, favourable for Poland, was taken on the night of the 21st October by China's highest leaders: Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, Deng Xiaoping, Peng Zhen, Lu Dingyi, Hu Qiaomu, Li Fuchun, Peng Dehuai. Wang Jiaxiang, Kang Sheng, Li Weihan, Bo Yibo and Li Xiannian.[6] In view of this situation, the Chinese party leadership asked the Soviet leadership for a revision to their erroneous position. On the night of 20th October at Zhongnanhai, Ambassador Judin was told that if the Soviet army entered Poland, China would officially condemn the Soviet Union, following which he was immediately, on the spot, ordered to call Khrushchev with this information.[7] In response to this, the Chinese delegation was invited to Moscow for talks, with a suggestion that they consider paying a similar visit to Warsaw in order to "persuade their Polish comrades to restrain themselves." On the 23rd October 1956 a delegation of the Communist Party of the China Central Committee consisting of Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping commenced talks at the Kremlin with representatives of the CPSU and the delegation of PUWP. Occasionally they had a stormy course, because Khrushchev still criticised the October transformation in Poland and did not trust Gomulka.

Mao's instructions, given firstly to Liu, subjected the Soviets to criticism because of their "grandly-powered chauvinism" and assumption of a military intervention as a primary solution. Liu, using these proxies, proposed that the Russian leadership with Khrushchev submit a self-critique[8] which had to be a painful affront, given the fact this this method was used previously during the Chinese political campaigns to humiliate their political opponents. Still in December 1956 during a conversation with Stanislaw Kiryluk, the Polish Ambassador in Beijing, Mao stressed that "Soviet comrades had no knowledge of the situation in Poland and were ready to use force, similar to the position taken by their Czech and German comrades." According to Mao's account, when the Chinese delegation with Liu Shaoqi visited Moscow, Khrushchev and the Soviet leadership were convinced of the absolute necessity of the earliest possible military intervention in Poland. The Chinese delegation only anticipated the acceptance of the use of force, but not to a discussion of the problem. However, things went differently[9] because in the face of a firm stance by the Chinese Khrushchev relented, preferring to choose the method of political persuasion and pressure on the new Polish leadership.

In light of the disclosed archival documents one must admit that the Chinese delegation in Moscow did a good job, also in Khrushchev's opinion, whom a few months after these events said to Polish Ambassador in Moscow that "His Chinese comrades gave him some wise counsel regarding the Poles". He cited, among others, the words of Liu Shaoqi," In China there is a worm that after the rain comes out of the ground, spreads out and lies quietly. Squeeze it with a finger in the middle and it will shrink, turn and become very worried; let

[6] Xianzhi Feng, Chongji Jin, *Mao Zedong zhuan 1949–1976*, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 2003, pp. 601–602.

[7] Jung Chang, Jon Halliday, *Mao. The Unknown Story,* London: Jonathan Cape, 2005, p. 421; see also Xianzhi Feng, Chongji Jin, *Mao Zedong...*, pp. 601–602.

[8] Ibidem, p. 421.

[9] Cipher text No. 19477 from Beijing, sent 4 December 1956 by Ambassador S. Kiryluk, p. 3 (a copy of the document in the author's private collections); cipher text No. 17599 from Beijing, sent 1 p.m., 27 October 1956.

go, and it will straighten up again and then calm down. There is no need to bother Poles".[10]

Once the threat of a Soviet intervention in Poland had been averted, the main Chinese leaders – Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yunem and Zhang Wentian, at 2 a.m. that day invited Ambassador Kiryluk to the main building of the CPC Central Committee and for three hours they explained to him the reasons for China's intervention in Moscow in favor of Poland; and most importantly, they wanted to deliver to the new leadership in Warsaw the message of "complete solidarity with the political stance of the PUWP Central Committee and welcomed the economic program resulting from the analysis of the achievements and mistakes occurring over the six year period. In addition, their Chinese comrades explicitly stressed that the Polish way is correct and to endorse it with full confidence." According to Kiryluk's reports, Mao also stressed that "the issue of an autonomy of Polish activities cannot be questioned despite the objections from the CPSU Political Bureau, which would become accustomed to the methods and forms of action that need to be eliminated from the relationships within the camp." Mao also spoke about the remains of grandly-powered chauvinism in the USSR and asked that at the forthcoming meeting of the Soviet and Polish leaders they pave new rules of cooperation between the two parties.[11]

Given such an unequivocal support to the October changes in Poland and personally to Gomulka, Mao simultaneously insisted that the PUWP leadership in Warsaw, whilst taking important political decisions, also take into account the "interests of the whole socialist community", its security and stability. In this context he addressed the Polish authorities to reconsider the justification of the current withdrawal of Soviet troops from Poland and whether such a step would not "undermine the existence of the Warsaw Pact.[12] One cannot let the enemy take advantage of fissures in our camp – supposedly said Mao and he again stressed a full solidarity with the new Polish leadership.

On the day Ambassador Kiryluk sent a sensational cipher text to Warsaw, at the airport in Beijing an unexpected conversation took place between Mieczyslaw Marzec, a member of the Political Bureau of the PUWP Central Committee and also the head of the Department of Light Industry at the PUWP CC who had just completed his mission in China, and Marshal Zhu De, who asked Kiryluk to inform the Polish leadership that the Political Bureau of CPC Central Committee "fully supports the transformation taking place in Poland and, within its capabilities, China will be happy to help Poland".[13] Zhu De's declaration meant something more than just mediation in the dispute or a declaration of solidarity; it meant firm support and assistance. And it was probably read as such in the executive circles of the PUWP. Even in July 1957 in the political report from the Polish Embassy in Beijing sent by ambassador Kiryluk to the Foreign Ministry in Warsaw it was stressed that from the 8th Congress of CPC (September 1956), and after the talks between Mao and Edward Ochab, and especially during the VIII plenum of the Central Committee and the departure of the Chinese delegation to Moscow, "comrade Mao Zedong and other comrades from the leadership expressed their overall approval for the changes taking place in Poland," as the Ambassador had informed in detail earlier in dispatches. "During this period, Comrade Mao Zedong repeatedly asked the ambassador to see him, carrying out long and detailed

[10] A note from the Polish Ambassador in Moscow, PUWP Archives of Modern History Documentation, 2631 K. 195–201. p. 2; Cipher text No. 17599..., pp. 2–3.

[11] Cipher text No. 17599..., pp. 2–3.

[12] Ibid., p. 4.

[13] PUWP Central Committee Archives of Modern History Documentation 254 / K. 2, p. 1.

discussions on the history of the Polish labour movement, achievements and deviations of the past 12 years, and the abnormality that occurred in the party and state relations between the Soviet Union and Poland. Further analysis of the facts still established comrade Mao Zedong's and the CPC Central Committee PB's [belief] about the correctness of the direction taken by the new Political Bureau and the Central Committee of PUWP. Support for the events in Poland was given in parallel with a profound analysis and assessment of the situation in the Soviet Union and the CPSU leadership. Chinese comrades repeatedly stressed the need for methods of persuasion and a skillful polemic in order to overcome the construction of the old style of work in the CPSU leadership and thus influence the implementation of the resolutions of the 20th Congress.[14] On 30th October, at a meeting of the CPC Central Committee Political Bureau, Mao Zedong described the earlier Soviet decision of the military intervention in Poland as "insolent" and "quite wrong".[15]

A peaceful solution to the post-October crisis situation in Poland, as planned by the Chinese, and more importantly – with their significant participation, was an unprecedented event in the current practice of Moscow's relations with its allies in the communist camp. It turned out that the determination of the Chinese party forced the Soviet party and its leadership not only to consult with Beijing on the most important decisions, but also to seek political consensus on certain behaviors. The new situation was both unusual and exceptional, in practice it irretrievably broke the former Soviet monopoly of truth and the binding dogma of the infallibility of the Soviet party. The solution to the Polish issue respecting the Chinese attitude, without an intervention by the USSR and still maintaining the party leadership in Warsaw independent of Moscow, for China meant a successful attempt to break not only the ideological monopoly of Moscow, but also – in one sense – establish a new practice and a new reality in which the CPSU and its leaders were losing their political primacy and an undisputed position. This created a very promising situation for Mao and his far-reaching plans. At this stage of the political game with the USSR it was enough for him to win an equivalent communist superpower status for China, by undermining the importance of Khrushchev as a successor to Stalin and the leader of the socialist world and a move towards playing such a role himself.[16]

"I suppose – says Andrzej Werblan – that their [Chinese] far reaching intention was to force the Soviet Union to share weapons, and for the USSR to help them become equal partners, as well as in a military aspect. The first step was to create a situation in which nothing would happen without their consent. It had not been like that in Stalin's time. Now China decided to exploit the situation and was waiting for an opportunity to capitalise. When the opportunity came – it was the Polish issue".[17]

It is difficult not to agree with this opinion, because the Polish issue occurred in extremely favorable circumstances for the Chinese leaders. Mao decided to capitalize on the situation, by intensifying diplomatic activity and decisively involving China in the trend of changes taking place in the countries of the Eastern bloc. Driven mainly by his own self interests, he insistently sought – and successfully too – to create an image of political reality in which China

[14] A political report of the Polish Embassy in Beijing from 5 July 1957, Archives of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Department VI, Division I, China 074, section 12, folder 94, set 5, p. 18.

[15] Wu Lengxi, *Shinian lunzhan*, Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999, Vol. 1, p. 51.

[16] Chang, Halliday, *Mao...*, pp. 421–422.

[17] 'Daltonista. Z Andrzejem Werblanem o Władysławie Gomułce' [Color Blind. On Wladyslaw Gomulka with Andrzej Werblan], *Res Publica*, 1990, No. 11, p. 34.

would be perceived by the majority of socialist countries as the main spokesman for equal rights and a sole defender of and their sovereignty. The remarkable activities of the Chinese leaders and their pressure on the Soviet leadership led ultimately to the solemn proclamation of a declaration by the Soviet government on 30th October 1956 in Moscow, regarding the basics of development and further strengthening of the friendship and cooperation of the Soviet Union with the other socialist states. The declaration acknowledged that there had been some violations and mistakes in the past that had limited the principle of equality in relations between Socialist states and helped cause unnecessary tensions and disputes. According to the new stance defined by the 20th Congress, the CPSU were committed to the principles of equality for all states and nations. The document, adopted on the inspiration of Beijing, was intended by Mao to sanction the new political order in the countries of the bloc which were created by the events in Poland and Hungary in which Beijing would play a role of an equal partner and co-leader for the whole great family of socialist states.

Documents disclosed years later prove that Mao, keeping up the momentum, proposed that Khrushchev include in the text of the declaration the five principles of peaceful co-existence adopted at the Afro-Asiatic conference in Bandung (May 1955), where China had played an active role. Unfortunately – said Liu Shaoqi years later "Soviet comrades did not agree to it and deleted the principle for peaceful co-existence".[18]

The Chinese initiative was all too clear for Khrushchev, who realized that by making concessions to Mao, in this case, would mean political consent on a wider range of independence for the socialist bloc countries in their external relations, which would weaken the already loosened Soviet control over the allies. Therefore, Ziemowit J. Pietraś is right to emphasize that on the part of China it was "an obvious attempt to define its specific global role, which was not quite in line with the interpretations adopted in the USSR, where it was believed that relations between the socialist countries are of a new type, with the result that the principles of coexistence among them do not apply, especially in the sphere of respect for the sovereignty and equality of participants".[19]

The Soviet refusal did not, however, discourage the Chinese leaders, on the contrary – they would be even more actively manifest in their own impeccable attitude with regard to this issue. This purpose was served, among other things, by giving wide publicity to the People's Republic of China official statement on the USSR government's declaration, a document full of anti-Soviet allusions. It seems that the purpose of both the Soviet declaration and the Chinese statement was to "define new conditions created by the events in Poland"[20], and it also represented the last desperate attempt to prevent the exit of Hungary from the socialist camp.

At this point it is worth considering the attitude of China towards the revolutionary events in Hungary[21]. Throughout October 1956, China (similar to the case of Poland) urged the Soviet leadership to abandon their intervention in Budapest and to continue to seek

[18] 'Rozmowy delegacji polskiej z delegacją Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej, Moskwa, listopad 1960' [The Talks of the Polish Delegation and the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, Moscow, November 1960], *Annex*, 1978, No. 18, p. 122.

[19] Z.J. Pietraś, *Międzynarodowa rola Chin* [The International Role of China], Lublin: UMCS, 1990, p. 118.

[20] Z. Brzezinski, *Jedność czy konflikty* [Unity or Conflicts], London: Odnova, 1964, p. 193.

[21] J.M. Rainer, *Imre Nagy. Biografia polityczna* [Imre Nagy. A Political Biography], Warszawa: ISP PAN, 2003, p. 142.

ways of a peaceful solution to the problem, with the basic assumption that Hungary would remain in the community. Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs also admits that China did not have a consistent view on the issue, sometimes supporting it, whilst criticizing it on other occasions. Finally, during the China – USSR talks in Moscow it was agreed that the Russians would refrain from intervention. However, several hours later after the end of negotiations, Khrushchev, already then on the Moscow airport tarmac, informed Liu Shaoqi that the Soviet leadership had finally decided to intervene.[22] And that was the message that Liu carried back to Beijing.

The indecisiveness of the Chinese in their evaluation of the first phase of the Hungarian events may have stemmed from the ambiguous assessment of Prime Minister Imre Nagy, who at the beginning of 1956 advocated the socialist path of development in Hungary, albeit with a greater internal autonomy, as well as the acceptance of the five principles of peaceful coexistence in external relations, which was consistent with the Chinese aspirations.

Rightly says Ross Terrill, Mao's biographer, that for some time the Chairman "flirted with Hungary".[23] Perhaps this lack of enthusiasm for the actions of the Soviets made China behave in an ostentatiously neutral manner towards and during the fratricidal fights in Hungary, by not granting refuge to the Hungarian communists in its embassy in Budapest. It did not escape the attention of Hungarian the insurgents who quickly spread the enthusiastic news that "the Chinese are with us".[24]

A radical change in China's position took place at the time Hungary, announced its neutrality, and exited the Warsaw Pact. The case of Hungary was treated as a special one related to the decision of the political leaders in Budapest to exclude their country from the camp, and the inability of the Hungarian communists to regain control of the situation all by themselves.

The stance of the Chinese was a surprise to Poland and the new Gomulka team, but the Chinese government, justifying its attitude, tried at the same time to argue that – as put diplomatically by the then ambassador of PRC in Warsaw in an interview with Polish Deputy Foreign Minister Marian Naszkowski – "what is occurring in Poland is fundamentally different to the situation in Hungary. In the Polish case we see internal issues between the different socialist countries, while in Hungary there is a war between revolutionists and counter-revolutionists".[25]

Due to the fact that the situation in Hungary was different from that in Poland, Mao Zedong, albeit without enthusiasm, accepted the Soviet invasion of Hungary, but opposed a similar solution for Poland. In a special statement the Chinese authorities confirmed that the declaration "corresponds to the wishes of the Chinese party" and even expressed a hope that "the same way would be taken to deal with the divergences that may arise in the future".[26] Still in December 1956 Mao Zedong intentionally emphasized his own great personal satisfaction with the way Wladyslaw Gomulka had conducted the negotiations in Moscow. "In Mao's opinion – writes Kiryluk – The Polish delegation showed political

[22] N.S. Khrushchev, 'Vremya. Lyudi. Vlast. Vospominaniya v 4 knigakh' [Time. People. Power. Reminiscences], 4 vols., Moscow: Moskowskije Novosti, 1999, Vol. 3, p. 51.

[23] Terrill, *Mao...*, p. 289.

[24] W.E. Griffith, *Communism in Europe. Continuity, Change and the Sino-Soviet Dispute*, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1964, Vol. 1, p. 241.

[25] PUWP Central Committee Archives of Modern History Documentation, 2541 K 7, p. 1.

[26] *Trybuna Ludu* [The People's Tribune], 23 November 1956, p. 2.

wisdom, by highlighting the importance of the community and alliance on legitimate grounds, while at the same time offering their Soviet comrades the possibility to withdraw from the their previously assumed wrongful positions".[27]

Let us stress once again that the issue of Poland and its solution helped to legitimize the growing role of China as an equal power (beside the USSR), while facilitating the process of creating the image of China as a political guarantor for the independence and sovereignty of the satellite states of the Soviet Union. Mao realized that the support for the post-October changes in Poland, and personally for Wladyslaw Gomulka, would create a sound platform for political confrontation with Khrushchev regarding the extension of Chinese autonomy concerning relations with Moscow. Hence, the publicly demonstrated sympathy towards changes in Poland and the fostering of Gomulka were part of Mao's great political game with the new leaders in the Kremlin.

However, the support for the Polish transformation and personally for Gomulka was conditional: Mao and the other Chinese leaders clearly stressed that the struggle for the autonomy of the PUWP and the independence of socialist Poland may not lead to a weakening of the socialist camp. Hence the admonition not to withdraw the Soviet troops from Poland, and to come to terms with the intervention in Hungary and "defend the Soviet Union against the attacks of imperialism".[28] "Recognizing the legitimacy of clashing views [...], the leadership of the CPC represents the view – read the political report of the Polish embassy in Beijing – that from the outside, the ideological and political primacy of the Soviet Union and CPSU should be maintained, and that the evaluation of errors cannot shake the position of the Soviet Union and the unity of the socialist countries in the international arena".[29]

Chairman Mao indeed supported the efforts from post-October Poland aiming at a greater sovereignty, as well as the autonomous pursuit of the PUWP in its relations with the CPSU, but at the same time marked the boundaries of support and the scale of its autonomous ambitions. And these boundaries were defined by Chinese strategic and political interests both in confrontation with "American imperialism" and "Soviet hegemony". While Poland was still officially praised, at the same time highly critical opinions were voiced within the Chinese party in the process of the ongoing struggle for a new shape to domestic policy. Already in November 1956, once Mao sent enthusiastic signals of support for Poland, at a closed session of the Central Committee plenum Wladyslaw Gomulka (on a par with Khrushchev and Tito) was mercilessly criticised as a "model representative of the ideological destruction and deviation". "The basic problem for some Eastern Europe countries is that the class struggle was carried out improperly there, so many counter-revolutionaries have not been dealt with, the *proletariat* has not been educated on how to make a distinction between us and the enemy, truth and falsehood, and between idealism and materialism. And now, consuming the fruits, they became burnt".[30] In this way Mao was proving that the realization of Khrushchev's ideological innovations in China would automatically activate the revisionist powers in the party and the counter-revolutionary ones in the state, together with the imitation of the stance taken from the 20th Congress of the CPSU which would

[27] Cipher text No. 19477 from Beijing, sent 4 December 1956 (a copy of the document in author's private collections).

[28] Ibid., p. 3.

[29] A political report of the Polish Embassy in Beijing..., p. 1.

[30] Mao Zedong, *Mao Zedong xuanji. Di wu juan,* Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1977, p. 323.

end like that in Poland and Hungary. Mao made use of the Polish and Hungarian events to achieve his two main strategic objectives: first – to strengthen China's autonomous position in the bloc and get to the position of actual co-leader of the whole community, and secondly – to oppose the stance of the 20th Congress over the Chinese internal scene.

The Chinese leaders, especially Mao, began to evaluate and interpret Khrushchev's new line mainly in terms of its suitability toward their political interests. Therefore, the Chairman appreciated his courage and praised the 20th Congress when he considered useful and politically convenient. At the same time he warned of the consequences of the new Soviet policy over its strength. Officially he would defend Stalin, repeating ad nauseam that 70 percent of his actions were merited and that only 30 percent were errors; actually attacking him ruthlessly. Seemingly an inconsistency, in fact it was a deliberate and thoughtful action. Mao defended Stalin's reputation when it was connected with his self-defense, his style and his model of political leadership. In turn, he attacked Stalin's policy when it resulted in interference of the internal affairs of the Chinese Revolution or a misunderstanding of the aspirations and determination of China to play a more active and an independent role in the international arena.

What else, if not the criticism of Stalin and Stalinism which was highlighting the practices of the "grandly-powered chauvinism of the internal and external policy" of the Soviet Union under Stalin? How to evaluate this negative role of such international communist organizations as the 'Comintern' or 'Cominform' (which in the eyes of Mao were merely obedient tools of Soviet state policy), if not as a denial of the whole Stalinist foreign policy? Mao's anti-Sovietness found an outlet for his attacks on anything Soviet. Suddenly, it turned out that the Soviet experience in the construction and implementation of communism, various solutions, working methods, the style and model of relations with fraternal countries were a burden, an obstacle and a major brake on the Chinese revolution. Let us recall that Mao's anti-Soviet rants on the "Russian chauvinists", "hardline elements", "revisionists" and "conservatives" in fact also concerned the relationship between China and USSR at the time of Stalin's reign, not Khrushchev's, who also courted Mao for support, cherished and flattered him, satisfying Chinese political and prestige ambitions. So why did Mao, an old Chinese nationalist, attack the 20th Congress of the CPSU and its provisions, when it was this congress and the new policy that helped China so much on the path towards independence and greatness? The core of the problems lay in the fact that Mao feared – and rightly so – that the criticism of Stalin would hit indirectly his own position, and therefore his vision of China – vast, powerful, invincible.

Mao could afford open and explicit criticism of the stance taken from the 20th Congress but only in the situation that prevailed amongst most of the political leaders of the communist bloc countries, whom, after events in Poland and the Hungarian uprising felt a real threat, considering the so-called renewal and thaw resulting from the spirit of the 20th Congress as the harbingers of instability, problems and political disorder. Such fears were also shared by a significant part of the Chinese political leadership, but Mao only officially expressed them. Calling those Chinese party activists who supported the stance of the 20th Congress "shaky intra-party elements" or even more contemptuously "little ants" which required even from Mao considerable political courage. After all, the highest representatives of the party and the Chinese state: Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Peng Dehuai, Deng Xiaoping, Zhu De, Bo Yibo and Chen Yun had spoken commendably about the 20th Congress of the CPSU. Would Mao have meant them when he spoke with disgust about "unstable elements within the party"? Certainly yes, because their subsequent political fates and charges formulated against them fully confirm this. Mao's opponents suddenly found themselves in a very awkward situation.

