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Tōkaidōchū hizakurige: Popular Work, or Fruit of a Well-Planned Commercial Strategy? An Inquiry from a Sociological Perspective

Abstract

The *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* is one of the most renowned and celebrated works of the entire Edo period; it was composed by Jippensha Ikku (1765–1831) and delivered by Murataya Jirōbee from the second year of Kyōwa (1802) to the sixth of Bunka (1809). It was so successful that it constituted the main source of income for both the publisher and the author. That kind of popularity could have hardly been achieved without a well-planned editorial strategy. During the publication the work changed; it is therefore possible to outline an evolution within Ikku's masterpiece which goes straight from the first volume to the eighth and last installment.

My aim is to analyze those changes by connecting them with society and the sales strategies of the publishing sector. I intend to outline the ways in which the author and the publisher arranged their work in order to enlarge the readership and address their production to a specific audience. It is my intention to examine the original edition of the *Hizakurige* and its reprint, which was published during the second year of Bunkyū (1862).

「前略」御存知の通、なんでも人の懐をあてにする、

そこが金じやと、版許の欲心房がひとつ穴の狐「後略」

As everybody knows, the publisher is extremely greedy, just like me, and he always says that we should look at the people's heart, since it's there that they hide money.[1]

The Edo period (1600–1867) is renowned as the phase of Japanese history during which the publishing machine reached full capacity and every single publisher, aiming to gain in fame and popularity, resorted to many devices and strategies to achieve them.

This paper aims to analyze the eight-year-long publication of the *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* by Jippensha Ikku, and to highlight the existence of sales strategies and commercial plans

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[1] Jippensha Ikku, *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* (Shank's mare), VI, Vol. 1, Introduction, p. 4, verso. The text adopted as reference is a copy of the original edition, held in Waseda University Library, published from the second year of Kyōwa (1802) to the sixth of Bunka (1809) by Eiyūdō (Murataya Jirōbee) in Edo; format: *chūhon*.

whose sole intention was to meet with the readers' approval. The paper also examines the reprint, which was issued more than fifty years later, during the second year of Bunkyū[2] (1862). It is my intention to address the new layout of the masterpiece and the ways in which publishers revitalized and put on the market a production that gained much more popularity than the rest of the literary products of the same period.

The epigraph above is from a passage in the introduction to the sixth chapter, published during the fourth year of Bunka (1807); it clearly shows how important money was for the publisher, who was always ready to urge his collaborators to be aware of people's tastes and, therefore, to publish works that the audience would certainly appreciate and buy.

The *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige*

The *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* (東海道中膝栗毛) is recognized as Ikku's masterpiece; it was published between the second year of Kyōwa (1802) and the sixth of Bunka (1809) by Murataya Jirōbee. It was so successful commercially that audience demand[3] compelled the writer to continue its adventures for another twelve years, with a sequel entitled *Zoku hizakurige*, which was released from the seventh year of Bunka to the fourth of Bunsei (1810–21). Originally, Ikku's intention was to write about a short trip to Hakone in one single volume, but the work rapidly gained in popularity, so both the author and the publisher decided to prolong the narration until Yaji and Kita – the main characters – reached Ōsaka, passing by Nara, in five volumes. The author, in the introduction to the third volume, tells the readers that his work *yo ni okonawareru*, became popular, therefore, in agreement with the publisher, he decided to continue the narration:

> The fourth volume goes from Maizaka to Yokkaichi, while the fifth is about the journey to Ise: it will describe the brothels in Furuichi and the wonderful panoramas in Ainoyama; then, passing through Nara, we will reach Ōsaka, where the entire work is going to finish.[4]

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[2]   The entire Japanese history is divided into many periods or eras; they changed each time the Emperor died and a new one took power.

[3]   The author wrote more than once in his prefaces about how popular his work became and how blessed he had been. When Ikku issued the first volume of the *Zoku hizakurige*, in the seventh year of Bunka (1810), he stated the following message in the preface: "Although last year I said that this *Hizakurige* would have finished with the eighth volume, the publisher suggested I write a new installment on the trip to the Konpira Sanctuary […] He also said that the literary world has never seen a work as much popular and with as many volumes as mine; moreover, he told me that I should know how fortunate and blessed I am, therefore, although unwillingly, he suggested I write a new chapter as there may be a good chance for me to earn more money […]". Every time the author published a new installment, he lost no opportunity to show his gratitude to the readers for the extraordinary popularity gained by his work; for instance, we read in the preface of the eighth and last chapter that "[…] the *Hizakurige*, from the first volume onward, has always been well received […]". But the main comments on its fortune are on the first four chapters, where we even read that the author had to release chapter number three as fast as he could, so he had no time to proofread the volumes (Vol. 3, Preface); the next installment registered an interesting and personal opinion which clearly show the popularity of the *Hizakurige*: "The great Confucian masters, when they published works, rarely reached the second installment, and the fact that my *Hizakurige* is already at the fourth stage, when barely three years has passed (since the beginning), together with its great success, should be registered in the annals".

[4]   Jippensha Ikku, *Tōkaidōchū…*, III, Vol. 1, *hanrei*, p. 4, verso.

At the end of the fifth volume, the publisher revealed the outcome of an additional part, composed of three chapters, in which the two protagonists would go to Kyōto and Ōsaka, and then continue along the Kisokaido. For what reason did a work that was supposed to finish at its first volume continue for a further seven editions? The answer is simple: both Murataya and Ikku realized how rich they could become if the *Hizakurige* were to continue; they thus decided to prolong the work for economic reasons only.

In order to outline the ways in which the publisher and the author arranged and changed their work according to the audience's tastes, the current analysis is based on an examination of the format of the volumes, the cover, the frontispiece, and all those aspects that Gerard Genette defined as 'paratextual'[5], as these would be very helpful to identify the group of

Illustration 1. View from Shinagawa executed by Ikku. The inscription *'jiga'* is on the left side

readers they addressed. Subsequently, I will focus on content and see how this changed in relation to new publication demands.

As mentioned above, the first volume of the *Hizakurige* was issued with no fear of prosecution, as it only wanted to impress readers positively, in order to get them to buy the author's next publications for Murataya.[6] It was a low budget product, lacking in any kind of decorative element, without frontispiece or professional-executed illustrations.In order to keep total expenses low, Ikku decided[7] to self-illustrate (see illustration 1) all the *sashie*

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[5]   Gerard Genette, *Soglie. I dintorni del testo* [Paratexts. Thresholds of Interpretation], Torino: Einaudi, 1989.

[6]   See Nakayama Hisao, 'Tōkaidōchū hizakurige no sashie ni tsuite 1' [About the illustrations of the *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* Vol. 1], *Tōyō*, Vol. 40, No. 7, 2003, pp. 25–35. See also Nakayama Hisao, '*Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* no sashie ni tsuite 2' [About the illustrations of the *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* Vol. 2], *Bungaku ronsō*, Vol. 79, 2005 (2), pp. 136–150, and Nakayama Hisao, 'Tōkaidōchū hizakurige no sashie ni tsuite 3' [About the illustrations of the *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* Vol. 3], *Bungaku ronsō*, Vol. 80, 2006 (2), pp. 69–82.

[7]   Ibidem.

(illustrations) of the first volume.[8] However, the work rapidly gained readers' appreciation and earned more than ten *ryō*, as registered in Kyokutei Bakin's[9] diary; therefore Ikku and Murataya decided to go for another installment.

The second chapter still does not show any new elements: we see no frontispiece and, as in the previous volume, the illustrations were entirely drawn by Ikku. We can state that the first two volumes of the *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* were published as an experiment to test readers' receptivity, and that they were basically a low-cost publication. They also share the same title, *Ukiyodōchū hizakurige*, quite different from the designation that we currently use, which clearly demonstrates that the author and the publisher did not really intend the work to continue. When the third volume was released during the first year of Bunka (1804), the old title was replaced with the better-known *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* and, for the first time, (see illustration 2) a frontispiece was included – representing sunrise in the city of Hamamatsu and displaying a style too refined to be considered the creation of the author. From the third chapter onward, the work changed, and the author and the publisher gradually turned it into a vehicle for attracting greater readership, trying to keep more readers entertained at the same time.

Illustration 2 & 3: frontispiece (left) and *mikaeshi* (right) from the third chapter

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[8]   All the illustrations of the first chapter display two little characters which demonstrate that they were the product of Ikku's versatile talent: they bear the inscription *jiga* 自画, which means "made by myself".

[9]   Kyokutei Bakin (1767–1848) was the most prolific writer of the late nineteenth century; in his career he wrote more than five hundred books, whose contents span from vendetta stories to religious and doctrinal texts.

At the beginning of the third volume we read the following comments:

> The first and the second chapters became unexpectedly popular, so my contentment was unexpectedly great; therefore, at the specific request of the publisher, I prepared the third chapter, which I now offer to all those who share with me the same passion and interests.[10]

Ikku's words are particularly significant as they demonstrate the great popularity gained by his masterpiece; he also specifies his intention of introducing new elements in the work:

> I am actually planning somewhat to change my work.[11]

The third chapter reflects the author's decision to modify the *Hizakurige*: he introduces the first frontispiece – *kuchie* 口絵 in Japanese – which, unfortunately, shows the signature of an unknown artist named Fujiya (豊事也). We realize that the *Hizakurige* – which was originally created as a low-cost production, with no fear of prosecution – gradually evolved into a creative device to gain money and popularity. From this chapter onward, in addition to the afore-mentioned frontispiece, the author adds a new device, the *mikaeshi* (見返し), a decorated paper which was generally stuck on the back of the cover.[12] It is very simple, (see illustration 3) as it reproduces only the title of the work, the author's name and the printer's pseudonym, but it is nevertheless noteworthy, as the third chapter is the first installment to present this new element. The fourth volume shows a simpler *mikaeshi*, with the title of the work in sole position, but it has a stark peculiarity that attracts our attention: *Hizakurige* is written in white letters on a black background.

The third chapter can be considered the first of the turning points in Ikku and Murataya's strategy; besides showing new elements, such as the *mikaeshi* and the frontispiece, it presents many old features which are partly renewed: the title and illustration, for example. The *sashie* from the first two volumes showed the inscription '*jiga*', which was an expression of the strategy developed by Ikku and Murataya, who wanted the readers to consider every single illustration as a product of Ikku's versatile talent.[13] However, these characters no longer appear from the third chapter onward. In addition, the volume shows a frontispiece which, although it clearly exhibits a style too refined to be a writer's creation, has no signature. Gradually the *Hizakurige* evolved into a professional production, relinquishing the 'do it yourself' strategy in order to give a professional image – which would be even more enhanced in the next chapters.

The first volume in which we notice substantial changes is the fifth. Its frontispiece draws on the work of the professional artist Toyokuni[14], one of the foremost painters of the time. (See illustration 4) It represents three *hamaguri* (clam) – a specialty product of Kuwana,

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[10] Jippensha Ikku, *Tōkaidōchū…*, III, Vol. 1, Introduction, p. 2, recto.

[11] Ibid., p. 4, verso.

[12] Nakano Mitsutoshi, *Shoshigaku dangi Edo no hanpon* [Monologue on bibliography: printed books in Edo], Iwanami Shoten, Tōkyō, 1995.

[13] Nakayama Hisao, 'Tōkaidōchū hizakurige no sashie ni tsuite 1', pp. 25–35.

[14] Utagawa Toyokuni (1769–1825) was a painter renowned for his portraits of actors. During his life, he had many disciples and established the famous Utagawa school.

in Mie prefecture – on a pine branch, celebrated with verses composed by Ikku.[15] However, Toyokuni's contribution was not the first contribution from a professional artist: the third chapter also has a frontispiece which was far too refined to be considered the work of Ikku's pictorial skill. Unfortunately, the latter does not bear any signature and we cannot clearly state whether or not it was made by a professional painter. The three characters that constituted the name of the supposed author, Fujiya (豊事也), can also be read as '*Toyo no koto nari*' 豊ノ事也, 'made by Toyokuni', thus proving a noteworthy and eminent authorship. Hence, the frontispiece from the fifth chapter, while not the first professional illustration, was the first that bore a signature. Why did Ikku and Murataya decide to introduce the first signed illustrations?

Illustration 4 & 5. Frontispiece from the fifth volume (left) & *mikaeshi* from the sixth chapter (right)

By comparing the colophons – *okuzuke* (奥付) in Japanese – of the fourth and the fifth chapters, we soon notice a slight difference in the space where the publishers' names and addresses were registered; in the first case we only see Murataya Jirōbee from Tōriaburachō in Edo, while in the second we read four different names: apart from Murataya, we have another publisher from the same area, Tsuruya Kiemon; and two others from Ōsaka, Kawachiya Taisuke and Nishimura Genroku. This increase in the number of printers is evidence that the *Hizakurige* was being published and sold in Kansai[16], in addition to Edo. The fifth volume marked its debut in a new area whose readers were considered more refined and cultured than their counterpart from Edo. It seems apparent that the production changes described above were attempts to attract new readers.

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[15] This illustration shows another important peculiarity: for the first time it used two colors, pink for clams and green for the pine needles. This was the first time a frontispiece was decorated with two colors; previously, no one had ever used this expedient to attract the readers' curiosity. The frontispiece from the sixth chapter also employs the same technique.

Ikku and Murataya were no longer addressing their low-budget product to a less critical readership, such as the people in Edo, but to many new potential readers, far more refined and expert in literature, due to the long and eminent literary tradition of the city of Kyōto. Hence, they changed their original plan by introducing new elements that might attract new readers and communicate to them that the *Hizakurige* was no longer a low-budget product from Edo, a city of warriors and merchants, but an attractive production that deserved to be read as suitable material for their literary high standards.[17]

In the fifth chapter we also read Ikku's official presentation to his new readers; in the second part, page eleven verso, a man comes up to Yaji and Kita asking about their place of origin. Once he realizes that they came from Edo, the man asks for an official presentation.

> "My name is Jippensha Ikku," said Yaji, and the man answered, "That's a very celebrated name. Are you really Jippensha Ikku? I'm very glad to meet you. My name is Kabocha no Gomajiru. Are you going to Ise on this journey?"
> "Yes," replied Yaji. "I came here especially to gain information for the *Hizakurige*."
> "Oh dear me, that's an extremely famous book," said Gomajiru.[18]

The passage marks the beginning of a famous *entr'acte* in which Yaji pretends to be Ikku and Kita passes himself off as an unconvincing *hizōdeshi* (秘蔵弟子), a pupil whose name is Ippensha Nanryō. As demonstrated above, the fifth volume of the *Hizakurige* made its debut in a new area, whose readers were largely unaware of Jippensha Ikku and of the popularity that he might have gained in a different part of Japan; we can reasonably read the passage as the author's official presentation to a new audience. Ikku decided to introduce himself and to show the readers in Kansai the popularity that his masterpiece enjoyed in the rest of the country, and Gomajiru's answer seems to be particularly meaningful.

According to Kyokutei Bakin, a real *Hizakurige* boom exploded around the fifth year of Bunka (1808) and its popularity greatly increased, just like the number of writers who drew inspiration and who imitated the original work. In the section of the *Sakusha burui* dedicated to the writers of *chūhon*[19] he stated:

> Immediately after the publication of a work entitled *Hizakurige*, from the fifth, sixth year of Bunka onward, (Jippensha Ikku) met with the readers' predilections and became extremely popular.[20]

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[16] The region of the cities of Kyōto and Ōsaka, also known as Kamigata.

[17] Edo was considered a city of warriors and merchants as it was the capital of the military government, and therefore full of warriors and merchants, with no aristocracy living there, as they were all in Kyōto.

[18] Thomas Satchell, *Shanks' mare*, Tokyo: Chronicle Tuttle, 1960, p. 193. Only the first part of the dialogue is from Satchell's translation. The last two cues did not correspond to the original meaning, so I decided to suggest my own version.

[19] Literally "middle-size book", whose page had the same size as a Mino sheet folded in two parts (19 × 13 cm).

[20] Kyokutei Bakin (edited by Kimura Miyogo), *Kinseimono no hon Edosakushaburui* [Classification of Writers and Books from the Edo Period], Tokyo: Yagishoten, 1988 (page number unidentified by the author).

The sixth volume, besides showing a *mikaeshi* completely different from the previous one, (see illustration 5) with green writing in a frame composed of tools generally used by calligraphers, presents a frontispiece drawn by Toyokuni, representing two plum branches on two bundles of camphor sticks, decorated with a poem composed by Ikku. This is not the only professional illustration of the volume, as Katsukawa Shuntei[21] embellished the next *sashie* by drawing a group of three men pulling a boat out of the Yodogawa river. This involvement of professional artists demonstrated the author and publisher's attempts to attract readers from Kansai.

The seventh book also shows a signed frontispiece, drawn by Shuntei, representing two geisha in the vicinity of the willow tree at the entrance of the Shimabara, the red-light district in Kyōto. However, this chapter introduces a new type of *mikaeshi*, (see illustration 6) in blue-colored paper with a reproduction of a *Kameyama bakemono*, a toy sold in Asakusa. Similarly, we see colored paper in the last chapter, but this time it is green, (see illustration 7) with several illustrations of shells by Shuntei. It also shows a double frontispiece signed by Yoshimaro and Shikimaro, brothers and members of the Kitagawa school.

Illustration 6 & 7. *Mikaeshi* **from the seventh (left) and the eighth chapters (right)**

Thus, we can see how the *Hizakurige* evolved in response to the transformation of the readership. The graphic apparatus became a perfect addendum to attract new readers and to please the old ones; this strategy to enlarge the readership included the gradual involvement of professional painters. The eighth and last chapter even has an official illustrator: at the end of the seventh volume, Murataya wrote a message to promote and disclose the outcome of the new installment. We read:

Hizakurige, eighth chapter, by Jippensha Ikku; illustration by Katsukawa Shuntei.[22]

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[21] (1770–1820) Painter, Katsukawa Shunshō's disciple and Ikku's close collaborator. Particularly renowned for his portraits of kabuki actors.

[22] Jippensha Ikku, *Tōkaidōchū…*, VII, Vol. 2, Colophon, p. 68, verso.

This short passage illustrates the clear relinquishment of low-cost production and, at the same time, the successful achievement of a professionalized process.

Gasan

Besides being strongly influenced by readers' tastes and by their growing numbers, the *Hizakurige* gradually turned into a means of promotion and support. *Gasan*[23] (画賛), verses created as decoration for pictures, followed exactly the same evolution as the work. Their number increased volume after volume: the first chapter presented only a limited number of those verses, and their authors were all members of Ikku's entourage, rather than his followers. The second volume is not embellished by any verse, which reappeared only in the third chapter. Here we have another illustration of the strategy adopted by Murataya and Ikku, who turned a work initially born as a low-cost product into a professional production. The third installment, which we defined as the first turning point in the publisher's commercial plan, presents an increase in the total number of *gasan* – three – but, it is only in the fifth chapter that we see a considerable increase. The verses pass from a total amount of eight, in chapter four, to twenty, spanning three sections, *jōkan*, *chūkan* and *gekan*, respectively the first, second and third parts. A further difference concerns their authors: while previously they were all members of Ikku's entourage, the poets of the fifth volume are all unknown and, except for three, they are definitely not Ikku's disciples.[24]

Next to each name the author carefully registered its geographic origin, so that we can classify three groups – the poets from Owari, the friends from Mikawa, and Ikku's fellows from Suruga.[25] The members of the first group had a special status; they were numerically greater and preceded the other two in importance. Within them, a leading position was taken by the man of letters called Kinometei Dengaku, whose real name was Kamiya Takasuke, and who worked as a doctor in Owari. Although he was not one of the mainstream literates, he was quite well-known in Edo, and Kyokutei Bakin wrote a short passage about his literary activity in his *Sakusha burui*:

> Doctor from Nagoya, Owari, whose real name was Kamiya Takasuke. He particularly enjoyed humor and wittiness and, as he was a gifted writer, during the first year of Kyōwa composed a *kusazōshi*[26] in three volumes entitled *Chōchingurayami no nanayaku*. He handed his creation over to Bakin and next spring – the first day of the second year of Kyōwa – it was released by Tsuruya.[27]

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[23] 画賛 *gasan* celebratory poems.

[24] Many authors of the Edo period had as many disciples. Followers and disciples shared one or more Chinese characters from the name of their master: for example, Jippensha Ikku's disciples were Tōteisha Ichiga, Tōshōtei Ippu, etc.; their names clearly show a resemblance to their master's pseudonym.

[25] Owari, Mikawa and Suruga were three important cities.

[26] A literary genre that was particularly famous during the Edo period for its popular and humorous contents. According to the color of covers we can point out several groups: *akahon*, red covers, intended for children, *kurohon* and *aohon*, respectively, black and blue covers, designated for an adult audience, and, finally *kibyōshi*, yellow covers, whose witty tone and frivolous contents were very popular during the entire era.

[27] Bakin, *Kinseimono…*, Tokyo: Yagishoten, 1988.

According to Tanahashi Masahiro[28], Ikku met Dengaku during a poem race and, delighted by his skill, asked him to collect verses to adapt in his *Hizakurige*. It is indeed clear how celebratory verses from the fifth chapter were intended to introduce and promote poems composed by amateur circles from cities and villages along the Tōkaidō. Ikku and Murataya started selling celebratory verses, as shown in a recently found letter written by Ikku to Dengaku; it dates back to the 21st day of the first month of the third year of Bunka (1806) and reports the following message:

> I held in due consideration all of your names.[29]

And more importantly:

> Before my departure, I received your parting gift; I felt blessed and honored and it is extremely hard for me to express my sincere gratitude and my regards.[30]

We realize that the author has received a *senbetsu*[31] (餞別) (parting gift), so we understand that his aim of introducing and publishing verses by amateurs was due to a perfectly planned commercial strategy. As stated above, Ikku and Murataya decided to sell the opportunity to enter the *Hizakurige* – a production extremely popular at the time – to the highest bidder, as shown by the letter and by the payment.

Illustration 8. *Sashie* from the sixth chapter drawn by Katsukawa Shuntei (see p. 6) & *gasan* by Senshūan Sandarabocchi

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[28] Tanahashi Masahiro, 'Gesakusha retsuden (12) Jippensha Ikku – Ikku no tegami' [Biographies of Writers (12) Jippensha Ikku – A letter from Ikku], *Nihonkosho tsūshin*, Vol. 945, No. 4, 2008, pp. 15–16.

[29] Ibidem.

[30] Ibidem.

[31] 餞別 *senbetsu* parting gift. Parting gifts were quite common in Japan for travelers. Upon leaving their friend's house, they usually got an amount of money with which they could easily return home without fear of running out of money. In Ikku's case, as stated by the letter and many other diary excerpts, he received a great amount of money, almost five *ryō*, during a trip to the city of Matsumoto, and this clearly shows that those who paid the money for the parting gift were definitely trying to buy the author's sympathy.

The tendency towards professional collaborations is even more remarkable in the last three volumes. A constantly increasing number of professional poets and well-known men of letters made contributions in verses: the sixth chapter, for example, begins with a poem composed by Senshūan Sandarabocchi [32] (see illustration 8), the leader of the Kanda school. As years passed, both Ikku and Murataya realized how important *gasan* were: as shown above, they sold most of the celebratory verses in the fifth chapter to three groups of amateurs in exchange for money, and this is also noticeable in the last three volumes. *Gasan* were a useful and precious advertising instrument, and the poets who had the honor of composing those verses, besides taking advantage of the *Hizakurige*'s popularity, were quite sure that even those who did not buy a copy of the volume would have read their compositions and praised their skill, which meant a sure and immediate promotion in terms of popularity.

In addition to many famous poets, from the sixth book onward, the already large group of versifiers grew richer, due to many new entries: the above-mentioned volume presents several other contributions by local artists, such as Ichibasai from Suruga and Tōsaku of the Hamanoya – the owner of the most famous brothel of the Yoshiwara, the red-light district in Edo. (See illustration 9) Apart from the local poets, whose verses were introduced in exchange for money, we have Mantei Onitake (also known as Kanwatei Onitake), one of the author's closest friends, who made his first appearance in the seventh book, first part, page sixteen recto, with a short quotation: "There was a mix of dialects from all over the country, but I decided to omit their description – obsolete by this time – as Kanwatei already did it in his *Kyūkanchō*".[33] His real walk-on happened in the sixth volume, with many half-hidden citations

Illustration 9. *Gasan* composed by Tsukimaro (left) & Kanwatei Onitake (right)

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[32] Former known as Akamatsu Masanobu, Senshūan studied *kyōka* (comic poetry) with the great Karakoromo Kisshū while working as a laborer. He became a leading member of the Senshū school and died during the eleventh year of Bunka (1814) at the age of eighty-four.

[33] A work composed by Mantei Onitake in three volumes, which is nowadays considered his masterpiece. Published from the second to the sixth year of Bunka (1805–1809), its plot closely resembled the *Hizakurige*. Like Ikku's masterpiece, Onitake's *Kyūkanchō* also describes a couple of ribald travelers who go on a short journey and, just like the protagonist of the *Hizakurige*, they get

from his masterpiece, but he was always present in the last three chapters due to *gasan*, quotations and, more importantly, the *sashie* drawn in imitation of his masterpiece.

It is then clear how the *gasan* constituted not only a clever device to present activities of local literary circles, but were also an ingenious instrument to promote and support the author's entourage, such as Onitake, or also Tsukimaro, a painter whose poems appear in the eighth chapter.[34]

The reprint[35]

The second part of the current study on the commercialization of the *Tokaidōchū hizakurige* concerns its reprint, which dated from the second year of Bunkyū (1862) and which was the sole attempt to put on the market of the Edo period, for the second time, a work whose popularity had not decreased despite a fifty-year interval since its first publication. It consists of ten chapters, two more than the original, and its three publishers – Yamashiroya from Edo, Hishiya from Kyōto and Kawachiya from Ōsaka – resorted to many expedients to turn the novel into a reliable travel guide: first of all, (see illustration 10) they introduced distance indicators – perhaps the cleverest idea of the *saihan* (再販) (reprint)[36] – with which they indicated the distance between two stations and then divided the text into many paragraphs, making the reading easier.

The reprint also used replacements and omissions for places which had ceased to exist since the time of the first publication. By updating the names of places and of restaurants, the three publishers endeavored to make their creation as accurate as possible, and by

Illustration 10. (Left page) the rectangle which follows the title is a distance indicator 'from Hakone to Mishima, 3 *ri* and 28 *chō*', from the second chapter, volume 1

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in trouble while traveling to the countryside. Onitake's protagonists are from the northern part of Japan (Ōshū) and they became famous for the bad manners and rudeness they show while visiting Edo.

[34] Many scholars think that *gasan* signed by painters, such as Tsukimaro, were designated to mark the origin of the illustrations they executed personally.

[35] The text adopted as reference is a copy of the reprint of *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige*, held in Waseda University Library, printed during the second year of Bunkyū (1862), by Yamashiroya in Edo, Kawachiya in Ōsaka and Hishiya in Kyōto; format: *chūhon*.

[36] After the Meiji Restoration (1867), many reprints of the *Hizakurige* were issued and they all adopted the clever expedient of distance indicators.

rearranging the original material and creating thematic sections, they divided the work into four different travel guides. The first comprised the initial four volumes and described the travel along the Tōkaidō road; the second included the fifth and the sixth volumes and it dealt with the pilgrimage to Ise Shrine. The last two sections contained the two chapters dedicated to the journey in Kyōto and in Ōsaka respectively. This justified the new arrangement of contents and the increase of two volumes over the original amount.

Furthermore, by increasing the amount of *furigana*[37] and turning most of the words in *kanji* into *hiragana*, the printers made the new *Hizakurige* easier to read. The number of words with *furigana* at their right side – which were designed to enable correct pronunciation – was greatly increased. Apart from the total amount of place-names, we notice that also the easy-to-read Chinese characters have *furigana* at their side[38], which should have made the work comprehensible for everyone, including less proficient readers. Through the rote repetition of the above-mentioned devices, the Bunkyū reprint became infinitely more accessible, and therefore able to increase its readership and disseminate its contents to a wider audience.

The transformation into a perfect guide would not have been complete without a new decorative apparatus, so every *sashie* was changed. With great precision the printers tried to make the illustrations suitable as a travel guide, without overlooking the real key to success: the adventures of the two protagonists. The original work presented a wide variety of pictures in which we only see famous panoramas and temples without any trace of individuals and, more importantly, of the two protagonists[39]; on the contrary, almost every *sashie* of the reprints introduced places, famous temples and unforgettable panoramas, but always put the two characters at its center. In the new approach we see no more pictures imitating the old travel guides, but only new representations trying to combine the comic *entr'actes* and boost the advertising aspect. This tendency is particularly noticeable in the last two sections, (see illustration 11) in which we notice an increasing number of illustrations with titles such as '*Sumiyoshi odori no kei*' 住吉踊乃景, '*Tenmangū jinjanai no kei*' 天満宮神社内乃景 and '*Kitano tenjin no kei*' 北野天神乃景[40], in perfect *annaiki* (guidebook) style.

The Bunkyū reprint, unlike the original, never cut out Yaji and Kita from the *sashie*, and the reason why is to be found in their great popularity. During the time span between the

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[37] *Furigana* were letters designed to correct pronunciation, written at the right side of every Chinese character.

[38] For example *kyō*, today, or also *ima*, now.

[39] Ikku and Murataya also decided to introduce illustrations drawn on the model of the travel guide. The fifth volume presents only one *sashie*, which drew inspiration from a work titled *Isesangū meishozue* – a guide for travelers to Ise Shrine – but this tendency is even stronger in the last three chapters, in which we notice an almost exclusive use of copied illustrations. The sixth and seventh books, which are set in Kyōto, drew inspiration from the *Miyako meishozue*, while the last volume, about Ōsaka, was based on the *Settsu meishozue*. The reason why Ikku's pictorial skill was omitted is to be found partly in the author's fear of being accused of superficiality by the exigent Kansai readers, as he did not know the city of Kyōto in detail, and partly in the decision to turn the work into a practical service for the readers.

[40] Respectively, an illustration of a Sumiyoshi dance, an illustration of the inner part of Tenmangū Shrine, and an illustration of Kitano Sanctuary.

Illustration 11. Example of illustration with title 'Kyoto, illustration of the inner part of the Pavilion of the Great Buddha'

original edition and the reprint, many works that closely resembled the *Hizakurige* were issued. These all shared something with the original – not only the pattern of the journey but, more often, the two protagonists. According to Ōzaki Kyūya, the number of the so-called *hizakurige mono* – works that imitated Ikku's masterpiece – greatly increased; at the beginning they were mostly *sharebon*[41], but soon works that imitated even the two protagonists' names were published. This is the case with the *Nagoya kenbutsu* from the twelfth year of Bunka (1815), or the *Hizasuriki* from the fourth year of Bunka (1807), which was published in Kyōto and set in Ōsaka. During the tenth year of Bunka (1813) the *Tennōji mairi* was published, and a few years later, during the An'ei period (1854–60), Kanagaki Rōbun[42] composed the *Nikkōdōchū hizakurige* and the *Kōshūdōchū hizakurige*. The above-listed productions had Yaji and Kita as their main characters but, in the meantime, productions with protagonists who bore different names were also published – the *Inaka mizu* (1808) and the *Kokkei arima kikō* (1813), among others. We estimate that, during the fifty years between the two editions of the *Hizakurige*, more than twenty works with Yaji and Kita as main characters were printed, while the number of productions whose protagonists' name differed reached thirty.[43]

As stated above, every *sashie* was rearranged with new contents and a new style, less elaborate than the original. The entire amount of renewed illustrations showed a strong

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[41] This genre was extremely popular during the second part of the eighteenth century, and often provided a sexually explicit setting, such as brothels, and two protagonists. One of them was younger and, by following his older friend who acted like a man of the world, *tsūjin* in Japanese, he was supposed to learn how to pick up women. In the end, the young protagonist showed himself to be far more expert than the older. *Sharebon* were famous for their witty tone and for the comic interaction between the two protagonists.

[42] A writer and journalist of the late Edo period; his first literary contributions were quite unsuccessful, but he suddenly became famous thanks to the publication of a work titled *Seiyōdōchū hizakurige* (Shank's mare to the western sea), which was based on Ikku's masterpiece (1829–1894).

[43] Ōzaki Kyūya, *Edoshōsetsu kenkyū* [Essays on the Novel during the Edo Period], Kōdōkaku, Tokyo, 1953.

tendency: unlike the original, they constantly try to present the scenes in their comical aspect. Ikku's original pictures used to illustrate the immediately foregoing instant in every *entr'acte*, perhaps in an attempt to excite the readers' curiosity and to increase the sense of tension. Many scholars have studied the Bunkyū reprint only superficially, and they all point out how its illustrated section is not comparable to the original. However, this study suggests that there is a connection between many pictures of the *saihan* and some of the most renowned pictorial works of the time, such as Utagawa Hiroshige's[44] *Dōchūhizakurige* and *Hizakurige dōchūsuzume*, both painted and published during the Tenpō era (1830–44).

Illustration 12. New arrangement of the *hamaguri* by Toyokuni

Although deemed less valuable in comparison, the new pictorial embellishment reveals the influence of many famous works of the time, such as Hiroshige's masterpieces. Several illustrations can be considered 'of value', and the printers try to highlight them in many ways. This is the case with the *hamaguri* by Toyokuni (see illustration 12) – originally the frontispiece of the fifth chapter – rearranged in a less expensive version for the reprint and decorated with a brand new poem. The new *Hizakurige*, besides paying homage to many famous productions of the time, shows many *sashie* drawn in imitation of models from the original version, whose popularity was evident even after five decades. Apart from the afore-mentioned *hamaguri*, we can also see that the first book of the reprint adapted an illustration from the original first volume – the picture was unique as it contained all the scenes from the chapter in one *sashie*, whose author was probably Kitagawa Shikimaro. He used Yaji's *nagaya* (row house)[45] as setting, with each room serving as a stage for the main episodes of the narration, with a style that closely resembled our time's comic strips.[46]

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[44] Utagawa Hiroshige (1797–1858) was a famous *ukiyo* painter, a disciple of Utagawa Toyohiro; he became famous for his poetic and colorful views and panoramas, but he was also renowned for the so-called *kachōga*, illustrations of flowers, trees, birds, and insects. His masterpiece is entitled 'The fifty-three views of Tōkaidō'.

[45] Nagaya, or a row house, was a line of narrow houses with only one floor in which many families lived.

[46] The original picture introduced many short dialogues between the characters in every episode/room, and the reprint rearranged them all without even changing a single word.

As stated above, to put the new *Hizakurige* on the market, the publishers tried to rearrange illustrations – updating the subjects – and made the contents easy to read for everyone. In addition, most of the volumes lack any decorative element, such as the *mikaeshi*, the *jo* and the *batsu* (introduction and conclusion respectively) or the useful *hanrei*, legend. We saw how important these elements were at the beginning of the nineteenth century, when the original edition was published, and how their production could be connected to sales strategies and commercial plans; the reprint, issued more than fifty years later, did not give any space to these important devices, as shown by their total absence. This, in addition to the new arrangement of the *sashie*, was one of the most common ways of promoting writings to less proficient readers. Works lacking in many of the decorative elements – which were the main reason for their high price – were sent almost daily to the countryside, where people usually could not afford to buy finely decorated books.

Conclusion

After our comparison of the only two manuscript editions of the *Tōkaidōchū hizakurige* we possess today, and in light of the results of the survey, we can safely draw some conclusions. The original edition of the *Hizakurige* changed together with its readers, going from a low-budget, amateur production to a creation in which the effort and the contributions of professionals were essential in order to enlarge its readership and, at the same time, to promote the author's entourage and close collaborators. The best strategy to pursuit these goals appeared to Ikku and Murataya to require the involvement of professional painters, poets and men of letters, whose contributions would have certainly embellished the work, as the graphic section had a pre-eminent role in attracting people.

This study, however, demonstrates that the new arrangement of the simpler and cheaper reprint better served the publishers' aim of increasing demand and reaching readers in rural areas. The difference in terms of price between a non-decorated book and its adorned counterpart could be substantial: a *fukuroiri gōkan*, a series of volumes bound together with a decorative sack, for example, cost one-hundred and ten *mon*, while a simpler version without the ornamental sack cost only eighty-eight *mon*.[47] It was then obvious that a book with little or no decorative element was cheaper and could thus attract a wider range of readers.

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[47]   Sato Satoru, '[Kane no waraji] no henshū to Moriya Jibee' [Moriya Jibee and the Publication of 'Kano no waraji'] *Shoshigaku geppō*, Vol. 50, No. 2, 1993, pp. 1–11.

TOMASZ OLEJNICZAK

Japanese Management: 50 Years of Evolution of the Concept

Abstract

This paper presents the debate about Japanese management in a chronological order and puts forward a new definition of the concept. As a result of reviewing the literature, we distinguished four major periods of the debate: the birth of Japanese management concept (the 1950s and 1960s), the peak of popularity (the 1970s and 1980s), the criticism and appropriation period (the 1990s) and the period of dispersion (since 200). The main conclusion we have drawn from the review is that the current debate about Japanese management is extremely dispersed and requires a new unifying definition. We therefore propose a new, more flexible definition of Japanese management as a dynamic, multilevel and contingent concept.

Introduction

Management is a theoretical field that evolves constantly and rapidly. As organizations grow and globalize, as technology develops and as the international environment changes, so management theory evolves. The problem with this evolution is that the number of concepts, definitions and theories grows rapidly and uncontrollably, and as a result we tend to forget the essence of the debate. Harold Koontz called this the "management theory jungle".[1]

The same applies to the theory of Japanese management, which reached a peak of popularity in the 1980s and then gradually became more and more fragmented and discussed separately in relation to different countries, industries, companies and practices, while the essence of the debate was slowly forgotten,[2] As a result, over the years it has become increasingly difficult to say what Japanese management actually is, especially as its most commonly used classical definition has been coined more than 50 years ago and has nothing to do with current reality.

In order to clear a path through the jungle and recapture the essence of Japanese management, we must approach the debate chronologically, trying to understand the rationale behind its evolution and find some permanent elements. We will present the

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[1] H. Koontz, 'The Management Theory Jungle', *The Journal of the Academy of Management*, Vol. 4, No. 3, December 1961, p. 174.

[2] B. Keys, T. Miller, 'The Japanese Management Theory Jungle', *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 1984, p. 342.

history of the debate starting from its nascent period in the early post-war years, following through the peak period of its popularity in the 1970s and 1980s, the period of critique in the 1990s, until the theoretical dispersion of the debate in recent years. Our objective is firstly to question the validity of the prevailing conceptualization of Japanese management that was coined more than 50 years ago, and secondly to put forward a new, more flexible definition of Japanese management as a dynamic, multilevel and contingent concept.

The birth of Japanese management

Regardless of what cultural studies say about the origins of Japanese management and issues such as rice culture, the concept of *ie* as a basic social entity etc., the concept of Japanese management itself was born in the early post-war period. To fully understand the classical definition proposed by James Abegglen, it is first necessary to understand the circumstances of the operation of Japanese industry in those years.

Historical background (1950s–1960s)

After the defeat in World War II, Japan found itself under occupation by Allied forces which began the process of demilitarization and wide-ranging political, social and economic transformation. The list of the problems that the occupying forces and the newly-elected Japanese authorities faced in the years 1945–1947 included payment of war reparations, a sharp rise in unemployment, a fall in production output in key industries, the breakdown of the traditional *zaibatsu* corporate groups, and huge inflation. Social discontent was clearly visible in the form of mass demonstrations and the growing number of trade unions, which often used socialist slogans. As early as 1948, the unions had 6.7 million members, which at the time constituted over 50% of the workforce. [3] Faced with the rapidly growing political influence of the socialist and communist parties, the American occupation's administration initially eased the existing restrictive economic policies, and then carried out drastic political and economic reforms, conducting mass layoffs in the public and private sectors and delegalizing a large portion of the trade unions. [4] The shock of mass layoffs was a major issue at the time and greatly influenced the perception of job security as the highest value in the following years. [5] The drastic reforms did not last long, however, since at the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, almost overnight Japan became a strategic ally of the U.S., and its industry became not only completely exempt from any previous restrictions, but also received an impulse for development. Owing to the Special Procurements system, including the production of textiles, machinery and vehicles, military equipment and ammunition, and the provision of transport services for U.S. troops, the volume of production in many industries returned to pre-war levels.[6] Unquestionably, the Special Procurements system provided Japanese companies with a much needed inflow of cash, but the post-war economic miracle would not have occurred if not for the proactive and

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[3]   Ewa Pałasz-Rutkowska, Katarzyna Starecka, *Japonia*, Warszawa: TRIO, 2004, p. 207.

[4]   Ibid., p. 210.

[5]   Tomasz Olejniczak, 'Wdrażanie japońskich technik zarządzania i organizacji produkcji w zakładach zlokalizowanych na terenie Polski' [Application of Japanese management techniques and production methods in factories located in Poland] MA Thesis, Wydział orientalistyczny, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warszawa, 2008, p. 15.

[6]   Pałasz-Rutkowska, Starecka, *Japonia*, p. 216.

consistent policy of 'administrative guidance' (*gyōsei shidō*) carried out by the Japanese central government. The massive influx of Western technology in industrial production, rising domestic demand and the availability of loans guaranteed by the central administration resulted in an acceleration of economic growth. However, at the same time a number of problems became apparent, for example regional and sectoral development imbalances, differences in employment conditions between large and small or medium-sized enterprises, the deficit of skilled workers, and the sharp increase in wages and competition among employers.[7] The 1960s brought about the Vietnam conflict, which like the Korean War resulted in a massive inflow of orders from the U.S. Army. This time, however, Japanese products were also shipped to the United States' domestic market, where local producers were not able to meet the demand. As a result of the events described above, less than 20 years after the war, Japan came to the forefront in terms of production in areas such as ships, televisions, cars, trucks, steel, synthetic fibers and plastics and fertilizers. In 1968, Japan became the third largest economy after the United States and the Soviet Union.[8]

James C. Abeglen and the classical definition of Japanese management

The unique management practices used in Japanese companies would have remained unnoticed if not for James C. Abegglen, who, we can confidently call the father of Japanese management. Abegglen was one of the first Western scholars who devoted themselves to the study of management practices used by Japanese companies. Abegglen, a former U.S. Marine, came to Japan in 1955 as a Ford Foundation scholar to conduct a study of the Japanese companies and their workplace organization.[9] The outcome of Abegglen's study was a classic book, *The Japanese Factory*, in which the author carefully examines the relationships among the employees of Japanese companies. The main message of the book is that the process of industrialization in Japan is deeply rooted in unique social and cultural conditions, and as such is completely different from the industrialization of the United States or Europe.[10] Abegglen was the first to define three unique characteristics of management in Japanese companies at the time. These characteristics remain at the core of the classical definition of Japanese management to this day.[11]

The first element of the classical definition is lifetime employment (*shushin koyō*). In this element Abegglen stresses the willingness of Japanese workers to devote their lives to a career in one company, and on this basis he emphasizes the fundamental difference in trust and cooperation between employers and employees in Japan and the United States.[12] While appreciating Abegglen's conclusions and remarks about consequences on lifetime employment, we must be aware of the historical context in which it was introduced. The second half of the 1950s and the early 1960s was a period during which the stability of

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[7]   Ibid., p. 268.

[8]   Ibid., p. 274.

[9]   Allan Bird, *Encyclopedia of Japanese Business and Management*, New York: Routledge, 2002, p. 1.

[10]   James Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of its Social Organization*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958, p. 2.

[11]   These three characteristics described by Abegglen in later years were known as the 'three pillars' or 'three sacred treasures' of Japanese management.

[12]   Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory*..., p. 11.

employment was one the most desired qualities for both employees and employers. For employees, in the early post-war years companies were the only entities that possessed the resources necessary for the survival of local communities. In the later period of accelerated growth, the staff remained within the company because of its attractive prospects for professional development, as well as the absence of a public safety net in the form of social benefits or pension systems. From the employers' point of view, the desire to stabilize employment was dictated by the scarcity of skilled workers in the period of accelerated growth and the mass adoption of new technologies. Since its inception the practice of 'lifetime employment' has become one of the aspects of Japanese management which attract most attention from researchers. Studies in subsequent years have shown that this practice has no formal or legal basis, is limited to a group of large companies, and covers only about 20%[13] of the workforce.[14]

Seniority-based wages (*Nenko joretsu chingin gata*), constitutes the second pillar of Japanese management, and is inseparably linked with lifetime employment. The seniority system applies both to wages and promotions, and according to Abbeglen it reflects not only Japanese management but also the Japanese culture, with its enormous respect for the elderly and their experience. The system is based on the assumption that a newly hired employee, which is usually young university graduate, must learn everything within the company. Newly hired employees therefore start at the lowest salary level regardless of their competence, and their salary increases steadily with experience and the aptitude that they present. With regard to the historical context of this system, it is necessary to emphasize three points. First, the seniority system supported lifetime employment, motivating workers to remain in the company and cementing their loyalty while discouraging experienced workers from changing jobs. Secondly, due to the inadequacy of the post-war education system to the needs of Japanese companies rapidly implementing new technologies, the seniority system supported and rewarded the gradual accumulation of competence within the company. Third, the seemingly irrational wage levels of the oldest workers were justifiable in the context of a complete lack of public pensions and retirement systems. It should be noted that, similarly to 'lifetime employment', 'seniority-based wages' is an unfortunate title which greatly simplifies its understanding. Seniority is not and never has been the sole criterion for determining the remuneration of employees in Japanese companies. In practice, it was always considered in conjunction with a rigorous assessment of competences, and in recent years, with individual performance.[15]

Enterprise union (*kigyō betsu rōdōkumiai*) constitute the third pillar of the classical definition of Japanese management as described by Abegglen. Above all, he emphasized harmonious cooperation between the union members and management and the membership of mid-level managers in the union.[16] In the case of enterprise unions, the key historical

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[13] Specifically the so-called 'core employees' (*seiki shain* or *seishain*), a group of highly educated workers, mostly men, recruited once a year, working on permanent contracts, receiving regular salary and subjected to a system of rotation, training and periodic evaluation. The opposite of this group is known as 'peripheral workers' (*hiseiki shain*), which includes mainly women, foreigners, workers on short-term contracts or temporary contracts.

[14] Bird, *Encyclopedia of Japanese Business…*, p. 281.

[15] Ibid., p. 283.

[16] Abegglen, *The Japanese Factory…*, p. 54.

event affecting the trade union movement was the 'reverse course' in the policy of the Allied Forces General Headquarters in the early 1950s. ??The decision to ban the existing socialist trade union structures led to their de-politicization and the atomization of the labor movement, which resulted in activists focusing on the issues of developing their businesses and dialogue with the management.

As shown in the above paragraphs, all of the classic elements of Japanese management as described by Abegglen can be understood fully only in the context of the political, economic and social reality at the time. Each of these practices was the direct result of the circumstances at the time, not a long-term strategy consciously chosen by the company. Abegglen's main achievement, therefore, should not be seen in a classical definition of Japanese management and its three practices, which by their nature are temporary, but rather in laying down the foundations for the debate in the following years, both in the West and in Japan.[17]

The peak of popularity

Even though initially both Abegglen's book and Japanese companies themselves did not attract significant attention from Western researchers and businessmen, Japanese companies' rapid growth followed by their global expansion in the 1970s and 1980s completely changed the scale of the debate, and has led to a flood of publications on Japanese management.

Historical background (1970s and 1980s)

The economic boom of the 1960s ended as a result of two international events that shook the fundaments of Japanese economy and politics. In 1971, Richard Nixon's administration unilaterally left the gold standard. Floating exchange rates resulted in a rapid appreciation of the yen and a decline in the profitability of Japanese exports, which were additionally subjected to severe restrictions in the form of import duties. The second shock was the oil crisis associated with unrest in the Middle East.[18] The 1970 oil crisis resulted in the restructuring of the Japanese economy and the development of less energy-dependent industries, which in turn resulted in trade surpluses in exchanges with both the United States and Western Europe.[19] The rapidly growing trade deficit[20] focused the attention of Japan's trade partners on the surprisingly high competitiveness of Japanese products in terms of technology and quality on the one hand, and lack of reciprocity in relations with the highly regulated and protected Japanese market on the other. The response to these issues was a surge of protectionism, in many cases leading

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[17] It was not until the late 1970s that Japanese academics such as Ryushi Iwata, Kazuo Ishida and Masumi Tsuda adopted the concept of Japanese management and began to discuss the uniqueness of local management practices.

[18] Pałasz-Rutkowska, Starecka, *Japonia*, p. 294.

[19] A full description of the history of political and trade relations between Japan and the European Community can be found in Tomasz Olejniczak, *The EU–Japan: The History of Relations in the Years 1952–2005*, BA, Warsaw University, Warszawa, 2005.

[20] In 1975, Japanese trade surplus with the United States totalled $1.7 billion, while in 1985 it had risen to $58.4 billion. Japan had already achieved a trade surplus with Europe in 1969.

[21] Strained trade relations with EC were further aggravated by numerous political *faux pas* committed by diplomats. The most notorious case was a leaked confidential report of the European

to the brink of trade war.[21] Export restrictions and a simultaneous appreciation of the yen, in turn, led to the Japanese investment boom in the 1980s, as a result of which within a few years Japan became one of the world's largest foreign investor.[22] The international expansion of Japanese companies was also driven by the desire to take over Western research centers, as well as internal problems such as rising labor costs, aging organizations and the rising costs of the lifelong employment system. Foreign investment took on the form of both capital and direct investments, but the latter became the preferred mode as it aroused much less controversy. By 1990 over 300 Japanese automotive companies had set up their manufacturing units in the United States. Among these investments, the factory that attracted most attention was New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc. (NUMMI) a joint venture between Toyota and General Motors. For Western companies it was the first direct contact with Japanese production methods and management, and for Japanese companies the first attempt to transfer Japanese practices abroad.[23] The investment boom in the 1980s was also felt in Japan, resulting in the last period of post-war prosperity, the 'Heisei boom' (1986–1991). The main economic driver of this period was the rise in real estate prices which reached astronomical values in the late 1980s. This led to speculation on the financial markets, as a result of which the Heisei boom became better known as the 'bubble economy' (*baburu keiki*), followed by a severe financial crisis and a decade-long recession.[24]

The flood of publications about Japanese management

The 1970s, and especially the 1980s, is a period which saw a flood of publications on Japanese management and companies, which became the first non-Western organizations to be studied so closely.[25] Publications appearing in these years can be divided into two main streams. The first sought to discover the essence of competitiveness of Japanese companies and was focused primarily on companies located in Japan. The second stream focused on the 'hotter' topic at the time, namely the direct foreign investments of Japanese manufacturing companies and the use of Japanese management practices outside of Japan.

One of the key publications in the first stream was a book by R.T. Pascal and A.G. Athos entitled *The Art of Japanese Management*. The authors looked for sources of Japanese competitiveness in the corporate culture and the specific combination of soft aspects of management. Borrowing the 7S model of Peters and Waterman, Pascal and Athos argued that the main differences between Japanese and American management styles lay not in the so-called hard elements (e.g. strategy, structure, systems), but in the soft elements of the 7S model

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Commission in 1979 on the causes of the surplus in the balance of trade between Japan and Europe, which described Japan as "a country of workaholics living in rabbit hutches".

[22] Eleanor Westney, 'Japan', in *The Oxford Handbook of International Business*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 631.

[23] NUMMI was not the only investment in the automotive sector at the time. Honda established a factory in Ohio as early as 1982, and Nissan established a truck factory in 1983. However it was the first large scale direct encounter with Japanese culture that attracted considerable attention from the media. One of the examples of this attention was Ron Howard's comedy from 1986 entitled *Gung Ho*.

[24] Bird, *Encyclopedia of Japanese Business…*, p. 51.

[25] Westney, 'Japan', p. 633.

(such as shared values, staff, skills and style of management).[26] The finding that contributed to the theory of Japanese management, however, was the discovery of strong interdependence both among members of the organization and among elements of the model. Athos and Pascale argued that the essence of Japanese management lies in attaching equal importance to the hard and soft elements and maintaining effective relationships between them.[27]

In the following years the issue of soft elements of management and interdependence was examined by Nina Hatvany and Vladimir Pucik in their 1981 article. According to them, the strength of Japanese management was not so much due to the cultural uniqueness of Japanese workers, as due to the close internal and external integration of the human resources management system. The authors were among the first to put forward the division of the Japanese management into three levels: philosophy focused on the human factor and its development, strategy of creating an internal labor market with a strong culture and socialization processes, and practices that logically and consistently reflected the assumptions of philosophy and strategy.[28]

The third key publication describing the essence of competitiveness of Japanese companies was a book by William Ouchi entitled *Theory Z: How American Business Can Meet the Japanese Challenge*. The tile itself reflected the widespread feeling of threat in the West faced by competition from Japanese companies.[29] Ouchi confirmed many of the previous observations made by Abegglen, pointing to the practices of lifetime employment, slow promotion, group decision-making and employee accountability as the sources of the competitiveness of Japanese companies. He also added a new concept of a hidden mechanisms of control, which he called 'clan culture'.[30] The management features identified in Japanese companies by Ouchi were only the starting point for his idea of an ideal organization. Referring to the famous typology of Douglas McGregor, Ouchi proposed a typology of organization, referring to the Japanese organizations as type J, American organizations as type A and organizations using a blend of the two styles as type Z.[31] Ouchi's main contribution was to point out that management is based on some fundamental assumptions that may be universal.[32]

[26] Anthony Athos, Richard Pascale, *The Art of Japanese Management*, New York: Penguin Books Ltd., 1986, p. xx.

[27] Ibid., p. xxiv.

[28] N. Hatvany, V. Pucik, 'An Integrated Management System: Lessons from the Japanese Experience', *Academy of Management Review*, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1981, p. 469.

[29] William Ouchi, *Theory Z*, New York: Addison-Wesley, 1981, p. 3.

[30] W. Ouchi, 'The Relationship between Organizational Structure and Organizational Control', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 22, 1977, p. 95; W. Ouchi, 'A Conceptual Framework for the Design of Organizational Control Mechanisms', *Management Science*, 1979, Vol. 25, No. 9, p. 833; W. Ouchi, 'Markets, Bureaucracies, and Clans', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 25, 1980, p. 129; W. Ouchi, J. Johnson, 'Types of Organizational Control and Their Relationship to Ennotional Well Being', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 23, 1978, p. 293; W. Ouchi, M. A. Maguire, 'Organizational Control: Two Functions', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 1975, Vol. 20, p. 559; A. Wilkins, W. Ouchi, 'Efficient Cultures: Exploring the Relationship between Culture and Organizational Performance', *Administrative Science Quarterly*, Vol. 28, 1981, p. 468.

[31] Ouchi, *Theory Z*, p. 71.

[32] Ouchi's critics attacked him for superficial analysis and conclusions, as well as for adopting an incorrect assumption that Japanese management is a consciously planned system, and not a product of evolution and the effect of a number of environmental factors such as those described in previous paragraphs.

Finally, we need to mention the contributions that Japanese authors made to the development of Japanese management concepts. One of the most prominent experts in this field was Hideo Ishida, who was one of the first to present a systematic typology of Japanese management features, classifying them into globally transferable and non-transferable. [33] Ishida began by describing the differences between Japanese and American management, the most important being the concept of a job, the organization of union movements, the labor market, the organizational hierarchy and access to resources. Then, taking a number of social factors into account, Ishida discussed the possibility of transferring Japanese management abroad. Elements of Japanese management which he described as universal and transferable included a philosophy focusing on human resources, egalitarianism, community development and the internalization of the labor market, the employment of graduates, training, open career paths within the organization, stability of employment and access to information about the organization's members and their participation in management. It should be noted that Ishida, like Hatvany and Pucik, distinguished three levels of Japanese management, philosophy strategy and practice.

Another major Japanese researcher who contributed significantly to the debate about Japanese management was Kazuo Koike. In his many publications Koike called into question the uniqueness of the 'three sacred treasures' of Japanese management by presenting similar trends and tendencies in specific worker groups in Europe and America. He then put forward his own theories concerning the underlying features of Japanese style management, the most notable of which were the concepts of the internal labor market and the "white-collarization of blue collar workers". [34] The first concept referred to the unique career patterns of Japanese employees, whose rotation within the company was much more frequent and performed on a wider scope of than in the West. The second concept was closely related to the first, and referred to the outcome of such rotation coupled with the prevalence of on-the-job training in Japanese companies. According to Koike, these practices led to a better understanding of the entire company by blue collar workers, and their transformation into employees capable of performing complex managerial and technical tasks. Koike also argued that the potential application of these concepts is not limited to Japan, and that Japanese companies are capable of replicating them in foreign subsidiaries. [35]

Koike was not the only researcher to have questioned the cultural uniqueness of Japanese management. In his 1978 paper entitled 'A Critique of Theories of the Japanese Management System', Professor Urabe Kuniyoshi questioned the rationale of the 'cultural uniqueness' approach to Japanese management put forward by sociologists. [36] He argues that it is necessary to pay more attention to technological factors and the economic

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[33] H. Ishida, 'Nihoteki hyuman risousu manejimento: Katei to kouzou', *Nihon Roudou Kyoukai Zasshi*, Vol. 285, No. 12, 1982, p. 204; H. Ishida, 'Transferability of Japanese Human Resource Management Abroad', *Human Resource Management*, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1986, p. 103.

[34] K. Koike, 'Naibu roudou shijou to keiei sanka', *Contemporary Economics*, Vol. 28, 1977, pp. 36–49.

[35] K. Koike, 'Chiteki jukuren to sono ippansei', *Organizational Science*, Vol. 21, No. 2, 1987, pp. 2–11.

[36] K. Urabe, 'A Critique of Theories of the Japanese Managment System', *Kokumin Keizai Zasshi,* Vol. 138, No. 4, 1978, p. 2.

rationality that have led to the development of the Japanese management system. According to Urabe, the rational foundations of the Japanese management system comprise of internal labor market, dispersed financial and non-financial rewards, and a relatively longer time frames of rewarding employees. He was also one of the first to foresee the future problems of Japanese management, stating that changes to economic conditions might call into question the rationality of the existing system and force changes to it.

The international expansion of Japanese companies in the 1980s allowed researchers not only to conduct a theoretical discussion about Japanese management, but also gave them opportunity to test the theories in practice. In Europe, the concept of Japanese management appeared along with the first Japanese investment in the UK in the early 1980s. In 1986, Peter Turnbull of Cardiff Business School was the first to use the term 'Japanization' to describe the new production techniques introduced by the Japanese in British plants. The term spread later, as Nick Oliver and Barry Wilkinson published a book in 1988 entitled *The Japanization of British Industry* in which they described the changes that occurred in British management as a result of Japanese foreign direct investments. The authors emphasized that the analysis of Japanese management cannot be limited to individual practices, and that the success of Japanese companies depends heavily on the support of external business development socio-economic factors.[37]

The largest research project to this day concerning the transferability of Japanese management was a project carried out by the Japanese Multinational Enterprises Study Group (JMNESG) headed by Professor Tetsuo Abo. Research began in the late 1980s and collected data on the transfer of Japanese management over a span of 20 years in virtually every location hosting Japanese direct investments.[38] The JMNSEG's research applied a uniform methodology for measuring the level of application of the original Japanese management practices and their adaptation to the local conditions. The result of study was the measurement and description of the phenomenon of management system hybridization occurring in foreign affiliates of Japanese companies. Interestingly enough, the level of hybridization reached similar values regardless of the location, with only minor differences in the individual countries and criteria. The JMNSEG study clearly confirmed earlier theoretical assumptions about the partial transferability of Japanese management. However, despite this rich and interesting empirical research, JMNSEG never tested the dynamics of the hybridization process, i.e. changes in hybridization levels as years pass.[39]

Research in the 1980s expanded the scope of knowledge about Japanese management far beyond Abbeglen's classic definition. It became clear that the system of Japanese management is more than the sum of its classical practices and that the key to its competitiveness lies in understanding the concepts of interdependence and integrity. Interestingly, this fact eluded many researchers in later years, leading to a gradual fragmentation and dispersion of the debate.

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[37] Nick Oliver, Barry Wilkinson, *The Japanization of British Industry*, Oxford:Blackwell Publishers, 1988, p. 2.

[38] Tetsuo Abo, *Japanese Hybrid Factories: A Comparison of Global Production Strategies*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, p. xi.

[39] Ibid., p. 221.

The period of disappointment and critique

After a period of overly optimistic debate about Japanese management came a period of severe criticism. Although Japanese management itself had little influence on the occurrence and scale of the financial crisis, many Japanese companies begun to exhibit serious organizational problems that remained latent in the periods of prosperity. To fully understand which accusations against Japanese management were justified and which are not, we must again consider the realities of the Japanese economy in the crisis years.

Historical background (1990s)

The 1990-s is widely known in Japan as the 'lost decade'.[40] A drop of nearly 50% in the value of the Nikkei stock index triggered a series of financial institutions bankruptcies as well as the spiral of so-called 'bad debts' which ultimately led to economic growth falling to 1% percent.[41] The economic problems which Japanese companies came to face in those years included persistent economic stagnation, decline in domestic demand, the appreciation of the yen in the first half of the 1990s, a lack of investment capital, rising commodity prices and falling demand for Japanese products as a result of the Asian financial crisis.[42] Many of these factors, in particular the decline in domestic demand and the high exchange rate of the yen, helped to maintain a high level of foreign investment.[43] The 1990s also saw major social and generational changes. Young recruits born in the 1970s and 1980s were sometimes referred to as 'a new human species' (*shinjinrui*), who seemed to prefer their own convenience over the good of the company.[44] Socio-economic factors clearly put pressure on existing management practices, and in particular the system of lifetime employment and seniority promotions. In the first years after the crisis, many companies were forced to carry out downsizing (*risutora*). In order to avoid massive layoffs, a number of companies used half-measures such as the reduction of temporary workers, early retirement, transfers to subsidiaries, halting the recruitment process and the reduction of working hours.[45] Although initially most Japanese companies were able to defend lifetime employment practices, in the face of continuing stagnation the maintenance costs proved to be too high, and companies were forced to carry out massive job cuts.[46] Similar pressures affected the seniority system, which lost its rationality in times of crisis. The 1990s was a period of massive experimentation with employment systems, during which Japanese companies came to pay much greater attention to the performance of their employees.[47]

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[40] Hiroshi Yoshikawa, *Japan's Lost Decade*, The International House of Japan, 2001, p. 3.

[41] Bird, *Encyclopedia of Japanese Business…*, p. 36.

[42] Ibid., p. 37.

[43] Westney, 'Japan', p. 629.

[44] Maria Aluchna, Piotr Ploszajski, *Zarządzanie japońskie: ciągłość i zmiana*, Warszawa: Szkoła Główna Handlowa, 2008, p. 95.

[45] Bird, *Encyclopedia of Japanese Business…*, p. 282.

[46] J. Majewski, 'Czy japoński model zarządzania wytrzyma próbę czasu? «Trzy święte skarby» a racjonalność mikroekonomiczna', *Japonica*, Vol. 10, 1999, p. 102.

[47] Ibid., p. 106.

The critique and appropriation of Japanese management

The impact of the economic crisis on the scientific debate on Japanese management was evident in the decline in the number of scientific articles published on the subject.[48] Japanese management was criticized first of all for the inefficiency and irrationality of the traditional practices that became apparent during the economic slowdown, and secondly for the actions of the Japanese multinational companies abroad and the inappropriateness of some Japanese management principles to globalization.

The first signs of criticism appeared just before the crisis in the late 1980s. Bartlett and Yoshihara noted in 1988 that the emphasis on homogeneity, the consultative style of decision-making, strict control by the Japanese headquarters and the ethnocentrism of Japanese managers can become a major barrier to competing effectively in international markets, where success lies in the ability to innovate and adapt to local demand.[49] Some Japanese authors predicted a slow change of Japanese management features and its gradual convergence with Western management practices. The new Japanese management involved retaining the practice of lifetime employment, while at the same time embracing heterogeneity, meritocracy and individualism.[50]

The greatest criticism, however, was targeted at the management of Japanese companies operating abroad. Hideki Yoshihara, in his book *The Immature International Management* (*Mijuku on kokusai Keiei*) criticized Japanese affiliates for the monopolization of management positions by Japanese managers, poor productivity and problems with communication.[51] Yoshihara saw a solution for these problems in the localization of management. Similar views were presented by Rochelle Kopp in a 1994 article which was later expanded into a book entitled 'The Rice-Paper Ceiling: Breaking through Japanese Corporate Culture'. On the basis of comparative data from Japanese, European and American companies Kopp argued that top management positions in Japanese companies were dominated by Japanese expatriates.[52] Referring to the typology of multinational companies proposed by Perlmutter[53], Kopp concluded that Japanese companies are ethnocentric and argued that it results in cultural and communication problems and low motivation of local employees. Kopp's article found a wide readership, and could be considered representative of the broader debate on the ethnocentrism of Japanese companies.[54]

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[48] K. Konecki, 'Uwarunkowania zarządzania japońskimi przedsiębiorstwami' [Conditions for managing japanese companies], *MBA*, Vol. 1, No. 66, 2004, p. 11.

[49] Ch. Bartlett, H. Yoshihara, 'New Challenges for Japanese Multinationals: Is Organizational Adaptation Their Achilles Heel?', *Human Resource Management*, Vol. 27, No. 1, 1988, p. 19.

[50] Akihiro Okumura, 'The Globalisation of Japanese Companies', in *Japanese and European Management*, Kazuo Shibagaki, Malcolm Trevor, Tetsuo Abo (eds.), University of Tokyo Press, 1990, p. 31.

[51] Hideki Yoshihara, *Mijuku na kokusai keiei* [Immature International Management], Tokyo: Hokutou Shoubou, 1996, p. 149.

[52]   R. Kopp, 'International Human Resource Policies and Practices in Japanese, European, and United States Multinationals', *Human Resource Management*, 1994, Vol. 33, No. 4, 1994, p. 581.

[53] H. Perlmutter, 'The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation', *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Vol. 4, 1969, p. 10.

