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Clash or Cooperation? India, China and the USA in Global Politics

Cooperation between India and China is a historical necessity.
Indian President K.R. Narayanan, Beijing, May 2000

The early 21st century finds China and India locked in a dangerous and little-understood nuclear embrace in a complex post-Cold War world. Management of this relationship depends not only on China and India but also on the international power distribution, as well as their individual relations with the sole superpower, the United States. Thus future relations among the three countries are critical to both Asian and global security. How this emerging triangular relationship can affect perceptions, calculations, and policy options is an interesting subject for the students of international politics. In fact, it may be added that skilful manoeuvring and manipulating of big power alignments can add to a country's existing diplomatic capital in terms that are more practical. This being the case, both China and India are paying special attention to the other's diplomacy, and each formulates counterpolitics accordingly in a unipolar world dominated by the US. Global power has many dimensions: economic, military, cultural, technological, intellectual and institutional. Today the United States can still claim full-spectrum dominance. It is the world's largest economy. It spends more on the military than the next 14 countries combined. Its popular culture – from films to music to fast food – has a global reach that is unrivalled. Its universities are the best in the world. US companies have led the information technology revolution. After victory in the Cold War, there is still no coherent alternative to the political and economic ideas (capitalism and democracy) associated with the US. Most of the world's most important institutions are either based in the US: the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or dominated by Americans, as NATO. Yet, every one of these forms of dominance is under some challenge. The most obvious challenge is economic. The rise of China is now so rapid that is future projections suggest that the Chinese economy will be larger than that of the US by 2027. China already has the fourth largest economy in the world and by 2020 its economy will be bigger than every member's of G8 except the US. India is also catching up and by 2025 its economy will be larger than that of six of the G8 members. As compared to that, the US has become the most indebted country in the world and its annual deficit is more than $ 800 billion.[1] It will be a long time before any other country can aspire to the global military reach of the US. However, the Iraq war has

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[1] *Financial Times* (London), 11 June 2007.

shown that very dazzling firepower is not as useful as many Americans assumed. How can it be, if the US is unable to control a Third World country of 22 million people? The erosion of US power to lead is well under way. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that US leadership will simply end on the day – 20 years from now when China's economy overtakes that of the US. Size is not everything. Even when the Chinese economy is larger than that of the US, the average American will still be far richer than the average Chinese. Combine riches with political freedom and it is likely that the "American dream" will remain more attractive than the Chinese reality for many decades to come – sustaining the cultural and intellectual power that is a vital part of America's ability to lead.

Continental planes shift at a rate that is often imperceptible to non-specialists. Then one day the pressure reaches the breaking point. What for decades has gone unnoticed by almost everyone suddenly becomes apparent to all. Likewise, the ascent and descent of a big power often happens gradually. The likely emergence of China and India as new major global players – similar to the rise of Great Britain in the 18th century, Germany in the 19th century and the United States in the 20th century – will transform the geopolitical landscape, with impacts potentially as dramatic as those of the previous three centuries. Sino-Indian relations in the past decade have largely been a waiting game. There were and are some challenges to the regional status quo, yet both countries defer the possibility of a major change. One principal factor is the US, which has been in charge throughout the world, and Asia has been no exception to its supremacy. Menus of Chinese restaurants in India offer food that is neither American, nor Chinese, but it is palatable. Such is the climate in international politics for the US, China and India these days in the era of globalisation. These three countries are so different and so complex, yet they are willing to share part of their menus with each other. Like India of the 2000s, China could not be perceived as just an ordinary middle rung state, like Italy and France. Again, like India, China needs to be perceived and understood within its own unique perspective. The two Asian giants are demanding at the world stage to be recognised as serious contenders for having some say in the international affairs. They simply cannot be dictated as the two giants together have the forty percent population of the globe. Their systems are different, yet their challenges are almost similar – to have a niche relevant to their size. Both countries are a product of the rich heritage of their ancient civilizations. If on the one hand India is the largest democracy, China, on the other, is the largest Communist state. The Chinese experience has shown that a Communist system is workable, unlike the experience in Eastern Europe that includes Russia, where it was tried and failed miserably in the end. Both democracy and Communism are Western models, yet both have found roots in Asian soil.

Copywriters at the New Delhi headquarters of a campaign to re-brand India have been agonizing over a slogan to sum up their revamped product. First, they tried: "15 years, six governments, five prime ministers, one direction, eight percent GDP growth", which offered plenty of information about economic progress but hardly tripped off the tongue. Then, they hit on "India: fastest growing free market democracy" – which was still not very catchy, but at least marked a break with notions of a country of elephants, spirituality and exotic mysticism. Concerned with its outdated global image, India has embarked on a radical makeover of its image, working to project a fresh face – a face constructed around ideas of economic achievements, democracy, Bollywood glamour and cultural excellence. No wonder the slogan "Incredible India" came out from the negative stereotypes of the past. People

are now attempting to find out about India that is on the radar as an economic and strategic power. Foreigners are trying to understand what India really is and what makes its people tick. The whole business of soft power is about trying to leverage that interest. The term "soft power" was first used by Harvard academic Joseph S. Nye in describing the international influence a nation acquires when others are drawn to its culture and ideas. Frankly speaking, there is no substitute for growth and it is statistics of development which show whether a country is a hard or soft power.

Fuelled by high-octane growth, India is trying to catch up the highly industrialised world. After decades of stagnation, India is emerging as a power to reckon with which is inconsistent to its size and capability. There is a good chance that without ever having actually been to India one finds it the place to call if one's luggage is lost on a connecting flight, or where one's company has outsourced its data processing. Every night in Banaglore, in the Indian Silicon Valley, young radiologists read CT scans e-mailed to them by emergency room doctors of the West. In much of the affluent world, it is no surprise to find that one's dentist or lawyer is of Indian origin. Indians have been vital to the development of everything from the international steel business to California's high-tech industry. In ways big and small, Indians are changing the world. Gradually the "soft power" of India is catching up quite fast and the Indian diaspora consisting of 25 million people has become the shining example of emerging India. This diaspora has contributed $ 25 billion in 2006, which was the largest remittance by any oversees community to its motherland. For the first time it has overtaken the Chinese diaspora by remitting more money to its native land.

India's software prowess has helped to revolutionise the country's foreign exchange situation, which in 1991 almost broke the economy. Then, India's reserves were less than a billion dollar; and by June 2007, it has climbed to around $ 215 billion. This is as good a barometer as any of India's new confidence. IT sector clocked up a milestone in 2003 when it earned more dollars than the cost of India's oil imports – the erratic energy bill that had haunted the country for decades. India's IT and IT-enabled sector has boomed to an extent that is changing India's urban economy. India, as many Indians generally maintain, is a unique country. Particularly unusual, especially in comparison with China, is the character of the economy. China is developing as most Western economies have; it began with agricultural reform, moved to low-cost manufacturing, is now climbing the value-added chain and probably, in the next ten to twenty years will break into international tradeable services on a larger scale. India is growing from the other end. Its service sector accounted for significantly more than half its economy in 2006, with agriculture and industry accounting for equal shares of what remained. This resembles an economy at the middle-income stage of development, such as Greece or Portugal.

That is possible because India – the second largest nation in the world and projected to be by 2020 the most populous one – is itself being transformed. Writers like to attach catchy tags to nations, which is why one has read plenty about the rise of Asian tigers and the Chinese dragon. Now here comes the elephant. Indian economy has been growing more than eight percent a year for the past seven years, and the country is modernising so fast that old friends and foes are bewildered by the pace. India's place in international system is being rethought. During the Cold War (1947–1990), relations between the largest democracies were frosty at best, as India was forced to cosy up to the Soviet Union while successive US administrations armed and supported India's regional rival, Pakistan.

However, in a breathtaking shift, the Bush administration declared India a strategic partner and proposed a bilateral nuclear expertise. After many decades when it was hardly registered in the political or public consciousness, India is on the US radar screen. While both India and the US seek trade and good relations with China, both are aware – and wary – of China's growing strength. Thus, both seek to hedge their bets, and what better way to do so than by improving their strategic relationship. Neither country can aim to restrain China in the way the "containment" strategy was aimed at the Soviet Union during the Cold War, but both wish to create an international structure that does not tempt China to throw its weight around. India has a 3,000 km border with China, a 2,000 km border with Pakistan (which is the beneficiary of Chinese military support) and growing concerns about the security of sea route in the Indian Ocean over which oil and other trade move. Thus, the emerging US strategic partnership with India shown in the nuclear deal and military cooperation is evidently aimed in part at China. No wonder then that the State Department issued a statement that the US would help India to become a major world power in the 21st century, involving both strategic and economic dialogue.[2] Both countries are having joint air and naval exercises in the wake of growing global terrorism. In other words, the US has moved from relative indifference to India to the development of a dependable partnership. Several factors underpin this new American attitude towards India. Rhetoric about the world's two largest democracies is not new, but it fits with the Bush administration's new emphasis on promoting democracy. The role of the Indian diaspora in the US is increasing, with its two and half million people who have become very vocal supporters of this relationship. The Indians in the US have a substantial clout in the IT sector and they are very active in the service sector, apart from first rate technicians and scientists at National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA), and they are contributing massively in developing programmes in space. An Indian young woman Sunita William's record stay of more than 181 days in the space station is a case in point. Equally important are strategic concerns about transnational terrorism. In a global war on terrorism, the way India holds its 160 million Muslim population in check is a remarkable achievement as compared to Pakistan's nasty role in creating Taliban and al Qaeda.

Will the United States view China as a new Japan, a new Soviet Union, or both? In addition, will China see the US as a supporter or as an opponent? The world's fate may depend on the answers to these questions. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the failure to cope with the rise of Germany and Japan led to two world wars and an economic calamity. After World War II, the US had to deal with a Communist superpower, the Soviet Union, and the rapid rise of its new ally, Japan. China now seems suited to become a future enemy number one. Among policy-makers in Washington, the new approach can be explained simply: India is the un-China. The US will always have to deal with China, but it has learned that doing so is never easy: China bristles too much with old resentments at the hands of the West. The Bush administration's view of Chinese military build-up is getting notably sterner, and so are its actions. Official description of China as a budding military rival has become almost standard fare within the administration. The Pentagon's recent strategic road map is explicit in finding that "of all major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States. China's use of

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[2] *Financial Express* (New Delhi), 19 April 2005.

disruptive military technologies[...]could over time offset traditional US military advantages."[3] Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick in a speech in September 2005 observed: "Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States to hedge relations with China.[...] Many countries hope China will pursue a 'Peaceful Rise', but none will bet their future on it. "[4] The administration officials are worried about the rising Chinese defence budget, reaching $ 35 billion annually, but as a matter of fact it is almost double the size as the Chinese figures are hidden under different subsidies. Nonetheless, it is six per cent of what the United States spends annually on defence. Chinese ambassador to Washington Zhou Wenzhong retorted: "This China threat notion is obviously a wrong perception of China's intentions." He suggested his country had emerged as America's next menace largely because the US defence industry "needs more orders."[5] In a sense the military-industrial complex of the Cold War era is still calling the shots in US domestic and foreign policy. This complex likes to exaggerate the threat from the perceived US foes and according to the Defence Intelligence Agency by 2020 China's defence budget will be likely to exceed $ 200 billion.[6] Still, these threats are manageable. One needs to distinguish two aspects. Economics is a positive sum game; everybody can become richer together (unless resources constraints limit growth and that can happen with the new energy cold war). Political power is a zero-sum game, since only one country can be the most powerful. However, outright conflict is usually worse than cooperation. How then is the potential for friction to be managed? The answer is to keep a firm grasp of shared interests. In a world of economical interdependence, nuclear-armed big powers, 19th-century approaches to conflict and 18th-century attitudes to commerce are potentially ruinous. As the status quo power, the US needs to demonstrate that it internalises the principle of mutually beneficial management of the world's economy and security. Unfortunately, this may not happen. The US policy-makers have not yet purged their old ideas. They have repeatedly stated their desire to "build and maintain our defences beyond challenge." To do so, the US must "dissuade future military competition". The message from the US to the world is: "Do as we say, not as we do."[7] On the other hand, the Chinese will believe military superiority is far from outdated if the US is determined to retain it. It is also plausible that China will possess the resources to match US military spending by the middle of the present century, though it is unlikely to match its technical sophistication even by that date. Whether the US would prefer to contain China or confront China, remains to be seen. Nonetheless, like Japan bashing in the recent past, China bashing is going on in the US media and in the higher echelons of power. But it is still a controlled exercise. Had the US not mired in Iraq and Afghanistan, China bashing would have been much shriller! When President Bush II came to power, he made China policy a top priority.

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[3] Neil King Jr., "Host Gets Warrier as They Visit U.S.", in *Wall Street Journal* (Washington), 20 April 2006.

[4] Ibidem.

[5] Ibidem.

[6] Martin Wolf, "Why America and China Cannot Afford to Fall Out", in *Financial Times*, 8 October 2003.

[7] Howard W. French, "Is it a Peaceful rise? U.S. Should Not Bet on It", in *International Herald Tribune* (Paris), 20 April 2006.

However, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack changed all that. US' pre-occupation, compounded with its folly to redraw the new Middle Eastern map, gave a big opportunity to the Communist leadership in China to pursue its agenda with less interference from Washington. Now China is already competing hard with the US across a range of fronts – from the pursuit of energy resources to the establishment of diplomatic networks in South East Asia and Africa. At the same time it is saying loudly and clearly that it not a threat to the United States, it does not even wish to be seen as a challenge. In the recent past, China's leaders have struggled over how best to convey this thought, issuing tortured slogans like "peaceful rise," for example, that are adopted and dropped with equal ambivalence. One has to know that China's own problems consume most of its energy, and will continue to for the near future. Whether the country's system can muddle through is anything but a foregone conclusion. It is increasingly outpaced by change on the ground, and by colossal problems of every kind – from the environment and energy to the ever more sophisticated and freethinking masses.

Lest anyone suspects hostility in this rebuttal of China's new line, one hastens to add that this is the way it should be. China has an exceptionally long history of power on the world stage, against which the last two centuries of relative weakness is merely a blip. In addition, like any fast rising power, its re-emergence will be bound to change the rules of the game, particularly when it is heavily investing in US bond market where its investment has surpassed the Japanese investments. The devil, as they say, is in the details, which is why one might hope for more candour from the Chinese leaders, both toward the outside world and toward their own people. The Chinese people are still spoon-fed and it is a saccharine-laced and ultimately dangerous form of history that paints China as the eternal innocent: happily self-contained, fair, and courtly toward others.[8] In keeping with the emphasis on stealth, the first element in China's recent play-book is to stay out of the way while the US undermines its own position in the world. China is becoming attractive to the developing countries in the Third World not only because of what China is doing, but because of what the US is doing. "It is quite natural for them to like China, if they do not like what America is doing. They want an alternative, in the same way as countries looked to the Soviet Union during the Cold War," said Professor Zheng Yongnian of University of Nottingham in Britain.[9] The Soviet parallel, however, ends there. China, by contrast, is doing what the US once excelled at, emphasizing economic multi-literalism: embracing regional and international organizations, signing trade pacts and becoming an ever-bigger player in the foreign aid game. China's advise to the world's poor resembles its strategy at home: "development first and politics later". At the same time one senses that the Chinese leadership is serious about wanting to avoid disastrous wars and ruinous arms races. Its challenge instead is to another key source of US power, the international system. In other words, by its growing muscle in trade and finance China is likely to draw into its embrace developing countries, particularly authoritarian ones, attracted by its corporatist capitalism. So when do the masks drop? When the challenge does become explicit? To answer these two important questions, one can say safely that China needs a few more decades either to

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[8] Ibidem.
[9] Ian Bremmer, "U.S.–China: The Mistrust is Mutual", in *International Herald Tribune*, 17 May 2007.

become economically strong enough to no longer care what the US might think, or to change into a democracy, which would settle the legitimacy issue in Western eyes.

Within the United States, two schools of China watchers are propagating their views. There has been a debate to address the rapid rise of China's economy and geopolitical influence. The so-called "panda hedgers" believe China can be a force for stability in both East Asia and the world at large and should, therefore, be constructively engaged. On the other side are the "dragon slayers", who believe China's growing economic and political power directly threatens US interests and must be contained. Further, "panda huggers" believe that China's economic changes, begun a generation ago under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, have opened a Pandora's box of reform that will eventually bind Beijing to commitments on rule of law, human rights, property rights and a higher degree of political transparency. Rising living standards cannot be sustained within a society in which citizens have virtually no political voice. The example is the way Beijing has adopted a "Go out" strategy of encouraging Chinese firms to scour the globe for commercial opportunities that will stoke the country's economic growth. No doubt, the hedging strategy makes a lot of sense unless it is simply a means of postponing strategic decisions on how best to respond to China's rise. Where is the line that China must not cross? Beijing does not know, because Washington has not yet decided. That is largely because the "dragon slayers" continue to argue that China's newest international relationships and growth of its military capacity are threatening vital US interests.[10] On the whole, the present administration seems to have (perhaps inadvertently) extended the strategy of creative ambiguity that has well served US policy on Taiwan for so many years to the entire US-China relationship. The ideological differences in the 21st century are not as great as those of the Cold War chasm between the White House and the Kremlin. Foreign investment of $ 72.4 billion in China in 2005, much of it American, is one measure of how interlinked a once fractured world has become. Yet, China is still a large and tempting economic target in Washington. Senior democrats after their win in the mid-term Congressional elections in November 2006 complain that unfair Chinese trade practices have killed US manufacturing jobs, that Beijing's failure to protect copyright has cost American companies more than $ 2 billion, that Beijing's manipulation of its currency has helped widen a bilateral trade deficit that reached a record figure of $ 232.5 billion in 2006, and that only forceful US actions against China can remedy these problems.[11] Republicans who either agree with this argument or fear that Democrats can use it to win elections support the get-tough approach. The fact of the matter is it is essentially the US' fault if it is importing cheap goods from China to please its people. Second, one cannot force another country to revalue its currency; it is up to the market forces, which will play their balancing game eventually. Americans are the most spendthrift in the world and they do not want to cut down their expenditure and like their government, which thrives on deficit financing. In such a climate, it is childish to expect from a country like China to do what Americans are supposed to do themselves first. Thus, there is not much chance of a success for coercive US trade policy in the end. If China withdraws its investment from the US security bonds, the US dollar can collapse in the

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[10] Ibidem.

[11] Ian Bremmer, "U.S. and China: The Panda Hedgers" in *International Herald Tribune*, 24 May 2007.

international market. It is the overseas capital which is helping the US government to proliferate in foolish ventures like Iraq and Afghanistan. But still the US Congress is up against Chinese trade practices. It wants to pass certain laws that will aim at forcing China to revalue its currency which is pegged to US dollar. To them, China's fixed exchange rate subsidises the country's exports and has contributed to the widening bilateral trade deficit.[12] Today, Asia has the foreign exchange reserves of more than $ 2.6 trillion, out of which more than a trillion and two hundred billion dollars belong to China. It will be no surprise if Asia and particularly China is going to call the shots in the coming decade on the economic matters.

However, China has no such preoccupations for scruples at the moment. "If the Washington consensus is ideologically interventionist, the emerging Beijing consensus looks ideologically agnostic. It prizes peace, development and trade. It cares not a hoot what a country's political or economic model is so long as oil and raw materials are flowing", wrote Roger Cohen.[13] Now China is not in the business of exporting war, development models or political blueprints, as it was in the 1950s and 1960s. It wants to do business, morality be damned. Democracy in its worldview comes in a very distant second to growth – if it comes in at all. The kindest view of the Chinese position is this: "Growth solves most problems, be they of poverty or enslavement [...]. In a sense, the era of struggle between democratic capitalism and one-party capitalism has begun a fight between Washington's banner of multi-party freedom and Beijing's banner of no strings-attached growth." "May you live in the interesting times", as the old Chinese curse says; it reveals the part of the screenplay for the next international movie of the 21st century. Gradually the American-dominated unipolar world, which emerged from the abrupt end of the Cold War, will lose its steam. Now the US knocks with deference at the Chinese door. "A very important nation" – this is how the US policy makers describe China these days.

India is no pushover either (try suggesting in New Delhi that outsiders might usefully broker a deal with Pakistan over Kashmir, the disputed territory over which the two countries have fought three wars and many border skirmishes), but democrats are easier to talk to than Communist apparatchiks. Making friends is a good way for the US to hedge its Asian bet as Japan and other South Eastern countries have failed to stop the Chinese influence in Asia and Africa. Democracy aside, there is a second way in which India is the un-China – and it is not to India's credit. In most measures of modernisation, China is far ahead. In 2005, per capita income in India was $ 3,3300; in China it was $ 6,800.The foreign exchange reserves of China have crossed more than a trillion as compared to India's $ 215 billion in 2006. Prosperity and progress have not touched yet many of 600,000 villages in India where two thirds of India's population live. Backbreaking, empty-stomach poverty, which China has been tackling successfully for the past three decades, is still too common in India. Education for women – the key driver of China's rise to become the workshop of the world – lags terribly in India. The Indian nation has more people with HIV/AIDS than any other country in the world, but until recently, the Indian government was in a disgraceful state of denial about the epidemic. Transportation networks and electrical grids, which are

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    [12] *Financial Times*, 14 June 2007.
    [13] Roger Cohen, "The New Bipolar World – China vs America", in *International Herald Tribune*, 22 November 2006.

crucial to industrial development and job creation, are so dilapidated that it will take a couple of decades to modernize them. Yet, the litany of India's comparative shortcomings omits a fundamental truth: China started first. China's key economic reforms took shape in the late 1970s, India's not until the early 1990s. However, India is younger and freer than China. India is playing catching up, for sure, but it has the skills, the required qualified work force and the dynamism to do so. It deserves the new notice and it has to get it. "We are not in a race with China, because they have already won the race", said Jairam Ramesh, the Indian commerce minister.[14] He was also trying to dampen the superpower hysteria, arguing that even if India was to become one of the world's largest economies that would not represent a stupendous achievement. "If a country of one billion people cannot become the third largest economy, then we need to have our heads examined. What counts is per capita income. [...] Let us not go overboard about this idea of the 21st century being India's century. On a micro level it may be, but not in terms of lifestyle or earnings", he added.[15] The fact of the matter is that China has reduced the number of poor drastically; only ten per cent of Chinese population is earning less than one dollar a day whereas in India there are forty per cent which come under this category. China's rise has broadly followed a well-trodden East Asian path of foreign investment, export and massive internal savings. India, with a more closed economy and a far lower saving rate, depends heavily on domestic consumption to sustain growth. China struggles to control excessive fixed assets investment, while India is constrained by scarce capital and woefully inadequate infrastructure spendings. Low-cost production is the engine of China's real economy. Indian manufacturing still generates a small share of national output – as do its much vaunted software and services industries. India has a reasonably sound banking system and a long-established stock exchange. China's shaky banks have yet to learn how to assess risk and lend prudently and its equity market is still primitive. Furthermore, the two economies interact only at the margins. While bilateral trade has zoomed from $ 1 billion in 2000 to $ 17.6 billion in 2006, India accounts for only 1.5 per cent of China's exports. Almost eight per cent of India's exports go to China. However, to the former's chagrin, most are low value commodities, while trade in the opposite direction is dominated by manufactured goods. From a practical standpoint, trade has grown dramatically as cheap Chinese consumer goods have penetrated Indian markets and as China has brought increasing amounts of Indian coal and iron to feed its furnaces. This complementary relationship is largely based on the weakness of the Indian manufacturing industry. If India is to follow China's path to growth, even at a slower rate, it will be looking to export manufactured goods, using its own more abundant labour force, rather than exporting raw materials that its own economy will need in increasing volumes. Second, two-way investment remains a trickle and each side complains of the difficulty of operating in the other's market. The question then becomes which route proves more effective. In a short-term perspective, the main risk in China is that failure to deal with the root causes of over-investment will turn boom into burst. In the downside, a global economic downturn would hurt both. India, less dependant on exports, might appear better placed to weather the storm. However, its reliance

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[14] Amelia Gentleman, "A 'Superpower Mania' has Gripped India", *International Herald Tribune*, 24 November 2006.
[15] Ibidem.

on short-term capital inflows from abroad to finance growth could make it vulnerable if global investors deserted emerging markets. Tight exchange controls insulate China from international financial turbulence. Weaker exports would hit many of its low-margin producers. However, the country can call on substantial financial resources to mitigate the impact of external shocks. By most measures, China today is more deeply integrated economically with the US than India is attached to the US. Until recently, the Americans have had a romantic idealised picture of China. This preoccupation with China has prevented a better understanding of India. Now there is much better appreciation of India and its potentiality in the coming decades.

The biggest uncertainties ahead both countries are political. Indian democracy, for all its flaws, has long been known for its resilience. However, it grew up in an era of rigid social structure in which every one was resigned to his or her place in the hierarchy. Faster growth is challenging the old order. While giving hope to many, it is also sharpening disparities between an affluent urban elite and vast numbers of rural poor eager for a better life. Meeting those aspirations and maintaining social stability poses a huge test for the country's political system. India is facing an uphill battle to rein in the insurgencies and terrorism that threaten investment climate. Besides the unrest in Kashmir, there is a growing Maoist rebellion in more than hundred districts of southern and eastern India that have been fuelled by economic deprivation and uneven growth. Incidentally, Maoism now has more followers in India than in China. Unless India's politicians face the situation on reform, open up to foreign direct investment and start tackling structural hurdles to growth, the economy will perform below its potential and its momentum may fade.

Those disconnections make it fanciful to suppose that the nascent dialogue between India and China will lead to rapid breakthroughs in economic cooperation. More likely, their governments' primary aim is damage limitation. Both want to prevent old rivalries, quarrels and mistrust interfering with their race to development. During Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit to India in November 2006 (the first by a Chinese President in ten years), both China and India tried to downplay the border question and put it on the back burner and emphasized more on economic cooperation. During that visit it was declared that there was room in Asia for the two emerging economic powers to co-exist in a cooperative rather than competitive relationship. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said: "There is enough space for the two countries to develop together in a mutually supportive manner, while remaining sensitive to each other's concerns and aspirations, as befits good neighbours".[16] In this context, the two countries agreed to increase their two-way trade to $ 40 billion by 2010. In a sense, both countries need more time to develop and eradicate poverty. Nonetheless, the Sino-Indian summit was less about the promised increases in cooperation than making a statement to the world: We are the future. For China, there was a subtext: India is learning from us.[17] The Chinese president refused to support India's seat in the UN Security Council as it was also opposed to Japan's inclusion. This is a trump card, which the Chinese leadership did not play at that time. Then "we are the future" connotation was aimed at the old developed world, including Russia. In addition, it was a message to the present developing world: we can be your guides, apart from the US.