Supporting the decisions of the 20th Congress, after what happened in Poland and Hungary, as well as in North Korea (where a group of opponents of Kim Il Sung, inspired by the new policy of Moscow, attempted to overthrow the Korean Stalin), was neither easy nor reasonable. Defending the previous political positions by Mao's opponents actually became impossible when, quite vaguely, loosely and impersonally he accused many activists of the CPC of maintaining "secret relations with foreign countries" that "undermine relations between the parties and sovereign states". From the context it was clear that he meant the contacts within the Soviet party and its institutions. Let us remember that it was 1956, and hundreds – if not thousands – of the Chinese party activists remained in more or less formalized relations with their Soviet counterparts. Anybody could fall victim of persecution, attacks and accusations. And that was the point. Mao Zedong not for the first time showed that he knew how to intimidate, attack, hypnotise and convince all that anyone could face the executioner's axe one day. So, it would be better for them to stay quiet and take no action against him.

Having disarmed his main opponents morally and politically, the Chairman proceeded to attack the Soviet Union and its political leaders, whilst demonstrating unwavering friendship, cooperation and political alliance. "Do not imagine – he said – that between the communist parties there is no dispute. Are there no disputes in the world? [...] Nowadays between China and the Soviet Union there are some contradictions. The way of thinking and acting of the Russians [...] is different to ours [...]. We implement a different policy to Moscow in the areas such as collectivization, attitude to domestic capitalists and intelligence, and the relationship between agriculture and heavy and light industry, which we implement differently to the Russian's pricing policy on the market at a national scale and so on".[31]

From that time Mao's statements acted like a boomerang that returned the issue of the necessity for China to reject Soviet experience and methods of building communism as incompatible to local conditions, moreover, damaging and inhibiting the rapid economic development of the country.

Mao did not want to break with Moscow. On the contrary, he was keen for cooperation with the Soviets, their help and support for solidarity with Chinese foreign policy. His anti-Sovietism, at that time, was partly a reaction from years of humiliation, intervention and forced servility to Moscow. The death of Stalin, and later the stance of the 20th CPSU Congress made it clear to him that this was the long awaited moment when the Chinese party would be unable to completely free themselves from Soviet tutelage, and even get to the position of an equal partner.

Relations between China and the USSR during Stalin's life could be described as at best cool, and Mao, an unforgiving individual, carefully noted all the humiliations he had suffered from Stalin: the reprimands directed at the Chinese party, the wrong decisions and unfriendly attitude of the Kremlin towards the CPC in its conflict with Guomindang, finally, the numerous examples of anti-Chinese activities in the Soviet Union, such as the repressions of the Chinese people in the cities of Siberia shortly after the Shanghai massacre, i.e. after Chiang Kai-shek broke cooperation with the Communists by killing many of them in April 1927.

At the end of 1956 China apparently felt ready to actively participate in the formulation of global strategy for the world communist movement. Its growing position and external dynamics resulted also in an attempt to demonstrate a different model of economic development and distinct experience in constructing socialism.

[31] Ibid., p. 344.

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The Culture and Policy of the People's Republic of China towards Southeast Asian Countries 1949–1976

Abstract

The aim of the article is the analysis of the Chinese political strategy in 1949–1976.

In the paper People's Republic of China policy toward the Southeast Asia countries in respect of the internal and international political circumstances is presented. Author is focused on the presentation of the main factors having impact on/ influencing the shape of the Chinese policy in two periods: since People's Republic of China Proclamation until Geneva Conference and since Geneva Conference until the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China. Moreover Geneva Conference Accords impact on the policy of People's Republic of China is discussed. Cultural, economic and political situation of the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia countries is highlighted in the paper.

Issue of PRC policy toward Vietnam is emphasized. Observations on the paper lead to the conclusion that Chinese policy is unique in local as well as in global magnitude.

Key words: China, Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Geneva Conference, Chinese diaspora

Since the proclamation of the People's Republic of China (*Zhonghua renmin gongheguo* 中华人民共和国) in 1949 until the present day, the geopolitical, political and economic position of China has deeply changed. China, situated in the southeastern part of the Eurasian continent, is the country of the world's largest population – 1.372 billion approximately (September 2015), a huge territory, of about 9.6 million square kilometers and the third-largest country in land size in the world. Chinese tops the list of the most popular of world languages (with the approximate number of speakers at 2 billion), and remains unbroken for more than a thousand years with state continuity not just regionally but also globally. The leaders of China define their system as socialism with Chinese characteristics, meaning socialism is adapted to Chinese conditions.

From the very beginning Chinese politics and its economy focused on relations with the Soviet Union, United States and the Southeast Asian countries, the region historically influenced by China. During this period various methods and means were employed by China to achieve this objective: of economic, political and military co-operation and pressure. The shape of Chinese policy towards Southeast Asia was decided, in accordance with internal and international circumstances, primarily in terms of geographical location, proximity of neighbours, historical ties, Chinese migrants – *huaqiao* 华侨 and the natural resources of the region.

It has to be mentioned that what Chinese civilization was for the Far East, equates to what Ancient Greek and Roman culture were for Europe, and Chinese characters, an important culture-forming factor, played a role similar to the Latin language in European culture. Until the superpowers expansionism in the 20th century, for over 2000 years the Southeastern countries recognized the suzerainty of the Chinese sovereign, paid tribute and were subordinated to China as the largest, and the most developed country economically and politically in the region. China gave to the neighboring countries an example which operated for centuries, influenced by their political, social, and economic systems as well as by the culture, philosophy (Confucianism, Daoism)[1] and morals and ethics.[2]

After making contact with Vietnam,[3] China started to develop its relationships with Jawa, Sumatra, and the Malayan Peninsula countries. By the end of the second century contemporary Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar and the islands of Indonesia were strongly influenced by China. According to historical records the first encounters between China and Vietnam took place as early as over two thousand years ago. The rulers of China used to treat other countries as certain vassals. Those relationships usually took the following shape: China, being the suzerain, did not engage itself in wars conducted by the vassal states which remained practically independent but did formally accept the supremacy of the Chinese suzerain. These countries were similar in agricultural character and climate, as well as in rice cultivation (staple food), the use of chopsticks, and technical achievement, such as: the use of sluices/water gates/floodgates and irrigation systems. The direction of Chinese politics was also affected by the national factors and Chinese reasons of state.

Until the industrial revolution in the West and colonial expansion, China had remained an unquestionable power, having no equal in Central or Southeast Asia. The traditional domination of the Chinese over its neighbors became a fact.

Until the middle of the XIX century China basically did not maintain diplomatic relations with other countries. Those relations were purely based on a specific tribute system, which contributed significantly to the maintaining of a Sinocentric foreign policy.

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[1] See R. Sławiński (ed.), *Konfucjanizm i jego współczesne interpretacje*, [Confucianism and Its Modern Interpretation] Warszawa: Polska Akademia Nauk, Instytut Kultur Orientalnych i Śródziemnomorskich, 2013; *Shenmin xinyang yu wangao zhengzo. Rujia wenhua de xiandai jiazhi* [Lifetime Beliefs and Policy of the Road of the Emperor. Contemporary Values of the Confucianism Culture], Taibei 2004.

[2] For more details about China's history see R. Sławiński, *Geneza Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej* [Genesis of the PRC], Warszawa: PAN, 1987; Idem, *Historia Chin i Tajwanu* [China and Taiwan History], Warszawa: ASKON, 2002; D. Twichett (ed.), *Cambridge Encyclopedy of China*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991; J.K. Fairbank, *Historia Chin, nowe spojrzenie* [China History, New Review], Gdańsk: Marabut, 1996; B. Ryczyło, I. Grabowska, *Pekin* [Pekin], Warszawa: ASKON, 2012.

[3] In 111 BC Nanyue were incorporated into China for a thousand years, and Guangxi and Guangdong forever. Vietnam has been exposed to more Chinese influences than any other country in Southeast Asia, because the Chinese rule was the longest and has the deepest results. The Chinese patterns in many spheres of life were adopted and the Vietnamese population mixed with the Chinese. During a weakening of the central government in China there were numerous uprisings in Vietnam, and in 1939, was established a Vietnamese dynasty, however Chinese institutions such as law andpublic organizations or habits continued working. See I. Grabowska-Lipińska, *Strategia polityczna Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej wobec krajów Azji Południowo-Wschodniej w latach 1949–1976* [The Political Strategy of the Peoples Republic of China toward the Southeast Asia Countries in 1949–1976], Warszawa: ISP PAN, 1995.

In the middle of the XIX century China itself, for the first time in a few thousand years of history, found itself as a weak and dependent country. The traditional Chinese domination of Southeast Asia was weakened by the colonial conquests of Western powers. China itself became an object of exploitation.

For centuriesChinese society was based on a patriarchal social structure. The basic social unit was a multi-generational family. State power was strictly authoritarian. From historical specifics arose a cult for the unit, together with the traditional and important role of the army. It was implemented on societies that remained under Chinese influence. The determinants of Chinese policy were: historical heritage, which included the geographical proximity of China to the Southeast Asian countries, a political and economic center of the region, and historical experiences – war against Japan, and civil war with Guomindang 中國國民黨, which affected internal and international circumstances.

The analysis of the documented history of the relations between China and the Southeast Asian countries after the Second World War justifies a thesis, in that China dominated over Asia with regard to politics, economy as well as culture and China tried to eliminate any influence of the United States and the Soviet Union upon the region.

After the Second World War China appeared and emerged as a new power,. Furthermore it was the only Asiatic country among the world superpowers that attributed itself the right of an active presence with an enhancement of political, economic, and cultural influences in Southeastern Asia.

The chronological boundaries of the paper were determined by the proclamation of the People's Republic of China in 1949 on one side, and on the other by the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (*Wuchan jieji wenhua da geming* (无产阶级文化大革命), as well as political operations on the Indo-Chinese Peninsula. The most important of these was the Vietnam re-unification, and what is strictly associated, with the end in some part of Chinese politics regarding Southeastern Asia countries.

It has to be emphasized that during the period of the cold war, confrontation between the two superpowers also existed on the discussed territory. Initially China had an alliance with the Soviet Union, and afterwards left the alliance and approached the United States, and what is strictly associated with (the pro-Western) Southeast Asian countries.

Southeast Asia consisted of 10 countries: Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines, which all vary in terms of population, natural resources, tradition and history.

They also differ from each other in terms of national structure. A common feature concerns the presence of a Chinese diaspora in the Southeastern Asia countries, estimated in the discussed period at around 20 million people, however it constitutes a different percentage in some particular countries, and usually plays an important economic and political role. Chinese people throughout the centuries have emigrated to Southeast Asian countries, and therefore this region was the territory most influenced by the Chinese diaspora.

In Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia all trade was basically in the hands of the *huaqiao*. Also in Myanmar, Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia, the Chinese diaspora was engaged mainly in trade and finance, by dominating some branches of light industry, and the clothes, food and tobacco industries. As the position of the Chinese diaspora strengthened it started to have an important impact on the politics of the particular countries.

The most significant impact was observed in Vietnam, and outside of the Southeast Asian countries in Japan and Korea. The presence of Chinese culture in these countries prove that

China was one of the major global centers, however its impact differed in other particular countries. Initially, Chinese foreign policy towards Southeast Asian countries was based on support in armed conflicts, cooperation with neutral countries (Myanmar, Indonesia) and avoiding close relations with the pro-Western countries: Philippines and Indonesia.

On 2nd September 1945 the establishment of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was proclaimed. Vietnam became the first country of the region in which a revolution was successful. At that time in China there was an internal struggle which resulted, four years later, in the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC).

During the first years of the PRC very close co-operation existed with Vietnam. Vietnam received vast Chinese assistance. The PRC established diplomatic relations with the DRV on 16th January 1950, Myanmar in 1949 and Indonesia on 27th March 1950. It has to be emphasized that at the time the Taiwanese government pursued active policies towards the southeast Asian countries and the Chinese diaspora. As a result diplomatic relations with Taiwan were strengthened and Treaties of Friendship were signed by Taiwan, Philippines and Thailand.[4]

The discussed period can be divided into two parts:

1. 1949–1954 – since the PRC proclamation until the Geneva Conference,
2. 1954–1976 – from the Geneva Conference until the end of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China.

During the 1950s Chinese politics in China was based on co-operation with the Soviet Union and East European countries. After the 1950s there was a breach in Chinese and Soviet Union diplomacy and even some common border incidents. At the time there was fighting in Vietnam. China offered Vietnam important economic, military and political support. On Vietnamese territory one could observe a rivalry of influences, that China had against the USSR. Initially China claimed that Vietnam was an example of a people's war and was against a 'peaceful parlay'. The change of the Chinese stance occurred following changes in Chinese foreign policy. A normalization of relations with the United States contributed to support concerning the end of the war in Vietnam, and the signing of the Paris Agreements, as well as ending the fighting in Indochina.

Mao Zedong – was the Chairman of the Communist Party of China (*Zhongguo gongchandang* 中国共产党) Central Committee during the period of the Chinese Republic radicalism. With the capital in Yan'an (延安), in the 1930s he emphasized many times the uniqueness of China's road to communism, and the fact that Marxism was to be adapted to Chinese specifics. It was associated with the fact that the East had its own country model of development, by applying European theories to the Asian reality.[5] However the ideological factor, influencing post-war history, did not play the dominant role in the Chinese policy towards regional countries over the discussed period.

It has to be emphasized that in China the highest level authority was divided into two main factions. The differences between each other basically concerned internal affairs (modelling the development of China) and foreign policy – co-operation with the USSR or with the West, and the problem concerned with resolving the wars in Vietnam, and then in Indochina.

[4] H. Fifield, *The Diplomacy of Southeast Asia 1945–1958*, New York: ULANPRESS, 2012, p. 261.

[5] See Li Zhisui, *Prywatne życie przewodniczącego Mao* [The Private Life of Chairman Mao], Warszawa: Philip Wilson, 1996; http://www.china.org.cn/arts/2011-07/04/content_22917108.htm (accessed 15 September 2015).

At that time Mao Zedong's impact on Chinese policy both internally and regarding foreign affairs was undoubted. An alternative to the winning faction was the pro-Soviet group, which as a result of internal fights within the Chinese leaders group was eliminated. The "serious fight of two lines" was concluded by the death of the Lin Biao in 1971.[6]

Basically during 1949–1954, Chinese political policy was demonstrated by the support of the Communist party in the region, by maintaining close bilateral relations with the DRV and aiming to maintain good relations with neutral countries throughout the region, however between 1957–1966 China adopted a new policy. According to this policy it was decided to develop diplomatic relations with all Southeast Asian countries, reducing the support for the socialist party.

During the period of the eight year 'dirty war' China offered Vietnam economic, military and political support. As the war in Vietnam was conducted in its 'neighborhood', China strongly opposed France's support to the Guomindang army. China was the first country to recognize the DRV on18th January 1950, and on 11th February 1950 with the establishment of the 'Vietnam – China' Friendship Association.

It is hard to estimate the level of the Chinese support for Vietnam, which included weapon delivery, transport of vehicles, training and technical support. After the end of the war in Korea, China delivered tanks, anti-tank guns, anti-aircraft cannon and heavy equipment to Vietnam. Also aid was provided with the training of Vietnamese soldiers and officers and the provision of Chinese military advisors.

On 10th June 1950 a confidential military pact was signed between the two countries, and accordingly China was supposed to provide free arms, near the Vietnam government's Chinese mission.[7] Even the Chinese delegation claimed that the Chinese army had taken part in fighting on the border and also in the famous battle of Dien Bien Phu.

Since 1951 China was the DRV's main trading partner. Vietnam exported mainly food products and wood and from China imported heavy tools, devices and household articles. Ho Chi Minh did not want to appear subordinate to China, however he was learning Yan'an Chinese Martial Arts to practice during periods of intensified terror at the Vietnam communists' meetings taking place on Chinese territories.In 1920 the Partai Komunist Indonesia was created, and after the unsuccessful uprising in 1948 in Madion some leaders

[6] Lin Biao, Marshal of the People's Republic of China, died in September 1971 when a Hawer Siddeley Trident plane, he with his family were aboard, crashed in Mongolia. According to the Chinese government he attempted a coup against Mao Zedong. The events of "the Lin Biao incident" is a source of speculation. Lin Biao and Mao Zedong's wife Jiang Qing were labeled as "Lin Biao and the Jiang Qing Counter-Revolutionary Clique" of the Cultural Revolition. Jiang Qing, Madame Mao, the fourth wife of Mao Zedong married Mao in Yan'an in 1938. She played a major role in the Cultural Revolution, from 1966 as deputy director of the Central Cultural Revolution Group and forming the radical alliance known as the "Gang of Four" (*siren bang*四人帮). In 1969 she gained a seat on the Politbiuro. In 1976, after Mao Zedong's death a fight for authority started between two different fractions: a cultural revolution fraction, led by the widow of Mao Zedong, and Jiang Qing with Kang Sheng and a group of pragmatics led by Deng Xiaoping. Finally the "Gang of Four" was brought to trial and condemned, accused of revolutionism, rightism and counter-revolutionism. The power took a pragmatic viewpoint. Jiang Qing was arrested in 1976. and sentenced to death,,a sentence that was switched to life imprisonment in 1983. She died in 1991. See R. Terrill, *Madame Mao: the White Boned Demon*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999; http://www. britanica.com/topic/Gang-of-Four (accessed 20 September 2015).

[7] *New York Herald Tribune*, 5 December 1950.

found shelter in China. After the Republic proclamation of 2nd November 1949, the United States of Indonesia was recognized by the PRC but diplomatic relations were not established. In 1950 the name of the country was changed to the Indonesian Republic, and later Indonesia stood for "active neutralism". At this time China supported the Indonesian communists; in 1965 Partai Komunist Indonesia had 3 million members and was the biggest communist party in Southeastern Asia.[8]

The PRC also supported the illegal Communist Party of Malaya (created in 1931), where Chinese nationals were also members. In 1948 an English authority banned the Communist Party, and eight years of military conflict started. In 1957 the Malayan Federation was proclaimed as part of the British Commonwealth of Nations. The PRC recognized the Malayan Federation but was not recognized itself in turn by the Malayan Federation.

Close co-operation also joined Chinese communists with communists from Myanmar. The PRC and Myanmar established diplomatic relations in 1949, but Myanmar did not maintain similarly close relations with China. After military incidents an agreement concerning borders was signed in January 1960. Leaders of the Communist Party in the Philippines (Partido Komunista ng Philipinas) also maintained close relations with the CCP.

The Chinese diaspora in Southeastern Asia divided countries because of the PRC and the establishment of the Republic of Taiwan. The important part of emigration was due to the PRC, especially, as it was caused from the fact that the PRC was actively engaged in all emigration affairs/matters. However recognition of the Chinese principle *ius sanguinis* created problems for dual citizenship, and since October 1949 Chinese nationals have lived in Southeast Asian countries as citizens of the PRC, or of Taiwan. Because of the lack of diplomatic relations with particular countries and specifically with Taiwan, they were treated as stateless or as Chinese without citizenship, waiting for citizenship of the country of residence, or just as citizens of the particular country.

The first act to regulate these matters was the signing by China with Myanmar and Indonesia of an agreement whereby dual citizenship was restricted. It was stated that the *huaqiao* have the right to choose citizenship, and those who had chosen citizenship of their country of residence were no longer considered as Chinese citizens. This complicated issue was exacerbated by the size of the Chinese diaspora. For this purpose different criteria was used. For example in Malaysia, even if the Chinese had Malaysian citizenship they were still considered as Chinese. The main reason for the lack of social assimilation was due to the fact that the official religion in this country was Islam. In Thailand they were treated as Chinese if they defined themselves as foreigners, the same applied in the Philippines, where those who were of Chinese origin were also included.[9]

Therefore during the first half of the 1950s Chinese policy towards Southeast Asian countries was based on maintaining close relationships with Vietnam, with support for the

[8] In 1965 in Indonesia a *coup d'etat* took place. The massacres began in October 1965, more than 500,000 people were killed. The purge was to eliminate the Communist Party of the Indonesia. The communists were purged from political, and social life and the Communist Party was banned. Probably more than 1,000,000 peoples were imprisoned at the time; http://www.insideindonesia.org/the-killings-of-1965-66 (accessed 1 October 2015).

[9] **A** new act concerning citizenship was accepted in China during the third session of the 5th National People's Congress, referring to those who accepted citizenship of the different country and would subsequently lose Chinese citizenship. The 5th National People's Congress was in progress from 1978 to 1983. It passed the Constitution of the PRC and the current constitution of the PRC in 1982.

communist party in the region, including fighting against Great Britain in Malaya, France in Indochina, Holland in Indonesia, and the pro-Western governments in the Philippines and Thailand, whilst maintaining good relations with the neutral countries of the region, e.g. Myanmar and Indonesia.

From the middle of the 1950s China introduced new policies – consequently support for communist parties was muted, China stopped criticizing their governments and started trying to establish diplomatic relations. China adopted the *Five Principles* of *Peaceful Coexistence*. These five principles, which included for the first time a Sino-Indian agreement concerning Tibet in April 1954, are: mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and co-operation for mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.[10] The *Five Principles* of *Peaceful Coexistence* were accepted officially as a basis of mutual relations with Myanmar in June 1954.

An important historic event of the 1950s was the Geneva Conference in 1954 where countries discussed the possibility of restoring peace in Indo-China. (8th May–21st July 1954). Chinese participation in the conference resulted in China's recognition in the arena of international politics. At the time Taiwan still had membership in the UN (until 1972), and many countries did not recognize the PRC and maintained diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The battle of Dien Bien Phu started on March 13th, 1954. The Geneva Accords were issued on July 21st, 1954 and set out the following terms:

1. A provisional military demarcation line running approximately along the 17th Parallel,
2. A 3 mile demilitarized zone each side of the demarcation line,
3. French forces to regroup to the south of the line and Viet Minh to the north, with neither zone allowed to join any military alliance or seek military reinforcement,
4. An establishment of an International Control Commission, comprising of Canada, Poland and India (the latter as chair), to monitor the ceasefire. The agreement was signed by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, France, the Peoples Republic of China, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. The State of Vietnam rejected the agreement whilst the United States took note of the ceasefire agreements.