[54] A. Bird & M. Mukuda, 'Expatriates in Their Own Home: A New Twist in the Human Resource Management Strategies of Japanese MNCs', *Human Resource Management*, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter

A tendency in 1990s literature, much more interesting than open criticism, was the appropriation of Japanese management practices that stood the test of time.[55] This mechanism was used primarily in relation to methods of production and work organization, which were responsible for the fact that despite the crisis, Japanese factories were still more efficient than Western ones. These best practices have been gradually filtered out of the broader set of Japanese management practices and renamed in culturally neutral ways. The best example of this appropriation mechanism was the creation of the English term "lean management"[56], which described the management and production practices employed in factories of Toyota and other Japanese automakers. A side effect of this process was a split in the debate on Japanese management into the practices of the organization of production (called work practices) and human resource management practices (called HRM practices).[57] The former included job rotation, group work arrangements, employee suggestion schemes and quality circles, while the latter consisted of selective hiring, intensive training, labor relations and egalitarian pay schemes.[58] This new stream of academic literature focusing on production practices was called High Performance Working Practices or High Involvement Working Practices[59] and its main objective was to confirm the correlation between the work practices and the company's financial performance. It turned out that the synergy effect occurring within and between the two groups of practices permits a better explanation of the company's financial results.[60] Although these findings have never been discussed within the context of the Japanese management debate, they provide empirical support for the interdependence argument made by Pascal and Athos. Another very important result of research into HPWPs was the discovery that the presence of specific HRM practices significantly influences the subsequent implementation of manufacturing practices.[61] Another good example of a theory that successfully broke loose from the tradition of the Japanese management debate was Ikujiro Nonaka's knowledge

1989, p. 437; S. Beechler, V. Pucik, J. Stephan, N. Campbell, 'The Transnational Challenge: Performance and Expatriates Presence in the Overseas Affiliates of Japanese MNCs', *CAHRS Working Paper Series*, Vol. 96, No. 6, 1996, p. 1; Timothy Dean Keeley, *International Human Resource Management in Japanese Firms: Their Greatest Challenge*, Houndmill–Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001, p. 7.

[55] Konecki, 'Uwarunkowania zarządzania…', p. 11.

[56] Z. Martyniak, 'Ciągłe ulepszanie czy radykalna przebudowa: antynomie japońskich i amerykańskich koncepcji zarządzania' [Constant improvement or radical rebuilding: antitheses of Japanese and American management concepts], *Organizacja i Kierowanie*, Vol. 4, 1999, p. 5; James Womack, Daniel Jones, Daniel Roos, *The Machine That Changed the World: The Story of Lean Production*, New York: HarperPerennial, 1991, p. 2.

[57] Olejniczak, 'Wdrażanie japońskich technik zarządzania…', p. 10.

[58] J.-P. MacDuffie, 'Human Resource Bundles and Manufacturing Performance: Organizational Logic and Flexible Production Systems in the World Auto Industry', *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1995, p. 197.

[59] Ibid., p. 198; J.-P. MacDuffie, F. Pil, 'The Adoption of High-involvement Work Practices', *Industrial Relations*, 1996, Vol. 35, No. 3, 1996, p. 424; J.-P. MacDuffie, F. Pil, 'What Makes Transplants Thrive: Managing the Transfer of «Best Practices» at Japanese Auto Plants in North America', *Journal of World Business*, Vol. 34, No. 4, 1999, p. 372.

[60] MacDuffie, 'Human Resource Bundles…', p. 197.

[61] MacDuffie, Pil, 'The Adoption of High-involvement…', p. 455.

management. Even though Nonaka's research was done primarily in Japan and the concept of the spiral of knowledge creation relies heavily on traditional Japanese practices of employee rotation, on-the-job training or 'on-the-spot-ism', by applying culturally neutral terms such as 'knowledge creation' and 'continuous innovation' Nonaka manages to put the debate about the practices used by Japanese companies in the center of international focus.[62]

The 1990s were only superficially a period of retreat from research on Japanese management. Criticism of the inefficiencies and gaps in the experience of Japanese companies within the field of international and intercultural management restored a much-needed balance to the debate. On the other hand, the processes of appropriation of Japanese work practice paradoxically contributed to an even greater spread of Japanese management in Western companies. A negative side effect, however, was a dilution of the debate, as a result of questioning the definition of the Japanese management system and the focus on individual practices.

Japanese management at the crossroads

In the twenty-first century, both the Japanese economy and the debate on Japanese management are at a crossroads. With the spread of knowledge on the Japanese management, the competitive advantage of Japanese companies over Western ones has been continuously eroded.[63] Many companies are thus facing the necessity of far-reaching reforms and choosing a new path of development. On the other hand, the scientific community has reached the limits of the debate on the divergence and convergence of Japanese management, and has begun to expand the scope of research to countries outside Western Europe and the United States.

Historical background (2000s)

The beginning of the 21st century marks the 50th anniversary of both the initial internationalization of Japanese companies and the start of the debate on Japanese management. Although the level of foreign direct investment of Japanese companies from the 1980s remained at a high level, after 2005 these investments began to achieve a whole new dimension.

The increase in the amount of FDI in the 2000s has been caused largely by the same factors as in the 1980s, i.e. the high rate of the yen, the aging population and the decreasing importance of domestic demand coupled with the increase in the importance of foreign global demand. While the reasons for expansion remained unchanged its outcomes are significantly different. For example, in 2007 a revolutionary event took place; for the first time in history the Toyota Motor Corporation's level of foreign automobile production has exceeded domestic production.[64] This situation is not an isolated event but represents a general trend in the Japanese manufacturing sector in which the percentage of foreign

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[62] Ikujiro Nonaka, Hirotaka Takeuchi, *The Knowledge-Creating Company*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 3–6; I. Nonaka, 'A Dynamic Theory of Organizational Knowledge Creation', *Organization Science*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1994, pp. 14–37.

[63] Michael Porter, Hirotaka Takeuchi, Mariko Akakibara, *Can Japan Compete*?, London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 2000, p. 7.

[64] Source: http://www.toyota.co.jp/jpn/company/about_toyota/data/regional_production.html (accessed 27.02.2013).

Figure 1. Japanese FDI (in US$ million)

Source: Based on data from JETRO http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/ (accessed 27.02.2013).

production increases every year, reaching a level of nearly 20%.[65] The dynamic development of foreign operations has serious implications for Japan's domestic situation, and it is extremely important from the point of view of Japanese management theory. Contemporary Japanese companies not only operate outside of Japan, but they are becoming dependent on income generated abroad. On the one hand, it means a higher reliance on foreign human resources[66], on the other hand, it requires a redefinition of Japanese headquarters and affiliates' strategic roles. Japanese companies are becoming increasingly aware that local managers are indispensable for accurately addressing the local needs, negotiating with local subcontractors and solving problems that Japanese headquarters cannot foresee. At the same time Japanese factories assume roles of 'mother' or 'sister factories' serving as training centers for foreign employees. This marks a significant change in Japanese managers' mindset, from the perspective of the Japanese center and the foreign periphery to that of a 'global family', or, to use Ouchi's terminology, a "global clan".

The globalization of Japanese management and the divergence/convergence debate

Although the debate about divergence and convergence has been carried out more or less since the 70s[67] it was not until 2000 that it reached full maturity. In the 1970s and 1980s the thesis about divergence was predominant, and was closely related to the assumption of the uniqueness of Japanese management. In the 1990s, in turn, researchers have provided

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[65] Even though 20% percent may seem like a relatively low level, it is worth noting that this is a number indicating the total ratio of foreign subsidiaries sales to sales of Japanese domestic industry, in which high technologies play an important part and generate high revenues. It should also be noted that the ratio is different depending on the industry. In most globalized areas, such as automotive and electronics production, the ratio of overseas production ranges from 30% to nearly 50%.

[66] One proof that this is happening is the recent changes in the top management in Toyota's European and American subsidiaries: http://www.toyota.eu/about/pages/newsdetails.aspx?prid=485&prs=Corporate&prrm=pressrelease (accessed 27.02.2013).

[67] Westney, 'Japan', p. 633.

convincing evidence of progressive convergence.[68] However, both sides of this argument have their limitations. The argument of divergence assumes the stability and permanent nature of Japanese management, and tends to disregard the universal nature of some aspects of management.[69] The thesis of divergence, on the other hand, fails to consider the fact that it was the unique features of Japanese management that had made it so successful, and that the rejection of these features can means a loss of competitive advantage for Japanese companies. After 2000, the debate became somewhat stalled, and researchers began to focus on weighing the pros and cons and the search for a compromise. A good example is Markus Pudelko's 2009 paper 'The End of Japanese-style management?'. The author presents the results of a survey conducted among high-ranking Japanese managers based in the US and Germany; Pudelko identified the underlying forces of both continuity and change within the Japanese management model, and found that even though there are multiple examples of Western inspiration to Japanese companies, the core principles remain intact.[70] The main conclusion is that Japanese management is currently in a constant state of change and evolution in which companies are striving to find a new, mutually reinforcing balance between new and traditional practices. Since this process is far from being over, it is as yet too early to discuss the new shape of Japanese management.[71] Similar conclusions concerning the dynamic nature and gradual adaptation of Japanese management, rather than its revolutionary change and convergence with Western models, were also presented by other authors, including James Abbeglen himself, the father of Japanese management.[72]

In the background of the convergence/divergence debate there seems to be another very important trend contributing to an even greater dispersion of the debate on Japanese management, namely the growing number of studies on individual Japanese management practices carried out by the researchers not only in traditional locations such as Europe[73] and the United States[74], but also in Central and Eastern Europe[75],

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[68] Konecki, 'Uwarunkowania zarządzania…', p. 11.

[69] Kuniyoshi Urabe, 'Krytyka teorii japońskiego stylu zarządzania' [Critique of the theory of Japanese management style] in *Sekret japońskiego sukcesu* [The secret of Japanese success], Elżbieta Kostowska-Watanabe & Akihiro Ishikawa (eds.), Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1990, p. 65.

[70] M. Pudelko, 'The End of Japanese-Style Management?', *Long Range Planning*, Vol. 42, 2009, p. 442.

[71] Ibid., p. 454.

[72] James C. Abbeglen, *21st-Century Japanese Management: New Systems, Lasting Values*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006. pp. 89–90; David Methé, 'Continuity Through Change in Japanese Management: Institutional and Strategic Influences', in *Japanese Management: The Search for a New Balance between Continuity and Change*, Markus Pudelko, René Haak (eds.), Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005, pp. 21–55.

[73] K. Yokozawa, H.-J. Steenhuis, E.-J. Bruijn, 'Factors affecting international transfer of *kaizen*', *Operations and Supply Chain Management*, 2012, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 1; J. Morris, B. Wilkinson, M. Munday, 'Farewell to HRM? Personnel Practices in Japanese Manufacturing Plants in the UK', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Vol. 11, No. 6, 2000, p. 1047.

[74] S. Gump, 'Who Gets the Job? Recruitment and Selection at a «Second-generation» Japanese Automotive Plants in the US', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Vol. 17, No. 5, 2006, p. 842.

[75] Shika En, *Chutōō no nikkei haiburiddo kōjō*, Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2006; H. J. Park, H. Mitsuhashi, C. Fey, I. Bjorkman, 'The Effect of Human Resource Management Practices

Southeast Asia[76], South America[77], and even Africa[78]. Although these studies confirm the selective transfer of Japanese practices and their gradual adaptation to local conditions, any comparative analysis is impossible due to the different research approaches, indicators and narrow research questions. As a result, these studies very often simply confirm the assumptions or theses proved in the 1980s and 1990s without advancing the debate about Japanese management.

In the 21st century both Japanese multinational companies and researchers dealing with the subject of Japanese management are facing similar challenges. Local branches of Japanese companies face the need to re-interpret and codify their underlying principles and values in order to find a common language with the local human resources. The scientific community needs to develop new, flexible definitions in order to describe and compare the increasing number of local varieties of Japanese management. In the following paragraphs, we will present a possible solution to the impasse in the debate on Japanese management, and put forward a new definition of this concept.

Discussion

A chronological review of the literature shows the inadequacy of classic definition of Japanese management and gradual process of the dispersion of the debate over the last 50 years. However, reviewing the literature has allowed us to identify several key features of Japanese management that could be used to form the basis of a new definition.

Japanese management as a process

One of the fundamental characteristics of Japanese management is its evolutionary nature and ability to adapt. As early as 1958, Abbeglen observed that Japanese industrialization had taken a different path because of adaptation to local conditions. The subsequent literature clearly illustrates the changes that Japanese management underwent over the years, starting from the formation of specific practices in response to the post-war reality, to their gradual

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on Japanese Mnc Subsidiary Performance: A Partial Mediating Model', *International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 2003, Vol. 14, No. 8, p. 1391; J. Gamble, 'Transferring Organizational Practices and the Dynamics of Hybridization: Japanese Retail Multinationals in China', *Journal of Management Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 4., 2010, p. 705; N. Takeuchi, 'How Japanese Manufacturing Firms Align their Human Resource Policies with Business Strategies: Testing a Contingency Performance Prediction in a Japanese Context', *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Vol. 20, No. 1, 2009, p. 34; N. Takeuchi, Z. Chen, & W. Lam, 'Coping with an Emerging Market Competition through Strategy-human Resource Alignment: Case Study Evidence from Five Leading Japanese Manufacturers in the People's Republic of China', *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, Vol. 20, No. 12, 2009, p. 2454; Mitsuhide Shiraki, *Chenjingu chaina no jinteki shigen kanri*, Tokyo: Hakutou Shoubou, 2011, p. 23.

[76] A. Ngoc Vo, 'Career Development for Host Country Nationals: A Case of American and Japanese Multinational Companies in Vietnam', *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 2009, Vol. 20, No. 6, p. 1402.

[77] J. Sparkes, M. Miyake, 'Knowledge Transfer and Human Resource Development Practices: Japanese Firms in Brazil and Mexico', *International Business Review*, Vol. 9, 2000, p. 599.

[78] T. Abo, H. Kumon, M. Itohisa, 'Afurika ni okeru monodukuri senryaku: Minami Afurika o chushin ni', *Tokyo University MMRC Consortium 84th Regular Meeting*, 2011, Tokyo, p. xi.

adaptation and hybridization under the influence of economic crises and globalization. It could be therefore argued that focusing on the dynamics, pace and conditions of development of Japanese management is much more important than trying to define and describe particular practices. The dynamic, procedural approach to Japanese management is justified by the very nature of its flagship practices. Strong organizational culture, human resource development, an internal labor market, rotation and group decision making, are all long-term processes.[79] In conclusion, without a dynamic approach, understanding the fundamental characteristics and problems of Japanese management will remain impossible.

Japanese management as a multi-level concept

Another crucial aspect of Japanese management is its multi-level character. The review of the literature allowed us to identify three levels of Japanese management, namely practices[80], strategies[81], and fundamental philosophies.[82] The idea that Japanese management can be divided into three levels in itself has a relatively long history and has been accepted ever since.[83] The three levels of Japanese management share some obvious analogies with Shein's concept of culture. Detailed explanation of the various policies and practices lies well beyond the scope of the present article, so we will focus only on the characterization of levels.

In the literature, there is almost unanimous agreement that the level of Japanese management philosophy could be best characterized by a focus on the human factor. This philosophy has been very skillfully translated from Japanese by a Polish researcher as '*humanitalizm*' (*jinponshugi*). The basic assumption of *humanitalizm* as an underlying philosophy of Japanese management is that the skills and experience of its employees constitute the main assets of the company (as opposed to capitalism, in which the capital is the most important asset).[84] In addition to this explanation of the underlying philosophy, it is necessary to point out two things. Firstly, this philosophy is relatively universal and has high potential for global application.[85] Secondly, ethnocentrism, and selective application of this philosophy to Japanese employees, stemmed not so much from Japanese culture as from underlying reasons of international expansion of Japanese multinationals. Japanese companies began their foreign expansion not in search of human resources, but to avoid trade barriers and defuse tensions arising in aging organizations. The aging population and the pressures of global competition in recent years, however, has put pressure on Japanese companies to extend their underlying philosophy to the entire global workforce.

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[79] D.-S. Cho, 'Nihon kigyō no takokusekika to kigyōnai gijutsu iten', *Soshiki Kagaku*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1994, p. 59; Takahiro Fujimoto, *The Evolution of a Manufacturing System at Toyota*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 4; Fujimoto, *The Evolution of a Manufacturing…*, p. 4.

[80] James Abbeglen, *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of its Social Organization*, Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958; Ishida, 'Transferability of Japanese…', p. 103; MacDuffie, 'Human Resource Bundles…', p. 197; Abo, *Japanese Hybrid Factories…*

[81] Hatvany, Pucik, 'An Integrated Management System', p. 469; Ishida, 'Transferability of Japanese …', p. 103; Kazuo Koike, *Kaigai nihon kigyo no jinzai keisei* [HRD in foreign Japanese companies], Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha, 2008.

[82] Ouchi, *Theory Z*; Athos, Pascale, *The Art of Japanese Management*.

[83] Ishida, 'Transferability of Japanese …', p. 105; Hatvany, Pucik, 'An Integrated Management System', p. 472; Aluchna, Ploszajski, *Zarządzanie japońskie…*, p. 37.

The second level of Japanese management is the strategic level. It contains three mutually complementary business strategies, namely development of community, the internal labor market and human resources development. The strategy of 'company as community' takes into account the cultural aspects of Japanese management, such as common values and interests, harmony, collectivity and egalitarianism.[86] The internal labor market strategy refers to the specific tendency of Japanese management to acquire, isolate and protect key human resources.[87] It should be noted, however, that this strategy may involve only a handful of employees, and does not exclude the use of open labor market strategies for other resources. This strategy supports the building of a community on the one hand, and justifies the development of human resources on the other. Human resource development, consists of training, socialization, job rotation and substantial investments, returns on which can be expected only in the long term.[88] Hence the use of this strategy is often limited only to human resources which will stay with the company for a long time.

The level of organizational practices is the third and final level of Japanese management, which very often is erroneously understood as its essence. We propose, however, that it is necessary to move away from Abbegglen's classical definition because, as we have shown, these practices no longer sufficiently describe the reality of Japanese management. In addition, the level of practices should be described as vaguely and neutrally as possible, in order to accommodate the different varieties of practice used by Japanese companies all over world. As in Schein's model of culture, in which artifacts are secondary to values and assumptions, we propose that management practices should be treated as mere outcomes to strategy and philosophy.[89] The level of practice should therefore be treated with a high degree of flexibility, not all of them must be present at the same time, and not all have to be implemented to a similar degree. The key issue is to what extent they are the result of conscious implementation of the philosophy and strategy of Japanese management.

Integrity and coherence as the essence of Japanese management

If, however, the philosophy of 'humanitarism' can be seen as largely universal, and if the practices are just outcomes of strategies whose form and amount may vary depending on the time and geographical location, we are inevitably faced with the following question: what is the innate Japaneseness of Japanese management? In our opinion, the essence of Japanese management is the qualities of integrity and coherence repeatedly emphasized in the literature.[90] 'Integrity' may refer to (a) the relationship between the members of the organization, (b) the relationship between the human resource management and other functions of the organization, (c) the relationship between levels of Japanese management, i.e. the philosophy, strategy and practices. Integrity is also inseparably linked to the

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[84] Majewski, 'Czy japoński model…', p. 103.

[85] Ishida, 'Transferability of Japanese…', p. 105; Ouchi, *Theory Z*, p. 71.

[86] Aluchna, Ploszajski, *Zarządzanie japońskie…*, p. 36.

[87] Hatvany, Pucik, 'An Integrated Management System', p. 468.

[88] Koike, *Kaigai nihon…*, p. 24.

[89] The Matsushita Foundation For Management and The Social Sciences, *Nihonteki keiei no honryū* [The mainstream of Japanese management], Tokyo: PHP Institute, 1997, p. 264.

[90] Hatvany, Pucik, 'An Integrated Management System', p. 469; MacDuffie, 'Human Resource Bundles…', p. 197; Athos, Pascale, *The Art of Japanese Management*, p. 116.

perception of Japanese management as an ideal concept, which cannot be achieved in reality. This means that we cannot talk about Japanese management if there is any dissonance between any of these elements, and because such a situation is not really possible, Japanese management will always remain in the realms of the ideal.

The new definition of Japanese management

Based on three key aspects of Japanese management identified as a result of literature review and described in previous paragraphs, we would like to put forward a new more dynamic and flexible definition of Japanese management:

> **Japanese management is a process of realizing the philosophy of people as the most important organizational resource through the strategies of community building, the internal labor market and Human Resource Development; and the creation of corresponding practices that maximize the input of the human factor in the production process.**

The proposed definition includes the assumption of an evolutionary and dynamic character of Japanese management, distinguishes three conceptual levels of philosophy, strategy and practices, and most importantly, emphasizes the importance of integrity and coherence between these levels.

Summary

This paper has described the process of fragmentation and dispersion of the debate on Japanese management over the last 50 years. By drawing on the most important theoretical developments that have taken place since the inception of the Japanese management concept, we have been able to put forward a new definition of this concept. Finally, it is worth emphasizing what the potential benefits may be of redefining the concept and reviving the debate about Japanese management. First, the new definition allows researchers to overcome the current fragmentation and organize the debate by clarifying and narrowing down the most important features of Japanese management to personnel management in manufacturing companies. Second, by placing the emphasis on philosophy and strategies rather than specific practices, the new definition offers the possibility of comparative studies in the growing number of locations in which Japanese manufacturing plants are present. Finally, by emphasizing the procedural character and the key importance of integrity in Japanese management, the definition sets an ambitious new direction for empirical research. As with Japanese multinational companies, the debate about Japanese management has entered the era of globalization. In the face of the threat of theoretical fragmentation and chaos, it is necessary to verify and organize these basic assumptions and definitions. In this way it will become possible to communicate and exchange valuable knowledge on a scale far exceeding previous achievements.

PAWEŁ PASIERBIAK

The Technological Leadership of the Japanese Economy?

Abstract

The author focuses on the technological development of Japan and assesses the country's international position in that field. He argues that Japan could achieve a position as a global technological leader thanks to the adroit and supportive policy of the state and the dedication of enterprises to technological development. But in the current, more complicated domestic and external economic circumstances, the country's leading position is coming under threat. Because of growing competition from new, mainly Asian rivals, the old leaders need to adjust to the new situation. This means that in some fields of technology Japan will lose its advantages as well.

1. Introduction

Technical and technological progress is one of the most decisive factors for the current and future economic position of the Japanese economy. Progress in this area generally determines the opportunities for the country's economic growth, and those economies that are developing on the basis of technology record the highest long-term dynamics of growth. This is considered in many theories of economic growth, where aspects of technological progress are often very important.[1] Therefore, those countries which thanks to technology are able to use their resources in not only intensive but also extensive ways, and whose governments pursue an active policy of promoting technological development and innovation, are the only ones which can attain a leading global position.

Japan's post-war economic development is an interesting example of the idea that through adroit technology development (among other factors), the country has been able to succeed in transitioning from the position of a backward country into a world leader. Confirmation of this can be found both in the number of indicators describing the technological development of the country[2] and the general perception of Japanese products as well as the whole economy as thoroughly modern and highly technologically advanced. The 1970s was a period when the technological gap between Japan and the most advanced economies closed, and the country entered a phase of technology creation, and the acquisition and consolidation of its position of global technology leadership. In the second

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[1] Technology is not, of course, the only factor of economic growth. In the classical approach there are three factors of production: land, labor and capital. In more recent concepts, both technology and entrepreneurship can be perceived as such factors.

[2] This will be developed in more detail in section 2.

half of the 1980s the Japanese economy offered products which were model examples of the progress that can be achieved through skillful technological development.

This position of leadership should not, however, be taken for granted. In the early 1990s a difficult period of economic slowdown for the Japanese economy began. At the same time, some dynamic changes occurred in the global economy and started influencing the balance of power within the global economy. It also posed challenges for Japan in the ??technical and technological areas; these changes are the focus of this study.

The analysis will cover the technological position of Japan related to other countries and the factors determining this position. In particular, the aim is to show the evolution of the development of Japan's technological level by the end of the 190s, and to compare the country's current position with such economies as that of the United States, Germany, South Korea and China. The analysis will cover the most important areas of technology. As the country's foreign trade also reflects the level of technological development, this sphere of economic activity will also be evaluated in detail.

The main analysis carried out in this study will include the most recent years (since 2000), but for a synthetic presentation of the evolution of Japan's technological level we will include the years immediately after World War II. The large amount of statistical data needed to achieve this goal influenced the research methods used in the paper. These include an analytical method (analysis of primary sources in the form of statistical data collected by the OECD and the World Bank) and a descriptive method.

2. The technological progress of the Japanese economy after World War II

After World War II Japan had to make a decision about the foundations of its future development. With a choice of two alternative routes, the government decided that economic development would be based on extensive economic ties with the rest of the world.[3] Active participation in the international economy was to be an effective way to upgrade the structure of the national economy. Both the government and the whole of Japanese society was convinced that the production and export of modern goods would quickly lead to economic and social advancement. In order for this to be possible, it was necessary to focus on improving the technological level of business enterprises and the entire economy.

Technical and technological progress serves as an incentive for improving the efficiency of the manufacturing process, but it also influences the prices and the non-price competitiveness of export supply.[4] Improved efficiency through technological progress leads to a decrease in the cost of production, but also helps to improve the utility of goods and the introduction of new products and models. An increasingly favorable relationship between price and product quality makes consumers more willing to purchase such goods.

All postwar Japanese governments were aware of this link. Therefore, deliberate state policy led to technological development. When private companies increased their position and technological progress was based on their commitment, governments were able to conduct a useful supporting policy.

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[3]   The first was development based on Japan's own resources for production, and the second was development in co-operation with the outside world.

[4]   Jan Bossak, Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, Mieczysław Tomala, *Stany Zjednoczone, EWG, Japonia – współpraca i rywalizacja* [The United States, EEC, Japan – Co-operation and Rivalry]*, Warszawa: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1988, p. 57.

After World War II, Japan pursued a policy of technological development similar to that of the Meiji period, that of importing technology from abroad. Along the same lines, directly after the war Japan was eager to take advantage of the technical expertise from more developed countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France and Germany. Initially, the main channel of technology transfer was imports of machinery and equipment[5], but in subsequent periods, the most desirable method of acquiring of technical knowledge became licensing. This was used in those industries that were the subject of industrial policy implemented by the state, especially in such industries as electrical and non-electrical machinery, chemicals, transportation and electronics. [6] Importing licenses was the most important way of obtaining technology in the early 1960s, when the technological level of the country still remained at a relatively low level. However, in later years, when the scientific base of the country began to develop intensively, Japan improved its ability to adapt foreign licenses. Japan began to close the technological gap dividing it from the developed countries.[7] Under such conditions, it became increasingly important to create its own technology and specific solutions. Bringing Japan's technological level up to that of the developed countries also meant that the licenses were less willingly sold to Japan, and in new areas of research, restrictive regulations on the import of technology were employed.[8] The strategy of 'catching up', as Japan's technology policy after World War II was described, was replaced in the 1980s by a strategy of seeking innovative technologies.[9]

The high level of technological development achieved by Japan was clearly reflected in foreign trade. Comparisons with the United States and countries of the European Economic Community were much in Japan's favor. Detailed data which illustrate this issue are presented in Table 1.

According to Table 1, the largest increases in exports by Japan were recorded in the field of high-demand growth goods that are also high-tech products. In this group Japan showed the highest growth of share among OECD countries. In the group of medium-demand growth goods Japan also showed an increase, but less than in the previous group. Smaller but still positive changes occurred in the group of low-demand growth goods. The analysis confirms the changes that took place in the Japanese comparative advantage – specialization in labor-intensive products was replaced by specialization in capital- and later in knowledge-intensive products. At the same time, the perception of Japanese products on international markets was changing. They became known for having the highest level of technological advancement, a high degree of reliability and relatively low prices.

Japan's rapid postwar technical and technological progress was achieved mainly by conducting a deliberate policy in that field of the national economy. This was reflected

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[5]   J. Monkiewicz, 'Importowana technika w rozwoju technicznym gospodarki japońskiej' [Imported Technology in the Technical Development of the Japanese Economy], *Kapitalizm*, No. 1/ 1979, p. 121.

[6]   Ibid., p. 123.

[7]   See among others: Hugh Patrick, *The Phoenix Risen from the Ashes: Postwar Japan*, Center Paper No. 151, New Haven: Yale University, 1970, pp. 314–317.

[8]   *Economic Survey of Japan 1981/1982*, Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1984, p. 230.

[9]   Yuko Harayama, 'Japanese Technology Policy: History and a New Perspective', *RIETI Discussion Paper Series*, 01–E–001, August 2001, p. 8.

Table 1. Changes of shares in total exports of OECD in the years 1968–1985, in percentage points

Specification	Percentage changes in years:		
	1973/68	1979/73	1985/79
Industrial goods in total			
Europe-10	–1.83	+0.24	–1.44
United States	–3.63	–0.17	+0.73
Japan	+1.61	+0.85	+5.37
Goods of high demand growth			
Europe-10	–3.43	–0.56	–2.54
United States	–4.96	+0.57	+1.24
Japan	+2.21	+0.70	+7.14
Goods of medium demand growth			
Europe-10	–1.19	–0.29	–2.42
United States	–4.61	–0.99	+0.21
Japan	+2.85	+1.64	+5.66
Goods of low demand growth			
Europe-10	–1.67	+1.70	+1.93
United States	–1.55	–0.09	–1.05
Japan	–0.71	–0.40	+1.85

Europe-10 – without Greece and Portugal, and discounting intra-EEC trade.
Goods of high demand growth – modern goods. Goods of low demand growth – traditional (not modern) goods.
Source: John A. Quelch, Robert D. Buzzell, Eric R. Salama, *The Marketing Challange of Europa 1992*, Addison-Wesley Publishing Company 1991, p. 5. Citation after Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko, *Rozwój powiązań w gospodarce światowej – etapy globalizacji i regionalizacja procesów gospodarczych* [Development of Links in the World Economy – Phases of Globalization and Regionalization of Economic Processes] in Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko (ed.), *Współczesna gospodarka światowa. Główne centra gospodarcze* [Contemporary World Economy. Main Economic Centers], Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2005, p. 59.

inter alia by the amount of funding allocated to research and development. From the beginning of the 1950s Japan extensively increased not only the absolute level of spending but, more importantly, its share of expenditure on R&D in relation to GDP. In 1953, the share was 0.5% and has constantly increased since then.[10] Comparison of Japan to other countries confirms the much greater involvement in the financing of research and development. In

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[10]　Dirk Pilat, *The Economics of Rapid Growth: the Experience of Japan and Korea*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar Press, 1994, p. 69.

1990, the ratio of expenditure on R&D to GDP was 2.91% in Japan, while in the United States it was 2.65%, and in Germany 2.61%.[11] In 2000, the shares were 3.00%, 2.71% and 2.47% respectively.[12] In subsequent years, Japan's share has even increased, and the country technological development has reached higher and higher levels.

However, this did not mean that along with achieving a better position Japan was losing interest in acquiring foreign technical expertise. On the contrary, in parallel with the development of their own scientific research facilities and exporting the results of their technology, Japan was still interested in importing technology from abroad. An illustration of this process, and at the same time a synthetic measure of the level of technological development, is the technology balance of payment, as measured by the difference of inflows and outflows arising from the selling and purchasing of the licenses. The following statistical evidence (Chart 1) shows the tendencies.

Chart 1. Technology balance of payments: Payments and receipts, in US$ million

Source: OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

The information from Chart 1 clearly shows the changes which Japan has experienced in the balance of technology since the early 1980s. Yet by 1993, revenues were almost equal to expenditures, resulting in a relatively stable technological balance. Since then, however, we can observe a stabilization of expenditures at an average amount of about US$5 billion, while at the same there has been a very dynamic growth in revenues from export licenses.

The above analysis provides a basis for assuming that in the second half or the 1980s Japan became a highly technologically developed country whose products could compete successfully not only on international markets but also on the highly demanding markets

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[11] OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

[12] Ibidem.

of such developed countries as the United States and some Western European countries.[13] In the 1980s products of Japanese origin became synonymous with the highest quality. Growing demand for Japanese products around the world confirmed the effectiveness of the industrial and technological restructuring of the economy.

3. The technological maturity of Japan in the 21st century

Forty years after the end of World War II, Japan had established a strong position of technology leadership in the global economy. A well-managed policy of industrial development and the technological involvement of private companies in a constant drive to improve efficiency through the implementation of innovation were the main reasons for this success, but public confidence about the benefits of technology development was also important. However, when symptoms of stagnation in the economy appeared in the early 1990s, the technology and innovation field also displayed some disturbing phenomena. What is more, these were also perceived as attributing to the negative impact on the overall economy. According to Marcus Noland, in the second half of the 1990s Japan failed to meet virtually any of the criteria that should have been maintained for the national innovation system to be defined as effective.[14] In his view, Japan did not have strong ties to industry and science, there was a lack of strong foreign trade and investment connections, and the scientific background was weak. In addition, business was not supported by favorable risk-taking institutions, and the existing conditions did not facilitate the creation and dissemination of innovation. Japan started to be perceived as a country that had lost not only its position in international trade and investment, but also its position of a technology leader.

Analyzing the changes that have taken place in the new century in Japan in the fields of science, technology and innovation, and applying them to the country's biggest competitors in that field, the picture that emerges is not stable, and is certainly complex and multi-dimensional.[15] In many areas Japan is still a leader which does not need to feel threatened, but there are also some spheres where its position is endangered, mainly from the quickly developing emerging economies.

Considering R&D expenditures, which are one of the key indicators,, we can say that Japan still spends a great deal in relation to GDP. In Table 2, data is collected for Japan and other selected countries.

In 1990, Japan's spending totaled US$68.8 billion, or 2.91% of the GDP. In 2011, expenditures reached US$146.5 billion, an increase of 113%, and its share of the GDP was 3.39%.[16] Among the countries listed in Table 2, only South Korea (4.03%) spent more than

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[13] Andrzej H. Jasiński [ed.], *Innowacje i transfer techniki w gospodarce polskiej* [Innovations and Technology Transfer in the Polish Economy], Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2000, p. 142.

[14] Marcus Noland, *Industrial Policy, Innovation Policy, and Japanese Competitiveness,* Washington: Peterson Institute for International Economics, WP 07–4, May 2007, p. 14.

[15] A comparative analysis of Japan will be made in respect of economies such as the United States, Germany, South Korea and China. These are two groups of countries, the first of which consists of the so-called traditional leaders (including the US and Germany), while the second includes those countries that aspire to that role (such as China and South Korea).

[16] OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

Table 2. GERD as a percentage of gross domestic product, 1990–2011

Specification	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2011
Germany	2.61	2.19	2.47	2.51	2.80	2.88
Japan	**2.91**	**2.87**	**3.00**	**3.31**	**3.25**	**3.39**
Korea	–	2.30	2.30	2.79	3.74	4.03
USA	2.65	2.50	2.71	2.59	2.83	2.77
EU-28	–	1.65	1.74	1.73	1.91	1.94
China	–	0.57	0.90	1.32	1.76	1.84

EU-28 covers the former EU27 members plus Croatia, which is to join the EU on July 1, 2013.

Source: OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

Japan. The United States and the EU countries spent much less on the sphere of R&D in relation to GDP.

This phenomenon is confirmed by the analysis of expenditure on R&D in terms of its growth. Countries such as South Korea and China have a significant advantage over the more developed countries such as the United States and Japan. In 2010–2011, the growth rate in Korea exceeded 11%, and reached 14% in China.[17] Japan showed an increase of 1.43% (2010) and 3.53% (2011), while in the same period expenditure in the US decreased by 0.45% (2010) and 0.52% (2011). This is not a result of lower volume in absolute terms, but above all of the base effect, which states that the size of the increase is related to a lower base, as in the case of Korea and China.

Forecasts for 2013 predict a further increase in expenditures for R&D (see Chart 2), but the largest increase will be in Brazil (31%), India (12%) and China (12%).[18] This means that transformations are also taking place in this area of the world economy. With all the importance of research and development, Japan has developed some specific characteristics in its scientific and research sphere[19]: it is mainly of civilian nature, it is primarily funded by the private sector, and in addition Japanese companies attach great importance to the effectiveness of these expenditures. This means that resources are focused in industry, and furthermore, the best specialists are working in industry. The analysis of the structure of expenditure on R&D leads to the conclusion that the main source of funds for R&D is indeed industry. Figure 3 shows the sources of funds for R&D in Japan.

In 2011 industry financed over 75% of total R&D spending. At the same time, there is a tendency to government's decreasing involvement in financing this sector of the economy. What differentiates Japan from other countries is a clear lack of participation of foreign

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[17] OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

[18] *Financial Times*, Thursday, May 30, 2013, p. 15.

[19] For more details see Paweł Pasierbiak, *Miejsce Unii Europejskiej w zagranicznej ekspansji gospodarczej Japonii* [The Position of the European Union in The Foreign Economic Expansion of Japan], Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2008, pp. 103–104.

Chart 2. Estimates of GERD in 2013 for selected countries, in US$ million

Source: *Financial Times*, Thursday, May 30, 2013, p. 15.

Chart 3. Sources of Japanese GERD financing, in %

Source: OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

capital in financing R&D. This is primarily due to low openness to foreign capital, resulting in a lack of strong investor interest in the functioning of the Japanese market.[20] Japan's commitment to efficiency caused it to develop its industrial innovation capabilities. This is

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[20] According to UNCTAD data, in 2012 Japan's share of in world's total inward FDI stock was 0.9%, while Germany's was 3.1% and China's 3.7%. UNCTAD, *World Investment Report 2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development*, New York and Geneva: UN, 2013, pp. 217–218.

confirmed by the high number of patents submitted by Japan and the country's participation in the number of patents obtained abroad. In 2011, the Japanese ICT sector alone reported more than 17,000 patents; this result was higher than that of the USA (16,548) and the EU28 (12,513).[21] Japan is also a leader in terms of participation in the triadic patent families.[22] Graph 4 contains data for Japan, the US and the EU.

Chart 4. Share of countries in triadic patent families, in %


Source: Author's calculations based on OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

The position of the United States, which in 1990 was the strongest, has weakened over time to 2011. Similarly, the role of the European Union has also been reduced, and the only member of the international economic relations' 'triad' which enhanced its importance in this respect was Japan.

4. The technological intensity of Japanese trade

After World War II, international trade became one of Japan's major sources of economic success. Japan actively and peacefully began to participate in the international economy. However, in order to succeed on international markets it had to offer products which were not only reasonably priced, but would also have a high utility value. These competitive advantages could only be provided under the rapid technological advancement of the country. Progress was reflected not only in the country's economic and production structure, but also in its increasingly attractive export offer. Japanese products were increasingly finding buyers on international markets. In the second half of the 1980s, Japan achieved very high status as an

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[21] OECD, 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

[22] Patent families refer to triadic families: i.e. a patent is a member of the patent families if and only if it is filed at the European Patent Office (EPO), the Japan Patent Office (JPO) and is granted by the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). OECD, *Main Science and Technology Indicators Volume 2012 Issue 2*, OECD Publishing. http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/msti-v2012-2-en, 2013, p. 102.

exporter of technologically advanced goods.[23] In the early 1990s, the Japanese economy started to feel the economic slowdown, which was reflected in a deterioration of the economy's macroeconomic condition as well as changes in the field of foreign trade (among other factors). Opinions were formulated that the Japanese economy was too heavily dependent on the current situation in the global economy. The demand on the international market, which by nature is independent of any policy undertaken by the governments of individual countries, created a certain burden for Japan. A growing external demand had a positive effect on the condition of the internal economy and a low level of demand negatively affected the dynamics of economic development. Attempts to become independent from the negative impact of the external environment by stimulating domestic demand have not yet succeeded.[24] In such circumstances it was more important for the products sold on international markets to maintain their technological leadership. The high level of technological advancement is conducive to the achievement of higher margins, and thus has a positive effect on the condition of businesses, foreign trade and the state of the economy. However it is worth noting that the contemporary conditions for exporters are radically different from those observed in the 1990s. The ever greater degree of the globalization of economic processes leads businesses increasingly to move their production processes abroad. This also results in changes to the foreign trade of each country. Existing leaders need to make adjustments caused by the pressure of rapidly developing new actors in the global economy.

Table 3 shows data on the exports of high technology products for selected countries from the beginning of this century. It can be concluded that, apart from 2009, the value of exports of such goods has steadily increased.

In 2009, many national economies experienced a collapse in global trade, including in the area of high technology. However, as illustrated by the data, in 2010–2011 there was a rebound in the value of exports and a resumption of growth. The growth rate of exports of high technology goods varied between countries; the highest growth was demonstrated by countries such as China and South Korea. To the same extent this is the result of the technological progress which has taken place in these countries, but it should be also treated as a result of the globalization of economic activities. For both China and Korea, a major role in their foreign trade is played by the import of components and sub-assemblies to be installed in the country of final stage of production. Therefore, according to the traditional approach to trade statistics, the final product is recognized as highly valued. In reality, much of the value added to the final good is added in other countries.[25] However, data showing changes in the share of economies (in the traditional approach) indicate that all the previous leaders are less important in the world economy in this respect. An illustration of this process can be found in Chart 5.

Analysis of the data clearly shows a decrease in Japan's position in world exports of high technology goods. Between 2000 and 2010, the country's share fell from 11.1% to just 6.8%. This brings Japan to the level of South Korea, while the latter country is experiencing a growing trend. Japan was not the only country whose share fell (the United States

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[23] Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko (ed.), *Współczesna gospodarka światowa. Główne centra gospodarcze* [Contemporary World Economy. Main Economic Centers], Lublin: Wydawnictwo UMCS, 2005, pp. 59–60.

[24] OECD, *OECD Economic Surveys: Japan 2009*, OECD Publishing, Paris 2009, pp. 22–23.

[25] This problem will also be considered in next paragraph of this article.

Table 3. High-technology exports of selected countries in the years 2000–2011, in % and US$ million

Year	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
World	*1159*	*1051*	*1068*	*1192*	*1431*	*1589*	*1825*	*1767*	*1841*	*1572*	*1792*	*–*
EU	390.3	386.2	385.3	421.4	499.9	552	624.6	554.3	581.9	511.1	574.1	622.4
	33.7%	36.7%	36.1%	35.4%	34.9%	34.7%	34.2%	31.4%	31.6%	32.5%	32.0%	–
USA	197.5	176.2	162.1	160.3	176.3	190.7	219	218.1	220.9	132.4	145.5	145.3
	17.0%	16.8%	15.2%	13.5%	12.3%	12.0%	12.0%	12.3%	12.0%	8.4%	8.1%	–
China	41.7	49.4	69.2	108.7	163	215.9	273.1	302.8	340.1	309.6	406.1	457.1
	3.6%	4.7%	6.5%	9.1%	11.4%	13.6%	15.0%	17.1%	18.5%	19.7%	22.7%	–
Korea	54.3	40.4	46.9	57.5	76.1	83.9	93.4	101	100.9	92.9	121.5	122
	4.7%	3.8%	4.4%	4.8%	5.3%	5.3%	5.1%	5.7%	5.5%	5.9%	6.8%	–
Japan	128.9	99.5	95.9	107.1	126.2	125.4	129.2	117.9	119.9	95.2	122	126.5
	11.1%	9.5%	9.0%	9.0%	8.8%	7.9%	7.1%	6.7%	6.5%	6.1%	6.8%	–

Source: Author's calculations based on World Bank Database. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD/countries. 2013 (accessed 23.04.2013).

Chart 5. Share in world's high-technology exports of selected economies, in %

High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.

Source: Author's calculations based on World Bank Database. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD/countries. 2013 (accessed 23.04.2013).

showed an even greater reduction of the share, by 8.9%), but if we take into account the position of Germany, which to some extent has been strengthened, the situation of Japan is not that good. In particular, comparisons with China give negative results. In the period analyzed (2000–2010), China increased its share in exports of high technology goods from 3.6% to 22.7%. Here again the hypothesis about the falling position of developed countries and the rising position of developing countries can be confirmed.

The analysis of more detailed data on Japanese exports and imports of high technology goods confirms the country's deteriorating competitiveness. In almost all areas of analysis (electronic industry, the office machinery and computer industry and the pharmaceutical industry), the deterioration in Japan's trade balance with other countries is easily seen.

One area that has shown little improvement was the *instrument industry*, where there was an increase in surplus, and the *aerospace industry*, where the previously recorded deficit decreased. The changes described are illustrated in Table 4. This data also shows the

Table 4. Japanese high-technology trade balance and share in world's exports, in US$ million and %

Industry	Trade balance [US$ mln]			Export market share [%]		
	1990	2000	2011	1990	2000	2011
Aerospace industry	–3549.2	–2468.8	–1488.5	0.7	1.5	1.8
Electronic industry	38100.2	47568.8	13872.1	37.4	12.8	5.8
Office machinery and computer industry	19498.7	7658.7	–7141.2	24.3	9.3	3.3
Pharmaceutical industry	–1784.0	–2419.9	–18173.3	3.9	2.9	1.0
Instrument industry	8603.3	13743.1	20348.2	17.5	14.2	8.2

Source: Author's calculations based on OECD 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', *OECD Science, Technology and R&D Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00182-en. 2012 (accessed 22.06.2013).

dramatically declining participation rates of Japan in world exports in selected groups of high-tech products. The biggest decline in the share between 1990 and 2011 showed an *electronic industry* (from 37.4% to 5.8%) and *office machinery and computer industry* (from 24.3% to 3.3%). The highest share in world exports of high technology goods was found in the *instrument industry*, but here too there was a decrease from 17.5% (1990) to 8.2% (2011).

This is also the consequence of internal transformations in each country. In the developed countries there is a noticeable reduction in the share of high technology products exports in the total exports of manufactured products. This trend is also apparent throughout the world as a whole (see Chart 6).

However, in developing countries (Korea, China) the trend is clearly reversed – the share of high-tech goods in total exports of manufactured goods has increased. In the case of China in 2004–2006 the level even reached 30%, with the global average little more than 20%. This reflects the positive changes in the structure of production and exports of developing countries.

In the case of Japan, data on the share of exports of high technology goods in the manufacturing export are similar to that for the global average. However, the declining

Chart 6. High-technology exports (% of manufactured exports) of selected economies, in %

High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.

Source: Author's calculations based on World Bank Database. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ TX.VAL.TECH.CD/countries. 2013 (accessed 23.04.2013).

share of the above-mentioned products in Japanese exports can be perceived as a negative phenomenon. Another symptom of adverse changes is Japan's trade balance with the rest of the world in the field of ICT products. In the years 2000–2009, this balance deteriorated drastically; the surplus fell from US$47.3 billion to US$7.4 billion (see Table 5).

Table 5. Product structure of Japanese ICT exports and imports in the years 2000–2009, in % and US$ million

Specification	2000	2005	2009	2000	2005	2009
	Exports			Imports		
Total (US$ billion)	108.80	100.81	70.16	61.48	69.50	62.73
Computers and peripheral equipment	29.0%	22.7%	10.1%	44.3%	39.6%	28.2%
Communication equipment	7.1%	3.4%	8.6%	7.9%	4.4%	16.5%
Consumer electronic equipment	17.5%	18.3%	16.3%	10.9%	13.3%	15.3%
Electronic components	42.1%	43.0%	55.8%	33.4%	32.5%	31.9%
Miscellaneous	4.3%	12.5%	9.2%	3.5%	10.1%	8.1%

Source: OECD, 'Harmonized System 1996: ICT Goods', *International Trade by Commodity Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00058-en. 2010 (accessed 27.06.2013).

Chart 7. Trade balances in Japanese ICT foreign trade, in billion USD

Source: OECD 'Harmonised System 1996: ICT Goods', *International Trade by Commodity Statistics* (database). Doi: 10.1787/data-00058-en. 2010 (accessed 27.06.2013).

A more detailed analysis of the structural changes leads to the conclusion that less and less importance in exports can be attributed to the group of *computers and peripheral equipment*. On the other hand, the *electronic components* group is growing in importance. This confirms the earlier statement about the rise of fragmentation of international production and its vertical integration, also in the case of Japan. In imports two groups have become less important: *computers and peripheral equipment* and *electronic components*, while the others have shown an increase. The worsening of Japan's general foreign trade in ICT goods was due to the deepening of unfavorable trends in all subsets of these goods. This is illustrated in Chart 7. In the first decade of this century the trade balance worsened in each commodity group. The surplus of US$47.3 billion in *computers and peripheral equipment* fell to only US$7.4 billion; in the case of *electronic components* it has decreased from US$12.4 billion to US$1.8 billion. The previously positive balance in *communication equipment* (US$4.3 billion) turned into a deficit (US$-10.6 billion). Similar trends were also seen in the *consumer electronic equipment* group (down from US$2.8 billion to US$–4.3 billion).

Besides these indicators for assessing the technological advancement of Japan's foreign trade and its international competitiveness, there are other measures which give a view on the country's position in the global economy. In the field of foreign trade, one of the most widely used measures is the index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). This concept refers to the relative trade performance of individual countries in particular commodities.[26] When a country has achieved a revealed comparative advantage in the field of high-tech goods, it can form the basis for a positive assessment of the country's technological position.

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[26] **RCAij = (xij/Xi)/ (xaj/Xa)**, where: *xij*: exports of product *j* from country *i*; *Xi*: total exports from country *i*; *xaj* total exports of product *j* from the reference area (e.g. the world); *Xa*: total exports from reference area. A country reveals comparative advantages in products for which the RCA indicator is higher than 1.

Table 6. Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) of selected economies in 1995 and 2009

Specification		Food products, beverages and tobacco	Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear	Wood, paper, paper products, printing and publishing	Chemicals and non-metallic mineral products	Basic metals and fabricated metal products	Machinery and equipment, n.e.c.	Electrical and optical equipment	Transport equipment	Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling
2009										
Germany	GE	0.6389	0.1808	0.9437	0.9504	1.1523	1.8854	0.5955	0.5773	0.5773
	DVA	0.6168	0.1731	0.9410	0.9164	1.0438	1.9400	0.7037	0.6147	0.6147
Japan	GE	0.1022	0.1418	0.1552	0.6936	1.0915	1.2223	1.3848	0.9386	0.9386
	DVA	0.0963	0.1357	0.1487	0.6903	1.0427	1.2291	1.4954	0.9118	0.9118
Korea	GE	0.1915	0.5374	0.1884	0.8247	0.9143	0.7516	1.7160	0.1850	0.1850
	DVA	0.2144	0.6114	0.2283	0.6122	0.9204	0.8752	1.8091	0.2347	0.2347
United States	GE	0.9499	0.2116	1.5405	1.1634	0.6985	1.0374	0.9476	1.0779	1.0779
	DVA	0.8615	0.1902	1.4629	1.1471	0.7097	0.9988	1.0732	1.0751	1.0751
China	GE	0.3421	2.6121	0.5368	0.5082	0.8430	0.8392	1.8211	1.5906	1.5906
	DVA	0.3445	2.9657	0.4726	0.4874	0.8386	0.7762	1.7693	1.7631	1.7631
1995										
Germany	GE	0.6133	0.3899	0.7492	1.1301	1.1346	1.646	0.6258	0.5471	0.5471
	DVA	0.6072	0.3671	0.7402	1.1392	1.097	1.627	0.6695	0.5587	0.5587
Japan	GE	0.0679	0.2156	0.2695	0.5852	0.7101	1.347	1.8137	0.3916	0.3916
	DVA	0.0639	0.2147	0.2575	0.5858	0.6875	1.3033	1.8668	0.3821	0.3821
Korea	GE	0.2714	2.3087	0.1971	0.7799	0.9051	0.5635	1.608	0.6832	0.6832
	DVA	0.2782	2.3835	0.2027	0.7359	0.8604	0.5587	1.6563	0.7114	0.7114
United States	GE	0.9928	0.4041	1.1943	0.9241	0.6427	1.1933	1.3609	0.4261	0.4261
	DVA	0.9745	0.412	1.1574	0.9481	0.6411	1.14	1.3925	0.4246	0.4246
China	GE	0.8335	4.076	0.1889	0.6553	0.9065	0.6267	0.9074	3.5418	3.5418
	DVA	0.8353	4.0951	0.1793	0.6731	0.9182	0.5863	0.9328	3.4977	3.4977

GE – Revealed Comparative Advantage based on gross exports; DVA – Revealed Comparative Advantage based on domestic value added embodied in gross exports.

n.e.c. – not elsewhere classified.

Source: OECD/WTO, *OECD-WTO: Statistics on Trade in Value Added*, (database). Doi:10.1787/data-00648-en. 2013 (accessed 26.06.2013).

Table 6 contains data showing the RCA indices of Japan and other selected economies in the field of industrial products. The analysis covers the period 1995–2009, and also takes into account the non-traditional method of measuring flows of international trade – the value-added method. [27]

Analysis of the data demonstrates that in 2009 Japan showed an advantage in four areas: transportation equipment, electrical and optical equipment, machinery and equipment and basic metals and fabricated metal products. In 1995 Japan showed no superiority in the field of basic metals and fabricated metal products. Within each area, however, there have been some changes in the period 1995–2009: Japan has strengthened its position in transportation equipment, where the RCA indicator (according to the GE method) rose from 1.6774 to 1.8836. In other areas the relative advantage dropped slightly. If the non-traditional method for calculating the RCA is taken into account, in many cases the advantage of Japan was even greater.

A comparison of Japan's situation to that of other countries leads to the conclusion that Japan has an advantage in areas where the technology is used extensively. This means that foreign trade in terms of RCA does not show dynamic negative changes. However, in such an approach towards competitiveness, one can clearly notice modifications for increasing the relevance and competitiveness of developing countries. They occupy leading positions in more advanced product groups, which must result in processes of adjustment in developed countries.

Due to the deepening of the production fragmentation process, countries at lower levels of development are increasingly frequently producers of technologically advanced final goods. This inevitable process of geographical transformation, due to the increasing intensity of the globalization and growing freedom to relocate any element of the value-added chain, is reflected in the RCA indices in the traditional sense. However, measures describing this problem but using the concept of domestic value added show that the developed countries still have a greater advantage than would result from traditional measures. This is also the case for Japan.

5. Conclusions

On the basis of the analysis in this study, it can be concluded that the technological progress and innovation which took place in Japan in the postwar period was one of the most important factors contributing to the improvement of its international competitiveness. By the second half of the 1980s, Japan had ended the period of 'catching up' and had begun to create its own technology. At that time, it was rated as one of the world leaders in technology. Since the beginning of the 1990s, domestic and international factors greatly complicated the circumstances. Domestically, the Japanese economy began to experience long-term economic slowdown. Abroad, together with the increasing globalization of economic activities, Japan was obliged increasingly to compete not only with developed countries but also with emerging economies.

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[27] In this work, we will not examine the method in any greater detail. For more, see R. Baldwin, 'WTO2.0: Global governance of supply-chain trade', *CEPR, Policy Insight No. 64*, December 2012; R. Stehrer, N. Foster, G. de Vries, 'Value Added and Factors in Trade: A Comprehensive Approach', The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, *Working Papers*, No. 80, June 2012.

Nowadays, the international competition has a slightly different character. If the global market is a place for conducting business, the technological advantage should be measured not only from a macro-level (national), but also from a micro- one (the level of individual enterprises). If a modern company freely locates elements of its value chain abroad, Japanese corporations can also do so. However, in the case of Japan, those aspects that are of the highest value added still remain within the country. These are elements which require high amounts of capital, knowledge, elevated expertise and a highly skilled workforce. This is supported by the amount of expenditure on research and development, which in Japan is principally provided by private companies. Japan is still a country that is extremely interested in the promotion of technological development, as is confirmed by the amount of expenditure on R&D. Japanese corporations are also interested in promoting innovative solutions, which is confirmed by one of the highest number of patent applications in the world and the participation in triadic patent families. As a disadvantage one can consider Japan's lack of interest in international cooperation in the field of technology. Expenditure on R&D financed by foreign affiliates is among the lowest in the world, which may adversely affect the overall productivity of production factors.

In the area of technological advancement, Japan's foreign trade situation is similar to that of other developed countries. The share of trade in high technology goods is falling, as this is mainly relocated to Asian countries (Korea and China). This means reducing Japan's leading role as an exporter of goods with a high degree of technological advancement. However, this is a macroeconomic view. From a microeconomic point of view, the situation is not as clear. Due to the fact that modern manufacturing processes are subject to fragmentation, it is difficult to determine the final contribution to the final products of particular companies. In the case of Japan, it is certainly high input, which can be confirmed by the increasing share of exports of electronic components (see Table 5). The continued importance of Japanese companies in the global economy and its technological leadership may be also proved by data on the participation of selected Japanese companies on the world market.[28] Around 75% of motors for hard-disk drives in computers come from Nidec, 90% of the micro-motors used to adjust the rear-view mirror in every car are made by Mabuchi; TEL makes 80% of the etchers used in making LCD panels; Covalent produces 60% of the containers that hold silicon wafers as they are turned into computer chips.

These and other examples indicate that the technological position of Japan, although changing, still remains strong thanks to the activities of individual companies. If we add to this a supportive national policy, we should refrain from making a clearly negative statement on the permanent decline in Japan's leadership role in the field of technology.

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[28] *The Economist*, November 5th 2009, http://www.economist.com/node/14793432 (accessed 05.04.2013).

IOAN TRIFU

Prefectural Governors and Populism in Japan
(1990s–2010s)

Abstract

Populism has become a recurring issue in Japanese politics, particularly at the local level. In a time of general discontent with traditional politics and politicians, the prefectural governor, chief executive of the larger local government body and elected by popular suffrage, occupies a political office which seems to offer large opportunities for populist behaviors. In the past two decades, various governors have been labeled with the term 'populist' for political styles built on appeals to the people and the use of mass media. However, the diversity and continuous increase in the number of such situations may, albeit sometimes in an extreme, deformed way, indicate the emergence of a new kind of democracy in Japan.

1. Introduction

The typical image of a Japanese governor, the directly elected chief executive head of the prefectural level, is that of a highly competent but rarely charismatic former bureaucrat, "above politics"[1] and considering "local government in terms of technical administration".[2] Since the early 1990s, however, amid a growing sense of mistrust of Japanese citizens toward the traditional political elites, politicians and other individuals with original discourses and career-paths have been regularly elected to this particular political office. Candidates with backgrounds as media celebrities and no political experience have emerged victorious, while seasoned or amateur politicians elected as governors have also brought a deeper emotional approach to the way they conduct politics. 'Populism' (*popyurizumu*) has since become common in Japanese journalism's vocabulary to designate not only the electoral success of candidates from the world of entertainment and television, but also that of numerous of these atypical political positions or propositions, principally to cast a

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[1] Steven R. Reed, 'Gubernatorial Elections in Japan', in *Parties, Candidates and Voters in Japan*, John C. Campbell (ed.), Ann Arbor: The Center for Japanese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1981, p. 143.

[2] Terry E. MacDougall, 'Political Opposition and Big City Elections in Japan, 1947–1975', in *Political Opposition and Local Politics in Japan*, Kurt Steiner, Ellis S. Krauss and Scott C. Flanagan (eds.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980, p. 80. MacDougall is writing about Japanese local chief executives, not uniquely about prefectural governors.

negative light on them. Starting with the concept of 'populism' itself and the difficulty of defining it, this article attempts to offer a deeper and more neutral analysis of the relationship between the Japanese prefectural governorship and populism, and how this relationship can be connected to the broader transformations of Japanese politics since the 1990s. While several candidates and governors had been accused of populism before the 1990s, such as Minobe Ryōkichi (Tokyo, 1967–1979) and Hosokawa Morihiro (Kumamoto, 1983–1991), the double elections in Tokyo and Osaka in April 1995 of two former actors surprised experts and commentators, who expressed increasing concerns on the evolution of the Japanese democracy and fear of the rise of populism. The changes in Japanese politics and society during the 1990s and 2000s, combined with the institutional features and particular historical construction of the governorship, have laid down even more favorable conditions for the election of various kinds of populist politicians as governor, such as Ishihara Shintarō (in Tokyo, 1999–2012) and Tanaka Yasuo (in Nagano, 2000–2006), as well as the development of populist behaviors. Yet these as well may be extreme signs of an extensive transformation process for Japanese democracy. But first, how should we understand the term 'populism'?

2. What is populism?

Numerous attempts have been made by social scientists and historians to offer a more precise, scientific definition or even a typology of populism. The Dutch scholar Cas Mudde, for example, provides a relatively short presentation of populism as:

> An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt' elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. [3]

One of the most famous works on the subject is the 1981 book by the political scientist Margaret Canovan, simply entitled *Populism*. Canovan distinguishes between an "agrarian populism", itself divided into three different types, and a "political populism" with four ideal types. [4] Among the latter she lists the populist dictatorship [5], the populist democracy which stresses the importance of direct democracy mechanisms (referendums…) [6], the reactionary populism, often with nationalist or racialist tones [7], and the politicians' populism appealing directly to the people beyond political parties or divisions. [8]

As useful as such typology can be, Pierre-André Taguieff, a French specialist on the issue, prefers to use Canovan's typology only as a starting base, most of today's populism being more like a syncretism of the various aspects defined by Canovan. [9] Indeed, for the

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[3]   C. Mudde, 'The Popular Zeitgest', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 39, No. 4, 2004, p. 543.

[4]   Margaret Canovan, *Populism*, New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981, pp. 8–16.

[5]   Like that of Juan Perón in Argentina (1946–1955) or Getúlio Vargas in Brazil (1930–1945). Ibid., p. 13, and p. 128 and following.

[6]   Ibid., p. 197 and following.

[7]   Ibid., p. 225 and following.

[8]   Ibid., p. 260 and following.

[9]   Pierre-André Taguieff, 'Le populisme et la science politique' [Populism and Political Science], in *Les populismes* [Populisms], Jean-Pierre Roux (ed.), Paris: Perrin, 2007, p. 42.

political scientists Yves Mény and Yves Surel, populism is a "dynamic ideology" that cannot be enclosed into a particular system. Nevertheless they propose a general framework to identify three major elements of the logic of specific populism[10]:

- the people forms the basis of the national and local community;
- the legitimacy conferred by the 'superiority / anteriority' of the people has been perverted by political actors or processes which must be denounced. The populist leader is the defender of the cause of the average people exposed to the exactions of the 'enemy'. In Japan, the role of the 'enemy' of the people is generally played by traditional political elites and bureaucrats[11];
- the return to the people as a fundamental political principle is the prerequisite for a 'comprehensive regeneration of society'[12].

However, Taguieff considers 'populism' less as an ideology but more as a political style, insisting on the fluidity of the term.[13] Even the political theorist Ernesto Laclau who tries to offer a comprehensive definition of 'populism' is forced to recognize how imprecise the concept is. Nevertheless it remains an important concept, in his opinion, midway between descriptive and normative statements.[14]

Understanding the latter aspect, the normativity connected to the term 'populism', is essential to fully understand this concept. In their work on populism and democracy, Mény and Surel recall the negative connotations associated with this word. The term is generally used to provide a normative vision of a situation designed as a "pathology of democracy".[15] An analysis of this kind implies the existence of a political normality which would be violated by those designated as populist. The risk of this approach is therefore to depreciate "anything that does not fit into the cozy repertoire of procedures receiving a certificate of democratic respectability".[16] This is what can often be seen in regard to the case of local Japan, especially since 1995, and the results of the gubernatorial elections in two of the most urbanized areas of the country.

3. Populist governors in local Japan: emergence and factors of development since the 1990s

The eruption of populism as an issue in Japanese local politics is usually dated from the 1995 gubernatorial elections in Tokyo and Osaka. The same factors (contextual, institutional and structural) which explain this emergence have continued since then to nurture populist tendencies among prefectural governors.

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[10] Yves Mény and Yves Surel, *Par le peuple, pour le peuple?: le populisme et les démocraties* [By the people, for the people: populism and democraties], Paris: Fayard, 2000, p. 181.

[11] See for example Uchiyama Yū, *Koizumi and Japanese Politics: Reform Strategies and Leadership Style*, London; New York: Routledge, 2010, p. 8.

[12] Mény and Surel, *Par le peuple…*, p. 181.

[13] Pierre-André Taguieff, *L'illusion populiste. Essai sur les démagogies de l'âge démocratique* [The Populist Illusion. Essay on the Demagogies of the Democratic Age], Paris: Champs Flammarion, 2007, p. 107.

[14] Ernesto Laclau, *La Raison Populiste* [On Populist Reason], Paris: Seuil, 2008, p. 15.

[15] Mény and Surel, *Par le peuple…*, p. 17.

[16] Ibid., p. 18.

3.1. The 1995 Tokyo and Osaka gubernatorial elections: an eruption of populism at the cores of Japan?

On April 9, 1995 elections were held to the positions of the governors of Tokyo and Osaka. To the surprise of experts, the two candidates elected were two former actors, competing without the support of any party: in Tokyo, Aoshima Yukio and in Osaka, 'Knock' Yokoyama (Yamada Isamu). Immediately after the elections, the newspapers headlines expressed shock from "Voters reject existing parties"[17] to "The overwhelming victory of independents over bureaucrats".[18] Yet the respective profiles of the new governors revealed that these two celebrities had both occupied a seat in the House of Councilors as independents. But in both Tokyo and Osaka, it was the fame and popularity Aoshima and Yokoyama had gained through TV shows and movies that helped them to be elected. These elections triggered a volley of comments on their populism and the threat they represented. Critics from the intellectual sphere spoke out against these results and the attitude of voters, especially regarding the election in the national capital. For Sone Yasunori, the Aoshima vote was an opposition vote, without any specific expectations.[19] The former governor Suzuki Shunichi, who stepped down after four terms, attributed Aoshima's success to the arrival of new populations in the city, uncertain of their length of stay and therefore for him, and who had little concern for the management of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG).[20] Nagasaki Kazuo castigated also the irresponsible behavior of the inhabitants of Tokyo, emphasizing that they had rejected the bureaucrats but elected a governor who would be unable to resist the behind-the-scene control of public affairs by these same bureaucrats.[21] Even more harshly, the rightist thinker Nishibe Susumu made the following observation:

> The strange case of celebrities who find themselves at the head of major regional administrations illustrates the sad situation Japanese democracy is in: autonomous political entities for people who have lost their autonomy.[22]

Beyond the issue of whether or not the term is accurate to describe the situation, the political and media coverage of the 1995 elections shows how 'populism' can also become an electoral or ideological weapon. It is a convenient way to rally voters by waving the banner of the rationality of one's own camp against an opponent deemed 'abnormal' and therefore dangerous. During the 2002 Nagano gubernatorial election, Hanaoka Nobuaki, journalist and opponent of the incumbent governor and media personality Tanaka Yasuo, said: "(We need to) challenge and eliminate populists. Otherwise Japan will head in a terrible direction".[23] To characterize what he considers the politicians' demagoguery and

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[17] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 10, 1995.