[16] *Times of India* (New Delhi), 22 November 2006.
[17] Phillip Bowring, "A Message from Asia", in *International Herald Tribune*, 23 November 2006.

However, the strategic divide remains intact. The relationship between the two countries has long had an air of mistrust. India is concerned about China's close military relationship with Pakistan. It is no secret that Pakistan got a nuclear device from China on a silver platter and most of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal, including missiles, have come directly from China. Pakistan's proxy war in Kashmir by helping terrorists is an open book. Chinese strategy to encircle India and build up its strategic assets stretching from Myanmar to Nepal to Pakistan has worried India extensively. China has been active in promoting links with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, which is essentially India's backyard. This Chinese activity has not gone down well in Indian establishment circles. In June 2007, China once again raked the issue of Arunachal Pradesh, which has been under India for the past few centuries, when it claimed 90,000 square kilometres as a Chinese territory. In the 1950s, China had unilaterally annexed 40,000 square kilometres of land in Aksai Chin area in the northern Himalayas without any border negotiations. This led to a bloody military war in October–November 1962 and the relations between the countries remained frozen for two decades. The Chinese claim came as a big surprise to policy makers in New Delhi who were hoping that China would behave sensibly. Senior defence officers feel that Indian foreign office, in its anxiety to facilitate border talks and improve diplomatic and trade relations, is taking Chinese insults too lightly. The politico-diplomatic establishment does not seem respond adequately to China's aggressive claims.[18] Other political observers feel that India's strengthening ties with the US is the cause of China's aggressive position over the disputed India-China border in the eastern Himalayas.[19] This happened just a few days after the meeting of Manmohan Singh with President Hu Jinato at the G-8-summit in Germany where Singh had described China as India's "greatest neighbour". Analysts say China's blunt assertion of claims to an area more than twice the size of Taiwan is inconsistent with "political parameters" for a potential settlement agreed in 2005 and could contaminate other areas of the relationship.[20] Again, on 27 June 2007, the spokesman of the Chinese Foreign Ministry took objection on forming a quadripartite alliance of the four democratic nations, the US, India, Japan and Australia. He said: "All countries should conform to the trend and to do more to enhance mutual trust and strengthen cooperation".[21] Professor Sun Shihai of the Chinese Academy of Sciences said: "It would divide Asia and it would also go against India's growing interests in the East Asia region.[...] Such a move would go against Late Jawarharlal Nehru's vision of a Pan-Asia as well".[22] Nonetheless, it was surprising that Nehru's name was mentioned in the Chinese academic circles after ages, as he was made responsible for the collapse of Sino-Indian relations in the early 1960s after he had given political refuge to Tibet's spiritual leader Dalai Lama and his followers in 1959. In other words, China remains an enigma for the Indian policy makers. It seems Sino-Indian relationship will never be smooth and there will be bumps on the way. The Chinese leadership, it seems, is willing to give a proper space to Indian logical aspirations in regional politics. Ever since China annexed Tibet in 1950, it has made itself a South Asian power as

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[18] R. Prasanan, "The Hidden Dragon", in *Week* (Kochi) 10 June 2007.
[19] *Financial Times* 11 June 2007.
[20] Ibidem.
[21] *Times of India*, 28 June 2007.
[22] Ibidem.

well and thus tries to checkmate India on each step. In order to understand Indians the Chinese leadership will have to purge its old mindset, if it is keen to maintain peace and prosperity in Asia. It has to realize that the ability to synthesize is one of India's great strengths. "It is tremendously important for India, as an emerging power, to start projecting that there is more to this country than just information technology and high percentage growth rates", said Dr Karan Singh, president of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations and a great intellectual.[23] Many a time in history India has confused even the smartest: Winston Churchill called India not a country but a geographical expression, and John Kenneth Galbraith was intrigued by what he called India's functional anarchy. However, the operative words are "expression" and "functional". For India not only offers the space for internal critics to express themselves fully, it also manages to function. While the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia disintegrated, to take just two recent examples, India is still one unit, though its size is that of a sub-continent. The polity is based on democracy and secularism and the Indian constitution is the only book which can be quoted every day for the functioning of this polity. Time will tell whether this elephant can dance majestically or not in the presence of the Chinese dragon.

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[23] *Financial Times*, 30 September 2006.

ŁUKASZ GACEK

Africa in the Chinese Diplomacy
The Struggle for African Natural Resources

The rapid economical growth in China, observed within the recent few decades, makes this country, already nowadays, become an alternative for the biggest economic powers of the world. Successes achieved in this area must be regarded with well-based respect. Since the moment of China's opening towards the world in 1978, initiated by changes carried out under direction of reformers closely cooperating with Deng Xiaoping, the gross national product in 2006 grew up to USD 2,6 trillion in comparison to USD 216,5 billion in 1978. That meant average annual growth of ca. 9,6%.[1] Within the analogical period, incomes of citizens of urbanized areas and farmers also grew up.[2]

While noting positive elements of this scheme, one should also consider problems arising paralelly to the process of modernization. In the opinion of director of Institute of Economy of the Chinese Academy of Social Research, Li Jingwen, at least few elements of key meaning should be considered here. Among the biggest difficulties mentioned by him one can find coexistence of the old and the new system. In this area, the question of managing national companies becomes a key one. Besides the existing national sector, a rapid development of private enterprises takes place. Li has underlined that economical growth is still of mostly extensive character; additionally, the structure connected with distribution of forces and means remains irrational. Another issue concerns domestic products, with the arising problem of managing production surpluses and their sales. To all these problems, the huge volume of goods imported by China has to be added as well. The deepening differences in economical development of various regions of the country also constitute a big challenge to the authorities. The number of unemployed keeps growing significantly, being particularly visible in rural areas. Another problem is the existing structure of employment and salaries. Disproportions between incomes of citizens of various regions keep growing. Demand for qualified scientists and techniques is visible. On the other hand, the surplus of low-qualified labor force is significant. In opinion of Li Jingwen, problems connected with pollution of natural environment will become an important issue, requiring taking up concrete solutions. Such problems cannot be solved temporarily, they

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[1] "Hu: China Firmly Committed to Peaceful Development", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 11.06.2007.

[2] Incomes of citizens of urbanized areas grew up from 343 yuan (44 USD) in 1978 to 11 759 yuan in 2006. In the analogical period incomes of farmers also grew up from the level of 134 yuan to 3 587 yuan ("GDP Grows Annual Average of 9.67 from 1978 to 2006", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 7.05.2007).

require taking up long-term activities.[3] One should add that the mono-party system still functions in China. At the end of 2006, the Chinese Communist Party gathered over 72 million members.[4] What is important, nevertheless, is that the party becomes opened for new millieux, previously not considered in its policy. On the 16th congress of the Chinese Communist Party in November 2002, important decisions were made in this area. A breaking event of the congress was the opening towards private entrepreneurs. The concept of "Three representations" indicated that the party should become a representation of "the most developed production forces of the country, the most developed Chinese culture and the fundamental interests of a significant majority of the Chinese nation".[5] This rule was reflected in the statute of the party. The new statement, despite the provision made by the president of the People's Republic of China, Jiang Zemin, that workers, peasants and soldiers still constitute the "backbone of the party", was a significant deviation from the tradition, underlining the supremacy of workers-peasants' alliance.[6] A significant support for the position of private entrepreneurs were also the amendments to the principal law, concerning protection of private ownership and respecting human rights. Nevertheless, one should be aware that despite these revolutionary changes, members of the Communist Party still constitute only 5% of the total population of the country. Constantly, lack of civil society is observed. It is the Communist Party who indicates the direction of development of the country, simultaneously controlling all the social behaviors. The discourse carried out within intellectual circles does not exceed the stated frames, fixed by the highest authorities. Limitations concern the flow of information and freedom of speech. Modernization process is realized under control of the party, drawing the main directives for changes.

This is all worth remembering while analyzing questions connected with development of the Chinese economy. According to economical forecasts, China is to become the biggest economic power of the world in 2050.[7] It seems that internal factors should be, within the coming years, a positive element, tending to maintain the high rate of economic growth, as well as the high rate of investments. For the last few years, the basic area on which social attention has been focused, is the economic development. On August 31st 2007, president Hu Jintao underlined the necessity of developing education in the country. In his opinion, this will help to provide more qualified employees and specialists, to build a properly functioning society and support the further modernization of the country.[8] Scientific and research development becomes a priority. On February 9, 2006, the National Council approved the plan of scientific-technological development of China for the nearest years. According to this, increases in expenses for research and development are to reach 2% of

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[3] Li Jingwen, "Reforma oraz polityka otwarcia przyniosły wielkie zmiany chińskiej gospodarce oraz społeczeństwu. Prognoza rozwoju gospodarki chińskiej (1996–2050)", in *Nowe Życie Gospodarcze*, No. 34, 23.08.1998.

[4] The Communist Party of China had 72 391 million members in 2006. It means an increase of 1 581 new members in comparison to the previous year ("CPC Full of Vigor and Quality", in *People's Daily*, 11.07.2007).

[5] P. Giller, „Nowi ludzie, nowe klasy", in *Rzeczpospolita*, 15.11.2002.

[6] "Jiang Zemin Report at 16th Party Congress", in *People's Daily*, 18.11.2002.

[7] "China to be Biggest Economy by 2050", in *China Daily*, 22.05.2006.

[8] "Chinese President Calls to Develop Education as Priority", in *Xinhua*, *People's Daily*, 31.08.2007.

GNP in 2010 and 2,5% GNP in 2020. It is worth mentioning that the current indicator is ca. 1,3%. According to these assumptions, in 2020 science and technology are to generate 60% of economic growth. Dependence on foreign technological investments is simultaneously to drop from the current 50% to 30%. Most of the means provided for this aim is to come from the national budget.[9] The *Financial Times,* referring to the OECD data, informed that China occupies the second position among countries providing the highest means for research and development.[10] Initiating the process of reforms led to rapid inflow of direct foreign investments. At the end of 2006, 590 000 of foreign investors were active in China.[11] After each following year, the access to the Chinese market shall be even widening, being to a great extent a result of commitments deriving from China's access to World Trade Organization in November 2001. According to the report concerning direct foreign investments prepared by Foreign Direct Investment Confidence (FDI), A.T. Kearney consulting company, China belongs, besides India and the United States, to the most attractive places of investments.[12] Among big foreign investments of the recent period, one can indicate activities of the Russian gas potentate Gazprom which, at the end of 2006, started up construction of gas pipeline from Western Siberia to China. The pipeline is to transport annually 30 billion m^3 of gas. According to the plan, two lanes of the pipeline are provided, aiming to connect the two countries. They are to deliver annually 60–80 billion m^3 of gas form Western and Eastern Siberia. The value of this enterprise, planned to be finished by 2011, is estimated at USD 11 billion.[13] Another example of such solutions is the contract between China and Kazakhstan, signed in August 2007, assuming cooperation in constructing pipeline to transport gas from Turkmenistan. The costs of building a pipeline of annual capacity of ca. 30 billions m^3 are estimated at USD 4 billion. China simultaneously signed a contract with Turkmenistan for gas deliveries for thirty years.[14] In March 2007, the Chinese oil concern Sinopec signed a great investment contract with American ExxonMobil and Saudi-Arabian Saudi Aramco. The value of the agreement made USD 5 billion. The contract provides for establishing two joint-ventures of capital of the three above mentioned companies.[15]

Chinese economy requires foreign fuels. Relying on domestic sources only is highly non-satisfying. Hence, in the recent years, one can observe diplomatic expansion of Chinese authorities, tending to obtain new sources of supply. Foreign travels of important politics

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[9] "Spending on R&D Gets Boost", in *China Daily*, 10.02.2006.

[10] Specialists estimated these expenditures at 136 mld USD in 2006. USA leads before other countries with expenditures on the level of 330 mld USD. It is worth noting that China overtook Japan, whose expenditures were estimated at 130 mld USD („Państwo Środka przebija Japonię w wydatkach na badania", in *Puls Biznesu*, 4.12.2006).

[11] "GDP Grows Annual Average of 9.67 from 1978 to 2006", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 7.05.2007.

[12] According to the prognosis, in the near future most of all investigation and development investments are going to be concentrated in the area of China, India and Middle-East Europe. Over 40% questioned managers are planning to achieve this kind of investments in aforementioned regions (A.T. Kearney: „Chiny, Indie i USA najatrakcyjniejsze od inwestowania", in *Puls Biznesu*, 9.05.2006).

[13] „Gazprom rozpoczął budowę rurociągu do Chin", in *Puls Biznesu*, 17.10.2006.