The conference participants were mutually obliged to respect the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and not engage in internal affairs. The purpose of the Geneva Accords on Indo-China was to stop any military action.

"The Final Declaration" provisioned for a general election, to be held by July 1956 to create a unified Vietnamese state. In Laos, the Pathet Lao Army was obliged to leave and move to the Northeastern provinces – Sam Neua and Phong Saly – and Khmer resistance was obliged to become demobilized within 30 days. The Laos government was recognized as the only legal authority. Zhou Enlai concluded the conference results which emphasized Indo-China's significance of neutrality

The United States did not sign "The Final Declaration" of the Geneva Conference, as the American delegate Walter Badal Smith declared that the United States took cognizance of the agreement on the cessation of war and of the first twelve articles of "The Final Declaration".

[10] *Zbiór Dokumentów* [Set/collection of Documents], No. 5, 1954, pp. 1157–1158; http://www.history.com/this-day-in history/geneva-conference-begins-Apr.26, 1954 (accessed 6 October 2105).

At the time China served as a "model" for the countries of the Third World. China stressed that Cambodia and Laos should adopt a neutral foreign policy and establish friendly co-operation with the PRC. The Chinese view stipulated that the only way of solving the conflict was by the implementation of the Geneva Conference.

In 1958 diplomatic relations were established and in 1960 "The Treaty of Friendship" and mutual non-aggression signed. Norodom Sihanouk, the charismatic leader of Cambodia pursued a policy of active neutrality. After Lon Nol's *coup d'etat* in 1970 China broke off diplomatic relations and continued to consider Norodom Sihanouk as the real leader of Cambodia. He, along with his government and the United National Front, had established himself in China as a leader in exile. Finally in 1975 the Khmer Rouge won in Cambodia.

After the passing away of Ho Chi Minh, the differences between China and Vietnam were publicized. During the period of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, especially at the very beginning, relations with other countries were practically frozen, the only exceptions being the Indo-Chinese and Chinese help during the Vietnam (Indochina) War (1964–1973). There are many variations in the numbers given for the value of the China's assistance to Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. The People's Republic of China assisted North Vietnam in their political, military and economic fields. The Vietnamese policy at the time was to keep a "middle of the road'' stance in relations with China and the Soviet Union, both of which were helping Vietnam in its struggle against American intervention.

On January 27th 1973 "The Agreement for Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" (also known as the "Paris Accords") was signed. This ended direct military involvement by the United States. Like the Geneva Agreements it mandated "free and democratic general elections under international supervision" in Vietnam. Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho were awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for their efforts as primary negotiators of the agreement. America's withdrawal brought an end to foreign involvement in the country of Vietnam for the first time in 114 years, since the first incursion by the French in 1858.

The People's Army of Vietnam entered Saigon on April 30th 1975. After Vietnam's reunification in 1975 bilateral relations soured. The end of war did not solve the problems, but only created new conditions.[11] Although the national liberation forces had won in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos and the countries proclaimed themselves as socialist, there remained, however, problems which made the stabilization of the situation in Southeast Asia difficult. These problems included border disputes, the question of national minorities, and the rule of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia.

One of the most complicated problems was the dispute between China, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines over the islands of the South China and East China seas, specifically Paracel Island (Chinese Xisha Qundao (西沙), the Pratas Islands (Chinese Dongsha Qundao 东沙群岛, meaning "Eastern Sandy Archipelago"), the Spratly Island (Chinese Nansha Qundao 南沙群岛) and the Macclesfield Bank (Chinese Zhongsha Qundao 中沙群岛).

Chinese foreign policy analysis lets us conclude that despite the many common features of China and other countries, its characteristics are unique. One can distinguish the main features by determining its role in history and tradition as well as the different western, moral, religious, and political systems. One can hypothesize about the incompatibility of the western theories of international relations, with the tradition and presence of Chinese foreign policy. The difference in Chinese policy is caused by a characteristic mutual

[11] From 1979 to 1990 China and Vietnam fought a prolonged border war.

independence in 'Chinese-Southeastern Asia' as well as with the specifics of the Chinese point of view.

Its contemporary characteristics are impossible to understand without the knowledge of history. The policy was and still is currently connected strictly with Chinese internal affairs subordinated to the needs of the national interests.

The Chinese policies towards the Southeast Asian countries during the years 1949–1976 evolved according to the domestic situation, and external conditioning. However, their basic purpose did not change. In the period discussed, with respect to the changes after the Second World War, Chinese policies undoubtedly achieved successes in terms of development and ensured an important place in the new international order. The policies were characterized by different attitudes towards the discussed region and were caused by historical tradition, the specifics of the relations in Asia together with a change of method in operation depending on the particular conditioning towards certain countries. A different problem occurred from the activities of the communist party in Southeast Asian countries and the Chinese role in these activities.

During the 1950s the PRC pursued a policy of peaceful coexistence, but since the middle of the 1960s during the Cultural Revolution, China's relations with most countries was frozen, except with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. China continued to provide assistance to this country and the DRV which was probably the only country with which China maintained friendly relations at the time. But during this period there existed two Vietnamese states: the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam both with strong close ties to the USA.

At the beginning of the 1970s the situation in the region changed profoundly. The PRC was admitted to the United Nations (1971), the Paris Accords was signed (1973)[12] and the process of normalization of relations between the PRC and USA began.

At the time China aimed to ensure a friendly political environment. China also stopped supporting the leftist partisans in the countries of the region and intended to maintain the correct relationships with legal authorities. Moreover the PRC was interested in the gradual normalization of international bilateral relationships. However at the time, the PRC did not maintain diplomatic relations with the majority of the countries of the region. Relationships were established respectively: with Malaysia (31st May 1974), the Philippines (9th June 1975), and Thailand (1st July 1975). After the establishment of these diplomatic relations economic exchange was improved, especially with Thailand and Singapore. However diplomatic relations with Indonesia came to an end in 1967, but were later re-established in 1991. Diplomatic relations were established with Singapore in 1990, the final country in Southeastern Asia.

The analysis of the Chinese political strategy in the preceding years may also be of help in understanding current Chinese policy, not just towards Southeast Asia, but also on a global scale. It seems that Chinese policies with regards to the characteristics of Southeast Asian countries are more unique than universal and cannot be treated as even a partial model for other countries.

[12] http://www.history.com/this-day-in history/paris-peace-accords-signed (assessed 8 October 2015).

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NGOs versus FBOs: Cooperation or Rivalry? The Case of the Chosen Asian and African Developing Countries

Abstract

On the positive side of global civil societies (NGOs) we could mention for instance the numerous civil initiatives which advance public education and public debate on global affairs. Many NGOs secured greater public support than governments and their officials. Most NGOs also undertook projects to fight for more equitable distribution of planetary resources. But at the same time the models of NGOs activities, growing and shaped by western patterns of economy and culture, were not properly understood and realized in the differentiated cultures of developing countries. This was the case especially at the end of cold war, when growing disappointment with globalization expanded the space for religious renewal. Alongside the erosion of traditional identities and sources of authority, religion was able to furnish the empty space of people's sense of security.In comparison with NGOs, religious social organizations (FBOs) have something qualitatively different to offer, particularly in terms of empowering people, e.g. giving them personal dignity and self-worth.

Key words: civil societies, religious social organizations, history, philosophy, sociology

The conception of civil society in the opinion of philosophers

The term: "societas civilis" was already used by Aristotle (381–322 BC) in his work *Politics*. In his opinion, humanity only comes to full development in terms of the state, because 'the whole' is prior to any partial entity. The individual cannot fully realize its purposes, unless he or she reaches the position of a member of the state.[1] Hence, the people became citizens by virtue of their activity for the sake of political society i.e. the state. Similarly, Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC) induced his fellow countrymen: "Exercise these minds of yours in the best pursuits which consist of promoting the good of government. For nothing on Earth is more agreeable to God... than the assemblies and societies of man' united together by lows, which are called states".[2] According to both philosophers presented above, the citizens – if mentioned at all are the subjects of the state.

[1] Aristotle, 'The Politics: 1280a–1281b' in B. Russel: *A History of Western Philosophy*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959, pp. 184–186.

[2] Marcus Tullius Cicero, *De Re Publica, Book VI,* transl. by M. Plezia, Warszawa: PWN, 2002.

The first description of civil society close to our meaning of this term, appeared as late as the 18th century and was formulated for the first time by Adam Ferguson (1723–1816), in his work *Essay on the History of Civil Society.* In the Scottish philosopher's opinion, civil society was for the first time differentiated from the state and was presented as a society, whose members enjoy freedom thanks to the preservation of civil liberty applied by the state, which also watches the rights of the citizens.[3] Ferguson is also of the opinion that a Republic is the state in which the people, as a collective body, possess the sovereign power. In other words, in a republican state, the supreme power remains in the hands of a collective body of society. Ferguson's cited description of civil society, opens the field to a closer inspection of different forms and aims of NGOs and FBOs. Such kinds of communal organizations could also be also described as voluntary associations or movements, creating trust and solidarity, in order to reach common aims. All these elements, together with common rather, than individual aims, build up the principles of the contemporary NGOs and FBOs. But the present-day civil societies are also a kind of enactment of citizenship and claim rights, but at the same time take responsibility for their actions in the name of their members in a given polity.[4]

The international or global reach of NGOs takes into account not only the geographical dimension, but also the important activities of these organizations, participating in passing laws and solving matters important for citizens on a global scale. According to Scholte, the global character of NGOs maybe revealed in such issues as: climate change, debt crises, HIV/AIDS sickness and other Planetary challenges. The NGOs may also take part in many civil society campaigns, concerning diasporas, sexual minorities and the disabled, but also by helping to protect the rights of simple citizens in times of globalization.[5] We should also mention, that the global links in civil societies activities became possible thanks to world-wide communication, which conducts their operations.

Bearing in mind the opinion of the aforementioned Ferguson citation, the appearance of civil society was strictly connected with the democratic structure of nation states, the citizens of which, conscious of their rights, conclude an agreement or compromise with the government promising loyalty and co-operation, in order to gain its protection for their activities and participation in governmental policy. Hence the importance of civil society stressed in Ferguson's definition, as a basis of agreement and co-operation with the government. The rational structure of a national bureaucratic state as a necessary base of civil society, is also recalled by Max Weber. [6] But are the present day civil or citizens organizations in Developing Countries really founded on the national and rational structure of their states?

The specific character and forms of activity by civil societies in Developing Countries

Most of the 'Southern' countries on our planet have not yet developed the rational, bureaucratic structures of state, nor have the common accepted systems of the basic democratic values have been 'grounded'. The lack of settled, rationalized structures of government in developing countries has its background in the traditional patterns of

[3] A. Ferguson, *An Essay on the History of Civil Society, Section IX–X*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1966, p. 10.

[4] Jan Aarth Scholte, 'Global Civil Society. Opportunity or Obstacle for Democracy?', *Development Dialogue,* No. 49, November 2007, p. 17.

[5] Ibid., p. 19.

[6] Max Weber, *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1978, p. 975.

authority, which dominated in colonial times, and their remanents are still present in contemporary, independent countries of the South. So for instance, instead of rationalized structures of authority, we witness the prerogatives of traditional forms of clientelism as a form of mutual obligation between governments and citizens.[7] Such traditional values and practices are unfavorable for spontaneous civil activity and do not help to develop the mutual responsibility of NGOs and governments for the wellbeing of the citizens.

Talking of NGOs we ought to also mention, that their members (more specifically their activists) – not only in the South are not really representative of the interests of all the citizens of their countries, but mainly towards sections of society, which could be described as "civilized" and feel connected with the NGOs international programs and aims. The rest of society (or the 'have not'), is often described by NGO activists as "deviant" or "uncivil", and are often excluded from consultation over important matters. The lack of popular support for NGOs, especially in developing countries is 'justified' by the position and background of the activists of this organization: they recruit from the "civilized" representatives of the middle classes and they are usually men of a monotheistic faith, using the official language dominating in the country. The same activists, chosen members of society, sometimes tolerate people of lower ranks, mainly of dark skin, confessing to different faiths and using their own language, hence the people regarded as second class citizens.[8]

Besides this group of "tolerated citizens", the accidental interests of civic activists sometimes awaken those regarded as 'sub-human', illegal immigrants, performing the most apparently 'contemptuous' works in the country, or the inhabitants from big city peripheries, constructing their own, parallel worlds.[9] Furthermore contacts with the "excluded" are in most cases combined with the realization of self-interests.

As program based non-profit making organizations, NGOs as well as FBOs do not dispose of their own funds, necessary in the fight with global poverty, injustice and environmental degradation. Most of the funding for NGOs and FBOs comes from private donors, churches or charity organizations, but also from governments, multilateral institutions and multinational corporations.[10] Lorenzo Fioramonti is also of the opinion, that most NGOs activities are based on funds, which are derived from governments and the often personalized 'corporation foundations'. But according to the African proverb: "if you have your hand in another man's pocket, you must move, when he moves".[11] To whose patterns of democracy should the leaders of NGOs refer to? The same problem is emerging on a global scale regarding NGO activity.

Nevertheless, despite all those restrains and limits to NGO activity, the same organization plays a very important role not only on a social level, but also on a political platform. In the face of diminishing economic controls at a national level, as a result multi-national corporate pressure, the national authorities also lose their political importance, which partly goes to NGO structures. In this situation national governments strive for the support of these

[7] *Clientelism* means the informal relations between patron and client in the economic as well as political field.

[8] Jai Sen, 'The Power of Civility', *Development Dialogue*, No. 49, November 2007, p. 58.

[9] Ibid. p. 59.

[10] Löfgren, Thörn, 'Introduction...', p. 6; Fioramonti, 'The Internal Conditions of Global Civil Society...', p. 134.

[11] M. Edwards, D. Hulme, 'Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Non-governmental Organizations', *World Development*, Vol. 24, No. 6, 1996, p. 963.

organizations and readily help them with funding, because co-operation with NGOs may hasten their diminishing legitimization.[12] But the "marriage" between NGOs and national governments, often imposed by the latter, is not advantageous for social organizations like NGOs and FBOs, because it dismisses them from their main programmatic activities which are deemed advantageous for society.

The obstacles of NGOs activity in Developing Countries

In 1980s the optimistic expectation of western social activists in connection with the structure of NGOs in Developing Countries, were viewed as flexible, participatory and democratically organized, as an alternative to dysfunctional and corrupt governments. As this expectation did not become true, the new policy of a neo-liberal economy and liberal democracy saw in NGOs the proper organization that knows the needs of the people and could efficiently implement new projects in their societies. But this expectation was also not fulfilled by NGOs, who were not prepared to implement such projects.[13]

From the beginning of the 21st century, NGOs have also had to cope with the problem of accountability. The rigid conditions imposed by the donors of funds, often deriving from abroad, often made southern NGOs easy objects of pressure in the choice of their aid programs which were not necessarily connected with the needs of local society. This tendency was often criticized by local people, and the southern organizations of NGOs were sometimes described as "neo-colonial representations".[14] Similar opinions were expressed by Alexis Roy in connection with Mali who stated that the civil organizations acting in this country were created by Northern emissaries, which also brought the necessary funds for their activities. In the same country, the total number of NGOs acting in 2006 was estimated at 2,135. In Roy's opinion, this enormous number of NGOs in one country may have been advantageous for the government, sponsors or some of the NGO leaders, but it may also have been connected with the phenomenon of corruption.[15] In the opinions of Kenyan citizens observed during field research between 2004–2008, corruption is not a sporadic feature of NGOs but their daily practice in the form of "institutionalized corruption". The corruption takes many different forms: sometimes it is just the partial use of donation-funds for the salary of the leader of NGOs or his kin's. Anyway, the staff of the NGOs are the highest paid people in the country.[16]

Another, milder form of corruption by NGO activists is in the form of "eating away" the received funds or using them for luxury articles instead channeling them to people in need. In the practice of this organization we could also recognize forms of clientelism or nepotism, which finds its way in the constant growing number of administration staff in NGOs.[17]

The forms of NGO activity could be illustrated shortly by the example of two Kenyan Non-governmental Organizations based on faith FBOs: Church Aid and Church to the People. Both of these organizations are international, faith-based in orientation, represented

[12] Noema Miranda, 'Global Civil Society and Democracy. A Difficult but Unavoidable Task: Vision from the South', *Development Dialogue*, No. 49, November 2007, p. 100.

[13] Matthew Harsh, Paul Mbatia, Wesley Shrum, 'Accountability and Inaction: NGOs and Resource Lodging in Development', *Development and Change*, Vol. 41, No. 2, 2010, pp. 264–265.

[14] P.Y. Opoku-Mensah, D. Lewis, 'Moving Forward Research Agendas on International NGOS: Theory, Agency and Context', *Journal of International Development*, Vol. 18, No. 5, 2006, pp. 665–675.

[15] Alexis Roy, 'Instrumentalization de la 'société civile'', *Alternatives Sud*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010, p. 111.

[16] Harsh, Mbatia, Shrum, *Accountability and Inaction*... p. 264.

[17] Ibid., p. 260.

in several African countries, which focus on a mainly rural community level. Their programs concentrate on aid for children and adults, with special interests in problems of education, health and agriculture. The difference between both organizations lies in the form of the distribution of funds between the local society. The Church Aid works through local community-based organizations, and provides funds directly to those groups; on the other hand, Church to People involves its own, professional staff in the community which selects the individual beneficiaries.[18]

The aforementioned differences in the forms of fund division could lead us to the distinguishing Church Aid as a proper form of social activation and participation in the funding division. But in reality, the result of the selection of beneficiaries is in both organizations rather similar. In the case of Church Aid, the decisions are set up by members of village committees which result in constant conflicts between program staff and the community leaders and in result of the just division of funds are hindered. Similarly, in the Church to People model, the desperately needed shoes for a poor girl, are finally offered to the daughter of local elite parents.[19] The lack of co-ordination but mainly cooperation between the activists of non-governmental organizations and the members of local society, is in most cases the result of specific, differentiated cultural traditions of developing countries in comparison with the national and democratic background of western NGOs.

This difference is, amongst others, stressed by Naomi Hossain about the specifics of cultural customs in India and Bangladesh, countries still resistant to modern change. In both of these countries an unwritten law of etiquette forbids the rudeness of a lower caste representative towards the member of a more 'noble' one. So for instance an older woman in Bangladesh, waiting for a long time in the dispensary for a doctor's consultation, and expressing her dissatisfaction with the lack of accountability of the doctor towards the waiting people, appears to society as a rude person, showing her poor upbringing. In Bangladesh and India it is undeniably rude to complain about the behavior of a higher status person. Failure to pay the "symbolic taxes" of politeness to the powerful is typically taken by elites as insubordination. At the same time the officials are often at pains to protect their delicate status against the rudeness of rural citizens.[20] The aforementioned "rude behavior" of a poor old women in Bangladesh is certainly a kind of rebellion against traditional custom, but at the same time it is only an individual rebellion which cannot be compared with the collective protest by and for the society supported by NGOs. Only organized and engaged citizens may establish new modes of control over public institutions.

The lack of social engagement in the realization of NGO common programs, pave the way for the individual initiatives of chosen activists in developing countries. So for instances, the scholarship research realized in Nigeria between 2007–2008 revealed, that the principal motivation given by NGO workers for their involvement, was their concern with the suffering of the under-privileged, and the desire to assist them. Some of the NGO workers expressed particular concern for women suffering from domestic violence, other for widows or prisoners etc. The researchers often witnessed NGO workers giving their own money to people. But such kinds of NGO activity could also be described as assistance

[18] Ibid., p. 269.

[19] Ibid., p. 271.

[20] Naomi Hossain, 'Informal Pressure on Frontline Bureaucrats in Bangladesh', *Development and Change,* Vol. 41, No. 5, 2010, pp. 908–909.

to poor people, or more precisely to its 'clients'. As one of the Nigerian NGO activists stated: "I'm just helping the people and it's giving me joy that I'm doing it... I have the passion for poor people".[21] Analyzing this behavior, Oliver de Sardan describes it as moral economy and talks of the Nigerian NGO worker as the kind of person who draws their morality from a redistributive ethic.[22]

The "connection" between NGO workers and their clients often ends up being one of sympathy, but they reinforce also a paternalistic dynamic to their relationship. Such kind of practices developed by NGO workers in Africa, do not correspond with the statutory programs of this organization dealing with activities, which have a broader impact on the members of this organization, such as: promotion of human rights and educating people about the rule of law. This education was intended to empower those who received it with such results, and that the people would be able to demand their rights themselves.[23] We observe similar misunderstandings of NGOs leading aims in the field of co-operation between the civil institutions and the local governments.

From negotiation to domination: the changing features of co-operation between NGOs and governments in the Developing Countries

Despite the description of an NGO as a non-governmental organization, sometimes even critical towards the state, the same civil organization needs the state to fulfill its role and activities in society, but also to promote and protect its own position. On the other hand, the state needs civil society in order to gain support of the citizens and to legitimize its own rule.[24] According to M. Shaw also, civil society is not only a sphere of association in society, acting independently from the state, but also the external outpost of the state, through which the ruling classes maintain their dominance in society.[25]

The scarce examples of co-operation between NGOs and governments in Developing Countries shown by the researchers in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, apply mainly to the fields of health and education. According to the authors of the report, in all three countries the NGOs are not dependent on government's funds, which constitute only a small part of their resources, because these came mainly from local, but also international resources. In the same countries, government's policies include some commitment to collaboration with NGOs.[26] According to the same authors also, the adventages of NGOs independence is viewed as being threatened where they are being encouraged to work in collaboration with governments.[27]

The co-operation between governments and national NGOs, seems to be less harmonious in Africa. The public interests of NGOs in this area do not seem to abide with the private orientation of the members of governments. Hence the criticism often expressed by NGOs

[21] Laura Routley, 'NGOs and the Formation of the Public: Grey Practices and Accountability', *African Affairs,* Vol. 111, No. 422, December 2011, pp. 130–131.

[22] J.P. Oliver de Sardan, 'A Moral Economy of Corruption In Africa?', *Journal of Modern African Studies,* Vol. 37, No. 1, 1999, pp. 25–27.

[23] Routley, *NGOs and*..., p. 129.