[18] *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 10, 1995.

[19] Funada Hajime, Sone Yasunori and Nagasaki Kazuo, 'Mutōha-sō to shushō kōsen' [Floating voters and the public election of the Prime Minister], *Shokun*, Vol. 27, No. 7, 1995, pp. 88–97.

[20] Takeda Tōru, 'Tōkyō o seijuku saseru tame shutto wa iten seyo' [Tokyo is sufficiently developed, we should relocate the capital], *Ronza*, Vol. 3, No. 4, 1997, pp. 110–117.

[21] Funada, Sone and Nagasaki, 'Mutōha-sō to shushō kōsen', p. 88.

[22] Nishibe Susumu, 'La politique japonaise: une nef des fous' [Japanese politics: a ship of fools], *Cahiers du Japon*, Winter 1995, p. 17.

[23] Quoted by Iwami Takao, 'Aoshima Yokoyama bumu no haikei' [The Background of the Aoshima Yokoyama boom], *Chūō Kōron*, Vol. 110, No. 9, 1995, pp. 108–109.

the voters' unconsciousness, Nishibe Susumu devised a new word: "What we have today is a mixture of democracy and totalitarianism – what I would call 'popularism'".[24] These exaggerations, among several others, were also regularly addressed to progressive governors of the 1960s and 1970s.[25] In January 1973, a former university professor labeled Ninagawa Torazō, the then governor of Kyoto, a "fascist" and a "dictator".[26] The latter term was also often used in the discourse of Tanaka's opponents in 2002.[27] More recently, Ōmura Hideki, elected to Aichi prefecture in February 2011, his ally during the election campaign Mayor Kawamura Takashi of Nagoya, and particularly Hashimoto Tōru, governor of Osaka, were repeatedly accused of populism.[28]

The recurrent apparition of populism, or at least accusations of populism, among elected governors since the 1990s is due to series of circumstantial and structural factors which have contributed to an environment more open to new political styles, and notably populism.

3.2. Gubernatorial populism: factors of development since the early 1990s

Various conditions have favored the expansion of populism: the erosion of ordinary channels of mediation (traditional political parties, local or national politicians), the growing importance of the media (especially television) in politics, and the personalization of power (direct elections, bans on holding multiple mandates, etc.).[29] These elements are found to greater or lesser extents in the Japanese situation and the public disaffection against its political representatives since the early 1990s, as well as in the institutional and structural characteristics surrounding the gubernatorial position, which have helped the election of several candidates with original political profiles in the particular circumstances of the last two decades.

3.2.1. Contextual factors

Contextual factors[30] have played a decisive role in the rise of populist behaviors in local Japan since the 1990s. This decade was marked by Japanese citizens' increasing disaffection towards their political environment. This trend was not unique to Japan, and has also been noted in the United States or in Europe. Yet, according to Yoshida Shin'ichi, Japan stands out among the developed countries in the magnitude of popular discredit with its political

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[24] Nishibe, 'La politique japonaise…', p. 17.

[25] Progressive (*kakushin*) governors were candidates, often with no prior political experience, who were elected as the chief executives of the prefectural governments with the support of the Socialist Party of Japan (SPJ) or the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) during the late 1960s and 1970s.

[26] Gotoda Teruo, *The Local Politics of Kyoto*, Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, Berkeley, Center for Japanese Studies, 1985, p. 82.

[27] *The Japan Times*, September 3, 2002.

[28] See, for example, headlines like 'Populist pair «overcome» politics as usual', *The Japan Times*, February 8, 2011 for the double election of Ōmura and Kawamura, and how "current and former politicians, academics and others … warn Hashimoto's brand of populism will lead to a form of dictatorship" according to *The Japan Times*, February 12, 2011.

[29] Mény and Surel, *Par le peuple*…, pp. 85–124.

[30] 'Contextual factors' here means the political, economic and social evolutions occurring more prominently since the 1990s, in contrast to institutional (the institutional, administrative and legislative framework) and structural factors (the long-term construction of the Japanese post-war political environment).

representatives.[31] Why such a disaffection? The treatment of the economic recession in Japan which arose in the early 1990s following the bursting of the speculative bubble proved the poor ability of the Japanese political and administrative elite to efficiently manage a crisis for which they were at least partly responsible. The sluggish state of the economy also demonstrated the failure of the State to carry out a global project that would make sense for the entire population in a country where economic development had been central in the post-war period. The national government's slow and inadequate response to the human catastrophes that resulted from the Hanshin-Awaji earthquake in 1995 and the Aum sect's gas attacks in the Tokyo subway the same year confirmed for many Japanese that their elected officials and bureaucracy were unable to resolve the economic and social dysfunctions of the country. Other major reasons related to the ethics of elected officials have also fueled the disavowal of political parties by the Japanese electorate: the maintenance of a government by money (*kinken seiji*)[32], widespread structural corruption[33], and finally the questionable relationship between part of the conservative establishment and members of the Japanese underworld and extreme right-wing groups.[34]

The discredit of the political world as a result of these events increased the volatility of Japanese voters who identify themselves less and less with one single party. Since the beginning, the Japanese political parties, with the exception of the JCP, were never mass parties. The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which is well-structured at the national level, is far more loosely organized at the prefectural level. It is mainly a party of executives, which derives most of its financial resources from the business world and its electoral support from the influence of its members' support groups (*kōenkai*).[35] Yet the 1990s experienced a major change, with the formation of a powerful voting bloc which not only had no party membership but also refused to attach itself to a specific party: the non-affiliates (*mutōha*). 1997 saw the highest amounts of people defining themselves as non-affiliates in the decade, according to a compilation of quarterly surveys of the *Asahi Shimbun*, with 52% of respondents on average, and occasional peaks up to 60%.[36] Other studies have shown that the electorate did not refuse to support any party, but instead frequently changed its choice. From 1997 to 1999, among those classified in this category, 60% had

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[31] Yoshida Shin'ichi, 'Distrust in Politics: Will Voters Transform the Nature of Governance?', in *Governance for a New Century: Japanese Challenges, American Experience*, Thomas E. Mann and Sasaki Takeshi (eds.), Tokyo, New York and Washington, D.C.: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2002, pp. 14–28.

[32] See Matthew Carlson, 'Money in Japanese Politics: Regulation and Reform', in *Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics*, Alisa Gaunder (ed.), London: Routledge, 2011, pp. 70–81.

[33] For example, the Recruit (1988) and *Sagawa Kyūbin* (1992) affairs were two major scandals of the late 1980s–early 1990s. See Masumi Junnosuke, *Contemporary Politics in Japan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995, p. 432 and following.

[34] See Gerald L. Curtis, *The Logic of Japanese Politics: Leaders, Institutions, and the Limits of Change*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 87.

[35] See Honjō Mika and Oniduka Naoko, 'Mutōha-sō no seiji ishiki to seiji sanka – Chihō seiji ni okeru Mutōha-sō no aratana yakuwari' [Political Participation and Political Consciousness of the Floating Voters – New Role of the Floating Voters in Local Politics], *Toshi Mondai – Journal of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research*, Vol. 92, No. 10, 2001, pp. 39–54.

[36] Quoted by Iwami, 'Aoshima Yokoyama…', pp. 108–109.

supported at least one party during these three years. Moreover, the electorate which described itself as supporting a specific party was also very volatile. In 1995, only 20–30% of them said they had supported the same party the previous year.[37]

Since the 1990s, a growing number of voters have therefore not been linked to a particular political party, but have a 'fluid' or 'floating' vote (*fudo-hyō*), regularly moving from one party to another at their own discretion. While in electoral decline in the 1990s and 2000s, the LDP was able to clearly win two major elections in 2001 and 2005 against its main challenger the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), both times by efficiently capturing the floating vote.[38] Four years later in 2009, the situation was nearly reversed as the LDP lost many of the floating voters which had moved from the DPJ to the party in 2005, resulting in the victory of the DPJ.[39]

This volatility does not mean that Japanese voters have a total lack of political consciousness.[40] Many keep themselves informed about Japanese politics through the news media. Even now television plays an influential role in the electorate's choices by quickly creating or destroying sympathies toward a particular candidate or political party. The Hosokawa Morihiro cabinet (1993–1994), the first without the participation of the LDP since 1955, was considered by some observers as a product of hostility towards the LDP generated by television programs.[41] In the past two decades, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichirō (2001–2006) has been acknowledged as the national politician most gifted at using television and other media (such as the Internet) to increase his own popularity and political influence.[42] Acting like a "superstar"[43] or a populist[44], Koizumi and his political

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[37] Yoshida, 'Distrust in Politics…', p. 20.

[38] Steven R. Reed, 'Winning Elections in Japan's New Electoral Environment', in *Japanese Politics Today: From Karaoke to Kabuki Democracy*, Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (eds.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 74–76. The 2005 LDP victory was the result of the gain of rural floating voters who had previously been attracted by the DPJ, as well as the large swing to the LDP of urban floating voters, despite urban voters being 'traditionally the weakest LDP constituency' (Ellis S. Krauss and Robert J. Pekkanen, *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP. Political Party Organizations as Historical Institutions*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011, pp. 249–250).

[39] Steven R. Reed demonstrates that "(i)n 2009 the LDP lost the urban votes it had gained in 2005, but those votes did not necessarily go to the DPJ. The LDP lost to the DPJ, but lost more when voters were offered the option of voting for Watanabe's party (*Minna no Tō*)." (Reed, 'Winning…', p. 83).

[40] Hashimoto Akikazu, *'Shin mutōha' no shōtai: shiji seitō nashi o dō yomu ka* [The Identity of the 'New Floating Voters': How to Read the 'Do Not Support a Political Party'?], Tokyo: Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha, 1995, pp. 15–25.

[41] Yoshida, 'Distrust in Politics…', pp. 16–18.

[42] Christian Schafferer and Kawakami Kazuhisa, 'Electoral Campaigning in Japan', in *Election Campaigning in East And Southeast Asia: Globalization of Political Marketing*, Christian Schafferer (ed.), Ashgate, 2006, pp. 25–27. On Koizumi and his influence on Japanese politics, see in particular Uchiyama, *Koizumi…* and Glenn D. Hook (ed.), *Decoding Boundaries in Contemporary Japan: The Koizumi Administration and Beyond*, London: Routledge, 2011.

[43] E. Seizelet, 'Koizumi Jun'ichirō, superstar de la vie politique japonaise' [Koizumi Jun'ichirō, Japanese political superstar], *Le Temps des médias*, No. 10, 2008, pp. 125–126.

[44] See Uchiyama, *Koizumi…*, p. 8 and Uchiyama Yū, 'Leadership Strategies: (Re)drawing Boundaries among and within Parties in Japan', in *Decoding Boundaries in Contemporary Japan: The Koizumi Administration and Beyond*, Glenn D. Hook (ed.), London: Routledge, 2011, p. 126.

style represented an intense moment of political and mass media marketing in Japanese politics, which formed the base of the LDP's electoral success during those years (notably in 2001 and 2005).[45] Despite several attempts to copy Koizumi's success and a slow, long-term dynamic in this direction[46], the structure of national politics in Japan seems to have prevented a complete and immediate general shift towards this kind of political style after the Koizumi experience.[47] On this matter, the post-war local government system does offer some advantages to prefectural chief executives.

3.2.2. Institutional and structural factors

Along with a favorable context gained through the rise of floating votes and media popularity, populism has also found great potential for development in regard to governorship in Japan and the post-war characteristics of this office (strong legitimacy, personalization of power, local leadership and a supra-partisan approach among others).

One of the major transformations of the Japanese local government system during the post-war period was the introduction of a direct election mechanism for local chief executives (governors, mayors). The legitimacy of a governor, elected by the inhabitants of the territory he represents, is definitely more solid than that of the prime minister, who nominally represents the entire nation but is chosen solely by the Diet's members.[48] This election of governors by direct popular suffrage is the key component of a strong personalization of power at the local level which results from the combination of three elements around the local chief executive.[49] First, the mode of election creates a direct channel between voters and the elected official. Along with it, the prohibition of holding more than one mandate at a time[50] ensures guaranteed availability and proximity from the governor for the residents. Lastly, the governor is provided with a right of representation, making him the natural spokesman of the prefecture at both the national and international levels. In the eyes of the population, this combination of factors bestows an essential legitimacy on these local politicians and shapes the foundation of the governor's leadership capabilities.

The double process of legitimation and personalization of the gubernatorial position works mainly through direct election, the rule of non-accumulation and the right of representation. These factors cement the commitment of the governor to the territory, which offers him a solid foundation to build a political leadership at the local level. Such leadership is made possible by the predominance of the executive in the local government system. Post-war legislation has granted governors a wide scope of discretion in local

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[45] See Reed, 'Winning…', pp. 81–82. Koizumi's strong stance of on postal reform was positively received by urban floating voters (Ellis and Pekkanen, *The Rise…*, p. 249).

[46] Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain, 'From Karaoke to Kabuki Democracy: Japanese Politics Today', in *Japanese Politics Today: From Karaoke to Kabuki Democracy*, Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain (eds.), New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, pp. 1–9.

[47] According to Reed, the LDP mostly went back to 'politics as usual' and to its old self after the retirement of Koizumi as prime minister, while efforts to mimic Koizumi's electoral strategies by LDP leaders were without 'substance'. These were some of the main reasons for the 2009 defeat (Reed, 'Winning…', p. 82).

[48] Constitution of Japan, art. 67.

[49] E. Seizelet, 'La fonction préfectorale au Japon' [Gubernatorial Functions in Japan], *Revue Française d'Administration Publique*, No. 96, 2000, p. 640.

[50] Local Autonomy Law, art. 141.

affairs (the appointment of high-ranking prefectural officials, self-regulatory authority, submission of the executive budget bill, etc.). While the local assembly is endowed with greater power than in the pre-war era, the governor remains historically the dominant force in prefectural politics.[51] The governor generally enjoys a stable position, especially in comparison with the national executive, as this stability is related almost solely to the decision of the electorate.[52]

Some particular characteristics connected with how the post of governorship was devised in post-war Japan[53] have also favored the regular emergence of populist behaviors. Candidates for the governorship and governors themselves tend to refuse any public display of connection with a specific political party. They prefer to appear officially under the banner of Non-Political Affiliation (*mushozoku*, NPA) during the electoral campaign. This generally translates not as candidates refusing any political support, but instead as a large coalition of almost all the principal local parties supporting one particular name (*ainori* in Japanese). The elected governor then adopts a supra-partisan approach in the prefectural government, acting for the good of the community (or at least the local establishment).[54] The development of localism, especially since the late 1970s[55], has also promoted the idea that the local chief executive must be the exclusive representative of the locality, and not be part of a partisan system.

Japanese governors are therefore provided with vast political power, a strong potential for local leadership and popular legitimacy while the ongoing decentralization process since the mid-1990s has in fact mostly reinforced the local executive, notably after the revision of the Local Autonomy Law (LAL) in 1999.

Despite some limitations, the combination of these different factors periodically opens up opportunities for the election of populist candidates, and also to greater transformations of local politics in which populism is just one part.

4. Two famous populist governors (late 1990s–2000s): Ishihara Shintarō and Tanaka Yasuo

Among the various atypical governors that emerged in the 1990s and early 2000s, the two most emblematic figures are certainly Ishihara Shintarō, governor of Tokyo, and Tanaka Yasuo, governor of Nagano. Elected to their positions for the first time in 1999 and 2000, both successful novelists, they represented two ideological extremes for governorships during the first half of the 2000s. Even today, Ishihara is internationally known for his nationalist

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[51] See Machidori Satoshi and Soga Kengo, *Nihon no chihō seiji: ni-gen daihyōsei seifu no seisaku sentaku* [Japan's Local Politics. Continuity and Change inside the Presidential System], Nagoya: Nagoya Daigaku Shuppankai, 2007.

[52] Kurt Steiner, *Local Government in Japan*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965, p. 372.

[53] On this subject see Ioan Trifu, *Prefectural Governors in Post-War Japan: A Socio-Historical Approach*, Ph. D. in Political Science, University of Lyon and Tohoku University, 2013, notably pp. 220–244.

[54] This attitude of public distance from political parties stems largely, in a path-dependent way, from the pre-war period when governors were appointed bureaucrats. See Ibid., pp. 62–69 and 237–244.

[55] See in particular the 'age of localities' (*chihō no jidai*) movement launched by Kanagawa Governor Nagasu Kazuji (1975–1995) in 1978: Nagasu Kazuji, '«Chihō no jidai» o motomete' [An Appeal for an 'Age of Localities'), *Sekai*, No. 395, 1978, pp. 49–66.

discourse, while Tanaka nurtures his image as a representative of a new front of progressive reformers[56]. However, despite their differences, these governors' political attitudes have all been labeled as 'populist' in the media and by their opponents to denigrate them.

4.1. Ishihara Shintarō in Tokyo (1999–2012)

Ishihara Shintarō was born in Kobe in 1932. While still a law student at Hitotsubashi University, he became famous in 1955 after publishing the novel *Season of the Sun* (*Taiyō no Kisetsu*)[57]. Despite a reputation as a provocative writer, he entered the Diet in 1968 under the banner of the conservative LDP. He rose gradually in the party hierarchy[58] until 1988 when he failed in the race for the presidency.[59] The following year was published *The Japan That Can Say No* (*Iie to ieru Nihon*) written by Ishihara with the help of Morita Akio, then president of Sony. In this pamphlet, the authors insisted that Japan regained its independence from the United States, arguing that the technical knowledge and capacity of the country was the foundation of the US military arsenal.[60] After his resignation from the Diet and the LDP in 1995, Ishihara seemed to have brought his political career to an end. However, in 1999, he won the governorship of Tokyo as an independent candidate, 24 years after his first unsuccessful run against Minobe Ryōkichi in 1975. With about 1.6 million votes, he won twice as many votes as his direct competitor from the DPJ, Hatoyama Kunio, and far more than the 690,000 votes of the LDP candidate.[61]

Among the 47 Japanese governors, Ishihara was certainly the best known outside of Japan in the late 1990s and 2000s. This international interest in Ishihara comes less from his ability to manage Japan's capital city than for his countless outrageous remarks. The man which the *International Herald Tribune* described, too quickly, as the "Japan's Le Pen"[62] regularly issues verbal provocations against Asian neighbors, but also against foreigners, women and even the French.

Ishihara qualifies himself as a "nationalist".[63] One year after his election, he declared in front of a unit of the Ground Self-Defense Force: "Atrocious crimes have been committed again and again by *sangokujin* and other foreigners. We can expect them to riot in the event of a disastrous

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[56] See Ishihara Shintarō's official website: http://www.sensenfukoku.net/ and Tanaka Yasuo's official blog: http://blog.livedoor.jp/dream_yassy/ (accessed 20.08.2013).

[57] The book was a huge success, and Ishihara won the Akutagawa Prize, the most prestigious of the Japanese literary prizes (*The Japan Times*, July 14, 2002).

[58] Most notably, he was appointed Director of the Environment Agency (with ministerial rank) in the Fukuda Takeo cabinet (1977–1978), and Minister of Transport in the Takeshita Noboru cabinet (1987–1989).

[59] Yawata Kazuo, *Rekidai chiji 300-ni: Nihon zenkoku 'gendai no tonosama' retsuden* [300 Historical Governors: Biographies of the 'Contemporary Feudal Lords' of all Japan], Tokyo: Kobunsha, 2007, pp. 132–134.

[60] Ishihara Shintarō and Morita Akio, *Iie to ieru Nihon: shin Nichi-Bei kankei no (kādo)* [The Japan That Can Say 'No': The New U.S.–Japan Relations Card], Tokyo: Kōbunsha, 1989.

[61] Yawata, *Rekidai chiji…*, p. 133.

[62] *The International Herald Tribune*, April 29, 2002.

[63] "I'm certainly a nationalist; what's wrong with that? Unless Japan is nationalist, it won't be taken seriously on the world stage. I'm very proud of my identity." quoted by Matt Frei, 'Japan's nationalists relive the past', in *BBC News*, August 18, 1999. See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/424386.stm (accessed 20.08.2013).

earthquake".[64] In this speech, it was the term *sangokujin* that struck the commentators. Literally 'people from third countries', the term was used to describe colonized Korea and Taiwan in the pre-war period, and remains extremely insulting for these populations. Ishihara expressed regret that this expression had shocked the large Korean minority in Japan, but he refused to apologize. Moreover, he regularly continues to accuse the foreign population, this time illegal residents, of being the source of the surge in new crimes in the capital.

Ishihara also maintains a troubling attitude towards Japan's militarist past. Thus, each year on August 15, the anniversary of Japan's surrender in 1945, Ishihara has visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which houses the spirits of the soldiers who have died for their country since the Meiji era, including some Class-A war criminals.[65] In October 2003, he justified the colonization of Korea on the pretext that the Korean people would have preferred Japanese rule to an annexation by Russia or China.[66] As for the Pacific War, it was a necessity for him as the Japanese were able to save Asia from colonization by "white people".[67] These sweeping assertions and speeches are part of the construction of a nationalist revival in Japan. Ishihara is also often accused of having links with extreme right-wing groups such as the *Seiryūkai* (Blue Dragon Society).[68] He comments frequently and virulently upon the foreign policy of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the two Koreas. In May 2000, Ishihara caricatured the PRC President Jiang Zemin as Adolf Hitler for his desire to reclaim Taiwan by force.[69] When Roh Moo-hyun, South Korean president, criticized Japanese claims to the islets known as Takeshima in Japanese and Dokdo in Korean, Ishihara slammed Roh as a "third-rate politician".[70] In 2003, he decided to tax the *Chongryun*, the General Association of Korean residents in Japan, which until then had been tax-exempt as the *de facto* embassy of North Korea in Japan.[71] In 2012, he made a yet bolder move; on April 16, at a think tank forum in Washington, Ishihara said that the TMG was starting negotiations with the private owners of the disputed Senkaku Islands[72] to buy them.[73] The national government was forced to directly intervene to prevent the nationalist governor's plan. The government finally purchased the islands, causing the anger of the Chinese and Taiwanese authorities, and a series of violent anti-Japanese protestation movements in mainland China[74].

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[64] Quoted by *The Japan Times*, April 11, 2000.

[65] *The Japan Times*, August 6, 2005. War criminals judged by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in 1948. The most famous of these Class A war criminals is General Tōjō Hideki.

[66] *The Japan Times*, November 1, 2003.

[67] *The Taipei Times*, October 10, 2004.

[68] According to a specialist interviewed by Michel Tenman, Japan correspondent of the French newspaper *Libération*, May 31, 2006.

[69] *The Japan Times*, May 21, 2000. Ishihara is a personal friend of the former Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui, architect of the democratization of the island, and close to the pro-independence parties (*The Japan Times*, May 20, 2000).

[70] *Chosun Ilbo*, April 4, 2005.

[71] *The Japan Times*, September 10, 2004.

[72] Groups of inhabited islands under the administrative control of Japan but disputed by the People's Republic of China and Taiwan. Their Chinese names are Diaoyu (PRC) and Tiayutai (Taiwan).

[73] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 18, 2012.

[74] *The Japan Times*, October 8, 2012.

Japan's neighbors are not the only targets of the governor of Tokyo. Ishihara puts little value on older women and the French language. In an interview with a weekly newspaper in 2001, he expressed support for a statement made by a physicist that "old women who no longer have the ability to reproduce are useless and their lives represent a crime against civilization".[75] Regarding the French language, Ishihara said: "I have to say that it should be no surprise that French is disqualified as an international language because French is a language that cannot count numbers".[76] In both cases, legal proceedings were initiated, but Ishihara avoided being found guilty each time.

The actions of the governor of Tokyo have not been limited to such provocations, however, and Ishihara has conducted several reforms in the prefecture, from trying to improve local public finances[77], developing Haneda Airport[78], and relocating the Tsukiji fish market.[79] His several re-elections were due more to favorable opinions of his administration than to his nationalist and xenophobic image as spread by the international press after each of his outrageous comments.[80]

After his decision to resign from the post of governor in October 2012, Ishihara established a new party *Taiyō no Tō* (The Sunrise Party) on November 13, 2012.[81] Four days later (November 17), the party merged with *Nippon Ishin no Kai* (the Japan Restoration Party) of the former Osaka governor Hashimoto Tōru. Ishihara was selected as the new leader of this political party, and was elected to the Diet in the December 2012 general election.[82] Ishihara's move from the governorship to national politics evokes the less successful career transition of another governor labeled as 'populist' during the 2000s.

4.2. Tanaka Yasuo in Nagano (2000–2006)

Tanaka Yasuo had no real political experience at the time of his election in 2000 in Nagano; his success was the result of a grassroots movement (the *katteren*), born from a myriad of small groups (from local artists to small business owners and local SMEs), in the midst of strong suspicion of financial mismanagement by the previous administration.[83]

Born in Tokyo in 1956, Tanaka became famous, like Ishihara, while studying at Hitotsubashi University, when in 1980 he was awarded the Bungei prize[84] for his novel

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[75] Quoted by *The Japan Times*, September 20, 2005.

[76] Quoted by *The Japan Times*, September 10, 2004. One week after several French-language teachers sued Ishihara over that remark, the TMG ordered the *Lycée franco-japonais* (a Tokyo-based French school operated by the French government) to pay about 100 million yen in taxes, as the school is not eligible to receive tax exemptions (*The Japan Times*, July 23, 2005).

[77] *The Japan Times*, November 17, 1999.

[78] *The Japan Times*, October 16, 2009.

[79] *The Japan Times*, February 4, 2011. The new location, the site of a former factory, is however believed by some to be full of pollutants.

[80] For a French example, see Jean Daniel, 'Du bon usage de l'antiaméricanisme' [On the good use of anti-Americanism], *Nouvel Observateur*, No. 1854, May 18, 2000.

[81] *The Japan Times*, November 14, 2012.

[82] *Asahi Shimbun*, December 17, 2012.

[83] Jean-Marie Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs apprennent à danser* [When sumō wrestlers learn to dance], Paris: Fayard, 2003, p. 436.

[84] *The Japan Times*, September 4, 2005.

Nantonaku Kurisutaru ('Somehow crystal').[85] After having worked briefly in a business company (Mobil), he became a media commentator, famous throughout the country for his provocative articles.[86] His political activity began in 1991 when he was one of the initiators of a petition against Japanese involvement in the first Gulf War. But above all, like many Japanese, it was the revelation of the terrible situation of the survivors of the great Hanshin-Awaji earthquake that prompted him to get involved in activism. He then participated in the local opposition against the construction of Kobe airport. From this experience, he drew mixed conclusions on the effectiveness of this type of action and on the intentions that motivate these groups.[87]

In this sense, even though he was supported by citizens' movements, during his campaign he promoted the notion of a government for all the population, without presenting any specific programs or projects.[88] This political vagueness as well as his fame and the mobilization of the *katteren* helped him win over public opinion. Nagano's residents were especially impressed by this candidate, with his different background and his roots outside of the traditional political game. On October 15, 2000, Tanaka was elected, winning nearly 116,000 votes more than his opponent, and became the fourth governor of Nagano since 1945.

Tanaka's first and most symbolic action when he came to power was to transfer his office to the ground floor of the prefectural building in a glass-walled room to make his work as transparent as possible for local citizens. Tanaka nurtured the image of a man accessible to all and with nothing to hide; he regularly toured the prefecture, and he published his travel and foods expenses on the prefectural official website. His popularity was one of the highest among Japanese governors in 2001.[89] In May of the same year, he abolished the press clubs' system (*kisha kurabu*)[90] and replaced them by regular press briefings, opened to all journalists.[91] Through his frequent appearances in television shows,

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[85] Translated by the author, as there is no translation in English of this novel.

[86] Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs…*, p. 436.

[87] Interviewed by *The Japan Times* (November 2, 2000), he declared: "The people who protested the Nagano Olympic construction and some of those involved in the campaign against Kobe airport were opposing the projects just for the sake of opposition. Such groups aren't working for the taxpayers but for themselves, the Japanese Communist Party and labor unions. They're as insular as the construction companies and government officials they criticize".

[88] Just after the election, he stated: "I have no intention of saying what I'm going to do or what I'm going to make. What's important is the principle of how it should be". (Quoted by *The Japan Times*, October 16, 2000).

[89] Ōnami Aya and Yamaguchi Kazuomi, 'Au Japon, la révolution Tanaka est en marche!' [In Japan, the Tanaka Revolution is moving!], *Courrier International*, No. 539, March 1, 2001 (First published in Japanese in *Shukan Asahi*, February 2001).

[90] The press clubs are one of the characteristics of the Japanese press and media system. They are implemented by public bodies (such as ministries), political parties, business companies, etc. to provide information to its members in exchange for the payment of a fee. The main criticism of these clubs is that they help to maintain a closed relationship between journalists and official sources. Journalists are tempted to reproduce the information obtained in these clubs at the expense of more thorough inquiries and investigations. For more, see Susan J. Pharr and Ellis S. Krauss (eds.), *Media and Politics in Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996.

[91] *The Japan Times*, October 1, 2001.

he continued to refine his image, becoming almost as famous as Koizumi. He carefully chose his clothing, avoiding the classic dark suits of bureaucrats and politicians.[92]

However, the real challenge laid for the governor in Nagano's 1.6 trillion-yen deficit, the second largest of Japan's 47 prefectures. To reduce the debt, Tanaka decided on a plan to reduce salaries by 6–10%, a progressive reduction according to the position within the prefectural hierarchy.[93] Moreover, Tanaka addressed the prefecture's public works program from both the financial and ecological perspectives. In November 2000, he suspended the construction of the Asakawa dam on the outskirts of the city of Nagano, a project which had been ongoing for 23 years.[94] On February 20, 2001, he released a declaration of "No More Dams" (*Datsu damu*). In this text, he declares his desire to preserve the rivers and lakes of Nagano for future generations. He also discusses the environmental and financial cost of the water reservoirs formed by dams, which must be regularly checked to prevent the accumulation of sediment.

The dam became the core issue of the struggle between Tanaka and the Nagano local assembly. The tension reached its peak in the first days of July 2002. At the end of June, Tanaka declared his intention to cancel the construction of the Asakawa and Shimosuwa dams. On July 5, 2002, a motion of no confidence against the governor was passed by the prefectural assembly. This was a rare event, whose only precedent since the introduction of the measure during the Occupation period was in 1976, against the Gifu governor Hirano Saburo for corruption.[95] The adoption of such a measure demonstrated the extent of exasperation among local politicians, who felt their electoral machines were threatened by Tanaka's actions.

In response to the motion, Tanaka chose to remain at his post. Automatically removed ten days later, he decided to seek a new term in the following election on September 2002.[96] In this campaign, Tanaka found himself more isolated than for his first election. His main opponent, the lawyer Hasegawa Keiko, received the unofficial support of almost all political parties and numerous other organizations. Confronted with this situation, Tanaka led a campaign based solely on volunteers and civic movements.[97] This election attracted the attention far beyond the limits of the prefecture. On September 1, 2002, the election drew a turnout of 73.8%, four points higher than in 2000 (69.7%) and the highest among all the gubernatorial elections of the 2000s. Tanaka won a landslide victory with more than twice the votes of his opponent Hasegawa (805,201 votes to 379,200).[98] The campaign, however, avoided addressing many essential areas, above all the dam issue, but also Tanaka's ability to manage the prefectural administration. These two issues were central to the conflict

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[92] Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs…*, p. 445.

[93] *The Japan Times*, February 2, 2003.

[94] *Asahi Shimbun*, February 6, 2001.

[95] *The Japan Times*, July 6, 2002. Since 2002, two other motions of no confidence have been voted on at the prefectural level: in March 2003 against Ōta Tadashi, governor of Tokushima, and in December 2006 against Andō Tadahiro, governor of Miyazaki. Both were forced to leave office.

[96] *The Japan Times*, July 16, 2002.

[97] Hatsuko Hoyano, 'Nagano: Japan's First Citizens' Revolution', *Znet*, December 4, 2002. Available at: http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=2705 (accessed 20.08.2013). (Original version, in Japanese, published in *Shukan Kinyobi*, September 6, 2002).

[98] *The Japan Times*, September 2, 2002.

between the governor and his assembly.[99] Thus, the success did little to change the situation at the local level, and the governor remained relatively isolated in the prefectural assembly.[100]

Tanaka's victory offered him a higher political profile in the country, and the governor of Nagano started to think seriously about more national ambitions. On August 21, 2005, Tanaka and four LDP dissidents created the New Party Nippon (*Shintō Nippon*) which emphasized decentralization. Yet, only one of the three former LDP members was re-elected after the election of September 2005 and the overwhelming victory of Koizumi's LDP. This failure at the national scene somewhat weakened the governor's credibility at the local level, where he faced an assembly unfavorable toward his policies, unlike Ishihara who had benefitted greatly from the support of the local conservatives in Tokyo.[101] To cope with his assembly, Tanaka continued to rely on the legitimacy conferred upon him by the direct election, and tried to convince his opponents that these initiatives went in the direction desired by the population itself.[102] However, this situation gradually undermined the governor's position, and Tanaka eventually lost his seat in the 2006 election, despite his populist stance.[103]

4.3. Different kinds of populism?

Although radically different in their political style, these two governors put forward the support of the population as an argument to justify their policies. This attachment to relying on the citizens' confidence has led many observers and critics to classify them and other governors as 'populist'[104] while not using this term with much precision.

While Professor Yoshida Tōru of Hokkaidō University considers Ishihara more as a far-right politician than a populist[105], other scholars of Japanese politics[106] have also

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[99] *The Japan Times*, September 3, 2002.

[100] Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs*..., p. 448.

[101] This was partly due to Ishihara's policy program and his political connections with the LDP and conservative politicians. His sons Ishihara Hirotaka and Ishihara Nobuteru are both members of the LDP (See Trifu, *Prefectural*..., pp. 330–331).

[102] See his public speech to foreign correspondents in August 2002: Tanaka Yasuo, 'Speech addressed to Foreign Correspondents', *Nagano Prefecture Press Conference*, August 12, 2002.

[103] Maruyama Masao, Kubota Shigeru, Higuchi Naoto, Takaki Ryōsuke, Matsutani, Mitsuru and Yabe Takuya, 'Popyurizumu to teihen minshushugi no airo: 2005 nen Nagano-ken chiji senkyo de no Tanaka Yasuo no haiboku o meguru tōhyō kōdō' [Why was populist governor defeated? An analysis of voting behaviors in the Nagano gubernatorial election in 2006], *Annual report of the Regional Studies Institute*, Ibaraki University, No. 40, 2007, p. 41.

[104] Among the foreign press articles, for Ishihara see for example: Olivier Weber, 'Le samouraï de Tokyo', *Le Point*, No. 1435, March 17, 2003 (Available at: http://www.lepoint.fr/actualites-voyages/2000-03-17/le-samourai-de-Tokyo/1088/0/911) ; and for Tanaka, Tim Larimer, 'The Grooviest Guv', *Time Asia*, May 21, 2001 (Available at: http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,127303,00.html) (accessed 20.08.2013).

[105] *Asahi Shimbun*, November 30, 2012.

[106] For example Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs*..., p. 442; Maruyama Masao, Kubota Shigeru and Matsutani Mitsuru, 'Nihon gata popyurizumu no ronri to shinjō: 2007 nen Tōkyō-to chiji senkyo ni okeru yūkensha no tōhyō kōdō no bunseki' [The populist governor and the citizens' support structure: analyzing the voting behaviors in Tokyo metropolitan gubernatorial election in 2007], *Annual Report of the Regional Studies Institute*, Ibaraki University, No. 41, 2008, p. 81.

employed the term to refer to both of these governors. As previously described, Tanaka refused to participate in party politics and preferred to appeal directly to the people.[107] Jean-Marie Bouissou states that the governor of Nagano opposed the wisdom of the "good people of the towns" (*Machi no ojî-san to obā-san*) to the condemnation of the intellectuals. Tanaka did not hesitate to accuse the former governor of transforming his official residence in "a palace à la Marcos [...] where he feeds ponies and peacocks".[108] But unlike Ishihara, who was embedded in extreme right-leaning and rigid populism, Tanaka Yasuo, according to Bouissou, expressed a populism in a "soft, almost feminine version"; Tanaka avoided raising his voice or appearing too manly or 'macho'. He protected the environment, the quality of life and constitutional pacifism, while his policy platform focused on participatory democracy, a question of growing interest at that time.[109]

The use of various kinds of populism among these governors illustrates the more offensive approach of several governors in their political style and policy objectives, which have actively influenced the transformation of local politics in Japan since the 1990s, along with the political innovations of some prefectural executives and the election of candidates with new profiles.

5. Populism in local Japan: an extreme form of a new democracy?

5.1. Populist behaviors on the rise

Along with governors labeled as populist by most media and scholars, populist behaviors appear to have been rising since the 1990s, notably with the success of TV celebrities (*tarento*) in gubernatorial elections, the clear opposition by elected candidates to any support from established parties, and the populist remarks made by various governors.

The surprising results of the 1995 Tokyo and Osaka gubernatorial elections were strong signals of the importance of non-affiliated voters and the growing irritation of citizens toward the traditional political establishment. Other candidates with similar *tarento* backgrounds to Aoshima and Yokoyama, who sometimes had no political experience at all, emerged victorious in gubernatorial elections during the 2000s. In March 2009, Morita Kensaku was elected governor of Chiba after Dōmoto Akiko's decision to retire after two terms. Defeated in the 2005 gubernatorial election, Morita, a popular actor and singer of the 1970s, was a former Diet member (1992–2003) for the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the LDP. Despite his political background and the support of the local LDP, he decided to run both campaigns as a NPA, minimizing the role of the LDP and partisanship in his candidacy.[110] In 2008, Hashimoto Tōru, a lawyer and regular guest on national TV shows,

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[107] Maruyama et alii, 'Popyurizumu to…', p. 41.

[108] Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs…*, p. 442. The following quotes are also extracted from the same page.

[109] For example, according to a poll published just before the 2002 elections in the Nagano local newspaper, the *Shinano Mainichi Shinbun* of August 12, 2002, when asked how the next governor should act to ensure the will of the population, 79% of the respondents said they would "prefer (the governor) ask the people of the prefecture their opinion directly". Only 15% thought the governor should "listen to the opinion of the prefecture assembly and town and village mayors". (Quoted by Hatsuko, 'Nagano…').

[110] *Asahi Shimbun*, March 30, 2009.

ran with the support of the LDP in the Osaka gubernatorial election. He was elected with more than 54% of the vote against the DPJ-backed candidate.[111]

One year before, in January 2007 in Miyazaki, the entertainer and comedian Higashikokubaru Hideo won the governorship in a resounding victory as an independent when his predecessor Andō Tadahiro stepped down over a bid-rigging scandal and a subsequent vote of no confidence.[112] In late 2010, despite enjoying a high support rate in the prefecture, he decided to not seek re-election. Setting his goal beyond the borders of rural Miyazaki, he declared: "I've decided not to run in the next election in the belief that changing the nation's system will serve the interest of Miyazaki".[113] Higashikokubaru finally chose to run in the Tokyo gubernatorial election of April 2011 without the support of any political parties, but with 28% of the vote, he fared no better than Asano Shirō, the reformist-oriented (*kaikaku-ha*) former Miyagi governor, had done in 2007 (30.7%).[114] Asano was determined to win, and received the help of the DPJ, the SPJ and other smaller opposition organizations, and also tried to create the conditions for citizens' mobilization. But as in 2009, these famous candidates failed to overthrow the powerful incumbent Ishihara Shintarō, who was supported by the local conservatives despite his populist stance and the criticism of the Japanese political elite.

During his terms as governor of Miyagi (1993–2005), Asano Shirō was one of the precursors of a new style of local electoral campaigning that some see as flirting with populism. In 1993, after what some called the 'Battle of Miyagi' (*Miyagi no ran*), Asano, a modest bureaucrat, managed to win the post of governor of Miyagi prefecture after a political campaign which served as a model for many other atypical candidates.[115] At that time, the political establishment in Miyagi was in a critical situation following the arrest of the governor and the mayor of Sendai, the prefecture's major city, in connection with a vast corruption scandal. An independent candidate without the support of any large party[116], Asano embarked on an original campaign while facing an opponent supported by the main local parties. Combining flexibility with enthusiasm, Asano's official support organization, poetically called "the network to realize the dream" (*Yume nettowāku*)[117] relied largely on local activists and disability-related organizations, with which Asano had been in contact since his time as an official at the Ministry of Health. The campaign was organized on the principle of voluntary individual mobilization rather than groups (agricultural, construction, etc.) linked by client relationships to the candidate.[118] Asano's speeches and activities

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[111] *Asahi Shimbun*, January 28, 2008.

[112] *Asahi Shimbun*, January 22, 2007.

[113] Quoted by *The Japan Times*, September 30, 2010.

[114] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 4, 2011.

[115] See Satō Yutaka, *Mutōha Miyagi no ran: Asano chiji asshō no himitsu* [The Revolt of Nonpartisan Miyagi: The Secret of the Complete Victory of Governor Asano], Tokyo: Hon no mori, 1998. The campaign served as a model for other candidates, most notably Fukuda Akio in Tochigi (2000), Dōmoto Akiko in Chiba (2001) and even more Tanaka Yasuo at Nagano (2000).

[116] Asano's candidacy was only backed by small parties: the Japan New Party, the New Party Sakigake, the Japan Renewal Party and the Socialist Democratic Federation.

[117] See Asano Shirō's official website: http://www.asanoshiro.org/network/index.htm (accessed 20.08.2013).

[118] Asano Shirō, *Shissō 12-nen: Asano chiji no kaikaku hakusho* [12 Years of Sprint: White Paper of Governor Asano's Reforms], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 2006, pp. 57–67.

were intended to give the bureaucrat all the appearance of a modest citizen: a candidate close to the people, who extolled the values of the local community and opposed a prefectural establishment plagued by corruption. However, the political amateurism did not mean inexperience in the campaign's management. Far from being novices, Asano's entourage consisted of professional political and communication specialists, some having assisted Hosokawa Morihiro at the time of his secession from the LDP and the creation of his own party in 1992.[119] Seven years before Tanaka Yasuo at Nagano, this electoral strategy, based on voluntary campaigning and in complete contradiction with traditional campaign habits, brought success for Asano against all odds. For Jean-Marie Bouissou, however, Asano's campaign of 1993 and his alleged amateurism can be seen as "the thematic and conventional positioning of populism".[120]

Finally, populist comments and statements have been made by several other governors. Ido Toshizō, governor of Hyōgo since 2001, made a controversial remark comparing a massive earthquake in Tokyo with a chance for the Kansai. During a meeting of the various governors of the Kansai region, he declared that "if something like a Great Kantō earthquake occurred, (the capital region) will be seriously damaged. This is an opportunity", and said that there is a need to prepare for the transfer of the functions of the capital city to the Kansai area.[121] Discriminatory remarks toward the foreign population in Japan are still often pronounced to some popular support, even by other governors than Ishihara. For example, Matsuzawa Shigefumi, governor of Kanagawa (2003–2011), proclaimed in a rally to support a candidate to the House of Representatives in November 2003 that "Foreigners are all sneaky thieves. As Tokyo Governor Ishihara has cracked down on them, they have flowed into Kanagawa Prefecture".[122] He apologized a few days later, however, on the grounds that this statement only concerned illegal immigrants who commit crimes.

These various examples of populist tendencies or attitudes seem, by their diversity and their increase, to signal a deeper evolution of Japanese politics at the local and even national level.

5.2. Development of emotional, theatrical politics

Starting in the early 1990s, the Japanese political world went through a series of scandals while the country entered a period of economic recession following the bursting of the economic bubble. These events stirred the electorate to a heightened sense of mistrust toward not only their political elites but also the bureaucracy. This trend manifests itself in a growing rejection of parties and traditional political practices that are radically transforming Japanese politics at the national level. Inoguchi Takashi and Purnendra Jain argue that in the 2000s, Japan has moved from a *karaoke* democracy to a *kabuki* democracy. In the old *karaoke* democracy, "bureaucrats provided political leaders with scripts on policy statements", and the politicians interpreted these scripts in their own way. Thus, although the political leaders changed frequently, "policy directions only mildly changed". Like a *karaoke* stage, "the singers behind the microphone came and went, but the song sheets

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[119] Satō, *Mutōha Miyagi…*, pp. 58–125 and 142–159.
[120] Bouissou, *Quand les sumōs…*, p. 441.
[121] *Asahi Shimbun*, November 12, 2008.
[122] *The Japan Times*, November 4, 2003.

remained unchanged".[123] In a *kabuki* democracy, however, "the political leaders bring personality and emotions to their role on the national political stage"[124], and offer a more transformative aspect to political action. At the national level, the volatility of the vote and the new electoral system[125] represent major changes in the Japanese electoral environment, most notably towards a greater role for politicians' personal image (particularly the party leader) and less importance of the "organized vote" (*soshiki-hyō*).[126] But even before these changes happened in national politics, at the local level, the same factors of endemic corruption and economic crisis which started the national transformations led to the election of atypical prefectural governors who often took populist stances during the 1990s and 2000s.[127] Through them, the evolution of the gubernatorial position took a decisive step toward *kabuki* democracy years ahead of the national level.

Since the late 2000s, some elected local executives in Japan have displayed different attitudes from the traditionally elected governors. Called theatrical (*Gekijō-gata*)[128] or activist (*kōdō-ha*) local executives[129], they seem to reinforce the *kabuki* aspect of local democracy by their populist stance and the construction of their media image, following the precedents set by Ishihara and Tanaka. And while reformist governors like Asano Shirō focused primarily on transforming the prefectural management and improving local autonomy, going against the habits and practices of the local and central bureaucracy, these governors have developed a more political perspective in both their actions and rhetoric. Yet rather than integrating more closely within national political parties like the DPJ and the LDP, they choose to position themselves as outsiders. This attitude fits with the space open for amateur candidates to join politics through the governorship as an alternative road into the Japanese political world.[130] If Tanaka may be considered as a precursor in this way[131], among the incumbent or recent former governors included in this category, three names are prominent: Higashikokubaru Hideo of Miyazaki (2007–2011), Ōmura Hideaki of Aichi (since 2011), and principally Hashimoto Tōru of Osaka (2008–2011).

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[123] Inoguchi and Jain, 'From Karaoke to…', pp. 1–2.

[124] Ibid., p. 1.

[125] The 1994 electoral reform replaced the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) system by a combination of Single-Member Districts (SMDs) and Proportional Representation (PR).

[126] See Reed, 'Winning…', pp. 71–72, and Ellis and Pekkanen, *The Rise*…, pp. 285–287.

[127] Reed cites gubernatorial elections. and especially the election of Tanaka Yasuo as Nagano governor in 2000, as 'the most dramatic evidence of the decline of the organized vote' (Reed, 'Winning…', pp. 74–76).

[128] Arima Shinsaku, *Gekijōgata shuchō no senryaku to kōzai: chihō bunken jidai ni towareru gikai* [Merits, Demerits and Strategies of Theatrical Local Executives: Parliaments in the Era of Decentralization], Kyoto: Mineruba Shobō, 2011, pp. 1–6. Arima cites three governors of this type in his study: Tanaka Yasuo, Higashikokubaru Hideo and Hashimoto Tōru.

[129] Sasaki Nobuo, Toyama Kimiyoshi, Ushiyama Kunihiko, Doi Takerō, Iwai Tomoaki, *Gendai chihōjichi no kadai* [Contemporary Local Government Issues], Tokyo: Gakuyōshobō, 2011, pp. 245–254. Three governors are listed: Higashikokubaru Hideo, Hashimoto Tōru and (briefly) Ōmura Hideaki.

[130] Trifu, *Prefectural*…, pp. 226–229 and p. 291 in particular.

[131] Arima, *Gekijōgata…*, pp. 31–54. See also Reed, 'Winning…', pp. 74–76.

Hashimoto Tōru is probably the most famous local executive of the last couple of years. Born in 1969, Hashimoto became a lawyer after graduating from Waseda University, one of the top Japanese private universities. Registered with the Osaka bar, he took a large number of cases, notably those related to the entertainment world. These connections eventually offered him a chance to appear on various TV shows. He gained national fame by providing legal advice with a youthful and stylish appearance.[132] In late 2007, following Osaka Governor Ōta's announcement that she would not seek a third term[133], Hashimoto declared his candidacy after having been assured of the support of the local LDP and *Kōmeitō*. He was elected with 54% of the vote on January 27, 2008.

Hashimoto's years at the head of Osaka prefecture were full of controversies, including his struggles with Governor Ido of Hyōgo about Itami airport, with the prefectural assembly about the relocation of prefectural buildings, and with the local administration about working conditions.[134] Hashimoto also often exhibited nationalistic or extremist tendencies similar to those of Ishihara. One of the most famous examples was his declaration that "strong power, almost dictatorial, is needed to change today's politics".[135]

However, his main conflict was probably his grand project to merge Osaka prefecture and Osaka city into an Osaka metropolis on the model of Tokyo. The objective was to reduce the cost of two large administrations on a small territory[136], and to prevent the construction and management of similar infrastructure projects (such as stadiums or libraries) by municipal and prefectural administrations, both of which were heavily in debt[137]. The idea was met with skepticism by several academics[138] and by hostility from many local politicians, in particular Hiramatsu Kunio, mayor of Osaka since 2007. To curb the opposition and to reinforce his authority, Hashimoto made a bold move by establishing his own party: *Ōsaka Ishin no Kai* (Osaka Restoration Party)[139] in April 2010. One year later, in the 2011 unified local elections, the party won more seats than any other party in the assemblies of

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[132] Hashimoto Tōru, *Mattō shōbu!* [Complete Victory or Defeat!], Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 2006, pp. 1–5 and 256.

[133] Ōta was criticized by many for her retirement money and her attempt to become a *tarento* while the Osaka prefecture financial situation was in serious difficulties. See for example 'Taishokukin 8 senman en seshimeta Ōta zen-fuchiji no «tetsumenpi»' [The 'effrontery' of former governor Ōta who has obtained 80 million yen of retirement money], *Facta*, August 2008. Available at http://facta.co.jp/article/200808049.html (accessed 20.08.2013).

[134] See most notably Sakakibara Hidenori (ed.), *Jichitai popyurizumu o tou: Ōsaka ishin kaikaku, Kawamura-ryū genzei no nagekakeru mono* [Question the Local Government's Populism: What Caused the Osaka Renovation Reform and Kawamura's Style of Tax Reduction], Tokyo: Jichitai kenkyūsha, 2012, pp. 163–196.

[135] Quoted by *The Japan Times*, December 1, 2011.

[136] Osaka prefecture is the second smallest prefecture in Japan with 1897 km², just 21 km² more than the 1876 km² of Kagawa prefecture.

[137] Ueyama Shin'ichi, *Ōsaka ishin: Hashimoto kaikaku ga Nihon o kaeru* [The Osaka Renovation: The Hashimoto Reform Transforms Japan], Tokyo: Kadokawa SSC, 2010, pp. 164–170.

[138] See most notably Takayose Shōzō, *Kyokō Ōsaka-to kōsō eno hanron: Hashimoto popyurizumu to toshi shuken no taiketsu* [A Refutation of the Idea of Osaka Metropolis: Confrontation Between Hashimoto's Populism and Urban Sovereignty], Tokyo: Kōjin no tomosha, 2010.

[139] See the official website of *Ōsaka Ishin no Kai*: http://oneosaka.jp/ (accessed 20.08.2013).

Osaka prefecture, Osaka city and Sakai city.[140] While until then the governors had generally had a loose relationship with the political parties in the prefectural assembly, Governor Hashimoto innovated by creating his own political forces throughout the prefecture, to a larger extent than a *kōenkai* or traditional political support. Moreover, with the aim of advancing the Osaka Metropolis plan, in 2011 Hashimoto chose to abandon his governor's seat and compete against his principal local rival, Hiramatsu, for the Osaka mayorship. In the double mayoral and gubernatorial election of November 2011, Hashimoto's success was total as he not only won his electoral bid against Hiramatsu, but Matsui Ichirō, a member of the Osaka prefectural assembly and the secretary-general of *Ōsaka Ishin no Kai*[141], succeeded him as head of the prefecture.[142]

On September 2012, Hashimoto announced the transformation of *Ōsaka Ishin no Kai* into a national party, *Nippon Ishin no Kai*[143], gathering seven Diet members[144] and several former local executives, notably Higashikokubaru Hideo and Nakada Hiroshi (the mayor of Yokohama from 2002 to 2009) around him. In November 2012, Ishihara Shintarō merged his Sunrise Party with *Nippon Ishin no Kai* and became the official leader of the party. With the former Tokyo governor at its head, former Osaka Governor Hashimoto as acting representative, the incumbent Osaka governor as secretary-general and even the former Miyazaki governor as a top member of the party, *Nippon Ishin no Kai* is without doubt an original attempt by a group of individuals with experience in a local executive position[145] to play a direct role in national politics. While many academics and commentators consider these party figures mostly as populists[146], there are also the representatives of a new kind of Japanese democracy with greater focus on charisma, emotions and personal qualities. Several of them were elected to the Diet in the December 2012 general elections.[147] The appearance of populist former local executives in national politics may indicate an increase of theatrical and emotional aspects on the national stage. Yet, despite this good start, the party has been plagued by internal friction and has faced many difficulties in 2013[148], and the last electoral results of July 2013 were relatively disappointing.[149] Like former governor

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[140] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 25, 2011.

[141] Matsui was elected, not as a NPA, but with the official affiliation of *Ōsaka Ishin no Kai*.

[142] *Asahi Shimbun*, November 28, 2011.

[143] See the *Nippon Ishin no Kai*'s official website: http://j-ishin.jp/ (accessed 20.08.2013).

[144] From the LDP, the DPJ and *Minna no Tō*.

[145] Aichi Governor Ōmura was also an advisor for the party until late November, but now aims to get closer to Nagoya Mayor Kawamura's position in order to alleviate difficulties in the prefecture. See *Mainichi Shimbun*, November 21, 2012.

[146] For Hashimoto, see Takayose, *Kyokō…* Former minister Masuzoe Yōichi has severely condemned the populist stance of the members of this party, despite being close to their political program (*Asahi Shimbun*, December 1, 2012).

[147] Along with Ishihara, Higashikokubaru and Nakada were elected. The party, with 54 seats, became the third party in the House of Representatives, just below the DPJ (57 seats) but far from the 294 seats of the LDP. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, December 17, 2012.

[148] See Eric Johnston, 'Hashimoto: from third force to political farce?', *The Japan Times*, July 8, 2013.

[149] *Nippon Ishin no Kai* won 8 of the 121 renewed seats, as many as *Minna no Tō* and the JCP, making it the sixth largest party in the House of Councilors with a total of 9 seats. Media celebrities

Tanaka's attempt with his New Party Nippon, this demonstrates that Japanese national politics is still regulated by its own political rules and offers fewer opportunities than local politics for new challengers.[150]

6. Conclusion

"Nowadays populist politicians in Japan are basically local executives," declared Professor Yoshida Tōru in a recent interview for the *Asahi Shimbun*.[151] Despite the polymorphic meaning and broad use of the word 'populism', several dynamics appear to have increased populist behaviors since the early 1990s in local Japan, particularly among prefectural governors. Media personalities such as Ishihara Shintarō, Tanaka Yasuo and Hashimoto Tōru (but less-known figures also) have displayed various kinds of populist attitudes. In a general context of dissatisfaction with traditional politics, the post-war particularities of the governorship in some aspects offers an even more favorable ground for populism than national politics.

At the national level, the 'Koizumi moment' (2001–2006) saw an evolution of Japanese politics toward "video politics"[152] with populist tendencies. Koizumi was able, more than anyone else before him and maybe even after him, to use the various media in the construction of his own political and public image, increasing the role played by the media in the Japanese political world as well as the personalization of power at the head of the country (two elements highly favorable to the expansion of populism) during his years as prime minister. Yet since Koizumi, the national trend has slowed down compared to local politics. Abe Shinzō, the newly elected prime minister and a politician close to Koizumi, has long been regularly described as populist[153] and he appears to have followed in some of the steps of Koizumi[154], but it is still too early to correctly assess his impact on Japanese politics. Anyway, the development of populist behaviors in local Japan, especially among governors, predated these national transformations by several years.

There are, without doubt, potential dangers and risks posed by the spread of populism for any modern democracy. For example, the nationalist and populist postures periodically adopted by local executives like Ishihara and Hashimoto or prime ministers like Koizumi and Abe, in part to please some of their electorate, have further deteriorated the already

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such as Inoki Antonio (a former professional wrestler) and Shimizu Takayuki (a former television presenter) were among the party candidates elected. See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 22, 2013.

[150] See Reed, 'Winning…', pp. 74–76. Even if not as essential as before, the organized vote through *kōenkai* remains an important asset in national politics for the LDP (Ellis and Pekkanen, *The Rise…*, pp. 281–282). *Nippon Ishin no Kai*'s electoral success, for example, was concentrated in the Kansai area where it originated and in the proportional representation block with popular figures like Ishihara and former Yokohama mayor Nakada Hiroshi, both of whom had previous experience in national politics. See the official website of the party for a complete list of its Diet members: https://j-ishin.jp/member/legislator/ (accessed 20.08.2013).

[151] *Asahi Shimbun*, November 30, 2012.

[152] An expression devised by the Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori. Giovanni Sartori, 'Video-power', *Government and Opposition*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1989, pp. 39–53.

[153] The 'populist LDP poster boy Abe' for *The Japan Times* (November 1, 2003).

[154] 'Abenomics' (a portmanteau of the name Abe and economics) and its worldwide fame may be seen as reinforcing the personalization of power.

tense relationships between Japan and its neighbors.[155] The consequences are not negligible for the image of Japan abroad, as well as for Japanese companies doing business in these countries (notably in China).[156]

Analyzing the current trend of populism in Japan only as a 'pathology' of democracy seems, however, to be reductionist. Various institutional, political and social constraints exist, particularly at the national level, to prevent serious endangerments to the current Japanese democracy by populists. The growing number of local and national politicians who focus intently on personality, charisma and emotion does indeed introduce these elements, connected generally to populism, more decisively into Japanese politics. Populism as a 'dynamic ideology' which puts the people at the center and stresses the direct connection between political leaders and the people against an 'enemy'[157], could thus develop more easily within this new dimension for Japanese democracy, but as a particular and more radical modality, and not necessary as a threat to democracy itself. This may also act as a partial solution to the problem of voter apathy, which is a major danger for a sane democracy as Tocqueville famously points out.[158] In gubernatorial elections, low voter turnout rates have been frequent since the 1990s: 63 of the 118 elections held in the 2000s had a turnout lower than 50%.[159] On the other hand, elections receiving large media attention, such as Nagano in 2002 or Osaka in 2011, attract more voters to the polls.[160] Original political styles and political innovations may also improve the image of elected officials and their support rates.[161]

Less than a sign of a dysfunctional democracy, the development of populism in local Japan can be seen as an extreme form of local and national political evolutions since the 1990s, indicating the general transition of Japanese politics toward a theatrical, *kabuki*-like democracy.

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[155] On Ishihara, see above (part 4.1 in this article). On Hashimoto, his comments of May 2013 on the 'comfort women' issue led to domestic and international criticism, while South Korean Foreign Minister Yun Byung-se stated that "By making such remarks, Japan will be further isolated in the international community." (*The Japan Times*, May 28, 2013). On Koizumi and, in particular, the results of his visits to the Yasukuni shrine, see Uchiyama, *Koizumi*…, p. 79. On Abe, the current Prime Minister has faced regular backlash from South Korea and China on the Yasukuni shrine issue and for his recent position apparently contesting the validity of the Murayama statement, a clear apology made in 1995 by then-Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi for Japan's colonial rule and wartime aggression, and officially endorsed by the Japanese government since then (*The Japan Times*, April 24, 2013).

[156] The nationalization of the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government was followed by huge anti-Japan rallies and a boycott of Japanese goods in China (*The Japan Times*, January 6, 2013).

[157] See Mény and Surel, *Par le peuple*…, p. 181 and Uchiyama, *Koizumi*…, p. 8.

[158] "It is, therefore, far more important to resist apathy than anarchy or despotism for apathy can give rise, almost indifferently, to either one". Alexis de Tocqueville, *De la Démocratie en Amérique* [On Democracy in America], Paris: Gallimard Folio Histoire, Vol. 2, 2004, p. 466.

[159] Based on data from newspaper reports after the elections. For more details on gubernatorial elections, see Trifu, *Prefectural*…

[160] 52.9% (+3.9) for the 2011 Osaka gubernatorial election. For the 2002 Nagano gubernatorial election, see above (part 4.2).

[161] The dynamic stance of Koizumi and the former Miyazaki governor Higashikokubaru was a key element sustaining their personal popularity while in office. However a new political style alone cannot guarantee electoral success without political and administrative efficiency, as proved by the last years of Governor Tanaka at the head of Nagano (Reed, 'Winning…', p. 75).

ILDIKÓ FARKAS

The Japanese Nation Building in European Comparison

Abstract

According to the secondary literature of past decades, many features of Meiji Japan (1868–1912) that had been regarded as 'traditionally Japanese' have been proven to be 'invented traditions' of an era of building a modern nation and a national consciousness as part of the process of modernization. The creation of a nation state based on a strong nationalism followed the European developmental pattern, but was built on Japanese cultural traditions. One of the aims of this paper is to trace back the sources of this process, suggesting that pre-modern and culturalist conceptions of community were also used. This paper suggests that in this respect, the Japanese cultural movement of nation-forming shows similarities not with the nation states of Western Europe (where nationalism was strongly attached to modernity) but rather with the 'national awakening' movements of the peoples of Central Europe, which have not yet been dealt with in the secondary literature.

Why a European comparison, and not Asian?

This question can generate another question: where does Japan belong? Japan today is a highly developed industrial, or rather post-industrial country and society, with a Western-type democratic state and institutions, a member of the G8, and one of the most developed countries in the world. But there is no doubt that, at the same time, considering its location, history, culture, religion, traditions, it is very different from the West and strongly connected to Asia – albeit not entirely. Although some aspects of its culture originate from Chinese or Buddhist civilization (Confucianism, Buddhism, Tao, the writing system), Japan shows significant differences compared to East Asia in its social structure, history and culture. "Japan has established a unique position for itself as an associate member of the West: it is in the West in some respects but clearly not of the West in important dimensions"[1] – so, in some respects, it can be seen as a kind of 'mixture' of the Western and the Chinese civilizations. Or, and not only according to Huntington, but also to several Japanese and Western social scientists[2], Japan is a separate civilization, in Huntington's view one of the eight great civilizations of today's world in the sense that "a civilization is the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', p. 45, *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, p. 45.

[2] The most well-known of these is Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, *Japanese Civilization; A Comparative Review,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

identity that people have".[3] So Japan can be considered either a periphery of Chinese civilization or a civilization itself, connected to some extent to China/Asia, but separate from them in some respects. Some of these differences can be seen in culture: *Shintō*; in society: the family system; in history: medieval feudalism, its independent (not colonial) statehood throughout its history, its successful modernization during the 19th century; the fact that Japan became the first (and for a long time the only) independent modern state in Asia, having developed on a separate path from Western civilization. These characteristics taken together signify a great many differences, and may provide sufficient arguments for the view that Japan is not unambiguously a part of Asia. Japan's geographical-political situation could be characterized as a periphery of Chinese civilization for a long time, which means that in some periods Japan could have been integrated into a China-centered East-Asian world (for example, in ancient times), but sometimes followed a different development independent from the Asian course. Especially after the 19th century, the path of Japan's development differed from the Chinese pattern. Japan was secluded until the 1850s, then after the arrival of the Western powers to the region, it did not become a colony, but achieved domestic development and formed a strong nation state with a homogeneous culture. Japanese modernization – or the foundation for it – had started before the Westerners arrived in Japan and influenced its development. The nation- and state-building process of the Meiji period followed the Western model, but the foundation upon which it was built had been laid in the Edo period.

Regarding our topic, the national issue, and especially the question of nation building, again important differences can be seen between Japan and other Asian countries. Asian nationalistic movements for independence were a direct reaction to colonization. In this case, Asian countries like China, Vietnam and India had experienced long periods of colonial history under European rule, and nationalistic movements rose up in an attempt to throw out foreign influence and gain independence. For example, in India it was British rule that unified the country, and British education produced educated Indians, familiar with Western ideas, who actually created Indian nationalism. This means that the national awakening in India began with the modern period, and that it was a consequence of colonial rule, of getting to know Western ideas (the Enlightenment) and their influence.[4] Even if it created a national culture that was not Western[5], but attached to the history and traditions of pre-modern times (thus maintaining a historical continuity), it was still closely connected to the modernizing course of revolutions, and did not originate from India itself without outside influence. In the case of China, national identities, ideologies and movements arose only after the arrival of the Western powers, under the influence of Western ideas (colonization). Hobsbawm[6] argued that Eastern (Asian) nationalism was the product of Western conquest and influence, and nationalism – just like many other characteristics of modernity – was the result of a dual revolution (industrial and social-political). This

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[3] Huntington, 'The Clash…', p. 24.

[4] S. S. Pujari, S. S. Narayana, *Indian renaissance – National Awakening*, http://yabaluri.org/TRIVENI/CDWEB/indianrenaissancenationalawakeningjul84.htm (accessed 16.06.2013).