[14] „Turkmeński gaz popłynie do Chin", in *The Wall Street Journal. Polska*, 20.08.2007.

[15] „Chiny zawarły wielki kontrakt naftowy z koncernami amerykańskim i saudyjskim", in *Puls Biznesu*, 30.03.2007.

to African countries, Latin America, Trans-Caucasian republics or countries located in the region of Persian Gulf seem to be a proof of the previously chosen direction. Usually, for the delivered fuels China carries out investments in highly-developed technologies of partner countries. Such investments cover also local industries and other strategic areas.

Subsequently to the rapid development of Chinese economy, various demands related to it appear. Lack of proper volume of domestic raw materials makes foreign countries a natural field for expansion. Shortcomings in various areas of economy already lead to the necessity of searching for alternative solutions. In accordance with economic estimations, in 2020 China will need 3,2 billion tons of coal to satisfy the domestic energetic demand. Only in 2006, the demand for coal was estimated at ca. 2,25 billion tons.[16] In the nearest two or three years, China is to become a net importer of coal. In 2006, export of this material made 63 million tons (decrease of 13% in comparison to the previous year), with 38,25 million tons imported (48% increase in comparison to 2005).[17] Shortcomings can be found also in the case of other raw materials. The demand for crude oil in 2010 shall oscillate between 320 and 350 million tons, out of which 150 million tons are to be supplied by import. In 2005, China imported 130 million tons of crude oil. In the next year, the import grew up further 14,5% and exceeded 1 billion barrels. Hence, a daily import to China in 2006 made 3 million barrels of oil.[18] Confirmed reserves of crude oil in China make 17 billion barrels, while confirmed reserves of natural gas made 2,23 billion m^3 in 2004.[19]

The growing demand for fuels had a great influence on the performance of Chinese administration. Reorganization in oil industries is a proof of deep changes in this matter. At the end of 1990s, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOP) were established. CNPC remains the leader in total Chinese production of crude oil. In 2002, it delivered 68,9% of the total production, while the other companies, Sinopec and CNOOP, 15,2% and 11,4%[20], respectively. Before restructuring, the domestic potentate, CNPC, was mostly active in production and searching for crude oil and natural gas. Sinopec, on the other hand, was engaged mostly in distribution and processing. Changes taken up by central authorities lead to changes in areas of activities of these companies. CNPC functions mostly in the West and the North, while Sinopec in the South. The third force in this system, CNOOP, is mostly active in exploitation of oil from offshore platforms. At the end of the present decade, public emission of shares of the mentioned companies in global share stocks took place.[21]

As far as recent years are concerned, in the area of consumption of energy one can easily observe China's constantly increasing demand. In 1991 it made 9%, while in

[16] „Chiny będą potrzebować 3,2 mld ton węgla w 2020 roku", in *Puls Biznesu*, 25.05.2006.

[17] „Chiny zostaną importerem węgla netto", in *Puls Biznesu*, 16.04.2007.

[18] „Chiny będą potrzebować 3,2 mld ton węgla w 2020 roku", in *Puls Biznesu*, 25.05.2006; „Chiny sprowadziły 1 mld baryłek ropy w 2006 roku", in *Puls Biznesu*, 11.01.2007.

[19] *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2005*.

[20] Kaoru Yamaguchi, Keii Cho, *Natural Gas in China*, The Institute of Energy Economics, Japan (IEEJ), August 2003.

[21] M. Tatarzyński, "Głód energii w Chinach a stosunki z państwami Bliskiego Wschodu", in *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe. Bezpieczeństwo energetyczne*, J. Strzelczyk, ed., no. 1/2006, Warsaw: Biuro Bezpieczeństwa Narodowego, 2006, p. 54.

Table 1. Natural gas production by major Chinese producers (100 million m^3)

Producent	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
CNPC*	171.80	149.83	162.60	183.10	205.81	224.75
Sinopec*		23.24	22.26	39.16	46.12	49.45
CNOOC*	40.50	38.64	43.92	39.60	38.57	37.16
Others	14.73	21.08	23.20	10.14	12.79	14.97
Total	227.03	232.79	251.98	272.00	303.29	326.33
Growth % **		2.54	8.2	7.9	11.5	7.6

Source:

*   *China National Petroleum Corporation, China Petroleum and Chemical Industry Association.*

** *China Statistical Yearbook 2002.*

2006 already 16%.[22] Such growth is typical of the fastest developing countries, like China, India or the United States. According to the report of Energy Information Administration (EIA), the global consumption of energy is to increase by a half by 2030. Demand for such raw materials like coal or liquid fuels (crude oil and products of its processing) is expected to grow. Only the structure of share of specified sources of energy is to undergo changes.[23]

The greatest shortcoming of natural reserves in China is lack of agricultural and forest areas in relation to a great number of citizens. It is worth underlining that in China, the third biggest country in the world, cultivated areas make a small percent of total space of the country; China possess one of the lowest coefficients in the world. Such a situation requires taking up some efforts on the international scale.

Observing the assumptions of Chinese foreign policy towards Africa, Middle East, Latin America or Trans-Caucasian republics, it can be concluded that what becomes the crucial target is establishing a proper system of supply diversification. Obtaining raw materials becomes now one of the most important factors, determining Chinese activity in foreign policy.

The objective of this paper is to focus on one of the directions of this offensive as an example of the conducted strategy. It seems that what happens in Africa is finding new paths with simultaneous recalling of the past. For obvious reasons, it arouses a great interest among the international society, becoming a subject of politological considerations.

Starting up a diplomatic offensive in Africa, the Chinese authorities go back to the policy pursued already in the Maoist period, when efforts were taken to struggle against American or post-colonial (mostly French) influences. Support given to local Leftist partisan groups until the 1970s tended to strenghten the Communist China's position in that part of the world. Aspirations of Mao Zedong himself, willing to become a leader of the entire Third World, were also of some significance. In the 1960s and 1970s, Chinese authorities

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[22] *BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2007.*

[23] *Annual Energy Outlook 2007 With Projections to 2030*, Energy Information Administration (EIA), February 2007.

used to force the concept of multi-polar world. A good example of this were travels, undertaken by prime minister Zhou Enlai assisted by minister of foreign affairs Chen Yi to fourteen countries of Asia and Africa between December 1963 and March 1964.[24] Worth recalling are also the earlier activities of Chinese diplomacy tending to propagate Asian-African brotherhood. In April 1955, a conference of non-aligned countries was held in Bandung, Indonesia, with a delegation of the People's Republic of China attending it as an observer. The participants of the conference accepted five rules of peaceful coexistence, established a year earlier by the prime ministers of China and India, Zhou Enlai and Jawaharlal Nehru, covering such issues as mutual respect of territorial integrity and sovereignty, non-intervention in domestic affairs, non-aggression, equality and rule of mutual advantages, peaceful coexistence.[25] In 1961, the 1st Afro-Asian Conference was held, with the idea of establishing a forum of strengthening cooperation between these parts of the globe. China was to play a leading role on this forum. In the 1970s, Mao Zedong defined his theory, assuming the world's division into three circles. During his discussion with one of the Third World leaders in 1974, Mao defined the United States and Soviet Union the first world, Japan, Europe, Canada as the second world, while Asia except Japan, the entire Africa and Latin America as the third one.[26] The draft of activity of Chinese diplomacy created in the 1970s seems very similar to the present one. This time, we can observe a kind of "rally for contracts". Basing the conducted policy on resentments of the past seems to be very profitable for China. After the "opening of China", initiated by Deng Xiaoping, first symptoms of change in approach towards Africa became visible. The ideology was visibly shifted into the background. Trade contacts, at first of limited character, started to develop. When discussing the policy of obtaining foreign raw materials in the early 1990s, mostly natural gas and crude oil, biggest efforts were still directed to the Middle East. Nevertheless, lack of stability in this region forced the interest in other markets. Africa, where American and European influences could be replaced, became the target. In 1996, president Jiang Zemin visited six African countries. These visits effected in signing few dozens of economic agreements. Simultaneously, they opened new stages in mutual relations. In the next years, Africa was visited by Chinese politicians of the highest rank, including vice-president Hu Jintao and prime minister Zhu Rongji. At the same time, many African representatives of the highest levels visited China.

A new opening in defining mutual relations took place at the beginning of the present century. The continuously strengthening economical cooperation led to organizing ministerial conference of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), held on October 10–12, 2000 in Beijing. The main assumptions of the newly established forum was entering into dialogue and creating new mechanisms of cooperation between the developing

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[24] L. Ladany, *The Communist Party of China and Marxism 1921–1985. A Self-Portrait*, Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988, p. 271.

[25] Eds. A. Patek, J. Rydel, J. J. Węc, *Najnowsza historia świata 1945–1995*, vol. I, Cracow: Wydawnictwo Literackie, 1997, p. 356.

[26] "Teoria przewodniczącego Mao o podziale na trzy światy wielkim wkładem w marksizm–leninizm (artykuł programowy *Renmin Ribao*, Pekin, 1.09.1977)", in *Dokumenty polityki zagranicznej Chińskiej Republiki Ludowej (1977)*, selected by J. Rowiński, Warsaw: PISM, Zakład Krajów Pozaeuropejskich, 1978, p. 108.

countries. The greatest attention was paid to pragmatic cooperation and relations based on equality and mutual advantages derived from widened political dialogue together with deepened economic-trade cooperation.[27] During the establishing meeting, participating ministers of foreign affairs signed two important documents: *Beijing Declaration of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation* and *Programme for China–Africa Cooperation in Economic and Social Development*. The declaration defined the basic assumptions of the new field of international political and economic order, indicating the necessity of mutual support in this area by developing long-term, friendly relations. The second document indicated the areas of cooperation between China and Africa, i.e. trade, agriculture, tourism, science, education, culture, health, development, etc.[28]

The beginning of the current decade brought the long-expected changes. Interest of Chinese entrepreneurs in African market resulted in signing numerous contracts. By the end of the year 2000, 499 businesses were started in Africa, investing total capital of USD 990 million. In the year 2000, mutual trade overturn made USD 10,6 billion. Among the main raw materials imported by China, crude oil (of total value of USD 3,615 billion) can be found.[29]

Another ministerial meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held on December 15–16, 2003 in Addis Abeba, Ethiopia. Meetings on ministerial level are held every three years, alternately in China and Africa. On the other hand, meetings of high-rank officials are held every two years. 44 delegations from Africa participated in the meeting in Ethiopia; the Chinese delegation was led by prime minister Wen Jiabao. The result of discussions was approving of the *The FOCAC Addis Abeba Action Plan (2004–2006)* by the Forum. Among the most important issues listed in the document, problems of agriculture, infrastructure, support to trade and investments, tourism, debts, development support and utilization of natural and energetic reserves were included. Significant changes can be found in the area of tourism. Until 2004, only three African countries (RSA, Egypt and Morocco) were given the ADS (Approved Destination Status) by Chinese authorities. During the Forum, this number was enlarged by further eight African countries (Mauritius, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia, the Seychelles, Tunisia and Zambia).[30] During the Addis Abeba meeting, much attention was also paid to political issues, particularly peace and safety protection. The meaning of such organizations like the United Nations or African Union in the area of eliminating negative phenomena was underlined. Chinese authorities committed to further support for peacekeeping missions in Africa. Another category to which attention was devoted was limiting the sources of terrorism. In the further part of the document, one could find regulations concerning social issues. Development of human resources, cooperation in the area of job training of employees, educational issues, cultural exchange and problems of migration were included there.[31]

Simultaneously to the Forum in Addis Abeba, a China–Africa business meeting took place, with ca. 400 of Chinese and African entrepreneurs participating. During the conference

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[27] *The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation*, http://www.focac.org

[28] Ibidem.

[29] A. Barasiewicz, *Stosunki chińsko-afrykańskie, partnerstwo w założeniach, dominacja w praktyce*, 14.05.2005, Portal Spraw Zagranicznych, http://www.psz.pl

[30] *Forum on China–Africa Cooperation-Addis Abeba Action Plan (2004–2006)*, http://english.focacsummit.org.

[31] *The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation*, http://www.focac.org; http://english.focacsummit.org.

organized on the occasion of ministerial meeting, ca. 20 contracts for the sum of ca. USD 460 million were signed.[32]

All the above mentioned activities prove that China tend to work out a new model of mutual relations with African countries. Simultaneously, they create a new mechanism of dialogue and long-lasting cooperation.

Africa is still a continent dealing with multiple problems of social and economic character. Such a view is not changed even by the report published by the UN concerning the situation in Africa, indicating that countries of this continent develop faster and faster. In 2006, the GNP growth for the entire Africa made 5,7%. In the two previous years it was also maintained above 5% (2005 – 5,3%, 2004 – 5,2%).[33] At the beginning of the decade, in the year 2000, GNP growth made 4%.[34] Nonetheless, it has to be remembered that quite big differences in development between various regions still remain. In 2006, it were the oil-exporting countries which generated 57,5% of the total economic growth of Africa.[35] Africa still remains a continent of contrasts, which is easily visible in a comparison of the fastest and the slowest developing countries.