[24] Jai Sen, 'The Power of Civility', *Development Dialogue,* No. 49, p. 56.

[25] M. Shaw, 'Civil Society', *Encyclopaedia of Violence, Peace and Conflict*, L. Kurtz (ed.), San Diego: Academic Press, 1999, pp. 269–278.

[26] Richard Batley, Pauline Rose, 'Collaboration in Delivering Education: Relations between governments and NGOs in South Asia', *Development In Practice*, Vol. 20, No. 4–5, June 2010, pp. 579–581.

[27] Ibid., p. 584.

workers towards the government can take drastic forms. So, for instance, in eastern Nigeria, during field research between 2007–2008, the NGO activists working in this area presented an opinion, that the state is fragmented by private interests, whereas civil society is seen as the honest broker of "the people's interests".[28] According to such points of view, the development policy of NGOs is holding the state to account for the benefit of the wider, public good.[29]The Nigerian NGO workers are not asking for favors of the government's free will, but rather demand a change of its orientation: "It is not necessary that a nation with so much wealth cannot deliver. Our challenge is to make this wealth to deliver".[30]

In Mali in 2006, the number of appraised NGOs was 2,135. By the initiative of the government the same organizations were becoming more political, and the Mali President, Amadou Toumani Touré, established his own party of Solidarity and Economic Progress in 2010, which included many former NGOs.[31]

Another interesting example of NGO activities, this time in Benin, concerns their claims directed to the government, asking for readiness to fight corruption in the country in order to construct respect for the principles of "good governance".[32]

The most vivid example of a lack of co-operation between an NGO and the government, with the consequence of the growing dominance and control of the latter towards civil societies, comes from the central Asiatic Republic of Uzbekistan, the former Republic of the Soviet Union.Uzbekistan, gaining independence in 1991, was not ready to accept the development of civil society. The earlier Soviet system of governance was characterized by its attempts to control every aspect of the economy and societal lives. The result was a low base of autonomous traditional grassroots associations including the local *mahalla*.[33]

At the beginning of independence in 1991, the Uzbekistan regime, staying in contact with the rest of the newly established, independent countries in Central Asia, was : "inherently uneasy about civil society, suspicious of its intentions and fearful of their dissent and critique".[34] At first, the creation of modern NGOs was tolerated by the government of Uzbekistan, as long as they focused on service delivery, and channeling foreign funds to local development. Those funds were not small. In 2002 US assistance to Uzbekistan, thanks to the strategic Uzbekistan partnership with the USA operation in Afghanistan, came to around $224 million including over $26 million directly invested in democracy promotion programs of which NGOs were included.[35] But the expansion of NGOs did not last long in Uzbekistan.

[28] Routley, *NGOs and the Formation of the Public*..., p. 120.

[29] C. Hewitt de Alcántara, 'Uses and Abuses of the Concept of Governance', *International Social Science Journal*, Vol. 50, No. 155, 1998, pp. 105–113.

[30] Interview with Ugwu, National NGOs Leader in Eastern Nigeria, 28 April 2008; quoted after Routley, *NGOs and the Formation*..., p. 121.

[31] Alexis Roy, Mali: 'Instrumentalisation...', pp. 111–116.

[32] Elieth P. Eyébiyi, Bénin: 'Un front 'anticorruption' catalyseur...', pp. 81–86.

[33] It is commonly accepted that the difference between the traditional, grassroots organizations and contemporary civil society, is the voluntary activity of free citizens of the latter, which was not possible in the traditional society. Daniel Stevens, 'Osama or the Georges: Shifting Threats and State Policy towards Civil Society in Uzbekistan', *Development and Change,* Vol. 41, No. 2, 2010, p. 356.

[34] See J.A. Howell, A. Ishkanian, E. Obadare, H. Seckinelgin and M. Glasius, 'The Backlash against Civil Society in the Wake of the Long War on Terror', *Development in Practice,* Vol. 18, No. 1, 2007, p. 82–93; Quoting after Stevens, *Shifting Threats*..., p. 256.

[35] Stevens, *Shifting Threats...,* p. 257.

From the end of 2003 a shift in state policy was witnessed and a change of Uzbekistan's political partnership from USA to Russia.According to international observers, from 2005 to 2007 the Uzbekistan government forced 269 of the most active and independent NGOs to close down.[36] At the same time, the demand to re-register every NGO in the Ministry of Justice, secured the control of the regime over foreign help for these organizations, which as a result stopped its funds for Uzbekistan. Many NGOs in Uzbekistan became temporarily inactive and afterwards were heavily reliant on state grants, which took the place of foreign funds. With the government claiming a total presence of over 5,000 NGOs, this sector has increasingly become an adjunct of the state. Similar fates have befallen the traditional mahalla community associations, who are increasingly perceived as a branch of local government.[37] Exactly the same process, with reference to mahallas, has taken place in Tajikistan.

The *mahalla*, a grassroots community association playing an important role in traditional culture in Central Asia as an autonomous, informal institution, did not lose its influence even during the 70-year control by the Soviet Union. Mahallas were operating in towns, as well as in villages, and under the pressure of modernization and growing emigration.[38]According to the global structural changes which reached also Tajikistan, the government of this country passed a new bill in 2008 dealing with the organization of social activity in the country. In the light of the new law, the mahalla organizations received a formal declaration, as the lowest hierarchical grade of government representation in the country, and the possibility of co-operation with higher governmental institutions. But at the same time the mahallas were controlled under the auspices of the government itself. So for instance, the leaders of the mahallas (the traditional 'rais') are nominated by governmental authorities, and the convent of mahallas (majlis) could only confirm the apparatus.[39] The conflict between the traditional authority of the rais and their actual dependence on the government, was also an obstacle in the realization of the Aga Khan Foundation project, whose intention was to build new forms of social initiatives in the country's villages.[40]

Special attention should be focused on the activities of non-governmental organizations in Turkey. After the military coup d'état in Turkey in 1980, any social activity was suppressed in order to strengthen the new regime. Hence the delegalization of all parties and social associations. But already by 1990, modern civil organizations had reappeared in Turkey's big cities and their character indicates that they were at least connected with international NGO programs. One of this voluntary social organizations was the Human Rights Association, created by the Turkish families of political prisoners in 1986. Another social organization was the Woman's Association against discrimination, which was established in

[36] Ibid., p. 252.

[37] N. Noori, 'Expanding State Authority, Cutting Back Local Services: Decentralization and its Contradiction In Uzbekistan', *Central Asian Survey,* Vol. 25, No. 4, 2007, pp. 533–549; Stevens, *Shifting Threats...* pp. 358–361.

[38] Anna Cieślewska, 'Organizacje międzynarodowe w procesie budowania samorządności lokalnej w Tadżykistanie, na przykładzie działalności Fundacji Aga Khana i Programu Narodów Zjednoczonych /UNDP/ [International Organizations in the Process of Building New Forms of Local, Social Initiatives in Tajikistan thanks to the Activity of the Aga Khan Foundation and United Nations Development Programmers] in K. Górak-Sosnowska, J. Jurewicz (eds), *Kulturowe uwarunkowania rozwoju w Azji i Afryce* [The Cultural Conditions of Development in Asia and Africa], Łódź 2010, pp. 367–368.

[39] Ibid., p. 369.

[40] Ibid., pp. 370–371.

1999.Another interesting social organization in modern Turkey is the Foundation of Social Volunteers, created in 2009 mainly by University students, whose activities concentrated around different social projects for public welfare benefit.[41]

The social activities of Turkish NGOs since 1980 is linked to growing religious enlightenments and an interesting experiment in binding together social laic activity with a religious agenda. Hence the connection of civil society's activities in Turkey with Faith Based Organizations.

The growing importance of FBOs in developing countries in the era of globalization

By 1980 the earlier enthusiasm for state-centric models of development has given way to a search for an alternative service delivery mechanism. For decades, religion, spirituality and faith have been practically marginalized or even avoided in development theory, policy and practice. But since 1980 some observers started to realize, that sustainable development can be achieved only if it incorporates cultural values and beliefs and that in many cases FBOs may be the most effective agencies to deliver development. The expanded sphere for religion in connection with globalization and the accompanying social change which it causes, opened the door for FBOs and new relief actors. The most interesting implementation of religion to the new social aid organizations appeared in Turkey. In this field Fethullah Gülen (born 1941) is often acknowledged as the founder of the first FBO by stressing the importance of interfaith and intercultural activities and work towards a peaceful co-existence and alliance of civilizations.[42]

Gülen has build up the basis for the establishment of many charitable organizations, hospitals, schools, universities, media outlets, journals, poverty eradication foundations and interfaith/ intercultural dialogue institutions. Voluntary spirit with donations from trusts and foundations, were the basis for establishing schools and to provide scholarships to help students. The philosophy of the Gülen movements is based on four major components of civility: tolerance, co-operation, reciprocity and trust, which made the movement a vehicle for development and the securing of civil societies.[43]

The Gülen educational projects introduced on an international level, mainly in developing countries where ethnic and religious conflicts were escalating, succeeded in forming programs that have brought together different ethno-religious communities as a necessary first step towards civil society. It also provides intermediary networks that contribute to the integration of individual citizens in relation to the state.[44]

Summing up, the Gülen movement with its several faith-based NGOs initiatives, has empowered civil societies by promoting inter-faith and inter-civilization dialogue. It is of

[41] Anna Fortuna, 'Organizacje pozarządowe w życiu społeczno-politycznym Turcji' [The Non-government Organizations in the Social and Political Life of Turkey] in *Kulturowe uwarunkowania rozwoju...*, pp. 165–185.

[42] Jenny Lunn, 'The Role of Religion, Spirituality and Faith In Development: a Critical Theory Approach', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 30, No. 5, 2009, pp. 937–940; Ihsan Yilmaz, 'Civil Society and Islamic NGOs in Secular Turkey and their Nationwide and Global Initiatives: The Case of the Gülen Movement, *Journal of Regional Development Studies,* 2010, pp. 115–116.

[43] Wanda Krause, 'Civility in Islamic Activism: Towards a Better Understanding of Shared Values for Civil Society Development', *Muslim World in Transition: Contribution of the Gülen Movement*, Ihsan Yilmaz et al (eds), London: Leeds Metropolitan University Press, 2007, p. 166.

[44] Yilmaz, *Civil Society and Islamic NGOs...,* p. 123; T. Kalyoncu, 'Preacher of Dialogue: International Relation and Interfaith Theology' in *Muslim World...,* pp. 511–525.

highly promising value even if not all organizations based on religion accept this point of view.

Talking of FBOs, we would like to illustrate their activities in the field of education in co-operation with the state in relation to the 'madrasa engagement', in six countries in different regions: in the Middle East (in Egypt, Turkey and Syria) and in South Asia (in Pakistan, Bangladesh and India). Both of these regions and countries were the object of field research between 2006–2009. The topic of investigation and object of analysis was the co-operation between FBOs and government officials dealing with traditional Koranic schools, in connection with the introduction of modernization programs.[45]According to Bano, traditional Koranic schools (or 'madrasas'), seem to be a good case in which to examine the potential of FBOs to start co-operation and involvement with many donor agencies and governments reform projects, especially after 9/11. Since that time, the growing recognition of religious organizations contribution to the process of radicalization, has forced governments and developing agencies alike to explore means to engage religious groups in development programs, in order to prevent their members from taking interest in radical options.[46]

In Egypt many Islamic centers of education, including the famous al-Azhar in Cairo, attained state control immediately after regaining independence. In Syria before the actual war, religious education was under the control of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, although a selected number of private Islamic foundations were allowed to continue Islamic education. The most prominent, such as for instance the Abu Nur Foundation in Damascus, often attracted students from Turkey and Pakistan.In comparison with Middle Eastern countries, in South Asia the state tolerated the private ownership of madrasas. The estimated, global number of madrasas acting in this region, range from between 10 to 30,000 schools.[47] But the governments in South Asia also undertook a scheme to modernize the madrasa education system, by introducing secular subjects such as English, science and mathematics along with religious subjects. Such types of reforms were already introduced in Bangladesh by 1979, but in India the main attempt to implement such reforms was introduced by governmental institutions as late as 1993/4. The focus was on introducing the teaching of science, mathematics, social studies, Hindi and English in the madrasa curriculum, in order to provide education comparable to the national system of education.[48] The experience of six countries may be grouped into three types of relationship between governments and madrasa according to the modernization of the latter: co-optation (Bangladesh and Egypt), collaboration (Syria and India), and confrontation (Pakistan and Turkey).[49] According to another point of view, the Bangladesh model can be classified as a co-optation model, as is the case of al-Azhar in Egypt, where state ideology has become more dominant in education programs.

[45] Masooda Bano, 'Co-Producing with FBOs, Lessons from State-*madrasa* Engagement in the Middle East and South Asia', *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 32, No. 7, 2011, p. 1277.

[46] Ibid., p. 1275. On the other hand, nowadays the growing importance of FBOs is also noted in the Global Civil Society Report: 'There is no way we can understand the logic, strategies and dynamics of civil societies anywhere in the Third World, unless we bring a transcendental dimension back into our analysis. Religious devotion is a fundamental movement in the South, from Latin America to Africa and South Asia' in *Global Civil Society and International Development*, H. Anheier, M. Glasius, M. Kaldor (eds), London 2004, p. 45.

[47] Bano, *Co-Producing with FBOs*..., p. 1281.

[48] Ibid., p. 1282; D. Nair, 'The State and Madrasas in India' in *Religions and Development Research Consortium Working Paper 15,* University of Birmingham, 2009.

[49] Bano, Co-producing with FBOs..., p. 1283.

The different forms of FBO co-operation with governments are also a reflection of the far reaching autonomy of madrasas institutions in the state. If their contacts with the state are deemed too close, the religious institutions lose their social support, something which became apparent in the case of Bangladesh and partly India.[50] On the other hand, the constant growing number of madrasas in the Muslim world and the continuing high social position of their leaders, stresses their present dynamic and importance in Muslim society.

Despite the many critical opinions about the structure and activities of NGOs and FBOs in developing countries, we should also stress their advantages, which among others consist of the animation and support of social activity, thanks to their involvement in remedying social problems. In this aspect we can hardly exaggerate the influence of both kinds of organizations in the awakening of social engagement in public affairs. We may also suppose, that the growing activity of NGOs and FBOs in Africa and Asia, open doors for the political participation of citizens, demanding for instance more accountability of the regime, and broader citizen's admittance to the decision-making processes of their countries. A confirmation of this thesis is the example of West Africa, where the local people created an association, which undertook control of the main part of local production, but also the problems of society as a whole.[51]

Another example of growing social responsibility derives from Indonesia. In 1998, after the fall of the autocratic government of president Suharto, a new form of association connected with madrasas, called Pesantren was constructed. This organization was mainly interested in the introduction of new features of modern Islam with new forms of religious education. The leaders of Pesantren were eager to realize the true, moral prescription of Islam in education, such as the duty to fight for social justice, freedom and democracy. The members of Pesantren also stressed its autonomous position, far from governmental control, which brings them closer to the programs of NGOs and FBOs, acting also in Indonesia.[52]

The importance of FBOs in Indonesia, especially the Pesantren, was also confirmed latelyby the political activity of Kyai Muzakkin, the spiritual leader of Pesantren in East Java. In 2009 he combined his vocational interest in 'spirits' and 'sent' a thousand spirits to Jacarta, to protect the supporters of the Indonesian president at an anti-corruption rally. The introduction of spirits into Indonesian politics in 2009 proved apt, as it was embarrassing to both the modernist ideas of secular politics, and the sensibilities of many orthodox Muslims.[53] But despite the long-lasting criticism in the Indonesian media for the "spiritual forces" used against the expected demonstrations in the 'Day of Anti-Corruption', it does not change the fact, that the riots, waiting for such occasion did not appear in Jacarta in 2009. It is once more a confirmation of the high position of leading FBOs in Indonesia. It is also worth mentioning

[50] Masooda Bano, 'Allowing for Diversity: the State M*adrasas* Relationship in Bangladesh' in DFID *Religions and Development Research Consortium, Working Paper 13*, University of Birmingham 2008; Nair, *The State and Madrasas in India...*, p. 2010.

[51] MohamadouI Magha, 'Movement paysan ouest-africain: entre efficacité et fragilité', *Alternative Sud*, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010, pp. 243–244.

[52] R. Bush, 'Islam and Civil Society in Indonesia. Paper presented at the SCID Sixth Annual Conference on Democracy and Development' in *The Changes for Islamic World*, Washington 2005, p. 22–23; M. Sirry, 'The Public Expression of Traditional Islam: the *Pesantren* and Civil Society in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *The Muslim World*, Vol. 100, No. 1, 2010, pp. 60–61.

[53] Nils Bubandt, 'An Embarrassment of Spirits': Spirits, Hauntology, and Democracy in Indonesia, *Paideuma*, 2014, p. 115.

that the "hero of spirits" by sending them to Jacarta, regardless of constant mockery and irony addressed at him, was able to keep his religious, social and political position.[54] In a case study similar to Indonesia, the traditional forms of religion come into contact with politics, this time in south-western Togo in Africa. The cultural, social and political meanings of a 'vodun' ceremony, are constantly renegotiated by members, but mainly by the leaders of these rituals. This region of field research revealed, that the local vodun cult, once contesting state power, had entered into the processes of politicization and mediatization of their ceremonies, appearing as a privileged arena in reinforcing or contesting state power.[55]

NGOs versus FBOs

The narratives of modernization and secularization that shaped social science for most of the post-war period, have also shaped the program of development studies. From this perspective, religion was seen as a conservative and traditional force designed to withdraw and eventually disappear from public life as part of societal progress towards an increasingly modern society. In this aspect, religion was regarded as an obstacle to development. In the era of globalization, the Western secular development models have either encountered their limits, or failed in several parts of the global periphery, and expanded the space for faith-based models.[56] In 2000, the sociologist Kurt Allan ver Beek declared that religion was a "development taboo".[57] Even in the field of development, the increase and visibility of religious organizations has been observed. At the beginning of our century the World Faith Development Dialogue came to life, proclaiming an international and national dialogue among faith and development institutions.[58]Alongside with these initiatives, a new object of research emerged focusing on religion and development, concentrating sometimes on faith-based organizations. The academic interest in religion and development has resulted in a range of publications, in the form of articles, reports and books. In 2005 the UK's Department for International Development was arguing for a more systematic understanding of the role that faith plays in achieving the 'Millennium Development Goals'[59] In Holland, five Dutch NGOs established the 'Knowledge Forum for Religion and Development Policy' in 2007. In Sweden SIDA has hosted a number of workshops on the role of religion in development. In the USA, governmental funding to faith-based organizations almost doubled from 10.5 percent of aid in 2001 to 19.9 percent in 2005.[60] But the stress placed lately on the faith-based organizations seems also to have another background.

The development ideology connected with NGOs, has grown out of experience of power and hegemony, of colonizing, but also out of sentiments of collective guilt and a sense of complicity in the creation of the "distant sufferer", stemming from the same colonial legacy. In contrast, the FBOs aid culture is shaped by experiences of marginalization, or being

[54] Ibidem.

[55] Marco Gordini, 'Nowadays Spirits Allow Themselves to be Photographed'. Renegotiating the Political Role of Yam ceremonies in Agou, South Western Togo, *Anthropos*, Vol. 109, No. 1, 2014, p. 33.

[56] Bruno de Cordier, 'Humanitarian Frontline', Development and Relief, and Religion: what Context, which Threats and which Opportunities?, *Third World Quarterly,* Vol. 30, No. 4, 2009, p. 663.

[57] Kurt Allan ver Beek, *Voices of the Poor*, World Bank 2000.

[58] Marie Juul Petersen, *Muslim Aid Serving Humanity*, University of Copenhagen 2011, p. 23.

[59] Department for International Development, 2005, p. 14.

[60] Petersen, *Muslim Aid Serving*..., p. 25; Gerard Clark and Michael Jenning (ed.), *Development, Civil Society and Faith-Based Organizations*, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008.

colonized. So for instance, Islamic aid culture is shaped by experiences of marginalization, of being colonized, and of the poor, not as a distant sufferer, but also a fellow member of a religious community (umma).[61] But in comparison with NGOs, whose central values are a culture of universal development aid based on terms of an inclusive, non-discriminatory approach to recipients, the leading values of FBOs are concentrated on notions of solidarity and a brotherhood of co-believers.[62]

Conclusion

The FBOs organization has emerged from development studies only in the last decade as a result of the "religious turn", i.e. the increasing visibility of religion in the public sphere. Today, some of the largest NGOs have a religious background, as do the Muslim NGOs for example. The World Bank estimates that as much as 50% of all health and education services in Sub-Saharan Africa are today provided by religious organizations.[63] Studies initiated by the World Bank also stress the importance of religious organizations for the poor, concluding that many people have more trust in religious organizations than in secular NGOs, governments or other societal institutions. Besides, the recent trends in development studies have made space for religion. After growing criticism towards the structural adjustments connected with globalization, development studies shifted away from classical liberal theory, towards more heterodox approaches. This opening of development space has facilitated the inclusion of religious actors in academic studies of development. Some development researchers even argue, that faith-based organizations (FBOs) contribute to providing an alternative vision of development.[64]

By trying to address the mooted question– in the title of this paper, we did not find any references concerning rivalries between NGOs and FBOs in any of the literature collected for the purpose of this paper. But the fast growing number of FBOs in recent decades indicates a slight domination of the latter over NGOs, especially because the religious organizations gain more importance and significance thanks to their local grassroots approach. On the other hand, the practices of the last decade demonstrate, that whenever religion brings to show something other than mediation between man and God, it retains a high position not only in people's attention, but also in politics.

[61] Petersen, *Muslim Aid Serving...*, s. 223.
[62] Ibidem.
[63] Ibid., p. 24.
[64] Ibid., pp. 24–26.