[5] See more: Partha Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?*, United Nations University, 1986.

[6] Eric Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution 1789–1848*, New York: Vintage Books, 1996, p. 144.

statement is not true of Japan, however. Compared to other Asian empires, where modern national ideas and movements started to emerge and spread after the appearance and impact of the Western powers on their territories, national movements in Japan began long before the Western powers appeared there. As Japan was closed to Western influence until the 1850s, it had very limited contact with Western ideas. After opening up, Japan did not become a colony, but took the influence of the western World and started a modernization policy that was so successful that at the beginning of the 20th century Japan became the only modern state in the world which did not emerge from the roots of Western civilization.

Nation and national identity in Japan

Interpreting the process of Japanese modernization in the 19th and 20th centuries still poses a challenge for social sciences and humanities. Among the various aspects and viewpoints have been developed during the long course of examining Japan's modern development, the question of Japanese nation-building (and nationalism) was also involved, thus connecting this issue to the comprehensive discourse on nationalism.

The Meiji state was modelled on European/Western patterns: a nation state (with the political notion of the nation) with modern institutions was created after a course of 'modernization from above', industrial and social 'revolution'. This was the consequence of Japan's immense effort to 'modernize' the country technically, industrially, politically, socially and institutionally, so as to 'catch up' with the developed Western countries. The creation of a nation state based on strong nationalism followed the European developmental pattern. In line with the modernist theories of nationalism, we can perceive the necessary components of a modern nation and national identity. According to these (Hobsbawm, Anderson, Gellner, Breully[7]), the nation is an artefact of modernity to which it is inextricably linked. The nation and nationalism is described as a political program which holds that groups defined as 'nations' have the right to form territorial states of the kind that have become standard since the French Revolution. A nation is defined as a body of individuals that have been initiated into a common high culture by the processes of industrialization and the institutions of modernity. The political rather than the cultural characteristics of the nation are emphasized. Anderson famously characterizes it as a limited, sovereign imagined community that came into being with the advent of print capitalism, the death of traditional religions and their idioms. A nation is thus seen as a socially constructed community, imagined by the people who perceive themselves as part of that group. Nations and nationalism are products of modernity which have been created as means to political and economic ends. All these can be applied to Meiji Japan. I do not wish to list the economic, social, political, cultural reforms and measures that transformed Japan into a

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[7]   Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991; Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992; Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983; Eric Hobsbawm, 'Inventing Traditions', in *The Invention of Tradition*, Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1–14; Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, John Wiley & Sons, 2006; John Breuilly, *Nationalism and the State,* Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993.

modern state, which were the essential parts of the process of 'modernization from above', realizing an industrial, social and political 'revolution', after which a nation state could be achieved on the basis of the Western models. All these are analyzed in details in the secondary literature about Japan.[8]

Invented traditions (?) in Meiji Japan

According to this interpretation, nations are 'imagined communities', which became possible on a mass scale only relatively recently when individuals living in a region came to be able to construct a collective and unified image of themselves through the printed word. These 'imagined communities' are established through common stories, myths, and the shared experience of life. All these factors imply that without 'national character' – that is, some sense of a common culture, shared values, and similar traits – the modern nation-state could not exist.[9] This 'national character' is sometimes referred to as 'myth', on the basis that a nation is socially constructed and ultimately imagined by the people who perceive themselves to be part of that group. However, we should be careful interpreting the phrase 'imagined communities', because it does not mean that such cultural units are not real; on the contrary, it emphasizes that the members possess a deep mental image of their communion. What people think they are determines their identity, so these mental images become objective facts of forming social reality. Hobsbawm describes this process of social construction as the 'invention of tradition'.[10] He and other modernists argue that many cultural practices, customs, and values which were thought to be old are actually of quite recent origin. This process is very important in the emergence of the modern nation-state. However, we should keep in mind that the word 'invention' does not mean introducing false or completely unknown things, as these 'invented traditions' are never completely invented. They had to fit into the historical experiences and collective memories of the people of the community in order to be accepted and internalized.[11] In Meiji, commoners took up the myths of the emperor and *Shintō* that were "completely alien" to the majority; these "inventions" were workable because they were seen to have been part of Japanese life in the past.[12]

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[8]   Some of the important works on the modernization of Japan: William G. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan*, London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985; Ann Waswo, *Modern Japanese Society 1868–1994*, Oxford–New York: Oxford University Press, 1996; Janet E. Hunter, *The Emergence of Modern Japan*, London: Longman, 1998; Marius B. Jansen (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan V*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989; Peter Duus, *Modern Japan*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998; Andrew Gordon, *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Marius B. Jansen, *The Making of Modern Japan*, Cambridge–London: Harvard University Press, 2000; Elise K. Tipton, *Modern Japan. A Social and Political History*, London–New York: Routledge, 2002; Marius B. Jansen (et al. ed.), *Japan in Transition. From Tokugawa to Meiji*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986.

[9]   Chris Burgess, 'The «Illusion» of Homogeneous Japan and National Character: Discourse as a Tool to Transcend the «Myth» vs. «Reality» Binary', *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 9–1–10, March 1, 2010: http://japanfocus.org/-chris-burgess/3310 (accessed 16.06.2013).

[10]   See more: Hobsbawm, 'Inventing Traditions'.

[11]   Burgess, 'The «Illusion»…'.

[12]   W. Dean Kinzley, *Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan: The Invention of a Tradition*, London: Routledge, 1991, pp. xv, xvi.

The modern nation-state (be it Japan or any other) relies on the construction of a coherent set of national traits to function as an 'imagined community'. According to the secondary literature of the past decades, many features of Meiji Japan that were regarded as 'traditionally Japanese' have been proven to be 'invented traditions' of an era of building a modern nation and national consciousness (such as state *Shintō* or the emperor cult[13]). The use of history in order to construct and legitimize a sense of a commonly shared culture is a pattern which has been observed in different countries. The national identity is constructed in more or less the same way in different societies or nation-states; however, the material used to construct a sense of national identity naturally varies. The Japanese discourse on national identity is not unique, but the historical materials it draws on and the national culture it helps to (re)create are.[14]

The question that arises here is: what uniquely Japanese materials were used to construct Japanese national identity in the Meiji period, and where did all those mythical or once living traditions come from? And so we arrive at the main theme of our paper. In the Edo period (1600–1868), in a still closed country, a cultural movement called *Kokugaku* was started in the 18th century which focused on Japanese classics, on exploring, studying and reviving (or even inventing) ancient Japanese language, literature, myths, history, and also political ideology. 'Japanese culture' as such was distinguished from Chinese (and all other) cultures, and the 'Japanese nation' was thus defined. This process of 'imagining a community' took place *before modernization*, and not after, or as a consequence of, modernizing Japan. And this process, before modernization, is our main concern here.

The antecedent of modernization: the early modern Edo period

During the Edo/Tokugawa period (which realized 250 years of peace, the longest such period in Japanese history), Japan remained relatively isolated from the world, so Japanese culture developed internally with very little outside influence. This period is now called 'early modern', and regarded as the antecedent of modern Japan, as historical and social sciences acknowledge much more continuity between the Edo and Meiji periods than used to be supposed. Actually, the foundation for Japan's future economic, social and political development was laid in this period.[15] The establishment of a national market, the victory of a money economy, increasing urbanization, an improved communications system, the impoverishment of the samurai class and the enrichment of the merchants, the rise of a new artistic and literary culture appropriate to town dwellers rather than courtiers, monks or soldiers, the increasing fervor of religious nationalism focusing on the person of the emperor,

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[13] Stephen Vlastos (ed.), *Mirror of Modernity: Invented Traditions of Modern Japan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998; Kinzley, *Industrial Harmony in Modern Japan…*; Ichikawa Midori, *Invented Tradition in Shintō: a New Construction of the Emperor as a God of the State*, Indiana University, 2000; Helen Hardacre, 'Creating State Shintō: The Great Promulgation Campaign and the New Religions', *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 1, 1986, pp. 29–63; Helen Hardacre, *Shintō and the State, 1868–1988*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

[14] Burgess, 'The «Illusion»…'.

[15] See more: Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion. The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan*, New York–London: Free Press, 1985; Nakane Chie and Ōishi Shinzaburō (eds.), *Tokugawa Japan. The Social and Economic Antecedents of Modern Japan*, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990.

the propagation of a series of new religious sects – these are some of the enormous social and cultural changes which went on in the period, many of them directly leading to the Restoration of 1868 and the new Japan that arose thereafter.[16] Intellectual development also paved the way for the formation of new ideological and political concepts.

Many factors that modernist theories presuppose as the roots of modernization were already present (or slowly being formed over time) in the Edo period. The modernist criteria for creating nations include a strong central political authority, general education and cultural homogeneity – all of them now proven characteristics of Edo Japan. The shōgunal government effected a strong political authority; general education was accessible to not only the upper layers (*bushi*) but also the lower layers of society in the towns and in the country as well[17]; and although regionally and socially divided, a general culture was formed and spread during the period. The *terakoya* and *han* schools (in the country also) provided education for the commoners[18], and thanks to this system the Japanese population had achieved a high degree of literacy at the end of the Edo period. Due to the lack of reliable statistics, only estimates about the literacy rate can be made, but it seems that 40–50% of all men and at least 15% of all women nationwide were literate and possessed basic calculation abilities.[19] As a comparison: the literacy rate in Europe in 1850, with the Industrial Revolution already well underway, was 50–55 percent[20] in the most developed countries (England, France, Belgium); while in the southern peripheries, such as the Balkans, southern Italy and Russia, it was well under 10 percent.[21]

Anderson argues that 'print capitalism'[22] – that is, the emergence of mass production and consumption of vernacular literature, and the development of literacy needed for that – made it possible to create nations as 'imagined communities'. In Japan, the last phase of the Edo period is known for its high level of literacy, almost as high as in the most developed

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[16] Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion…*, pp. 11–12. However, he states that, naturally, there were relatively constant values and ideas throughout the period – broad structural features of family, polity and social class – which distinguish this period from the preceding and following ones.

[17] Katsuhisa Moriya: 'Urban Networks and Information Networks', in *Tokugawa Japan. The Social and Economic Antecedents of Modern Japan*, Nakane Chie and Ōishi Shinzaburō (eds.), Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1990, pp. 118–119. For Edo period education, see the works of Ronald Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967; and Richard Rubinger, *Popular Literacy in Early Modern Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2007.

[18] According to Dore, on the basis of *terakoya* enrolment figures, they postulate approximately 40% of male children and 15% of female children receiving some kind of formal schooling by the end of the Tokugawa period. See Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*, pp. 291–295.

[19] Ronald Dore, 'The Legacy of Tokugawa Education', p. 100, in *Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Modernization*, Marius B. Jansen (ed.), Rutland, Vermont–Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1985, pp. 99–133.

[20] Watanabe Hiroshi, *A History of Japanese Political Thought*, Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2012, p. 445, note 10.

[21] Hobsbawm, *The Age of Revolution…*, p. 136.

[22] Anderson states that a nation as a group forms an imagined community that emerges with a common language and discourse generated from the use of the printing press. Books and media are printed in the vernacular (in order to maximize circulation). As a result, a common discourse emerged. Anderson argued that the first European nation-states were thus formed around their "national print-languages". Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 1991, p. 224.

parts of modern Europe at the beginning of the 19th century. More and more people became literate, and together with the necessary administration, highly organized even in the rural territories, and the spreading influence of city culture, the people's interest in the world around them created a demand for mass publication. "To satisfy that demand, early modern Japan developed an extensive publication industry and an elaborate communication system that produced and disseminated new information – political, economic, and cultural – throughout society".[23] Literature, books, pamphlets etc. spread widely, in the countryside as well, forming the components of a common culture: history, language, myths, ideas of origin and traditions. This way, another criterion – according to the modernist theory – for nation building can be regarded as having existed in Japan: a mass vernacular literature, which together with 'print capitalism' was able to discredit the ideas of traditional rule. That is exactly what *Kokugaku* did with the feudal rule of the shōgunate, creating the vision of a dynastic realm, with people being subjects of the emperor alone. This idea helped to form a homogeneous state with no power divisions, and mass vernacular literature was a truly useful tool to spread this idea.

Nation building in the 18th and 19th centuries: *Kokugaku*

Kokugaku (国学): in the two characters used, the first, *koku*, means country or nation. The second *gaku* means studies or school, so literally it means 'national studies'. In practice, *Kokugaku* was far more complex than this definition suggests: it served as a means of distinguishing between what was genuine Japanese culture from what was Chinese or Indian (or European) culture.

In several works of the secondary literature, *Kokugaku* is called or defined as "Japanese nativism".[24] However, even scholars of Japanese studies do not agree on this.[25] I personally share the view of Mark Teeuwen: "Following the lead of H. D. Harootunian's *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism,* it has become an established convention in Japanology to translate the term *Kokugaku* as 'nativism'. One of Breen's main points in his 2000 article was to question this identification. He noted that while most *Kokugaku* scholars had a nativist agenda, they were far from alone in this. Nativism, classically defined as the ambition to revive or perpetuate aspects of indigenous culture in response to a perceived threat from other cultures, did not originate with the emergence of *Kokugaku*, nor did it expire with the demise of this school in the Meiji period. Rephrasing Breen's argument, we could say that we need to recognize that even in the nineteenth century, not all nativism was *Kokugaku*, nor was nativism all there was to *Kokugaku*".[26]

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[23] Katsuhisa, 'Urban Networks…', p. 97.

[24] Harry D. Harootunian, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988; Peter Flueckiger, *Imagining Harmony: Poetry, Empathy, and Community in Mid-Tokugawa Confucianism and Nativism*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011; Mark McNally, *Proving the Way: Conflict and Practice in the History of Japanese Nativism*, Harvard University Asia Center, 2005. (However, he emphasizes that not all nativism was *Kokugaku* by focusing on the efforts of Hirata Atsutane.)

[25] John Breen, 'Nativism Restored', *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 55, No. 3, Autumn, 2000, pp. 429–439; Mark Teeuwen, 'Kokugaku vs. Nativism', *Monumenta Nipponica*, Vol. 61, No. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 227–242.

[26] Teeuwen, 'Kokugaku…', p. 227.

Some theses and interpretation of *Kokugaku* can be regarded as nativism or can show nativist traits, but on the whole, as we will see further on, it was a far broader intellectual movement on one hand (including literary, linguistic and historic interests and activities); and on the other, a far narrower concept (than nativism in general) concerning its time span, aims, and circumstances.

In the early modern period, Neo-Confucianism[27] was the main current of scholarship, and one of its main tenet was the study of the classics, which eventually led Japanese scholars to the investigation of Japanese classics, and thus a specifically Japanese tradition and thought by means of Japanese documents, to contrast it with the study of Buddhist writings or Confucianism based on the Chinese classics. Eventually, the philological investigation of Japanese historical works or classical literature came to be referred to as *Kokugaku*. This began in the 17th century as a tradition of textual study focusing on specifically Japanese sources, in contrast to *Kangaku* (Chinese studies) or *Yōgaku* (Western, or *Rangaku*, Dutch studies). Its task was to study ancient Japanese literature by means of scrutinizing the exact meaning of ancient words. As an academic discipline, it relied on philology as its methodological tool to bring out the ethos of Japanese tradition freed from foreign ideas and thoughts. They drew upon ancient Japanese poetry to show the 'true emotion' of Japan. So 'national learning' originally referred to an intellectual trend which rejected the study of Chinese and Buddhist texts and favored philological research into the early Japanese classics.

The most important scholars included Keichū[28] (1640–1701), who performed philological study of Japanese classics and interpretative study of classical language and of the *Man'yōshū*. Kada no Azumamaro[29] (1669–1736) is famous for his theological studies of ancient teachings and faiths (*Shintō* studies), and also for his studies on ancient court and military practices, and an interpretative study of classics. Kamo no Mabuchi[30] (1697–1769) pursued the interpretative study of *waka* poetry and classical language, and of the *Man'yōshū*, and studied ancient morality as well. Motoori Norinaga[31] (1730–1801) conducted philological studies of ancient morality and literary criticism of *Genji monogatari;* also studied ancient morality centered on *Kojiki*, and carried out research on *Shintō* and the ancient Japanese language. Hirata Atsutane[32] (1776–1843) studied *Shintō* mainly for political purposes, dealt with the doctrine of 'national character', and studied ancient history and morality also.

Over the course of the Edo period, the aim of *Kokugaku* studies shifted from the scholarly and philological study of ancient texts to the quest for a unique native ethos and spiritual identity, free of Buddhist and other foreign traits, and identified more or less with *Shintō*. It displayed a discourse that aimed at restoring the classical world of ancient Japan. They

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[27] Byron H. Earhart, *Japanese Religion: Unity and Diversity*, Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1982, pp. 137–143.

[28] Susan L. Burns, *Before the Nation:* Kokugaku *and the Imagining of Community in Early Modern Japan*, Durham: Duke University Press, 2003, pp. 49–52.

[29] Wm. Theodore de Bary, Tsunoda Ryusaku, Donald Keene (eds.), *Sources of Japanese Tradition II*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, pp. 1–9.

[30] *Sources of Japanese Tradition…*, pp. 9–15.

[31] Earhart, *Japanese Religion…*, pp. 144–147; *Sources of Japanese Tradition…*, pp. 15–35.

[32] Harootunian, *Things Seen…*, pp. 199–204.

tried to re-establish Japanese culture before the influx of foreign thought and behavior, so they turned primarily to *Shintō*, the earliest poets in Japan (the *Man'yōshū*: the earliest collection of Japanese poetry from the 8th century), and the inventors of Japanese culture in the Heian court.

From the start of the movement it had political and religious implications as well. The first scholars (like Keichū) raised society's interest in classical literature, but they did not found an organized school of thought. However, Kada no Azumamaro sought to establish such a school of thought and social recognition for *Wagaku*, and as early as 1828 he submitted a memorial (written in elegant Chinese) to the *Shōgun*, a 'Petition for the Establishment of a School of National Learning'.[33] Kamo no Mabuchi wrote his thesis 'A Study of the Idea of the Nation' in almost pure Japanese in 1765, and he first formulated the political implications.[34]

Motoori Norinaga, arguably the most influential of them[35], made linguistic claims about the 'difference' of ancient Japanese into the foundation of a theory of Japanese cultural uniqueness and superiority. His work, *Kojikiden* (Commentaries on the *Kojiki*) transformed Japanese conceptions of their own history and culture and made the *Kojiki* a central work in the Japanese cultural canon. The problem was that the *Kojiki* was written entirely in Chinese characters, but Norinaga insisted that it was possible to discover the ancient language within this complex system of inscription, and actually he rewrote the *Kojiki* in what he claimed was the ancient language using *kana* (the Japanese syllabary). The *Kojikiden* takes the form of an annotated version of the new text, with two or three lines of the *Kojiki* typically followed by ten or more pages of annotations. Norinaga's conceit was that he was only revealing the original meaning of the text, and not 'interpreting' it. In the *Kojikiden*, Norinaga defined the contours of a new theory of Japanese history, culture, and personal cosciousness that challenged the assumptions of Confucian doctrine. He used his concept of the ancient Japanese language to assert a theory of original cultural identity.

Norinaga made the 'ancient language' of Japan (*Yamato kotoba*) which he found in the *Kojiki* the basis for a new vision of Japanese community. He used *Yamato kotoba* to distinguish China and Japan, showing ancient Japan as a natural community distinct from the Chinese states, which were artificial and legitimized by power. He saw the emperor as occupying a special position in relation to the gods, the language and rites. He initiated new strategies that determined the new *Kokugaku* discourse which appeared in the 18th century, highlighted language as the primary "bearer of identity and difference", focused on the "origin and nature of cultural difference", and created new political vocabulary focused on the emperor. These strategies enabled a new vision of Japan.[36]

The main teachings of *Kokugaku*, as popularly understood, were that Japan and the Japanese people constitute a distinctive national entity (*kokutai*[37]) marked by spontaneity,

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[33] *Sources of Japanese tradition…*, pp. 5–9.

[34] Ibid.*,* pp. 9–15.

[35] See several chapters in Burns, *Before the Nation…*, especially pp. 68–101.

[36] Burns, *Before the Nation…*, pp. 220–223.

[37] Marius B. Jansen, 'Meiji Ishin The Political Context', in *Meiji Ishin: Restoration and Revolution*, Nagai Michio – Miguel Urrutia (eds.), Tokyo: United Nations University, 1985, pp. 5–6;

natural goodness and innate divinity. These unique characteristics are revealed in early Japanese works such as the *Kojiki*, *Nihongi* and *Manyōshū*, which predate the foreign and polluting influences of Buddhism and Chinese thought. The Japanese national character is naturally pure, and this true Japanese spirit needs to be revealed by removing a thousand years of negative Chinese learning. This approach was popularized by Hirata Atsutane in the 19th century, who was important as a systematizer and propagandist; thanks to him and his disciples the ideas of *Kokugaku* became very widespread in the early 19th century. "After Hirata, *Kokugaku* ceased to be a type of scholarship, and instead acquired the rudiments of a nativist movement". [38]

The findings of *Kokugaku* scholars inspired a popular movement for the restoration of a Japanese 'golden age', paved the way for the return of imperial rule, and called politically for the overthrow of the shōgunate and the restoration of direct rule by the divinely-descended emperor – an objective achieved in the Meiji restoration. These ideas succeeded in gaining power and influence in Japanese society. These ideas were not restricted to any one intellectual movement, but were indeed widespread, especially near the end of the period. The effect of accepting the *Kokugaku* message would be to make men revere the emperor above all else and hope for or work for his restoration. In this way the thoughts of *Kokugaku* influenced the *Sonnōjōi*[39] philosophy and movement: the slogan *sonnō* (revere the emperor) typified the new emphasis on the emperor, and the term *kokutai* (national body) expressed the new concept of the state. So, the political implications of the *Kokugaku* doctrine were the establishment of a strong centralized monarchy, toward which every Japanese owed absolute allegiance, and the destruction of the shōgunate or any other power which stood between sovereign and people.[40] Among others, it led to the eventual collapse of the Tokugawa regime in 1868, the subsequent Meiji restoration, and the building of a strong nation state.

Kokugaku thinking influenced Meiji government policies in relation to *Shintō*, state *Shintō*[41] and the ideology of *kokutai* developed from this thought, and has effects even today, in 'Nihonjinron' debates, which remain at the center of Japanese self-definition in the 20th century.

The invention of the Meiji period based on *Kokugaku* ideas

When the Japanese began writing (6th century), they wrote in Chinese, as they had adopted Chinese culture and ways of thinking. It is thus almost impossible to determine

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Marius B. Jansen, 'Japan in the Early Nineteenth Century', in *The Cambridge History of Japan, V. The Nineteenth Century*, Marius B. Jansen (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 111–115; Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi, *Anti-Foreignism and Western Learning in Early-Modern Japan: The New Theses of 1825*, Harvard East Asian Monographs 126, Harvard University Press, 1999; *Sources of Japanese Tradition…*, pp. 90–93.

[38] Hardacre, *Shintō and the State…*, p. 17.

[39] The term first appeared in Aizawa Seishisai's work, *Shinron*, in 1825. He was a Mitogaku scholar, close to the Tokugawa family and the official ideology of the Tokugawa order, which means that the tenets of *Kokugaku* were so influential that they not only reached the anti-Tokugawa groups but also the Tokugawa followers as well. Beasley, *The Modern History of Japan*, pp. 50–53.

[40] Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion…*, p. 102.

[41] Hardacre, *Shintō and the State…*, pp. 42–58.

what Japanese culture was like before Chinese culture began to influence. It was *Shintō* which embodied the spirit and character of the ancient Japanese for *Kokugaku*. However, almost nothing was known about *Shintō* before the arrival of Chinese culture, and after the arrival, *Shintō* was integrated into Buddhism in practice and ideology. So the *Kokugakusha* (the *Kokugaku* scholars) set about recovering the original form of *Shintō* in order to purify Japanese culture. Most of what we know as *Shintō* and most of what we consider to be uniquely 'Japanese' was largely an invention of the *Kokugaku*.[42]

Talking about 'inventions' may not be the most expedient way of interpreting this process. These 'inventions' contained old cultural heritage, forgotten – but once existent – tales and literary forms and language parts. Thus, some kind of continuity can be found in all these changes, which according to many scholars of Japanese studies[43] can be taken as the key factor in understanding Japanese development – the high rate of continuity in the changes. Bellah also rightly focuses on the paradoxical ideas of tradition and modernity that coexist in Japan society even today.[44] Seemingly radical changes could occur quite easily and rapidly (and did so several times during the history of Japan), which can be explained with the assumption that there was much more continuity during the changes than was apparent. Accordingly, *Kokugaku* of the Edo period can be seen as a key factor of mediating continuity during the changes. What Meiji scholars 'invented' as traditions were revivals of the *Kokugaku* tenets, that is, they were not entirely inventions, as they contained elements of old cultural heritage. Meiji scholars used *Kokugaku* conceptions of Japan to construct a modern nationalism that was not simply derived from Western models, and was not purely instrumental.[45]

The new Meiji government attempted to put the teachings of *Kokugaku* at the center of its education policy, and to abolish the old institutions of the Tokugawa regime which emphasized Confucianism and Buddhism. This attempt ultimately failed due to various kinds of resistance and internal struggles between the *Kokugaku* schools, but it gave a stimulus to the movement of Westernization-modernization. The early years of Meiji saw the rapid and abundant importation of Western cultures into Japan, which in fact stimulated the people to reflect and reconsider their own national culture, as well as the revival of the *Kokugaku* movement.[46]

Among the several recent books dealing with *Kokugaku*[47], let us look at Susan L. Burns' brilliant and thorough analysis. She emphasizes the importance of this intellectual

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[42] Ibid., pp. 42–58.

[43] See more: Tadashi Fukutake, *The Japanese Social Structure*, Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1989.

[44] See more: Robert N. Bellah, *Imagining Japan. The Japanese Tradition and its Modern Interpretation*, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003.

[45] Burgess, 'The «Illusion»…'.

[46] Uchino Goro, 'Early Modern *Kokugaku* (National Learning) and the New *Kokugaku*: Their Growth and Significance', in *Cultural Identity and Modernization in Asian Countries: Proceedings of* Kokugakuin *University Centennial Symposium*, Institute for Japanese Culture and Classics, Kokugakuin University, 1983, http://www2.Kokugakuin.ac.jp/ijcc/wp/cimac/uchino.html (accessed 12.06.2012).

[47] Recently published books on *Kokugaku* (interpreting it mainly as nativism): Burns, *Before the Nation…*; Harootunian, *Things Seen…*; Flueckiger, *Imagining Harmony…*; McNally, *Proving the Way…*; Breen, 'Nativism Restored', pp. 429–439; Teeuwen, 'Kokugaku…', pp. 227–242.

movement, stating that *Kokugaku* scholars made the early Japanese texts the means to articulate new forms of community that contested the social and political order of their time. Against divisions such as status, regional affinities, and existing collectivities such as domains, towns, and villages, they began to make 'Japan' "the source of individual and cultural identity".[48] Japan came to be constituted as the primary mode of community.[49]

Burns sticks to the modernist theory, that no nations existed before modernization, and emphasizes that *Kokugaku* is not the predecessor of Japanese nationalism. She states that modern Japanese nationalism is obviously a construction; however, the new *Kokugaku* discourse engendered new conceptions of Japan, and these visions of Japan predated the introduction in the 19th century of Western concepts of nations. What *Kokugaku* scholars collectively produced in the late Tokugawa period was "a complex and contentious discourse" on the nature of Japan, an attempt to make 'Japan', rather than class or domain or village, into "the source of individual and cultural identity".[50] Much of what concerned *Kokugaku* was directly related to language. As Burns notes, "the ideal of an original, authentic, and enduring 'Japanese' language was a powerful means to explain and thereby constitute cultural identity".[51]

Here a remarkable new idea appears in Burns' interpretation: the concept of 'cultural identity'. Actually, Burns starts her book by citing Miroslav Hroch (whose views on 'culturalism' will be dealt with later on), and builds on his theory interpreting the changes in communities of a society.[52] Burns cites Hroch's thesis on the effect and importance of social changes and crisis in changing the frames of communities. She interprets the *Kokugaku* movement this way: a new national consciousness of Japan emerged out of the dramatic changes that took place during the Tokugawa period, as these changes caused a crisis that challenged the social and political order authorized by means of the ideology of virtue, a Confucian ideology. The *Kokugaku* writers responded to this crisis with alternative concepts of community. Burns invokes Hroch's theory that national consciousness arises in the context of dramatic change[53] – not necessarily connected to Western modernization. Against the modernist theories, Burns also follows Prasenjit Duara's[54] thesis that modern Asian varieties of nationalism were not simply borrowed from the West but made good use of pre-modern and culturalist conceptions of community.[55] Meiji scholars used these *Kokugaku* conceptions of Japan to construct a modern nationalism that was not simply derived from Western models and was not purely instrumental. This way, Burns leaves behind the modernist (solely political) concept of nation and gets into culturalism as an explanation and interpretation of Edo-period

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[48] Burns, *Before the Nation…*, p. 220.

[49] Ibid., p. 3.

[50] Ibid., p. 220.

[51] Ibid., p. 12.

[52] Ibid., p. 19.

[53] Samuel Yamashita, 'Before the Nation: *Kokugaku* and the Imagining of Community in Early Modern Japan. By Susan L. Burns. Book Review', in *Journal of Japanese Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 1, Winter 2006, p. 216.

[54] Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996.

[55] Yamashita, 'Before the Nation…', pp. 215–220.

nation building. The way that she concludes some culturalist explanation and turns to a theory basically made to explain *non*-Western national development shows the shortcomings and limited possibility for interpretation of the modernist theories concerning non-Western type of development. All the 'problematic' topics and concepts of the Edo-period nation building – the importance of language as the primary bearer of national identity, the notion of cultural identity, a sense of modern (!) national identity without modernization (that is, without capitalism), the formation of national identity and thus of the nation before formation of a modern nation state (which happened the other way round in Western development, and was thus regarded as '*the* way of development') – can be found in the debates and discourses about the national development of another region: Central Europe. This is how we arrive at the Central European comparison of Japanese nation building. Let us examine first whether the theories interpreting Central European national development or providing different development patterns can be applied to Japan, and may perhaps offer a more satisfying explanation for these issues.

Central Europe and the Central European concept of modernization and nationalism

There is certainly a third, central region in Europe besides the western and eastern zones.[56] According to Huntington[57], Europe is divided culturally, with a fault line between two great civilizations, Western and Orthodox Christianity (and Islam), which had been formed by the year 1500. The peoples on the 'border zone' or 'periphery' to the north and west of this line (today the territories of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia) are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the common experiences of European history – feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, the Enlightenment, the French revolution, the Industrial Revolution –, and can thus be regarded as an organic part of Western civilization.

Central Europe seems to be a historic region (*Geschichtregion*) as well.[58] Robin Okey wrote about Central Europe: "Given this background the history of the lands of central/eastern Europe (…) affords an understandable pattern. Crucial to it are the attempts of a clutch of small and medium-sized peoples to assert their identities against more powerful neighbours on their flanks. (…) In short the geographical region of Central Europe, (…) has created the possibility for a historical region, whose different sectors have moved towards disintegration or fusion according to the flux of events".[59] There is a long-standing association of Central Europe with a German sphere of influence.[60] Okey states that Central European development has common characteristics, e.g. the German element in east-central European urbanization, the military expansion of the Teutonic Knights, the colonization

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[56] Jenő Szűcs, 'The Three Historical Regions of Europe: an Outline', in *Civil Society and the State*, John Keane (ed.), New European Paradigms, London: Verso, 1988, pp. 291–333.

[57] Huntington, *The Clash…*, pp. 29–30.

[58] See more: Zlatko Sabić, Petr Drulák (eds.), *Regional and International Relations of Central Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

[59] Robin Okey, 'Central Europe/Eastern Europe: Behind the Definitions', in *Past and Present*, No. 137, November 1992, p. 105.

[60] Ibid., p. 107.

and 'Germanization' east of the Elbe and then the Oder, the role of the Holy Roman Empire; that is, in short, the hegemony of German civilization in these lands.[61] By 1800, German had already become the chief language of polite society, the language of science and culture.[62] Okey acknowledges that the role of socio-economic change, of 'modernization', in the process is undeniable; yet, he thinks that the historic roots of these nationalisms may be underestimated[63], and that the national revivals, which changed the map of central Europe, are still an under-researched field.

Miroslav Hroch, a Czech historian and political scientist, now internationally renowned for his work on the formation and evolution of the national movements of Central European nations, has significantly contributed to the establishment of comparative history as a research field in East-Central Europe.[64] He defines the nation as a large social group integrated by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness. "Now the «nation' is not, of course, an eternal category, but was the product of a long and complicated process of historical development in Europe. For our purposes, let us define it at the outset as a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness (…) among them, three stand out as irreplaceable: (1) a 'memory' of some common past, treated as a 'destiny' of the group – or at least of its core constituents; (2) a density of linguistic or cultural ties enabling a higher degree of social communication within the group than beyond it; (3) a conception of the equality of all members of the group organized as a civil society".[65] Although the national unit is here characterized by social and political relationships, it is still a subject that exists *a priori*. Hroch emphasizes that there can be more interpretation of the concept of the nation, and the political concept of the nation may be just one of the possibilities. "We also need to bear in mind that the word 'nation' (…) has different connotations in different languages. In English, 'nationalism' is understood to imply a struggle for statehood, but this is not the case in German or Czech. In 18th-century definitions one can already see a difference between a 'political' concept of the nation in English and a 'cultural' one in German and Czech".[66] We can add to this statement that this cultural concept of nation is relevant to the whole of Central Europe. Hroch states

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[61] Ibid., p. 108.

[62] Ibid., p. 112.

[63] Ibid., p. 117.

[64] See more: Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe, Die Vorkämpfer der nationalen Bewegungen bei den kleinen Völkern Europas*, Praha, 1968; Miroslav Hroch: *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.

[65] Miroslav Hroch, 'From National Movement to the Fully-formed Nation: The Nation-building Process in Europe', in *Mapping the Nation*, Balakrishnan, Gopal (ed.), New York and London: Verso, 1996, p. 79.

[66] 'Learning from Small Nations. Interview with Miroslav Hroch', in *New Left Review*, 58, July–August 2009, pp. 49–50, http://newleftreview.org/II/58/miroslav-hroch-learning-from-small-nations (accessed 16.06.2013).

several times that modern nations came into being essentially by two roads.[67] One of them is the 'Western European way', when the state was, at the start of the national formation, an established continuity of political independence, and the internal transformation of the state or of its society from a corporate to a civil society led to the process by which this society began to define itself as a national society. This type of development was absent in Central Europe. A different type was typical here, which had a sub-variety in the form of a literary 'national culture', not connected to the state. "The development towards a modern nation in this area assumed the form of a national movement, that is to say, a struggle to achieve the attributes considered necessary for national existence".[68]

Many works have been written lately about the similarities of Central European development in the 19th century. Tomasz Kamusella documented and explained the rise of 'ethnolinguistic nationalism' as the dominant political force in Central Europe.[69] In his work, more specific attention is given to the similar nation-building role of languages (4 languages: Hungarian, Polish, Czech, Slovak – the nations of the 'core area' of Central Europe), as he states: "The history of politics of language in Central Europe is identical with the political and social history of this area between the mid-19th century and the turn of the 21st century".[70] These four languages were all subordinate languages over much or all of the period before 1918, and became state languages over much or all of the period thereafter. A Hungarian cultural and literary historian, Csaba Kiss Gy., has written a work comparing the similar motives and symbolism of Central European national anthems from the 19th century, thus giving a thorough comparative analysis of the parallel ideologies and cultural movements of the nations of this region.[71]

Catherine Horel also argued in her book on Central Europe[72] that in a region where political conditions did not favor the emergence of nations, culture became the primary core of political identity, reviving historical traditions and mythical figures. The specific geopolitical identity of the perceived 'bridge between West and East' placed the region in the imagined periphery of both 'Europes'. Her concept of Central Europe (today: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia) coincides with Huntington's theory of civilization referring to this region as the territory of the periphery and the border of Western civilization.

Modernists argue that nations are a by-product of industrialization, and see capitalism as a necessary condition for nationalism. However, as we have seen concerning the Central

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[67] Miroslav Hroch, 'National Romanticism', in *Discourse of Collective Identity in Central and Southeast Europe (1770–1945), Texts and Commentaries, Vol. 2, National Romanticism – The Formation of National Movements*, Balázs Tencsényi and Michal Kopecek (eds.), Budapest-New York: CEU Press, 2007, p. 8.

[68] Ibid., p. 9.

[69] See more: Tomasz Kamusella, *The Politics of Language and Nationalism in Modern Central Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.

[70] Kamusella, *The Politics…*, p. 7.

[71] See more: Kiss Gy. Csaba, *'Hol vagy, hazám?' Kelet-Közép-Európa himnuszai* ['Where are you, my homeland?' The anthems of East-Central Europe], Budapest: Nap Kiadó, 2011.

[72] See more: Catherine Horel, *Cette Europe qu'on dit centrale: des Habsbourg à l'intégration européenne, 1815-2004*, Paris: Beauchesne, 2009.

European development, nationalist ideas and movements were (and are) far more complex phenomena, and their interpretation need more complex systems of thoughts. Let us now examine two important theories of these attempts at challenging the modernist view of linear development.

Ethnosymbolism

Anthony D. Smith proposed a synthesis of traditional and modernist views, referred to as ethno-symbolism, suggesting that nations reach back to the myths, structures and memories of a pre-modern era (ethnic nations) in order to (re)construct or transform this communities into the modern phenomenon of the nation. Smith acknowledges that we may not find 'nations' as such in pre-modern periods; however, he does identify a number of looser collective cultural units which he calls 'ethnies'[73], which are more than just race or ethnicity, but "named units of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity". Smith lays special emphasis on the 'vital' role of myths and symbols which, far from being 'false' or 'illusory', generate a real emotional attachment for members.[74] Smith argues that nationalism draws on the pre-existing history of the 'group' to form a sense of common identity and shared history. This way nationalism is not just an illusionary belief of an imagined community, but builds on the pre-existing kinship, religious and belief systems of a group. A nation is "a named population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members".[75] According to Smith, the preconditions for the formation of a nation are as follows: a fixed homeland (current or historical),high autonomy, hostile surroundings, memories of battles, sacred centers, languages and scripts, special customs, historical records and thinking. Those preconditions may create a powerful common mythology. All these preconditions were present (or were formed and expressed) during the nation-building process of Central Europe and Japan as well.

Smith sees Japan as a good example of an ethnie or ethnic nation.[76] 'Ethnies' are more than just race or ethnicity, they combine cultural and genetic aspects which emphasizes the organic unity of the Japanese people/nation as a community bound together by ties of language and tradition. The existence in pre-modern Japan of a sense of Japanese identity based on a perception of cultural distinctiveness[77] has been noted by other scholars also. The Meiji elites had a great deal of material to utilize in the process of reconstructing a fragmented ethnic community into a cohesive modern state.[78] Japan is a good example of a nation state being born from an ethnie with an organic pattern of development.

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[73] Anthony D. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995, p. 57.

[74] Anthony D. Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986, pp. 15–16.

[75] Smith, *Nations…*, p. 57.

[76] Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity*, Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1991, pp. 26–27, 45–46.

[77] Burgess cites here: Yoshino Kosaku, 'From Ethnie to Nation: Theoretical Reflections on Nationalism', pp. 151–152, in *Japan in Comparative Perspective*, Hidehiro Sonoda and S.N. Eisenstadt (eds.), Kyoto: International Research Centre for Japanese Studies, 1998. pp. 147–155.

[78] Smith, *National Identity*, p. 105.

In this respect, the Japanese cultural movement for forming a nation shows astonishing similarities not with the nation states of Western Europe (where nationalism was strongly attached to modernity and the existence of a state) but rather with the 'national awakening' movements of the peoples of Central Europe, which have not yet been dealt with fully in the secondary literature. Anthony D. Smith presents his theory about the alternate, ethnic conception of the nation in Central Europe and in Asia, but makes no further distinction among different Asian developments compared to Central Europe. In the ethnic-genealogical concept of 'nation', lexicologists, ethnographers and philologists played a central role in the early nationalisms of Eastern Europe and Asia[79]; their linguistic, historic and ethnographic research provided the materials for the blueprint of the 'nation-to-be'. "By creating a widespread awareness of the myths, history and linguistic traditions of the community, they succeeded in substantiating and crystallizing the idea of an ethnic nation in the minds of most members…".[80]

In Central Europe and in Japan, in the shadow of a cultural and/or political 'monolith' (China for Japan, and the great empires in Central Europe), before modernity, ethnic groups or communities started to evolve their own identities with cultural movements focusing on exploring or even inventing their 'ancient' culture, thus creating a new sense of community, the nation. 'Japan' as a social and cultural identity began to be imagined before modernity, and so did the nations of Central Europe.

Miroslav Hroch's ABC pattern of national development

Another pattern of comparative approach is linked to Miroslav Hroch, who intended to describe Central European national awakening by an abstract schematization of national development through different phases. Hroch emphasizes that the national movements did not remain the same from their beginning; on the contrary, they went through different phases. "The earliest phase was the period when (…) the ethnic group, its culture, past, state in nature, customs and so forth, became a subject of academic interest. In this phase, basic linguistic norms were sought and formulated and historical contexts were traced; in short, the potential nation was defined in a scholarly fashion according to the individual features that distinguished it from other groups".[81]

Hroch defined three chronological stages in the creation of a nation. At first, the nation exists at a cultural level; second, the nation is politically implemented; thereafter, the people internalizes the nation. That is, Phase A is the "period of scholarly interest", Phase B is the "period of patriotic agitation", and finally Phase C is the "rise of a mass national movement". Both Hroch and Smith locate the materials for the building of a nation in its mythic past and, while not denying the *createdness* of the nation, they affirm the nation's continuity and its material existence. For Smith and Hroch, then, the nation seems to represent a continuity with the past rather than a rupture with it.

Hroch's work has influenced scholars of nationalism mostly through its phase theory of how individual national movements develop over time. Hroch's work provides scholars with a solution to the problem of inter-disciplinary communication: it offers a useful terminology for classifying and describing various sorts of nationalism.

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[79] Ibid., pp. 12–13.
[80] Ibid., p. 12.
[81] Hroch, 'National Romanticism…', p. 9.

In my opinion, considering the Japanese *Kokugaku* activity, this ABC theory can be applied to the case of Japan as well:

A. In the phase of the scholarly or academic interest, the *Kokugaku* scholars started to study ancient Japanese texts and wrote scholarly essays on ancient Japanese poetry, literature and language (Keichū on the *Man'yōshū,* 17th c., Kada no Azumamaro on *Shintō,* 18th c., Kamo no Mabuchi on *waka*, 18th c.) and founded schools for 'national learning'.

B. At the beginning of the 19th century, in the cultural movement phase (*Kokugaku*), views about ancient Japan and ancient Japanese ethos, tradition and language (including Motoori Norinaga's views on *Kojiki* and ancient Japan) spread all around the country thanks to the publications and especially the schools for 'national learning' in Edo, in other cities and in the countryside also, among samurai, city dwellers and wealthy land proprietors as well.

C. In the national movement phase, the political implications of the *Kokugaku* ideas popularized by Hirata Atsutane (in the 1820–30s) became known throughout the country, and political aims connected to it were expressed, such as the *sonnōjōi* movement lying behind the political struggles of the *Bakumatsu* (1853–1868) period.

Hroch's work has informed scholars with a wide variety of geographical specializations, and the ABC theory has inspired various theoretical discussions. Roman Szporluk reformulated Hroch's phases into 'academic, cultural, and political' stages. Tomasz Kamusella has added a Phase D to refer the moment "when the nation establishes its own nation-state in fulfillment of the equation of ethnic nationalism: language = nation = state." Kamusella documented and explained the rise of "ethnolinguistic nationalism" as the dominant political force in central Europe.[82] More specific attention is given to the nation-building role of languages, which were all subordinate languages over much or all of the period before 1918, and became state languages over much or all of the period thereafter. The role of print and this way the spread of vernacular literature in the formation of these nations and societies is unquestionably of key importance.

Here we can re-emphasize that *Kokugaku* also placed special importance on the language. Motoori Norinaga made the 'ancient language' of Japan (*Yamato kotoba*), which he stated he had found in the *Kojiki,* the basis for a new vision of Japanese community. The idea of an original and authentic 'Japanese' language was a powerful means to constitute cultural identity, and the same process was a characteristic feature of the national awakening movements of Central European nations.

Japan and Central Europe

If we look at Okey's analysis again about the determining location of Central Europe and its effects on its development, and change the names of 'Central Europe' to 'Japan' and 'German' to 'Chinese', we can see a description of the relation between the Japanese and Chinese cultures: "Given this background the history of the lands of central/eastern Europe (Japan) (…) affords an understandable pattern. Crucial to it are the attempts of a clutch of small and medium-sized peoples to assert their identities against more powerful neighbours on their flanks. (…) In short the geographical region of Central Europe (Japan), ... has

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[82] Kamusella, *The Politics of Language…*

created the possibility for a historical region, whose different sectors have moved towards disintegration or fusion according to the flux of events (…)".[83]

In this respect, I think that the Japanese cultural movement of forming a nation shows similarities not with the formation of nation states of Western Europe (where nationalism was strongly attached to modernity) but rather with the 'national awakening' movements of the peoples of Central Europe. The end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century was a period of national awakening in Central Europe[84], and also in Japan. The concept of the 'nation', defined as a people united by linguistic and cultural affinities, produced an intellectual revival that laid the foundation for subsequent national movements. The earliest phase was philological, when scholars attempted to record and codify native languages, explored folk legends (and wrote romantic epics) of the ethnic origins, and compiled national histories, sometimes based on legends. The Czech, Slovak, Polish and Hungarian languages were developed just as the Japanese language was studied. In Central Europe, university departments, national academies and museums were founded, associations for cultivating national cultures were organized in the region, first by the elite (nobility) then followed by the middle or lower social layers as well. Vernacular literature was published and spread throughout. The Japanese *Kokugaku* movement shows astonishing similarities with this, founding schools to study and research 'National Studies', that is, the ancient Japanese language, literature, history, customs and traditions; educating people of all classes and spreading all these ideas and knowledge about Japanese culture in Japanese language; creating the sense of national identity. Further research and more detailed study will be needed to prove the similarity of this process with a comparative study of events, the activities of the most important scholars and leaders, and the texts and discourses of the period.

Hroch's ABC scheme was originally created to provide an interpretation of Central European national concepts and nation building movements. However, Hroch's theory includes a broader concept of nation (than the Western model) with cultural and historical implications besides the political, and thus provides a wider, interdisciplinary approach to developmental patterns. For this reason there have been attempts to apply this scheme to non-Western nations as well (studies on Mexico, Pakistan and others have tried to analyze nation building movements on the basis of the ABC pattern[85]). It could be supposed that in this way all non-Western nations share some common traits in their nation-building processes. However, several important differences can be seen between Japan and other Asian countries. In Asia it was European colonial rule that unified territories or countries, and Western education produced educated natives who were familiar with Western ideas (such as the Enlightenment). The great difference between Japan and other non-Western

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[83] Okey, 'Central Europe…', p. 105.

[84] There are several works on the histories of the different national awakening movements, but few with a comparative synthesis of the Central European movements. See Emil Niederhauser, *Kelet-Európa története* [The History of East Europe], Budapest: MTA TTI, 2001, pp. 112–136; Horel, *Cette Europe…*; Kamusella: *The Politics of Language…*; Kiss Gy., *'Hol vagy, hazám?'…*

[85] See more: Alexander Maxwell (ed.), *The Comparative Approach to National Movements: Miroslav Hroch and Nationalism Studies*, Association for the Study of Nationalities, London: Routledge, 2011.

nations is the *Kokugaku* movement, by which early modern Japanese scholars began to define Japan as a unique social and cultural identity before the Western impact, which meant the "prehistory of Japanese nationness".[86] Cultural movements of nation-building, formation of national identities, ideologies and movements arose in Asia only after the arrival of the Western powers, under the influence of Western ideas, and so Eastern (Asian) nationalism is partly the product of Western conquest and influence. Japan was closed until the 1850s, and after opening up, Japan did not become a colony; but under the influence of the Western world, it started a modernization policy during which the achievements of the *Kokugaku* were utilized. In my opinion it is no exaggeration to say that the *Kokugaku* movement, which defined the national identity and started the building of the nation, was a crucial factor contributing to the success of modernization, to the transformation of Japanese society, and to the building of a political nation state – a similar role to that played by the national movements in Central Europe.

Other similarities between Japan and Central Europe can be seen in another aspect, that of the geo-political location: Japan and Central Europe lay at the peripheries of centers of civilization. They could have become integrated into those civilizations or, at times, been separated from them. In the Middle Ages, Central Europe was a basic region of European civilization based on Christian feudal kingdoms. Japan also belonged to Chinese civilization in the Nara and Heian periods. However, in other periods, and for different reasons (invaders attacked Central Europe from the East, or seclusion in Japan), the development of these regions turned in different ways from the centers. Japan and Central Europe, too, lived in the shadow of cultural 'monoliths', that is, Chinese culture for Japan, and German influence for Central Europe. The consequence of this was that the 'high culture' originated from outside, the language of the officials, the educated (and the science) was 'foreign' (Chinese/German), and their own territory seemed peripheries of the cultural center, and even seemed 'inferior' to it. Against these 'foreign cultural centres', even before modernity, ethnic groups or communities (ethnies) started to evolve their own national identities with cultural movements focusing on their own language, on exploring or even inventing their own 'ancient' cultures, thus creating a new sense of community, the nation. "A self-consciously modern nationalism was constructed by deploying existing culturalist notions of community"[87] before the Western type of modernization. This modernization was achieved and realized mainly 'from above' in Japan and in Central Europe as well, with the political and social (reform!) program of "catching up with the modern West" led partly by the intellectuals and partly by the traditional elite of the nations[88] (and not by the bourgeoisie, as happened in Western Europe).

Finally let me cite a Japanese scholar whose book was published in English last year about the history of Japanese political thought. Watanabe Hiroshi wrote about the national identity that the Japanese had even before modernization, in the Edo period.[89] "It is believed

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[86] Burns, *Before the Nation…*, p. 9.

[87] Ibid., p. 225.

[88] In the case of Japan, for the role of the samurai in the transition of the country see Bitō Masahide, '*Bushi* and the Meiji Restoration', *The Samurai*, Bitō Masahide (ed.), *Acta Asiatica,* No. 49. 1985, pp. 78–96.

[89] Watanabe Hiroshi, *A History of Japanese Political Thought*, Tokyo: International House of Japan, 2012, pp. 275–278.

today that people in the Edo period only thought of themselves as residents of their domain (*kuni/koku*), and had almost no conscience of being Japanese, but it is a complete misconception. Japan as a whole was also clearly perceived to be a *kuni*, a country." (They used the phrase *Sankoku*, referring to the three countries known to them before the early modern period: India, China, Japan.) By the 18th century, several major conditions for self-perception of Japan as a nation had already been fulfilled. 1. Political unification, institutions of political control unifying the realm; 2. economic integration, a common currency, nationwide market; 3. networks for the circulation of people and information; 4. cultural integration – there was no regional difference in the style of the written language; 5. *sakoku*, or a rigorous distinction between nationals and foreigners – so "even without the experience of personal contact with people from other countries, most Japanese were conscious of being members of a distinct national or ethnic group. There was a lively contemporary debate on the characteristics that made Japan unique."

Of course the circumstances were different, but the result of the national movements of Central Europe was the same as *Kokugaku* had had in Japan. 'Japan' as a social and cultural identity (and also: a nation) began to be imagined before modernity, and so did the nations of Central Europe.

LARISA ZABROVSKAIA

The Character of Japan-China Relations
since the Earthquake of 2011

Abstract

After the earthquake of 2011, the Japanese authorities decided to switch the focus of its foreign policy from 'economic diplomacy' (promoting goods) to 'scientific diplomacy' ('know-how' expansion). In this case, China may become the most important ground for promoting Japanese innovation projects.

The modern stage of the Sino-Japanese politico-military rivalry and competition is accompanied by an increase in the economic interdependence and the degree of mutual interest in solving regional problems. However, in the near future the close relations between Japan and the US will not let Tokyo fundamentally reverse its policy toward China.

At present the Japanese authorities are making attempts to change their policy towards China, to make it more balanced and meet national interests. However, the frequent changes of Prime Ministers of Japan, who are sometimes diametrically opposed to one another as regards foreign policy, do not let Japan maintain a stable policy towards its neighbor.

The short term in office (2006–2007) of Prime Minister Shinzō Abe created good opportunities for the further development of Sino-Japanese relations. In 2006, in order to improve bilateral relations Prime Minister Abe paid official visits to Beijing and Seoul, abstained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and proposed the broadening of economic cooperation between China and Japan. In April 2007 a meeting between Mr Abe and the Prime Minister of China Wēn Jiābǎo took place in Tokyo, during which new agreements on the development of trade exchange and scientific-technical cooperation were concluded. However, the parties did not manage to overcome their divisions on territorial issues. The following Japanese Prime Ministers, Yukio Hatoyama and Naoto Kan, also supported improvements in relations with China. Moreover, Mr Kan had intentions to cooperate substantially with China in overcoming the after-effects of the earthquake and tsunami of 2011.

After the earthquake, the Chinese authorities also displayed interest in broadening the scope of various contacts with Japan. In March 2011 the President of the PRC, Hú Jintāo, visited the Japanese Embassy in Beijing and expressed his condolences to the people of Japan. In May 2011 the Chinese Prime Minister, Wēn Jiābǎo, paid a visit to Miyagi Prefecture, the region hardest hit by the earthquake. China provided humanitarian assistance to Japan in form of food and medicaments.[1]

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[1]   Heizo Takenaka, *China Mirror*, http://www.project-syndicate.org (accessed 03.02.2011).

Thus, a new turn in the Sino-Japanese relations seems to have arisen since the disastrous earthquake and the Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear disaster. In this case a bilateral interest in extension of contacts could be observed.

The Fukushima factor in Sino-Japanese relations

Taking into account the distressful situation in the country after March 11, 2011, the Japanese leaders were bound to revise their policy towards China, considering that their economically strong neighbor could help in the revival of Japan. They reminded Beijing of the great contribution made by Japan to Chinese modernization, pointing out that Japanese companies had created 9.2 million jobs in China, and the total amount of tax paid to the Chinese government since 1979 worked out at 5 billion yuan. Furthermore, over 200,000 Chinese students had studied at Japanese universities.

In other words, the Japanese politicians had good grounds for claiming that 'Japan had played an active part in the modernization of China' by granting loans on attractive terms, supporting the construction of infrastructure and ecological projects, suggesting a number of energy development solutions, and rendering assistance in research and development. In the opinion of the Japanese diplomatic official Keiji Ide, all this resulted in the fact that China "had learnt a lot from Japan and had hereby facilitated and accelerated its growth significantly". [2]

Many Japanese politicians, in particular then-Prime Minister Naoto Kan, realized that due to the radiation contamination of a considerable area of its territory, Japanese goods and food would not be in great demand abroad. They therefore decided that Japan should change the focus of its foreign policy and switch from 'economic diplomacy' (promoting goods) to 'scientific diplomacy' ('know-how' expansion).[3] In this case, China could become the most important ground for promoting Japanese innovation projects.

This is relevant also because Japan lost its leading position in the foreign trade of China in the early 21st century. Yet the Chinese economy has not suffered from the fall in imports from Japan, because its share amounted to less than 13% of total Chinese imports (US$177 billion out of US$1.4 trillion, 2010). The fall in Chinese exports to Japan has not affected the Chinese economy significantly either, because it came out to only 8% of total Chinese exports in 2010 (US$121 billion out of US$1.58 trillion).[4]

Evidently, the new circumstances forced Japan to revise its economic relations with China. Japan used a variety of international opportunities in order to test its new policy towards China. For instance, at the Sino-Japanese-South Korean summit of May 21–22, 2011, the matter of creating a regional emergency coordination mechanism was discussed. The parties came to an agreement that closer cooperation on nuclear safety should be established.

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[2]   Кэйдзи Идэ [Keidzi Ide], *Модернизация Китая и вклад Японии* [China's modernization and Japan's contribution]. Moscow, March 2011, p. 5. (A report manuscript in Russian).

[3]   Atsushi Sunami, *Japan's Innovation System: Evolving from Catch-up to Post Catch-up. The MOF Lecture in Russia*, March 23, 2011, Moscow, 2011, pp. 18, 20. (A report manuscript).

[4]   Дубровин Д., Макарчев В. [Dubrovin D., Makarchev V.], "Последствия землетрясения в Японии для мировой экономики" [The effect of the earthquake in Japan on the international economy], *Compass (ITAR-TASS Agency)*, 2011, No. 13, p. 13. (In Russian).

The breakdown of the nuclear power station in Japan may have provided an impulse for complementing the Six-Party Talks on averting the nuclear threat on the Korean peninsula with another special regional institution aimed at securing nuclear safety. At present 88 nuclear reactors are operating in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Some of the nuclear power stations, such as Hongyanhe in Wafangdian (in the suburbs of Dalian, Liaoning province), are located along an earthquake fault line, and also by the sea.[5]

A recurrence of the Fukushima accident at other nuclear sites should not be ruled out. Creating an international mechanism for resolving the consequences of a nuclear disaster in North-East Asia has become a topical issue.

One of the consequences of the earthquake in Japan was that China's role on both the international arena and the Asian-Pacific region in particular became significantly stronger. This is a unique situation because for the first time in its history, Japan could fall under Chinese political influence, although it seems unlikely as yet taking the two nations' centuries-long rivalry, territorial disputes and ethno-cultural antagonism into account. However, it would be wrong to rule out the possibility of creating a Sino-Japanese union, which could become an unprecedented economic leader in East Asia. A revaluation of the national interests of Japan, which could be directed at 'cooperation' rather than 'rivalry' with China, is quite possible. This could be promoted both by the Japanese value system, as reflected in the formula '*dobun–doshu*' ('the same characters – the same race')[6] and the very proximity of the two countries' cultures.

Should a Sino-Japanese alliance be formed, it will become impossible to retain the American military bases in East Asia. In such a scenario the US will have to take extraordinary measures both in the financial and the military-political areas. This may be the devaluation of the US currency, or a major action of force in the Pacific. In other words, linking the economies of the two Asian giants – China and Japan –could lead to profound changes in the balance of powers in East Asia, and force the USA out of the region. In connection with this, the US has been taking proactive measures and working to ensure that pro-American politicians come to power in Japan. So far the American strategy has paid off, and has cemented the bilateral military and political relations between Japan and the United States.

In August 2011 Prime Minister Naoto Kan had to resign as he had been sharply criticized by his political opponents for his plans to abandon nuclear energy. The pro-American Yoshihiko Noda became the new Prime Minister of Japan, and took a position for fostering military and political union between Japan and the United States, seeing this union as a counter-balance to the military power of China and a basis for the foreign policy and security of Japan.

One of Mr Noda's first steps was the declaration that Chinese military expansion was giving rise to "concern in the Asia region", and he took a firm stance toward China. Moreover, he pointed out that the Japanese leaders of World War II "were not criminals" and therefore Japanese politicians' visits to Yasukuni Shrine should be regarded as a tribute to the

    [5]   Wen Bo, *Japan's Nuclear Crisis Sparks Concerns over Nuclear Power in China*, http://nautilus.org/publications/essays/napsnet/forum/npower_in_china_WenBo (accessed 24.05.2011).

    [6]   Арешидзе Л.Г. [Areshidze L.G.], *Международные отношения в Восточной Азии: Угрозы и надежды* [International Relations in East Asia: Threats and Hopes], Moscow: International Relations Publ. House, 2007, p. 154. (In Russian).

memory of those who died in the service of Japan.[7] However, Mr Noda abstained from visiting Yasukuni Shrine before his official visit to Beijing, which took place on December 25–26, 2011. The purpose of the visit was to hold consultations on a number of the most important issues: the necessity to broaden trade and economic relations, cooperation in the field of energy efficiency and environmental protection, and discussing measures to safeguard peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula.

During the talks, the leaders of both countries made a point of deepening the mutual understanding and friendship between the peoples of the two countries, and noted the development of people's diplomacy and youth exchanges as a positive fact. Over 5.4 million citizens from both countries have taken part in different meetings, festivals and study trips. In Mr Noda's opinion, this promotes "the sustainable development of relations between China and Japan, and the friendship of the two countries' peoples".[8]

The Japanese Prime Minister attempted to discuss the issue of resuming talks on the joint development of gas fields in the East China Sea.[9] At the same time, the Japanese authorities declared an intention to buy Chinese Treasury bonds of the sum of US$10 billion. Such a deal was mutually beneficial: the Chinese yuan would advance to the status of an international accounting and reserve currency, and the Chinese economy would receive significant financial support. The above sum is not significant for Japan, 70% of whose foreign exchange holdings are in US dollars, and accounts for just 0,77% of the total reserves.[10] Moreover, the move would be one of the strategic measures aimed at diversifying Japanese financial assets. The Chinese officials did not comment on this proposal made by Japan, whereas the Japanese mass media communicated that Japan had started buying Chinese treasury bonds.[11] As we can see, Japan once again resorted to the earlier proven tactics of financial injections in order to improve relations with China.

During the China-Japan summit, Premier Wēn Jiābǎo set out a number of priority issues for discussion. These included creating a joint investment fund, constructing an industrial park, and discussing issues connected to creating a free trade area between China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. Premier Wēn assured Mr Noda that China would continue its participation in recovery efforts in the earthquake-hit areas of Japan, and would share more of its experience on reducing disaster damage and safeguarding the nuclear plants.

The two sides discussed the situation in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea since the death of the Supreme Leader Kim Jong-il, and came to the understanding that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula should "proceed in dialogue and through cooperation". The Chinese leaders claimed that it was necessary to avoid a situation where "the Six-Party Talks lead to rivalry in the North Korean Command authority and as a result

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[7]   *Japan rules the Senkaku*, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/ed20110909a1.html (accessed 9.09.2011).

[8]   *Deepening the strategic mutually beneficial relations between China and Japan is of importance*, http://russian.news.cn/importnews/2011-12/25c_131325314 (accessed 29.12.2011).

[9]   *Mr. Noda's Beijing summit*, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/print/ed2011128a2.html (accessed 29.12.2011).

[10]   *Purchase of the Chinese treasury bonds by Japan is mutually beneficial for both parties*, http://russian.news.cn/importnews/2011-12/21c_131319931.html (accessed 5.01.2011).

[11]   *Japan to start buying Chinese bounds under bilateral cooperation*, http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/12/133505.html (accessed 21.01.2012).

to the breakup of the DPRK". Meanwhile, the Chinese leaders gave no encouragement to Japan's request "to push the DPRK into resumption of the Six-Party Talks and the repatriation of the Japanese who had been kidnapped earlier by the North Koreans".[12] In other words, the Chinese leaders gave the Japanese premier to understand that they were ready to cooperate with Japan on the Korean issue, but only within certain limits.

Upon the visit's completion, bilateral agreements were signed on cooperation in the field of energy efficiency and environmental protection, as well as on the expansion of youth exchange programs of up to 5000 people per year. The parties agreed to carry out collective actions to celebrate the 40th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations, and declared 2012 to be "A year of exchange and friendship between the peoples".[13] These plans were not implemented in full because of tensions over the Senkaku Islands and the subsequent exacerbation of relations between China and Japan.

Judging by the subject of the documents signed, the discussion at the Sino-Japanese Summit was held according to the Chinese agenda. The problems in which Japan was mostly interested remained unresolved. These primarily concern resolving the matter of the development of gas fields in the East China Sea. For their part, the Chinese government does not like the looks of the ongoing declarations on the importance of the military and political union with the United States for Japan, and the participation of the Japanese defense forces in joint military operations with the US outside Japanese territory.

The landslide victory for the Liberal Democratic Party on December 16, 2012 made it possible for its leader Shinzō Abe to become the Prime Minister of Japan again, and to continue the fence-mending policy toward China. Many Chinese people are worried that Abe's second coming to power will further damage bilateral relations, as Japan's actions on disputed territories in 2012 seriously damaged its relations with its neighbors, especially with China. In an Internet poll carried out on December 17, 2012 in China, 78.8% percent of the participants believed Chineses-Japanese relations would worsen after Mr Abe took office, and 89.5% thought that if Mr Abe revises Japan's current constitution and upgrades the self-defense force into a self-defense army, the possibility of military conflicts in East Asia would greatly increase.

But on the contrary, on December 17, 2012 Mr Abe said that Chinese-Japanese relations are one of the most important bilateral ties for Japan. He said the current tension between China and Japan had not only damaged bilateral relations, but also harmed Japan's international interests. Mr Abe said that he will increase communication with China in order to revive relations.

Nevertheless, at the very beginning of 2013 members of the new Japanese cabinet visited not only China, but all of China's neighbors as well. Besides, Mr Abe invited the leaders of China's neighboring countries, India and Myanmar, to pay official visits to Tokyo. Chinese experts called this an attempt to create "a ring around China", adding that

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[12] *Japan to start buying Chinese bounds under bilateral cooperation*, http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/12/133505.html (accessed 21.01.2012).

[13] *Deepening the strategic mutually beneficial relations between China and Japan is of importance*, http://russian.news.cn/importnews/2011-12/25c_131325314 (accessed 29.12.2011).

[14] *Попытки Синдзо Абэ добиться «блокады Китая» не увенчаются успехом* [Sindzo Abe's attempts to achieve 'blockade of China' won't crown success], http://russian.people.com.cn/95181/8201933.html (accessed 21.05.2012).

all these diplomatic measures represented attempts to involve these countries in opposition to China, and to restore the dominant status of Japan in Asia.