Analyzing these figures, it has to be underlined that five of the countries from the group of the fastest developing ones are oil exporters (Angola, Libya, Mauritius, Republic of Congo and Sudan). Another two (Democratic Republic of Congo and Mozambique) are also countries possessing big reserves of raw materials. Liberia clearly regains its position after the period of war conflicts. Ethiopia, on the other hand, took advantage of growing prices of tea and coffee, being one of their biggest exporters. Malawi noted the biggest economic growth in one year in comparison to the previous one; in 2005, GNP growth of this country made only 1,9%. Malawi economic success results mostly from reforms carried out in agriculture since 2005.[36]

The activities of China in Africa shows that the discussed issue is a diplomatic offensive in many areas. Some of them tend to provide a friendly atmosphere for the future, which is particularly visible in the case of programs of support for Africa. A great problem of Africa are infective diseases. The most dangerous ones are malaria, HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. According to statistics from 1999, 70% of AIDS-infected population lives in Africa. Among 34 million of germ carriers, 23 million are Africans. Malaria, on the other hand, kills ca. one million human beings yearly (WHO, 1999). Tuberculosis leads to similar losses among African population. Only in 1999, 864 thousand of tuberculosis infections were observed in Africa.[37] The present situation does not look much better. Nowadays, Africa is populated by 25 million of HIV virus germ carriers. In 2005, 2.8 million of deaths for that disease were observed in the world. Most of the victims (2 million) were Africans.[38] There is no doubt that financial support in struggling against negative phenomena in Africa is of crucial

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[32]   P. Picquart, *Imperium chińskie. Historia i teraźniejszość chińskiej diaspory* (L'Empire chinois. Mieux comprendre le futur numéro 1 mondial: histoire et actualité de la diaspora chinoise), trans. by I. Kałużyńska, Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Akademickie Dialog, 2006, p. 165–167.

[33]   *Economic Report on Africa 2007. Accelerating Africa's Development through Diversification*, Addis Abeba: Economic Commission for Africa, 2001, p. 2.

[34]   *Transforming Africa's Economies. Economic Report on Africa 2000*, Addis Abeba: Economic Commission for Africa, 2001, p. 1.

[35]   *Economic Report on Africa 2007...*, p. 2.

[36]   Ibid., p. 38–39.

[37]   *UNAIDS 1999*, *Transforming Africa's Economies...*, p. 28–29.

[38]   *Economic Report on Africa 2007...*, p. 56.

Table 2. Top 10 and bottom 5 performers in Africa in 2006 (% annual growth)

Country	% annual growth
Angola	17,6
Mauretania	14,1
Sudan	9,6
Etiopia	8,5
Liberia	8,1
Libya	8,1
Mozambique	7,9
Kongo R.	7,5
Malawi	6,9
Kongo DR	6,4
Cote d'Ivoire	1,2
Comoros	1,2
Swaziland	1,2
Seychelles	1,0
Zimbabwe	−4,4

Source: *EIU*, January 2007, *Economic Report on Africa 2007...*, p. 39.

importance. Support of international society for Africa still remains on a non-satisfying level. Thus, in the recent years, the attention of African countries is more and more focused on Asia, particularly China.

It is worth noting that at the beginning of the present decade, China cancelled the debts of 31 African countries. Various kinds of support programs for the poorest African regions are organized. Quite often can Chinese investment allocated in low-efficient and low-income sectors be observed. China also supports aspirations of African countries that do not belong to the World Health Organization (WHO) for joining this organization. China slowly builds up capital for the future, gaining the trust of these countries. In the way of enlarging its influences in nearly all areas, China becomes the biggest player in this continent. A practical expression of such new force are the votes of African countries on the forum of United Nations, of vital importance for the People's Republic of China.

Within the period of five years, 2000–2005, China established its position in Africa. The mutual trade at the end of 2005 reached the level of USD 39,7 billion, meaning a four-times-increase in comparison to the year 2000.[39] In 2006, the results were even better. Trade exchange between both parties made USD 55,5 billion. That meant 40% growth in comparison

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[39] "China–Africa Cooperation Fruithful Over Past 50 Years", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 30.01.2007.

to the previous year. Chinese export to Africa made USD 26,7 billion (a 43% increase), while import – USD 28,8 billion (a 37% increase).[40] In the meanwhile, China cancelled the debts of the poorest African countries for a total sum of USD 1,38 billion. Among many other solutions from this time, the Chinese government approved implementing a "zero" customs level for some products exported from Africa to China. By the end of the year 2005, the authorities of People's Republic of China helped in establishing ca. 720 various projects for Africa (including also 18 thous. of government education grants in China). The support included also training of specialists and development of human resources. The cooperation was widened to culture, which resulted in signing 65 agreements with African countries, establishing 151 plans of cultural exchange.[41] Among the most important events, tending to deepen the mutual knowledge, the *Young Chinese and Africans Festival*, an international festival dedicated to Africa – *Meeting in Beijing*, as well as *Chinese cultural travels to Africa* were organized in 2004.[42]

In Autumn 2006, the third Forum on China-Africa Cooperation was held in Beijing. The conference, lasting for two days (November 4–5, 2006) was attended by leaders of 48 African states. Moreover, representatives of five other countries (Burkina Faso, Malawi, Gambia, Swazi, Saint Thomas and Prince Islands) participated, despite having no formal diplomatic contacts with Beijing but with the Republic of China in Taiwan. Such a clever move of the People's Republic of China's authorities aimed at breaking some barriers. The Beijing's position is the existence of "one China", Taiwan being part of it. For this reason, it is impossible to keep simultaneous diplomatic relations with Beijing and Taipei. It seems that PRC activities can soon result in gaining the undecided states on its side. In accordance with the Chinese proverb of "water drilling a rock" (*shuidao qucheng*), in the author's opinion, changes in this area can be expected. In accordance with the idea of "friendship, peace, cooperation and development", China provided a program of further cooperation. The participants of the conference accepted the conception of *Beijing Action Plan of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (2007–2009)*,[43] defining the basic assumptions of political, economical and cultural cooperation for the coming three years. In his speech delivered on the conference, the president of China, Hu Jintao, underlined the meaning of Chinese–African cooperation. He noticed that forming a new kind of strategic partnership derives from the dynamic of mutual cooperation, being simultaneously an expression of common work of both parties for promoting global peace and development. Hu also noticed the necessity of deepening cooperation in some areas. Bringing up the relations onto a higher level, he defined eight conditions of such cooperation.

• Doubling the help for Africa from the present level within three years, by 2009

• Proposal of providing USD 3 billion in form of privileged loans and USD 2 billion as export credits for Africa within the nearest three years

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[40] "African Counties Seek Investment, Business in Central China", in *Xinhua*, *People Daily*, 5.07.2007.

[41] "China–Africa Cooperation Fruithful Over Past 50 Years", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 30.01.2007.

[42] Picquart, *op.cit.*, p. 166–167.

[43] *Declaration of the Beijing Summit Of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation*, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China,* 16 November 2006, http://english.focacsummit.org.

• Establishing a special fund of USD 5 billion, supporting Chinese enterprises carrying out investments in Africa

• Erecting African Union conference center, aimed at deepening cooperation within this continent

• Canceling a part of debts of the poorest countries

• Increase of the number of goods (from 190 to 440) free from Chinese import tax

• Establishing, by 2009, three to five economic zones in Africa

• Training 15 thousands of African specialists; sending 100 Chinese agricultural experts to Africa; establishing 10 exhibition centers for agriculture in Africa; erecting 30 hospitals; providing USD 300 million for fighting malaria; sending 300 young Chinese volunteers to Africa; erecting 100 schools in rural areas; increasing the number of educational grants in China from the present 2000 to 4000 per year in 2009.[44]

A coordination plan for the coming three years was elaborated in Beijing. During the next Forum, which is to be held in 2009 in Egypt, results of this cooperation can be assessed.

Paralelly to the Forum, a second China–Africa business meeting was held, with participation of entrepreneurs from both sides. Chinese companies signed agreements with eleven African ones for the total sum of USD 1,9 billion. They concern undertakings in the area of infrastructural and technological investments, also in mining, energy, finances and insurances.[45]

A good proof of the role given to Africa by China can be the further moves of Chinese authorities. Within only three months since the finishing of the Forum, a step was made towards approaching particular countries of Africa. At the beginning of 2007, the president of PRC, Hu Jintao, took up a travel across African states. From January 30 to February 10, he visited eight states: Cameroon, Liberia, Sudan, Zambia, Namibia, RSA, Mozambique and the Seychelles. The character of those visits represented maintenance of the policy carried out for last few years. On the basis of these visits, one could try to define the general tendency in Chinese foreign policy towards Africa. Pursuing the "strategic partnership", Chinese authorities took proper advantage from this visit to promote themselves and strengthen their position in this continent. The travel itself was organized as a "journey of friendship and cooperation". During the visit to one of African countries, president Hu Jintao said that "China is the biggest developing country and Africa is the continent with the largest number of developing countries".[46] This higlights basic assumptions of the Chinese policy. The spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Liu Jianchao, underlined the hope that president Hu's travel would galvanize friendship with Africa, simultaneously being a promotion of detailed cooperation in many fields and, thus, letting define the draft of strategic partnership.[47]

The first country visited by Hu Jintao was Cameroon. Diplomatic relations with this country were established in March 1971. Mutual trade, as with most African states, remains

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[44] *Address by Hu Jintao at the Opening Ceremony of the Beijing Summit of The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation*, Beijing, 4 November 2006, http://english.focacsummit.org.

[45] *Beijing Summit adopts declaration, highlighting China-Africa strategic partnership*, *Xinhua*, 5.11.2006, http://english.focacsummit.org.

[46] "President Hu: We Are Forced for Peace", in *China Daily*, 8.02.2007.

[47] "Hu Arrives in Cameroon, Kicking Off Africa Tour", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 31.01.2007.

in an initial phase. Mutual trade exchange in 2006 made USD 338 million, being a double result in comparison to the previous year. During this visit, the presidents of both countries, Hu Jintao and Paul Biya, signed agreements for providing two Chinese loans of 30 and 40 million yuan (USD 3,86 and 5,15 million) for economic and technical projects in Cameroon. Additionally, China committed to provide a preference loan of 350 million yuan for the needs of financing the local telecommunication sector.[48] The cooperation is developed in many fields; cultural and educational areas can be good examples. In 1987 Zhejiang Normal University established, with support of local authorities, a Chinese language center in Yaounde, Cameroon.[49]

Another step of Hu Jintao's travel across African countries was Liberia, where meeting between Hu and president Hellen Johnson-Sirleaf took place. During this visit, the president of China presented his program of further cooperation. He indicated the necessity of developing contacts of political character, pragmatic trade and economical cooperation, common activity towards enforcement of rules propagated during the Forum summit in Beijing in the previous year, as well as cooperation in the area of education, health, culture, foreign policy. It has to be stressed that diplomatic relations with Liberia were established only in October 2003. In 2006, mutual trade overturn exceeded the level of USD 400 million.[50]

The third African country visited by Hu Jintao was the Sudan. This country has for many years belonged to the group of China's crucial trade partners. Diplomatic relations were established in February 1959. Mutual trade made USD 3,9 billion at the end of 2005.[51] It is the Sudan which provides a big part of crude oil imported by China. On the other hand, China National Petroleum Corporation is the biggest foreign enterprise active in this area. China remains the Sudan's biggest trade partner. Developing this positive tendency was the subject of discussions of two presidents, Hu and Omar Zassan Ahmed al-Bashir.

Chinese cooperation with Zambia reaches back to the 1960s; that was the time (1964) when official diplomatic relations were established. At the beginning of the 1990s, trade overturns oscillated around USD 20 million. At the end of 2005, this sum grew up to USD 300 million. Currently, China is the third investor in Zambia, lesser only than RSA and Great Britain. Around 200 Chinese companies invested in Zambia, mostly in such sectors as mining, textile industry, construction industry or finances. During the Beijing Forum, governments of both countries signed a commitment on investing USD 200 million in copper industry.[52] During his visit to Zambia, Hu Jintao together with the president of this country, Levy Patrick Mwanase, officially opened the Zone of Economic and Trade Cooperation in Lusaka.[53] Chinese authorities tend to encourage domestic entrepreneurs to invest in this area. Earlier undertakings are also worth recalling. Already a year earlier, Zambia had purchased few Chinese multi-purpose Y-12 planes, designed for transportation

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[48] "Multi-million Deals Inked with Cameroon", in *China Daily*, 1.02.2007.

[49] "China–Cameroon Cooperation Posts Steady Growth", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 30.01.2007.

[50] "China–Liberia Ties Moves Forward Steadily", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 31.01.2007.

[51] "Sudan–China Ties Exemplary in South–South Cooperation", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 3.11.2006.

[52] "China, Zambia Witness Booming Economic Cooperation", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 2.02.2007.