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Searching for the Truth: The Life and Work of Abū Ḥāmid Al-Ghazālī

Abstract

The paper describes an interesting intellectual venture of Al-Ghazālī in his quest for the truth. In the process, he came to doubt the senses and even reason itself as the means of attaining truth and fell into a deep skepticism that lasted about two months. However, he was eventually delivered from this with the aid of the divine light, and thus recovered his trust in reason. Al-Ghazālī's extensive studies in Islamic law, tradition, theology, philosophy and Ṣūfīsm, together with his long period of self-discipline led him, using his method, described as that of "courage to know and the courage to doubt," to present his position with regard to various schools of Islamic thought of his days. In his quest for the truth he carefully examined various "seekers after the truth", that is theologians, philosophers, authoritarians (the Ismā'īlīs whom he called the party of or authoritative instruction) and finally the Ṣūfīs, or mystics. Because of these studies, he reached the conclusion that there was no way to ascertain knowledge except through However, in order to reach this ultimate truth of the Ṣūfīs, it was necessary to renounce the world and to devote oneself to mystical practice.

Key words: *falsafa*, *kalām*, Bāṭinism, party of *ta'līm,* Ṣūfīsm, *mujaddid*

Abū Ḥamīd Muḥammad ibn Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (1055–1111), one of the most influential philosophers, theologians, jurists, and mystics of Sunni Islam,[1] occupies a unique position in the history of Islamic thought and his contribution to its development is tremendous. He was a reputable scholar at a time when Sunni theology had just passed through its consolidation and had entered a period of intense challenges from both the Shī'a Ismā'īlite theology and the Arabic tradition of Aristotelian philosophy (*falsafa*). In his worldview, he combined an extensive knowledge, a deep spirituality, a rigid fundamentalism and an extraordinary independence of mind that enabled him to become a veritable challenge to the philosophies of Aristotle, Plotinus and their Muslim followers, namely Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Al-Ghazālī understood the importance of *falsafa* and developed a complex

[1] Al-Ghazālī's life and work is discussed by E. Ormsby in his book: *Ghazali: The Revival of Islam,* Oxford: Oneworld, 2008. Also refer to: H. Algar, *Imam Abu Hamid Ghazali: An Exponent of Islam in its Totality,* Oneonta, New York: iPi, 2001, pp. 3–43; M. Marmura, *Probing in Islamic Philosophy: Studies in the Philosophies of Ibn Sīnā, Al-Ghazālī, and Other Major Muslim Thinkers,* Binghamton: Global Academic Pub., Binghamton University, 2005.

response that rejected and condemned some elements of its teaching, while also allowing him to accept and apply part of it. His teaching, originality and influence cannot be fully understood without knowing the story of his life in a socio-political context.

Al-Ghazālī was born in the town of Ṭūs, near modern Mashhad in Eastern Iran and began his early education in his hometown. When he was fifteen, he went on to pursue his studies in Gorgān, a place in the southeast corner of the Caspian Sea. Subsequently, at the age of nineteen, he went to Nishapur, where he was admitted to the famous Niẓāmīya College under ʿAbd al-Malik al-Juwaynī (died 1085), known as Imām al-Ḥaramayn, one of the leading religious scholars of the period. Although Al-Ghazālī focused on jurisprudence, he was also introduced to Ashʿarī theology and encouraged to read the philosophical treaties of Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna). Soon, he was recognized as a rising scholar and asked to help with teaching at the College. After the death of his teacher Al-Juwaynī, Niẓām al-Mulk, the powerful vizier of the Seljuq Sultans invited him to join his court.

In 1091, when Al-Ghazālī was about thirty-three, he was appointed to the main professorship at the Niẓāmīya College there. His scholarly work focused on both lecturing on Islamic jurisprudence and writings aiming at refuting heresies and responding to questions from all segments of the community. In the political confusion following the assassination of Niẓām al-Mulk and the subsequent violent death of Sultan Malikshah, Al-Ghazālī himself fell into a serious spiritual crisis and finally left Baghdād, renouncing both his scholarly career and the world.[2]

This event marks the beginning of a new stage in his life, that of retirement (1095–1111). which also included a short period of teaching at the Niẓāmīya College in Nishapur.[3] After leaving Baghdād, he wandered as a Ṣūfī into Syria and Palestine before returning to Ṭūs, where he was engaged in writing, Ṣūfī practices and teaching his disciples until his death. The inner development leading to his conversion is discussed in his autobiography*, al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl* (1108, The Deliverer from Error), which he wrote when he was about fifty.

As Al-Ghazālī explained in his book, it was his habit from an early age to search for the truth. In the process, he came to doubt the senses and even reason itself as a means of attaining truth and fell into a deep skepticism that lasted about two months. However, he was eventually delivered from this with the aid of 'the divine light', and thus recovered his trust in reason. Al-Ghazālī's extensive studies in Islamic law, tradition, theology, philosophy and Ṣūfīsm, together with his long period of self-discipline led him, using methodology described as the "courage to know and the courage to doubt," to present his position with regards to the various schools of Islamic thought of that time.[4] In his quest he carefully examined various "seekers after the truth," that is theologians, philosophers, authoritarians (the Ismāʿīlīs whom he called the party of *taʿlīm* or authoritative instruction) and finally the Ṣūfīs, or mystics. Because of these studies, he reached the conclusion that there was no way to ascertain knowledge except through Ṣūfīsm. However, in order to reach this ultimate truth of the Ṣūfīs, it was necessary to renounce the world and to devote oneself to mystical practice. Al-Ghazālī came to this realization through an agonizing process of decision making, which led to a nervous breakdown and finally to his departure from Baghdād.

[2] For Al-Ghazālī's political theology see: Y. Said, *Ghazālī's Politics in Context*, Abingdon–Oxon–New York: Routledge, 2013.

[3] About the significance of learning institutions, see: G. Makdisi, 'Muslim Institutions of Learning in Eleventh-Century Baghdad', *BSOAS*, Vol. 24 (1961), pp. 1–56: *The Rise of the Colleges*, Edinburgh, 1981.

[4] See: M. Sharif (ed.), *History of Muslim Philosophy,* Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1983.

His first encounter was with the *mutakallimūn*, that is the Ash'arī rational theologians, by whom he was trained and among whom he was reckoned. In *Iḥya''ulūm al-dīn* (1096/1097), *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*) he criticized the scholar-jurists, including theologians. According to Watt, Al-Ghazālī simply supported "the vigorous criticism of the worldliness of the rulers of the Islamic empire and of those scholars who were prepared to take office under such rulers", expressed on many occasions by the ascetic and mystical movements in Islam.[5] However, the vehemence of his expressions could suggest that this was more likely an expression of his strong personal feelings. In the preface to *The Revival of the Religious Sciences* Al-Ghazālī said:

> The science of the road of the world to come, on the other hand, and the learning, wisdom, knowledge, illumination, light, guidance and direction as God calls them in scripture, by which the noble Muslims of old lived their lives, has become rejected among men and completely forgotten. Since this is a grave weakness in a religion and a black mark against it, I thought it is right to busy myself with composing this book, out of concern for the revival of the religious sciences, to show the practices to the former leaders, and to make clear the limits of the useful sciences in the eyes of the prophets and the noble Muslims of old.[6]

In his book, Al-Ghazālī never allows his reader to forget his critical attitude towards the scholar-jurists of the day, including theologians, focusing on five key-points. He accused them of preoccupying themselves with worldly affairs instead of devoting their attention to the preparation of man for the life of the world to come, of justifying their, at times, inappropriate conduct on religious grounds and of being primarily concerned with their professional qualifications as a means of gaining wealth, power, and position. Furthermore, he expressed his conviction that the true scholar would have nothing to do with rulers, would not take offices from them, and instead should teach freely without any remuneration. Finally, he pointed out that it is important not to forget that man's true destiny is the world to come, and in light of this, to allow the usefulness of each branch of religious knowledge to determine the extent to which it is studied.[7]

In *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* Al-Ghazālī complains that the reasoning of the Ash'arī theologians is based on certain presuppositions and assumptions which they never try to justify, but which he cannot accept without some justification. In effect what happened was that he found in philosophy a way of justifying some of the bases of Ash'arī theology. This can be seen in *Al-Iqtiṣad fī al-I'tiqād* (1095, *The Golden Mean in Belief*),[8] where he introduced many philosophical arguments, including one for the existence of God. However, one should note that the theological position expressed in both *Al-Iqtiṣad fī al-I'tiqād* and his other important work, *Al-Risāla al-Qudsīyya* (1097, *The Jerusalem Epistle*),[9] is Ash'arīte, and there is no fundamental difference between Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arīte school.

One should point out that *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* also reveals Al-Ghazālī's attitude towards theology from the after crisis period. In this book, Al-Ghazālī's views focused on

[5] W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A Study of Al-Ghazali,* Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1963, p. 109.

[6] Al-Ghazālī, *Iḥya''ulūm al-dīn* [The Revival of the Religious Sciences], Vol. 4, Cairo: Al-Matba'a al-Azhariya, 1898, Vol. 1, p. 2. English translation Cf. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 112.

[7] Ibid., pp. 113–114.

[8] It was composed towards the end of his stay in Baghdad and after his critique of philosophy.

[9] It was composed soon afterwards in Jerusalem.

two important points. Firstly, he maintained that the aim of theologians was to defend dogma against heretical aberrations and innovations. Secondly, he accused them of failing to meet the logical demands of those who had studied Aristotelian logic, since their arguments were directed against those who already shared their own point of view to a considerable extent. In conclusion, he felt that theology contributed nothing to the actual practice of religious life. However, it is important to point out that despite the fact that one may notice some changes resulting from the influence of philosophy and Ṣūfīsm, until the end of his life he seemed to have maintained that Ash'arī theology was true.

It is worth noting that although Al-Ghazālī was dissatisfied with theology because it contributed little or nothing to the attainment of that goal of the individual life which he described as"salvation" or the bliss of Paradise, he believed that it had a prophylactic function in the life of the community. Furthermore, despite the fact that Al-Ghazālī was rather convinced that the importance of theology had been greatly exaggerated, he continued to take up a theological position which was broadly Ash'arīte.[10] With regards to Al-Ghazālī's contribution to the later development of theology, one should point out the conscious-based arguments on syllogistic logic and the attention to objections from a Neo-platonic standpoint. With time, according to Watt, he gradually influenced other scholars and "from now onwards all the rational theologians in Islam wrote in a way which assumed a philosophical outlook in pre-theological matters, and often explicitly discussed such matters".[11] In conclusion, one may say that this new perspective, introduced by Al-Ghazālī into Islamic theology, became an aspect of its permanent nature.[12]

The second encounter in Al-Ghazālī's intellectual journey in search for the truth was with philosophy (*falsafa)*[13] and, in particular, with the Muslim Neo-Platonism of Al-Fārābī[14] and

[10] The date, which has been found for a small work called 'The Restraining of the Commonalty from the Science of Theology', marks the completion of this work only a few days before his death (Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 119). For a thorough account on Al-Ghazālī's theological views refer to: R. Frank, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ash'arite School,* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1994.

[11] Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 123.

[12] See: F. Griffel, *Al-Ghazālī's Philosophical Theology,* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

[13] Islamic philosophy (*falsafa*) has been one of the major intellectual traditions in the Islamic world, and it has influenced and been influenced by many other intellectual perspectives including scholastic theology (*kalām*) and doctrinal Ṣūfīsm (*ma'arifa*). It developed as a result of Muslim philosophical reflection on the heritage of Greco-Alexandrian philosophy. During the period from the eighth to tenth centuries in Baghdād, under the patronage of the 'Abbāsids, the more or less correct translations of philosophical treaties of Plato, Aristotle, Neo-Platonists (predominantly Plotinus) into Arabic were prepared. These translations gave Muslim scholars, immersed in the teachings of the Qur'an and living in a universe in which revelation was a central reality, the basis and the starting point to prepare original commentaries and eventually their own original philosophical systems. In contrast to the Greeks, Muslim philosophers focused on "prophetic philosophy". The Qur'an, as well as the *ḥadīth*, served as the central source of Islamic philosophical speculation for centuries. In later Islamic philosophy the sayings of the Shī 'ī imam also played a major role. Far from being simply Greek philosophy in Arabic, Persian or Turkish, Islamic philosophy integrated certain elements of Greek philosophy into the Islamic perspective, creating new philosophical schools. One may say that Islamic philosophy became an original and productive assimilation of Greek thought created by open-minded scholars of very different cultural traditions, including Arabic, Persian, Turkish, as well as an attempt to make a "foreign", namely Greek element an integral part of Islamic tradition.

[14] Abū Naṣr Muḥammad ibn al-Farakh al-Fārābī (870–950), was a famous philosopher, scientist, cosmologist, logician, and musician of the Islamic Golden Age. He became well known

Ibn Sīnā.[15] It should be pointed out that this particular group of seekers primarily engaged his polemical attention and his criticism had an impact on the further development of the *kalām* and perhaps even the destruction of neo-Platonic philosophy in the East.

According to the scholars, it is difficult to say whether he is responsible for the "death" of philosophical studies in Islam. It is true that after his death philosophical studies rather ceased to exist in the East.[16] However, one may observe these studies in the Islamic West, where Islamic philosophy had its famous representatives, such as Ibn Bajja,[17] Ibn Ṭufayl,[18] and Ibn Rushd.[19]

As for Al-Ghazālī's knowledge of philosophy, it should be mentioned that he began philosophical studies in his early years in Nishapur, where he had probably been introduced to the subject by Al-Juwaynī. However, the main focus on such studies was during his professorship in Baghdad, which is evidenced by his treaties on logic and *Maqāṣid al-Falāsifa*. Al-Ghazālī was the first Muslim theologian who undertook serious polemics with the philosophers and who realized that in order to refute the system, one should acquire a deep knowledge of it or else would act blindly.

In *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* Al-Ghazālī presents his discussion on philosophy. His main attack on philosophers and their practices came later, namely with the powerful critique *Tāhāfut al-Falāsifa* (1095, *Incoherence or Auto-destruction of the Philosophers*).[20] Al-Ghazālī's critique of twenty points in this particular book is a significant landmark in the

among medieval Muslim intellectuals as 'The Second Teacher', that is, the successor to Aristotle, 'The First Teacher'. For a thorough discussion on the philosophy of Al-Fārābī see: M. Fakhry, *Al-Fārābī, Founder of Islamic Neoplatonism: His Life, Works and Influence,* Oxford: Oneworld, 2002; M. S. Mahdi, *Alfarabi and the Foundation of Islamic Political Philosophy,* with a foreword by Charles E. Butterworth, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.

[15] Abū 'Alī al-Ḥusayn ibn 'Abd Allāh ibn Sīnā (980–1037), known as Ibn Sīnā and as Avicenna, was a Persian philosopher, medical doctor, and scientist. His most famous works are *The Book of Healing*, a vast philosophical and scientific encyclopaedia, and *The Canon of Medicine*, which was a standard medical text at many medieval universities in Europe. See: J. McGinnis, *Avicenna*, *Great Medieval Thinker*, New York–Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010; D. Gutas, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works,* Leiden–New York: E.J. Brill, 1988.

[16] There was an important Persian tradition of the theosophical philosophy.

[17] Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn al-Ṣā'igh al-Tūjībī (1085–1138), known as Ibn Bajja (or Avempace in the West) was one of the most important philosophers of Muslim Spain. See: M. Chemli, *La philosophie morale d'Ibn Bâjja (Avempace) à travers le Tadbîr al-mutawaḥḥid (Le régime du solitaire),* Tunis: Impr. N. Bascone & S. Muscat, 1969.

[18] Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn Abd al-Malik ibn Muḥammad ibn Ṭufayl (1105–1185) was an Andalusian philosopher and novelist, most famous for writing the first philosophical novel, *Hayy ibn Yaqdhan*. See: Z. A. Siddiqi, *Philosophy of Ibn Tufayl,* Faculty of Arts Publication Series, No. 18, Aligarh: Aligarh Muslim University, 1965.

[19] Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad ibn Aḥmad ibn Rushd (1126–1198) commonly known as Ibn Rushd or by his Latinized name Averroës, was a Spanish Andalusian Muslim philosopher, theologian, jurist, and scientist. He was a defender of Aristotelian philosophy against Ash'ari theologians led by Al-Ghazālī, whom he attacked in his famous work *Tahafut al-tahafut*. See: M. Fakhry, *Averroës (Ibn Rushd): His Life, Works and Influence,* Oxford: Oneworld, 2001.

[20] See: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa), A Parallel English-Arabic Text,* translated, introduced, and annotated by Michael E. Marmura, Provo, UT: Birmingham Young University Press, 2000.

history of philosophy, as it advances the nominal critique of Aristotelian science developed later in 14th century Europe. In his discussion of Muslim philosophers, he focuses on the third group, namely theists, represented by Al-Fārābī and Ibn Sīnā. Their neo-Platonism adapted to Islamic monotheism allows them to claim to be Muslims. According to Al-Ghazālī everything that they transmitted falls under three headings, namely (1) what must be counted as unbelief, (2) what must be counted as heresy and (3) what is not to be denied.

Al-Ghazālī considers six philosophical sciences, i.e., mathematics, logic, natural science, metaphysics or theology, politics and ethics.[21] As for metaphysics, he criticizes it severely: "here occur most of the errors of the philosophers." Most of the other philosophical sciences he regards as neutral in themselves. In the case of mathematics, according to Al-Ghazālī, none of its results are connected with religious matters. As for logic, nothing in this science is relevant to religion by the way of denial and affirmation.[22] With regard to natural science, similar to medicine, in the view of Al-Ghazālī, it should not be rejected, except for some points. As for politics, he believes that this discussion is taken from the Divine Scriptures. Finally, in the case of ethics, people should rather refrain from the reading of these books because they contain a "mixture" of the sayings of the prophets and mystics and the philosophers' own ideas, and, therefore, according to Al-Ghazālī, it is difficult for an unprepared person to distinguish between truth and fallacy.

What are the philosophical issues and debates in the *Tahafut al-falāsifa*? Al-Ghazālī explains his purpose for writing the *Tāhāfut al-falāsifa* in his religious preface and short introductions. In the preface he inveighs against certain pseudo-intellectuals of his time who were "impressed" by such 'high-sounding names' as Socrates, Hippocrates, Plato and Aristotle have become mere imitators of their philosophy without having any real knowledge or insight of their own. What is more, using the example of such philosophers, they rationalize their own disregard for the rituals and obligations imposed by religious law, opting, in effect for unbelief (*kufr)*.[23] In the introductions that follow, he makes a number of basic points. He states that his quarrel is not with the philosophers' mathematics, astronomical sciences or logic, but only with those of their theories that contravene the principles of religion.[24]

As he states in his book, the truth of the positive facts of religion neither can be proved nor disapproved and to do otherwise leads philosophers to take quite nonsensical positions. Al-Ghazālī attacks the philosophers because many of their particular arguments are logically false and the various positions that they take in their systems as a whole are inconsistent with one another. Furthermore, some of their assumptions are unfounded. According to Al-Ghazālī, these assumptions neither can be demonstrated logically nor are self-evident through intuition.

The philosophy of religion has to accept the facts of religion as given by religion. It is worth noting that although Al-Ghazālī's whole polemic is derived from the Ash'arite theology, his method is a philosophical one. In his critique of the philosophers, he stands firmly upon the revelation and strongly opposes the philosopher's exclusive reliance on reason.[25] The philosopher is convinced that there are things beyond the grasp of intellect

[21] Refer to: Ibid., pp. 161–225.

[22] The Aristotelian logic, and in particular syllogism impressed Al-Ghazālī. He also wrote several books on logic.

[23] Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*..., pp. 1–3.

[24] Ibid., pp. 4, 8.

[25] For a thorough discussion on the issue of reason and revelation see: A.J. Arberry, *Revelation and Reason in Islam,* London: Allen & Unwin, 1957.

and they have to be accepted as they are given by revelation. The philosophical methods should not enter here.

One by one Al-Ghazālī brings the points on which the philosophers can be convinced of incoherence and shows that they are unable to give logical proofs for their metaphysics.[26]

He attacks them as concerns the twenty points, beginning with the creation and ending with inevitable finality. On seventeen points, he accuses them of being heretics. He demonstrates the weaknesses of their arguments concerning the existence of God, specifically his unity and incorporeality. He attacks their rejection of God as a simply perceived entity without quiddity and attributes, and their conception of 'His knowledge' and some of their assertions about heaven and the human soul. On the three remaining points, Al-Ghazālī regards the philosophers as infidels. These points are as follows: (1) the eternity of the world,[27] (2) a denial of God's knowledge of the particulars, [28] and (3) a denial of bodily resurrection.[29] As he pointed out in the conclusion of the *Tahafut al-falāsifa*, these three theories are in violent opposition to Islam and to believe in them is to "accuse the Prophet of falsehood; to this no Muslim sect would subscribe". Concerning the other points, Al-Ghazālī approximates the position of the philosophers to that of Mu'tazila.

The problem to which Al-Ghazālī gives special consideration is the eternity of the world. The orthodox could not possibly accept the philosopher's claim. There is nothing eternal, but God, and all else is created. Therefore, anything co-eternal with God means violating the strict principle of monotheism. It is worth noting that, as he stated at the conclusion of his critique of the philosophers four proofs for the world's pre-eternity, to refute their position was the main purpose behind writing *Tahafut al-falāsifa*. As he stated:

> We have not endeavored to defend a particular doctrine, and as such we have not departed from the objective of this book. We will not argue exhaustively for the doctrine of the temporal origination [of the world], since our purpose is to refute their claim of knowing [its] pre-eternity. As regards the true doctrine, we will write a book concerning it after completing this one – if success, god willing, comes to our aid – and will name it *The Principles of Belief.* We will engage in it in affirmation, just as we have devoted ourselves in this book to destruction. [30]

Al-Ghazālī's challenge to the Muslim philosophers, in the form of a well-elaborated and very critical study of their doctrines rendered them increasingly defensive. The results of his critique became a vibrant element in the *kalām*. Therefore, Al-Ghazālī is credited with providing Islamic theology with sound philosophical foundations.[31] In addition, Al-Ghazālī legitimized and popularized the study of one philosophical science, namely logic and in this way made the Greek modes of thinking more accessible, as compared to the more

[26] See: Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī, *The Incoherence of the Philosophers*..., pp. 12–160.

[27] See: Ibid. ('First Discussion: On Refuting their Doctrine of the World's Past Eternity'), pp. 12–46.

[28] See: Ibid. ('Thirteenth Discussion: On Refuting their Statement that the First does not Know Particulars'), pp. 134–143.