Chinese experts consider that since Abe's return to the post of prime minister, three principles of Japanese foreign affairs were very quickly restored: 'strategic diplomacy', 'valuable diplomacy' and 'active independent diplomacy'. These three principles of diplomacy are like "the old song of the Cold War times" and a provocation of the group of countries having close economic relations with China. Chinese experts concluded that as a result, the edge of such diplomacy is directed against China.[14]

Furthermore, they state that at present China and Japan are incomparable in their economic, state and military potential. Global prosperity and stability are also impossible without China. Therefore, in speaking about a 'blockade of China', Japan is incorrectly estimates its own forces. China is thus closely watching the actions of the Japanese government and will not allow itself to be misled.

At the same time, Chinese experts emphasize that many abnormal actions by Japan under Abe's leadership are "dangerous signs" which could derail its efforts to become a "normal country". Pandering to a revival of militarism threatens to challenge the post-war international order and take the country even further from its goal. They warn that "a nation that does not have the courage to reflect on its past will not be able to move forward. Abe has much to learn from Japan's abnormal past to define the correct steps toward becoming a "normal country".[15]

Chinese scholars reproach Japanese leaders that Japan's continued enthusiasm for a Cold War mentality is not accidental. The country developed its economy recovery under the tutelage of other countries, rebuilding itself from scratch in less than 20 years to become the world's second largest economy. Chinese scholars consider Japan to have been the main beneficiary from the Cold War, but this has also resulted in the economic stagnation which has beset the thinking of the Japanese ruling class in the years that followed. Some elements in Japan are still trying to circle the ideological wagons in an attempt to protect the enormous gains they made during the Cold War.

At present the international situation has fundamentally changed. Asian countries are embracing rare opportunities for developing. Therefore, Chinese scholars believe that Asian people should see through the intentions of Japan's ultra-rightists, actively resist 'value diplomacy' and act together to safeguard regional win-win cooperation and common development.[16] As a result, no "ring around China" would be created.

At the same time, Chinese experts emphasize that Japan cannot develop its economy without the Chinese market. They said that the Japanese economy relies more on China than vice versa, especially in the export sector.[17]

Apparently the new Chinese leadership under Xí Jĕnpíng also intends to strengthen miscellaneous links with its economically developed neighbor, despite the disputes over rights to the Senkaku Islands.

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[15] Wang Haiqing, Wu Xia, *Japan is moving away from goal of 'normal country'*, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/8289728.html (accessed 19.06.2013).

[16] Liang Jun, *Keeping a watchful eye on Japan's 'new cold war'*, http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90777/828396.html (accessed 17.06.2013).

[17] Ding Ying, 'The Return of Abe', *Beijing Review*, Vol. 55, No. 52, December 27, 2012, pp. 18–19.

Behind the professions of friendship and mutual understanding lie insurmountable difficulties leading to recurrent frictions. At the same time, however, the leaders of the two countries are aware of the necessity to maintain stable and sustainable development in relations between China and Japan, which have become more active in recent years thanks to people's diplomacy and economic cooperation.

The modern stage of Sino-Japanese relations distinguishes itself in that the aggravation of politico-military rivalry and competition is accompanied by an increase in economic interdependence and the extent of mutual interest in solving regional problems. However, in the near future, the close relations between Japan and the US will not allow Tokyo to fundamentally reverse its policy toward China.

The continuous growth of China's military potential and political and economic influence will lead to an intensification of Japanese maneuvers between its ally (the US) and its regional neighbor (China). In this case, China is likely to adopt the attitude of an onlooker, and take a pragmatic approach to cooperation with Japan on different issues of regional politics. As a result, bilateral relations will be characterized by uncertainty and will depend on the personal preferences of the two countries' leaders.

TINE WALRAVENS

Japan Facing a Rising China: Food Safety as a Framework for Japanese Identity Formation

Abstract

As a flag of national identity, food provides a promising referential framework through which a sense of belonging is communicated, negotiated and challenged. In this article, I focus on the nexus between food safety and identity, and more particularly on the question of how food safety incidents regarding imported Chinese goods have affected the formation of Japanese national identity. Japanese government agencies long claimed that Japan's regulatory system and import measures guarantee the safest food in the world. On the public as well as the elite level, discourse about food scandals (especially when directed against a clear 'Other') thus represent a very promising and fruitful source for defining changing national identities.

1. Introduction

In October 2012, an article entitled '"Food terrorism" a new concern in China-Japan rift' was published on the internet journal *Japan Today*.[1] The article was written in the context of the then ongoing Sino-Japanese dispute, which had escalated since the Japanese nationalization of three of the five Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai in Chinese). In the light of the 2008 Poisoned *gyōza* incident (餃子事件、ギョーザ事件, *Gyōzajiken*), in which deliberately poisoned Chinese dumplings entered the Japanese food chain, the Japanese public feared a similar incident would occur again. The act of intentional contamination was coined 'food terrorism'(食品テロ, *shokuhintero*), a term that ideologized mere concerns about the health-related properties and the safety of foods[2] by linking these with more power-laden and politicized bilateral relations and even identity politics. In Japan, food-related incidents, particularly concerning imported Chinese foods, have received widespread

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[1] '"Food Terrorism" a New Concern in China-Japan Rift', *Japan Today*, October 8, 2012, http://www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/food-terrorism-a-new-concern-in-growing-china-japan-rift (accessed 6.06.2013).

[2] It is important to distinguish between food safety (食品の安全, *shokuhin no anzen*) and food security(食料安全保障, *shokuryō anzenhoshō*). In the Japanese context, the first one refers to whether or not food is safe to eat, the second is a reference to food supply and availability. A third term often used is self-sufficiency (食料自給率, *shokuryōjikyūritsu*), which refers to the ratio of domestically consumed food that is supplied by domestic production.

attention in the media, and this can be expected to have a great impact on the public's consumption habits, and is thus also of interest for industry and government agencies concerned. Polls carried out by Gallup International and the Nihon Research Center six months after the *gyōza* incident showed that 90% of Japanese respondents questioned said they were concerned about the safety of foods coming from China.[3]

This article sets out to explore how different agents within Japanese society react to incidents involving Chinese food, and the inevitable impact on Japanese national identity, which forms itself to a significant degree by differentiation from China. I will identify the political and economic interests behind the reactions of several players involved within Japanese society. By linking China-related food scandals and questions of Japanese national identity, I will also shed light on Japanese consumers' distrust of Chinese foodstuffs.[4] The findings presented in this paper are the preliminary results of my research into Japanese food safety issues, and offer potential for further research in the so far under-examined approach to food in Japan.[5]

2. Identity formation: Self and Other

The positioning of 'Self' versus 'Other' can be seen as a key element determining narrative structures in the traditional histories of nations.[6] A state's collective identities are constructed in a complex and dynamic process by depicting the 'Self' as differing from the 'Other'.[7] Campbell called the construction of identities through practices of 'othering' that generates differences 'radical interdependence' of our political identities.[8] Furthermore, national identity construction is not limited to one exclusive image of the 'Self', neither to

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[3]   Nihon Research Center, Gallup International, "『旅行、食の安全性、環境問題等』についての日中比較論調査" ['*Ryokō, shoku no anzensei, kankyōmondai' nitsuite no Nicchuuhi-kakuronchōsa*, Comparative study between China and Japan concerning tourism, food safety and environmental problems], p. 8. Available at http://www.nrc.co.jp/report/pdf/090105.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[4]   As this is not a comparative study, I have limited myself to incidents involving Chinese food and have chosen not to deal with Japan's domestic food problems regarding radiation since the Triple Disaster of March 11, 2011. I will also not comment on scandals involving food imports from the US or other countries.

[5]   Further research could focus on literatures and popular conceptions regarding food safety issues involving Chinese food products elsewhere in East Asia. In South Korea for example, meat and dairy products sourced from China are held in such suspicion as to support an industry in importing products from elsewhere (particularly Australia and New Zealand) that is then deliberately marketed as 'safe', which could be interpreted as a popular euphemism for 'non-Chinese'.

[6]   See Prasenjit Duara, 'Historical Narratives and Trans-nationalism in East Asia', 2008, p. 105; in *Contested Views of a Common Past. Revisions of History in Contemporary East Asia*, Steffie Richter (ed.), Frankfurt am Main and New York: Campus, 2008, pp. 99–117.

[7]   The Self/Other approach was developed within social theory, but is also increasingly used in International relation (IR) theory. See Iver B. Neumann, *Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999, p. 2. Thomas Diez, 'Europe's Others and the Return of Geopolitics', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2004, p. 321, Iver B. Neumann, 'Self and Other in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1996, pp. 139–174.

[8]   See David Campbell, *Politics without Principle: Sovereignty, Ethics and the Narratives of the Gulf War*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993, p. 95.

one exclusive 'Other', but is characterized by a high level of intersubjectivity through social interaction with multiple 'Others', which results in various, changing and even overlapping self-identities.[9] Depending on the context and the particular 'Other' one is dealing with, a specific 'Self' will manifest itself. There might be 'Others' that one wants to positively identify with, while there are 'Others' one likes to differentiate from. This implies that the definition of the 'Other' is highly dependent on the identity of the 'Self' and not known *a priori*. In this article, identity is seen as embedded in social relations and as contextual, relational and susceptible to change. The given context in this paper is the negotiation between two social groups, which is often power-laden when concerning two nation states or entire populations.

In the case of Japan, China has been a very significant Other in the historical process of forming state identity.[10] The first nascent Japanese cultural and national consciousness in the 18th century emphasized precisely "that which made the Japanese irreducibly Japanese, meaning the same, and thereby different from the (Chinese) Other".[11] The emergence of 'national studies' (*kokugaku,* 国学)[12] during the 18th and 19th centuries was precisely aimed at challenging Chinese neo-Confucianism and demonstrating the superiority of Japanese over Chinese culture, by comparing a 'civilized' Japan with an 'uncivilized China'.[13] At this early stage of Japanese national identity formation, the nation's cultural consciousness was clearly formed by juxtaposition with China, precisely as China was for Japan the significant reference point in time. It is fair to state that the modern Japanese 'Self' was born from the encounter with the Chinese.

Even now, as Northeast Asia is changing, China's rise and seemingly assertive pursuit of regional interests unsettle the neighboring states, no least Japan. Growing uneasiness about the implications is reflected in the current discourse, which is often characterized by Sinophobia, the 'China Threat' thesis and the perceived image of an increasingly aggressive China.[14]

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[9] See Shogo Suzuki, 'The Importance of 'Othering' in China's National Identity: Sino-Japanese Relations as a Stage of Identity Conflicts', *The Pacific Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2007, pp. 24–25.

[10] For an overview of the significant reference group according to time period, see *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia, Representation and Identity*, Harumi Befu (ed.), Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, p. 125.

[11] Harumi Befu (ed.), *Cultural Nationalism in East Asia, Representation and Identity*, Institute of East Asian Studies, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993, pp. 82–84; taken from Harry D. Harootunian, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, p.409.

[12] *Kokugaku*, 国学, or 'national study' is a school of Japanese philology and philosophy that originated during the Tokugawa period as a response to Sinocentric neo-Confucian theories that dominated the intellectual scene at the time. *Kokugaku* scholars tried to refocus Japanese scholarship away from the study of Chinese, Confucian, and Buddhist texts in favor of research into the early Japanese classics and *shintō*. It became very popular in the 19th century with important scholars such as Hirata Atsutane (1776–1843). See Haga Noboru, Matsumoto Sannosuke (eds.), *Nihon shisōtaikei* (日本思想体系, Series on Japanese thought), Vol. 51, *Kokugaku undo no shisō* (国学運動の思想, *The thoughts of the Kokugaku movement*), Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1971.

[13] Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Rice as Self. Japanese Identities through Time,* New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993, pp. 102–104.

3. Food and food safety in Japan

In the discourse of Self and Other, food has served as a powerful vehicle for the Japanese to think about themselves in relation to other peoples. As in many cultures, food as a flag of national identity provides a promising referential framework through which a sense of belonging is communicated. Bearing symbols of the nation, food is used to articulate identity and identification, and – like language – it can mean inclusion and exclusion, national pride or xenophobia. It is powerful not only as a concept, but also psychologically, when used to juxtapose 'us' versus 'them'. Rice, the 'staple' of the Japanese diet, is used as such to set Japan apart from the bread-eating Europeans, or from other Asians by juxtaposing the 'superior' Japanese-grown rice (内地米, *naichimai*) against 'inferior' foreign rice (外米, *gaimai*).[15]

As a commodity, food plays a significant role in national 'imagined communities'.[16] Once national consciousness is imagined, it is constantly reinforced through a unified 'national culture' constructed by the state and dispersed via education and bureaucracy.[17] However, as many scholars such as Hobsbawm (in general) and Cwiertka (for Japan in particular) have already pointed out, there is no such thing as a 'national cuisine'. The concept of alleged culinary traditions is a construction in itself, rendering pre-existing food customs into a national symbol, a flag of identity for the nation.[18] The invented discourse of Japanese national cuisine of rice, fish and vegetable side dishes is presented as pure, healthy and unique, allegedly due to the growing process in Japanese soil. According to Ohnuki-Tierney, this notion of 'purity' has always been integral to the concept of the Japanese Self, even long before the rise of nationalism.[19] Yet, as will be shown below, this concept in practice is easily politicized as a negative nationalism, when aimed against an external Other, which is defined as 'impure'.

Despite the fact that rice culture was adopted from China, Japanese nativist *kokugaku* scholars of the 19th century such as Hirata Atsutane (平田篤胤, 1776–1843) tried to establish the sources of a pristine and distinct Japanese identity in agrarian ideology and rice agriculture. As such, the presumed Japanese uniqueness was said to be built on agriculture,

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[14] Linus Hagström, Björn Jerdén, 'Understanding Fluctuations in Sino-Japanese Relations: To Politicize or to De-politicize the China Issue in the Japanese Diet', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 83, No. 4, 2010, p. 720. Chung Jae Ho, 'East Asia Responds to the Rise of China: Patterns and Variations', *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 82, No. 4, 2009, p. 663. Björn Jerdén, Linus Hagström, 'Rethinking Japan's China Policy: Japan as an Accommodator in the Rise of China, 1978–2011', *Journal of East Asian Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2012, pp. 215–250.

[15] Ohnuki-Tierney, *Rice as Self*, pp. 103–104.

[16] One of the ground-breaking ideas in the scholarship of nationalism was the concept of a nation as an 'imagined community', which proposed that any community larger than a group of people who all know each other is imagined. Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London and Brooklyn: Verso, 1983.

[17] See Katarzyna J. Cwiertka, *Modern Japanese Cuisine. Food, Power and National Identity,* London: Reaktion Books, 2006, p. 177.

[18] Eric Hobsbawm, 'Introduction: Inventing Traditions', in Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, *The Invention of Tradition*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 1–14. Cwiertka, *Modern Japanese Cuisine*, pp. 175–180.

[19] Ohnuki-Tierney, *Rice as Self*, p. 131.

which was actually introduced from the continent. However, it was argued that Chinese rice was inferior compared to 'divine' Japanese rice.[20] The same accounts for many other foodstuffs that are considered truly Japanese, such as *ramen*, tea and *gyōza*, which have all been imported from China, but which during a process of acculturation came to be seen as Japanese in origin.[21]

It is a well-documented fact that Japan is highly dependent on food imports (60%) for its food security, with one of the lowest self-sufficiency rates among major industrialized countries.[22] Most of the ingredients for the so-called traditional pure and authentic Japanese cuisine have to be imported. Whereas in 1965 the self-sufficiency rate was still 73%, in recent years barely 40% of necessary food supplies have been provided by domestic production.[23]

On the other hand, Japanese government agencies long claimed that the Japanese regulatory system and import measures guarantee the safest food in the world.[24] The Japanese system towards Chinese imports consists of food being tested upon entering (10% to 15% of the imports are checked), providing exclusive licenses for Chinese companies exporting to Japan, and screening Chinese producers even before produce is shipped to Japan. As Kakita Tatsuya (垣田達哉), a much-published expert on food safety in Japan, stated in 2007: "Japan is five years ahead of the rest of the world in dealing with quality problems from China. The world can learn from Japan".[25] The nation takes pride in the strictness of its system, and as such has even been cited by the Energy and Commerce Committee of the US as a model for American importers.

> "Can food be imported from China safely? The Japanese, Hong Kong, and FSIS (Food Safety and Inspection Service) models all are safer than our current system for the import of the 80 percent of the American food supply regulated by FDA

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[20] Ibid., pp. 87–88. This did not merely concern food and the consumption thereof, but Atsutane also stated that 'other peoples' admired the Japanese because of their good table manners. Ibid, p. 104 (from Harry D. Harootunian, *Things Seen and Unseen: Discourse and Ideology in Tokugawa Nativism*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press 1988, pp. 211–212). See Tahara Tsuguo, Saeki Arikiyo, Haga Noboru, Eds., *Nihon shisōtaikei* [日本思想体系, Series on Japanese thought], Vol. 50, *Hirata Atsutane, Ban Tomoyuki, ŌkuniTakamasa* [平田篤胤　伴信友　大国隆正, Hirata Atsutane, Ban Tomoyuki, Ōkuni Takamasa], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1973.

[21] Other non-food examples of Japanese 'copying practice' are the introduction of the Chinese writing system to the Japanese language, city planning and metallurgy. See Rupert Cox (ed.), *The Culture of Copying in Japan: Critical and Historical Perspectives*, New York: Routledge, 2006.

[22] Imported Foods Inspection Services Home Page, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Government of Japan, http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/importedfoods/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[23] MAFF, 'Food and Dietary Habits', http://www.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/09ep3.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[24] Theo H. Jonker, Hiroshi Ito, Hiroji Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards in Japan. Compliance of Suppliers from Developing Countries., Agriculture and Rural Development Discussion Paper,* Washington: Agriculture and Rural Development Department, The World Bank, 2004, p. 1.

[25] 'Safe Food for Japan', *The New York Times*, October 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/ 2007/10/11/business/worldbusiness/11safety.html?_r=0 (accessed 6.06.2013). Tatsuya Kakita, *Anatamotabeteru Chuugokusan* [The Chinese produce that you too are eating], Tokyo: Riyonsha, 2007.

(Food and Drugs Administration). No one we met with suggested that either the Hong Kong or FSIS system was practical. (…)The Japanese system of regulating Chinese food imports does appear to offer better control than that currently used by FDA".[26]

China, as a major food supplying country to Japan (second after the US), also seems to show great determination to meet the strengthened Japanese official sanitation and private company standards. As a report by the World Bank in 2004 shows, China enjoyed high esteem from Japanese importers for its efforts to tackle the problem of pesticide residues.[27] Nevertheless, that same report from the World Bank also states that "most Japanese believe that domestic food is safer than imported food, (…) Chinese products are believed to be least safe." Despite the fact that the quotes below were taken from articles published right after the *gyōza* incident became public, they do show that Chinese imported foods are not much valued in general.

"In various parts of China [incidents of] large-scale food poisoning caused by residual agricultural chemicals and other substances have happened one after another. We have to question whether China as a whole plays fast and loose with food safety." (Yomiuri Shimbun, February 1, 2008).[28]

Chinese vegetables are notorious for containing residual chemicals used in the process of cultivation and have posed serious health concerns to Japanese consumers. (The Japan Times, January 31, 2008).[29]

Chinese importers, for their part, complain that Japanese buyers do not pay enough for optional extra food safety and quality measures.[30]

Looking at JETRO statistics for the fiscal years (FY) 2009 and 2010, we see that the US remains the major importer, with 25.1% or one quarter of the food imports to Japan, while the PRC accounts for 13.1%.[31] Of a total of 1376 violations in FY2010, the US accounted for 152 cases, 11% of the total, while the PRC accounts for 322 cases or 23.4%, almost one quarter of the total amount of violations.[32] China thus ranks second

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[26] Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, US Committee on Energy and Commerce, 'Staff Trip Report. Food from China: Can we import safely?', October 4, 2007, pp. 9–10, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=480415 (accessed 6.06.2013).

[27] Jonker, Ito, Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards…*, p. 4.

[28] 'Poisoned Dumplings Incident Reveals Fragility of Sino-Japanese Relations', *World Socialist Web Site*, March 3, 2008, http://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2008/03/dump-m03.html (accessed 6.06.2013).

[29] '10 Sick after Eating Tainted Gyoza from China', *The Japan Times*, January 31, 2008, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/01/31/national/10-sick-after-eating-tainted-gyoza-from-china/#.UXQ1HnDRtUQ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[30] Jonker, Ito, Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards…*, p. 4.

[31] JETRO, Japan External Trade Organization, 'Japanese Trade and Investment Statistics', http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/reports/statistics/data/0809_import.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[32] MAFF, Department of Food Safety, Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, 'Statistics of Imported Foods Monitoring for FY 2010', http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/importedfoods/10/dl/10-08.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

as a food importer for Japan, but still accounts for most of the violations on food safety.[33]

Food safety concerns among Japanese consumers evolved in the 1960s and 70s, but developed out of an earlier sensitivity about food supply.[34] One factor contributing to this attitude shift was the widely reported spate of food poisoning cases, such as the 1955 Morinaga arsenic milk contamination[35] and the Kanemi rice oil case of 1968.[36] Both cases had a direct effect on the Food Safety Law, and on public perceptions concerning the food industry. Additionally, awareness among the public rose that pollution incidents could have a direct impact on human health through their effects on food safety.[37] The Minamata poisoning affair of 1953 in Kumamoto province is probably the most famous of a number of pollution incidents that affected public health as locally harvested foods proved to be contaminated. Another consideration among consumers was the increasing dependence on imports and its consequences for food security and safety. These developments made the public realize the importance of food safety, and the country's dependence on imports for food security. One measure the government took as a reaction to consumer protests was the revision of the Food Safety Law in 1957. The shift in attitude also resulted in the emergence of many local grassroots consumer cooperative movements, such as the *Nihon no Dentō shokuwo Kangaeru Kai* (日本の伝統食を考える会, The Movement for Thinking

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[33] Nevertheless, a brief look at the Japanese government's figures on violations against the Food Safety Law by country reveals that Chinese products (not including Taiwan) are not necessarily more problematic than, for example, American or Thai imports. On the contrary: Vietnamese, Taiwanese and Ecuadorian imported foodstuffs seem more likely not to conform to the Japanese regulations than Chinese imports. For FY 2010, 0.05% of all Chinese imported goods were found to be in violation of the food safety regulations; for the US goods this figure was 0.07%, and for Vietnam 0.29% of its total number of food imports. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Government of Japan, 'Statistics of Imported Foods Monitoring for FY 2010'. Available at http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/importedfoods/10/dl/10-08.pdf, accessed 22.08.2013. The MHLW mentions the amount of violations by country compared to the total amount of violations. I argue that this does not give us a clear view of the size of the problem, and therefore I suggest calculating the amount of violations relative to the total amount of declarations per country. This gives us a completely different view of the matter. At first sight, China's 322 violations seem large compared to Vietnam's 128 violations, or the 152 violations by the US. Nevertheless, putting this against the total amount of declarations – for China 607,994, Vietnam 43,924 and the US 214,590, this casts the matter in a different light.

[34] For the difference between food safety and food security, I refer back to footnote 2.

[35] In 1955 in the western areas of Japan, some 12,000 newborn babies suffered from poisoning and another 130 died after consuming milk contaminated with arsenic from the Morinaga Milk Company. This event was particularly notable for the large number of people from the same age group who fell victim to the poison. See Jun Ui, *Industrial Pollution in Japan*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1992.

[36] In 1968, rice oil from the Kanemi depot in Fukuoka was found to be contaminated with PCBs. The estimated amount of victims was around 15,000 persons, but only 1081 cases were officially recognized as poisoning. See Jun Ui, *Industrial Pollution in Japan,* Tokyo, United Nations University Press, 1992.

[37] Raymond A. Jr. Jussaume, Shūji Hisano, Yoshimitsu Taniguchi, 'Food Safety in Modern Japan', *Contemporary Japan, Journal of the German Institute for Japanese Studies*, Vol. 12, Munich, iudicium Verlag, p. 218, 2000.

about the Traditional Japanese Diet), which originated in 1981 in Osaka.[38] In 1969 Takeuchi Naokazu (竹内直一) founded the Consumers Union of Japan (CUJ) or *Nihon Shōhisha Renmei,* one of the country's most prominent consumer organizations that promotes domestic produce and culinary traditions.[39] Initiated to protest against the food industry and governmental institutions and their policies, these consumer movements later organized themselves in order to create alternative systems of food supply.[40] In the aftermath of a series of food-related incidents in Japan, food safety has gained increasing importance in the discourse of social movements and civil society.

4. 'The last citadel' – national identity under threat by the Other

By using the phrase 'the last citadel', a metaphor for self-identity under threat, I refer to Ohnuki-Tierney, who applies this term to the Japanese equation of self-sufficiency with an exclusive reliance on domestic rice.[41] Based on my preliminary findings concerning the role of food within Japanese national identity, I argue that this idea can be opened up from merely rice to the whole of Japanese domestic produce. Additionally, I will also argue that the anti-China feeling among the public within the context of the current issues related to food and food safety can be readily used to invoke a revived sense of national identity expressed through the 'food' framework.

Since the Snow Brand Milk scandal in 2000, Japan has been plagued by several food safety incidents and scandals, ranging from mad cow disease or tainted rice, through mislabeled food products to high pesticide residues on vegetables.[42] The recent flow of scandals involving both domestic and foreign companies is threatening to damage the government's propagation of food safety, and by extension the image of Japan as "a country of culinary wonders, squeaky-clean factories and impeccable sanitation"[43] which has become an important element in Japanese national identity. Threatening invasions of what Dena Attar calls 'filthy foreign food'[44] are seen as dangerous to the whole fabric of national identity, and as such a nation's diet can have a key role to play in nationalistic sentiments; especially since the

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[38] *Nihon no Dentōshokuwo Kangaeru Kai* [日本の伝統食を考える会, The Movement for Thinking about the Traditional Japanese Diet], http://blog.dentousyoku.org/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[39] Patricia L. Maclachlan, 'Global Trends vs. Local Traditions. Genetically Modified Foods and Contemporary Consumerism in the United States, Japan and Britain', in *The Ambivalent Consumer*, Sheldon Garon, Patricia L. Maclachlan, P.L. (eds.), London: Cornell University Press, 2006, pp. 250–251. *Nihon Shōhisha Renmei* [日本消費者連盟 Consumers Union of Japan, CUJ], http://www.nishoren.org/en/(accessed 6.06.2013).

[40] Jussaume, Hisano, Taniguchi, 'Food Safety in Modern Japan', pp. 218–219.

[41] Ohnuki-Tierney, *Rice as Self*, pp. 136, 8.

[42] For an incomplete list of domestic food scandals, see Aiko Kojima, 'Responsibility or Right to Eat Well?: Food Education (Shokuiku) Campaign in Japan', *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, p. 63. For food-related incidents in Japan involving foreign firms as well, I refer to Jonker, Ito, Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards…*, pp. 6–7.

[43] The expression is taken from 'Scandals Shatter Japan's Food Safety Myth', *Chicago Tribune News*, 26 October 2007, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-10-26/news/0710260606_1_illness-or-food-poisoning-food-safety-labeling (accessed 6.06.2013).

[44] Dena Attar, 'Filthy Foreign Food', *Camerawork*, No. 31, 1985, pp. 13–14 cited in Ian Cook, Philip Crang, 'The World on a Plate. Culinary Culture, Displacement and Geographical Knowledges', *Journal of Material Culture*, 1996, Vol. 1 (2), pp. 131–153.

nation is also an organizational unit, and the regulating bodies have their own interest in what the nation is eating. The reaction to food-related issues with China, both among the public and within the regulating segments of society, reflects a revived sense of national identity precisely because – as I will argue – the Other, China, is involved in these scandals. A survey conducted by the Cabinet Office in September and October 2012 reveals that 80.6% of the Japanese respondents do not have friendly feelings towards China.[45] Anti-Chinese feeling among the Japanese public is readily exploited in these cases, resulting in new spurts of (food) nationalism and adding to the never-ending Sino-Japanese tensions.

In the following, I will analyze as an example the so-called 'Poisoned *gyōza* incident' of 2008 to illustrate the reactions of the agents involved.

The 2008 poisoned *gyōza* incident and its diplomatic aftermath

In January 2008, ten Japanese people fell severely ill and some other 500 people reportedly complained of severe pains after consuming pork dumplings that were produced in China. After investigation, the dumplings turned out to have been tainted with a highly poisonous insecticide, at levels up to 400 times higher than allowed by Japanese health standards, arousing assumptions that it was not merely cultivation residue but that the pesticide must have been introduced during the production or distribution process. Since the investigators found a suspicious hole in one of the packages, the Japanese prefectural police treated the case as attempted murder, and started investigations. Jointly-run investigations by the Japanese and Chinese governments found no trace of the particular deadly pesticide in the factory. The company was therefore cleared of responsibility.[46] The issue was then officially treated as a deliberate poisoning, and gave way to yet another episode of Sino-Japanese diplomatic quarrels, and food safety rose high on the agenda of many national, bilateral and multilateral summits in the years to come. In a national opinion poll conducted by the *Yomiuri Shimbun*, food safety showed up as the third highest priority for the Fukuda cabinet (Liberal Democratic Party, LDP) according to the interviewees.[47] On a bilateral level, Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to Japan in May 2008 was concluded with a joint agreement which singled out energy, environment, and food and product safety as areas of enhanced cooperation.[48]

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[45] 'Record 81% of Japanese feel no friendship towards China, government survey shows', *The Japan Times*, November 25, 2012, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2012/11/25/national/record-81-of-japanese-feel-no-friendship-toward-china-government-survey-shows/#.Uc2WpeDRtUQ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[46] MHLW, *Chūgoku sanreitō gyōzagagenin to utagawareru kenkōhigaijirei no hassei nitsuite* [中国産冷凍ギョウザが原因と疑われる健康被害事例の発生について, Concerning the occurrence of cases of health issues caused by frozen dumplings produced in China], http://www.mhlw.go.jp/houdou/2008/01/h0130-1.html (accessed 6.06.2013). James J. Przystup, 'Japan–China Relations: All about Gyoza: Almost all of the Time', *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 10 (1), April 2008. (Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0801qjapan_china.pdf, accessed 6.06.2013).

[47] Yomiuri Shimbun April 2008 Opinion Poll, available at http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-database/listofpolls/2008-polls/yomiuri-shimbun-april-2008-opinion-polls-08-07/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[48] James J. Przystup, 'Japan–China Relations. Progress in Buildings a Strategic Relationship', *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 10 (2), July 2008, p. 5. (Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0802qjapan_china.pdf, accessed 6.06.2013).

The fact that the visit was postponed from April to May was allegedly attributed to the strain in relations. The Japanese investigators focused very strongly on the fact that the particular pesticide was banned in Japan, and that the sample of the pesticide taken from the suspect dumplings was of such poor quality that it could not possibly have been produced in Japan. These assertions only served to reinforce Japanese feelings of superiority towards their neighbor mainland China.[49] Mutual accusations about the country of contamination were uttered, and public opinion polls revealed a substantial downturn in affinity towards each other. The crisis also led to Nissin Food Products withdrawing from a planned merger with the Chinese unit of Japan Tobacco Inc. Japanese officials blamed China for the poisoned foods; their Chinese counterparts did the same to Japan. The rumor even spread that the dumplings could have been deliberately poisoned precisely in order to create friction between both countries.[50] Wei Chuanzhong (魏传忠), deputy minister of the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) in China, reportedly told a Japanese fact-finding mission in China: "A small group who do not wish development of Sino-Japanese friendship may have taken extreme measures".[51] The fact that such suspicions immediately dominated the discourse is indicative of a very strong pre-existing mutual distrust.

In July 2008, Chinese consumer complaints also arose about the same food products. The Japanese government was informed, but respected the Chinese demand for non-disclosure in light of the ongoing investigations into the matter, which led to domestic accusations of inaction. The Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) lambasted the then Fukuda administration (LDP) for its weakness towards China and for putting China's request above Japanese citizens' concerns about food safety.[52] In August 2008, the Chinese government finally disclosed that the dumplings had likely been contaminated in China. Only in 2010 was a Chinese employee at the Tianyang Food factory, where the tainted dumplings had been produced, arrested for poisoning the *gyōza* that had sickened a dozen people. Lu Yueting, (呂月庭) a temporary worker at the factory, disgruntled about the unfair working conditions and the fact that his wife was not given a bonus when she took maternity leave, allegedly injected the *gyōza* with a pesticide at the end of 2007.[53]

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[49] 'Tainted Dumplings from China Upset Relations with Japan. The Incident Triggers Food-safety Alarm Among Japanese Consumers', *U.S. News*, March 20, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/03/20/tainted-dumplings-from-china-upset-relations-with-japan (accessed 6.06.2013).

[50] 'Poisoned Dumplings Incident Reveals…'. 'Japan Tobacco and Nissin Food Drop Plan to Merge Frozen Food Businesses', *New York Times*, June 2, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/06/business/worldbusiness/06iht-food.2.9792147.html (accessed 6.06.2013).

[51] 'Activists May Have Poisoned Chinese Dumplings: Media', *Reuters*, February 6, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/06/us-japan-china-food-idUST20827420080206 (accessed 6.06.2013).

[52] James J. Przystup, 'Japan–China Relations. The Gyōza Caper: Part II ', *Comparative Connections*, Vol. 10 (3), October 2008, pp. 2–3. (Available at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/0803qjapan_china.pdf, accessed 6.06.2013.)

[53] James J. Przystup, 'Japan–China Relations: Troubled Waters to Calm Seas?', *Comparative Connections*, July 2010, p. 4. Available at http://csis.org/files/publication/1002qjapan_china.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

The incident became a national obsession in Japan, and thousands of Japanese visited doctors and hospitals with supposed symptoms.[54] Restaurants, schools and the Japanese public in general avoided consuming Chinese imported foods. Skylark Co, which owns more than 4000 restaurants in Japan, suspended the use of products processed in China, although none of them came from the Tianyang Food company.[55] Health officials reportedly started touring schools to warn the children that Chinese produce is dangerous and that they should ensure their parents were not buying food from China.[56]

Nakano Kōichi (中野晃一) from Sophia University calls the *gyōza* incident a very symbolic and significant event for the Japanese people, as it showed how 'contaminated' by China Japan has already become. "Japan is heavily reliant on China for food, goods, workforce, and market, but the reliance may turn out to be 'poisonous'", he said.[57]

Reaction from consumers and civil society

During the last 15 years, the number of food safety incidents on a domestic (e.g. Snow Brand Milk Products Co., 2000) as well as on an international level (e.g. the US beef ban over BSE, 2003) in Japan has risen. The higher number of incidents certainly reflects stricter controls of imported foods, so while the actual percentage of 'contaminated' food might not have been increasing, the perception that food imports from China are increasingly 'contaminated' is growing. Japan had a series of scares involving pesticides on Chinese products, starting with contaminated spinach in 2002. Despite the recent series of scandals, a continued increase in Japanese food imports from China was noted. However, we need to place this increased import within the context of the Triple Disaster of March 11 and Japan's consequent problems with food self-sufficiency.[58] Despite the decreasing amount of violations by Chinese importers, China still accounts for the highest number of individual cases, with 34.6% of all violations during FY 2006, and 23.4% of all violations during FY 2010.[59]As for Chinese imported foods, the disturbance to the Japanese national consciousness lies not only in the fact that Chinese national cuisine is entering Japan, but also that imported foodstuffs are increasingly used in the production of Japanese national

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[54] 'Tainted dumplings from China upset relations with Japan. The incident triggers food-safety alarm among Japanese consumers.', *U.S. News*, March 20, 2008, http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2008/03/20/tainted-dumplings-from-china-upset-relations-with-japan (accessed 6.06.2013).

[55] 'Japan, China Head off a Dumpling War', *Time*, February 7, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1710742,00.html#ixzz2W6KNjuUW (accessed 6.06.2013).

[56] 'Gyoza Scare Offers Insight into Japan's Culture of Eating', *Japan Today*, April 13, 2008, http://www.japantoday.com/category/opinions/view/gyoza-scare-offers-insight-into-japans-culture-of-eating (accessed 6.06.2013).

[57] 'Hu's Dumpling Diplomacy', *Policy Innovations*, May 13, 2008, http://www.policy innovations.org/ideas/commentary/data/000054 (accessed 6.06.2013).

[58] JETRO, 'JETRO Survey: Analysis of Japan–China Trade in 2012 and Outlook for 2013', February 19, 2013, http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/news/releases/20130219452-news (accessed 6.06.2013).

[59] Also see footnote 33. MHLW, Department of Food Safety, Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, 'Statistics of Imported Foods Monitoring for FY 2010', p. 3. MHLW, Department of Food Safety, Pharmaceutical and Food Safety Bureau, 'Statistics of Imported Foods Monitoring for FY 2006', http://www.mhlw.go.jp/english/topics/importedfoods/dl/6.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013), p. 3.

cuisine. The share of Chinese (and other countries') foodstuffs leaking through the net of strict Japanese regulations calls the Japanese long-term pride in the construction of a secure food safety control system into question. The failing of Japan's supposedly unbeatable system represents a threat to an identity that relies on the 'purity' of its food, especially when coming from that significant Other, China.

Despite the fact that the recent food scandals have also involved well-established domestic Japanese food companies, and despite many problems with radiation contamination of crops since the March 11 Triple Disaster, Japanese consumers still tend to equate food safety with the consumption of domestic products. "Most Japanese still subscribe to the belief that homegrown food is safe", Nakano Kōichi states, "whereas foreign imports are dubious if not downright dangerous".[60] Food items that come from China are even worse since they are not only suspicious but also indispensable for Japanese food security. According to a World Bank Report of 2004 (before the Triple Disaster of 2011), domestic food is considered safer than imported food, and Chinese imports are believed to be least safe.[61] Moreover, while a focus on adulterated food or on the failing system would have been expected, the discourse on Chinese food-related scandals tends to be very emotional and reflects a strong focus on China as a country.[62]

The food-related incidents and scandals of recent years have badly affected the Japanese consumer's trust in regulatory authorities and food safety. It can be argued that the public's understanding of food scandals and the consequent health risks has been constructed within a specific social and historical context through social interactions. The media has an undeniable role in heightening public anxiety, but Japanese consumption behavior should not be underestimated. As John Clammer states in his sociological study of Japanese consumption, the *buumu* concept is a very important factor in understanding consumer culture in Japan, as consumption activities have a strong group preference. Trends are followed, firstly because practically speaking it is very difficult *not* to follow them; and secondly because following a trend is, as Clammer states, "one of the most powerful mechanisms of social integration, especially in a culture which does not much value those who stand out".[63] One result of the Chinese food scares is a boost to Japanese citizens' movements (国民運動, *kokuminundō*) addressing

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[60] 'Hu's Dumpling Diplomacy', *Policy Innovations*, May 13, 2008.

[61] Jonker, Ito, Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards…*, p. 26. Stephanie Assmann, 'Food Action Nippon and Slow Food Japan: The Role of Two Citizen Movements in the Rediscovery of Local Foodways', in *Globalization, Food and Social Identities in the Asia Pacific Region*, James Farrer (ed.), Tokyo: Sophia University Institute of Comparative Culture, 2010, p. 6. Available at http://icc.fla.sophia.ac.jp/global%20food%20papers/pdf/2_2_ASSMANN.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[62] As comparison we can refer to the 2001 BSE scandal in Japan. At the time, the government reacted by banning American beef imports. Despite the fact that in 2006, when imports resumed again, 80% of the Japanese public was said to still be wary of American beef, the handling of this issue was really focused on the food issue itself. Shortly after the resumption of US beef imports, in December 2007, MAFF launched a campaign advertising Japanese beef, *wagyuu*, for its delicious taste and its guaranteed safety (http://www.maff.go.jp/e/export/wagyu/intro.html, accessed 6.06.2013).

[63] John Clammer, 'Contemporary Urban Japan. A Sociology of Consumption', in Cwiertka, *Modern Japanese Cuisine*, 2006, pp. 165–166.

the country's low self-sufficiency rate and food safety issues, which are always very closely linked to patriotic propaganda and national identity.[64] An example of this development is the above-mentioned Consumers Union of Japan (CUJ, 日本消費者連盟, *Nihon Shōhisha Renmei*, founded in 1969)[65], one of the most prominent Japanese consumer organizations, which promotes a return to 'traditional' Japanese eating habits and the consumption of locally produced goods, in line with a general trend in Japan to return to a perceived idea of a 'pure' past. Many of these citizens' movements suggest a return to Japanese-style basics as the solution to Japan's food-related problems, upholding Japanese culinary traditions and eating domestically produced foods, in order to decrease the dependence on potentially unsafe imports.[66]

Media coverage

In any case, food makes for good copy in Japan, and as such it warrants close media attention. Apart from economic interest, cultural concerns and food-related scandals, food has also been at the center of intense political conflicts since postwar times, from international stand-offs over Japanese agricultural protectionism to the rice demonstrations by starving citizens immediately after the war, from the radiation controversy after the March 11 Triple Disaster to the recent demonstrations against the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Moreover, the Japanese media monitor every scandal with painstaking detail and focus on the wrongdoers, rather than moving on to an analysis of the underlying problems, a failing system, or potential solutions.[67]

As mentioned above, the sensational media coverage of the Tainted *gyōza* incident, even before China had investigated the matter, created a real scare in Japan that spread far beyond frozen dumplings alone. The consumption of frozen food in general, and Chinese imported foodstuffs in particular, dropped.[68] Even though investigations into the *gyōza* incident showed it to be a 'mere' criminal case, rather than a food safety scandal, the media coverage and the impact on the Japanese public was remarkable. At that time, it was not proven that the act was

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[64] Assmann, 'Food Action Nippon and Slow Food Japan…', pp. 4, 10.

[65] Consumers Union of Japan, http://nishoren.net (accessed 6.06.2013).

[66] Maclachlan, 'Global Trends vs. Local Traditions', in *The Ambivalent Consumer,* pp. 250–251.

[67] Jochen Legewie, Junji Nishiata, Andreas Seidler, *Japan's Media: Inside and Outside Powerbrokers*, Tokyo, CNC Japan, March 2010, pp. 12–13. Available at http://www.cnc-communications.com/fileadmin/user_upload/Publications/2010_03_Japans_Media_Booklet_2nd_Ed_JL.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[68] According to the Rules of Origin in Japanese law, products should be labeled 'Produced in China' [中国産・ 中国製, *Chūgokusan, Chūgokusei*] when they are 'wholly obtained or produced goods', processed or prepared in China. Yet the law does not require indicating the country of origin of each of the ingredients.As such, many Chinese imported vegetables are still used in foodstuffs, processed in Japan, without being mentioned on the label. This, and Japan's increased dependency on food imports since the Triple Disaster, could be factors in explaining the contradictory figures of increased imports versus reported consumption decrease of Chinese foodstuffs. Japan Customs, Rules of Origin, http://www.customs.go.jp/english/origin/index.html (accessed 6.06.2013). 'Consumers shun frozen food amid 'gyoza' poisonings', *The Japan Times*, February 5, 2008, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/02/05/national/consumers-shun-frozen-food-amid-gyoza-poisonings/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

not directed against Japanese consumers. The fact that it was a deliberate act by the employee was highly stressed by the media, and a new term arose among the Japanese public as well as in the security field: fear of food terrorism.[69] Particularly within the context of heightened Sino-Japanese frictions concerning the Senkaku Islands around September 2012, concerns have surfaced that the incident with the poisoned *gyōza* will be repeated.

Another example of sensationalized media attention, on an incident not even concerning imported Chinese food but with a very high impact on Japanese national identity discourse, was the Chinese cardboard bun hoax in 2007. Even before the tainted *gyōza* scandal, this incident combined two subjects Japanese media love: food and Chinese scruples. In July 2007, an allegedly undercover Chinese video went viral, as it reported about a street vendor in Dalian (大连) selling pork buns (*baozi* in Chinese, 包子) stuffed with soaked cardboard. The Chinese government soon announced that a journalist looking for a good story staged the video. The report prompted China's health authorities to investigate vendors selling pork buns in Dalian, but none was found to use cardboard. Yet many Japanese and Chinese still believed the story to be real and not staged. The incident seemingly even stirred up the 'traditional' Japanese China hatred (中国嫌悪, *Chūgokuken'o*, or 嫌中, *kenchū*). An article in AERA, a weekly magazine published by the left-liberal *Asahi Shimbun*, entitled 「中国嫌い」の本心　発端は「毒食品」だった (" *Chūgokukirai' no honshin. Hottan ha 'dokushokuhin' datta*" "The true feelings behind 'China-hate'. It started with 'poisoned foods'") clearly linked the outburst of China hatred with the recent food poisoning cases, disregarding the Chinese government's announcement that no cardboard had been found during their investigation.

> Many times before, (China and Japan) have been at each others' throat. They could not rule out feelings of hate. However, only this time disgust, which has been sealed with rationality, is belching out like magma. And the cause for this is poisoned food.[70]

According to this article, the Chinese public's reason for its disbelief is related to a general distrust of the government, whereas the Japanese public's opinion is more related to the suspicion that Chinese people in general cannot be trusted. Polls show that, even though the incident was actually unrelated to anything happening in Japan, consumer behavior was highly influenced, 74% of respondents replying that they had stopped or were now buying less Chinese food than they used to since the cardboard bun incident.[71] Moreover, many renowned Japanese newspapers such as the Japan Times never refuted the Cardboard Bun incident as a staged affair.

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[69] ''Food terrorism' a new concern in China-Japan rift', *Japan Today*, October 8, 2012, http://www.japantoday.com/category/kuchikomi/view/food-terrorism-a-new-concern-in-growing-china-japan-rift (accessed 6.06.2013).

[70] "これまで何度も、いがみ合ってきた。　嫌いという感情が捨てきれなかった。だが、理性で封印してきた嫌悪感が、今回ばかりはマグマのように噴き出している。原因は毒食品だ。[*Kore made nandomo, igamiattekita. Kirai to iukanjougasutekirenakatta. Da ga, risei de fūin shite kitaken'okanga, konkaibakari ha maguma no yōnifukidashiteiru. Gen'in ha dokushokuhin da*] In 'Chūgokukirai' no honshin. Hottan ha 'dokushokhin' datta.' [「中国嫌い」の本心。発端は「毒食品」だった。The true feelings behind 'China-hate'. The origin was 'poisoned foods'], *Asahi Shimbun Weekly AERA*, September 10, 2007, pp. 16–21.

[71] Ibid., p. 17.

The discourse concerning these food scares reminds us of what Ulrich Beck calls 'risk society': our highly educated information society which is increasingly defined in terms of heightened 'risks' and where the individual becomes the primary agent in defining meaning and identity in society.[72] In this case, the choice is left to the individual consumer whether or not to buy Chinese products, but the food choice is constrained by limited or biased information provided by the government, media and industry.[73] Following Alison Leitch, a sociologist working on food and food politics, we can also link real or imagined anxiety over these risks to other widespread fears concerning the rapidity and acceleration of social and economic change.[74]

Bureaucracy and political parties

During and after the poisoned *gyōza* incident, the then Fukuda administration (LDP, 2006–07) worked hard to improve the strained bilateral ties with China after the Koizumi administration (LDP, 2001–2006), but they received severe disapproval for these intentions, from within their own party as well as from the opposition. The resentment towards China, which had until then been somehow more repressed, but had been fueled by years of China-bashing in Japan, anti-Japanese protests in China, and a list of unresolved and controversial issues, was then being exploited by hardliners striving for a tougher policy against China. The *gyōza* scandal dented China's image, and as such had the potential to curb the government's plans to improve bilateral relations. Getting the public to panic would also focus attention on the country's dependence on imported food, particularly from China.[75] Import dependence and low self-sufficiency is the cause of much unease among many Sinophobic politicians in Japan.[76] In general, Japanese negative media coverage on China plays into the hands of rightist or nationalist politicians, or for those aiming at protectionist measures in agricultural policy. Extremists in the government gladly welcome burgeoning anti-Chinese feeling, as it fits with their constructed image of a weak Japan, which these politicians strategically exploit to push for tougher measures against China.[77]

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[72] See Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*, London, Sage, 1986 (1992). Simon Cottle, 'Ulrich Beck, 'Risk Society' and the Media. A Catastrophic View?', *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 5–32.

[73] See Sally Macintyre, Jacquie Reilly, et al., 'Food Choice, Food Scares, and Health: The Role of the Media', in *The Nation's Diet: The Social Science of Food Choice*, Anne Murcott (ed.), London: Addison Wesley Longman, 1998, p. 232.

[74] See Alison Leitch, 'Slow Food and the Politics of Pork Fat: Italian Food and European Identity', p. 384, in *Food and Culture, a Reader*, Carole M. Counihan, Penny Van Esterik (eds.), pp. 381–399.

[75] 'Striving hard for food safety', *Xinhuanet news*, June 3, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/indepth/2010-06/03/c_13330898.htm (accessed 6.06.2013).

[76] This might be one factor in the LDP government's failure to continue essential discussions with China concerning a long-awaited bilateral framework agreement on food safety cooperation. Only at the end of 2009 was a trilateral memorandum on food safety cooperation signed by Japan, Korea and China. Government of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999–2012), 2012, p. 7. Available at http://www.gov.cn/english/official/2012-05/10/content_2133893_7.htm (accessed 6.06.2013).

[77] Linus Hagström, 'China–Japan Tensions over Senkaku Purchase an Orchestrated Affair', *East Asia Forum*, September 17, 2012, http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/09/17/china-japan-tensions-over-senkaku-purchase-an-orchestrated-affair/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

A nation's diet can play a key role in nationalistic sentiments; especially since the 'nation' as an organizational unit has its own interest in what the nation is eating. Many of the above-mentioned problems, such as food-related illnesses or the nation's food self-sufficiency rate, are mentioned in the introduction to the Basic Law on *Shokuiku* ('food education').

> At the same time, living in a fluctuating socio-economic environment, people tend to overlook the importance of *shoku*. Dietary life of the nation is suffering from problems such as unbalanced nutrition, irregular eating habits, an increase in obesity and lifestyle-related diseases, and an obsession with the 'thin-ideal'. New problems are also emerging, such as the issue of food safety and an overdependence on foreign food. Within this deluge of information, people need to learn their own foodways in order to improve their dietary life and to ensure food safety. Furthermore, Japanese foodways are in danger of disappearing. It is the foodways of local varieties, of rich gustation, and of cultural heritage, which have been cultivated on our fertile lands and sea.[78]

The first page of the brochure, written in English, 'What is Shokuiku?', distributed by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF) following the enactment of the Basic Law on Shokuiku, clearly shows the alleged Japanese traditional cuisine of rice, *miso*, fish and vegetable side dishes.[79] The fear of Chinese imported foods has given the Japanese government exactly the impetus needed for their national movement promoting the consumption of locally produced goods and a healthy lifestyle, such as Delicious Nippon or Oishii Japan.[80] Right after the *gyōza* incident, former Foreign Minister Tarō Asō suggested, somewhat jokingly, that the Japanese should thank China, noting that the scare over foreign foodstuffs had added value to local agricultural products.[81] However, Japanese agriculture might be at a crossroads. On the one hand, MAFF has been trying hard to fight against the declining food self-sufficiency rate by promoting the consumption of locally produced goods. On the other hand, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is promoting further trade liberalization.[82]

Recent steps towards strengthened public control have done little to alleviate fears of quality problems with Chinese foodstuffs. Despite measures by the government, such as

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[78] Cited from Kojima Aiko, 'Responsibility or Right to Eat Well?: Food Education (Shokuiku) Campaign in Japan'. *Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs*, Vol. 11, No. 1, 2011, p. 50, http://www.stanford.edu/group/sjeaa/journal111/Japan1.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013). For the original text, see http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/H17/H17HO063.html (accessed 6.06.2013).

[79] MAFF, 'What is 'Shokuiku' (Food Education)?', http://www.maff.go.jp/e/pdf/shokuiku.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[80] For an incomplete list of the current governmental campaigns, see the homepage of MAFF, under 'Japanese Food Promotion', http://www.maff.go.jp/e/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[81] 'Japan, China Head off a Dumpling War', *Time*, February 7, 2008, http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1710742,00.html#ixzz2W6KNjuUW (accessed 6.06.2013).

[82] Jonker, Ito, Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards...*, pp. 7–8. Despite the fact that PM Abe (LDP) added the promotion and structural reform of agriculture in the 'third arrow' of his (widely criticized) economic growth strategy, a possible Japanese participation in the Trans-Pacific Free Trade Partnership might have a devastating effect on rural communities and Japan's agricultural industry.

the establishment of a Food Safety Commission in 2003[83], stricter import restrictions and traceability measures, these steps to strengthen public control have not assuaged the consumer's distrust and pessimism with Chinese foodstuffs. Apart from a comprehensive legal framework, which supposedly guarantees food safety in Japan, the government has also invested in trust, transparency and visibility at the local level. Even at the grassroots level, the government is taking an active role in changing the population's culinary customs, in order to enhance the country's self-sufficiency rate and guarantee food safety and security. Imported foods that had been long regarded as somewhat superior have gradually been losing their appeal, and have given way to pride in domestic produce and local specialties. At the same time, domestically produced foods have become increasingly associated with high quality, safety and perfection of form.

Food Action Nippon (フードアクションニッポン), a state campaign initiated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries of Japan (MAFF), has the objective of developing into a 'citizens' movement' within the Japanese population, encouraging the public to start 'eating local' (豊かな国産物を食べ,…, *yutaka na kokusan mono wotabe,…,* by eating rich local produce,…).[84] This campaign regularly uses associations with national identity, as the simple choice for 'Nippon' instead of 'Nihon' in their name already shows. Another example is a video called 'Ensuring the Future of Food', released by MAFF in 2009, offering a simple solution to Japan's alarmingly low self-sufficiency rate, a wide range of health problems (e.g. overweight), social issues (e.g. an ageing farming population) and the disappearance of Japan's so-called traditional cuisine in daily life: Eat Japanese. This video makes the obvious visual contrast between the portrayal of those people eating meat and oil as being obese and unhealthy, and the image of healthy and slim people eating the Japanese 'traditional' diet of fish, rice and vegetables. Furthermore, Japan's low self-sufficiency rate is directly linked to the change in the Japanese people's diet.[85] It is suggested that obesity and food-related illnesses are un-Japanese, and are even causing damage to the overall social welfare of the nation. By that, one could argue that the consumption of non-domestic foodstuffs is depicted as unpatriotic. The Japanese insistence on and celebration of domestic products is part of the process of redefining the endangered Self-identity, a return to the nostalgic concept of *furusato* (故郷 'native place'), which is reconfirmed by media, advertisement and domestic tourism.[86] This (re)discovery and active promotion of local foods is symptomatic of the search for a national identity in a changing context, faced with a threatening Other.[87]

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[83] Food Safety Commission of Japan, http://www.fsc.go.jp (accessed 6.06.2013).

[84] Food Action Nippon, http://syokuryo.jp/index.html (accessed 6.06.2013). *Nihon no shokuryōjikyūritsumondai'* 日本の食料自給率問題とは, The problem of the Japanese food self--sufficiency rate], http://syokuryo.jp/fan/japanese-problem.html (accessed 6.06.2013).

[85] MAFF, *Ensuring the Future of Food*, 2008, http://www.maff.go.jp/e/grv2422/ (accessed 6.06.2013). It is interesting to note that at 2:11 the Japanese voice reads 「次に、中国なども経済発展…」 [*"Tsugini, Chūgokunadomokeizaihatten…",* Next, the development of (countries) like China…] while the English subtitles do not mention China, but only read 'Next, there is rapid economic growth in developing countries…' without mentioning China.

[86] Cwiertka, *Modern Japanese Cuisine*, pp. 167–168. For *Furusato*, see Marilyn Ivy, *Discourses of the Vanishing. Modernity. Phantasm. Japan*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, pp. 102–104.

[87] Assmann, 'Food Action Nippon and Slow Food Japan', pp. 1, 10.

Industry

The industry has reacted to the so-called 'string of poison food' by diversifying through their adherence to standards, and by adjusting their company and market strategies. The sensitivity of the consumers to food safety has made food-handling companies increasingly keen to achieve food safety. It also offers opportunities to manufacturers, as they try to distinguish their products from their competitors by meeting their own company-specific quality standards or by providing traceability information. Japanese supermarkets, or for example the organic hamburger chain Mos Burger, present placards in their outlet shops which clearly indicate the origin of the vegetables used on a specific day, often accompanied by a picture of the local farmer with his produce. Yet, like any other economic sector, the food industry focuses on profit growth, cost reduction, production efficiency and competitiveness. Despite the fact that Japanese consumers in general spend approximately one-fifth of their total expenditures on food[88] and tend to be willing to pay more for certified quality food, or organic or biological produce, the market system prevails in the end: Japan demands cheap food and China sells it.[89] A survey by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* conducted in April 2008, shortly after the *gyōza* incident, showed that 62.6% of Japanese interviewed would still buy domestic produce if the price increased, and 25% would not change their consumption behavior even if the price increased significantly.[90] In principle, then, Japanese consumers prefer to buy domestically produced foods, but the lower prices of imported food products make them attractive.[91] Hence the JETRO statistics for FY 2010 and FY 2012 (i.e. both before and after the Triple Disaster of March 2011) still reveal a continued increase in imported food from China.[92]

5. Conclusion

In the aftermath of a series of food-related incidents and scandals, the attitude of Japanese consumers, media, government officials and the industry has undergone a significant change in recent years. Japanese governmental agencies had long claimed that the Japanese regulatory system and import measures guaranteed impeccable food safety for the Japanese people. This reputation has now been damaged, and has undermined public trust in the regulatory authorities and the safety of food being sold and consumed in Japan. Food safety as such has become an important issue for the

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[88] US Bureau of Labor Statistics, 'Focus on Prices and Spending. Consumer Expenditure Survey', Vol. 2, Nr. 16, March 2012. Available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/btn/archive/how-do-us-expenditures-compare-with-those-of-other-countries-pdf.pdf (accessed 6.06.2013).

[89] On a positive note, China, as the second supplying country to Japan after the US, also shows great determination to meet the more rigorous Japanese official sanitation and private company standards. As a report by the World Bank in 2004 shows, China was actually enjoying high esteem from Japanese importers for its efforts to tackle the problem of pesticide residues. Also, the *gyōza* incident itself revealed mutual respect: Japan allowed Chinese investigators into the country, and China swiftly investigated the complaints.

[90] *Yomiuri Shimbun* April 2008 opinion poll, available at http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-database/listofpolls/2008-polls/yomiuri-shimbun-april-2008-opinion-polls-08-07/ (accessed 6.06.2013).

[91] Jonker, Ito, Fujishima, *Food Safety and Quality Standards…*, p. 8.

[92] JETRO, 'JETRO Survey: Analysis of Japan–China Trade…'.

public and in media, as well as a decisive factor in governmental policy-making and commercial and industrial strategies.

Although the two examples I have elaborated above are not even real food scandals – one was a criminal act, the other a contested food scandal within China – they are still perceived as food scandals, and hence as a threat to Japanese national identity. The discourse of a 'pure' Japan being 'contaminated' by China is maintained by the regulating bodies, reinforced and encouraged by the media, and used by political extremists and government officials. Within the context of a 'rising' or 'reemerging China', this anxiety over real or imagined food risks among the public can be indicative of other fears of social and economic change.

Food as a flag of national identity – the 'pure' Japanese food versus the 'impure' and 'adulterated' Chinese food – has as such been politicized to revive a sense of Japanese national and cultural consciousness. Food, so inherently connected with Japanese identity, has proved to be a very powerful tool to construct the idea of a 'pure' Japanese 'us' that is placed against a 'contaminated' Chinese 'them'.

MARTA LUTY-MICHALAK

Demographic Ageing in Japan

Abstract

The ageing of the population is one of the most important demographic processes taking place in many countries today. This process is connected with the transition from high to low fertility and mortality. However, the beginning and duration of this process varies in different countries, so the proportion of elderly in the total population varies depending on the country being analyzed. In this article, the author has analyzed the process of demographic ageing in Japan in the period from 1950 to 2100 using the data from the World Population Prospects (the medium variant of fertility).[1]

1. The replacement of the generations

Japan is one of the 'oldest' countries in the world. It is said that the demographic future of Europe has already happened in Japan. It is one of those countries in which the probability of living longer than 80 years of age has doubled in relation to 1950. Mortality among the elderly is constantly falling, but the extension of the duration of life does not mean that it is free from the diseases and disorders which often lead to partial disability.

Nowadays people can live longer than their parents and grandparents. This situation has certain consequences, economic and social as well as physical. There are several causes of demographic ageing, the most important of which include:

1. a decrease in the number of births;
2. a reduction in mortality;
3. the lengthening of human life;
4. migration processes.[2]

The author will focus on the first and third causes, because "low fertility in combination with increasing life expectancy has led to a remarkable decline of the population in most countries. The main problem is that the population is not only declining, but it is also ageing rapidly and, apparently, inevitably".[3]

[1] This is the projection made by the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations.

[2] Marta Luty-Michalak, *Intergenerational Bond and Income Redistribution in Ageing Societies. Sociological Study on Example of Chosen European Union Countries*, PhD dissertation, Warsaw: UKSW, 2012, p. 78.

[3] Charlotte Höhn, 'Aim and Structure of the Dialog Project', *Demographic Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 148, June 2005, p. 10.

The decrease in the birth rate causes ageing of the population at the base of the age pyramid, which means that the participation of the youngest members of the general population is decreasing. Most often, this process is illustrated by the total fertility rate (TFR), or the average number of children that a woman gives birth during her life (between the ages of 15 and 49 years, assuming a certain level of probability of having a baby in the next generations). It is assumed that the value of TFR at a level of 2.1 or higher ensures the simple replacement of the generations.

The first graph shows that the second demographic transition model in Japan has already been established, according to which the fertility has been reduced to a level which means that the generation of children are less numerous than that of their parents. After a radical decrease in the values of this ratio immediately after the Second World War, there was a steady decline over the next few years. A small increase in the value was recorded in the period from 1970 to 1975, and after that its value again began to decrease. From 2005 to 2010 its value has increased, so that in the period from 2095 to 2100 the TFR is projected to reach 1.85.

What could the reasons for such low fertility values be? In the literature we can find the claim that the reduction in TFR to such a low level may be caused by such factors as an increased average age of first marriage and the decrease of their frequency; the frequency

Graph 1. Total fertility rate in Japan in 1950–2100

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*, http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 25.06.2013).

of divorces; the popularity of consensual relationships, and the older age of women at the birth of their first child.[4]

In the early 1970s, the annual number of marriages in Japan exceeded one million, so the marriage rate (per 1000 population) was about 10‰. After this marriage boom the number and rate started declining, so that in 2011 the marriage rate in Japan stood at 5.2‰. At the same time, the mean age of first marriage was rising; in 2011 it was 30.2 for men and 29.0 for women, whereas twenty years earlier the same figures were 2.3 years and 3.0 years lower respectively. The reverse situation has occurred with divorces; since the 1960s the number of divorces has been rising, and in 2002 it was 290 000. However since 2003 the number of divorces and the divorce rate have been declining; in 2011, the number of divorces totaled 236 000, and the divorce rate (per 1000 population) was 1.87.[5]

The average age for first birth is also rising. In 1970 it was 25.6, and in 2011 it stands at 30.1.[6] It should be noted that the average age of women giving birth to children has risen significantly over the past 30 years, which confirms the thesis that women are choosing to postpone their reproductive decisions.

Table 1. Changes in mothers' age at childbirth

Year	Number of babies	Distribution of mothers' age (%)						Mean age bearing first child
		–19	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40 and over	
1970	1.934	1.0	26.5	49.2	18.5	4.2	0.5	25.6
1980	1.577	0.9	18.8	51.4	24.7	3.7	0.5	26.4
1990	1.222	1.4	15.7	45.1	29.1	7.6	1.0	27.0
2000	1.191	1.7	13.6	39.5	33.3	10.6	1.3	28.0
2010	1.071	1.3	10.4	28.6	35.9	20.5	3.3	29.9
2011	1.051	1.3	9.9	28.6	35.9	21.1	3.6	30.1

Source: Statistical Handbook of Japan 2012, Chapter 2, p. 19: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/c02cont.pdf (accessed 25.06.2013).

Postponing the decision to have children has become possible thanks to the use of contraceptives by women; moreover, it is a logical consequence of the increasing popularity of consensual relationships and relationships referred to as LAT (Living Apart Together). The control of fertility is possible because of the modern methods of effective contraception, which mean that the birth of a child is no longer a matter of coincidence, but is the result of the woman's conscious desire. These methods cut the link between sex, procreation and

[4]   Andrzej Ochocki, *The World Population. Duty and Capital*, Warsaw: UKSW, 2010, p. 25.
[5]   *Statistical Handbook of Japan 2012*, Chapter 2, p. 20, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/c02cont.pdf (accessed 25.06.2013).
[6]   Ibid., p. 18, http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/c02cont.pdf (accessed 25.06.2013).

marriage. The greater empowerment of women and the introduction of contraceptives have resulted in changes in the pattern of fertility, the increasing number of illegitimate births and the increasing popularity of consensual relationships.[7]

In conclusion, it should be noted that despite the small changes in the level of the total fertility rate over the period analyzed, its values remain similar, a low level which does not guarantee the replacement of the generations. However, the noticeably slower growth in the value of this ratio may be a factor that slows the ageing process of Japanese society in the future.

2. Life expectancy at birth

In the light of life expectancy tables disaggregated by gender, it is clear that ageing causes an increasing feminization of the population, because due to high male mortality, there are far more women living to old age. Women give birth to more boys than girls, and men generally remain in the majority at younger ages, but in middle age the proportion between the genders becomes even, and in old age women predominate. These features are characteristic of today's ageing population in Japan and throughout the wider world. The average life expectancy for a newborn for both sexes combined was 62.2 years at the beginning of the period analyzed, while for men it was 60.4 and for women 63.9. In the entire period analyzed, the life expectancy at birth should rise to 94.2 years for both sexes combined in 2095–2100 (90.8 years for men and 97.6 years for women).[8] It is clear that the difference in average life expectancy between the sexes will increase.

**Graph 2. Life expectancy at birth in Japan in 1950–2100**

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision,* http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 25.06.2013).