[53] "China Launches 1st Economic, Trade Co-op Zone in Africa", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 05.02.2007.

of troops and rescue actions in emergency situations.[54] Since 1967, China has performed dozens of investments projects (e.g. construction of roads, Tanzania–Zambia railway, etc.). In 1997, Bank of China established its unit in this country. A year later, China National Nonferrous Metals Industry Construction Co. Group purchased a copper mine (Zambian Chambishi Copper Mine) for USD 20 million. The production started in the year 2000.[55]

In Namibia, president Hu Jintao met his counterpart, Hifikepunye Pohamba. The strategy of performance towards Namibia was drafted in four points, presented by Hu. These concerned political exchange, increasing economical and trade cooperation, widening social contracts (development of such areas as education, health, culture, tourism), cooperation in the area of international affairs (mostly on the forum of the UN and other international organizations). Diplomatic relations between these countries were established in March 1990. Since that time, the mutual cooperation has started to develop in many fields. In the recent time, increased economical cooperation can be observed. At the end of 2005, mutual trade overturn made USD 140 million. A year later, this sum was nearly doubled.[56]

Republic of South Africa belongs to the group of China's most important trade partners in Africa. Diplomatic relations were established quite early, in 1998, in the period of Nelson Mandela's presidency. Since that moment, a significant change in regarding mutual relations has occured. RSA remains an important ally of China in international organizations, particularly the UN and WTO. It is not by accident that the authorities of both countries defined their mutual relations as "strategic partnership" in 2004. This fact was underlined in Hu Jintao's discussions with RSA president, Thabo Mbeki, during his visit to African countries in 2007. Economical factors seem to support this thesis. At the end of 2006, trade overturns of China and RSA made USD 9,856 billion, a third part more than in the previous year.[57] It is worth remembering that since June 2005 Kung-footsy's Institute has been active in RSA promoting Chinese culture and language.

In Mozambique, a meeting of Hu Jintao with president Armado Emilio Guebuza took place. The subject of the discussions was enlarging mutual political and economical contacts. China established diplomatic relations with Mozambique in June 1975. Since that moment, the catalogue of common activities has got significantly wider. In 2006, China's Export Import Bank (Eximbank) decided of a possibility of investing USD 2,3 billion for constructing hydro-power plants in Mozambique, to provide energy for mining in this country.[58]

The last step of Hu's travel across African states were the Seychelles. Diplomatic relations between both countries were established in 1976. The president of China was received by his counterpart, James Michale. It seems likely that in the future China will take advantage of the strategic location of this area.

Visits of the Chinese leader, paid to such different countries, show that Chinese foreign policy towards Africa escapes any simple classification. It is worth noting that China

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[54] "China Exports Light, Multi-purpose Airplanes to Zambia", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 1.08.2006.

[55] *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China.*

[56] "China, Namibia Set to Maintain All-Weather Relationship", in *Xinhua, China Daily*, 4.02.2007; "China, Namibia to Hold Talks on Expanding Trade Cooperation", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 4.11.2006.

[57] "Hu's Visits to Boost China–S. Africa Strategic Partnership", in *Xinhua*, *China Daily*, 5.02.2007.

[58] "China to Loan Mozambique $2.3b for Power Plant", in *China Daily*, 10.05.2006.

significantly galvanized its position in particular countries. The first half of the present decade, when important decisions facilitating expansion in African markets were made, turned out to be a breakout.

There is no doubt that Africa provides a perfect hinterland for rapidly developing Chinese economy. China requires fuels, while Africa performs perfectly as its supplier. Various agreements concerning this matter seem to support this thesis; examples can be multiplied. At the beginning of 2004, Total Gabon consortium signed a contract with Chinese Sinopec, allowing crude oil sales to China. In the same year, Chinese vice-president Zeng Qinghong visited Tunisia, Togo, Benin and RSA. Contracts for various investments projects were signed at that time. At the beginning of the next year, Angola defined the way of utilization of USD 2 billion loan obtained from the Chinese government for infrastructure restructuring. In July 2005, China and Nigeria signed a USD 800 million contract on crude oil sales between Petrochina International and Nigeria National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). The volume of crude oil delivered to China was fixed at the level of 30 thous. barrels daily. In January 2006, CNOOC conducted its biggest foreign investment, allocating USD 2,3 billion in Nigeria, in areas of crude oil and natural gas reserves.[59] On May 13th 2007, Nigeria launched its second satellite from Xichang cosmodrome in Sichuan, China. The first one had been launched four years earlier from the Russian cosmodrome in Plesieck. The satellite was fully projected and constructed by the domestic company Great Wall. What turned out to be important was the readiness of Chinese government to provide a credit for financing two thirds of the undertaking, worth over USD 300 million.[60] In April 2006, Algerian government provided a contract, estimated at ca. USD 7 billion, for constructing a 1300 km long motorway from Tunisia to Morocco for a Japanese-Chinese consortium. In the same month, Hu Jintao signed an agreement with Kenyan authorities, allowing CNOOP to carry out searching in the south and the north of the country. Nearly at the same time, Nigeria was granted a USD 4 billion loan, including subventions for common economical undertakings, as well as fighting malaria. In November 2006, China signed agreements with African countries of total value of 1,9 billion USD.[61] In September 2007, China undertook one of the biggest financial actions in Africa, signing a contract with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo for providing a USD 5 billion loan for constructing the local transport infrastructure and restructuring mining sector. A larger part of this sum, ca. USD 3 billion, will be consumed by infrastructural investments. Among them, construction of a 3,400 km long road connecting the city of Kisangani in the North-East with Kasumbalesa in the south, at the Zambian border, is included. A 3,200 km long railway line, connecting the mining centre with port of Matadi is also planned. 31 hospitals, 145 health centers and 2 universities are to be erected. The rest of the loan is to be invested in the mining sector. In the opinion of Congo's minister of infrastructure, public works and reconstruction, Pierre Lumbi Okongo, the agreement guaranties paying back the loan by providing China with mining licenses, as well as allowance to charge the tolls on motorways and railway lines that are to be constructed in the future.[62] As by now, China has financially supported

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[59] "China–Africa Trade Links", in *China Daily*, 29.01.2007.
[60] K. Godlewski, „Pekin buduje klub kosmiczny na przekór USA", in *Dziennik*, 25.05.2007.
[61] "China–Africa Trade Links", in *China Daily*, 29.01.2007.
[62] „Chiny pożyczą Kongo 5 mld USD na inwestycje w infrastrukturę", in *Puls Biznesu*, 18.09.2007.

around 800 help projects in Africa. These include 137 projects concerning agriculture and 133 infrastructural ones.[63]

Representatives of Chinese authorities indicate that investments in Africa in 2006 reached the sum of USD 11,7 billion. Donald Kaberuka, the chairman of Africa Development Bank, assesed the amount of expected Chinese investments in 2007 at USD 2 billion. In June 2007, the government of People's Republic of China dedicated USD 1 billion for support of trade and investment activity in Africa.[64]

There can be no doubt that a thorough evolution is observed in the area of defining the basis of Chinese foreign policy. Ideological issues have been visibly shifted into the background. Their place was taken by pragmatic policy, taking into account the temporary current conditions. The diplomatic offensive tending to obtain foreign sources of raw materials results from problems which confront the rapidly developing Chinese economy. Establishing a system for diversifying sources of supply proves it to be a well-considered strategy. It is worth noting that by its activity China makes African states more and more dependent on it. Thus, there is nothing strange in the fact that more and more critical voices can be heard, trying to show the second side of the coin. Activity of Chinese entrepreneurs leads to some changes in African markets. Accusations of abusing and mistreating local labor force become widespread, being raised up by many trade unions. What shall be also taken into account is the fact that on the edge of business and politics opportunities for financial abusements appear. Cases of corruption and bribes compromise the local authorities in the opinion of the citizens. Among critical voices, the ones informing about inflow of cheap Chinese products to some African countries can also be found. Together with being provided with credits by PRC the local governments lose some part of their independence. The increasing debt of African states leads to further dependence on China.

The activity of China in Africa is mostly the struggle for the primary position in the world. The moves of Beijing establish the ground for carrying out future empire dealings. In Africa, as in other parts of the globe, a conflict of powers takes place. Discussions are concentrated on enlarging the influences in these strategic regions. Conflict between countries dominating in the world is included in the very nature of mutual relations. China plays one of the primary roles in this game. After the breakdown of the bipolar model of the world on the global scene, the United Sates remained the only global power. In the current reality, China is a local empire only. For the current needs, Chinese authorities force the concept of multi-polar world, without one dominating centre. Such a concept will surely be modified. Within the coming decades, China should become a real counterweigh for influences of the USA. Chinese moves in Africa prove this vision to be more than possible.

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[63] *Ministry of Commerce People's Republic of China.*
[64] "African Countries Seek Investment, Business in Central China", in *Xinhua, People's Daily*, 5.07.2007.

PIOTR KOWNACKI

The Globalization Aspect of Japanese–Chinese Economic Relations

1. Introductory Remarks

Presentation of the issues connected with the economic partnership of Japan and China is a difficult task because of the complexity of judgments and opinions expressed in the existing publications. Those judgments and opinions, presented from various and often even opposite positions, are also characterized by radical inconsistence and thus problems cannot be captured on a single theoretical and cognitive plane.

The judgment on the causes of the economic development achieved in both Asian countries in different periods and as a result of the conditions connected with those periods, is often reduced to a common plane, seen as representing the specifics of economic influence of the state. What comes to the fore in this view is the common cultural heritage, marked with the notions and values of Confucianism. The belief that according to Confucianism the use of persuasion is more important in ruling a country than the use of violence, and that according to Confucianism the society is obliged to obedience and loyalty to the authorities, is used in assessing economic phenomena. Such an interpretation is reflected in the judgments on the economic development observed in both countries, which range between two extreme views. One stresses the superior role of the state in achieving impressive economic results, while the other, opposite view, proclaims a negligible role of the state due to the society's obedience and loyalty, which allegedly limit the need for excessive state activity. According to the latter interpretation, the decision-making process in the economy of countries with Confucian traditions, in opposition to the Western cultural specifics and tradition, did not require referring to legal grounds, but was based on recommendations and persuasion, where the Confucian traditions were deemed to be useful.

Despite the awareness of the cultural differences between the determinants of the economic development in the discussed Asian countries, a decisive majority of the studies concerning this issue, because of their authors' professional specialties, does not examine in any depth the cultural aspect of the economic growth and does not attempt to find an answer to the question to what extent the Confucian norms and values are shared in those countries, and to what degree they have contributed to achieving the economic results. Instead, the said studies choose the path of explaining the problem with the conceptual apparatus of economics.

The specifics of an economic explanation of economic development is not unlike that of an explanation offered by political economy. It should be noted that the economic sphere

is not free of political influences, whether based on legal grounds or on the norms and cultural values perpetuated by tradition.

An explanation of both the Chinese and Japanese economic development, without which any attempt at capturing their mutual economic relations would necessarily have a fragmentary character, cannot disregard the political aspect, and hence also requires an approach based on political science. All the more so since the economic growth did not take place in the same period in both the countries, and this temporal difference had a political character. Any disputes whether in the discussed issue the motives of considerable or insignificant involvement of the state in the economic decision-making processes stemmed from the political and legal reasons, or from the cultural and religious ones, can be considered pointless.

It is to be kept in mind that at the time when Japan was experiencing growth, China was doomed to regression. The allegedly common Confucian values and norms did not give fruit in China, whose economic relations with the former Japanese partner had suffered a complete atrophy. Their renewal and increased importance were accompanied by the deteriorating Japanese economic results and the growing Chinese economic successes. Hence the causal framework of the economic development in those countries, which underlies the essence of their mutual relations, is certainly broader, and the phenomena related to them – more complex.

2. Temporal and Political Differences between the Japanese and Chinese Development Strategies and the Issue of Mutual Economic Relations

An explanation of the efficiency of the state and the effective mobilization of the society towards economic development of the Asian countries under discussion requires a broader approach, based on the political science. Until 1952, after the lost war and capitulation, Japan did not show any economic successes that could be a starting point for its later development. The United States, as the wartime victor and occupier, did not have any intent to allow any possibility of the defeated country's transformation into a political and economic power. It was doing all it could to keep the former aggressor and wartime enemy at the level of an underdeveloped country, unable to renew its world power status and to take revenge.

The change in the position of the United States, which decided to grant Japan the status of a regional ally with a strategic importance, is explained in the literature in a way remote from the actual context of the problem. The interpretation of this change as related to the Communist threat, reinforced by the victory of the Chinese revolution, needs some qualifications. Until 1952, three years had passed since the Chinese revolution, and during that time there had been no need for Japan as a strategic ally. After the Japanese capitulation, the World Bank loans granted in 1946 were only aimed at preventing the threat of famine, renewing coal mining and activating the steel industry in Japan. There was no idea of supporting the industrial sector whose reconstruction could result in rebirth of the weapon industry and the armament potential of Japan. The change came with the Korean war, which generated demand for Japanese production, due to the wartime military demand. The factor of essential significance was the territorial proximity of Japan. The issue of vital importance for the change in the position of the United States, which this time wanted to enhance the status of Japan, was not the Communist threat, but China's access to the

Korean war, which could endanger American victory on the Korean peninsula. Up to that time, the main problem for the United States was to control the defeated Japan rather than to make it an ally in the alleged strife with international Communism, which was to threaten the position of the United States in the Asian region.

The earlier refusal of the United States to involve its Soviet ally from the recent past in controlling the defeated Japan by assigning it an occupation zone facilitated the future process of social and political normalization in the occupied country. It was also unthinkable for the United States to involve in controlling Japan the Chinese ally and coalition partner embodied by the government of Chang Kai-Chek, preparing for such a role and expecting economic support for reconstruction of the economy ruined by the Japanese aggression and the resultant destructive war.