[29] See: Ibid. ('Twentieth Discussion: On refuting their denial of bodily resurrection'), pp. 208–226.

[30] Ibid., p. 46.

[31] See: W.M. Watt, *Islamic Philosophy and Theology,* Edinburgh: University Press, 1962; H.A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Kalam,* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1976.

traditional Muslim ones.[32] His attack evoked replies and the most important, i.e., *Tahafut al-Tahafut* was written in the West by Ibn Rushd. With Al-Ghazālī begins the successful introduction of Aristotelianism or rather Avicennism into Muslim theology. After a period of appropriation of the Greek sciences in the translation movement from Greek into Arabic and the writings of the *falāsifa* up to Ibn Sīnā, philosophy and the Greek sciences were "naturalized" into the discourse of *kalām* and Muslim theology. Al-Ghazālī's approach to resolving apparent contradictions between reason and revelation was accepted by almost all later Muslim theologians and had, via the works of Ibn Rushd and Jewish authors, a significant influence on Latin medieval thinking.

It has been customary to see Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī as a vehement critic of philosophy, who rejected it in favor of Islamic mysticism. However, over the past few years such a view has come under increased scrutiny. Alexander Treiger, the author of the recently published study (2012), namely *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Mystical Cognition and its Avicennian Foundation*, argues that Al-Ghazālī was instead, one of the greatest popularizers of philosophy in medieval Islam. The author supplies new evidence showing that Al-Ghazālī was indebted to philosophy in his theory of mystical cognition and in his eschatology. Moreover, within these two areas he even accepted those philosophical teachings, which he ostensibly criticized. Arguing that despite overt criticism, Al-Ghazālī never rejected Avicennian philosophy and that his mysticism itself is grounded in Avicenna's teachings, the book offers a clear and systematic presentation of Al-Ghazālī's "philosophical mysticism". [33]

The third encounter was with a section of Ismā 'īlīya, which held that true knowledge was to be gained from an infallible imam. It is worth noting that with regard to the Ismā 'īlīs, Al-Ghazālī's views were close to that of Niẓām al-Mulk, and he shared his concerns about the growth of their influences.[34] Therefore, after the assassination of the vizier in 1092, he had no hesitation in responding to the request of the young caliph Al-Mustaẓ'hir (1094–1118), stating that he should write a book refuting the doctrines of the Ta'līmites or Bāṭinites. The book, commonly known as the *Mustaẓ'hirī*, was completed before Al-Ghazālī left Baghdād in November 1095.[35] He subsequently wrote several other works directed in whole or in part against the Bāṭinites.

In the *Mustaẓ'hirī*, Al-Ghazālī is focused on exposing inconsistencies with the esoteric doctrine of the Bāṭinites.[36] This enabled him to not only criticize the doctrine but also to explain the need of refuting it. For example, he argues that it is practically impossible to consult the imam or his representative in every case. Furthermore, he points out that although the Bāṭinites claim to abandon reasoning, they cannot avoid surreptitiously making use of it. Furthermore, as underlined by Watt, there is a considerable difference between the *Mustaẓ'hirī*

[32] About Greek philosophy, as translated and commented on by Muslims, see: R. Walzer, *Greek into Arabic. Essays on Islamic Philosophy*, Cambridge: Harward University Press, 1962.

[33] A. Treiger, *Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought: Al-Ghazālī's Theory of Mystical Cognition and its Avicennian Foundation,* London–New York: Routledge, 2012.

[34] For a thorough account on Al-Ghazālī's polemical engagement with the Ismā'īlīs see: F. Mitha, *Al-Ghazālī and the Ismailis: A Debate on Reason and Authority in Medieval Islam,* Ismaili Heritage Series, 5, London: I. B. Tauris, in association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2001.

[35] Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 82.

[36] *Bāṭin* is defined as the interior or hidden meaning of the Qur'ān. See: M. Ghālib, *Al-Ḥarakāt al-bāṭinīyah fī al-Islām,* Bayrūt–Lubnān: Dār al-Andalus, 1982.

and *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* with regard to Al-Ghazālī's attitude and "appreciation" of the Bāṭinite doctrine. The caliph commissioned the first work and, therefore, it was obvious that the author focused on rather destructive criticism. As for the second work, as Watt says, it is clear that Al-Ghazālī, "had realized that part of their success was due to the fact that they satisfied, however imperfectly, the deep demand in men's hearts for an embodiment of the dynamic image of the charismatic leader."[37] Therefore, whilst being aware of such a demand, he insisted that Muslims already had such a leader, namely the Prophet Muḥammad and "he has his living expositors (presumably the scholar-jurists), just as the hidden imam has his expositors, the accredited agents".[38] Here Watt brings our attention to a very important point, namely to the issue that is "untouched" or "omitted" by Al-Ghazālī. He says:

> It is perhaps worth calling attention here to what Al-Ghazālī does not say. Though the ʻAbbāsid caliphs had originally claimed to have charismata, he does not attempt to make them into imams of the Bāṭinite type... neither does he attempt to attribute any charismata to the scholar-jurists... Had he wanted he could have referred to the tradition that the scholar-jurists were the heirs of the prophets... His later thought...tended to view that there was an elite who, could obtain an insight into the divine truth comparable to that of the prophets. It is perhaps in parts of his later works, apparently unconnected with contemporary problems, that we find his real and effective answer to the challenge of Ismāʻīlism, which, even if it had little effect on the ruling institution, enabled Islamic society to preserve its characteristic structure and manner of life.[39]

Al-Ghazālī's final encounter was with Ṣūfīsm. As for Islamic mystical tradition, it is worth noting that from the life of Muḥammad onwards there were Muslims to whom the element of piety or spirituality in the Qur'ān had strong appeal. In the earliest days, such Muslims were nearly all Arabs. With the conversion of the inhabitants of Iraq, came into Islam many people familiar with Christian mystical traditions. It is among non-Arabs that mysticism in the strict sense developed. Among the most prominent Ṣūfīs of the early period, one should mention Ḥasan al-Baṣrī (643–728), Abū Yazīd al-Biṣṭāmī (d. 874–875 or 848–849), Al-Junayd (d. 910) and Al-Ḥallāj (d. 922). There was much mysticism during the tenth and eleventh centuries. It is worth noting that in those days Ṣūfīsm was not something isolated, as some Western accounts may suggest, but had become a part of the ordinary life of the Muslim *ʻumma*. One of the important aspects of the early Ṣūfī movement was its relation to contemporary history and to social conditions. In other words, the early ascetic trends were a reaction to the wealth and luxury of the leaders and a little later, the Ṣūfīs began to attack the worldliness and hypocrisy of the scholar-jurists.[40] These men, "supported" by the "strong argument" taken from the standard collections of "sound Traditions" by Al-Bukhārī (d. 870) and Muslim (d. 875), formed a closed co-operation and from the times of *Miḥna* or the Inquisition of (833–849), were, with hardly any exceptions, wholly subservient to the government.

The period from around 900 to 1100 saw fresh vicissitudes. For half a century or more after 945, Baghdad was under the rule of the Shīʻite Buwayhid sultans. Although the

[37] Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 85.
[38] Ibidem.
[39] Ibid., pp. 85–86.
[40] Ibid., p. 131.

Sunnite scholar-jurists continued to have official recognition, their power was decreasing and they became involved in court intrigues. After the turbulent years that followed the Buwayhids decline, the advent of the Seljuqs in 1055 brought a measure of peace. When their government, guided by Niẓām al-Mulk, decided to support and promote Ash'arism, the dependence of the scholar-jurists on the rulers was increased. One of the results was the succumbing of the scholar-jurists to the politicians' disease of worldliness and materialism, an "epidemic to which criticism bear witness.[41] Under these circumstances, the movement flourished. However, the sources of worldliness were so strong in political and judicial circles that it was impossible for mystics to express their spiritual aspirations in public life. One may say that, in this situation, it seemed quite natural that the higher spiritual aspirations should seek to express themselves through the cultivation of the inner life. Thus, the adoption of the mystic life by some members of the intellectual circles did not simply mean a refusal to face difficulties, but as Watt pointed out, "the spiritual vision which had hitherto guided the development of Islam was itself pointing to a greater concentration on the inner life".[42]

After four years in Baghdād, Al-Ghazālī felt himself so involved in the worldliness of his milieu that he was in danger of 'going to hell'. The profound inner struggle he experienced caused a psychosomatic illness in 1095. Dryness of the tongue prevented him from lecturing and even from eating, and the doctors could do nothing to alleviate the symptoms. After about six months, he decided to leave the professorship and adopt the life of Ṣūfī. To avoid any attempts to stop him, he let it be known that he was setting out on a pilgrimage to Mecca. In November 1095, Al-Ghazālī left Baghdad heading to Damascus and lived there for a while. Towards the end of 1096, he went to Jerusalem. During the months of November and December 1096, he was engaged in the pilgrimage to Mecca, perhaps visiting Alexandria on the way. He went back to Damascus, but no later than June 1097 did he return to Baghdad. He spent some time there, but possibly, around 1099 returned to his native town Ṭūs.

There Al-Ghazālī established a *khānāqā* where some young disciples joined him in leading a communal Ṣūfī life. Around 1105 or early 1106 Fakhr al-Mulk (the son of Niẓām al-Mulk) the new vizier of the Seljūq prince, offered him the professorship at the Niẓāmiyya college. One should underline that this was the eleven month of the Muslim year 499. The year 500, which began on September 2nd, marked the beginning of a new century. According to traditions, Muḥammad was reported to have said that God would send a *"mujaddid"* (a "renewer") of his religion at the beginning of each century. Some friends assured Al-Ghazālī that he was the "renewer" for the six century. Therefore, he accepted the invitation of Fakhr al-Mulk, went to Nishapur, and there he assumed his duties around July or August of 1106. After about three or four years of working there, Al-Ghazālī returned to Ṭūs, where he died in 1111.

In his autobiography *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, Al-Ghazālī said that he had turned to the study of Ṣūfīsm only after he found no satisfaction in his study of theology, philosophy, and Bāṭinism. However, it should be pointed out that this was not his first encounter with the Muslim mystics. Al-Ghazālī was in contact with them much earlier. The guardian to whom he and his brother were entrusted to upon his father's death, was a Ṣūfī.[43] While he was a student at Ṭūs, he had a spiritual leader who was also a Ṣūfī. In Nishapur, Al-Juwaynī, under

[41] Ibid., p. 133.
[42] Ibidem.
[43] Ibidem.

whom he was studying theology, was sympathetic to Ṣūfīsm. In addition, Al-Fārmadhī, the professor of jurisprudence under whom Al-Ghazālī worked, was a recognized leader of the *Ṣufīs* in Ṭūs and Nishapur.

As mentioned by Watt, in light of *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, during both his student days and the subsequent years, Al-Ghazālī was particularly concerned with the quest for the truth. His first crisis, while he was a complete sceptic, arose from his conclusion that the methods he had been employing did not give him absolute certainty. He had probably begun to study philosophy before this crisis, and he may have reached the point of seeing that in theology and metaphysics, the philosophers did not follow a strictly logical method. At the close of this period of skepticism, he found himself able to accept some basic principles because of a "light from God." One may say that he saw this light directly or had an immediate intuition, that the principles were true. In 1095, when the second crisis came upon him, he already had a steadfast faith in God, in prophethood and in the Last Day.[44] Although in *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* Al-Ghazālī speaks about a personal search for the truth in his study of Bāṭinism, it may seem that he was rather fulfilling a duty imposed by the caliph.

The close examination of the doctrine of the Bāṭinites also proved beneficial. However, this time Al-Ghazālī's aim was not to find intellectual certainty but rather to achieve a satisfying life, a life worthy of Paradise. He had already realized that this mysticism entailed not only intellectual doctrines but also a way of life. At the beginning of the ninth chapter from *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl* he said:

> Lastly I turned to the ways of the mystics. I knew that in their path there has to be both knowledge and activity...Knowledge was easier for me than activity. I began by reading their books... Then I realized that what is most distinctive of them can be attained only by personal experience (taste – dhawq), ecstasy and a change of character.[45]

The importance of Islamic mysticism in also explained by Al-Ghazālī in *Iḥya''ulūm al-dīn* (1096/7, *The Revival of the Religious Sciences*), considered to be his greatest work.[46] It is divided into four "quarters." Each "quarter" consists of ten books. The first quarter isentitled "matters of service (sc. of God)." The first book, intended as an introduction, is divided into seven chapters and is focused on presenting which subjects of study or science are, according to Al-Ghazālī, important for a pious Muslim. The second book is devoted to the presentation of the basic principles of the creed and contains:

> (a) an elaboration of the Confession of Faith – "I bear witness that there is no god but God, Muhammad is the messenger of God; (b) a discussion of education in matters of doctrine; (c) a statement of the Islamic doctrine in four sections, each with ten points; (d) a discussion of the relation between the faith and Islam, that is between being a believer and being a Muslim.[47]

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[44] Ibid., p. 134.

[45] Al-Ghazālī *Al-Munqidh min ad-Dalal* [Deliverance from Error], Cairo: Al-Maktaba al-Anglo-Misriya, 1962, p. 34. Cf. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 135.

[46] A small part of it, namely *Al-Risāla al-Qudsīyya* (1097, *The Jerusalem Epistle*) was probably written separately during his stay in Jerusalem in 1096 (Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*..., p. 151).

[47] Ibid., p. 152.

The remaining eight books deal with ritual purity (ablutions before worship, etc.), formal prayers or worship, tithing, fasting, the pilgrimage to Mecca, the recitation of the Qur'ān, private prayer and extra-canonical devotions. Each practice is usually introduced by the Qur'ānic verses and the Traditions justifying it.

With regard to the second quarter entitled "customs," Al-Ghazālī discusses the external aspects of ordinary life outside the practice or cult. There are books about various aspects of everyday life, such as eating and drinking, marriage, earning one's living, and engaging in business, relations with relatives and friends, the life of retirement, traveling, the use of music, and about reforming society and improving the reciprocal relations between people. Furthermore, Al-Ghazālī also discusses the issue of "lawful and unlawful," which is a sensitive issue of conscience. It is worth noting that for Muslims all the aspects of their lives are connected with the reviled law. Therefore, although in this quarter the author deals predominantly with rather secular matters, one may say that he never "loses sight of the contribution of the things he discusses to man's spiritual growth".[48]

The third and fourth quarters are devoted to matters related to man's inner life and are respectively entitled "things leading to destruction" and "things leading to salvation". The third quarter begins with an introduction on the "mysteries of the heart", followed by a book discussing the matter of improvement of character. In his subsequent eight books, Al-Ghazālī considers issues such as the control of appetites for food and sexual intercourse, the weakness of 'the tongue', anger, worldliness, avarice, hypocrisy, and love of fame, pride, vanity and self-deception. The books of the fourth quarter are respectively on repentance, on patience and gratitude (to God), fear and hope, poverty and self-discipline, asserting God's unity and trusting in him, love (for God) and approval (of his decrees), sincerity and purity of intention, on self-examination, on meditation, and on death and the life to come.

In light of *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, one may conclude that Al-Ghazālī Ṣūfīsm signified much more than devoted prayer and a cultivation of ecstatic states. His adherence to Ṣūfīsm absolutely convinced him and made him constantly aware of the fact that the life he lived was only a preparation for the life to come. In addition, since the prelude of the life to come was the Last Judgement, Al-Ghazālī was very concerned with the improvement of his own character. Therefore, he believed that some experience of mystical ecstasy should not be the ultimate goal, but that it could only help support and make it easier to improve one's character and reach a higher degree of reward in the life to come.

Al-Ghazālī's great works, and in particular *Iḥya' 'ulūm al-dīn* and *Al-munqidh min al-ḍalāl*, provide both a theoretical justification of his position and a highly detailed elucidation, both of which emphasized the deeper meaning of the external acts. In this way in both his writing and in his own life, this outstanding scholar showed how a profound inner life can be combined with a full observance of *sharī 'a* and a sound theological doctrine. The consequences of the life and works of Al-Ghazālī was that religious scholars in the main stream of Sunnism had to look more favorably on the Ṣūfī movement, and this made it possible for ordinary Muslims to adopt moderate Ṣūfī practices.

[48] Ibid., p. 153.

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Jihadist Activities in the Internet and Social Medias

Abstract

The present paper concerns studies on communication and propaganda strategies of the main jihadist groups al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In fact, agitation campaigns implemented by those organizations enabled to expand ideological and operational influences as well as to encourage different militants in the world to join the battlefield in Syria and Iraq or to carry out terrorist attacks in the West.

Analysis of propaganda techniques reflects al-Qaeda propaganda, which concentrates on limited technical facilities and written manifestos based on liturgical sermon and Arabic rhetoric.

Besides, the research presents some innovative propaganda techniques implemented by ISIS. They concern traditional, liturgical speeches in Arabic addressed to local audiences in mosques and modern forms of communication such as radio and TV stations, social medias including sophisticated programs, high quality pictures, graphics and videos. Moreover, studies on jihadist propaganda show specific ideological competitions between al-Qaeda and ISIS, which try to attract the audience and affect emotions of followers who support particular group.

Key words: ISIS, Islam, jihadism, rhetoric, communication

Introduction

Growing threats and worldwide influences of jihadist organizations such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or al-Qaeda rely on ideological, military, financial and operational capacities. However, radical Islamist groups could not succeed without appropriate propaganda and communication strategies that enabled to recruit and inspire insurgents, including foreign volunteers.

Al-Qaeda was the first organization, which exploited effectively media agitations, which concentrated on audiovisual manifestos broadcasted by Arab satellite channels and Internet websites. The manifestos had limited technical facilities and they relied on traditional communication forms in the Arab world. In recent times, agitation campaigns have been initiated by ISIS, which focuses on new technologies and social medias. In fact, the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011 and other al-Qaeda's leaders like Anwar Awlaqi or Abu Yahia al-Libi, as well as eruption of the Arab Spring have affected al-Qaeda's ideological and operational capacities. Moreover, failures of the transition process in post-revolutionary countries and overthrew of Islamist representatives by secular and military forces deepened the crisis among al-Qaeda's militants who expected other results and they hoped to share power or to implement their ideological programs.

Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of ISIS responded to insurgents' hopes and offered new concept of jihad and implementation of sharia regulations as well as establishment of the historic caliphate. Successful military combats, support of Sunni communities, control of large parts of Syria and Iraq as well as terror campaign and brutal executions reinforced the position of the organization and defined new forms of jihad compared to dignity, bravery, honor and adventure. So far, more than 30 different groups, including insurgents from Asia and Africa have taken an oath to al-Baghdadi.[1]

Moreover, al-Qaeda and ISIS compete each other for successful position among worldwide jihadists. The last terrorist attacks in Paris demonstrate this phenomenon. The attack against French *Charlie Hebdo* magazine in January 2015 was carried out by the Kouachi brothers who were inspired by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Besides, Amedy Coulibaly, who headed the attack against the kosher supermarket in Paris claimed that he was encouraged by ISIS.[2] Propaganda techniques played a crucial role in motivation and agitation process that encouraged young persons to carry out brutal acts against civilians in France. Similar situation reflect other recruits who are inspired by appropriate forms or messages presented in the Internet and social medias. In this regard, the jihadist propaganda deserves further studied.

Traditional concept of jihadist propaganda

First forms of jihadist propaganda were rather limited and they concerned al-Qaeda organization, which focused on verbal and written manifestos. Audiovisual or stylistic features were limited and less important because al-Qaeda's leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri or Musab al-Zarqawi usually delivered their manifestos in difficult logistic conditions in war zones of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq. Propaganda materials delivered by official Islamist websites or TV channels like al-Jazeera contained poor scenery, staid graphics and uniform pictures highlighting figures of the speaker. Moreover, after each terrorist attack insurgents and followers have waited an official statement of al-Qaeda's command and they have respected all ideas, slogans and objectives of the message.

However, propaganda techniques applied in official manifestos exploited the concept of liturgical sermons called *khutba* and Arabic rhetoric called *balagha*. *Khutba* is one of the oldest narrative and oratory forms in the Arab and Muslim world. It is presented in mosques during Friday's prayer or on special occasions of feasts and holidays. Basic narration and stylistic features reflect two parts of the speech. The first one regards short prayers, religious invocations and citations of Quranic verses. It is always followed by the expression: *wa ba´d* (and then; afterwards), which indicates separation between passages in the speech. The second part is delivered after a short break and it is the main fragment of the sermon. It usually concerns religious and moral values or social questions such as unemployment, drug abuse, organized crime or family crisis and positive values of Islam. Discussions are based on the Quran and hadiths (stories, statements and report attributed to the Prophet Mohammad) or various allegories and examples from history and everyday

[1] Tobias Feakin and Benedict Wilkinson, 'The Future of Jihad What Next for ISIL and al-Qaeda?', *Strategic Insight, Australian Strategic Policy Institute*, June 2015, pp. 7–8.

[2] Rukmini Callimachi and Jim Yardley, 'From Amateur to Ruthless Jihadist in France', *The New York Times*, January 17, 2015, http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/18/world/europe/paris-terrorism-brothers-said-cherif-kouachi-charlie-hebdo.html (accessed 10 November 2015).

life. The speech is concluded by other religious citations.[3] Moreover, the central fragment of the sermon also reflect implementation of rhetorical devices regarding different forms of narration and compositions, appropriate words and arguments as well as rhetorical figures like comparisons, metaphors, repetitions or antithesis.[4]

Khutba also includes some non-verbal devices and speaker's attributes such as theological skills, respect among believers, presentation of the sermon in liturgical podium above the auditorium as well as sacral clothes during the speech or balanced voice and gestures.[5] It should be pointed out that religious discourse was often politicized by Islamist groups, which used the structure of *khutba* or *balagha* to present political messages in the second part of the speech.[6]

For instance, al-Qaeda's leaders Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-Zawahiri often started their speeches with religious invocations such as: "In the name of God the Most Gracious, the Most Merciful", "Prayer and peace be upon the Prophet", "Peace be upon those who follow the right way" or: "I seek protection in Allah from the accursed Satan". After the expression: *wa ba´d* they concentrated on the second part, which was a combination of political, ideological and religious slogans and demands. Al-Qaeda's publications and media presentations were focusing on two opposite images. The first was based on criticism, accusations and damnations of different political enemies like Western governments and military forces as well as local authorities and officials. The second idea reflected glorification of terrorist activities and encouragement of supporters and militants.