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[7]   Luty-Michalak, *Intergenerational…*, p. 80.

[8]   The average life expectancy in Japan rose sharply after the Second World War, and is today the highest in the world.

The rise in life expectancy does not mean that the elderly enjoy good health. In a situation when the development of medicine does not compensate sufficiently for a decrease in mortality among the oldest part of the population, in a society that is ageing the result of longer life expectancy may be an increase in morbidity and disability among the elderly. The data shown in graphs 3 and 4 suggest that after 1995, we can observe an expansion of morbidity for both men and women. However before 1995 the situation was reversed because of the compression of morbidity.

These trends may be explained in several ways. In 1989, the Japanese government implemented the so-called 'Golden Plan', which introduced or expanded many support

Graph 3. Proportion of life expectancy in various health states for 65- and 85-year old Japanese men, 1986–2004

Source: Vanessa Yong, Yasuhiko Saito, 'Trends in healthy life expectancy in Japan: 1986–2004', *Demographic Research*, Vol. 20, No. 19, April 2009, p. 477.

Graph 4. Proportion of life expectancy in various health states for 65- and 85-year old Japanese women, 1986–2004

Source: Vanessa Yong, Yasuhiko Saito, 'Trends in healthy life expectancy in Japan: 1986–2004', *Demographic Research*, Vol. 20, No. 19, April 2009, p. 479.

services and infrastructure for the elderly. The change in these trends may also be a consequence of the Asian financial crisis in 1997, because it caused changes in stress levels, risk-taking, lifestyle and health behaviors, human capital investments, unemployment levels, relative income, and the relative costs of medical care.[9]

We can explain these changes using the General Theory on Population Ageing. This theory assumes the periodicity of successive steps, which include the expansion of morbidity theory, the theory of dynamic equilibrium and the theory of compression of morbidity. The first researcher, Jean-Marie Robine, asked whether it was possible to create a General Theory of Ageing as an attempt to reconcile and combine the above three theories and which would be a subsequent stages of the epidemiological and demographic transition models. Robine and Jean-Pierre Michel, as authors of the General Theory of Ageing,have hypothesize about the cyclical nature of the above-mentioned steps. This means that at the beginning the sick and disabled people live to old age; then we observe a balance between mortality, morbidity and disability and finally the number of years lived without disability and disease increases. Then there will probably once again be an increase in the number of years lived with disability and illness as a result of lower mortality and increased life duration, which will generate an increasing number of elderly (even reaching 100 years and more). Those people will be characterized by physical and mental weakness in the last period of life.[10]

Taking into account the lengthening of the life expectancy in Japan, we may have to deal with a situation when, in the light of the General Theory on Population Ageing, we will once again witness an expansion of morbidity and disability.

3. The population structure by age

In Japan, there have been significant changes in the population structure by age. The age pyramids are the basic method for presenting such changes; it is a graph drawn on the rectangular coordinate, the X-axis to the right of the zero point is determined by the number of women, and that of men to the left, expressed in absolute figures (often in thousands of persons); or in relative terms, the Y-axis is determined by age (usually five-year age groups).[11]

Gustaw Sundbärg distinguished three types of population structures: progressive, stagnant and regressive. In each of these three types he distinguished a class of children (the population aged 0–14 years), of parents (15–49 years), and a class of grandparents (50 years and above). In each of these three types the class of parents is about 50% of the total population. In the progressive type, the class of children numbers 40%, and the class of grandparents 10% of the total population. In the stagnant type these proportions are 27% and 23%, and in the regressive type 20% and 30%.[12]

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[9]   Vanessa Yong, Yasuhiko Saito, 'Trends in Healthy Life Expectancy in Japan: 1986–2004', *Demographic Research*, Vol. 20, No. 19, April 2009, p. 480.

[10]   Jean-Marie Robine, Jean-Pierre Michel, 'Looking Forward to a General Theory on Population Aging', *The Journals of Gerontology*, Vol. 59A, No. 6, June 2004; Jean-Pierre Michel, Jean-Marie Robine, 'A «New» General Theory on Population Ageing', *The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance*, Vol. 29, No. 4, October 2004.

[11]   Jerzy Zdzisław Holzer, *Demography*, Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 2003, p. 135.

[12]   Edward Rosset, *The Old People. Demographic Study*, Warsaw: Polskie Wydawnictwo Ekonomiczne, 1967, p. 173.

Trying to interpret the data in the age pyramids for Japan, I have noticed that in 1950 the age structure of the population was progressive; the number of children significantly exceeded the number of grandparents. In 2010, we can see a decrease in the birth rate, together with an increase in the life expectancy. The age pyramid has a narrow base, and looks like a spindle. We can see that in this case the ageing of the population takes place

Graph 5. Age pyramid for Japan in 1950

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,* http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 1.04.2013).

Graph 6. Age pyramid for Japan in 2010

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,* http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 1.04.2013).

at the bottom of the age pyramid, which is caused by a decrease in the number of births, as well as at the top of the age pyramid, which is affected by the lengthening life expectancy of the population.

The years 2050 and 2100 shows that the age pyramids will change significantly, and will look more like a bell than a spindle. This means that we will deal with a stagnant structure

Graph 7. Age pyramid for Japan in 2050

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,* http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 1.04.2013).

Graph 8. Age pyramid for Japan in 2100

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2010 Revision,* http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 1.04.2013).

of population, which means that the annual number of births will be similar to the annual number of deaths. Moreover, the annual number of births in each year will be similar. We can also observe lengthening life expectancy, and consequently, we will observe the ageing of the population from the top of the age pyramid.

4. Analysis of the demographic ageing process in Japan using various ratios

We should begin the analysis of the ageing process in Japan by defining what the demographic threshold of old age is. Most researchers maintain that the threshold of old age is retirement age. It seems that today we are witnessing a shift in the top border of old age from 60 to 65 years. The reason for this is a noticeable difference in the length of human life. If we observe the lengthening of the life expectancy at birth, the threshold of old age must be rising. Demographers have also taken into account the fact that old age is not a single period, and that different sub-periods must be distinguished. In the literature we can find a bipartite division of the elderly: the first phase of elderly is 60 to 79 years for women and 65 to 79 years for men; the second phase occurs after crossing the age of 80 for both sexes, which corresponds to the terms used in gerontology of 'the third age' and 'the fourth age'. The World Health Organization (WHO) define the threshold of old age as 65 years or over for both sexes; I have also chosen to define it in this way.

To begin an analysis of the process of ageing in Japan, we must initially consider the changes in the proportion of the population in old age (65 years and older) in the total population. The data presented in Table 2 shows a significant increase in the proportion of people over 65 years of age in the general population over the period analyzed. We should therefore consider the demographic changes leading to the establishment of a new demographic order of population in Japan.

The proportion of the population aged 65 years and more in the general population is expected to rise up to 2050, and in 2075 there will be a slight drop in the old age ratio value. The value of this ratio at the beginning of the period analyzed was only 4.95% in 1950, but in 2100 it will be 35.66%. The largest value will be noted in 2050 (36.55)%.

In the opinion of the United Nations statisticians, if the value of these ratio is less than 4% then the population is considered young. In 1950 in Japan, its value was 4.95%, which means that according to the UN typology Japanese society already belonged to the old societies at the beginning of the period analyzed. The speed at which Japan's population has aged is much faster than in advanced Western European countries.[13] "Although the aged population in Japan accounted for only 7.1 percent of the total population in 1970, 24 years later in 1994, it had almost doubled in scale to 14.1 percent. In other countries with an aged population, it took 61 years in Italy, 85 years in Sweden, and 115 years in France for the percentage of the elderly to increase from 7 percent to 14 percent of the population. These comparisons clearly highlight the rapid progress of demographic aging in Japan".[14]

The old age index shows the relationship between the number of people aged over 65 and the number of people aged between 0 and 14 years, thus showing the effects of the

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[13] In comparison in Germany, which is one of the oldest European countries the value of this ratio will be in 2050 – 32.7%, and in 2100 – 34.2%.

[14] *Statistical Handbook…*, pp. 14–15: http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/c02cont.pdf (accessed June 25.06.2013).

changes in the proportion of the population. The lowest value of this index was also reached in 1950 (13.99%). Since 1975 we can observe a very rapid rise in its value. This situation will las until 2050, when the index will reach 291.74%, and in 2075 and 2100 we will notice a decrease in the value of the index, so that by 2100 it will reach 262.49%.

We should be concerned by such a huge change in the proportion of the population. This index reflects the increase in the population of grandparents and the decrease in the population of grandchildren. In the future this will lead to an excessive burden on the Japanese budget.

The old-age dependency ratio[15] illustrates the burden placed on the working population (15–64 years) by the population at retirement age (65 years or more). In the period analyzed there was a significant rise in its value. In 1950, it was 8.29%, and will reach the highest value in 2050 (71.78%), and after that its value will fall, until it reaches 70.25% in 2100. The reduction of the old-age dependency ratio has important implications for social security schemes, especially for the pension system.

We should also look at the changes that will happen in the structure of the sub-population of the elderly. We can use the very old age ratio, which is used to count how many people aged 80 years or over there are per 100 persons aged over 65 years. In 1950 this indicator reached the value of 8.92%, thereafter its value began to rise very quickly. The same situation will arise in the future, when in 2100 its value reaches 53.61%. In this case there will be no decrease in its value in 2075, as we can observe with other ratios. This means that despite the projected slowdown in Japan's ageing process after 2075, Japanese society will confront the problem of increasing proportion of people over 80 years.

**Table 2. The value of selected population ratios in Japan in 1950–2100 (in %)**

Ratio	Year						
	1950	**1975**	**2000**	**2025**	**2050**	**2075**	**2100**
Old age ratio	4.95	7.88	17.18	29.63	36.55	35.81	35.66
Old age index	13.99	32.39	117.49	238.38	291.74	270.08	262.49
Old age dependency ratio	8.29	11.63	25.19	51.15	71.78	70.29	70.25
Very old age ratio	8.92	13.46	21.61	36.67	40.96	51.99	53.61

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*, http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 25.06.2013).

According to the latest United Nations forecast, by 2045 the median age[16] in Japan will be 53.4 years, and from the year 2060 it will also slowly decrease to 51.8 in 2100.

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[15] The old-age dependency ratio is also known as the old-age support ratio.

[16] This is the age that divides the population into two equal parts, where there are as many persons with ages above the median as there are with ages below the median. http://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Documentation/glossary.htm (accessed 25.06.2013).

Graph 9. Median age in Japan in 1950–2100

Source: United Nations, *World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision*, http://esa.uan.org/unpp (accessed 25.06.2013).

Taking all the information into account, it is clear that in the year 2100 there will be a significant increase in the share of people over 65 years in the general population in Japan in comparison to 1950, but after 2050 we will see a gradual decrease in the value of the old-age ratio. The same will happen with the old age index. We should worry about such a significant increase in the old-age dependency ratio, which illustrates the burden being placed on the population of working age by the population of retirement age. Moreover, increases in the very old-age ratio and the median age of the population will be recorded.

Such changes in population structure in Japan are very disturbing. "Population ageing is profound, having major consequences and implications for all facets of human life. In the economic area, population ageing will have an impact on economic growth, savings, investment, consumption, labor markets, pensions, taxation and intergenerational transfers. In the social sphere, population ageing influences family composition and living arrangements, housing demand, migration trends, epidemiology and the need for healthcare services. In the political arena, population ageing may shape voting patterns and political representation".[17]

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[17] *World Population Ageing 2009*, New York: United Nations, 2010, ST/ESA/SER.A/295, p. XXV.

FRAUKE KEMPKA

'Sorry, we're homogeneous.' The Baffling Appeal of Homogeneity Concepts among Supporters of Immigrants Examples from Japan and Germany

Abstract

When an interviewee proclaims that she/he supports cultural and ethnic plurality, but then proceeds to argue that immigrants do not really fit into her/his homogeneous society, the effect is baffling. This article analyses these apparently paradoxical accounts in order to explore how and why concepts of homogeneity were being referred to. To this end, case studies of individuals engaged in civil society immigrant-support organizations are presented, based on problem-centred interviews conducted in Beppu (Japan) and Halle/Saale (Germany). By employing methods of qualitative data content analysis, this article argues that concepts of homogeneity may appeal to plurality-supporters in order to protect their ambitious self-images.

Introduction

While exploring the ways in which human societies cope with and appreciate ethnic and cultural pluralism, Michael Walzer observed that "there will always be people, in any democratic society and however well-entrenched the commitment to pluralism is, for whom some particular difference – this or that form of worship, family arrangement or dietary rule – is very hard to tolerate".[1] Walzer's statement illustrates that a commitment to plurality may sadly not suffice to ensure an individual's toleration of other individuals that she/he perceives as 'others'. Instead a problem appears. It is the apparent paradox[2] of an individual professing to be committed to a culturally plural and inclusive society, while she/he nevertheless relates affirmatively to concepts of homogeneity that stipulate and legitimize the exclusion of persons marked as ethnic and/or cultural 'others'.

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[1]   Michael Walzer, 'The Politics of Difference: «Statehood and Toleration in a Multicultural World»', *Ratio Juris*, Vol. 10, No. 2, March 1997, p. 167.

[2]   The phrasing 'apparent paradox' refers to King's argument that the paradox of an individual acting in a tolerant way towards one particular social group/practice/situation, while being intolerant of others, was not in fact a paradox. Instead Preston presented it as a problem of setting priorities for one issue that one objected less (and thus exercised toleration) over another issue to which one objected more (and thus refused toleration). Preston King, *Toleration*, London: George Allen & Unwin Limited, 1976, pp. 27–29.

One brief example might illustrate the problem: One of our interviewees, Mami Goto[3], was a vivacious, enthusiastic woman in her early 40s who lived in the southern Japanese city of Beppu. She worked as a public administration employee, and had studied and worked in New York for several years. After returning to Beppu from the U.S. in the late 1990s, Goto set up a support group for immigrants[4], particularly foreign university students and their families. She organized or supported leisure activities, and helped out when the students or their spouses were in need of a job or a new apartment. Moreover, she had run anti-discrimination panel discussions in the past to counter xenophobic fears among the older population. One might assume that Goto was supportive of an understanding of Japanese society as ethnically and culturally plural. However, minutes later she made the following statement:

> "How can Japan be not a homogeneous nation?! (…) Basically «the homogeneity stems» from our «Japanese» understanding of values. That means, we all know which is what and what is common knowledge. In Japan this common knowledge vouches for more than the public law. (…) That's why, (…) to admit something from outside, (…) something that's different, that's really tough, right?"

From Goto's point of view, more immigrants would disturb the unspoken understanding of norms and values that was apparently inbred in all Japanese. Despite supporting the non-Japanese living in Beppu, the interviewee's image of Japanese society therefore effectively excluded the participation of non-Japanese. Hence the interviewee supported ethnic and cultural plurality through her activities, and yet embraced and reiterated concepts of a homogeneous Japanese society that seemed to contradict her earlier pluralist commitments. In order to explore this problem, this article addresses the following two questions: How are exclusive national concepts being reiterated by individuals who otherwise seem supportive of multi-ethnic coexistence, and why does this happen?

Comparing individual case studies sampled in Japan and Germany offers us the opportunity to analyze the impact of different concepts of national homogeneity and different environmental frames for immigrant-support engagement. Thus the comparison may allow for explorations of the question of how commitments to plurality and concepts of homogeneity get along in different societies.

Methodology and data sampling

Since the research on which this article is based focusses on the individual level, the core data used here was sampled through problem-centered interviews.[5] This individual-related

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[3]   All names of interviewees are pseudonyms.

[4]   In this article an immigrant is defined as an individual 'who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least a year (12 months), so that the country of destination effectively becomes his or her new country of usual residence. From the perspective of the country of departure the person will be a long-term emigrant, and from that of the country of arrival the person will be a long-term immigrant.' UNStats, 'Recommendations on Statistics of International Migration', *Statistical Papers Series M*, No. 58, Rev. 1, p. 18, http://unstats.un.org/unsd/publication/SeriesM/SeriesM_58rev1E.pdf (accessed 23.05.2013).

[5]   Andreas Witzel, *Verfahren der qualitativen Sozialforschung: Überblick und Alternativen* [Methods of qualitative social research: overview and alternatives], Frankfurt/ Main: Campus-Verlag, 1982.

data was supplemented by data which referred to the national or municipal environment that the interviewees lived in. It was collected from legislative texts, policy statements, demographic statistics, grey literature and selected media coverage that featured public debates on immigrant integration in Japan and Germany. Data analysis followed the suggestions made by Corbin and Strauss on qualitative content analysis.[6]

The interviews were conducted between 2008 and 2009, in the southern Japanese city of Beppu and the city of Halle (Saale) in eastern Germany, through face-to-face qualitative interviews with ten individuals. The bi-national, bi-municipal frame was chosen in order to explore individual narrations in different organizational and structural social environments. The ten interviewees were selected for their activities in civil society organizations engaging in immigrant (self-) support. Within their organizations they conducted or assisted in such activities as language classes, anti-racism campaigns, conflict-mediation and counseling. The interviewees' ages ranged from the mid-twenties to the early seventies. Their occupational status was also diverse, as the interviewees referred to themselves as housewives, administration employees or executives, social workers, university students or pensioners. Whilst three of them defined themselves as immigrants, four other individuals, despite perceiving themselves as autochthonous Japanese or Germans, stressed their possessing personal experience studying or working for several years outside Japan or Germany. The remaining three interviewees mentioned none of these situations. Religious affiliations to Islam and Buddhism were pronounced. All ten interviewees had either attained or entered tertiary education.

The interviews focused on the problems of perceiving and dealing with plurality and related conflicts. Their activities and the problems they encountered were therefore explored, as well as their strategies, motivations and ambitions in dealing with them. The interviewees' definitions of their own social status and groups they identified with, as well as of other social groups and their perception of prevalent distribution of rights and resources, were further subjects of interest. The interviews were then transcribed and analyzed for content.[7]

Beppu and Halle (Saale)

The data was sampled in Beppu and Halle (Saale), two mid-sized cities situated in peripheral regions of Japan and Germany. Beppu and Halle have both witnessed sudden, recent and regionally significant influxes of foreign residents. Halle, which prior to German unification in 1990 was part of the German Democratic Republic (GDR), had only 1.4 per cent of non-German residents in 1991.[8] However, over the last 20 years the number of non-German nationals almost tripled, to 4 per cent of the city's population in 2010. Meanwhile non-German nationals comprised only 1.9 per cent of the population in the surrounding

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[6]   Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research. Techniques and Procedures for Developing Grounded Theory*, 3rd edition, London: Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 2008.

[7]   Corbin and Strauss, *Basics of Qualitative Research…*, pp. 195–228; David Silverman, *Interpreting Qualitative Data*, London, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications, 1993, pp. 398–399.

[8]   Matthias Henze, *Soziologische Erklärungsansätze zur Ausländerfeindlichkeit am Beispiel einer empirischen Studie in Halle-Neustadt* [Sociological approaches to xenophobia: the case of Halle-Neustadt], 2000, http://www.soziologie.uni-halle.de/archiv/diplom/2000-henze-auslaenderfeindlichkeit.pdf (accessed 17.04.2013), p. 39.

state of Saxony-Anhalt.[9] In Beppu the trend is even stronger: whilst the percentage of non-Japanese nationals accounted for only 1.1 per cent of the city's population in 2000, their numbers more than tripled in the following 10 years to 3.6 per cent in 2010.[10] They thus surmount sevenfold the average percentage of 0.5 of non-Japanese nationals in the surrounding Oita prefecture. Beppu and Halle therefore appear to have rather recently turned into plural islands in largely mono-ethnic and mono-cultural seas. They thus offered very interesting settings for studying individual reactions towards immigration-related plurality.

However, commitment to pluralism in the two cities appeared to take place in decidedly different discursive surroundings. Komai Hiroshi mentioned Beppu in his works elaborating his vision of a "Japanese-styled society of multicultural coexistence" (*nihongata tabunka kyōsei shakai*) as an internationalized environment advancing towards a "society of multicultural coexistence".[11] Thus it can be assumed that Beppu offered an environment where individual commitments to pluralism might be supported by the public mainstream without strong opposition from rivaling discourses. Meanwhile Halle, as an eastern German city, has notoriously been associated with right-wing extremism and violence against immigrants.[12] The Halle-based politician and immigrant-support activist Karamba Diaby explained that the situation had recently improved, but attributed "racist attacks [that] happen in our city from time to time" to right-wing agitators creating a xenophobic atmosphere in Sachsen-Anhalt.[13] Unlike in Beppu, public discourses advocating commitments to pluralism in Halle could be assumed to be rivaled by opposing xenophobic sentiments. The frameworks were therefore expected to allow insights into how different public discourses on pluralism and homogeneity reflected on individual perceptions, and how these reflections shaped the individuals' commitment to plurality.

Concepts of homogeneity in Japan and Germany: *tan'itsu minzoku kokka* and *deutsche Leitkultur*

Mami Goto's account of Japan as an "ethnically homogeneous nation", which derived from a common understanding on norms and values that was shared by all Japanese but by nobody else, can be traced to the popular understanding of Japan as *tan'itsu minzoku*

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[9]   *17. Statistisches Jahrbuch der Stadt Halle (Saale)* [17th Statistical Yearbook of Halle (Saale) City], Halle: Amt für Bürgerservice, pp. 36–47.

[10]   Beppu Shiyakusho, *Heisei 24 nen Beppu-shi gaiyō* [Outline of Beppu-city in the year Heisei 24 (2012)], http://www.city.beppu.oita.jp/03gyosei/general/gaiyou/gaiyou.pdf (accessed 15.04.2013), pp. 17–18.

[11]   Komai Hiroshi, *Gurōbaruka jidai no Nihongata tabunka kyōsei shakai* [Japanese-styled society of multicultural coexistence in times of globalization], Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2006, p. 137. See also Imamura, Shohei and Ōshima, H., 'Tabunka kankyō no daigaku' [A university with a multicultural environment], in *Tabunka shakai he no michi. Kōza gurōbaruka suru Nihon to iminmondai, dai ni ban* [Paths to a multicultural society. Globalizing Japan and the Question of Immigration lectures, part 2], Tokyo: Akashi Shoten, 2003, pp. 77–98.

[12]   Wolfgang Dick, 'Rechtsradikale Gewalt in Ost und West' [Right-wing radical violence in East and West «Germany»], *Deutsche Welle online*, April 23, 2012, http://www.dw.de/rechtsradikale-gewalt-in-ost-und-west/a-15903160 (accessed 19.04.2013).

[13]   Jürgen Grosche, 'Integration in Halle. Verwaltung sollte Vorbild sein. Interview mit Karamba Diaby' [Immigrant integration in Halle. Public admin should act as role model. Interview with Karamba Diaby], *Clavis*, February 2012, p. 11.

kokka (an ethnically homogeneous nation). According to Kosaku Yoshino, the concept implies a "notion of racially exclusive possession of particular cultural characteristics".[14] Yoshino argued that Japanese who adhered to this notion typically linked specific 'Japanese' cultural characteristics, such as codes of conduct, moral values or consumer preferences with their association with the Japanese as a racial group defined as birth of Japanese parents. Accordingly the concept of *tan'itsu minzoku kokka* denied the possibility that individuals who were born from non-Japanese parents could ever acquire these cultural characteristics, and therefore could never become fully accepted members of Japanese society.[15] Images of the Japanese possessing racially determined unique cultural characteristics can be found in bestsellers, popular magazine articles and public speeches by government officials. It can therefore be defined as an exclusive, national concept that does not only appeal to individuals politically affiliated with the far right, but one which is shared by mainstream society. To give one example, the author of one popular bestseller pointed out: "How was this small archipelago, so poor in natural resources, able to be so eminently successful? (…) In short, it is because the national traits which the Japanese possess are so magnificent".[16] Hence Fujiwara claimed that the Japanese people possess certain unique and ethnically inherited traits that constituted the nation's greatness. The concept of the ethnically homogeneous Japanese nation therefore typically links Japan's economic success to Japanese ethnicity.[17] According to this argument, anything that compromised this ethnic homogeneity, such as immigration and the permanent settlement of immigrants in Japan, therefore also endangered the nation's success and well-being.

Compared with the interviews in Beppu, the accounts of activists in Halle predominantly stressed the need for cultural assimilation for immigrants in Germany. To give one example, Francis Olea, a university student who explained to have immigrated to Germany himself, argued as follows:

> "I believe one problem here in Germany is that (…) the largest part of immigrants belongs to the Turkish population. And they've got…, let's say, a completely different culture, there's a lot of talking that they themselves don't want «social participation». And they're really closing themselves off, because of their cultural, religious and other backgrounds (…). And I believe, if they don't open up, then it's gonna be difficult."

References like Olea's may be related to the concept of *deutsche Leitkultur*, which will here be translated as "the prevailing German culture".[18] Over the past years, the concept

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[14] Yoshino Kosaku, *Cultural Nationalism in Contemporary Japan. A Sociological Enquiry*, London: Routledge, 1992, p. 116.

[15] Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism…*, pp. 115–121.

[16] Fujiwara Masahiko, *Kokka no hinkaku* [The Dignity of the Nation], Tokyo: Shinchō Shinsho, 2005, p. 181.

[17] See also Yoshino, *Cultural Nationalism* …, pp. 86 and 182–184.

[18] The German verb *leiten* means to lead or to prevail. Stein pointed out that the term *deutsche Leitkultur* therefore implies notions of a German culture dominating others or of disqualifying individuals associated with non-German cultures as being relegated to a lower social rank. Tine Stein, 'Gibt es eine multikulturelle Leitkultur als Verfassungspatriotismus? Zur Integrationsdebatte in Deutschland' [Is there a multicultural *Leitkultur* as constitutional patriotism? On the debate on immigrant-integration in Germany], *Leviathan*, Vol. 36, No. 1, March 2008, p. 41.

has enjoyed some popularity among mainstream politicians such as Chancellor Angela Merkel and Interior Minister Hans-Peter Friedrich. Tine Stein pointed out that proponents of the concept typically used it in public debates on immigration and immigrant integration in Germany to distance themselves from concepts of multiculturalism that they dismiss as relativist ambiguity. Instead they advocated granting political rights to immigrants only on condition that they first adopt a set of "common values and common cultural practices".[19] Stein argued that the concept of *deutsche Leitkultur* did not necessarily demand cultural assimilation, but warned: "When German or likewise European prevailing culture is portrayed as a «historically» grown cultural pattern, (…) then there is a great danger that this is understood as the illegitimate application of pressure to enforce spiritual assimilation".[20] The concept of *deutsche Leitkultur* can therefore be described as a mainstream concept that refers to an image of a culturally homogeneous German nation, and postulates cultural assimilation from immigrants in order for them to be granted acceptance in German society. Because assimilation is thus considered a precondition for social inclusion, exclusion can easily be explained as a problem caused by the inability or the unwillingness of immigrants to assimilate. Furthermore, Bauman argues that postulations of assimilation can always be considered to carry the intrinsic stigma of inequality to be applied by those dominant individuals in a society who demand assimilation from those they are determined to dominate.[21] The concept of a prevailing German culture will thus here be considered as an exclusive concept of a culturally homogeneous German society.

Two case-studies from Japan and Germany

References to concepts of homogeneity such as those quoted from the interviews with Goto and Olea were not uncommon both among interviewees in Beppu and in Halle. This was surprising since all of them were selected for their activism in civil-society immigrant support organizations. Still, concepts of homogeneity obviously appealed to them, even if they appeared to contradict their self-portrayals as individuals who were positive about ethnic and cultural plurality in their social environments. In order to take a closer look at the forms and contexts in which references to concepts of *tan'itsu minzoku kokka* or *deutsche Leitkultur* were made, two more detailed individual case-studies will be reconstructed and presented.

1. Gogun Taeko (Beppu)

Gogun Taeko referred to herself as an autochthonous Asian housewife. Before marrying into a family in Beppu that she described as very well-known and influential, Gogun had lived abroad for two years to study foreign languages. She organized Japanese cooking and conversation classes, which focused specifically on the needs of the spouses of foreign university students and employees. Throughout the interview, Gogun expressed compassion and sympathy for the needs of her participants, claiming that she had formed many friendships along the way. However, in the course of the interview, it turned out that she loved non-Japanese coming and going, but not staying:

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[19] Stein, 'Gibt es eine multikulturelle…', p. 35.
[20] Stein, 'Gibt es eine multikulturelle…', p. 42.
[21] Zygmunt Bauman, *Modernity and Ambivalence*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993, pp. 72–73.

> "And then, when they all go back (to their home-countries), then they cry and say: 'I had so much fun!' or 'We're one family!' or 'We're friends!' or so. Well, when it comes to that point, the human heart overcomes all possible differences."

Gogun's ideal of a non-Japanese person in Beppu was therefore someone who stayed for a while, had a good time and then returned to their home country full of good memories and who would perhaps come back as a tourist one day. She explicitly did not welcome non-Japanese people settling down permanently in Beppu, explaining that they simply would not fit into her concept of Japanese society:

> "This is Japan, so (…) this is not a multiethnic country."

Consequently, non-Japanese were inevitably forced to live a life in isolation:

> "If you're living in Japan (as a foreigner) for a long time, and you want to get closer and closer to the Japanese, and then there's this irremovable wall between them and yourself, you're bound to be lonely."

Hence according to Gogun there was always a barrier between Japanese and non-Japanese that was impossible to overcome. As the barrier that isolated them was from her point of view irremovable, non-Japanese were necessarily and inevitably isolated from sustainable social participation. Table 1 illustrates the stark difference in personal well-being that Gogun attributes to the length of the immigrants' period of stay in Japan.

Table 1. Potentials of personal well-being for immigrants according to their length of stay, as attributed by Gogun

Short-term immigrants	Long-term immigrants
"When they all go back **(…).**"	"If you're living in Japan for a long time (…)."
"I had so much fun!"	"you want to get closer and closer to the Japanese." "there's this irremovable wall (…)."
"the human heart overcomes all possible differences."	"you're bound to be lonely."

The two interview-statements compared in the table appear as positive and negative counterparts. According to Gogun, short-term immigrants generally saw their needs fulfilled: "I *had* so much fun!" In contrast, long-term immigrants found themselves struggling for social inclusion: "You *want* to get closer and closer (…)." However, in the interviewee's account, their struggle was futile, as their need for inclusion would unavoidably come up against "this *irremovable* wall." The outcome therefore was therefore equally polarized: While the short-term immigrants' departure caused "the human heart" to act as the great emotional leveler to overcome cultural and personal differences, long-term immigrants were "*bound*" to stay put in their self-inflicted loneliness. The crucial point for Gogun was clearly the length of their period of stay. Thus short-term immigrants (and tourists) were the only non-Japanese who could be happy in Japan. According to Gogun, therefore, leaving Beppu for their countries of departure was the only way for non-Japanese to avoid social isolation and loneliness.

Another rather peculiar feature of the above-described passage is the switch of addressees. Whereas Gogun spoke of short-term immigrants referring to the participants of her cooking-classes, talking of long-term immigrants to Japan she switch to directly addressing her interviewer, who is writing these lines: "*You*'re bound to be lonely." Let us picture the interview situation. From presenting herself as a compassionate adviser to participants of her cooking circle, we can assume that Gogun was comfortable in her self-cast role of a cultural guide in things Japanese, but probably not in being interviewed. Her interviewer was a younger, Caucasian woman from Europe, who had previously lived in Oita-prefecture for various years. Although no indication of possible wishes of the interviewer to settle down in Japan was given, Gogun obviously interpreted the questions on long-term immigration as her seeking advice on staying in the country. As the interview intensified Gogun thus referred to her accustomed role as a cultural adviser more and more vigorously up to the point when she literally warned the interviewer not to settle down in Japan. To stress her point of view she cited the notion of ethnic homogeneity, from which the interviewee would always stick out. Referring to the concept of Japan as an ethnically homogeneous nation thus here served the purpose of scaring outsiders off their possible intentions of becoming more than a short-term guest in Japanese society.

Explaining that Japan was "not a multi-ethnic country," the reason for the inevitable isolation of non-Japanese was to Gogun in-bred in the national character. The concept of ethnic homogeneity that she attributed to Japanese society was therefore described as both a powerful tool that kept non-Japanese away and preserved the national character. On the other hand, Gogun portrayed it as a subtle, inalienable principle that ruled the lives of everybody living in Japan and left the individual powerless to alter the principle's effects. Social exclusion for ethnic others was therefore accounted for as an irrevocable trait of Japan's national character.

2. Jürgen Demming (Halle)

Jürgen Demming presented himself as an autochthonous, Caucasian man in his end-fifties, who held a prestigious executive position in Halle. Originally from western Germany, he had spent several years of his career living and working outside of Germany, and referred to himself proudly as an open-minded and cosmopolitan person:

> "I believe I have cast off or sufficiently compartmentalized many of these (…) unnecessary (…) cultural anxieties that impediment the «East-German» people over here when they're dealing with other cultures."

Demming volunteered as a conflict-mediator in situations which he described as "conflicts with foreigner-relations". He described himself as a powerful, unbiased trouble-shooter:

> "If there are any social wrongs, then everybody who has dealt with me will see that in such a case (…) I'm someone who doesn't have to fear anything when dealing with public administration authorities."

The interviewee therefore presents himself as a fearless protector of harassed or exploited immigrants in Halle. He refers to the city's notorious reputation for xenophobic violence, and points out that he will not be intimidated by anyone. However, the reality of his activities as a voluntary conflict-mediator appeared to cast him in a different role. Demming

went on to point out that he did not view most of the issues that were brought forward to him by non-Germans as acts of discrimination:

> "About 30% of the cases are real problems, the rest are unfounded accusations. (…) «They make these accusations» in order to cover up their own failure, what else?"

Hence the interviewee described the majority of non-Germans who sought his advice in conflict situations as individuals who had personally failed in something, and now attempted to make up for it by illegitimately putting the blame on autochthonous Germans. This is an extremely harsh accusation, especially for someone who claimed to be a fearless and unbiased trouble-shooter. In order to substantiate his allegations, Demming pointed out:

> "You've got to realize that there are many people from systems where the personal power or the personal influence of a person of official standing is many, many times bigger. And where there is this expectation that all you need to do is going to an important person, and he will write a magical letter and the problem is solved. (…) The understanding of democratic, transparent structures often is (…) not very well developed."

Demming therefore related the deceptive behavior that he blamed on his non-German clientele with systemic differences between Germany and the countries where they had lived before immigrating. According to the interviewee they were personally incapable of dealing responsibly with set-backs, because political or cultural systems in their countries of departure left them ill-equipped for living in a democratic society. When asked, how these problems could be tackled, he explained:

> "You can simply try to convey and point out that (…) they cannot simply stick to the codes of behavior in their own countries of origin."

Apart from acts of severe discrimination or exploitation, Demming explained that he perceived most conflicts between immigrants and autochthonous Germans as problems caused by personal failures on behalf of the immigrants who appealed to him. In this interview, there was thus a gap between the interviewee's expectations towards his role as a conflict-mediator and the reality that he found himself in, as illustrated in table 2.

Table 2: Expectations and actual challenges as a conflict-mediator recounted by Demming

Demming's expectations	Actual challenges perceived by Demming
"social wrongs" "real problems"	personal "failure" "unfounded accusations"
"I'm someone who doesn't have to fear anything."	"You can simply try to convey (…) that they cannot stick to «their» codes of behavior (…)."

As the above-quoted passages might illuminate, the interview situation at times verged on the bizarre, when Demming on the one hand cast himself as champion of exploited immigrants and at the same time claimed they were not exploited at all, but used him cover up their own shortcomings. Again it might be helpful to reconstruct the interview situation.

Demming presented himself as a powerful, valiant and established figure, whose social status supplied him with an unassailability that he thought he deserved: "I'm someone, who doesn't have to fear anything." Moreover Demming was obviously being used to answering questions about himself and his activities as several interviews by him were found in the local media. Sitting in his office with a younger, female interviewer, also autochthonous German of the same Caucasian ethnic group might have egged him on to present himself as even more proactive and tough. The interview-situation thus can be considered a setting which Demming was accustomed to and felt no restraint from using tough, provocative and authoritative words. We can assume that he resorted to his blunt language to present himself in what he thought of as a favorable light, dominate the situation and ward off possible criticism.

Acting as a mediator in conflicts between non-Germans and Germans did not prove as courageous and challenging as Demming expected it to be. There seemed to be little demand for his fearlessness, while he apparently often felt compelled to make simple attempts at conveying the basics of what he viewed as German culture. Instead of tackling "real problems", he perceived himself being demanded to arbitrate the "unfounded accusations" of immigrants towards autochthonous Germans. Whereas he had expected himself to be alleviating the effects of "social wrongs," Demming felt he was consulted to cover up personal "failure." His perceptions cast an extremely negative light on the non-Germans who sought his advice. Demming suspected they were deceptive individuals wielding accusations of discriminations in order to make up for their personal shortcomings, and sought to substantiate this allegation by referring to the undemocratic systems in their countries of departure, which he claims left them ill-equipped to deal with structures of social mediation and decision-making in Germany. Thus Demming refers the problem to the lack of cultural assimilation on behalf of the non-Germans. In this he echoed concepts of a prevailing German culture that non-Germans were supposed to assimilate to or be excluded from.

Discussion

This article started from the observation that individuals professing to be positive about ethnic and cultural plurality at the same time affirmatively reiterated concepts of homogeneity. This raised the question of how and why these concepts were being related to. In paragraph 4, two concepts of homogeneity, *tan'itsu minzoku kokka* (ethnically homogeneous nation) and *deutsche Leitkultur* (prevailing German culture) were presented as concepts popular in public mainstream debates on immigration in Japan and Germany. It was further argued that while the concept of ethnical homogeneity in Japan stressed the uniqueness of Japanese ethnicity and implied the exclusion of ethnic others, the concept of a prevailing German culture demanded that immigrants assimilate culturally or be socially excluded. The previous paragraph presented two case studies in which these two different concepts could be traced. This paragraph focusses on the 'why': why did these concepts of homogeneity appeal to Gogun Taeko and Jürgen Demming, two individuals who professed to be committed to ethnic and cultural plurality?

Gogun resorted to homogeneity to explain something that obviously seemed legitimate to her, but was nevertheless contradictory: even though she claimed to be happy that non-Japanese people were coming to live in her hometown Beppu, she did not like them to settle down. This would normally contradict her earlier self-portrayal as an accommodating and compassionate supporter of non-Japanese. It seems noteworthy that the interviewee

draws a very ambitious portrait of herself, as acting as a compassionate cultural mediator, adviser and intercultural guide may be considered a highly demanding challenge.[22] However, Gogun argued that staying in Japan permanently made non-Japanese lonely and unhappy. Seen from her perspective, settling down permanently would endanger their well-being, whereas leaving after a short-term stay would ensure it.

However, this point of view left Gogun with another problem: without the concept of Japan as a homogeneous nation, this perception would portray herself as a person excluding the very people she was claiming to help and paint Japan as a place rife with xenophobia. The Japanese, including herself, would not want ethnic others in their midst, so they isolate them with a wall of social exclusion. However, by presenting Japan as an inherently homogeneous nation, the isolation of long-term migrants was explained to be not xenophobic, but simply unavoidable. According to the concept of homogeneity, the non-Japanese were not isolated because the Japanese did not like immigrants, but because there was no other way for them to behave. From Gogun's point of view, the concept of ethnic homogeneity thus legitimated exclusive behavior.

Similarly, Demming also referred to concepts of a prevailing German culture to explain the contradictions he encountered while volunteering as a conflict mediator. Drawing an ambitious self-image matching Gogun's, he presented himself as an unbiased troubleshooter protecting non-Germans from brutal acts of discrimination. However, in mediating conflicts between immigrants and autochthonous Germans, he found himself feeling that only 30 per cent of the cases brought forward to him were "real problems," whereas he dismissed the remaining 70 per cent as "unfounded accusations." It seems noteworthy that despite referring to himself as an unbiased troubleshooter, reflections on his own, rather privileged status as a middle-aged, Caucasian male in a prestigious professional position were notably absent from his interview-account. Instead Demming referred to his cosmopolitan lifestyle to point out that this prevented him from being biased in any way. He therefore eschewed self-reflections upon the privilege he enjoyed, which would have been essential to moderate social conflicts in a duly sensitive and helpful way.

Arguing that 70 per cent of his non-German clientele were frauds can be assumed to have posed a problem for Demming. Suspecting that the majority of ethnic or cultural 'others' act irresponsibly and deceptively does after all conflict with claiming an unbiased attitude for oneself. However, the interviewee related the individual immigrants' behavior to the 'undemocratic' structures in their countries of departure and their inability to assimilate culturally since arriving in Germany. His particular point of view, which was pointedly devoid of critical self-reflection, was thus legitimated by invoking the concept of a "prevailing German culture," which immigrants were obliged to adapt to or rightfully face social exclusion. Demming therefore reiterated concepts of a prevailing German culture in order to legitimize the exclusion of non-Germans, caused by the limitations of his ability to meet with the challenges of his position as a conflict-mediator.

Conclusion

Gogun and Demming both showed individual limitations to their motivations to act inclusively towards immigrants. Gogun expected non-Japanese to return to their countries

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[22] Bauman, *Modernity* …, pp. 56–61

of origin after a couple of years. Demming refused to assist the majority of immigrants who sought his assistance in conflicts with the autochthonous population, because he suspected their claims were in fact caused by unwillingness or an inability to assimilate. These limitations conflicted with their very ambitious self-images, in which they 'valiantly' or 'compassionately' supported people they considered ethnic others. Therefore their limitations in acting inclusively did not simply curtail their civil society activities, but in fact compromised the very images and expectations that the two interviewees had of themselves. In order to avoid a deconstruction of self-images and a frustration of expectations, they related to concepts of homogeneity. The appeal that concepts like *tan'itsu minzoku kokka* or *deutsche Leitkultur* had for the two interviewees was therefore fuelled by the highly ambitious images they drew of themselves and their inability to reflect critically on these ambitions. We might therefore draw a final conclusion: If an individual's commitment to ethnic and cultural plurality collides with highly ambitious self-images, the individual might end up reiterating concepts of homogeneity just in order to legitimate her/his actions without giving up on personal ambitions. Hence even for individuals professing their support of multi-ethnic coexistence, concepts of exclusive homogeneity can provide apt tools for them to protect their ambitious self-images.

Concepts of homogeneity are powerful symbolic constructions that legitimate in- and exclusion within a society. If individuals active in immigrant-support organizations are reiterating them, this is bound to be particularly problematic. By invoking concepts of homogeneity, they deny immigrants who need help the assistance they are supposed to provide. Individuals who are engaging themselves in civil-society immigrant-support organizations can furthermore be considered role models for the autochthonous population to emulate inclusive behavior towards individuals or groups considered as others.[23] If these 'immigrant supporters' thus affirmatively relate to concepts of homogeneity, they further spread the notion that however hard immigrants tried, their rights to fully participate in the society they live in would always be in doubt or in fact unattainable. They thus fail to be supportive, and instead act as symbolically powerful proponents of social exclusion. The case studies consequently stress the importance for individuals committed to plurality by supporting immigrants to balance their ambition with critical self-reflection.

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[23] Bauman, *Modernity*..., p. 57.

OLGA BARBASIEWICZ

The Impact of Confucianism
on Modern Japanese Women's Life

Abstract

The aim of this article is to consider questions regarding Japanese culture and Confucianism, especially while researching women in Japan. The author will describe the implementation of Confucian values in Japanese society, the Confucian attitude towards the role of women and the situation of Japanese females. The article will examine the question of whether there are similarities between the situations of women in countries which implemented Confucian morals and ethics, and to compare this situations with contemporary Japanese society.

Introduction

Due to economic growth, the modernization of Japanese society which began in 1868, and the influence of American culture since the American occupation, Japan seems to be a very modern state, comparable to the Western nations. Nevertheless Japanese culture and society is still of interest to the Western scholars, because of the sense of its difference. We cannot forget that traditional Japanese culture, philosophy and religion(s) have had a great influence on modern Japanese society. Even if the American occupation had a great impact on the culture, the Japanese people (sometimes unconsciously) continue to base themselves in the norms which their nation developed over centuries.

In a time when gender studies are developing rapidly, the interest in the situation of Japanese women has rapidly increased among researchers. The stereotype images of women from the 'Country of Cherry Blossoms' are that of the *geisha*, a woman in a *kimono*, or just a smartly dressed lady with a brand handbag, the wife of a Japanese businessman, called *kaishain* in Japanese. Japanese women are considered as shy, calm, never showing their feelings, taking care of their family, usually a housewife rather than a businesswoman.

But this image is shattered when we see the young girls called *ganguro*, who wear colorful makeup and clothes, dye their hair platinum blonde, and walk down Harajuku doing everything to be considered as *kawaii*. It is so different from the traditional Japanese concept of beauty, defined as snow-white skin, natural dark hair and discreet makeup. This diversity makes Japanese culture and society even more inscrutable, and worth exploring because of this.

In this paper the author will consider the following questions regarding Japanese culture and Confucianism, especially while researching women in Japan. First, what is the position of women in Japan according to Confucian values? This is examined in the light of previous

research on the place of females in Confucian teachings and writings, as well as an analysis of textbooks for girls and the education they could receive.

Second, where can we trace the influence of Confucianism on the situation of women in Japan? This question addresses the links between Confucian teaching and the situation of women in Japan throughout its history. Studying the history of the circumstances in which Japanese women have lived and comparing them to Confucian principles for women will give us a view of the impact of Confucianism onto women's lives until recently.

Third, what is the role of women in contemporary Japanese society, and what are the rights they possess? While women have traditionally been assigned to take care of their households, the modernization and democratization of Japan have obliged the Japanese people and their government in the 20th century to treat women equally with men. Several laws were passed regarding this issue, starting from the Constitution (enacted in 1947), the Equal Employment Opportunity Law (enforced in 1986) and the law on Equal Participation in Socio-Political Activities (1999). Nonetheless, the situation in Japan shows that there is a huge difference between the number of economically active men and women, and that very few women can be found in senior political or business positions. The situation is well depicted by the Global Gender Gap Report of 2012, in which Japan places 101st.

Fourth, what is the position of women in the modern Japanese family? As mentioned above, the traditional place in the society for women was the private sphere, understood as the home. However, because of the economic decline, as well as the rise in decision-making freedom among Japanese females around the turn of the 21st century, a paradox of choice among contemporary women in Japan can be observed, according to Uta Shimada from Cambridge University. This leads to the single life, dedication to a professional career, or the final abandoning of the idea of starting a family, which used to be the fundamental role in society for women. Even if a woman decides to start a family today, she does not want to quit her job, which definitely changes the social patterns.

Finally, what is the situation of women on the labor market? The expansion of rights and the choices made by young Japanese women have resulted in changes on the labor market, which can be defined as traditional, as can be understood from the Global Gender Gap Report of 2012. Even though women in Japan should be guaranteed equal treatment, they accept unfavorable working conditions, while their husbands earn enough to compensate their wives for taking care of family life.[1]

This paper focuses on gender studies, especially women's studies in Japan. It is very important to analyze the women's perspective, since as Yoshio Sugimoto claims, some academic studies have also attempted to generalize about Japanese society on the basis of observations of its male elite sector.[2] This also refers to research on Confucianism and Japanese society.

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[1]   Teruji Suzuki, 'Women's Rights in Japan', in *Prawa kobiet we współczesnym świecie*, Lena Kondratiewa-Bryzik, Wojciech Sokolewicz (eds.), Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, 2011, p. 248.

[2]   Yoshio Sugimito, *An Introduction to Japanese Society*, Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 2.

Confucianism in Japan

The philosophical and ethical system of Confucianism was introduced to Japan at the beginning of the fifth century. However, the ruler of Japan who implemented Confucian values into Japanese society was Shōtoku Taishi – Prince Shōtoku, the founder of the first Japanese constitution. The 'Seventeen Article Constitution' was the first code of moral instructions in Japan for the ruling class. It was promulgated in 604 and introduced a universal morality that conflicted with clan loyalty.[3]

Using Confucianism for political reasons was characteristic of Japan from the earliest times, and in the Nara period (710–784),[4] those who wanted to make a career in governmental service had to complete schools where they were trained for governmental administration purposes, and where the Confucian classics were predominant.[5]

During the subsequent Heian (782–1185)[6] and Kamakura (1185–1333)[7] periods, Confucianism survived in Japanese society only because of the efforts of Buddhist priests who studied the Confucian classics, despite the antagonism between the metaphysical philosophy of Buddhism and the humanistic philosophy of Confucianism.[8] Zen Buddhists supported the most Neo-Confucian philosophy, and they later came to dominate in the Edo period (1603–1868)[9].

Nonetheless, the Edo saw the rise of a number of people who adopted the way of the sages as a personal creed, even if the ideological use of Confucianism did not expand.[10] In that period, Confucianism became a way for its adherents to improve their social position. This was necessary as Confucians were members of the samurai class, descended from its lower layers, as samurai with no lord or master, also called *rōnin*. For this reason, during the Edo period several schools of Neo-Confucian philosophy developed in Japan. However, the ruling class tended to look on Confucian scholars as suspiciously as if they were Christians.[11] Watanabe claims that Japanese society was a poor follower of Confucian traditions and teachings, since the shogun, who was the effective monarch during the Edo period, neither legitimized his position through

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[3] F. Calvin Parker, 'Traditional Japanese Ethics', in *The Christian Gospel and Its Ethical Implications for Japanese Society*, PDF Version 1.2, November 2008, http://www.jema.org/hayama/reports/Hayama1980.pdf (accessed 15.05.2013), p. 37.

[4] 奈良時代 *Nara jidai* – the period in Japanese history, when the capital of the country was the city of Nara, modeled after Chang'an, the capital city of Tang China.

[5] Warren W. Smith Jr., *Confucianism in Modern Japan. A Study of Conservatism in Japanese Intellectual History*, Tokyo: Hokuseido Press, 1959, p. 7.

[6] 平安時代 *Heian jidai* – also called the 'court period', with the capital in Heian (modern Kyoto), when Japanese art, especially literature and poetry, reached its peak.

[7] 鎌倉時代 *Kamakura jidai* – the period where real power was held in the hands of the Kamakura shogunate, and Kamakura became the city of government.

[8] Warren W. Smith Jr., *Confucianism in Modern Japan…*, pp. 8–9.

[9] 江戸時代 *Edo jidai* – also called the Tokugawa period, when Japanese society was under the role of Tokugawa shogunate and the capital of Japan was Edo (now Tokyo).

[10] K. Wildman Nakai, 'The Naturalization of Confucianism in Tokugawa Japan: The Problem of Sinocentrism', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 1 (June 1980), p. 157.

[11] Ibid., p. 158.

Confucian theory nor worshipped Heaven, but rather his ancestors according to Shintō and Buddhist traditions.[12]

Regarding this problem, Hirose Tansō (1782–1856), the founder of the Kangien (咸宜園) private Confucian academy, which was the most well-attended private school in the late Edo period, wrote[13] an essay in 1840 entitled *Ugen (Roundabout Words)* on statecraft, where he described the schism that existed in Japanese society under the Tokugawa shogunate.

He mentioned the following six social evils:

1. The nobility act in a haughty manner toward the commoners who, in turn, ridicule the nobility for this haughty behavior;
2. The nobility indulge in unnecessarily exaggerated and ostentatious displays of pomp and ceremony;
3. The people are secretive and misrepresent the truth in order to preserve their reputation;
4. Too many people place unnecessary emphasis on a person's rank and pedigree;
5. Too many people emulate ancient customs that have grown ineffective in modern times, and base their present-day decisions and actions on past precedents that are no longer appropriate to the times;
6. There is widespread ignorance and lack of learning among the people.[14]

To summarize Tokugawa neo-Confucianism, three different variants of this philosophy were described by William Theodore de Bary. The first is oriented toward book learning, the second is an introspective endeavor focused on mediation, and the third consists of a disparate group of independent scholars who are characterized as neo-Confucian in their work within the established tradition.[15]

After the Meiji Restoration (1868) many references to the Confucian virtues appeared in primary and secondary teaching. Moreover special courses for moral teaching were compiled. In many high governmental posts of that time, references were made to ideas of harmonious unified activity by the people, of duty and responsibilities, of loyalty to the throne, and of augmenting the benevolent virtue of one's ancestors.[16] It can be argued that these values are the Confucian ideas which were incorporated into the political line of Meiji government.

During the period of militarization in Japanese history, which started in the 1930s, the Japanese government started the official encouragement of Confucianism, firstly in Manchukuo. Warren W. Smith Jr. wrote:

> Confucianism in Japan, because of its background of consistent anti-Westernism and its importance in the traditional Asiatic cultural heritage, was naturally called on

[12] Watanabe Hiroshi, '«They Are Almost the Same as the Ancient Three Dynasties». The West as Seen through Confucian Eyes in Nineteenth-Century Japan', in *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons*, Tu Wei-ming (ed.), Harvard University Press, 1997, p. 120.

[13] The book was published in 1855.

[14] Marleen Kassel, *Tokugawa Confucian Education. The Kangien Academy of Hirose Tansō (1782–1856)*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996, pp. 9–10.

[15] Ibid., p. 65.

[16] Ibid., p. 97.

to help give an ethical justification for this 'crusade' and in other ways attest to the high ideals of the Japanese sponsored Asiatic renaissance.[17]

After World War II, direct references toward Confucianism disappeared from the governmental acts. Nevertheless the impact on Japanese society during the past centuries was so strong that we can easily observe the traces of Confucian virtues in social life in contemporary Japan.

Confucianism and women

Regardless of the unique culture of Japan, Confucian values regarding women's issue were similar in all Confucian countries. In this chapter the role of women will be examined according to Confucian ethics, avoiding for now any national interpretation.

Nevertheless, examining the woman problem as a social or cultural category is a brand new way of analysis; in previous studies, references to women's issues were previously explored together with the traditional concept of the 'house' (Chinese *jia*, Japanese *ie* 家), or as part of relations inside the family structure. Still this concept differed from that in China, as in Japan it marked a special kind of 'corporation' which fulfilled a hereditary social role, rather than a lineage group.[18] Therefore, kinship roles are the focus point in this discussion of gender.[19] Consequently, the emphasis on filial piety (*ko*), which in the Edo period meant loyalty to one's *ie* as well as the familial virtue which characterizes Confucian philosophy and ethics, can be considered as a starting point for analyzing the woman issue.

To discuss the status of women, two more notions must be described, the concepts of the 'inner zone' and 'outer zone'. They are characterized by the pictograms 内 and 外, pronounced in Chinese as *nei* and *wei*, and in Japanese as *uchi* and *soto*. Women traditionally belong to the inner area, whereas men occupy the outer part. The inner area is usually related to the *ie* 'home and family', while the outer side, belonging to men, deals with external relations and the business zone.

In the article 'The Japanese family system from Meiji restoration until 21st century' we can find a following description of the Japanese family:

> First of all, we should explain the meaning of the Japanese word *ie. Ie* means in the Japanese language "home", the most important, coming after *kaisha* – the company – place for every Japanese person. But it is very difficult to translate the meaning of this term into Western languages. Fukutake, author of a book *Japanese Rural Society*, and Hendry who has written *Marriage in Changing Japan,* suggested to use it in English in the same way as the "House of Windsor" concept. However, the most obvious difference is that in Japan the idea of *ie* does not denote a set of relationships of such exquisite exclusivity, but implies rather the basic organizing principles around which Japanese family has evolved.[20] It is very important that after all reforms made

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[17] Ibid., p. 209.

[18] Watanabe Hiroshi, '«They Are Almost the Same…»', p. 120.

[19] Li-Hsiang Lisa Resenlee, *Confucianism and Women. A Philosophical Interpretation*, Albany: State University of New York Press, New York 2006, p. 47.

[20] Michael Jeremy, M.E. Robinson, *Ceremony and Symbolism in the Japanese Home*, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989, p. 31.

in Japan, and all modernization which took place in this country, many aspects of the traditional life where influenced by them. In the Japanese language, not only the word *ie* can be translated into English *family*. Japanese took up in the 19th century a phrase *kazoku,* which become the most proper word for *family.* That is why this English term does not reflect properly the idea of Japanese *ie.* The way to understand this term is to analyze basic principles of its structure.[21] The first is embodying the notion of genealogical line extending from the past, through the present, and into the future.[22] The second is connected with the practice of primogeniture and patrilineal descent which, at least formally, subordinates the status of women in Japanese society.[23]

In comparison with the status of Japanese females, Li-Hsiang Lisa Resenlee describes in her book *Confucianism and Women. A Philosophical Interpretation,* the term *nei-wai* as correlated with gender, and often equated with two mutually opposing and conflicting spheres – family and state, i.e. the separation between private and public zone; and in the Chinese case, between men and women.[24] She also argues that in Imperial China women were socially sanctioned to traverse the assumed rigid boundary of the *nei* and the *wai.*[25]

In Confucian texts, the only distinction between *nei* and *wai* is mentioned by Mencius in the Confucian *Four Books* as: "What is the *nei* will manifest itself in *wai*".[26] Nevertheless, there are didactic texts for women which make clear their role in the society and the obligations they have. However, some feminist writings state that nowadays, the sphere of *nei* is marginal, and Chinese women are typically characterized as submissive, oppressed, and illiterate.[27]

However, as mentioned above, didactic texts such as *Four Books for Women* (*Nusishu* 女四書) were created as a parallel to the Confucian *Four Books*. This book was first completed as an anthology by Wang Xiang (1789–1852) in the mid-Qing.[28] The second book is *The Analects for Women* (*Nulunyu* 女論語) (parallel to the *Analects*) which was published during the Tang dynasty by Song Ruoxin and Song Ruozhao; this is a collection of advice for young women regarding relations with their in-laws or those who will help them to reasonably manage their households. However, according to Resenlee, the most influential essay written on the question of females is *Fuxue*, which can be translated into English as 'Women's Learning', written by Zhang Xuecheng in the 18th century. In this text one can find the following kind of approach to the question of women's learning:

> As for women's speech, its emphasis is on the mastery of speech. [Yet] in ancient times, words do not pass from the inner quarter to the outside world. [Hence] what is called the mastery of speech is also a fundamental characteristic of ritually correct literary art. Confucius once said: "Without learning the *Book of Songs,* one has nothing

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[21] Ibid., p. 32.

[22] Ibidem.

[23] Ibidem; Olga Barbasiewicz, 'The Japanese Family System from Meiji Restoration until the 21st Century', *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, No. 22, 2009, pp. 7–8.

[24] Li-Hsiang Lisa Resenlee, *Confucianism and Women…*, p. 69.

[25] Ibid., p. 70.

[26] Ibid., p. 72.

[27] Ibid., p. 95.

[28] Ibid., p. 103.

to say." This means there is no one who is good at mastering speech without having a deep understanding of the *Book of Songs*. And this makes it clear that in women's learning one must begin by learning ritual and then move to comprehending poetry… The women's learning of ancient times always begins with rites and then poetry. The women's learning of today is the reverse; it uses poetry to destroy the rites.[29]

This fragment is essential, because as will be mentioned in the next chapter of this paper, the one sphere in which 'women' became consolidated as a social category in Meiji Japan, was education. Furthermore, in Tokugawa Japan, there were many texts which emphasized the female's role, in accordance with Confucian virtues.

Martha C. Tocco argues that during the Edo period there were many writings about the need for women's education. She gives the following explanation:

In the absence of systematic study, many scholars of Japanese women's history continue to view Japan's versions of Neo-Confucianism thought on the status of Tokugawa women as devastating, as Confucian tenets confined women within the family, subordinated their interests there, and proscribed their public participation in the political realm. In fact, Neo-Confucian thought on women's education varied greatly, ranging from admonitions that highly educated women posed a danger to the state to warnings that, given their role as mothers, *uneducated* women undermined the stability of the family and by extension the stability of the state. Over the course of the period, many Neo-Confucian philosophers wrote essays on the importance of women's education and commanded parents not to neglect the education of daughters.[30]

This quotation may serve as a good introduction towards the situation of women in Japan, which is often considered as unequal and degrading, but can also be at variance with the existing stereotypes.

Women in Japan

While talking with Japanese men about their mothers, wives or daughters, Japanese females in general, it becomes obvious that they tell informants directly that their situation is worse than that of their sisters in Western countries.[31] Furthermore, while traveling with guided tours, even in Asian countries such as Singapore, and especially while visiting Western countries such as Hawaii or Guam, Japanese tourists are always informed to remembers about the rule 'ladies first', at which the male tourists gasp with amazement.

We may begin an examination of the Japanese situation by considering Japanese proverbs. As in any language in the world, in Japanese proverbs we can find references toward the position of women in society.

In 1992 Hiroko Storm published an article entitled 'Women in Japanese Proverbs' in *Asian Folklore Studies,* in which she classified Japanese traditional proverbs concerning women on the following basis:

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[29] Ibid., p. 112.

[30] Martha C. Tocco, 'Norms and Texts for Women's Education in Tokugawa Japan', in *Women and Confucian Cultures in Premodern China, Korea, and Japan*, Dorothy Ko, Jahyun Kim Haboush, Joan R. Piggott (eds.), Berkley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2003, p. 195.

[31] Based on interviews conducted in July 2013 by the author.

A) Women in general: a. inferiority; b. stupidity; c. changeability; d. ill-nature; e. talkativeness; f. weakness; g. miscellaneous.

B) Women in specific roles or situations: h. wives; i. mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law; j. widows; k. prostitutes; 1. intelligent women; m. beautiful women.[32]

If we analyze the proverbs selected by Storm regarding women's role according to Confucian teaching, we may find some which confirm women's status in the Confucian-influenced society. These include:

Nyonin ni kenjin nashi (女人に賢人なし) meaning 'There are no wise women', which may be compared with *Fushō fuzui* (夫唱婦随) that means 'The husband initiates, the wife obeys', in which it is assumed that the one who makes the decisions among Japanese family members is the husband.

Moreover, the word '*onna*', standing for 'woman', appears in innumerable proverbs, such as *onna sannin yoreba kashimashii* (女三人寄れば姦しい), meaning when three women get together there is a lot of noise, or 'onna no ichinen iwa wo mo toosu' (女の一念岩をも通す) which is translated as 'Women will have their wills', which in direct translation says that women's desires can even go through rock.

Historically, the position of women was obviously unequal with that of men. However, before the formation of the shogunate (1603–1868), women had had much more freedom in public life. Those who lived in villages often became the head of households, and voted in elections in their localities. Even earlier, during the Heian period (in the 12th century) women could keep their name and manage the assets they inherited. Compared these privileges to those prevailing at that time in the Western world, Europe would have had little to criticize Japan for. However, these rights were ultimately limited, and in the Edo period did not apply. In the Meiji period, the one sphere in which 'women' became consolidated as a social category in conjunction with the historical and cultural complexity of Japan's modernity was women's public education.[33]

Although the working wife and mother was still considered as something 'unnatural' until the most recent financial crisis, the first changes to women's suppressed role were made by the aforementioned public education for women, especially by the Second World War, in which almost 25 million women were involved in social activities.[34]

After the war, women were given rights of equal treatment and protection by the Constitution of 1946. These rights were described in Articles 14 and 24 as follows:

"All the people are equal under the law and there shall be no discrimination in political, economic or social relations because of race, creed, sex, social status or family origin" (Article 14);

"(1) Marriage shall be based on the mutual consent of both sexes and it shall be maintained through mutual cooperation with equal rights of husband and wife as a basis.

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[32] Hiroko Storm, 'Women in Japanese Proverbs', *Asian Folklore Studies*, Vol. 51, No. 2, 1992, pp. 168–169.

[33] Miyako Inoue, 'Gender, Language, and Modernity: Toward an Effective History of Japanese Women's Language', *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2002, p. 397.

[34] Teruji Suzuki, 'Women's Rights…', p. 242.

> (2) With regard to choice of spouse, property tights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and others pertaining to marriage and the family, laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sexes".[35]

Although the Constitution gave equal rights to women and men, echoes of previous systems, especially of the *ie* institution, based on the Confucian philosophy still remain in Japanese society. Behavior deriving from this institution, defined in the Civil Code of 1898, in which the oldest man in the family was given the supreme authority, can be observed in Japanese people in their fifties or sixties, i.e. those whose working life fell during Japan's great economic boom in the 1980s. The beneficial economic situation allowed women to take care for their family and household, while their husbands made money in companies. The situation changed with the crises beginning in the 1990s, and some women had to take on activities outside their houses to earn money to support the family. This situation separated those families which could still support themselves from the husband's income alone from those which had to change the *ie* tradition and send their women to work. Nonetheless, it was a great step toward changing the social situation of Japan, and its effects have lasted until now.

The status of women has been changing since World War II, but among the challenges that the new situation brings to Japanese females is the inflexibility of the labor force, which can be presented as an M-shaped curve, as below:


Figure 1. Lifecycle Profiles[36]

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[35] Teruji Suzuki, 'Women's Rights…', p. 243.
[36] Hiroshi Kawata, Saori Naganuma, 'The Labor Force Participation Rate in Japan', *Bank of Japan Review*, December 2010, https://www.boj.or.jp/en/research/wps_rev/rev_2010/data/rev10e07.pdf (accessed 20.08.2013).

Over the last 13 years, the M-shaped curve has become flatter each year, which means that many women have been combining their work with bringing up their children. This may be the effect of both the changing social role of women, which is caused by global trends, and the economic situation in the last two decades, which has forced Japanese females to join their duties towards company and family. But it is still women, not men, who give up their work and take care of the children.

Furthermore, according to a survey compiling results from Japan's *Vital Statistics* and the *ILO Year Book of Labor Statistics*, the number of working women has risen since the 1980s, but great social problems will be brought about by the rapid decrease in the fertility rate, as shown in the following graph:


Figure 2. Changes in Japan's total fertility rate and female labor force participation rate: 1970, 1980, 1985, 1990, and 2000[37]

Nonetheless the situation of women graduates who found positions at work in 2012 is ambiguous. When we consider all females who completed their education last year, the numbers seem to be optimistic, because 60% of those graduates who found new jobs were women. However if we skip those who got jobs in nursing[38], one can find that only 34% of new employees are women:

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[37] 'International Comparison of the Social Environment Regarding the Declining Birthrates and Gender-Equality, Summary Report', http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/basic_data/resarches/pdf/english-1.pdf (accessed 20.08.2013).
[38] The nursing profession is exclusively occupied by women in Japan, whereas almost all doctors are men.