Participation of the United States in reconstruction of the Chinese economy and undertaking the next to impossible task of reconciling China and Japan, involved in a deep conflict due to a bloody and destructive war, exceeded the possibilities of the US and was not compliant with its either economic or political interests.

The carefully thought-over and calculated safety measures undertaken by the United States to prevent a pointless involvement in Chinese matters with the intention of keeping the nationalist and anticommunist group in power, created only a bigger problem for the Soviet Union, connected with the issue of relations between the USSR and China, governed by ideologically similar political groups.

The marginalization of the nationalist group and Chang Kai-Chek's government, as well as their moving to Taiwan, represented an optimum solution for the United States – and also a much cheaper one, compared to the costs of taking the responsibility for providing support to the coalition partner and reconstructing the Chinese economy. Hence the decisive factor was the pragmatism characteristic of the policy of the United States, which gave priority to its own interests and the capability of discharging the commitments expected by the Western allies.

The Korean war showed China's capability of playing a role that had not been expected of it. It was just the need for a new economic infrastructure in the region which made it necessary to divide the burden of the military involvement and to adapt Japan to its new role. Up to that time, possibilities of the Japanese independently making use of credit and investing on their own had not even been taken into consideration by the victorious occupier. It should also be stressed that the position of the local Japanese administration, the attitude of Japanese entrepreneurs and of the society at large had not suggested any intent on their part to cooperate with foreign capital. And the deficiency was so great that a complete breakdown of the whole Japanese economy was feared. And so it would have probably been the case but for the Korean military conflict.

Until then, the Confucian norms and values had not triggered any economic results and had not shown any signs of becoming the ferment of the future economic development to which they allegedly were to contribute.

During the Korean military conflict, the North-American SCAP occupation authorities enforced on Japan implementation of social and institutional reforms. The reforms resulted in formation of a political and economic coalition that commenced execution of the task set out in the development strategy, which ultimately resulted in the later economic growth. The coalition exhibited an ability to overcome the apathy of the society, afflicted by the

defeat in the war and foreign occupation, and secured for itself the necessary support by mobilization of the people. Breaking the economic isolation opened the way for international cooperation and the desirable reception of foreign investments within the established legal foundations modeled on Western solutions rather than following the local, Confucian principles.

Without going into the details of social and institutional reforms implemented in Japan, we should stress that SCAP was exerting pressure towards empowering the civil government bureaucracy, which it qualified as an apolitical force, not bearing any responsibility for the wartime past.

The situation outlined above clarified the conditions in which the Chinese economy was bound to suffer. They were due not only to the internal socio-political change in the country, caused by the strengthening of the victorious revolutionary group, but also, or even first of all, to the international position of China, determined by the Cold War confrontation between the world powers and the rivalry between the political systems.

The issue of the economic development path to be taken by continental China was decided in the course of the confrontational Cold War. Up to the time of the Korean military conflict, the Chinese development concept had not been clearly and finally defined. It is to be remembered that already during the civil war, which ended in the victory of the Communist group over the nationalist wing, Mao Zedong was making efforts to retain relations with the Unites States and the Western countries, assigning special importance to maintaining economic relations. The economic links of China with the Western world unequivocally committed the country to economic thinking and the appropriate choice of the cooperation directions with respect to the paths and methods of economic development.

The fear of isolation and its consequences was fully justified in China. The country's reserved attitude to the bonds with the economies of the Soviet Union and the CMEC[1] countries stemmed from the awareness that economic relations with the Eastern block could not be treated as a substitute for the development possibilities lost because of China's isolation.

As a result of the Korean military conflict, the hopes for retaining significant economic bonds between China and the Western countries, as well as the related calculations concerning the development concept, became outdated, and hence pointless. The newly established relations with the Eastern block did not open any rational perspectives. The size of the Chinese demand driven by the reconstruction of China's economy exceeded the capabilities of the Eastern block – more exactly, of the Soviet Union, for the remaining countries of the block played here only a negligible role.

The isolation of China, which the authorities had feared but did not manage to avoid, revealed new problems of the Eastern block, visible especially in the Soviet economy. Its production for the needs of Chinese demand, driven by the recovery of the industry ruined by the war, had grown. However, this did not wholly solve the problem on the scale of Chinese needs, for the demand was too high. On the Soviet economy scale, the above growth deepened the imbalance and intensified the crisis-generating mechanism of that economy, which consisted in the dominance of the manufactured capital goods over consumer goods.

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[1] Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

China's economic coexistence with the Soviet Union was never established as a compensation for the deficiency resulting from the isolation imposed on China. Search for the method to overcome that isolation became the basic goal of Chinese politics, and strengthening of Chinese-Soviet relations did not contribute to achieving that goal. On the contrary, the Chinese people saw in a confrontation with the Soviet Union a method for China showing itself on the international forum as a sovereign, non-subjugated entity.

China's isolation hampered the possibilities of an external investment support for the country's economy. The impaired capability of participation in the world economy, undermined by the lack of access to international development centers, and especially to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, deprived the country of the possibility of acquiring funds and using them to implement the optimum solutions. China's ambition was not to maintain the state of the economy prior to the isolation and its connections with the world economy. The strategic goal was to overcome the unsymmetrical relations with the world economy centers and to expand the internal market. Although opening the Chinese economic space to external investment was both possible and taken into consideration, such a solution was rejected. Autarchic development was chosen despite the stagnation which it triggered and maintained. But the autarchy was not a matter of free and satisfactory choice. It was enforced by the isolation imposed by the external environment. The endeavors to overcome isolation were at the same time endeavors to abolish autarchy.

When assessing the Chinese autarchic development option stemming from the country's isolation and the Japanese strategy one can turn to the comparative discussions presented in the literature. Without considering in detail to what degree the Chinese and Japanese states and societies were bound by Confucian norms and values, we should note that these were not decisive for the direction and results of development. A factor of vital importance were the differences in the political positions of China and Japan in the international relations and in the world economy.

In the circumstances presented above, the economic relations the two countries had enjoyed earlier completely died out, and their renewal was not even deemed probable. The Cold War confrontation between the world powers and the rivalry between the political systems deepened the rift between the Chinese and Japanese economies. Durable separation was seen as certain, without any possibility of finding a plane where the interests of both the Asian powers could converge.

However, the development of the world economy was not determined by the development of the political situation; the latter was also affected by the former. The transformations taking place in the world economy enforced a change in the global political situation as well. The détente in the relations between the world powers, as well as between the Eastern and Western blocks, were both a consequence of, and the reason for, the change in the world economy, which triggered the need for China's presence. The overcoming of Chinese isolation was parallel with the gradual slowdown of the Japanese economic growth. It were just these circumstances that gave rise to the Chinese economy's demand for Japanese participation, seen as a means for regenerating China's own economy. This opened the way to initiating mutual economic relations, whose renewal had been deemed improbable, or even pointless, just a short time before.

3. Renewal of Chinese-Japanese Economic Relations

A turning point in overcoming Chinese economic autarchy, which initiated intensification of Chinese-Japanese economic relations, was the proclamation of the so-called "program of four modernizations" in China. This all-important event, which was a harbinger of China's opening to the world economy, took place in late 1978.

One should also keep in mind that China decided to implement the appropriate solutions by establishing the legal grounds for them, which allegedly are not of primary importance in a society with Confucian traditions.

The first act of law encouraging foreign investors to participate in the Chinese economy was the act on joint venture undertakings with combined Chinese and foreign capital, which came into force on July 1, 1979. The act introducing the institution of a prosecutor's office, established to guard the law and enforce its observance, came into force after four more days. Finally, the act of vital importance for opening Chinese economy to the participation of foreign investors came into force after four months. The act proclaimed either validity or annulment of the regulations in force until that time, the uncertainty of which could raise the investor's caution and reserve, and result in their distrust. This was because the thitherto existing regulations were suited to the functioning of an autarchic economy, which did not provide for participation of foreign investors. The act opened the way to new, reformist legislation, which favored China's opening to the world economy, and to a transformation which consisted in moving from the policy of isolationist self-sufficiency to the policy of global interdependency, based on a pro-export strategy of economic development.

The Chinese-Japanese economic relations established in the trade zone had been already developing earlier. The normalization of the bilateral China–USA relations and China's taking a seat at the UN as a permanent member of the UN Security Council undermined the justifiability of maintaining the mutual separation, motivated politically. Besides the trade exchange, prior to the opening of Chinese economy to foreign participation, there had also been inter-governmental contacts between China and Japan. Chinese orders were beneficial for many branches of the Japanese economy, whose production had a guaranteed market in China. However, the real test for Japanese capabilities of participation in the Chinese economy turned out to be the opening of the latter to the world economy through the new legal regulations. Indeed, this amounted to increasing the importance of non-governmental entities participating in the Chinese economy. Their growing number and rivalry for position in the Chinese economy were also related to their condition and competitive capabilities. At that time, the condition of the Japanese economy did not enable it to determine the course of things in the Chinese economy by its own expansion. Japanese economy was immersed in its own problems and the strife to solve them.

The economic development of Japan after 1952, based on pro-export industrialization, took place under the influence of the external determinants which enforced it. In fact, Japan was not rich in natural resources, and as a result of the defeat in the war it lost its overseas possessions and the control over the thitherto used natural resources. Hence the source of funds for the necessary raw materials purchases could only be pro-export production.

The disturbances in the world market, and especially the energy crisis in 1973, repeated also later, affected the Japanese economy particularly strongly, resulting in a regress in production and a breakdown visible in almost all branches and sectors.

The opening of the Chinese economy to external investment did not result in immediate Japanese involvement. It is worth noting that Japanese economy was not the first to make use of the opening, despite the countries' territorial proximity and common Confucian traditions. Namely, Japan was outdistanced by Hong Kong, and at the same time motivated by it to participate in the Chinese economy. The inspiration stemming from the example given by Hong Kong had an even greater importance and spread to other countries and economic entities too, for the said example confirmed the credibility of Chinese partnership.

The important position of Hong Kong's economy in the Asian economy is also a result of a specific, unexpected development of the situation in the region. Just as the occupation authorities initially did not intend to favor the revival of Japanese economy, the British colonial authorities also did not intend to facilitate economic advancement of the enclave in the territory of continental China. The immediate neighborhood of China enforced cautiousness on the part of Britain, which, as opposed to the US, recognized China and maintained mutual relations with that country. Though those relations did not counterbalance the imposed isolation, they were not without importance. Antagonization of the Chinese-British relations was neither in the Chinese nor in the British interest, and the British caution, maintained in the name of political pragmatism and political prudence, contributed to Hong Kong's development beyond the status of just one of the many British colonies.

After the Chinese revolution, a sizeable part of the Chinese population moved to Hong Kong. As a result, the colonial authorities faced the problems of its adaptation and by no means certain loyalty. A fact that is especially worth noting is that the migrants to Hong Kong included a numerous group of Chinese businessmen and managers, who could not find a place for themselves in the continental China, since they did not accept its political and economic system. The presence of Chinese businessmen and managers in Hong-Kong bore fruit in the form of impressive results of their economic activity, aided by their open access to the Western world and to the international development centers. Had the Great Britain even tried to slow down the economic development of Hong Kong, it could not have been either reversed or marginalized.

The importance of Hong Kong economy turned out to be essential for the Chinese reformist endeavors. Upon the opening of the Chinese economic space to foreign investment the first reaction came from Hong Kong, represented by a population of Chinese origin, speaking the same language, and shaped by the same culture rather than by the British colonial authorities of the enclave. For that reason, the economic cooperation between China and Hong Kong, as Chinese-Chinese one, progressed easily and without problems. This example was followed by Japan, which initiated its activity in the Chinese economy, sure of the Chinese partnership and its credibility, as shown in the relations with Hong Kong. Japan was not the first to participate, but it was not the last, either. The investment activity in the Chinese economy coming from the outside grew almost in a geometric progress.

Nevertheless, the Japanese investment activity in the Chinese economy slowed down and became limited in the circumstances of economic globalization. Without going into the details and the intricacies of economic globalization, which is not understood uniformly, we should consider its consequences for Japanese economy.

After transformation of the Soviet economy to a market one, the tendencies to maintain protectionist and isolationist options in the peripheral sector of the world economy virtually disappeared. This change resulted in commencement and intensification of the investment transfer from the highly developed countries to underdeveloped ones. Economic globalization has freed the investors from the limitations inherent up to that time in both the command-driven planned economy and the socialist market economy. Special activeness of the investors is seen in the countries on the economic peripheries. Even the greatest companies from the highly developed countries provide investments, technologies, funds, licenses and consulting to the countries seen until now as not advanced in development, and in this way contribute to establishment of expansive production centers in such countries. This process continues despite the high unemployment level persisting in the highly developed countries, which are not looking for solutions aimed at utilization of the local production capabilities and protection of jobs. The investments are more willingly directed to countries less advanced in development, seemingly against the interests of the highly developed countries themselves. Economic globalization does not trigger the investor's fear of the nationalization acts, undertaken in the past in order to provide a substitute for import, or to implement para-socialist solutions. The investor treats underdeveloped countries as a zone more profitable for a capital investment. Though the investor's interests clash with the aspirations of the society in the highly developed country of his origin, the issue has a different context than in the past. In the conditions created by economic globalization, this problem has also a global dimension rather than a national or regional one. This follows from the increasingly stronger common interests of the shareholders from the highly developed countries and the elites from the underdeveloped countries, where the labor costs are low, and social benefits small or completely unknown. In such circumstances, the investor's profits are higher than those which can be obtained in highly developed countries, with a socialist-biased economy. The most profitable field for investments have turned out to be the Indian and Chinese economies.