However, those images were based on different rhetorical devices, which had a strong influence on emotions and opinions of the audience. Al-Qaeda's leaders often used particular names and definitions attributed to Western enemies, interior authorities and military forces. For example, many words focused on historical and religious symbols. The publications often contained the words like *salibiyyun* (crusaders), *sihyuniyyun* (Zionists) and *taghut* (a devil, a Satan). The enemies and opponents were also called *kuffar* (sinners), *murtaddun* (apostates) or *a´da Allah ta´ala* (The enemies of Allah). Al-Qaeda's leaders tried to keep alive national and social disproportions as well as religious dissentions between societies in the world. They adopted words containing negative connotations related to a sin, a devil, immorality and hostility as well as critical impressions resulting from crusaders war and Zionism. Moreover, political messages were intensified by certain Quranic verses and *hadith*, which explained objectives of jihadism and justified terrorist activities. Manifestos also concerned traumatic descriptions regarding Muslim communities in particular countries. Many manifestos referred to Western military operations and devastations among civilians in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia or Chechnya. The arguments affected feelings and reactions of Muslim societies who condoled with victims of military missions in the Arab-Muslim world.

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[3] Linda Jones, *The Power of Oratory in the Medieval Muslim World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012, pp. 195–232.

[4] Patrick Gaffney, *The Prophet's Pulpit*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994, pp. 271–293.

[5] Jones, *The Power of Oratory...,* pp. 195–232.

[6] Examples presented in the following paper are based on jihadist propaganda materials available in private archives of the author. They were collected from various jihadist websites, social medias as well as al-Jazeera Internet sections that have published al-Qaeda manifestos in the years 2001–2011. Al-Jazeera has finally cancelled navigation to the section. See more: http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/392BC4D7-E9AA-4E5A-8F33– 877EEB0C0781.htm (accessed 20 November 2011).

The negative opinions about Western countries were also emphasized by distinctive and controversial news frustrating or shocking the public opinion. Jihadist groups benefited from events, which demonstrated humiliation or insults to traditions, beliefs and costumes of Muslim communities around the world. Statements have also mentioned tortures of prisoners in Guantanamo and Abou Ghraib, as well as caricatures of the Prophet Mohammad or a ban of Islamic veil in Europe. The appeal to different arguments were usually followed by final conclusions showing a new kind of crusades against Islam, which encouraged additionally to military and terrorist response. Besides, appropriate arguments glorified militants responsible for the spectacular terrorist plots like the 9/11 attacks or Madrid bombings in 2004 and London attacks in 2005. Al-Qaeda's militants were exalted by metaphoric expressions concerning destruction of the pagan idol, which replaced the literary sense of the 9/11 attacks. The terrorist acts were justified and respected because they generated religious connotations related to struggle against the evil and paganism. Moreover, al-Qaeda referred to glorious events in the Arab-Islamic history and descriptions of distinguished Muslim personalities or heroes like successors of the Prophet Mohammad, famous caliphs or brave military leaders.

Traditional liturgical discourse has affected ISIS's leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi who applied the concept of the sermon in his official speeches. The sermon delivered in Ramadan 2014, in which he announced the establishment of the caliphate is a good example in that context.[7] Contrary to previous jihadist leaders, al-Baghdadi respected all conventions and etiquettes regarding non-verbal and narration features of *khutba*.[8] His sermon was presented in classic Arabic in the main mosque in Mosul above the auditorium in liturgical podium. Al-Baghdadi was wearing sacral clothes and he was standing up at the first step of speech and then he was sitting down during other parts of the discourse. He also avoided loud voices, chaotic gestures or reactions and he used index fingers to precise or underlines some questions.

Apart from personal skills, al-Baghdadi followed strict narration and stylistic devices of *khutba* and *balagha*. He started his speech with religious invocations and citations and after a short break he refers to main subjects concerning spiritual values of the holy month, which absolves from all sins and rehabilitates human souls. Ramadan was confronted with specific concept of jihad described by al-Baghdadi as scarified efforts facilitating defeat of enemies and implementation of Islam values and the historic caliphate. Furthermore, al-Baghdadi's opinions were followed by appropriate argumentations based on sources such as the Quran, hadiths or citations of noble personalities from the history of Muslim empires. For examples, he refers to the speech of the Caliph Abu Bakr who became the first Muslim Caliph from 632 to 634 following the Prophet Muhammad's death. Al-Baghdadi appeals to the famous speech of Abu Bakr after seizure of power: "I have been given the authority over you, and I am not the best of you. If I do well, help me; and if I do wrong, set me right. Sincere regard for truth is loyalty and disregard for truth is treachery. The weak amongst you shall be strong with me until I have secured his rights, if God will; and the strong amongst you shall be weak with me until I have wrested from him the rights of others, if God will. Obey

[7] Hannah Strange, 'Islamic State Leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi Addresses Muslims in Mosul', *The Telegraph*, July 5, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-State-leader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html (accessed 9 November 2015).

[8] Jones, *The Power of Oratory...,* pp. 195–232.

me so long as I obey God and His Messenger. But if I disobey God and His Messenger, ye owe me no obedience. Arise for your prayer, God have mercy upon you''.[9]

Al-Baghdadi stated his obedience to Allah's orders like the first caliph Abu Bakr did. He also avoided straight political messages but the appeal to the symbolic speech of Abu Bakr enabled to authorizes the new Caliphate, distinguish the power of the new Muslim leader and stimulate allegiance of other jihadist groups. However, the narration of the speech and liturgical style also explained and justified ISIS's policy regarding violent implementation of sharia laws, executions of hostages and rival religious factions.

Al-Qaeda's media and Internet facilities

Al-Qaeda propaganda techniques have flourished along with development of new technologies and Internet facilities. The organization expanded its activities in particular websites such as *Ansar al-mujahidun* (Supporters of mujahideen), *Shabakat al-jihad al-alamiyyi* (Network of Global Jihad), *Shabakat ash-shumukh al-islamiyya* (Islamic Glory Network). The websites often changed their names and technical parameters because of Internet blockade and suspension. The Internet services included various materials produced by media centers like as *as-Sahab* (Cloud) that focused on global issues as well as local services like *Furqan* (Victory) and *al-Fajr* (Dawn) from Iraq or *Kataib* (Battalion) from Somalia, *al-Andalus* (Andalusia) from Maghreb and *al-Malahim* (Epics) from the Gulf. Al-Qaeda's online offensive was determined by growing number of audiovisual materials. For instance, in 2007 *as-Sahab* network released 97 different media productions comparing to 2002 when the organization issued only 6 videos.[10] The concept of media campaign relied on decentralized networks, which posted online materials that usually concerned video reports from battlefields in the Middle East, Asia or north Africa. Statements of regional insurgents were identified by the same composition of texts, which pointed out detailed descriptions of terrorist attacks. All materials stressed dates and way of terrorist attacks as well as information about damages and causalities among security forces and civilian.[11] Besides, local statements became a derivation of the manifestos delivered by al-Qaeda's leaders. For instance, regional insurgents used the same meanings describing different enemies called apostates, pagans or crusaders and they applied similar arguments justifying and glorifying terrorist attacks.

Moreover, regional statements were reinforced by some video materials. Distinctive features of the productions reflected dynamic scenes and combination of different motifs. Many videos started with presentations of al-Qaeda's leaders, who delivered their speeches in front of pictures pointing out spectacular terrorist attacks like September 11 attacks, Madrid bombings in 2004 or London attacks in 2005. The manifestos were interfered with official press releases and videos showing military activities of Al-Qaeda. However, the scenes were supported by religious chants glorifying fighters and condemning enemies, as well as pictures demonstrating tragic situation of Muslim communities around the world.[12]

[9] Rami Munir, *Al-Khitaba ind al-arab*, Bayrut: Dar al-Fikr al-Arabi, 2005, pp. 39– 40.

[10] Craig Whitlock, 'Al-Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive', *The Washington Post*, June 24, 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com (accessed 9 November 2015).

[11] Manifestos of regional jihadist groups were often published by particular websites such as al-Boraq: http://www.al-boraq.info/showthread.php?t=42304. (accessed 10 May 2005) or al-Ekhlas: http://al-ekhlaas.net/forum/showthread.php?t=168809 (accessed 10 May 2005).

[12] Al-Qaeda propaganda video issued on You Tube: http://pl.youtube.com/watch?v=p04IptVK-7M (accessed 6 June 2008).

Pictures of al-Qaeda's leaders were confronted with videos of local branches that demonstrated in details attacks against local authorities, US army patrols, convoys and official headquarters. The scenes usually showed trapped cars, which exploded in front of military vehicles or governmental buildings. Besides, some reports described every step of the attack. First scenes were called *Idad al-ghazwa* (Preparation of the attack) and they presented preparations of explosives and the trapped car. The scenes were followed by sequences showing greetings and wishes between fighters and their commandants. Afterwards, the videos focused on travel through the target called *Rihla* (Journey). Last scenes highlighted strong detonation of explosives placed in cars or trucks. Sometimes, the final scenes were repeated and slowed down to point out the moment of the destruction.[13] All films included appropriate battle songs encouraging the audience to support al-Qaeda's activities. The chants contained burdens like: "The fate to the target has started" or: "Dear Mather! Pass the racket Katyusha and put on the back a uniform of cartridge".[14] The phrases conserved their rhymes and they expressed poetic, pathetic or sentimental character of the battle compared to heroism, dignity and adventures. Furthermore, encouragements and glorifications of terrorist attacks were also based on pictures illustrating pride, glory and happiness of death fighters. Many videos scenes included pictures of smiling and happy faces of combatants after the attack, as well as inscriptions: "After the sacrifice, an aroma of musk has risen from his body".[15] The authors of films adopted magic and spiritual elements to terrorist acts that affected sentiments and emotions of insurgents, who considered terror actions as heroic deeds.

New forms of jihadist propaganda

Counter-terrorism campaigns have decreased the role of al-Qaeda's official websites that were censored, blocked and suspended. Webmasters had limited access to Internet services and militants were forced to use suitable passwords and logins.

ISIS took a lesson from the situation and implemented some innovative forms of propaganda that includes new technologies such as TV channels, radio stations or social medias and sophisticated online magazines issued in PDF versions. It should be pointed out that all sources are available in different free Web hosting or uploading sites. They are released in multilingual versions in order to attract wide audience, especially young militants from Western countries.[16] *Dabiq* magazine became an important communication platform for radical Islamists around the world.[17] The name refers to the historic Battle of Marj Dabiq near Aleppo in Syria. In 1516 the Ottoman army conquered most of the Middle East, which encompassed the entire region of Syria and built the new Empire.[18]

[13] Al-Qaeda propaganda video issued on You Tube: http://pl.youtube.com/watch?v=umfq-Bht4KM&NR=1 (accessed 6 June 2008).

[14] Al-Qaeda propaganda video issued on You Tube: http://pl.youtube.com/watch?v=zwgrAuZKLNA (accessed 6 June 2008).

[15] Al-Qaeda propaganda video issued on You Tube: http://pl.youtube.com/watch?v=m8yYO7bUp-E&NR=1 (accessed 6 June 2008).

[16] Franck Daninos, 'Internet, Arme de Persuasion Massive', *Hors-Series science et avenir*, Juillet–Aout, 2015, pp. 10–14.

[17] PDF versions of Dabiq magazine are available on the website Jihadology: http://jihadology.net/category/dabiq-magazine/ (accessed 9 November 2015).

[18] Richard Gray, *The Cambridge History of Africa*, Vol. 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975, pp. 14–15.

Instead of long theological and political discussions, the magazine contains short messages based on suggestive graphics and provocative pictures similar to tabloid press or comics. Cover and first pages from the magazine usually present main headlines, including slogans regarding policy and strategy of the new caliphate. Statements, manifestos and short reports are always followed by photos illustrating ISIS successful offensives and campaigns in Syria and Iraq, images of wounded soldiers among fires and explosions as well as victorious parades of militants in controlled cities or harvest campaign and distribution of food and water. Other pictures show brutal executions of Shia prisoners, representatives of Christian and Yazidi communities or some colorful and sophisticated graphics showing spectacular terrorist attacks around the world. The pictures are followed by symbolic sentences such as: "Khalifa declared", "A new era has arrived" or: "It's either the Islamic state of the flood".

The *Dabiq* respects traditional concept of propaganda popularized by previous jihadist leaders such as Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. For example, different opponents are usually called *salibiyyun* (crusaders), *taghut* (a devil, a Satan) or *kuffar* (sinners) and *murtaddun* (apostates). The meanings are already known for radical Islamists, who compare Western and local authorities to the Devil, sins, immorality, crusaders wars or Zionism. Furthermore, the *Dabiq* presents transliterations of the Arabic words without English equivalents in order to conserve stylistic traditions of jihadist propaganda and to identify symbolic meanings that unite and strengthen ISIS insurgents and followers. It should be also pointed out, that ISIS hijacked the stylistic and linguistic concept of the *Inspire* magazine issued by Anwar al-Awlaqi who has been killed in 2011 by drone attack on his convoy in Jawf province, Yemen.[19] Sophisticated and modern style of the *Inspire* magazine contained short messages in English based on suggestive graphics and significant pictures similar to tabloid press or comics and graffiti. The slogans exposed in the journals usually refer to martyrdom and bravery of militants as well as destructive activities of Western countries.

Apart from online journals and magazines ISIS broadcasts the radio station called *al-Bayan* (Statement) and TV station al-Hayat Media Center as well as the Internet service *A'maq Ikhbariyya* (Depth of Information). The audiovisual tools enable to implement sophisticated programs and headlines, including high quality pictures, graphics and videos regarding statements on terrorist attacks, short multilingual reports from battlefields in Syria and Iraq, brutal executions of hostages as well as manifestos glorifying attacks against enemies and implementation of ISIS laws and regulation in controlled territories.[20] For example, some media sources present modifications of heroes and graphics appearing in popular video games or Hollywood films. They are attributed to local fighters who are compared in that way to brave and famous heroes fighting with brutal enemies.

Statements released by ISIS media stations are often similar to the war reports published by al-Qaeda in the past. They usually contain dates and type of attacks as well as number of casualties among security forces and civilians. However, descriptions and updates are always followed by appropriate graphics, pictures, color scheme and logos that identify the organization.

[19] Howard Koplowitz, 'US Formally Admits Killing Anwar Al-Awlaki, 3 Other Citizens, In Drone Strikes', *International Business Times*, May 22, 2013, http://www.ibtimes.com/us-formally-admits-killing-anwar-al-awlaki-3-other-citizens-drone-strikes-full-text-1275805 (accessed 29 June 2014).

[20] Asma Ajroudi, 'It sounds like BBC: ISIS seeks legitimacy via 'caliphate' radio service', *Al-Arabiya News*, June 12, 2015, http://english.alarabiya.net/en/media/television-and-radio/2015/06/12/-It-sounds-like-BBC-ISIS-seeks-legitimacy-via-caliphate-radio-service-.html (accessed 10 November 2015).

ISIS also exploits social medias such as Twitter. Militants usually avoid Facebook or Instagram profiles because in their opinions they have poor security and encrypting tools. Besides, new encrypting programs and application become more and more popular among jihadists who try to protect their identity and conversations.[21] However, ISIS is still very active in Twitter that facilitates fast communication and publication of short messages, graphics and videos. ISIS's profiles contain appropriate avatars that identify users, their political views and character of displayed materials. Every tweet generates other posts and profiles reflecting common ideas of jihadism, glorification of fighters and condemnation of local and Western authorities or threats of future attacks. Twitter profiles also regard unofficial services of Hayat Media Center or *A'maq Ikhbariyya* as well as less known accounts services like *Somood* from Afghanistan or *Qabas* and *Rimah*, which focus on ISIS policy in the world or Syrian and Iraqi territories. Furthermore, ISIS militants can freely express their opinions, manifestos, graphics and videos. The new phenomenon was obvious during the terrorist attack against the *Charlie Hebdo* magazine in Paris in January 2015. ISIS's followers published a tragic photo of a dead policemen lying on the ground. It should be noted that first videos from the attack showed a terrorist shooting a police officer who tried to help people executed in the editorial board of the *Charlie Hebdo*. Twitter accounts used by ISIS released the picture of the killed policeman with short inscriptions: "If we do not revenge the Prophet, we do not will know prosperity" and: "The attack against the newspaper which published pictures insulting the Prophet".[22] The commentaries explained and justified the attacks and they glorified ISIS's policy.

Blocking of Twitter accounts are ineffective because suspended profiles are replaced by new users who often change their avatars and names. According to the United States Department of Defense there are around 6000 active ISIS users. Some surveys estimate 46,000 ISIS's supporters who use Twitter accounts.[23] It is also more and more difficult to identify potential supporters, militants and terrorists because they use various avatars, profiles, symbols and particular words that unite them and facilitate communication and exchange of materials. It should be pointed out that communication between jihadists relies on appropriate words and phrases in Arabic. They identify internet accounts and hashtags in Twitter service. Internet users usually refer to Arabic hashtags like: *khilafa* (caliphate) and *dawla islamiyya* (Islamic State), *jund al-khilafa* (soldiers of the caliphate) or *shabakat al-jihad al-alamiyyi* (worldwide jihadi network), *a'maq ikhbariyya* and *ansar al-mujahidin* (followers of mujahideens) that are a derivation of popular jihadist websites. The words are often modified and they include additional epithets in Arabic in case of blocking and suspension. Many Tweeter accounts also reflect different statements, threats and short commentaries posted after particular terrorist attacks. The accounts are usually attributed to the hashtag *ghazwa mubaraka* (blessed invasion) with an appropriate name of the country affected by terrorist threats and attacks.

[21] Kim Zetter, 'ISIS's Opsec Manual Reveals how it Handles Cybersecurity', *Wired*, November, 19, 2015, http://www.wired.com/2015/11/isis-opsec-encryption-manuals-reveal-terrorist-group-security-protocols/ (accessed 19 November 2015).

[22] Posts and commentaries published in jihadist profiles in Twitter service: www.twitter.com/ss20y4_zz/status/552900877403045478 4 (accessed 20 January 2015).

[23] Allison Astorino-Courtois and Sarah Canna (eds), 'ISIL Influence and Resolve', *Special Operations Command Central – SOCCENT, A Strategic Multi-Layer (SMA) Periodic Publication*, September 2015, pp. 11–13.

Conclusion

The research presented in the paper has demonstrated some communication and propaganda strategies of the main jihadist groups al-Qaeda and ISIS. Analysis of propaganda techniques showed that al-Qaeda's media campaigns have concentrated on limited technical facilities and written manifestos based on liturgical sermon and Arabic rhetoric. Moreover, in recent times al-Qaeda has decreased its propaganda capacities because of censorship and suspension of official websites. The agitation process was replaced by successful ideological and military offensives of ISIS that spread different sorts of agitation techniques, especially in social medias such as Twitter. Besides, studies on jihadist propaganda presented some common propaganda mechanisms applied by al-Qaeda and ISIS. In fact, al-Qaeda has inspired ISIS's militants who applied similar propaganda materials. Both organizations have delivered liturgical speeches and adopted rhetorical features in their sermons. On the other, al-Baghdadi's sermons had more effective impacts on the audience that appreciated adherence to the stylistic principles of the sermon and ideological or theological messages. Besides, both organizations released similar statements compared to war reports that have included appropriate graphics, narration and stylistic or rhetorical figures as well as similar descriptions of terrorist attacks and information about damages and causalities. This phenomenon also reflected the *Dabiq* magazine published by ISIS and the *Inspire* magazine issued by Anwar al-Awlaqi from al-Qaeda. In this regard, both organizations have been operating like a well-coordinated enterprise with particular logos, appropriate graphics or color schemes.

However, contrary to al-Qaeda's media campaigns, ISIS reinforced various channels of communications and exploited new technologies and Internet facilities. For instance, activities in social medias have expanded ideological and operational influences of ISIS and encouraged different militants in the world to join al-Baghdadi's organization. Various Internet accounts and Tweeter profiles have enabled to express jihadist objectives and to spread extremist ideas among internet users in order to recruit new fighters and to inspire terrorist attacks.

The research presented in the paper also showed some new challenges for security and counterterrorism policies in the world. It should be pointed out that it is more and more difficult to identify potential supporters, militants and terrorists because they use various avatars, profiles, symbols and particular Arabic hashtags that unite them and facilitate communication and exchange of materials. Besides, blocking of Twitter accounts are ineffective because suspended profiles are replaced by new users who often change their avatars and profiles.

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The Ethnic Groups and Religious Beliefs of Southern China in the Transformation Period Shown as in the Example of the Hunan Province

Our original plans included visiting three provinces of Southern China: Yunnan, Guizhou and Hunan. External factors, in this case an earthquake, changed our plans: we could only visit the province of Hunan, with particular emphasis on its capital Changsha, and the western part of the province, inhabited by ethnic minorities known as Xiangxi.[1]

In 2005 the population of the Hunan province consisted of approximately 66,977,000 inhabitants, out of which around 23,776,800 lived in cities, and the rural population numbered around 43,200,200. In addition to the traditionally dominant Han nationality, in the province there are as many as 50 (out of 55) nationalities constituting around 5.2 million people, roughly 8% of the population of the province. However, from that number, 99% are attributed to six major nationalities, i.e. Tujia, Miao, Dong, Yao, Bai and Hui[2] who are Sinicized Muslims.

Conventionally, the Hunan province is one of the two large Chinese provinces (the other one is Guangdong) in which the harvest of rice is abundant enough to sustain the whole country. Also traditionally, in the restaurants of Hunan, rice is free and you can have as much of it as you want.

During our visit to the Hunan province once again the old Chinese maxim: *Boi wen bu ru yi jian!* (It's better to see once than to hear a hundred times!) was confirmed. Instead of the rustic character of the province, we saw the urban landscape of the capital with numerous skyscrapers made of glass and steel, rice plots in the valleys of the rivers deserted after the harvest, and a magnificent highway which took us a few hundred kilometers to the west of the province, to the large district city of Jishou, a base camp for the Miao villages.