**Figure 3. Total number of graduates who found jobs in 2012** [39]

Figure 4. Graduates who found their jobs in other professions than nursing in 2012[40]

It shows that although women can find jobs after graduation, the labor market is divided into those addressed toward men and women. So, there are jobs available for women but those dedicated toward men are harder obtainable for female graduates.

This trend is confirmed by a report published on gender equality and female participation, in which the percentage of women who took part in activities related to the Great East Japan Earthquake was. We may see that the proportion of women on Reconstruction Planning Committees in 2012 was very low. Only in one prefecture (Aomori) were even a quarter of the committee members women, while in the Fukushima prefecture there were less than 5% of women among the members. This example is significant, even if the Japanese government selected women for the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission.

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[39] *Dokuritsugyōsei hōjin'nado josei sankaku jōkyō chōsa no kekka ni tsuite* [On the results of a survey on female participation situation by the Independent Administrative Institution], Gender Equality Bureau Cabinet Office, 2012, http://www.gender.go.jp/research/kenkyu/sekkyoku/pdf/h241214_iaa.pdf (accessed 20.08.2013).

[40] Ibidem.

Table 1. Proportions of women on Reconstruction Planning Committees[41]

Prefecture	Committee members	Of which women	Percetage of women
Aomori	12	3	25.0%
Iwate	19	2	10.5%
Miyagi	12	1	8.3%
Fukushima	23	1	4.3%

How does this situation refer to the rights that Japanese women received in the 1980s and 1990s? In the 1947 parliamentary elections, which were the first to give equal rights for women and men, 40 women were elected for the first time in the history of Japan.[42] Even though such extraordinary changes have taken place in Japanese society, almost 40 years later there were still discriminatory practices, which obliged the Japanese government to implement new laws which could make the situation of women easier.

The Japanese Equal Employment Opportunity Act (EEOA), was initially enacted in 1985 and took effect in 1986. The main changes of the EEOA were conducted in 1999 and 2007. It was a great step towards changing the situation of women on the labor market. Nevertheless it did not lead to women combining family and work duties. First, the EEAO contributed to the employment of highly educated women who are younger than 40.[43] Second, those women, who took advantage of the improvements guaranteed by EEOA, often marry later or stay single.

There is also the problem of the gender wage gap, as women receive ?lower relative wages compared to their male counterparts.[44] This shows inequality, regardless of the legal regulations.

In 1999 Japanese government enacted a Law on Equal Participation in Socio-Political Activities to make women take an active part in the social and political environment. The effect was 2400 women elected all over the country in 2000, 36 seats in the lower house of the National Diet and 43 seats in the upper house held by women.[45]

These examples show that even if the situation of women improves in the labor market, it causes further social problems, such as birthrate decline. This will force the Japanese government to implement new policies, such as encouraging fathers to take active part in bringing up their children, which is a brand new model in the structure of Japanese society.

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[41] 'Disaster Prevention and Reconstruction from a Gender Equal Society Perspective. Lessons from the Great East Japan Earthquake'. From the *White Paper on Gender Equality 2012. Summary*, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, June 2012, http://www.gender.go.jp/english_contents/about_danjo/whitepaper/pdf/ewp2012.pdf, p. 14.

[42] Teruji Suzuki, 'Women's Rights…', p. 246.

[43] Yukiko Abe, 'Long-Term Impacts of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act in Japan', *Japan Labor Review*, Vol. 10, No. 2, Spring 2013, p. 22.

[44] Yukiko Abe, 'Long-Term Impacts…', p. 28.

[45] Teruji Suzuki, 'Women's Rights…', p. 248.

Conclusion

To sum up, Confucian values had a great impact on Japanese society, even if unconsciously. The morals implemented in the Tokugawa period. which continued through the Meiji era, remained in the social values and behavior, even though they were erased by post-war policymakers.

The attitude towards the role of women was similar in other societies which implemented Confucian teaching. We may even specify the role of the woman as a person who takes care of the home and children, which was similar in China, Korea or Japan. But the contemporary situation varies depending on the political or social system in each specific country.

In Japan, the equality of men and women was implemented by the Constitution, given to the Japanese nation by the Americans. Nevertheless, the economic situation of Japan allowed the patterns described by Confucius to continue and left women at homes, fulfilling their duties as housewives and preserving the social patterns introduced ages ago.

However, the economic crisis in Japan forced the government to implement new laws which enabled women to undertake other activities than those related to running the household. This gave rise to new problems, such as a falling percentage of marriages, low birthrates and an aging population.

The only solution for these problems seems to be a total move away from the social roles described by Confucius and his disciples for both women and men, and to create a brand new society with brand new social patterns.

BEATA KOWALCZYK

The Japanese Way of Becoming an Artist and Its Religious' Connotations. A Case Study of Teshigawara Saburō

Abstract

In Japan it is often the case that the process of mastering a profession, especially in the field of traditional arts and crafts, proceeds through a close relationship with one's master (*sensei*), who embodies an abstract ideal of a certain art, as well as concrete methods and rules indispensable to perform that art as a profession and to attain success in one's career. A 'proper' relationship with one's master and a given artistic milieu, hard work, effort and sacrifice certainly pay off. Nevertheless, some Japanese artists, regardless of the linguistic and cultural gaps, take the risk of deciding to pursue their professional career outside Japan. Based on an informal, semi-structured individual interview with the artist Teshigawara Saburō, this paper will examine a professional career of the dancer, who claims to have walked his artistic way (*dō*) alone, (in)dependently of the so-called community of Japanese artists. Analysing a traditional path to artistic success, which partly derives from the ethical and philosophical teachings of Confucius, I will discuss an alternative to the above-mentioned tradition. Namely, I shall argue that it is possible to become an established Japanese artist outside of the system, working as an outsider, an immigrant or an 'other'.

Introduction

The professional trajectory of artists pursuing their artistic 'careers' in the field of such traditional Japanese arts and crafts as *nō*, *kabuki* or *bunraku* theater, *ikebana*, *sadō* (the way of the tea), martial arts or *kaiga* (Japanese paintings) etc. is institutionalized partly on the basis of various 'religious', or I shall rather say, ethical-philosophical ideas and practices rooted in Confucianism and Neo-Confucianism as well as Zen (Buddhism)[1]. This paper aims at an analysis of the artistic 'way' (*dō*) of the dancer and choreographer Teshigawara Saburō in the aforementioned cultural context to see whether, and if so to what extent, the

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[1] For more about Confucianism in Japan, see for example Charles Holcombe, 'Ritsuryō Confucianism', *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, Vol. 57, No. 2, December 1997, pp. 543–573; Mary Evelyn Tucker, 'Religious Dimensions of Confucianism: Cosmology and Cultivation', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 48, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 5–45; John Berthrong, 'Confucian Piety and the Religious Dimension of Japanese Confucianism', *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. 48, No. 1, January 1998, pp. 46–79; Feng Youlan, *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy. A Systematic Account of Chinese Thought. From Its Origins to the Present Day*, Warsaw: PWN 2001; Nobuyuki Kaji, *Jūkyō to ha nanika* [What is Confucianism?], Tokyo: Chūōkōron-Shinsha 1990.

tradition of patterns in artistic education etc. have influenced his professional career, regardless of its predominant globalized aspect, and what consequences it has had, if any, on the shape of his career. Moreover, I shall also address the following issues: the problem of cross-cultural communication/cooperation between artists, and the question of success and recognition on an international/local level. Finally, I would like to question the myth of an artist as a cosmopolitan, stateless person, who exists along with the art he creates, beyond any borders based on state or civilisation, as someone whose talent and genius – an idea broadly discussed by Lehman and Ellias[2] among others, etc. – are universal, rather than particular, and as such strongly linked to the local cultural environment where the artist originates from. The goal of this paper is not to prove that it is so-called Confucian ethics which lies behind the idea of Teshigawara's artistic creativity and constitutes the very sense of it. This particular philosophical perspective, which underwent significant modifications when transplanted onto the ground of Japanese culture, shall be applied to an analysis of the professional trajectory of Teshigawara Saburō as a theoretical frame, whose structures will cast light on some aspects of his career, such as his artistic choices, his relations with other artists with whom he has collaborated, the sources of his esthetic inspiration, and the like. Ultimately my goal, within the limits of this short paper, is to reconstruct a general image of the artistic path Teshigawara is walking on, emphasizing at the same time the fact that, despite the international dimension of his artistic career, when investigated in detail it turns out to be deeply rooted in a specific culture – that is, Japanese culture based partly on Confucian ethics. Given the above, it is essential to formulate a temporary operational definition of the perspective of Confucian ethics, from which Teshigawara's professional trajectory will be examined. For the purposes of this paper, the concept of Confucianism is defined through two of its aspects: firstly, the relation with one's self intrinsic to one's attitude towards the surrounding world of nature; and secondly, relationships with other people. In the case of an artist, emphasis will be placed on relations with teachers (*sensei*) or masters, as well as co-workers and the public. Something which at first glance may appear strikingly different in this philosophy, when looking at it from a perspective of someone educated in the Western individual-oriented system of thinking, is the fact that the individual self must dilute oneself in a nexus of social relations and interactions, and surrender one's individuality to begin constructing it anew. This also seems to be the case for Teshigawara Saburō. The reason for selecting this particular artist for the following analysis was not the uniqueness of the form of his career. On the contrary, the way he has built up his professional career can in a sense be interpreted as a representative example of a generation of Japanese artists – especially in the fields of contemporary music, theater, painting, design, and even literature with Tawada Yōko as an exemplary model. More precisely, while cooperating with artists and institutions on an international level and performing in front of international audiences, he has managed to maintain a specific method of managing his interpersonal relationships, and his artistic works remained profoundly Japanese in terms of the rich references to his native culture which they contain. Keeping in mind the above-mentioned operational definition of the so-

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[2]   See for example Harvey Christian Lehman, *Age and Achievement*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953; Norbert Ellias, *Mozart: Portrait of a Genius*, California: University of California Press, 1993.

called Confucian ethic, or system of interpersonal social relations, including the attitude to one's self, I shall base the core analysis of this paper around three issues in particular: a relational[3] individual self and its creationist potentiality (corporeality and art as bodily rather than conceptual practice); the role of the master-disciple tension/dependence/relation as well as reciprocity in achieving artistic success; and finally, the relations and interactions between artist and his audience. The reason why I focus particularly on these three problems is that in the theoretical perspective of interactionism (Blumer, Mead, Goffman, Becker, Hughes etc.) which I shall apply to my research, the formation process of a human's identity and his/her professional activities, which are based on the chain of interpersonal relations, are engendered in social interactions.

Furthermore, the core of such a relational self is constituted by a set of cultural determinants like behavioral patterns, beliefs, habits and the like (social determinism); yet these are the subject of constant negotiations and changes (social constructivism). It may be assumed that similar presuppositions about the nature of the social individual and the nexus of interpersonal relations which lay the foundations for the phenomenon of society establish the basics of Confucian thought. Namely, the aforementioned similarity lies in the fact that in Chinese philosophy too, as has already been pointed out, the emphasis is laid on the human individual as *homo politicus*, entangled –implying both active participation as well as passive connectedness – in a network of hierarchically organized relations of a patriarchal/mutual character. In the original, Chinese version of Confucianism the story of a human existence can be reconstructed only in the social context, where the latter is incessantly transformed by the former.

Methodology

Social research focused on the professional careers of artists can be based on the premise that there is no one pattern to be followed in that field, and that therefore each artist has to create (social constructivism) one's career (in)dependently. Such a manner of constructing one's artistic path in order to achieve professional perfection and success in the future should for some cases be analyzed in terms of broadly construed interpersonal relations and their quality, as already explained above. One's professional trajectory is constituted of a set of indiscernible details, acquaintances or events, and unveiling them in an analysis enables the researcher to reconstruct and better understand the social process of career-making. This area of social studies requires and justifies the application of qualitative methods such as (auto)ethnography, participant observation and structured or semi-structured interviews.

My research was conducted with the use of qualitative techniques: a semi-structured individual interview with the artist (in the respondent's mother tongue of Japanese), which took place in Warsaw on October 30, 2012, when Teshigawara was visiting Poland as one of the artists invited to perform at the Crossroads 2012 festival. The interview was supplemented by a participant observation, which I carried out at the Ujazdowski Castle

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[3]   The Japanese word for [human] (*ningen*) presupposes the relational nature of an individual – we exist only in relation to others. *Ningen* literally means space between humans. Jane M. Bachnik, 'Time, Space and Person in Japanese Relationship', in *Interpreting Japanese Society. Anthropological Approaches*, Joy Hendry (ed.), London and New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 91–92.

Center for Contemporary Art during the artist's talk with the audience on October 29, 2012. The meeting with the audience was interesting in terms of its structure, which enabled the artist to reveal many facts from his professional career, concerning his educational background, his first steps into the dance world, his physical training, his choreographic imagination and his international encounters with other dancers.

In addition to that, I saw three dance performances by Teshigawara – two in his native Tokyo and one in Warsaw – during which I concentrated not only on the form and the subject of the performance itself, but I also tried to grasp the atmosphere and the reaction of both types of audience – the Japanese and the Polish – to what they were watching on the stage. Two of the performances were actually two versions of an approximately one-hour piece entitled *Miroku* (the name of a Bodhisattva), rich in references to Japanese culture and religion, a semi-improvised dance, based on a Japanese novel.[4] The other was a loose adaptation of a short novel written by a Polish writer Bruno Schulz[5], entitled *Haru, Ichiya ni shite. Bruno Schulz Haru yori* [Spring, in one night – inspired by Bruno Schulz's Spring].

As I have already mentioned, all my fieldwork was carried out in the Japanese language. Since this is not my mother tongue, when it came to the formulation of the hypotheses and results of the survey, I had to challenge several dilemmas related to linguistic issues, such as the adequacy of my questions, in terms of proper interpretation and/or understanding of intentions of the interview; my correct understanding of the responses; and the relevance of the data acquired which will be presented in this paper, and the validity of my conclusions etc. Most of the problems I have just enumerated can be solved by the following measures: recording an interview, repeating conversations and asking the respondent for further clarifications or explanations of his statements. Moreover, the validity of the data may be also confirmed through either written materials (other interviews with the artist, critics, essays, books both by and about him, etc.) or conversations with people from the artist's environment, as well as with persons who originate from the same culture and whose professional activity is related to the world of the art of dance.

In this paper, I combine empirical data with theoretical deliberation in order to reconstruct the path which led Teshigawara Saburō to where he is today as an artist. My intention is neither to retell the detailed biography of the artist while presenting all the data I have collected, nor to evaluate the professional achievement of my respondent in terms of success or failure. Having analyzed the information I have acquired by means of the methods described above, I plan to focus on three aspects of the career-building process itself, and to attempt to investigate the impact which the Confucian ethic might have had on the way Teshigawara shaped the network of interpersonal relations within which his career evolved. This research has been conceived as an idiographic and ethnographic description[6] of one particular professional path in the world of art[7], and is a part of a larger survey about professional careers pursued by Japanese artists on an international level. The following

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[4]   Taruho Inagaki, *Miroku*, Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1946.

[5]   It was based on the short novel by Bruno Schulz entitled *Spring*.

[6]   Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research*, Polish edition, Warsaw: PWN, 2003, pp. 45–49.

[7]   As a part of *Lebenswelt* or 'life-world', a concept used in phenomenology (Edmund Husserl) and in sociology (Max Weber, Alfred Schutz, Jurgen Habermas).

case study has an explorative character, and serves as a preliminary insight into the question, thus possibly leaving the reader with a feeling of insufficiency. On the one hand this survey has a limited range of deductions, but on the other hand it could help to formulate some hypotheses which will be tested in the course of further analysis.

Theoretical background. (In)dependent creation of a professional trajectory

The question of the artistic career in the world of Japanese art shall be approached from the theoretical perspective of Confucian or Neo-Confucian ethics, with emphasis put particularly on those aspects of this philosophical system which touch upon the social role of an individual, including the importance of education or practicing virtues. The book of Chung Yung says that God created nature, and human duty is to live in accordance with nature, called the path of reason or *tao*.[8] This path (*tao*) is cultivated by means of education; in other words, "it is through education that we try to comprehend nature and cultivate the path of reason".[9]

Walking one's own path means perfecting oneself in the virtues (Japanese: *toku*) in order to live in harmony with nature and other social individuals. Furthermore, the ideogram of the character *toku* is composed of five components which express the sense of the word: a man pursuing his path and practicing skills through multiple repetitions of an exercise, all over again and again to achieve perfection, and individual as well as social harmony of mind and body.[10] The path is of a seemingly paradoxical nature, since being shaped individually it is at the same time immersed in the path of one's ancestors, with whom the living are bonded by one of the four virtues, namely the filial piety (Chinese: *sìzì*). It is also through the process of education that a human being attains the unification of past knowledge and the fruits of self-improvement.

The aforementioned nexus of interdependences between individuals which constitute the foundation of society are hierarchically structured, and as such can be also traced back to the idea of the five bonds, according to which an individual is assigned to a particular place in the social order. Knowing one's place and role means being aware of one's duties in relation to others which arise from it, and is important in a sense that it guarantees social harmony – a central concept in Confucianism. The top position in this echelon of social relations belongs to the ruler and the ruled, and the second to the father and son. These two categories in particular shall be taken into consideration when examining the issue of the relationship between master (*sensei*[11]) and disciple (*deshi*), in the world of art generally, but especially in the context of Japanese culture.

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[8]   Leonard Shihlien Hsu, *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism. An Interpretation of the Social and Political Ideas of Confucius, His Forerunners, and His Early Disciples*, London: Curzon Press, 1975, p. 201.

[9]   Ibid., p. 201.

[10]   Anna Iwona Wójcik, *Wolność i władza. Filozoficzne idee cywilizacji liberalnej i konfucjańskiej w próbie międzynarodowego porównania*, Kraków: Collegium Columbinum, 2002, p. 41.

[11]   For the purpose of this paper, the term *sensei* is defined in a broader sense than its initial meaning, that of a teacher. Here, it also indicates a network of institutions which predefine conditions and determine one's professional path in a the world of art (e.g. *nitten* in the *kaiga* field of Japanese paintings).

This relation constitutes a core element of the *iemoto*[12], a hereditary system whose beginnings date back as far as the Heian period (794–1185), when practices already existed for transferring orthodox knowledge about specific skills within a line of a family from father to son. However, its mature form and the most distinguishing features of the *iemoto* institution as we recognise it today developed in the eighteenth century.[13] A literal translation of the term *iemoto* would give a combination of words meaning approximately the 'house (*ie*) of origins (*moto*)', that is, a familial environment where certain art/skills of creation have been worked out. This hierarchically organized institution for the study and practice of traditional arts and crafts is strongly associated with feudalism, paternalistic kinships of subordination, and relationships of power and control over the way some unique competences are disseminated and used both within and by society at large. Moreover, the authority of the great master, who stands on/at the top of the pyramid, guarantees his position and stable income, since he is the one to certify the competency of his disciples and the local teachers who have practiced under his supervision. The master also determines the standards as well as the criteria of artistic accomplishment[14], and retains exclusive rights to reject any deviations from the set norms.

The *iemoto* system was adopted in the world of the tea ceremony (*chanoyu* or *sadō*), *ikebana*, calligraphy (*shodō*), the worlds of classical theater such as *nō*, *kabuki* or *bunraku*, Japanese dance (*buyō*), and martial arts. Even nowadays it is still present in many institutions where Japanese people learn fine arts and crafts, among which the tea ceremony and *ikebana* attract particularly large numbers of students. What is also striking about the *iemoto* system is that it permits only one *iemoto* at a time, which sometimes leads to the creation of new 'houses' or 'lines', often in contradiction to the main line. In practice, this means that there can be only one recognised master, whose title of *iemoto* is hereditary, usually transmitted from father to son by direct line or by adoption. Such rigid organization of this institution, where the position and role of every newcomer is predefined by a set of rules, rather than the actual skills or talents of the apprentice, is often a subject of harsh criticism for its undemocratic or non-meritocratic, authoritarian and nepotistic character; and thus many artists practicing traditional arts and crafts consequently reject participation in this system.

My hypothesis is that some of the main distinctive characteristics of the *iemoto* system, which grew from within the Confucian or Neo-Confucian ethic, pervaded and influenced the shape of the Japanese system of education and also the modern arts in general, whether classical music or film education, and even the worlds of literature and theater. This problem is too complex to be elaborated on in this paper, but I shall briefly outline some questions indirectly related to the role which the *iemoto* system has played in the professional career of Teshigawara Saburō, when discussing the aspect of master/disciple relations.

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[12] For further information about the '*iemoto* system', see Francis L.K. Hsu, *Iemoto: The Heart of Japan*, New York: Schenkman, 1975.

[13] Eiko Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility. Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture*, New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 165.

[14] Ibid., p. 165

In the course of a path which will supposedly lead to artistic accomplishment, the aforementioned interactions or ties emerge as a determinant factor, in the sense that a successful relationship with a great master opens up the possibility to follow one's artistic vocation or 'professional career'. Here, the latter term is used in the meaning given to it in the perspective of the sociology of labor, namely as a set of stages coming one after another, of which one's artistic way (*dō*) is composed. These stages can be differentiated from one another in terms of the quality of the interactions[15] which a person gets into with the so-called significant others, whose appearance at a certain time prompts a turning point in their career.

Given all that has been said so far about the conditions of career-making within the limits of the Japanese *iemoto* system, it is quite clear that in the professional biographies of Japanese artists, especially those whose careers develop on their native ground, one relationship prevails upon any other encounters, that is, meeting and working with the right *sensei* (teacher). Is that also the case for Teshigawara Saburō? Before I answer the question, I will introduce the artist in one short paragraph, and outline the broad scope of his artistic activities.

The case of Teshigawara Saburō and 'Karas(u)'[16]

Teshigawara Saburō studied plastic arts and initially planned to be a sculptor. Ultimately, he became a very special kind of 'sculptor', one who uses his own body as material to create dance performance on the stage. His adventure with dance started in 1981 in a private ballet school, located by a railway station in his native Tokyo. Unsatisfied with the rigidity of ballet, whose methods did not suit Teshigawara's body, he soon quit the school. In 1985, as we find out from his homepage, he formed a group called KARAS(u), and started his individual career independently of any artistic institution, where he could master choreography and dance techniques. Teshigawara's work is recognised in Japan, where he has established his position not only as an artist but also as a *sensei*, teaching movement theory (*sic!*) and conducting workshops at the Department of Expression Studies, in the College of Contemporary Psychology, St. Paul's (Rikkyō) University. Furthermore, throughout his professional career he has also set up a wide network of artistic relations on an international level, cooperating with artists from England (S.T.E.P.), France (Paris Opera) etc., which has contributed to his artistic reputation on a global scale. Teshigawara's creative activity is not limited only to dance; he has also won increasing international attention in the visual arts field, with art exhibitions, films/videos, as well as the set design, lighting and costume for all his performances.

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[15] See Everett C. Hughes, *The Sociological Eye. Selected Papers*, New Brunswick: Transaction Books 1971; Howard Becker, *Sociological Work, Method and Substance*, Chicago: Aldine, Press of Glencoe 1970; Anselm Strauss, *Professions, Work and Careers*, New Brunswick, NY: Transaction, Inc., 1975.

[16] This part is based on information from Teshigawara Saburō's homepage: http://www.st-karas.com/en/index.html (accessed 10.02.2013).

The official name of the group is KARAS; adding 'u' in brackets is intended to emphasize that the name comes from the Japanese word *karasu* meaning 'raven'. The reason for removing the last vowel is to give the name itself a more international sound and bring it a 'career' outside of Japan.

The corporeal dimension of art

This part of the paper will focus on Teshigawara's 'bodily practices' (*dō*, derived indirectly from Zen and Confucianism), which are meant to help an individual to develop and perfect human virtues (*toku*), such as artistic expression among others. During the 'artist talk', given at Ujazdowski Castle in October 2012, Teshigawara stressed several times that for him everything in dance has its beginning in the physical body, which also becomes the main source of inspiration for all of his performances.

> We went to the mountain, a group of dancers, to practice outdoors in harmony with nature, which would help us – we believed – to get to know the edge points, limits and possibilities of our physical bodies. A part of this training was to let oneself be buried up to the neck in the ground and stay in this state for quite a long time. That is how I really became conscious of all parts of my body, the breath, blood running in my veins. (…) Nowadays, when I work on a new performance, what I attempt at is always getting over the limits of my body. I recall the moments I spent practising ballet figures. Those techniques were against the natural movements of my body, and so I decided to quit the school and switch from ballet into a kind of free modern dance. I exchanged the restraints of ballet techniques for the physical restriction of freedom of action, which on the other hand, can be in a way liberating. Yet, even today I seek for these moments, when my body says 'no', resisting my mind, I try to work them out, and I am inspired by them.[17]

This direct, physical experience of 'great nature' was crucial in the dancer's professional career, because that was the first time he thought of himself as a part of a larger universe, the macrocosm, and thus developed the need for harmonic existence with the natural world. Teshigawara concentrates very much on action, on the act of dance throughout which he becomes a dancer. What counts for him in his career is the constant effort he undertakes everyday while working with his body. Teshigawara considers dance, as he explicitly stressed in the interview, as a way (*tao/dō*) of living. It is through dance that he (re)creates himself also as a part of the community whom he identifies himself with. Consequently, his very body serves as a means of communication with others, a tool that goes beyond cultural or political – Teshigawara equates both levels of social life – borders. Visible influences of Japanese culture can be observed when analyzing the elements of which the choreography created by Teshigawara is composed. The entire dance is horizontally oriented, there are hardly any movements requiring any step of elevation, no springing into the air, but instead the dancer remains close to the stage, as in the traditional *nō* theater, trying to give an impression that he dissolves in the space rather than dominating it. Differences between classical *nō* theatre and ballet are described by the Japanese philosopher Suzuki Daisetsu, who thereby juxtaposes the syncretistic and unifying nature of the East with the dualistic, individualising West.[18] According to Suzuki, the Oriental

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[17] Based on the notes from the 'artist talk' which took place at the Ujazdowski Castle Center for Contemporary Art on October 29, 2012.

[18] For differences between ballet and Japanese dance which reflect differences between the Orient and Occident, see Daisetsu T. Suzuki, *Zen i kultura japońska*, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2009, p. 92

mind tends to perceive things in their totality and unification, integration within the world, while the Occidental mind seeks differences between things, highlighting their individual and unique value. Teshigawara Saburō's professional career as a dancer involves the persistent pursuit of artistic perfection, where the stress is put not on the final achievement but on the process itself. On the one hand he 'dances' his own individually crafted biography, yet this biography does not evolve in a void. Through his attitude to nature, his body and the people with whom and for whom he performs – as I shall discuss in the next paragraph of this paper – he proves that the path he once stepped onto and is now walking on is but a continuance of the way of his ancestors, at least in the ethical-philosophical dimension. Furthermore, the presupposed individuality and independence of the institution of *sensei* seems only to be an apparent one.

Tension between the master and his disciple

Teshigawara does not mention any *sensei* or master who would have had any significant impact on the process of his artistic formation, considering himself in large part a self-made dancer. Nevertheless during an interview with the audience in Warsaw, he associated his artistic practices with people like Ōno Kazuo (founder of the *butoh* dance style). Additionally, in the story of his professional training it is possible to track down traces of institutions, norms and customs characteristic of Confucian teachings, as already discussed above. These are related to the practices of self-improvement, education and achievement of perfection in virtues. The conclusion which may be drawn from my interview with Teshigawara is that on the one hand, his professional career has developed in relative independence of the institution of a proper *sensei*. Yet, on the other hand, the 'way' (Japanese: *dō*) in which this dancer shapes his career, from the corporeal techniques he has used to train his body and mind, through his attitude towards the tradition of Japanese stage performances (such as the techniques of *nō* theater) and dance masters (Ōno Kazuo et al.), up to the themes or motives (the spatial organisation in *Miroku*, which was supposed to evoke a room in a Japanese traditional house with the sliding *fusuma* paper doors) he refers to in his artistic creation. All these aspects suggest the visible presence of these so-called institutions in his professional activities (of which Teshigawara is only partly conscious – as far as I could understand from the interview – and this is related to the fact that he does not treat himself as a reflective but rather as an active subject when creating a new performance).

Another interesting point which was revealed during the interview, and which requires further investigation, is the fact that Teshigawara used to work as a professor at Rikkyō University in Tokyo. He taught not only dance techniques, but also lectured in the field of psychology, and additionally has experience of conducting workshops, including with international students. Moreover, he is the author of several books in which he draws on his experience to lay out his own dance theory (e.g. *Tsuki to suigin. Teshigawara Saburō no buyō* 1988 [Moon and Mercury. Dance of Teshigawara Saburo]), including the notion of the body and mind of a dancer and similar related issues. The conclusion that arises from the above is that on the one hand, Teshigawara claims to reject any institutionalised 'patriarchal' form of dependence such as *sensei*. Nevertheless, he works within a network of dance artists, cooperating with other dancers on an international level, and has created himself as an '*ie*' (house of origins), where his disciples practice

the art of dance, as defined and performed by Teshigawara. Therefore, rather than existing outside of the Confucianism-based *iemoto* system, this artist admittedly crafts his own professional path individually, while referring to this very structure. Even though his attitude towards it is critical, his criticism is expressed within the system, at the university where he used to teach, or on professional stages of theaters in Japan, where he performs. The last question which should be asked is about the audience: Does Teshigawara need a recipient for his art?

The artist and his public. In search of mutual understanding

> An artist needs his public, needs to grab its attention and interest it in what he is doing on the stage. An artist must curry favour with his audience, because he does not exist without it. (…) On the other hand, it is of less importance whether the audience is capable of grasping the cultural context of the performance, whether they can spot and understand the uniquely Japanese motives in it. (…) Besides, the very Culture is a part of politics, a useful tool to make politics, a soft power, something that is sold, and therefore I don't like the word itself. (…) In my performances I refer to something which is beyond national cultures.[19]

According to Teshigawara Saburō, communication with the audience does not necessarily have to be mediated through culturally defined language in both the spoken and corporeal forms, but it is also possible beyond cultural constraints and determinants. The very 'culture' and its products (*manga*, *anime*, J-pop and even classical *kabuki* or *bunraku* theater etc.) are perceived as a political tool, a kind of 'soft power' which serves the country to promote its ideology and strengthen its position on global markets. Yet, when pointing out the importance of the contact between the artist and his audience, Teshigawara refers somehow to the Confucian philosophy of social virtue, a virtue of living in harmony with the other, in this case the audience. In the interview this idea was expressed more explicitly, when he said that during performance he becomes a servant, offering his body and mind to the public and hoping for empathy-based mutual understanding, which is a *sine qua non* of a successful artistic communication.

The main problem which should be addressed at this stage of the analysis is the possibility and necessity of communication and mutual understanding between an artist and his audience in a situation where the cultural background of the performer is categorized as different, but the substance of this difference (such as the sense of time and space, culture/nature as well as body/mind dualisms etc.) remains obscure and ambiguous, and therefore very often tends to be ignored. Before the 'artist talk' at Ujazdowski Castle started, I eavesdropped on a conversation between Teshigawara and his Polish translator, during which the artist was explaining the philosophical background and source of inspiration for the performance entitled *Miroku* which he was going to give the following day. Apparently, the main idea of this work was to play with the Buddhist concept of light and enlightenment. Initially, the dancer planned to explain the ideological dimension of his choreography to the public, but eventually gave this plan up, being convinced that his explanation would not be understood anyway. In this

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[19]   Based on the notes from the interview conducted on October 30th 2012.

situation the artist must be satisfied with any form of active presence from the audience. According to Teshigawara, complete mutual understanding is neither possible nor really necessary. Nevertheless, the artist is presumably convinced that the public's awareness of the cultural context enriches the reception of the dance and thus enhances the quality of the mutual contact – even though this conclusion cannot be found *expressis verbis* in any of his statements. Therefore ideally, a culturally competent audience would react vitally to the performance, thereby actively participating in the creative process as a subsequent source of inspiration for the dancer. This active participation is especially important for Teshigawara, whose dance performances are in a way *aleatoric*, as there is always a moment of improvisation. In this sense, he needs the audience and he is "desperately seeking" for its response. However, we may also imagine that he could keep on practising dance even without having anyone to admire his work. Why? That is because for Teshigawara, dance is a (Confucian) way (*tao/dō*) of living and because mastering artistic expression for him actually means achieving control over the body and mind, or striving to live in better harmony with one's self within nature. We can thus assume that this process does not need any witnesses in the form of an audience. This statement finds corroboration in what the dancer said during the interview, that he rarely thinks about the audience when he is working on a new performance. Once they are sitting there watching him dance they become important, but at the first stage of the creation process Teshigawara mainly focuses on a certain topic or problem that troubles him. Then he selects the elements, techniques and means of bodily expression appropriate to speak about a given subject. Contact with the audience takes place later on. The public seemingly has no impact whatsoever on the topic Teshigawara selects for the play, yet during the performance the public becomes an inspiring part of it. If the dancer seeks mutual understanding and communication with his audience, it is because he exists as an artists as well as a human being only within a society which. with its response, confirms his artistic and individual identity.

Conclusion

To sum up, the goal of this preliminary and idiosyncratic survey was to present the professional career of the Japanese dancer Teshigawara Saburō within the ethical-philosophical frame of Confucian thought. This philosophy had a great impact on the institutional organisation of the Japanese art world as well as the Japanese education system in general, especially in terms of the relation between the master and his (rarely her) disciples, but also as far as an overall vision of the world's order and the concept of human life related to it are concerned. The data presented in this paper comes from research conducted with the methods of qualitative sociology (a semi-structured interview with the artist, participant observation and ethnography).

The problem was approached from the perspective of the sociology of labor, which analyses a professional career as a set of phases in a biography different in terms of encounters with the people who propel a turnover in the trajectory of one's professional life. The sociological approach was combined with elements borrowed from Confucian philosophy which refer to the interpersonal relations and social education of a human being. Given this, the analysis of Teshigawara Saburō's artistic pursuit was focused on three problems: the relation with the master and his position within the Japanese art world

(including his attitude towards the institutions of this world), his artistic education and vision of himself as an artist, and finally his relationship with the audience.

The paucity of data does not allow definitive conclusions to be drawn, but nonetheless some hypotheses can be formulated. As I have tried to show, Teshigawara Saburō and his idea of art as a way of self-improvement and striving for perfection may be explained in the context of Confucian philosophy and ethic, where emphasis is put on respect to ancestors and other members of the society, as well as leading a life in harmony with great nature. All these virtues are to be achieved by proper training or education (*dō*), which should be performed under the supervision of a master. Teshigawara claims that he has not trained with anyone who would have had any particular impact on his artistic expression, although when he speaks about his profession he mentions Ōno Kazuo, and also refers to various symbols, rules and notions which stem from certain Confucian concepts of the human being, a vision of nature and social order. The image of an artist that arises from this survey is an image of a craftsman, rather than a genius, who makes hard efforts every day to take yet another step further in his artistic achievements.

NICOLAS LEVI

Confucianism in South Korea and Japan: Similarities and Differences

Abstract

Korea and Japan spent much time culturally and politically under the influence of China, which brought Confucianism to these countries. This study explores the influence of Confucianism on modern Japanese and Korean societies. This paper discusses issues such as loyalty and collectivism in the two previous mentioned countries.

1. Introduction

Whilst most of the literature focusing on Confucianism has concentrated on how important it has been in China, little attention has been paid to a comparison of the development of Confucianism in Korea[1] and Japan. When considering the current society in these countries, we can see that the time has come to analyze whether Confucianism is still the dominant philosophy in these both countries.

The goals of this paper are the following: to find characteristic features of Confucianism in Korea and Japan, and to examine the differences in terms of beliefs and strengths. Regarding its structure, the paper proceeds in four steps: (1) defining Confucianism, (2) outlining its realizations in South Korea, (3) outlining its realizations in Japan, (4) suggesting possible grounds for further development of this project.

Confucianism has its basis in the teachings of Confucius (541–479 BC), despite the fact that Confucius was not the founder of a school of philosophy. He wanted to recreate the kind of social order that would have prevailed at the very beginning of the Zhou dynasty (1027–256 BC). So he traveled all around the Zhou kingdom, hoping that his political ideas would find an enthusiastic patron. Although Confucius never succeeded in this issue, some people became interested in his beliefs. Confucius's followers started to consider him not only as a political figure but also as a teacher.[2] He set in motion the project of philosophy as a search for harmony. Shortly after he passed away around 500 ADBC, new philosophical schools emerged (Daoism, Mohism, and Legalism[3]), all of which appeared around the same time, and could be associated with the ideas of Confucius.

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[1] 'Korea' here is used to refer to both South and North Korea.

[2] It has to be said that Confucius never wrote any treatises that included his personal ideas. However, his discussions with his students/disciples came to be recorded as the *Lunyu* (saying of Confucius to his disciples), a term most commonly translated as the Analects (Korean: *Nuno*, Japanese: *Rongo*).

[3] Nicolas Zufferey, *La Pensée des Chinois*, Paris: Marabout, 2008, p. 130.

According to Chen Hongxing, a Chinese researcher from the Academy of Social Sciences of Tianjin, the most important notion to be attributed to Confucius was the idea of humaneness.[4] The *Analects* proposed that this element consists in not treating others in a way that one would not want to be treated oneself. This notion can be considered as the center of its moral philosophy. Another important concept developed in the *Analects* is the notion of the *junzi* (Korean: 황자), a term which can be translated as the 'prince'.[5] Confucius considered that the prince refers to the "son of a ruler" who is cultivated as the son of the leader, the only one who knows the truth and who can bring the nation to harmony. Therefore all people can be considered as sons of the prince if they cultivate their personality appropriately. In terms of politics, Confucius suggests in the *Analects* that moral rule, or rule by virtue, is far more effective than rule by law. Rule by virtue brings forth compliance when the coercive power of the ruler is manifest, but also when it is not. It means that it would be right for a father to conceal the crimes of a son rather than turn him over to the authorities.

Confucius' teachings were developed and advanced by various disciples such as Mencius (371–289 ADBC).[6] The most important and significant contribution of Mencius to Confucianism was the idea that human nature is good at birth. As an extension, Mencius suggested that evil is a consequence of the resignation of the goodness people were born with, and is inherent to the body. That is why according to Mencius, the aim of human beings was to maintain the natural goodness of humankind. In terms of politics we can define Mencius as a being more aggressive than Confucius. As an example, he stated that when a citizen does not respect the rules of the country, he should be removed or re-educated, or possibly even executed.[7]

According to traditional accounts, Confucius was credited with editing the various classics of ancient Chinese writing that supposedly existed prior to his day. These books consisted of some treatises from the Han Era: the *Book of Changes*; the *Book of History*; the *Book of Poetry*; the *Book of Rites*; the *Spring and Autumn Annals*. In these times, these texts were studied widely. During the Han dynasty, Confucius began to emerge as the revered sage-philosopher of China, and Confucians as a group of scholars.

During these times another philosophical system, Buddhism, entered the Far East and China. Following the fall of the Han, Buddhism gradually expanded, often in association with the ruling power of non-Chinese elites. However, Buddhists were highly persecuted as a result of an increasing awareness of the foreign nature of Buddhist teachings.[8] As a consequence, Confucian teachings were reasserted under the form of Neo-Confucianism. Rational principle and strong force constituted the basic points of the Neo-Confucian

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[4]   C. Hongxing, 'Reproduction, Familiarity, Love and Humaneness: How Confucius Revealed «Humaneness»', *Frontiers of Philosophy in China*, December 2010, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 507.

[5]   H. Kim, H. Ja, 'The Education of the Yi Crown Prince: A Study in Confucian Pedagogy', in *The Rise of Neo-Confucianism in Korea*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1985, p. 27.

[6]   Mencius was allegedly a student of Confucius' grandson. Zufferey, *La Pensée des Chinois*, p. 174.

[7]   John M. Koller, *Oriental Philosophies*, London: MacMillan, 1985, p. 252.

[8]   Some Confucian literati appreciated and socialized with Buddhists. D. Kim, 'The Social and Cultural Presence of Buddhism in the Lives of Confucian Literati in Late Choson: The Case of Tasan', *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, December 2012, p. 214.

description of the world, as responses to Buddhist concepts. Like the scholars of Mencius, Neo-Confucians also affirmed that human nature was at birth good and added that human nature was a rational principle regarding the rational structure of a world that characterized humanity through human nature.

2. Confucianism in Korea

No exact date for the introduction of Chinese Confucianism into Korea can be given, although it can be said that Confucianism was introduced to the kingdom of Koguryo (고구려) by China in the fourth century. A national academy for Confucian studies, known as Taehak (태학), quickly emerged in 372. This academy was followed by local schools called Kyongdang. However, Koguryo refused to be totally Sinicized, and so the impact of Confucianism was highly limited. Confucianism entered Shilla much later than Paekche (백제) and Koguryo[9]. The establishment of a government office in charge of Confucian studies and the National Academy (국학) in 628 marked the beginning of Confucian studies; it produced a quite important number of Confucian scholars. Approximately one hundred years later, in 717, portraits of Confucius and many of his disciples were brought from China and installed at the National Academy where Confucian and Chinese history were taught. We may also remark that it is not known whether Paekche did in fact establish a Confucian school. Nevertheless it should be noted that the Chinese-style Sôgi (書記/서기, the so-called 'Documentary Records') of Paekche was produced in the fourth century.

Regarding Neo-Confucianism, this philosophy was first introduced during the closing years of the Koryo Dynasty (918–1392). According to Kim Daeyol, a researcher affiliated to INALCO (Paris, France), the rulers of the Chosun Dynasty (1392–1910) adopted Neo-Confucianism as their national ideology.[10] Furthermore Yi Hye Gyung, a research professor in the Institute of Humanities of the Seoul National University, emphasized that Neo-Confucianism influenced the Chosun Dynasty even more than it did Japan and China. Neo-Confucian scholars thought that in accordance to world-view of Neo-Confucianism, the ethical ability of the individual could generate peace in the universe.[11]

The rise of Neo-Confucianism led to the sudden decline of Buddhism in Korea. At the beginning of the fifteenth century, King Taejong (태종대왕) inaugurated a clearly anti-Buddhist policy by reducing the number of monasteries and temples. One of his successors, King Saejong (세종대왕) tolerated Buddhism, as an example ordering the construction of the Buddhist Wongak temple in Seoul. In the sixteenth century, Buddhism became the religion of the uneducated and rural population; thus Neo-Confucianism became the dominant value system of the leadership of the Choson (조선) Dynasty (1392–1910). During the Choson Dynasty, Korean kings made the Neo-Confucian doctrine of the Chinese philosopher Zhou Xi their ideology.[12] According to Wang Sixiang, a researcher from

[9]   Koguryo, Paekche and Shilla were the three kingdoms of Korea which ruled over the Korean peninsula between 57 BC and 668 AD.

[10]   Kim, 'The Social and Cultural Presence of Buddhism…', p. 213.

[11]   H. G. Yi, 'Changes in the Concept of *Yulli*', *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 2, December 2011, p. 238.

[12]   Kim Haboush, Ja Hyun, *A Heritage of Kings: One Man's Monarchy in the Confucian World*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, p. 234.

Columbia University, the concept of filiality is a part of the extensive state-sponsored project for the promulgation of Neo-Confucian morality in early Choson. [13] Although it was a foreign philosophy, Korean Neo-Confucian scholars played a role in adapting Zhou Xi's teachings to Korean conditions. This had to be realized without denying the cultural superiority of China as the homeland of civilization. Looking at history, we may note that traditional ties between Korea and China (especially during the rule of the Han dynasty) are deeply rooted in Korean history, and also naturally forced Korea to become Confucian.

3. Confucianism in Japan

As we mentioned in the previous part, the territorial and therefore cultural expansion of the Han dynasty was the time for the introduction of Confucian [14] texts and teachings, not only in Korea, but also into Japan via the Korean kingdom of Paekche in the mid-6th century.

It must be noted that an ancient Japanese text, the *Records of Ancient Matters* (*Kojiki*, 712), relates that earlier, Keun Ch'ogo, the ruler of the kingdom of Paekche, had sent an instructor named Wani, along with a piece of the *Analects* and another Chinese text, the *Thousand Character Classic* (*Qianziwen*; Japanese: *Senjimon*), to the ruler of Yamato around 400 AD. [15] Presumably the intent was to instruct the Yamato prince in the principles of Confucianism. In this way Paekche served as an effective transmitter of Confucian texts and scholars in the mid-6th century. In Japan, Confucian ideals played a major role in the development of ethical philosophy. This was especially true during Japan's formative years (6th to 9th centuries), when Confucianism was introduced. The first patron of Confucianism in Japan was Prince Shotoku Taishi who lived during the 6th century. He enacted a Constitution of 17 acts which established Confucian ideals and Buddhist ethics as the pillars of Japan. During the Edo Period[16] (1600–1868), neo-Confucianism appeared, relatively later than in the Korean peninsula, and became an ideology for the government and the elites of the country. Neo-Confucianism completely broke from the moral supremacy of Buddhism. During these times, the Japanese society was already deeply keen on Confucianism; people would think that a given social concept was "a Japanese value" instead of thinking that it was simply a Confucian value. The role of ancient history cannot be omitted and underestimated either; Confucianism is very strong in Japan because it affects and was affected by Shinto, the indigenous religion of Japan. The moral code in this religion is partly based on Confucian teachings; and so the spirit of Shinto reinforced the Confucian base within Japan. However it has to be said that although Confucianism was adopted by the Tokugawa regime, it had a limited influence on educational institutions. Going further, during the Meiji government (1868–1911), Confucian thoughts were used to

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[13] S. Wang, 'The Filial Daughter of Kwaksan: Finger Severing, Confucian Virtues, and Envoy Poetry in Early Choson', *Seoul Journal of Korean Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 2, December 2012, p. 177.

[14] The most commonly used references to Confucianism in Japanese history, traditional and modern, are the terms *Jugaku* and *Jukyô*. In these, *Ju* is the Japanese reading of the Chinese word *Ru*, literally referring to 'weaklings'.

[15] Peter Nosco, *Confucianism and Tokugawa Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 22.

[16] Ibid., p. 45; Gino Piovesana, *Recent Japanese Philosophical Thought, 1862–1996: A Survey*, Richmond: Curzon Press, 1997.

advocate nationalism.[17] The relationship between the emperor and the people was also compared to that of father and son, and thus loyalty was emphasized, an element which may be compared to Confucianism in the Korean peninsula.[18]

4. Confucianism in Modern Korea

As an introduction to the notion of Confucianism in modern Korea and Japan, we have first to discuss the compatibility between Confucianism and the notion of modern society. The following question arises: Is it possible to reconcile a Confucian vision of heavenly and human nature with the modern world with its ethics and political system? According to Jonghwan Lee, a South Korean researcher, it seems so, because many people are disappointed with Western values and have thus returned to their roots, to the Confucian model.[19] It has to be said clearly that the relation between Confucianism and modern society is a very complicated issue because Confucianism is much more focused on historical elements than on the future.

In order to understand contemporary Korean society, we must take account of the fact that its basic premise is the presence of Confucianism in the daily life of Koreans. This means that in order to understand the significance of Confucian influence in the Korean peninsula, we must be sensitive to the specific contexts in which Confucianism is being discussed.

As of today, Neo-Confucian temples and educational institutions are contending with a range of modern practices.[20] Many elements of Neo-Confucian thought still exist in the daily administration (loyalty to an organization, long-time contracts, difficulties changing jobs…). It should also be emphasized that Neo-Confucian instruction disappeared from school curricula after World War II[21]. However after the rebirth of Confucianism in the late 1990s, a growing interest in Korean Confucianism reemerged in many countries of the Far East, albeit for different reasons in each country.[22] As an example, since around the year 2000 it has become fashionable to reconstruct the graves and memorial stones of a ancestor, or to open private museums for

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[17] Richard Reitan, *Making a Moral Society: Ethics and the State in Meiji Japan*, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2010, p. 18.

[18] Regarding North Korea and Confucianism, the North Korean society is often described as being Confucian or Neo-Confucian. It seems that this system has borrows a lot from the ideology known as Legalism which was adopted by the Wei state of the first Chinese emperor. In the 14th century all books of philosophy other than Legalist tracts were burnt. This doctrine as implemented during China's Ming dynasty (1364–1644) is a re-interpretation of Confucian teachings.

[19] K. Tamai, J. Lee, 'Confucianism as Cultural Constraint: A Comparison of Confucian Values of Japanese and Korean University Students', *International Education Journal*, Vol. 3, No. 5, 2002, p. 35.

[20] Torbjörn Lodén, *Rediscovering Confucianism, a Major Philosophy of Life in East Asia*, Folkestone: Global Oriental Media, 2006, p. 98.

[21] Regarding Neo-Confucian education, see J. K. Lee, 'Confucian Thought Affecting the Leadership and Organizational Culture of Korean Higher Education', *Radical Pedagogy*, December 2001, Vol. 3, No. 3; and James Huntley Grayson, *Korea – A Religious Country*, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002, p. 40–50.

[22] Xinzhong Yao, *Konfucjanizm. Wprowadzenie* [Confucianism. Introduction], Kraków: Wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2009, p. 274–275.

local scholars. [23] Regarding this issue, we may add that Korean funeral rites are currently the product of a mixture of influences from both Christianity and Confucianism.

The notion of filial piety[24] is also still upheld in South Korean tradition, especially with the importance of respect for the teacher (students do not call their teacher by name but by function – Korean: *seongsaengim*. Some Korean traditions such as the tea ceremony [25] and flower arranging follow Confucian principles.[26]

5. Confucianism in Modern Japan

An important legacy of Confucian philosophy derives from the history of modern Japan.[27] This was apparent in the transition from the Tokugawa period to the Meiji period (1868–1912), i.e. the restoration of imperial rule. Confucianism can be considered as an ideology which tends to see ideals in the past. This ideology advocates a return to a 'golden age' as a great way to improve conditions in the present. The political transformation giving rise to the Meiji imperial regime was in a way a return to an ancient mode [28], and Confucianism had already served as a kind of state philosophy during the Edo era (1603–1868). Some researchers underlined that the Confucianism of the Edo period is ultimately responsible for the modernization of Japan by underlining the role of harmony between employees. This harmony led to an increase in productivity per employee, and to an overall growth of the Japanese economy.[29] Some Edo researchers also tried to mix traditional values with Confucianism: Yamaga Soko (1622–1685) in his military book *Bukyo Yuroku* bases his military theories on Japanese and Confucian cultures. His book has also had a great impact on Japanese military tradition.[30]

As another example of the importance of Confucianism to Japan today is that the modern word for a college or university, *daigaku* (derived from the Chinese *daxue*) is an allusion to the title of the first of the four books of Neo-Confucianism, the *Daxue* (*The Great Learning*), a text that was understood as the gateway to learning for adults.

6. Similarities between Confucianism in Korea and in Japan

Certain of similarities in the role of Confucianism in Korea and Japan may be noted. The crucial concept of harmony is one of the core Confucian ideas, a key value in Japanese and

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[23] Tu Wei Ming, *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity – Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996, p. 211–213.

[24] Between 1948 and the early 1960s, the use of the traditional Confucian expression 'Show filial piety to your parents' was officially avoided in the state's ideology. Those who are married and families receive protection from the State. It is strongly affirmed that families are the cells of the society and shall be well taken care of by the State.

[25] Oliver Ansart, *L'empire du rite: La pensée politique d'Ogyū Sorai*, Genève: Droz, 1998, p. 38.

[26] The Korean language has many different registers of speech that can also be traced back to the five types of relationships defined by Confucius.

[27] Wiesław Kotański, *W kręgu shintoizmu* [In the circle of Shinto], Warszawa: Wyd. Dialog, 1995, p. 73–85.

[28] Robert Bellah, *Tokugawa Religion: The Cultural Roots of Modern Japan*, New York: The Free Press, 1985, p. 23–30; Martin Collcutt, 'The Confucian Legacy in Japan', in *The East Asian Region: Confucian Heritage and Its Modern Adaptation*, Gilbert Rozman (ed.), Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

[29] Kato Shuishi, *Réevaluation du Confucianisme*, Cahiers d'Extrê me-Asie, Vol. 6, 1991, p. 211.

[30] *Le Japon*, Paris: L'Harmattan, 1993, p. 163.

Korean society, and a concept that has helped to shape both Korea and Japan's political cultures.[31] Any form of open conflict is avoided. According to Torbjörn Lodén[32], harmony can be considered as the guiding philosophy for the Japanese and Korean civilizations in familial and business relations. Torbjörn Lodén also mentions that Korean and Japanese children are taught to act in harmony with the surrounding order, starting from the pre-school period. Therefore in both countries there is a great emphasis on politeness, on working together for the universal, rather than on an individual basis.

The concept of education in Korean and Japanese civilizations is dominated by the fundamental principles of Confucian education. Both the Korean and Japanese systems are very similar[33]. Many Confucian texts refer to the field of education. The 'educator/ instructor' is not only present in educational institutions alone but also in various kind of societies and administrations. The title of 'chief instructor' is therefore very common in Japan and Korea[34]. However we must remember that the Japanese government tried to extirpate Confucianism from the school curriculum; in 1958, the Ministry of Education introduced a new curriculum which contained no references to prewar lessons such as loyalty or etiquette. In other words, elements related to Confucianism were deleted[35].

According to Albert Pilot, both Korea and Japan societies are highly "collectivistic" societies[36]. In these kinds of societies, each person born dissolves into a collective entity, either the family or the group. In both countries, more emphasis is placed on group orientation and loyalty to the group, for it is the group that gives one a social identity, provides a feeling of security, and receives the rewards of service[37]. For example in South Korea, people are attached to various churches which provide them an identity and a path to follow. In Japan, we can notice that businesses (Japanese: 系列, Korean: 재벌) offer their workers total integration within their entire structures (Korean and Japanese companies are very large structures). For example, Toyota created various educational institutions for its workers and for people with some industrial knowledge and work experience (the so-called Toyota Technological Institute). Regarding integration into a structure, in Korean companies new employees are indoctrinated to regard their workplaces as a family where the company director (or

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[31] Tamai, Lee, 'Confucianism as Cultural Constraint…', p. 33–49. Arranged marriages are serve to maintain group harmony. O. Barbasiewicz, 'The Japanese Family System from the Meiji Restoration until the 21st Century', *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia*, No. 22, 2009, p. 8.

[32] Lodén, *Rediscovering Confucianism*, p. 143.

[33] A point on which Japan and South Korea are rather similar is the huge importance attached to university entrance examinations. Furthermore, the educational systems of Japan and South Korea are basically very similar. All children used to go to elementary school for six years, and then to senior high schools for three years. As for higher education, both countries have two-year junior colleges, four-year universities, and graduate schools.

[34] Tu, *Confucian Traditions…*, p. 208.

[35] Ibid., p. 165.

[36] N. Phuong-Mai, C. Terlouw, A. Pilot, 'Cooperative Learning vs. Confucian Heritage Culture's Collectivism: Confrontation to Reveal Some Cultural Conflict and Mismatch', *Asia Europe Journal*, October 2005, Vol. 3, Issue 3, p. 404.

[37] Daniel A. Bell, Hahm Chaibong, *Confucianism for the Modern World*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 34–42.

rather the president) is the head of the family who appreciate contact with workers (family members), leading to formulations such as 'the Samsung family', 'the Toyota family', 'the Hyundai family' and so on.[38] This leads to the conclusion expressed by the Chinese researcher Tu Wei Ming, who underlined in his research papers that the owner/managers of small factories are in large measure examples of Confucian values: paternalistic, conservative and traditionalist.[39]

Regarding loyalty (Korean: 충송한은) to the group and to the leader, we can also notice that loyalty to elders and to the leader is extremely prominent within Korean society (both North and South) and in Japan. In North Korea loyalty toward Kim Il Sung was extremely important until he died in 1994. The entire society also expressed its respect towards him through ceremonies and rituals[40], similar to the Choson era. Regarding South Korea, loyalty toward leaders is less demonstrative, although South Korean policy-makers have used the concept of loyalty towards the United States, for example.[41]

Regarding economic matters, it can be seen that the Confucian values of the common good and hard work are shared in South Korea and Japan. Observing the financial crisis which happened in the late 2000s, it can be noted that Japan and South Korea very quickly recovered from the crisis. This was due to the leadership of these countries (a kind of collaboration between the political and business elite) which mobilized the society to confront problems.

7. Differences between Confucianism in Korea and Japan

First it has to be underlined that there are subtle but significant differences between Japan and South Korea, in terms of their levels of economic development and education[42]. We can then deduce that these factors have clearly impacted the economic and political development of these two countries.

Korean Confucianism stresses particular social relationships, but it is also a universal moral code, which made it easy for the Japanese to adopt[43]. The Japanese have of course transformed it in their way, and therefore some of the Confucian concepts concerning relationships carry a different meaning from those in Korea. The Korean morality is especially definite regarding the family structure and all blood-related family clans. This is why the former leader of North Korea Kim Il Sung always considered himself the 'father' of the Koreans.[44] Regarding Japan, these kind of relations are not only associated with the family

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[38] Tu, *Confucian Traditions*…, p. 220.

[39] Ibid., p. 273.

[40] Example of celebrations regarding Kim Il Sung: the birthday of Kim Il Sung (April 15, 1912), the return of Kim Il Sung to North Korea (August 22, 1945), the death of Kim Il Sung (July 8, 1994).

[41] *조상들의 충효사상 고취 시킨다* [Filial piety and loyalty inspire ancestral history], *Chosun Ilbo*, April 16, 2012.

[42] The systems are similar, but competition among pupils and students is more important in Korea than in Japan.

[43] Tu, *Confucian Traditions*…, p. 164.

[44] *Kim Il Sung and Korea*, Pyongyang: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1982, p. 240. For example, the Party openly describes Kim Il Sung as a god – the "Sun of Love", "superior to Christ in love, superior to Buddha in benevolence, superior to Confucius in virtue and superior to Mohammed in justice". Jasper Becker, *Rogue Regime: Kim Jong Il and the Looming Threat of North Korea*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 77.

but also to the larger group with no blood relations. This is an important reason for why the notion of clans is prevalent in Japan. We can thus deduce that when a conflict between two entities appears, loyalty takes precedence over filial piety (i.e. a filial child is recognized only if a person gives a loyal service to a superior).[45]

Regarding nationalism and heterogeneity, which are fundamental values of the Confucian model, Korean organizations are much more tolerant. Koreans are much more interested in foreigners; they accept people from abroad and move around outside Korea fairly freely. Japanese society is more homogeneous and less open to foreign cultures.[46] Korea's heterogeneity is probably due to the geographical situation of Korea (which is a peninsula and not an island like Japan) and to historical elements. The Korean peninsula has been attacked by both Chinese and Japanese forces of conquest. During and after the Korean War, South Korea was in contact with UN and American forces. Japan, meanwhile, is considered as one of the most insular countries, possibly because it has almost never been the target of massive foreign invasion.[47]

8. Conclusion

The importance of Confucianism in Japanese and Korean history is undeniable: Confucian philosophy in Korea and Japan came to be the dominant system of their modern worldviews. Its legacy is apparent in any number of ways in modern Korean and Japanese discourse (especially in the fields of economy, education, humanities, the approach to foreigners, et al.). It also seems that Korea (both North and South) is more Confucian than Japan. This is due to various factors. First Korea was under more influence from China than Japan was. Secondly, Korea did not have any 'state religions' playing the role which Shintoism did in Japan. Finally, the geographical issue of Japan's isolation cut it off from foreign influences (including Chinese Confucianism and its derivatives). Furthermore, historians have neglected the influence of Christianity in the late Choson dynasty. The surprising flourishing of this religion in Korea was brought about by interactions with foreign partners such as Europe and Japan. Catholicism, which was authorized in Korea, played a significant role in the spread of this religion over the Korean population. On the contrary, Catholicism was prohibited in Japan in the 17th century, therefore reducing its impact on Japanese civilization. In more general terms, it is necessary to emphasize that during the great majority of its long history, Korea was not a hermit kingdom, and only came under the influence of Confucianism in the Choson dynasty, in contrast to Japan, which tried to protect its own model of social development more strongly.

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[45] *Opinion Survey on Social Consciousness*, Public Relations Office, March 19, 2001. Available at http://online.sfsu.edu/sguo/courses/psc411.ch1_ChineseJapanese_Confucianism.doc (accessed 1.06.2013). Such conflicts/frictions are always avoided on a national scale. Therefore Korea and Japan adopted an economic model where specialization (especially in the electronics industry) would help international coexistence.

[46] S. Aubrey, 'A Cross-Cultural Discussion of Japan and South Korea and How Differences Are Manifested in the ESL/EFL Classroom', *Asian Social Science*, Vol. 5, No. 5, May 2009.

[47] Jeffrey Hays, *Japanese Society: Wa, Confucianism, Homogenity, Conformity, Individualism and Hierarchies*: http://factsanddetails.com/japan.php?itemid=642&catid=18#07 (accessed 20.05.2013).

DAVID ADEBAHR

Japan's Security Policy in the 21ˢᵗ Century – New Implication's for an Old Strategy ?

Abstract

While Japan has been allying constantly with the United States during the Cold War, new conditions in a multi-polar world since the early 1990s and new threat perceptions – namely due to the awareness of the phenomenon called 'global terrorism' – have shaped Japan's security perceptions. Based on the dichotomous approach of 'fear of abandonment' vs. 'fear of entrapment', this article seeks to clarify the motivations for Japan strengthening its alliance with the US after 2001 to counter-balance emerging threats in East Asia.

1. Introduction

After Japan's defeat in the Second World War, Japan remained occupied by the US and was ruled by the Supreme Command for the Allied Powers (SCAP) under General MacArthur until regaining it's full sovereignty in 1952 by signing the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Yoshida Shigeru, Prime Minister from 1946–1947 and 1948–1954, introduced the so-called Yoshida Doctrine, which involved focusing Japan's domestic policy firmly on economic recovery and restructuring Japan's industry, while giving up the country's sovereign right of self-defense to the United States, i.e. SCAP under General MacArthur, and keeping a low diplomatic and foreign policy profile. Due to this policy, Japan experienced nearly four decades of economic prosperity. Later, as a consequence of Prime Minister Sato's nuclear principles and Japan's acceding to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1969, Japan has since then depended on Washington's nuclear deterrence capacity. However, due to these nuclear principles, Japan will neither possess nor allow the production of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. Furthermore, Japan will never permit the deployment of nuclear weapons on Japanese territory. As a result, in view of a potential nuclear crises on the Korean peninsula or in areas surrounding Japan, or with respect to counter the military expansion of China, expecting Japan to support a nuclear war or American measures to build up nuclear deterrence within Japan does not seem to be an option.[1]

This paper will analyze Japan's shifting security strategy in the 21ˢᵗ century with regards to systemic external determinants. Following the analytical approach of the neoclassical realist approach in International Relation Theory, this paper argues that Japan has been

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[1]   Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, 'Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable', in *The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices*, Kurt Campbell, Robert Einhorn and Mitchell Reiss (eds.), Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp. 218–253.

following a 'bandwagoning' strategy to ensure its safety under the US security umbrella within a bipolar system during the Cold War. In view of a potential abandonment by the US after the end of the Cold War, Japan has been expanding instead of abandoning its alliance with the US by constantly shouldering more of the military and financial burden within the context of the bilateral alliance. Reviewing the theoretical approaches of international scholars such as Kenneth Waltz, Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller has supported this assumption.[2] Even though these three scholars differ slightly in their theoretical assumptions, all of them would support the thesis of Japan still following a bandwagoning strategy by allying with the US. Therefore this *fear of possible abandonment* after the Cold War, along with the benefit of reducing transaction costs by already institutionalized cooperation (as regime theory suggests), then led to a continuation of the bilateral alliance with the US and to the expansion of Japan's military capacities during the 1990s and thereafter. To strengthen the bilateral alliance, Japan participated in cooperation with the US in various military conflicts – backed by UN mandates or simply legitimated by US foreign policy interests.[3] This strengthening of the bilateral alliance by Japan's pro-active participation in military actions after the year 2000 mainly resulted in a fear of abandonment, a potential loss of external threat that delegitimized the bilateral security alliance with the US. However, in East Asia, one could argue that the Cold War system did not end in 1989 in East Asia, for Japan was – and is – still facing a nuclear-armed China along with North Korea's nuclear ambitions. As a result one could argue that the bipolar system of Cold War world order has not yet ended in East Asia. This paper will argue that Japan's participation in the War on Terror offered Tokyo a convenient opportunity to strengthen its bilateral alliance with Washington in view of a militarily expending China, regional territory disputes with various Asian neighbors and a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea. This paper will thus analyze how the War on Terror and the emerging nuclear threat posed by North Korea, along with an economically and military expanding China have been shaping the Japanese defense strategy in the 21st century. By a deeper understanding of the constituent elements of these agents in Asia, such as threat perception, the security agenda and military development, this paper will help to assess these policies more precisely against this background.

2. Japanese defense policy during the 1990s – a prelude to change?

Japan's foreign and security policy during the 1990s already marked a turning point regarding threat perception and participation in multilateral operations under the UN's mandate. Having been one of the main financial contributors to the United Nations since the 1970s, Japan has always regarded an institutionally-based foreign policy as a key factors in its own foreign policy. However, with a newly structured international system,

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[2]   Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Politics', *International Security*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1993, pp. 44–79; Stephen Walt, 'The Progressive Power of Realism', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 91, No. 4, 1997, pp. 3–43; Stephen Walt, 'Why Alliances Endure or Collapse', *Security Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1997, pp. 174–196; Randall Schweller, 'Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back in', *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, 1994, pp. 72–107.