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[1] We visited Hunan in 2013. This expedition was made possible by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences and the Hunan Academy of Sciences. The initial screening of the situation of the ethnic groups of Southern China was facilitated by a meeting with the eminent scientists representing different nationalities of the region associated with the Institute of Ethnology CASS in Beijing. We wish to express our heartfelt thanks to the institutions and all those representing them (Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences).

[2] Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, *Doing Business in Hunan Province of China. Hunan* (in Chinese), Beijing 2006, p. 4.

The Zhonghuang village

The village, located 15 km from the centre of the district (Jishou), currently bears the administrative name of Zhonghuangcun XXX, which means Zhongguang Village, but in fact it consists of three natural settlements (*ziranzhai*), and three rural settlements (*cunmin xiaozu*). The whole administrative unit of Zhonghuang consists of 202 households (*hu*) and has 1,018 inhabitants. The village has 619 *mu*[3] of land irrigated for the cultivation of rice, 497 *mu* of non-irrigated lands and 852 *mu* of land withdrawn from cultivation and allocated to an afforested area. It has well-preserved buildings and cultivates Miao habits. The architectural heritage of the Qing Dynasty includes 68 buildings with more than 200 rooms, with a total area of 13,000 square meters. These buildings include an old paper mill, dams, wells, old housing buildings, roads lined with stone slabs, bridges, stables and the headquarters of the former district authorities. The village within a radius of five kilometers has landscaped areas with amazing mountain roads covered with asphalt and with bridges, as well as parts of the Southern Great Wall. This area is the home of the Miao dance and drum ensemble, and the traditional Miao festival called the Festival of the Eighth of April.

The Zhonghuang village cherishes the traditional arts and crafts in the form of the production of intricate silver ornaments, fabrics and embroidery. Artistic performances depicting the celebration of the aforementioned festival and scenes from Miao village life have won first prizes at festivals. In 2009 the village was granted status of a village entered in the register of protected historic entities.[4]

The traditional occupation of the Zhonghuang population was for centuries the cultivation of rice. The numerous irrigation canals and circular bamboo bailers, used to transfer water from one level to another, are evidence of this. During our presence we were able to see for ourselves how deep is the penetration of the globalised economy (or farming) in local social arrangements (or systems). Several years ago handlers working for companies purchasing types of tea for export started coming to the village and began encouraging local people to switch from cultivating rice to growing this type of product for export. As a result, some fields belonging to the village were covered with a black foil, under which the villagers began to plant tea shrubs. Tea cultivation was much more profitable, although the villagers had to wait several years before the seedlings grew into shrubs. During our stay in the village local women prepared more seedlings for cultivation, which were brought back by representatives of the export companies from the provincial capital.

Old mountain settlement Zhongwu

Although the Zhongwu settlement consists of 68 houses formally inhabited by 307 people, whose statistical annual income is 1,090 yuans per person, in the village itself you can meet very few locals because of the aforementioned internal migration. This migration enables a significant increase in the revenue that local families can obtain from working on the land of which the village has 850 *mu*, but only 207 *mu* of it is arable land, 420 *mu* comprising of forests.[5] Currently, the settlement is subject to heritage conservation and only single-storey or two-storey buildings are permitted to be built inside the village, without any buildings at

[3] 1 *mu* = 1/16 ha.

[4] The Housing and Urban and Rural Construction Bureau of the City of Jishou, *Planning of Preservation of the Old Miao Villages of Zhonghuang and Zhongwu by the City of Jishou. Collection of Documents,* (in Chinese), Jishou, 2012, pp. 1–2.

[5] Ibid., p. 3.

all breaking its external environment. Well-preserved stone and wooden architecture creates a group of constructions rising like an amphitheater on a small hill.

Inside the village there are no roads and only from the lower situated households can you access the further, higher ones, and finally by ladder at the 'attic' you can climb to the highest level. From there, from the terrace of the stately home of the wealthiest owner from the Yang family, there is a splendid view of the valley full of lush greenery, surrounding misty mountains and a grey amphitheater of roofs leaning towards the riverside.

The local authorities have their minds set not only on the protection of the still existing Miao architectural monuments. They are also driven by tourism, primarily domestic, which provides funds for building the infrastructure necessary for Miao's rural development (waterworks, roads, etc.), and for the tourism itself (parking, etc.). A building worth admiring is the large, already operating, amphitheater with Miao designs in the form of giant bull horns, referring to traditional bullfighting events (and related to gambling).

An accurate guess as to which bull will be victorious, may lead to winnings amounting to the value of the bull multiplied a thousandfold. Towering over the whole decoration is a mast bristling with daggers placed crosswise, on which daredevils climb and ascend in a horizontal position skillfully avoiding the dangerous daggers.

The amphitheater is where non-stop, costumed performances of Miao dances take place, usually referring to wedding ceremonies, with the inevitable silver crowns adorning the girls' heads. The local Miao women. encouraged by the manager in their continuous performances, also present the colorful costumes of ethnic minorities from other areas of Western China. This is where thousands of years ago the exuberant dances with drum accompaniments were created. This is also the place where you can see the seemingly uncomplicated tug of war dance with an oblong wooden drum in the middle. "Home" and "away" teams without haste parody the old wrestling game to the sound of music. In fact, it is not a sporting competition, merely a show referring to the traditional rituals associated with the worship of ancestral spirits. The rarely shown wrestling of picadors with bulls is of similar origin. The animal finally dies as a sacrifice every 13 years and is given to the spirits of the absent ones, followed by one bull sacrifice each day for the next seven days.

The stone mountain settlement of Qixin

Up to the old Miao mountain settlement of Qixin, which is situated in a valley surrounded by the Majingshan, Maliangshan and Guanyinshan mountains whose peaks reach 800 meters above sea level, leads a winding, breakneck but asphalted road on the mountain slope above the abyss which is wide enough for one car only. From time to time traffic signs order drivers to signal to those at the top, that a car is coming up from the lower foothills. After the vehicle reaches the top of the mountain, from dense fog emerges a cluster of houses built of layered stone slates without any mortar.

At the entrance to the village, in a small pool fed by a mountain stream, women do the washing and clean and prepare vegetables for dinner. The narrow passage between the houses, no wider than 6 meters, takes you deep into the village, into the house of a semi-retired teacher who still teaches two local classes and willingly serves as a guide. Before entering the house in which the dinner for the guests was cooked, a short entrance ceremony is held: to enter the room in which the reception is to take place you must first stop by a barrier made from a wide and colorful sash held by girls in festive attire and drink some rice alcohol with them from a clay bowl, or sing a song with them, and it would be desirable

to fulfill both of these wishes. We eagerly stood up to the task. Only then could we sit at the banquet table and enjoy Miao specialties with fatty pork and extra hot peppers of local origin as the main ingredients.

As reported by the teacher, the older children along with their parents had left the village to travel the areas of the southern coast of China, where they would continue their education and begin new lives. Migrants provide financial support to the elderly residents who have stayed in the village, and also take care of the youngest children. Hence there are some new building sites. However they rarely visit their hometown, which is probably due to their three-year contracts on construction sites. Some do not stay in the cities, because it is not easy to get a contract, and they only get as far as the rural areas situated closer to the prosperous coast of South China. Regarding the women, it is easier to find work on farms where they work shearing sugarcane.

As we later learned, the shortage of labor in rural areas has created a new phenomenon, specifically the formation of significant fallow land areas that were formerly cultivated. Before the effects of globalization, this phenomenon was completely unimaginable in China.

A characteristic element of the architecture of Qixin are the stone towers, devoid of windows, which were used for defense against attacks by neighbouring tribe or against criminal expeditions of Manchu troops. Currently there is only one surviving tower left out of the original three and the ruins of another one. The third one is so damaged that it would be dangerous to walk into because it might collapse anytime. During one of the criminal expeditions of Manchu troops, Fu Kangan (1754–1796) leader of the Miao uprising, was locked in one of the towers but could not resist a long siege and in the end surrendered and was executed. The great Miao uprising fought with 18,000 Manchu troops for around 12 years. The defeat of the uprising did not put an end to further revolts from the valiant Miao people and as a result the Manchu authorities simply recognized the whole area of West Hunan as "enclosed". The lack of admission of the Han population to these areas paradoxically meant that despite a well rooted influence from Chinese culture, manifested in ubiquitous, traditional Chinese beliefs (the cult of Heaven and Earth, the cult of God of Thunder Leigong) or in the furnishings of the houses of the affluent Miao, the Han population retained some of their local customs including dances, costumes, embroidery, and the cult of Chiyou a Miao chief reportedly killed in a battle with the emperor, as well as the belief in spirits and demons which have survived quite well. Many legends, newly interpreted, began to be presented as merely a social struggle of the poor against the feudal power.

This does not mean that all the customs listed in the extensive *Dictionary of China's Customs*[6] have survived. According to the local population only the most important ones

[6] Zheng Zhuangyan, Zhang Jian (eds), *Zhongguo minsu cidian* (Dictionary of Habits of China), Publishing House Hubei Cishu, 1985; see: food p. 127; housing p. 139; p. clothing l71; p. festivals 255 etc.

have survived, for instance the ones connected to the Miao New Year or the 'Festival of the Eighth Day of the Fourth Month'. Some of the old customs have long since died out and are long forgotten. It seems that even such an excellent, comprehensive work, which clearly the aforementioned *Dictionary* is, requires in a future edition some clarification as to which customs are still preserved, and which are merely an account from the past attested to only in written sources.

The Hunan Venice, i.e. Fenghuang

We had heard before of the unusual beauty of the waterside city of Fenghuang, also called Phoenix, but the visit exceeded all our expectations. From the windows of one of the dozens of houses which are clearly hotel destinations, we first saw a solid wall, built as a pre-caution against any rebellious Miao, followed by a fairly wide but shallow river, coloured by reflections of dozens of bright neon signs, advertising shops with souvenirs and silver ornaments situated on the other side, with invitations to quaint restaurants, pubs, and especially clubs with music until dawn. It is a big festival for tourists from all over China as well as for a few Japanese.

Just as it barely gets light and the fog rises to reveal a mountain riverside background of sleepy pavilions, divisions of hikers set off led by their guides. Others, after having slept longer after a long night of fun, make their way to less intensive touristic attractions such as spending time on large, populated ships or smaller boats with just a handful of people. Singing contests and mild banter encouraging boat racing entertains the tourists spending time on the river. A water obstacle can also be crossed by jumping onto stone piles, the only threat being a rather sudden bath.

On the other side there is an undoubted paradise for women – the embroidery of the Hunan Miao women. Each item of female clothing ranging from headbands to blouses, aprons, trousers and shoes has long been filled with laborious but exquisite colorful embroidery. Girls at the age of 10 used to begin embroidering their robes for times of being future brides and after singing an introductory duet with a boy from another hill, often after a simulated "kidnapping", they would reach the groom's house. Patriarchal tradition stipulated, however, that only the son inherits the property, so every thrifty mother invested all of her savings in silver ornaments, especially richly decorated, gossamer crowns, massive necklaces, bracelets and pendants, in order to ensure her daughter a dowry, using the only available way of a transfer of assets.

Unfortunately, globalization has also made its mark here, as the old, traditional embroidery is disappearing and is being replaced by mass-made, industrial scale embroidery. This so-called progress has meant that the tasteful selection of colours and delicate patterns embroidered by the Miao women is inevitably giving way to modern fabrics in gaudy colors, decorated with industrially manufactured embroidery. The tradeswomen are selling only the remnants of the original embroidery, mostly from the 1950s. Such historical referencing evokes some unfinished embroidery business, upon which uplifting words from the Great Leap Forward of 1958 have been marked in pencil, however they have yet to be filled in with colourful thread. The unaware tourist may also believe that the industrial scale embroidery is the work of the skilled and crafted hands of the stallholder. But here everything is for sale: from 'ancient' coins minted yesterday, varying sizes of Mao Zedong portraits, the countryman from Hunan, to the wreaths of fresh flowers to adorn the heads of female tourists and help them recall their youth. The vibrancy of the hustle and bustle is infectious. And all of this outside the tourist season, which supposedly ended with the start of the school year.

Exhibition in the Museum of Jishou: "The customs of Western Hunan"

The Branch of the National Museum of Hunan treated us to an exhibition devoted to the customs of West Hunan. In fact, the exhibition proved to be a very versatile exhibition, and also included the most precious local treasures, the stories of local historical figures and the fate of unruly rebels. Virtually the entire history of the region was shown: from ceramic relics of architectural details from the Han dynasty; through an extensive collection of traditional furnishings of the interiors of the affluent Miao's homes, an extremely rich collection of Miao outfits, as well some from the Tujia nationality (even more numerous in Hunan than Miao); and modern book publications on the history and culture of West Hunan.

The richest collection of wealthy household furnishings includes gossamer structures used for forming a canopy over a king size bed, from the inside protected by nets against mosquitoes which could carry malaria. All of which are valuable relics of Miao ebonists. In front of the bed, which is placed at the back, the exhibition shows the bride and groom. The bride, wearing a red dress, is veiled with a red shawl, and the groom is modestly dressed in a blue, trailing robe. Clearly the impact of the traditional customs of the Han nationality was a model for wealthy families. Nowadays, the great attraction of foreign fashion results in young Han couples leaving behind the traditional palanquin and red wedding dress in favor of the white European dress in which they pose for a series of wedding pictures. We saw such a couple on the beautiful hill of Tianxinge in Changsha. But as the story goes, it happens that wealthy families send the bride to the groom's house in a traditional red dress where a commemorative photo is taken, before it is replaced by the white elegance of the western wedding dress. Thus, Westernization does not necessarily have to completely eliminate the local culture.

Tianxin Hill

The aforementioned defensive hill of Tianxin is one of the most important historic sites in Changsha, the capital of the province. Its importance lies in collecting the legacy of relics left by the prominent local characters from the eras of the last two Chinese dynasties. However today, above all, it is a place which commemorates the unfortunate residents of Changsha who were not forewarned by the army of Guomindang, and were sacrificed when their mostly wooden city was torched so it did not to fall into the enemy hands of the Japanese army. Although guilty of such a careless and foolhardy method of 'defending' the city, the local governor and commander were soon sentenced to death, as the city burned. This tragic event is commemorated by the recently erected 'Great Bell' standing in the courtyard on the north side. The park surrounding the hill has been treated, even during the times of Guomindang occupation, as a place of remembrance for the victims, which is confirmed by the commemorative ceremonial gate on the south side of the hill.

The Confucian Academy of Hunan

The traditional beliefs of the Chinese consist primarily of three religions: Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism, which in earlier times were mixed with animist beliefs. They did not supplant and replace them completely, but rather adapted them and created a rich pantheon of deities, saints, immortals and mythical figures such as the Yellow Emperor, as well as historical figures such as the honored Guangong, who were raised to the rank of deities residing with Confucius in the Temples of Literature Wenmiao.

Confucianism, as one of the three most important Chinese beliefs, has been recognized as an immanent part of the belief system that is succinctly defined by the Chinese as the

belief that "three religions are one religion" (*san jiao, yi jiao*). Such an understanding of beliefs arose from syncretism, could be called historical syncretism. Its origin in turn lies in the interaction of three philosophical and religious trends: Taoism, Confucianism and Buddhism, primarily through borrowing terminology to facilitate contact with the recipient. But this is not the whole story. Taoism and Confucianism did not turn away from the earlier theories such as *yin-yang*, and even benefited extensively from them. The subsequent Sinicization of Buddhism and its transformation into a meditative Buddhism *chan*, which spread further to Korea and Japan (there known as *Zen*), also used the native Chinese Taoist terminology so that the translations of sutras from Sanskrit and Pali would be better understood in China and in the influential circles Chinese culture.

In such situations religious syncretism became natural. This has allowed a situation whereby a man studying Confucianism and seeking to comply with its ethics, can visit a Buddhist temple to receive divination e.g. about the health of his family or his own well-being, and if one of his relatives dies he can contact Taoist exorcists to send the spirit of the deceased to the other world.

Confucianism became involved in providing an effective prescription for permanent rules. However, unlike their apparent adversaries the Legalists who advocated rule by means of severity of law, Confucianists looked to governance by "moral rule" of a leader appointed by the Heavens (*Tianming*) and having the responsibility to provide for its subjects' well-being. As a result Confucianism started being perceived as more of a pro-state ideology than as a religion. Regardless of the settled division of Confucianism to *rujiao*, understood as a science in the sense of religion, and *ruxue* understood as a science in the sense of philosophy; the connection of Confucianism with the worship of ancestral spirits; the transfer of patriarchal family relations within the hierarchical structure of the state, and finally the cult of Confucius entrenched its religious character. The imperial examination system for official positions further strengthened its position, as preparation for exams required perfect proficiency in using quotations from Confucian classics. Traditional education relied on both private small studios, as well as on respectable academies in which philosophical disputes were conducted.

The whole system started to be criticized by proponents of the modernization of China in the early twentieth century. The final blow was dealt to Confucianism by Mao Zedong who from 1958 introduced strict restrictions on those willing to study, let alone promote Confucianism, which led to the break-down of the patriarchal polygamous family and its replacement with a monogamous family structure. Therefore it was a pleasant surprise for us that in the native province of Mao Zedong it was possible to restore the Hunan Confucian Academy, which is known under the traditional name of Yuelu Shuyuan.

Its millennial history is associated with the most prominent Confucian philosophers such as Zhu Xi, Wang Yangming and others; it also ranks among the four most famous academies

in the country. It has educated more than 17,000 students of Confucianism, including many well-known figures such as Wei Yuani, Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Chen Qian and many other Hunan citizens. In 1903 The Academy was transformed into a higher education school called Hunan Gaodeng Xuetang and in 1926 it was transformed into Hunan University.

The seat of the Academy, dating back over two hundred years, is a beautiful building, full of tasteful furniture, portraits of distinguished Confucians, preserved original texts, and calligraphic sentences, full of grandeur and splendor. However in the general atmosphere of worship, of the emigrants from the Hunan province, especially Mao Zedong, it seems that despite the beautiful traditions it is unlikely that the local philosophers would succeed in the way their predecessors did, in the actual reintroduction of Confucianism, at least from a socially functional perspective, and at the same time pro-state ideology prevails, at least the one derived from sources other than Marxist, something which the central government continues to rely on.

In Changsha, you can even see red cloths with appeals to follow the example of Lei Feng, a communist saint. And all that in three decades from moving away from orthodox Maoism in favor of pro-market reform, which is a contradiction of the notion of autarky and treating the individual as "a stainless steel screw of chairman Mao" (*Mao zhuxi de buxiu luosiding*).

Liu Shaoqi also comes from Hunan

However all is not lost, since the citizens of Hunan dared to rebuild the Mausoleum of Liu Shaoqi, which is the ancestral seat of the Liu family. Through that they in some way honoured the former head of the party who, during Mao's "cultural revolution", was sent to prison in Kaifeng and died there deprived of medication. The work on the reconstruction of the extensive household, beautifully situated by a small lake, is still ongoing but there are already two completed (and photographed) pavilions. One of them is devoted to the widow of Sun Yat-sen, who was friends with Wang Guangmei, the wife of Liu Shaoqi. The photographic documentation on the life of Soong Ching-ling is extensive and almost completes the scarcity of memorabilia about Liu Shaoqi. And no wonder, when we consider that the widow of Sun Yat-sen was always the pride of the regime in Beijing, and like her sister, Soong Mei-ling, a wife, adviser and a translator of English for Chiang Kai-shek, who was the prominent supporter of the regime in Taipei. Soong Ching-ling has already been honored by memorials in the form of museums of her offices in Shanghai and Beijing. The adjacent, main pavilion dedicated to Liu Shaoqi is actually quite separate apart from in brochures from the distant past which present two significant photographs: a horrible picture of the deceased covered with a white shroud, lying on a shabby prison bed in Kaifeng and a document relating to the man's cremation and signed by the son. On video you can also watch the process of throwing his ashes into the sea.

Scientific conclusions:

As a result of the research visit in Hunan, as well as after seminar discussions, the following reflections were established, which could be summarized as follows:

Globalization in China brought far-reaching changes not only in the well-known regions of the wealthy coast, but also in remote, inaccessible peripheral areas. With regards to the national minorities of the South of China, a new social phenomena appeared on such a large scale, that the significant migration of national minorities to the coastal cities has had important and far-reaching social consequences.

Hence, the need to propose a new typology regarding the Sinicization of ethnic groups other than just the Han nationality. Such a necessity to make further distinguishable demographic profiles would appear to be justified. The proposal for a new typology is as follows: it is necessary to distinguish between at least two different types of Sinicization:

1. Voluntary Sinicization

Internal migration causes natural Sinicization. This type I would initially call "voluntary Sinicization". Convincing proof of its existence are reflected in Chinese studies, according to which around half of the modern day Miao population does not speak the native language. Even in contacts with parents general Chinese is more likely to be spoken. In this respect Miao is a mid-ranking population in comparison to other parts of China: 92.09 % knows Chinese language, but only 59.70% knows the native language of their national minority; in the case of the national minority of Tujia, the data is accordingly: 99.39 % for the knowledge of Chinese and 6.63 %[7] for the language of the minority. Of course, there are such nationalities as the Manchu, who only a hundred years ago were the rulers of the whole of China, and have now completely lost their language and writing.

2. Extraneous Sinicization

„Voluntary Sinicization" should not be equated with "extraneous Sinicization", which the national minorities have no influence on. Extraneous Sinicization causes a significant change in the proportion of the local populations, towards an increasingly large Chinese immigrant population (Han) and has resulted from the implementation of the plan of intensive development of the 12 provinces and autonomous regions of the West *(xibu da kaifa*).

Therefore, for clarity, it should be considered necessary to distinguish between these two types of Sinicization, which are not equal but are mutually exclusive; however the result is similar: the disappearance of the native language in favor of the general Chinese language, which results in the elimination of one of the most important criterion of membership of a given nationality, even if continues to be formally declared and serves to embellish the statistics.

[7] Mingtang Chou, 'The Contact between Putonghua, and Minority Languages in China', *International Journal of the Sociology of Language*, De Gruyte-Mouton, No. 215, 2012, p. 6.

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