[3]   Robert Keohane (ed.), *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World of Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

the end of the Cold War and with new threats on the rise, Japan contributed to UN peacekeeping operations for the first time by sending military personnel.[4]

Furthermore, Japan intensified its participation in international regimes in East Asia – namely in cooperation with other ASEAN states – enforcing a complementary approach to its foreign policy strategy.[5]

Nethertheless, even though Japan was evolving a more multilateral approach in its foreign policy, this did not mean Tokyo intended to abandon its bilateral alliance with the United States dating back to the post-war period. Japan was rather forced to expand this alliance by various security amendments over time. As a matter of fact, Prime Minister Koizumi assured Washington of Japan's full support for the US's War on Terror, following the September 11th attacks.

Given the increasingly threatening situation in East Asia, it is remarkable that the Japanese National Defense Guidelines, first drawn up in 1976, had not been adjusted since 1995, and only started to be implemented in 1997.[6] On the other hand, this indicates how the new multipolar situation and the uncertain future of the bilateral alliance had been disturbing Japan during the 1990s. Also, this underlines Japan's extreme dependency on the US, and its conviction that there was no alternative to this alliance.

Regarding bilateral relations between Tokyo and its neighboring countries, such as Vietnam, South Korea and also China, remaining within the bilateral alliance with the US whilst keeping military contributions to this alliance relatively low, Japan could lower the risk of provoking distrust concerning a potential remilitarization among these countries.[7]

The Gulf War in 1991 marked a turning point in Japan/US relations. When Washington asked Japan to contribute to Operation *Desert Storm*, constitutional restrictions and domestic political considerations generated distrust and irritations. The Japanese post-war constitution limits the options to deploy military personnel in overseas missions. The constitutions states that

> "Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) To accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized".[8]

However, Japan acknowledges the right of collective self-defense. During the UN mandated operation *Desert Storm* in 1991, Japan supported the operation both financially,

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[4]   Katsumi Ishizuka, 'Japan and UN Peace Options', *Japanese Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 5, No. 1, 2004, pp. 137–157.

[5]   Christopher Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power*, London: Oxford University Press, 2004, p. 117.

[6]   Andrew Oros, *Normalizing Japan. Politics, Identity and the Evolution of Security Practice*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008, p. 176.

[7]   Richard Samuels, *Securing Japan. Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, London, 2007, pp. 2–3.

[8]   Japanese Ministry of Defense, http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/d_policy/dp01.html (accessed 15.05.2013).

with US$13 billion, and by contributing *Jieitai* personnel[9] and equipment to evacuate refugees from the Emirate of Kuwait, along with six SDF minesweeper vessels.[10] As a result, Japan was internationally isolated and Tokyo's foreign policy was labeled as 'checkbook diplomacy' since Japan refrained from participating in military actions to free Kuwait. The United States were especially disappointed by Japan's limited military support, commenting on Tokyo's slow actions as being too little, too late.[11] With respect to these experiences, one can easily understand the Japanese motivation to assure Washington of its wholehearted commitment in the vein of the War on Terror and the attacks on September 11th.

While international isolation and Washington's disappointment about Japan's refusal to participate more actively in multilateral military operations created a clear fear of abandonment in Japan, it was not until Prime Minister Hashimoto's term in office that Japan tried to strengthen ties with Washington and create a new atmosphere of mutual trust among both countries. On April 17, 1996, Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton signed the Japan/US Acquisition and Cross-Serving Agreement (ACSA, *niche-bei anzen hoshō kyōdō sengen*) which allowed the bilateral support of fuel and emergency supplies as well as rear-area support for US troops by the Japanese Self-Defense forces.[12] Further, it extended the tasks of the bilateral alliance to intelligence sharing, missile defense and a common China policy. Therefore, experts regard the Hashimoto-Clinton agreement of 1996 as the first wholehearted reassertion of the bilateral alliance since the end of the Cold War.[13]

In fact, this affirmation marked the first turning point in Japanese foreign policy and the strategic realignment of the bilateral alliance. The new ACSA Agreement redefined the geographical implications of possible SDF deployment by stating that military operations are not necessarily limited to the Far East any more, but could be extended to areas, "where situations have arisen that threaten Japan's security".[14] Moreover, due to the definition of the SDF's security tasks as protecting Japan's security in "areas around Japan" (*nihon no shūhen*,日本の周辺), the new security guidelines of 1997 determine Japan's security interests as no longer being defined by certain geographic areas but rather by Japan's national interests that should be protected wherever they seem to be endangered.[15] Along with these expansions, the new Defense Guidelines define Japan's security interest to be carried out mainly in the *Far East,* although they fail to explain to what geographic region this term applies to.

Even though a number of regimes have been established in East Asia to support regional integration, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which includes 27 member states

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[9]   The Japanese Self-Defence Forces are referred as *Jieitai* 自衛隊, in Japanese.

[10]   Oros, *Normalizing Japan…*, pp. 86–87.

[11]   Yukio Okamoto, 'Japan and the United States: The Essential Alliance', *The Washington Quaterly*, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2002, p. 63; Jonathan Watts, 'Japan Revisits the Gulf War', *The Guardian*, 20.9.2001, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/worlddispatch.afghanistan (accessed 30.04.2013).

[12]   Bhubhindar Singh, 'Japan's Post-cold War Security Policy: Bringing Back the Normal State', *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2002, p. 89.

[13]   Akiyama Masahiro, 'Japan's Security Policy toward the 21st Century', *The RUSI Journal*, Vol. 143, No. 2, 1998, p. 8.

[14]   Ibid., p. 10.

[15]   Ibidem.

to strengthen bilateral relations and to reduce transaction costs when cooperating in areas such as collective defense policy, the success of international organizations in East Asia remains limited. Since all three major agents of the East Asian security system participate in these regimes, Japan, China and South Korea are likewise prone to mutually block each other. For example, this was the case during the North Korean nuclear crises in 1998, the incidents in the Taiwan Strait, and the fallout Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo's proposal to establish multilateral cost guard cooperation.[16]

Besides, Japan has been successfully expanding its bilateral security cooperation with other countries such as Australia since 1996, and Singapore and Canada since 1997. Furthermore, Japan has established bilateral security dialogues with Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia during the 1990s' however, these forum for cooperation are rather informal and of low importance for Japan's security strategy.[17]

As shown above, during the 1990s Japan was looking for new ways to implement other security aspects in its national security agenda, apart from its omnipresent bilateral alliance with Washington. A key issue in this approach was the attempt to enhance Japan's international role through contributing to the UN budget, as well as through participating in United Nations peace keeping operations. Japan had been second only to the US in its financial support of the United Nation's budget, since 1988.[18] Covering 19.629% (roughly US$500 million) of the UN budget in 2001, Japan remained second, behind the US (with 22%) and ahead of Germany (with 9.825%).[19] This trend remained consistent in the following years; in 2010, those three countries are still the top financial contributors to the United Nations. Japan is the second largest contributor to the United Nations Regular Budget with US$264.959.464 (12,53%), while the US contributes US$532.453.102 (22%) and Germany covering roughly 8% of the budget with $139.648.230 (6,6%).[20] These figures illustrate the high value and importance Japan attaches to the purposes and functions of international organizations as agents within the international system for promoting international peace and stability.

Also, triggered by the experiences of the Gulf War and the subsequent nationwide debate about a possible revision of Article 9 of the post-war constitution, the Japanese Diet passed the *Act on Cooperation for United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and Other Operations* in June 1992 extending Japan's participation in UN peace keeping operations.[21] This bill expanded Japan's means of cooperation in UN peace keeping missions,

[16]   Toshi Yoshihara, 'Japan's Emerging Strategic Posture in Asia: Headed Toward Leadership or Rivalry?', in *Strategic Stability in Asia*, Amit Gupta (ed.), Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008, pp. 59–86.

[17]   Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 17 nenban. Nihon no bōei: Bōei hakusho* [The Defense of Japan 2005: Defense White Paper], Tōkyō: Gyōsei, 2005, p. 187.

[18]   Tsuneo Akaha, 'Japan's Comprehensive Security Policy: A New East Asian Environment', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 31, No. 4, 1991, p. 329.

[19]   Peter Opitz, *Die Vereinten Nationen. Geschichte, Struktur, Perspektiven* [The United Nations. History, Structure, Perspectives], Dachau: Bayerische Landeszentrale für Politische Bildung (ed.), Dachau: Hofmann-Medien Druck und Verlag GmbH, 2002, p. 30.

[20]   Marjorie Ann Browne and Luisa Blanchfield, *United Nations Regular Budget Contributions: Members Compared, 1990–2010*, Congressional Research Service (ed.), 2013, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL30605.pdf (accessed 24.08.2013).

[21]   Toshiya Nakamura, *Transforming Japan's Security Policy: Diplomacy and Domestic Politics*, Melbourne: Asian Studies Association of Australia, 2008, p. 10.

humanitarian relief operations, election monitoring etc., as long as the following 'Five Principles' are met:

1. Agreement on the ceasefire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflicts.
2. The parties to the conflict, including the territorial states, shall have given their consent to deployment of the peacekeeping force and Japan's participation in the force.
3. The peacekeeping force shall maintain strict impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to satisfy the government of Japan, she may withdraw its contingent.
5. Use of weaponry shall be limited to a minimum necessary to protect personnel's lives.[22]

Where there is the necessity to expand the tasks of SDF personnel in UNPK operations that are not covered by the UNPKO-Law, the Japanese Diet has to decide individually on the possible broadening of these boundaries.[23] Based on this law, Japan participated in UN Peace Keeping Operations in Afghanistan 2001, Angola 1992, Bosnia (1998 and 2000), Cambodia (1992–93), El Salvador (1994), the Golan Heights (1996), Iraq (2003), Kosovo (2001), Mozambique (1992–94), Rwanda (1994) and Timor-Leste (2001–2004) with 4633 SDF members in total.[24] Japan participated in the UN disaster relief mission in Indonesia as part of the humanitarian aid for the victims of the 2004 tsunami in the Indian Ocean, deploying 1000 SDF members, three rescue vessels, five helicopters and two C-130 military transport aircrafts.[25]

Even though this increase in participation in UN peace keeping operations during the 1990s is remarkable, this cannot be seen as a fundamental change in Japan's security agenda. There are probably several reasons for this: on the one hand, participating in UNPKO gave Japan an opportunity to act outside of the bilateral alliance with the United States and still bear responsibility on an international basis. Second, contributing to UN missions, not only financially but also with military equipment and SDF personnel, helped Japan to regain its international reputation, especially among its East Asian neighbors. However, this shift towards a more proactive foreign policy was rather negligible compared to Japan's participation in the War on Terror, in particular by carrying out counter-piracy missions in the Indian Ocean in 2001.

In any case, the extended participation in UN missions during the 1990s clearly indicate Tokyo's attempt to strengthen the US–Japan Alliance, caused by a fear of the potential abandonment by Washington after the end of the Cold War and the demise of potential direct threat posed to Japan by Soviet nuclear capacities. However, Japan's participation

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[22] William Middlebrooks, *Beyond Pacifism. Why Japan Must Become a 'Normal' Nation*, Westport: Praeger Security International, 2008, p. 41.

[23] Ibidem.

[24] Japanese Foreign Ministry (ed.), A record of Japan's International Peace Cooperation Activities based on the International Peace Cooperation Law can be found on: www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/pko/pamph2005-2.pdf (accessed 31.05.2013).

[25] Toshi Yoshihara, 'Japan's Emerging Strategic Posture in Asia…', p. 73.

in UN peace keeping cooperation was not uncontroversial. In fact, these missions not only conflicted with the Japanese constitution, but they also did not correspond with traditional geopolitical assumptions among Asian countries, in which UN peace keeping operations were considered to undermine the sovereignty of those countries in which UN troops were deployed to settle conflicts.[26] Acharya claims this resistance to UN peace keeping operations is deeply rooted in Asia's geopolitical culture, in which certain artifacts from the Cold War era still remain and determine the awareness of the principle of non-intervention in those countries.[27]

Irrespective of the constrains and obstacles United Nations peace keeping operations pose, Japan still regards international organizations as of fundamental concern to its foreign policy – despite its bilateral alliance with Washington.

Amendments to the legal framework of the bilateral alliance, newly introduced laws, and emerging the threats towards the end of the decade, such as the 1998 North Korean missile test, established a turn in the bilateral alliance. A fundamental result of this turn was Japan's foreign policy after the attacks of September 11th when Prime Minister Koizumi assured military support to the US and Japan participated in the anti-piracy Mission in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden for the first time fighting terrorism within a multilateral alliance that did not perform as a humanitarian mission. In fact, this participation in oversea missions with MSDF combat vessels marked another turning point in evolving a more pro-active approach in Japan's foreign policy, as happend several times in the years following.[28] The participation in US War on Terror, as presented in MSDF's participation in missions in the Indian Ocean can be interpreted as an attempt to strengthen the bilateral alliance with the US, with regards to North Korea as a potential emerging nuclear power, and due to Japan's experiences following the Gulf War in 1990/91 when Japan declined the US any military support. Following the assuptions of Stephen Walt and Randall Schweller, one could interpret Japan's participation in the War on Terror as an attempt to strengthen Tokyo's 'bandwagoning' strategy via Washington and to demonstrate its ability to share responsibility within the bilateral alliance. As a result, the bilateral alliance would create trust among the two allies and ensure US support for Japan and protection under Washington's nuclear deterrence umbrella, since the nuclear threat posed by North Korea became more and more relevant to Japan after 1998.[29]

Therefore the emergence of a more flexible and more proactive Japanese Self-Defense Force participating in the War on Terror was not completely unforeseen, but rather a further development of a strategy that had already been introduced in the 1990s.

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[26] Satomi Ho, 'Japan's Human Security Policy: A Critical Review of its Limits and Failures', *Japanese Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 2008, pp. 106–107.

[27] Amitav Acharya, 'Redefining the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Intervention', *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 3, 2001, pp. 378–379.

[28] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 18 nenban. Nihon no bōei: Bōei hakusho* [The Defense of Japan 2006: Defense White Paper], Tōkyō: Gyōsei, 2006, p. 74; *Japan Times* (22.06.2013), 'MSDF to join drill in Gulf of Aden', http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/06/22/national/msdf-to-join-drill-in-gulf-of-aden/#.UgJ5AX9GNqM (20.0.2913) (accessed 1.08.2013).

[29] Stephen Walt, 'Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power', *International Security*, Vol. 9, No. 4, 1985, pp. 3–43.

3. Regional threats and nuclear deterrence – Japan's emerging military cooperation

As described above, Japan's participation in the bilateral alliance was mainly financial and logistical during the Cold War. Since the Cold War had ended, Japan intended to strengthen the alliance and to assure its commitment to the US due to a fear of abandonment, since the direct threat posed by the Soviet Union had vanished. The expansion of the legal framework of the bilateral alliance and for Japan's participation in multilateral U.N. missions had already been introduced during the 1990s. For instance, on June 19, 1995 Japan passed the United Nations Peace Keeping Operation Law (*kokusai rengō heiwa iji katsudō nado ni taisuru kyōryoku ni kansuru hōritsu*) and introduced the National Program Defense Guidelines, defining Japan's long-term security strategy, to be revised every ten years. Also, new amendments to the US-Japan joint cooperation were introduced with regards to a possible military crisis that might occur in the Taiwan Strait. These amendments lowered the restrictions on SDF personnel arms and equipment.

Additionally, Japan's more proactive part in supporting the United States was further backed-up by the Armitage-Nye Report in 2000, increasing Japan's defense responsibilities within this framework.[30] These developments must be taken into account when investigating how Japan's security policy development after 2001 because they illustrate that the growing strategic implications for the Japan-US cooperation and the new definition of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces did not result from the change in global security architecture after September 11, 2001. A closer look reveals that a fear of abandonment and Japan's experience of international isolation after the Gulf War motivated the country to engage in multilateral alliances more actively. To this end, after the Gulf War 1990/91 Japan introduced new laws to make participations in United Nations Peace Keeping Operations possible and to expand the limitations of SDF personnel. On the other hand, it was exactly due to these legal expansions that Japan participated in US War on Terror as a strong ally. To conclude, Japan's introduction of the UNPKO Law and new legal expansions to be able to send military personnel to international conflict zones marked not only a first step in Japan's pro-active security strategy but also laid the foundation for its participation in out-of-area-missions after 2001, such as the Mission in the Gulf of Aden, the Indian Ocean 2001–2005, and the multilateral anti-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa.[31]

In fact, under the new Security Guidelines of 1995/97, the expansions of the UNPKO law, along with the introduction of Japan's security responsibility as defined by the 'surrounding areas' (*nihon no shūhen*) demonstrate that the strengthening of the bilateral alliance, mainly the militarly participation of Japanese forces within operations carried out by the US after 2001 were not all too surprising, since Japan had already expanded its military contributions to international missions during the 1990s.[32]

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[30] Emma Chanlett-Avery, *The US–Japan Alliance. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress*, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdf, 2011, pp. 3–4 (accessed 20.05.2013).

[31] Geoffrey Till, 'Chapter Four: Non-traditional missions', *Adelphi Series*, Vol. 52, No. 432–433, 2012, pp. 163–216; Japan Times, *Japan Times* (22.06.2013), 'MSDF to join drill in Gulf of Aden', http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2013/06/22/national/msdf-to-join-drill-in-gulf-of-aden/#.UgJ5AX9GNqM (accessed 20.07.2013).

[32] Oros, *Normalizing Japan...*, pp. 86–87.

These developments were in fact direct results of structural changes within the bilateral alliance that were introduced during the 1990s to strengthen Japan's role as a strategic partner in East Asia.

Beginning in 2001, the Koizumi administration passed three laws to reinforce Japan's position within the bilateral cooperation system with the US the *Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law* (テロ対策特別措置法) by October 2001, the law on *Japan's International Peace Cooperation Activities based on the International Peace Cooperation* (国際連合平和維持活動等に対する協力に関する法律) and the *Act on Special Measures concerning Humanitarian Relief and Reconstruction Work and Security Assistance in Iraq* (イラクにおける人道復興支援活動及び安全確保支援活動の実施に関する特別措置法).

For instance the *Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law* states that

(1) The Government of Japan (GOJ) shall implement Cooperation and Support Activities, Search and Rescue Activities, Assistance to Affected People and other necessary measures (hereinafter referred to as 'Response Measures') in an appropriate and swift manner, thereby contributing actively and on its own initiatives to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, and ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan.

(2) These measures must not constitute the threat or use of force.

(3) These measures shall be implemented in the following areas:
– Japan's territory
– Following areas where combat is not taking place or not expected to take place while Japan's activities are being implemented.
The high seas, including the exclusive economic zone stipulated in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and airspace above
Territory of foreign countries (Implementation shall be limited to cases where consent from the territorial countries has been obtained.)
(…)

4. Measures To Be Taken (…)

(1) Cooperation and Support Activities
Cooperation and Support activities are the provision of materials and services, convenience and other measures implemented by Japan in support of Foreign Forces.
Relevant government agencies, including the Self-Defense Forces, shall implement these activities.
The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense Forces provide are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, airport and seaport services, and base support. (Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces shall not undertake the supply of weapons and ammunitions and shall not supply fuel or conduct maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, or undertake the land transportation of weapons and ammunitions in foreign territories.)[33]

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[33] For detailed text of the The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law see: Cabinet of the Prime Minister (ed.): http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/2001/anti-terrorism/1029terohougaiyou_e.html (accessed 10.08.2013).

The contents of materials and services that the Self-Defense Forces provide in implementing Search and Rescue Activities are supply, transportation, repair and maintenance, medical services, communications, billeting and decontamination. (Nonetheless, the Self-Defense Forces shall not undertake the supply of weapons and ammunitions, supply fuel or conduct maintenance on aircraft preparing to take off on military sorties, or undertake the land transportation of weapons and ammunitions in foreign territories.)

This was mainly for the same reason that the UNPKO laws were passed in the 1990s to expand the option for SDF personnel in peace missions, that is the fear of potential abandonment or being regarded as reluctant to share responsibilities within the alliance.

Revising the 1995 security guidelines provided a possibility for a more comprehensive support of US troops, and therefore established a new framework for Japanese security policy within this alliance, ending the crisis of legitimacy it had experienced after the end of the Cold War. It was not until the Taepedong incident in 1998 that the necessity for US troops and missile deterrence to ensure the security of Japan could no longer be ignored.

As a direct result to these developments the *Japan-US Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement* (ACSA, *Nichi-bei buppin ekimu sōgo teikyōkyōtei* 日米物品役務相互提供協定) was revised, now providing the legal basis for refuel missions and rear area support during peacetime and in emergency situations. [34] The ACSA included further expanding SDF tasks to the evacuation of Japanese citizens from abroad, the use of armed force for self-defense in rear area missions and the engagement in search-and-rescue-missions to free US soldiers.[35] With this in mind, the Japanese participation in providing rear-area support for US troops in Iraq in 2003 and engaging in post-war reconstruction can only be regarded as a contribution to strengthen the bilateral alliance. When Japan engaged in providing rear-area support to US troops in Iraq and in reconstructing the country in the aftermath of the war, the US scholar Daniel Kliman, senior advisor to the US Marshall Fund and author of *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World*, sees this behaviour mainly as an attempt of Japan to strengthen the bilateral alliance with respect to the potential rising nuclear threat posed by North Korea. [36] Since Tokyo has never declared any particular strategic interest in Iraq – except perhaps for economic and investment possibilities – it should be assumed that Japan's participation in restructuring post-Iraq and in providing military rear area supply during the US War in Iraq in 2003 was an attempt to strengthen the bilateral alliance with Washington. Ishibashi comes to a similiar conclusion, assuming that Japan's support in Iraq is to be regarded as a response to US requests, in order to strengthen the security cooperation so the US will support Japan in case of an attack from North Korea. Ishibashi remarks that perceptions of threat among the Japanese population from the DPRK and Iraq are different. Ishibashi shows in his survey that the Japanese perception of threat from North Korea exceeded the importance of Japanese security interests in the Middle East, being important by 74% of the

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[34] Singh, 'Japan's Post-cold War Security Policy…', p. 89.

[35] Ibidem.

[36] Daniel Kliman, 'Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World. Embracing a New Realpolitik', in *The Washington Papers*, Walter Laquer and Donna Spitler (ed.), Westport, London: Praeger, 2006, p. 139.

population, and the latter important only to 33,9%.[37] Based on this survey, as well as the Japanese Defense White Papers between 2000 and 2010 that consider the threat posed by North Korea as being much more important to Japan than any other, one could argue that the SDF's participation in restructuring post-war Iraq mainly served fostering Japan's alliance with Washington.

It can, however, be questioned whether Japan's following this 'bandwagoning' in supporting the US in Iraq after 2003 was caused solely by fear of North Korea and therefore an act of support with future protection by Washington in mind. This is for two reasons: When North Korea successfully tested a nuclear missle in 1998, it become dramatically clear to Japan how important the US nuclear deterrence umbrella was for its security. Also, due to Japan's 'nuclear-allergy' and the non-nuclear principles implemented by Prime Minister Satō in 1967, Japan has sought to promote the peaceful use of nuclear power, to work toward global nuclear disarmament – and to rely on extended US nuclear deterrence.[38]

Secondly, since China has been constantly expanding its economically and military capacities since the 1990s, it poses a greater threat as an emerging hegemonic power in the East Asian region to Japan. To counterbalance this threat, Japan has no choice but to rely on its alliance with the US.

However, Japan's security agenda does not seem solely to be motivated by a fear of abandonment. When Japanese companies purchased oil and gas rights for the Azadegan oilfeld in 2001 and began to support oil producing with around US\$3 billion, Washington had already labeled Iran as an enemy to the US; this made Japan's Iran policy inconsistent with the security alliance anticipations.[39] Further, when Japan opened its first oversea bases in 2011 in Djibouti to prepare counter-piracy mission in the Horn of Africa, this marked another step in evaluating an independent security strategy outside the bilateral alliance with the US.[40] With this in mind, Japan's emerging international commitments cannot be interpreted simply as 'bandwagoning' or allying with the US, but should rather be regarded as the emergence of genuine Japanese foreign policy perceptions.

3.1. Post-9/11 constraints and domestic political agendas

As measures to strengthen security ties with Washington, the introduction of the Iraq Special Measures Law (*iraku ni okeru jindō fukkō shien katsudō oyobi anzen kakuho shien katsudō no jisshi ni kansuru tokubetsu sochihō* イラクにおける人道復興支援活動及び安全確保支援活動の実施に関する特別措置法), and the participation in an anti--piracy mission in the Indian Ocean in 2001 have posed a greater risk to the Japanese SDF to of their becoming entrapped in military conflicts than ever before. In fact, after 2001, Japan constantly tried to expand its participation in Peace Keeping Operations, namely in observing ceasefire agreements, arms inspection and monitoring POW

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[37] Natsuyo Ishibashi, 'The Dispatch of Japan's Self-defense Forces to Iraq: Public Opinion, Elections, and Foreign Policy', *Asian Survey*, Vol. 47, No. 5, 2007, p. 780.

[38] Campbell and Sunohara, 'Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable' pp. 218–253; For Sato's Nuclear Principles see: *Hikaku Sangen Soku*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/gensoku/ (accessed 15.08.2013); *(Sankō) hikaku san gensoku ni kan suru kokkai ketsugi*, http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/kaku/gensoku/ketsugi.html (accessed 15.08.2013).

[39] Samuels, *Securing Japan…* , p. 153.

[40] *Japan Times*, 2.07.2011.

exchanges.[41] Prime Minister Koizumi passed the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law on October 29, 2001. This step was actually far beyond President Bush's expectations, who had only asked Japan to support the War on Terror financially by contributing approximately US$40 million and engage in diplomatic and intelligence cooperation. Instead, by implementing the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, Japan was now able to engage in further rear area support missions and medical support from SDF units. [42]

This might have been caused by Japan's urge to demonstrate its ability to share responsibility at an international level. In addition, in 2007 the Armitage-Nye Report on the US–Japanese security alliance mentioned the firm desire of the Bush administration to deepen this alliance, and the need to encourage Japan to consider itself as the 'Great Britain of Asia' led by the example of the Anglo-American alliance.[43]

Further, nearly all of the conflicts Japan had been engaged as a form of contributing to the alliance were security concerns to Washington, and less vital for Japan's own security posture. This can only be explained by the fact that the fear of potential international isolation experienced during the 1990s has influenced Japan's turn towards a more proactive hedging strategy in its foreign policy. This fear of abandonment accumulated together with the growing risk to Japan posed by a potentially nuclear-armed North Korea.

Since President Bush was focussed on the Middle East after 2001, Tokyo was desperate to assure Washington that Japan remained a reliable partner in East Asia. Also, not only did North Korea pose a potential risk to Japan, but also an economically and military expanding China was on the rise to become a regional hegemon in East Asia and conflicts with Japan over disputed territory were already indicated.

Having said that, the decision to send 600 SDF ground troops to South Iraq to engage in reconstruction and medical support between 2004 and 2008 was merely a contribution to the security alliance and to President Bush in particular, due to the fear of potential abandonment. After all, since Japan is still relying on its three nuclear principles with regards to the North Korean nuclear threat, it has no other option but to rely on the US security umbrella and its nuclear deterrence. [44] However, it is questionable whether this strategy will pay off. There are two reasons for this. One the one hand, President Obama announced the US's 'pivot to Asia' turning the focus of American foreign policy towards East Asia, which could make Japan an even more important partner to the US.[45] However, Obama has also announced a future troop deployment of US soldiers from Okinawa to Guam and Hawaii in April 2013, and is still planning to close down the US military base in Futenma and deploy the troops to the coast of Haneko, Nago by 2014. Due to these restructuring plans, along with the ongoing financial and economic crises in the US which will also have an impact on US military and oversea

[41]   Hughes, *Japan's Re-emergence…*, p. 125.

[42]   Ishizuka, 'Japan and UN Peace Options', pp. 137–157.

[43]   Richard Armitage and Joseph Nye, *Getting Asia Right through 2020*, Washington DC.: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2007.

[44]   Tomohiko Shinoda, 'Costs and Benefits of the US–Japan Alliance from the Japanese Perspective', in *The US–Japan Security Alliance: Regional Multilateralism*, Takashi Inoguchi, G. John Ikenberry and Yoichiro Sato (eds.), New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2011, pp. 26–27.

[45]   *Japan Times*, 17.02.2012.

missions, the future of US military bases in Japan remain uncertain, as does the role Japan will play in the bilateral alliance regarding the announced pivot.[46] In the end, the major shift announced in US' foreign policy by turning the focus towards Asia might be just another way of passing over the military burden to the US's allies, such as Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

On the other hand, the election of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in December 2012 may indicate a possible return to a much more reliable and predictable Japanese foreign policy than under the previous Hatoyama administration.[47] For instance, one major step in changing Japan's foreign policy was the ending of the SDF mission in the Indian Ocean by the Hatoyama cabinet. This action had raised doubts about Japan's contribution to the bilateral alliance as a strong partner in Washington.[48] Along with a fast economic recovery, Prime Minister Abe has announced that a revision of the constitution, particulary Articles 9 and 96, is a matter of personal importance to him. A first step was his announcement to revise article 96 of the Japanese constitution, which states that a two-thirds majority of the Diet is needed to change the constitution. Removing this hurdle would bring Abe a huge step closer to achieving constitutional revision, and therefore to change article 9.[49]

While Abe has succeeded in promoting the Japanese Defense Agency to a Ministry of Defense, and therefore in shifting Japanese defense policy towards a more proactive direction, he failed in establishing a more profound legal basis for the deployment of Japanese Self-Defense personnel in missions not backed up by a UN mandate.[50]

In March 2003, the United States and Japan worked to revise the conditions of the bilateral alliance and extend their tasks on a global basis, which then led to the Joint Summit on US-Japanese Defense (*nichi-bei bōshunō kaidan,* 日米防首脳会談) in November 2004. On this occasion US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Japan's Minister of State for Defense Ono Yoshinori agreed to deepen the cooperation in the security policy field.[51] As a result of this meeting, 11,300 Japanese and US troops participated in a joint military exercise in November 2004, aiming to deepen mutual understanding in the field of strategic coordination and synchronizing troop units.[52]

The changes described in the previous chapter are to be regarded in the context of a military expanding China and potential nuclear buildups in North Korea, which have forced Japan into a counter-balancing strategy, and therefore promoted a higher dependence on and alliance with the US. Japan's China policy will be subject of the next section in this paper. Along with this, the encouraged expansion of Japanese security issues in more

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[46] *The Japan Times*, 'Armitage: Futenma, Japans responsibility' 13.04.2013, www. japantimes.co.jp/news/ 2013/04/17/national/armitage-futenma-japans-responsibility/#.UaIjOdhc3kU (accessed 17.04.2013).

[47] Ibidem.

[48] Ibidem.

[49] *The Japan Times*, 'Politicians Open Debate on Article 96', 10.05.2013, www.japantimes.co.jp/ news/ 2013/05/10/national/politicians-open-debate-on-article-96/#.UaJ519hc3kU (accessed 19.05.2013).

[50] Chanlett-Avery, *The U.S.–Japan Alliance…*, p. 4.

[51] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 17 nenban…*, p. 137.

[52] Ibid., p. 139.

distant areas, especially under Prime Minister Koizumi, dramatically increased the risk of Japan to be entrapped in US security concerns dramatically. Therefore, a deeper analysis of the transformation of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces from a protecting army into a special boarding unit (*tokubetsu keibitai*,特別警備隊) will demonstrate that Tokyo's security concerns in the beginning of the 21st century are deeply influenced by a changed perception of the theat from China and North Korea. While these perceptions concerning North Korea are leading to a strategy of closer alliance with the US, increased economic interdependency with China hinders Japan from simply employing a strategy of containment.

3.2. Japan's quest to counterbalance China in the East Asian security architecture

With a militarily strengthening China on the rise, Japan has become obliged not only to reconsider its strategic position within the bilateral alliance but also to build up its own military capacity irrespective of US–Japanese cooperation. Therefore, when investigating Japan's recent security policy perceptions, the next chapter will take a closer look at how consistent these perceptions are with Tokyo's long-term security strategy and Japan's part within the bilateral alliance.

In fact, Japan's security policy in East Asia on the one side, and the rising economic interdependency between Japan and China on the other, at times present a strange picture. This appears to be even more disturbing since China seems to be the key growing market, not only in Asia but worldwide. Therefore, this paper seeks to explain, how Japan could interact with China in matters of low politics while still pursuing a counter-balancing-strategy against Beijing, along with a close bandwagoning approach towards Washington in its foreign policy.[53]

On a second level, this paper will take a closer look at maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region, not only because of Japan and China's territorial disputes with their neighbors, but also because leading naval scholars regard the sea in general as the most important security issue in this century.[54] However, one need not necessarily take President Obama's announcement of the US' 'pivot to Asia' and the 'new' focus on the East Asian region as the prelude to a new 'East Asian century', for the following reasons.

First of all, the US' pivot to Asia can be firmly understood as a reaction to a China expanding its maritime and military strnght in the Pacific region. Therefore the pivot resembles rather a reassurance of US protection its allies than a genuine new approach. This is the case in particular for Japan, South Korea and several South-East Asian countries with whom China is currently carrying out territorial disputes (for example Vietnam).

Second, the 'pivot' presents a political doctrine that is quite consistent with US foreign policy in East Asia than actually presenting a genuine new shift. In fact, with territorial claims on the rise, there have been several incidents between Chinese and Japanese vessels that could have triggered an armed conflict. Additionally, the 'pivot' can be interpreted as reaffirming the bilateral alliance with Japan, due to the US' policy of neutrality in past disputes such as the Senkaku / Diaoyu Island conflict. According to this strategy, the US is aiming for a closer strategic defense network with its security partners in the region, and

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[53] Derek McDougall, 'Response to «Rising China» in the East Asian Region: Soft Balancing with Accommodation', *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 21, No. 73, 2012, p. 1–17.

[54] Eric Grove, 'The Sea and Global Security', presentation on the 15th Annual Strategic Studies Conference, University of Calgary, Calgary. 01.03.2013.

is trying to establish a regional security regime, based on rules and principles as well as shared values.

In line with this approach, Obama is not only seeking to deepen the alliance with Japan, but is also trying to establish and carry out security partnerships with South Korea, Australia and Thailand, as well as with the rising economic powers in the region such as India, Malaysia or Singapore.[55]

Several reasons for Obama's shift towards Asia might be identified. The most obvious seems to be the potential share of the burden that is inevitable in regards to the US's current fiscal situation and the ongoing global recession. Further, President Obama has to fulfill the promises made when running for office, in particular to end the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and to focus more on domestic issues than international politics. After all, the current situation in the US recalls the Clinton administration, when the only goals in domestic politics were to create jobs and bring the economy back on track.

The growing war-weariness of the American people and the US economy's growing dependency on Chinese markets leaves little opportunity but to adopt a moderate counter-balancing strategy, not only for Japan, but also for the US. Washington needs to strengthen economic ties with Beijing while counterbalancing China with military means, stopping it from expanding its influence in East Asia and elsewhere. However, the downturn of the US economy and continuing the War on Terror (which has now been ongoing for over a decade with no or little outcome), Obama's 'pivot to Asia' seems rather to aim for sharing the burden among US' allies in the Asia-Pacific region rather than an overall expansion of US forces in East Asia.

Furthermore, with Washington already shifting its focus towards the high-tension Middle East, the actual impact of the 'pivot to Asia' on US foreign policy and therefore on the bilateral alliance with Japan seems rather uncertain.

3.3. Restructuring Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and Japanese Coast Guard

By providing a broader legal framework for expanded authority and restructuring its internal organization, the Japanese Coast Guard became *de facto* the fourth section of the Japanese Self- Defense Forces. For instance, the Japanese Coast Guard is now responsible for border security around Japanese territory.[56] It was not until the first North Korean nuclear crises in 1998 that the Japanese Self-Defense Forces detected the fundamental deficits it had in preventing potential attacks on the Japanese coast. In order to redress these shortcomings, the Japanese government planned a restructuring of the Japanese Maritime Self- Defense units, expanding the responsibilities and defining the tasks of the Japanese Coast Guard.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese Coast Guard now has more power than the Maritime Self-Defense Forces regarding the protection of Japan's border security. For instance, in the case of suspicious vessels entering Japanese territorial waters, the Coast Guard is allowed to use armed forces to stop the vessel, or even sink it if warning shots are ignored. This is an

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[55] Alexandra Sakaki, 'Die neue Asien-Strategie der USA: Japanische Reaktionen und Perspektiven. Aus japanischen Fachzeitschriften und Think-Tank-Publikationen der Jahre 2011 und 2012', in *Zeitschriftenschau*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, p. 2, http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin /contents/products/zeitschriftenschau/2012zs04_skk.pdf (accessed 19.05.2013).

[56] Samuels, *Securing Japan…*, p. 77.

even more dramatic revision, since the Japanese Coast Guard should be regarded as branch of the Japanese national police, and not as part of the Self-Defense forces.[57]

In addition to this, a potential threat posed by terrorist bombings in ports of Japan endangering domestic seafaring was another reason for enhancing the authority of the Japanese Coast Guard.[58]

As a result, Japan began to reinforce its ocean peace keeping program in multilateral cooperation with other ASEAN+3 member states.[59] However, due to Japan's past, numerous misgivings and hesitations against Japan are deeply rooted in neighboring Asian societies. As with Japan's approaches for multilateral cooperation in the 1990s, difficulties arose among the participating nations. China in particular failed to cooperate with the regional regime to prevent piracy among ASEAN members, because Beijing saw China's security interests as being endangered by proposed mutual cooperation with member states. Tokyo seems to be put a 'catch 22' situation with China mistrusting Japan for potentially using the regional regime to strengthen the US–Japanese alliance in Asia on the one hand, and with Tokyo's fears that China would use ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to weaken Japan's bilateral alliance with Washington on the other.[60]

With the enhanced authority of the Japanese Coast Guard (*kaijō jieitai* 海上自衛隊) it now covers tasks such as missile defence, carried out by AEGIS-equipped destroyer.[61] In total, the total tonnage of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces measures 440,000 tonnes, while the capacities of the People's Liberation Army Navy is estimated to measure 135,000 tonnes of equipment.[62] Further, five Japanese destroyers constantly cruise along the coast of Japan to be able to respond flexibly to unexpected dangerous situations that might occur.[63]

According to the Defence Guidelines laid out in FY 2005, an additional 16 submarine units of the *kaijō jieitai* cruise between the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, protecting Japanese territory and shipping traffic.[64] Japan even increased this number were by additional 2 AEGIS vessels in 2008.[65] In addition to this, the air force's capacities were increased between 2001 and 2005 by 60 Boeing AH-64Ds Jets, along with airborne refillable aircraft. All these numbers show a dramatic increase in the pace at which the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have been modernizing.

4. Conclusion

As the previous chapters have shown, Japanese security perceptions are still linked closely to US military strategy even after the potential threat posed by the Soviet Union is disappeared. In fact, new regional emerging powers such as China and North Korea

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[57] Ibid., pp. 78 –80.

[58] Toshi Yoshihara, 'Japan's Emerging Strategic Posture in Asia…', p. 75.

[59] Ibidem.

[60] Ibidem.

[61] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 17 nenban…*, p. 137.

[62] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 23 nenban. Nihon no bōei: Bōei hakusho*, Tōkyō: Gyōsei, 2011, p. 445.

[63] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 17 nenban…*, p. 102.

[64] Ibidem.

[65] Kliman, "Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World...", p. 23.

seem more than ever to confirm the importance of the US security umbrella. However, during this alliance, Japan has now to take on more responsibility due to a fear of abandonment by the US after the end of the Cold War, and Washington no longer considers Japan as just a financial contributor to US military missions, but also as an active military partner. Furthermore, Japan has been actively engaging in promoting its own security interests, establishing its own foreign agenda outside the bilateral alliance (by introducing oversea bases and following a path of diplomacy towards Iran that differs from that of the US) and built up its military equipment in a dramatic way. In hindsight, this development even increased after the events of September 11, 2001 with respect to Japan's growing fear of abandonment and to the potential withdrawal of US troops away from East Asia. As a result, the Japanese participation in rear area support for US troops in the Indian Ocean and Iraq should be regarded as an attempt to strengthening the bilateral alliance and to build up trust betwen the allies.

In order to ensure this support several laws were implemented by Japan's governments, especially by the Koizumi administration. Yet even though these amendments and laws resembled a turn in Japanese foreign policy towards becoming a more proactive security alliance partner for the US, it should be remembered that this turn had already begun with the revision of the 1976 security guidelines in 1995, and was triggered by a feeling of international isolation after denying material and troop supplies for the US/UN intervention in the Gulf War in 1990/91. In short, the increased support for the US after 2001 in terms of military means is not to be understood as a completely unforeseen turn in Japanese global security strategy.

However, due to the increased support for US military actions as a security ally, this change has triggered skepticism and fear of Japan's possible military expansion among other Asian countries. Nevertheless, because of unforeseen turns within the East Asian security architecture, such as North Korea's nuclear program, Japan seems more dependent than ever on US nuclear deterrence. As a result, Japan has evolved security perceptions which are no longer limited to East Asia, but which apply on a global scope in order to protect Japan's security – or more likely, to make it possible to interact within the framework of the bilateral alliance.

By establishing the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era, (*anzen hoshō to bōei ryoku no kondan kai*) in 2004, Prime Minister Koizumi placed greater emphasis on Japanese foreign policy and the need for a genuine Japanese security strategy (as a complement to the bilateral alliance with the US).[66]

According to this, the Araki Commission made several recommendations on Japanese foreign policy, such as regarding the defense of Japan and the improvement of cooperation within the international community in order to prevent global threats (*tōgōteki anzen hoshō senryaku*), which in turn meant an important amendment to US–Japanese security cooperation.

Considerations about the need to build up further defense capacities (*nihon jishin no doryoku*) (in addition to those of the bilateral alliance) provided another benchmark for Japanese foreign policy. With this approach, along with intensifying cooperation among its allies – particularly the United States – Japan tried to enforce cooperation on an

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[66] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 17 nenban…*, p. 89.

international level (*kokusai shakai to no kyōryoku*).[67] This approach also marked an attempt to escape from possible entrapment in US military actions due to an exclusive fixation on the bilateral alliance as core to Japanese foreign policy.

However, this attempt has not yet been completely successful. Moreover, Japan's defense White Paper of 2005 stresses that this approach might cost more lesses of SDF members in combat activities than previous foreign policy approaches. Also, military spending to secure international peace will thus rise (*kokusai teki anzen hoshō kankyō no kaizen ni yoru kyōi no yobō*).[68]

To conclude, Japanese security policy has become much more globalized due to a fear of potential abandonment on the one hand and the growing potential threat posed by North Korea and territorial disputes with China on the other hand. However, this fear of abandonment has shifted the Japanese foreign policy in a pro-active direction, hence the Japanese Self-Defense Forces have also become more prone to become entangled in US security concerns and major third-party conflicts. Future developments in international security, especially within the East Asian security architecture, will show, how the recently re-elected right-wing Prime Minister Abe chooses to intensify the bilateral alliance and define Japan's role within President Obama's 'pivot to Asia'.

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[67] Ibidem.
[68] Japanese Ministry of Defense (ed.), *Heisei 23 nenban…*, pp. 321–322.

ESSAY

KIE KAWADA

Japanese Cooking through Media

Abstract

Japanese food, such as sushi, tempura, sukiyaki, and so forth is considered a vegetarian cuisine. Since the Meiji era, Japanese food culture has absorbed influences from the food culture of other countries, for example European countries, China, Korea, India, etc. Japanese people eat other countries' foods quite often – not only in food served at restaurants but also in the daily food created in each family. The media has introduced many new foods into the lives of Japanese people for 200 years; and nowadays, the internet has drastically changed the role of the media.

How has the internet changed our food culture?

Which Japanese dish comes to your mind first? 'Sushi', isn't it? We can see sushi everywhere in Poland and throughout the world. However, traditional Japanese sushi doesn't contain any cheese or avocado. As for the sushi with banana and chocolate (I can confirm that this sushi is mainly for children because it is easy for them to eat), the taste is good to me, but it is not real Japanese sushi. I would say that is 'global-taste sushi'. Each country has already customized 'global-taste sushi' to its own taste.

In the same way, in Japan, we have a lot of customized Japanese food from other countries, which has reached into every family. We can also find some foods which are very similar to Polish food in Japan.

In Poland and other European countries, the 'cutlet' is a typical food, known in Polish as '*kotlet*'. When the '*kotlet*' arrived to Japan from France, it became 'カツレツ (*katsuretsu*)'. Moreover, it was customized into 'トンカツ (ton-katsu)', which means pork-*kotlet*. A Japanese *katsu* has bigger breadcrumbs than Polish or European ones do, and the meat is thicker in Japan. It has also been developed into 'カツ丼 (*katsu don*)', which is *katsu* with rice, as well as 'カツサンド (*katsu*-sandwich)', which is a sandwich with *katsu* inside.

A popular dish in Poland is '*gołąbki*', which tastes almost the same as Japanese rolled-cabbage.

The Japanese-style rolled-cabbage has meat inside which has been boiled with soup stock. Japanese people often add ketchup to it. (Nowadays, Japanese people can prepare Polish-style rolled-cabbage '*gołąbki*' because canned boiled-tomato is sold everywhere in Japan.)

If you try them, it must taste strange to you because it has been prepared in the Japanese style. I can imagine your first impression of that rolled-cabbage with ketchup! It must be incredible!

These foods have already become popular as taste of home in Japan.

How did it become taste of home in Japan? The mass media played a big role. Magazines, TV, advertisement, the Internet and others, all contributed to spread the new foods into Japanese homes. Here are some examples of the role the media played.

In the Meiji era (1862–1912), recipe for foreign foods such as 'オムライス (an omelet containing fried ketchup rice)' or 'シチュー (stew)' in magazine were introduced in the magazines published for women, such as '女鑑 (*Onna Kagami*)', '婦人倶楽部 (*Fujin Club*)' and '家庭雑誌 (*Katei Zasshi*)'. In this era, the standard menu for ordinary families was rice, soup and small pickled vegetables. Even in upper middle-class families, the standard menu was rice, soup, vegetables and small fish. In this era, literacy among women in Japan was quite low. That meant many women could not read the menus in the magazines. Even worse, few women could get magazines at the time. Those women who could read and obtain those magazines usually had good education thanks to their rich parents.

Also, the recipes themselves were not popular with most Japanese people.

'コロッケ (*korokke*)', from the French word *croquette*, is a popular Japanese food. Originally, it was served with white sauce, in the typical French style. It became a major family food as 'potato *korokke*' because potatoes was cheaper and more easily obtained than flour at the time. In 1917, the song 'コロッケの唄 (The *korokke* song)' was quite popular because the song was sung in a comedy play 'ドッチャンダンネ (*Dokkyan Danne*)' of '浅草三文オペラ (the *Asakusa Sanmon* Opera Theater)' which was very popular in Japan at the time. The lyrics of the song go, "Today, we eat *korokke*. Tomorrow, we will eat *korokke*, too. We always eat *korokke*, after all…".[1] The song struck a chord with the public. Most people became *korokke* lovers. '*Korokke*' was already counted as a Japanese food in the 1920s.

After the late 1920s, most Japanese people did not have opportunities to taste the food of other countries until 1945, in other words, the end of World War II. However, most Japanese families did not get such opportunities even until the 1960s.

The following three factors can be seen as the main reasons why food from other countries eventually spread to Japanese families.

Firstly, milk and meat became Japanese food after World War II, mainly because of the school lunch program. Secondly, the development of transportation and the increase in the number of supermarkets. Third, the spread of gas for cooking, the electric rice-cooker, and television to almost all Japanese families.

Television became a new media, replacing magazines, journals and radio. The first TV cooking program began in 1957. Its title was '今日の料理 (Today's Cooking)' and it is still being aired. It is still one of the most popular TV shows in Japan.

In the 1960s, the cooking programs' recipes were prepared for 5 or 6 people, i.e. for a family usually consisting of father, mother, children and grandparents.

In the 1970s and 1980s, various types of TV cooking programs were broadcast, such as 'The Graman Kerr Show', which was imported by TV Tokyo from Canada International TV

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[1] http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aY66ixyTdZI (accessed 30.06.2013).

Ltd. in 1974 , 'キューピー３分クッキング (Kewpie 3-minute Cooking)' shown from 1963 to the present on Nihon TV, and '料理天国(*Ryōri Tengoku*)' from 1975 to 1992 on TBS.

During those two decades, TV watchers demanded quick cooking and recipes for seasonal traditional cuisine, such as traditional New Year food.

At that time, the typical recipe as broadcast was for 4 people, or the more 'Western' nuclear family.

TV commercials and advertisement helped to promote good sales for instant mix products. Two examples here are 'バーモントカレー (Vermont Curry)' and 'マカロニグラタン (Macaroni Gratin)'. The 'Vermont Curry' is a solid soup mix for curry rice, and 'Macaroni Gratin' is a white sauce mix for gratin. Both products were produced by House Foods Ltd. Another popular product was '麻婆豆腐の素 (*Mapo Tofu* Instant Mix)' by Marumiya Ltd. Since many women had jobs, people preferred quick cooking products such as the *Mapo Tofu* Instant Mix.

In the 1990s, a gourmet boom arose from comics such as '美味しんぼ (*Oishinbo*)' which is published by Big Comic Splits, Shogakukan Inc., from 1983 to the present, and 'クッキングパパ (Cooking Papa)' which is published by Weekly Morning, Kodansha Ltd., from 1985 to the present. Also, gourmet magazines such as '*dancyu*' and *PRESIDENT Inc.* started publishing in the 1990s, and they have been published continuously ever since.

In this decade, many mothers now work full-time and the nuclear family has become typical. There was no 'cooking teacher' like the grandmother in the family any more. Cooking in the family is not only a matter for the mother but also for the children, men and young unmarried women.

In the 1990s, more than 10 million people went abroad from Japan, and they could taste real local foods. Amateurs could learn the professional cooking methods of the local foods. This was reflected in programs such as '料理の鉄人 (Iron chef)' from 1993 to 1999 on Fuji Television Network, or 'Bistro SMAP' from 1996 to the present on Fuji Television Network.

In the 2000s, TV cooking programs covered a diverse range of demands. For example, a TV program such as '今日の料理　ビギナーズ (Today's cooking for beginners)' on Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) shows how to make soup stock without the instant soup which has been sold in supermarket. There are shows for people who want to know how to make soup from seaweed, '昆布' and '鰹節 (*Katsuobushi*)', how to cook soup stock. A second example, '男子ごはん (*Danshi Gohan*)' on TV Tokyo, is a show about young people cooking with their friends. A third example, 'コウケンテツが行くアジア旅ごはん (Asian Soul Food by Kō Kentetsu)' shows a presenter visiting somewhere in the world to cook their soul food. Meanwhile, 'すすめ! キッチン戦隊クックルン (Let's go! COOKR'n)' on Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) is aimed at children, and intended to hook children's interest in cooking.

In this decade, we have a new major media for cooking – the Internet! Now, we can get recipes on the internet at websites or on YouTube any time we want. Also, we can upload our own recipes onto the internet easily. It is fairly convenient. I can get recipes whenever I want. One website, Cookpad (http://cookpad.com), not only gives us recipes, but also information about discounts at our nearest supermarket. I use my iPad to see online recipes when I cook in my kitchen.

On the internet, we can see a new food culture. One example is 'Chara-Ben'. The name comes from an abbreviation of the character *bento* (Japanese boxed lunch) which features

food decorated to look like people, characters from popular media, animals and plants. Recently, some housewives started to post their artistic pictures of 'Chara-Ben' on their blogs. Many mothers copied it for their children's lunch boxes as an expression of their warmth. The mothers thought about what kind of lunch box their children would want to eat. They might show off their own lunch boxes or their friends might check them out. Such amazing ideas for lunch boxes were already around in my childhood during the 1980s, such as the *Tako-san* Winner (a Vienna sausage shaped like an octopus) or *Usagi-san* (apple cut like rabbit). So Chara-Ben style ideas have developed for at least the last 30 years.

Now, one Japanese cooking TV show is very hot. It's called 'MOCO's Kitchen', and is broadcast on NTV. What's new in this TV show?

'MOCO's Kitchen' is on for only 3 minutes, from 7:55 to 7:58 in the morning. It is a busy time of time. There has never been a cooking program broadcast at this time before. It's like a short movie. In this cooking program, there is no recipe and no quantities of salt or sugar, because we can see the recipe on website or cooking book that will be published later.

This surprising short morning cooking movie created an online sensation. A lot of comments were posted on Twitter at every TV showing. The audience shares their feelings against or for this cooking program. It seems like a living room conversation on Twitter. This TV program which lasts for only 3 minutes fits well with the Internet.

On the other hand, since this April, another TV cooking program has introduced Edo era (1603–1867) cooking on NHK. It is a movement going back to traditional Japanese foods. Many people believe that we will have food shortages in the near future. Besides that, there are other issues such as food safety and Japan's dependence on imported foods. Therefore, the need to consider traditional food has arisen. The following questions are posed by this movement: What is Japanese food today? What should be selected as our future foods?

Film is another important medium for our cooking. A food specialist, who is attempting to spread the habit of making soup for children and elderly people, is highlighted in a documentary film entitled '天のしずく ― 命のスープ (Drops of heaven)', directed by Atsunori Kawamura (河邑厚徳). The film asks us the question, 'What is food?'.

In conclusion, all the media are always looking for the current trends in foods. Since the emergence of the internet, the media have changed their roles. Before the internet, the media only gives information to people. However, the media have changed their position from being merely an 'information provider' to a position that gives to the people and also takes information from them.

Today in Japan, we have access to various types of foods. On the other hand, we have retained our traditional foods such as miso soup, *natto*, *soba*, etc. We have to consider new food questions because we must face problems concerning foods, agriculture, import and export, etc.

We need to find out what the best foods for our future are. The food 'customization' mentioned above can also be integrated into our new Japanese food of the future. Our daily meals can be considered through the media, and then the best foods and the cooking methods can be chosen from the vast amount of information presented to us through the media. Now, it is important to carefully consider which information is the most appropriate. Simultaneously, we can form new future food styles through the media, because each individual is already a participant in the media feedback.

BOOK REVIEW

Brigitte Steger, Angelika Koch (editors), *Manga Girl Seeks Herbivore Boy.*
Studying Japanese Gender at Cambridge, **Wien; Zürich; Berlin; Münster: Lit,**
2013, 229 pp.

The book *Manga Girl Seeks Herbivore Boy. Studying Japanese Gender at Cambridge*,
is a collection of essays from the University of Cambridge, written in English and edited by
Brigitte Steger and Angelika Koch, which was published by Lit Publishing House in 2013.
The title suggests a new approach towards analyzing gender issues in contemporary
Japanese society. Moreover it was created by young scholars, and merits attention because
of this fact.

This book contains a complex introduction to gender questions in modern Japan and
four essays on different topics, including the anime and manga question, the issue of
fatherhood combined with education matters, the question of masculinity, and the problem
of transgender identities.

As Angelika Koch and Brigitte Steger claim in the introduction to the book, many
cultural images and stereotypes regarding gender issues prevail among Western scholars.
But it is extremely important to confront these problems while examining Japanese society,
in the light of the problem of gender inequality, confirmed by the *Global Gender Gap
Report 2012*, which this volume's editors raise. Furthermore, new gender roles can be
observed in contemporary Japanese society. The masculinity issue is worth attention
because of the recent changes which can be witnessed while examining the behavior of
Japanese males.

In the second chapter of this book, entitled *Manga Girls*, in an essay titled 'Sex, Love,
Comedy and Crime in Recent Boys' Anime and Manga', Hattie Jones uses her discussion
of boys' manga to examine the very important issue of the Japanese Equal Employment
Opportunity Act (EEOA), which was a turning point in the situation of Japanese females.
Jones dates the Act to 1986 (and its revision to 1999); however, in my opinion it is worth
mentioning that these dates are the years in which the Act took effect, but it was initially
enacted in 1985 and revised in 1997. After arguing that the study of women as written by
men is 'anti-feminist' (p. 27) Jones describes numerous *manga* and *anime*, alternating
them with the ideal of woman according to the stereotypes present in Japanese society,
and with feminist issues. This is an interesting way of depicting this problem, but
sometimes one can feel unsatisfied with the overwhelming amount of summaries of
individual works.

In the third chapter, *Absent Father*, Zoya Street's essay 'Fatherhood in Moral Education Textbooks' seems to deal with an extremely interesting question, especially since the implementation of a government project called *Ikumen*, launched in 2010 to encourage Japanese fathers to get involved in parenting. Unfortunately, this is not raised in this essay, although this can be explained by the fact that the thesis which formed the basis for this essay was defended in 2010, the year in which the government project was launched. An error can be found in this chapter, wherein Street argues: "The political uncertainty after the death of the Meiji Emperor in 1911 and the end of the First World War in 1918 brought more controversies over moral education policy" (p. 92). It should be clarified that the Meiji emperor died on 30 July 1912.

Nonetheless, in this chapter we can read a detailed history of the Japanese (moral) education system. The examination of the Japan Teachers' Union and the rightist *Atarashii Rekishi Kyōkasho-o Tsukuru-kai* association is necessary in order to investigate the education problem in Japan in any great depth. I would only suggest that a distinction be made between the Japan Teachers' Union Enlightenment Association (p. 92) and the Japan Teachers' Union (JTU), mentioned on the next page, which was established on 8 August 1947, as a result of the merger of three teachers' organizations. This chapter is especially valuable as it presents the content of the stories from 20 century Japanese textbooks and the appendix which details them.

The fourth chapter, Chris Deacon's *All the World's a Stage*, contains the essay 'Herbivore Boys and the Performance of Masculinity in Contemporary Japan'. This is a very good and compact piece on the role of males in Japanese society, both from the historical perspective (emphasising the role of the Meiji Restoration and the Second World War) and the situation in contemporary Japan. He raises the 'men becoming useless!' problem in modern Japanese society and gives a definition of *sōshokukei danshi*, which is of great importance in any research on present Japanese culture. The subsections on 'Hegemonic Masculinity' and 'Performing Masculinity', often illustrated with pictures from newspapers and books, give us exemplary images of Japanese men through ages, and their stereotypical and actual picture – from the pre-war strong hegemonic masculinity, through the salaryman to the current subversion of hegemonic masculinity. In his conclusion, Deacon inquires about the contemporary societal shift being seen as a crisis of masculinity in Japan, and states that behaviour which the older generation perceive as a crisis may be seen as an opportunity for the people from the younger generation, which is a very interesting deduction on the situation in modern Japan. I consider this chapter as the most interesting and definitely worth reading.

The last chapter by Nicola McDermott, entitled *Resistance and Assimilation*, raises the issue of 'Medical and Legal Transgender Identities in Japan', and considers the problems posed in fundamental areas of life in Japan and the discussions held in this country on this question. She presents the readers with the available sources on this matters, based on questionnaires she has conducted, which is very valuable information. She discusses the post-war boom of interest in transgender people as well as an analysis of the Blue Boy Trial, the Eugenics Protection Law, and the legal and political issues facing transgender people, questions which are not often raised in the scientific works. A very interesting point is the *koseki* issue and its importance in this analysis.

This book is a very interesting source of information for both beginners and experienced researchers in Japanese studies. I would highly recommend this publication to academics

specialising in the topic of Japanese society and gender studies, as well as to those who are generally interested in contemporary Japanese society. Even those researchers with wide knowledge on these issues will find interesting information which may be new to them. The book's main advantage lies in the authors, who are young scholars interested in contemporary social problems in Japan. They present a current view of Japanese society, which can be a great source for all researchers in Japanese studies.

Olga Barbasiewicz

REPORT

OLGA BARBASIEWICZ

Researching Japan in the Social Sciences and Humanities: Conference Report [1]

On 24–25 April 2013 at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw, an international conference entitled *Researching Japan in the Social Sciences and Humanities* was held. The event was organized by the Center for Research on Contemporary Confucianism (CBKW), a research centre at the Institute of Mediterranean and Oriental Cultures of the Polish Academy of Sciences (IKŚiO PAN), in conjunction with the Interdepartmental Unit for Migration Research (of the Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw), the Institute of Sociology (Warsaw University) and the Kozminski University. The conference was sponsored by the JAAP–JICA Alumni Association in Poland, supported by the Asia and Pacific Museum in Warsaw. The event also took place under the auspices of the Japanese Embassy in Poland, which organized a reception for the participants and a meeting after the conference in the Japan Information and Culture Center of the Japanese Embassy.

The conference was attended by forty-six speakers from fifteen countries, which allowed the participants to hear over fifty papers presented in two parallel sessions.

At the invitation of IKŚiO PAN, the speeches were given by four keynote speakers: Prof. Yoshio Kawamura from Ryukoku University in Japan, who presented a speech on 'The socio-economic reality of Japanese agricultural/rural development in the globalizing era'; Dr Izabela Wagner from Warsaw University (UW) introduced the audience to social science issues through her paper 'The extreme value of extreme cases: Japanese culture'; Prof. Teruji Suzuki from Kozminski University presented his lecture titled 'Legal governance', which examined the influence of the Japanese legal system on East Asian countries; and Kie Kawada, an independent researcher from Japan, who presented the phenomenon of Japanese culinary programs and the specificity of Japanese cuisine in his presentation 'Japanese cooking through the media'.

Next, sessions concerning issues of the social and human sciences in the context of Japan were held. In the panel on Japanese culture the following speeches were given: Piotr

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[1] The report will also be released in Polish in the journal *Miscellanea Anthropologica et Sociologica*.

Dąmbski from Opole University spoke on 'Film as an unbiased insight into Japanese culture'; Urszula Mach-Bryson from UW ('Symbolism and aesthetics of the Japanese tea garden (*roji*)'); Karolina Bromy-Smenda from UW ('*Enjō-kosai* (compensated dating): a problem of contemporary Japanese society through the reading of the play *Call Me Komachi*'), and Dr Jakub Karpoluk from the Polish-Japanese Institute of Information Technology (PJWSTK) on Japanese *nō* theater.

At the same time, in a session devoted to issues of gender studies, Dr Kyoko Koma from the Mykolas Romeris University in Lithuania introduced *kawaii* culture in the contexts of contemporary Japanese life, in a presentation entitled '*Kawaii* represented in scientific research: the possibilities and problems of *kawaii* cultural studies'; and Nilay Calsimsek from the Canakkale Onsekiz Mart University in Turkey introduced the audience to 'The process of gender identity formation in children's magazines in the Meiji era'.

Other panels offered opportunities to discuss social and economic issues in presentations by Prof. Sunyoung Park from POSTECH, Pohang, Kyungbuk in Korea, who presented the 'Mt. Baekdu expedition of Kyoto University and news media' case; Olga Merkusheva from Moscow State University, on 'Regional policy in post-industrial Japan'; Olga Kotowska-Wójcik from UKSW, who presented 'Mutual inspirations – Japanese and European looks at the insurance area'; Daniela Stella from UKSW, whose work was entitled 'Japanese companies in Poland (1995–2012)'; Justyna Turek from UKSW, on 'Economic relations between the EU and Japan – new challenges and perspectives'; Tomasz Białobrzeski from UW, whose speech was entitled 'The influence of geological structure and constructing buildings on the human sense of security in Japan. The case of seismic hazard in the context of social psychology'; and Dr. Andrea Revelant from Ca' Foscari University of Venice, speaking on 'Economic growth and tax inequality: evidence from World War I'.

On the second day of the conference, Magdalena Piecyk from UKSW considered the issue of '*Kawaii* syndrome – its importance and role in contemporary Japan'; Forum Mithani from SOAS presented the problem of 'Challenging the narrative of the two-parent norm: representations of single mothers in contemporary Japanese television drama'; the Serbian researcher Nevena Stajcic gave a speech entitled 'Understanding culture: food as a means of communication'; and Dr. Cornelia Reiher from MLU Halle-Wittenberg presented the issue of 'Spatial politics of food in contemporary Japan'. Legal science and public policy was represented by Simone Kopietz from Hamburg University, with her presentation entitled 'Candidate recruitment within the DPJ – restrictions of the hereditary system'; Seongjo Kim from the University of Sheffield, with a speech 'The politics of health care retrenchment in Japan after the 1990s'; and Dr. Leon Wolff from Bond University, Gold Coast in Australia, considering the problem of 'Law and popular culture in Japan: a reinterpretation of Japanese attitudes to law and justice'.

Migration issues were presented by Paweł Lewandowski from UKSW, who dealt with 'The most significant consequences of migration for Japan'; and Edyta Bednarek from Łódź University discussing 'Struggle with social exclusion in Japan. The case of the *Buraku* people'. Sino-Japanese relations were examined by Krystian Karolak from Łódź University in his speech on 'Political history and myths in Sino-Japanese relations', and Mariusz K. Krawczyk from Ryukoku University in Japan introduced with great passion his own research titled 'Who is responsible for real estate bubbles? Comparing 1980s Japan and 2000s China'.

The last theme discussed during the conference was Confucianism and international relations. In the first panel a paper was presented by Emil Ciecieląg from John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, entitled 'The Confucian elements in the book of five rings', and by Adam Krawiec from the Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, entitled 'The impact of Confucianism on social and business relations in Japan'. International relations were discussed in the following papers: Adam Raszewski (UKSW) on 'French–Japanese relations in the course of the last decade: chances, threats and prospects'; Alicja Ciszewska from UW on 'The significance of the trans-Pacific partnership for Japan'; Marta Mickiewicz-Nikodem from Wrocław University on 'Public diplomacy of Japan'; Dr. Yasunobu Ito from the Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, with a paper entitled 'The anthropology of business anthropology: investigating ethnographic methods used in the context of business in Japan', and others.

The conference was summed up during the reception at the Japan Information and Culture Center of the Japanese Embassy by the Japanese Ambassador to Poland, Makoto Yamanaka; Professor Yoshio Kawamura, and Olga Barbasiewicz on behalf of the organizers from IKŚiO PAN. They expressed the hope that a network of links between scientists involved in Japanese issues would be created, and announced further conferences and publications in international cooperation.

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