The emergence of the tendency signaled above is of essential importance for explaining the development directions of the Chinese and Japanese economies, and the scope of their mutual relationship. The economic power of Japan has never resulted from a free-market development, since it was built on the basis of social harmony and nationwide consensus. In the past, Japan overtook in development also countries outside the Asian region, but the beliefs that it would become the leader of world economy were based on appearances rather than facts.

The Japanese economic development and export expansion, which in the past were especially felt by the US economy broke down in the course of globalization processes also for system-based reasons, characteristic of highly developed countries. The Japanese democratic system included also institutions representing the state's social-oriented involvement in economic actions, which diverged from the processes taking place in the other Asian countries, where democracy was limited to elections only.

The Japanese economic power formed as a result of the priority of national interests imposed by the state and articulated by the government elite to both the producers and the consumers. The state fully controlled the development of the economy by protecting weaker branches, supporting new ones, and enforcing full employment. In order to avoid violating the nationwide consensus, the state decided to artificially support non-profitable

companies and to subsidize bureaucratic banks which drowned their funds in bad credits. The decrease in the production growth temporarily stopped, which allowed the country to hope that good economic conditions had returned and would persist for a longer time. However, the real course of things was different, and at the turn of the century the situation deteriorated so much that the unemployment, which used to be unknown in Japan until that time, reached the 5% level. It is to be remembered that at that time the Chinese economy did not share the problems pervading the Japanese economy. The volume of Chinese production kept growing, its profile diversified, and its export expansion strengthened.

Economic globalization, associated in the most general way with free capital flows, is most often imagined in the context of capital inflow. However, one should be aware of the other side of it, which is capital outflow and its consequences. And the special consequences of capital outflow were experienced by the Asian economy in 1997–98, first of all by the Japanese economy, affected earlier by an economic breakdown. It was for the first time that economic growth was expressed in negative digits, reaching –2.8%. Economic recovery was achieved just after one year, when a 1.4% growth was obtained, but the price for this was 250 billion dollars. The money was invested in new branches, with the hope that they would play a significant role in the coming years, but this brought about the fall of companies in the obsolete branches of economy, particularly in the metal industry and the building industry. This resulted in increased unemployment, social dissatisfaction , and problems with elections for the ruling group.

The Japanese economic breakdown was in an essential way related to the country's democratic political system, within which decisions concerning the economy were made. The heart of the matter was the need to take into consideration the opinion of the constituency, which guaranteed the ruling party power in return for a socially oriented economic policy. In this context and for this reason, adjustment to the globalization requirements was being postponed, and eventually delayed. The timely undertaking of the necessary restructuring moves was delayed by what was inherent in the very nature of the Japanese political system, namely the need to consider future elections. In order to avoid undermining the social harmony, the retreat from an excessive level of economy control was being delayed. The durability of socially oriented control over the economy was itself a negation of free market-based development, which came to be appreciated again in the on-going globalization processes.

The developments in the Chinese economy were totally different. Instead of undergoing a breakdown, its development resulted in a high, two-digit production growth, increased export and a growing interest on the part of foreign investors. It was just then that China decided for access to the WTO, in spite of the earlier fears of excessive opening of the Chinese market to imported products and possible difficulties in coping with the requirements of increasing competition.

The difference in the development situations in the Chinese and Japanese economies decided that the evolution which had taken place starting from the establishment of economic relations between those countries through their intensification stopped because of the need to overcome the effects of the financial crisis which rolled through the Asian countries in 1997–1998, and to prevent its future repetition. Then the issue of a possible common Asian endeavour aimed at preventing the crisis consequences came on the agenda, and the countries started considering integration moves from that viewpoint.

4. Asian Regional Integration and Japanese-Chinese Economic Relations

The issue of Asian regional integration is connected with the talks initiated by China, Japan, South Korea and the ASEAN countries on the subject of establishing an economic group able to protect itself against the crisis situations and their consequences. Since a repetition of the crisis was recognized as the greatest threat for stabilization of the whole region, the task of the intended integration would be to work out appropriate coordination arrangements. The most important issue was developing a mutual crediting mechanism and an early warning system for the threatening crises, guaranteeing predictability of short-term capital circulation. The countries also undertook preparations for establishing a common currency basket, enabling resignation from a strict connection with dollar, and in the future even introduction of a common currency, to be called asio.

During the discussions on Asian regional integration, initially both China and Japan had the same views on the rationality of introducing a mechanism protecting Asian economies against a renewed crisis. In response to the crisis threat, Japan was the first to put forward a proposal of establishing an Asian currency fund. The integration discussions covered even broader plans of cooperation. The countries recognized special importance of coordinating the energy policy in view of the destabilization of oil prices prevalent at that time, which implied an increase in production cost. The plans for storing energy resources and searching for alternative fuels were to constitute one of the essential pillars of the integration aimed at economic stability.

Asian regional integration was undertaken as a defense enforced by the crisis threat. However, the discussions on integration could not disregard the global development trends. Those trends revealed the incompatibility of the processes taking place in the economies of the Asian countries, which did not facilitate the integration endeavors at all. The economic growth achieved in the region took place in the countries which did not control the economy with the help of regulations aimed at maintaining the democratic social and political order through social involvement of the state, as was the case in Japan. The state interventions were aimed at achieving good economic results through promotion of new production branches and the export merchantability of production, winning new markets and protecting one's own. Unlike in Japan, the political position of the state was free of the burden of social involvement towards a social consensus within the democratic order.

The Asian countries did not interpret their crisis situation as a consequence of their mistaken decisions, but as a result of a deliberate action undertaken against them. This resulted in perceiving economic globalization not as a process driven solely by economic vectors and motivated by free capital flows. In the Asian countries, there was a growing belief that the mass outflow of capital resulting in the financial crisis had been deliberately and purposefully caused by financial centers supervised by the United States, for competitive and rivalry-oriented reasons. This was because the Asian countries had a greater capability of adjusting in a natural way to the requirements of globalization than the highly developed countries, and were more profitable as a space for capital inflow.

The factor which determined the resignation from the integration endeavors undertaken by the Asian countries was the divergence in the development of the Chinese and Japanese economies. The decreasing position of the Japanese economy in the whole Asian economy undermined the sense of seeing Japan as an integration partner. The earlier belief that

economic cooperation in the Asian region with considerable participation of Japan would be favorable for the other integration partners, and that the Japanese economy can be a driving force for the integrated group, was not confirmed. Japan was forced to focus on itself, and the expansive sectors of its economy showed a special interest in investments in other Asian countries, and especially in the Chinese economy, which was the only one not affected by the financial crisis suggesting the integration solutions.

The growth in the Chinese economic power, outdistancing the Japanese economy, is also connected with the better position acquired by the Chinese state in its relations with the United States. The mutual economic connections between China and the North America show even the signs of advanced interdependence and long-term enforced partnership of the two global economic powers. On the one hand, the growing trade with China provides the United States with the goods and mortgage loans desired by the citizens of that country. On the other hand, the trade ensures a high employment level and relative social and political stabilization in China. However, the Chinese export increases the trade deficit of the United States. Hence the recent demands of the US for the Chinese government to carry out a significant revaluation of yuan in order to stop the outflow of jobs and dollars to China cannot be seen as a maneuver of no importance for the future, when China, in contrast to Japan, can be left without the system-based protection against social dissatisfaction.

The North American administration and decision makers have for a very long time tolerated the undervalued exchange rate of yuan, thanks to which China directed its cheap exports to the United States and as a result collected great sums in dollars, since it also involves a positive aspect for the United States. The Chinese export expansion has helped to maintain low interest rates in the US. Milton Friedman termed the developed and strengthening interdependence between China and the United States "the Texas–Tiananmen transaction", adding that its sudden and not well thought-out breaking could have fatal consequences for the North American economy. Indeed, if the value of dollar and the interest rate suddenly decreased, which is unavoidable in the case of revaluation of yuan, this could result in a recession or a stagflation. On the other hand, revaluation of yuan can, through a sudden increase in its exchange rate, cause a regression in China, resulting from the country's inability to sell the production whose export has been ensured up to this time. This can be followed by an increase in unemployment and the related social and political tensions, or even a rebellion against the country's rulers, who bear the responsibility for economic growth.

Reorientation of the political and economic system in China aimed at coping with the situation described above would be equivalent to weakening the authoritarian rule, which up to now has ensured economic stability in the country. Destabilization of the Chinese economy would also be a circumstance showing the advantage of the democratic Japanese political and economic system, which is able to prevent social dissatisfaction, despite representing a burden for the economy. Hence the system-based aspect of Chinese-Japanese relations is also perceived as limiting far-reaching cooperation possibilities.

Nevertheless, the scope of cooperation is becoming wider and wider. In fact, the latest data show changes in economic positions on the global scale. For many years, Japanese economy was the main partner of the US economy, but at present is has given way to China. However, it has also become the main partner of the Chinese economy. Reconciliation

of Japanese and Chinese interests will be a matter of the future, when both the conciliation and the rivalry aspect will be revealed.

5. Final Remarks

The present paper presents the issue of depreciation of Asian regional integration as a result of dissent in the Chinese-Japanese relations, with the intent of signaling it rather than exhausting the subject. The system-based aspect of the dissent in the Chinese-Japanese relations cannot be seen as a paradigm rashly suggesting certain regularities. The crisis of the Japanese economy controlled by the institutions of a democratic system and the success of the Chinese economy controlled by an authoritarian system cannot be interpreted as discrediting democracy because of economic deficiencies, or as praising an authoritarian regime for impressive economic achievements.

The durability of Chinese economic achievements is neither guaranteed nor unthreatened, and the issue of overcoming social dissatisfaction, should it become necessary, might suggest democratization as an alternative. Referring to the constituency according to the democratic procedure does not simplify the task of bringing the Japanese economy out of the crisis state, but an authoritarian threat to the democracy is not probable. The institutional permanence of the Japanese democratic system has not been undermined by the serious economic breakdown, and there is no fear that an authoritarian system will be seen as an alternative more effective in achieving economic successes.

Though we should not generalize temporary circumstances and derive from them any unquestionable regularities, yet we should agree with the opinion that the countries with the lowest degree of democratization were most effective in counteracting the consequences of the financial crisis which affected the Asian countries, and the only country which managed to completely avoid the crisis was the authoritarian China.

Any generalization of the system-based determinants of economy would be a simplification of the problem. We should agree with the opinion expressed in the Asian countries that financial crises can be provoked and caused for competitive and rivalry-based reasons, with crushing consequences, and regardless of the system-based conditions. This is because economic globalization involves rivalry for a position in the world economy, either in its center or on its peripheries. On the other hand, inside the state entities there is also strife for power, involving overt or hidden endeavors to bring about a crisis of the political and economic system. Such intentions can also be facilitated by the country's economic position, being a test for the robustness of that system.

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IZABELLA ŁABĘDZKA

Oneiric Themes and Conventions in Gao Xingjian's Dramas

The Other Shore of Cognition

The Other Shore (*Bi'an,* 1986) continues the discourse on the art of acting, and also documents another stage in the formation of Gao Xingjian's (1940–) idea of theatre and of his concept of the modern art of acting. The playwright admits that he wrote this work with actors in mind and the chance to test new possibilities in acting by combining certain techniques of the Beijing opera and the Western style of acting. In an interview in 1987, Gao confirmed that while writing the play he focused on creating a versatile actor (*quanneng de yanyuan*), shaped in opposition to the existing model of acting which cultivates the art of word.[1] The stage directions which Gao habitually attaches to the texts of his plays fully disclose the intention of the playwright who aims at liberating the theatre from the dictates of language and restoring performative qualities of the drama. In order to achieve this, it is necessary to educate a new type of actor, who should be able to act in the classic Western repertoire and to sing, who should know martial arts and the stylized gesture of the traditional Chinese theatre and be acquainted also with the art of mime and musical. "Our play", writes Gao, "aims at training actors who can be as versatile as the actors in Chinese traditional operas, but it is not our intention to create a new set of conventions for modern drama, because the latter aspires to the kind of acting which is non-formulaic, unregulated, and flexible. Before the actual performance, the actor should enter into a state of competitiveness similar to that of an athlete before a game, or a cock preparing to slug it out in a cock-fight, ready to provoke as well as to receive his partner's reactions. Thus the performance must be fresh, regenerating, and improvisational, which is essentially different from gymnastic or musical performances."[2]

In his stage directions, Gao also emphasizes that the self-exploration of an actor who discovers himself occurs in the course of the process of entering reciprocal relations with the partners on stage. "If the actor", says Gao, "without being obsessed with his own self,

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[1] Gao Xingjian, "Jinghua yetan" (Night talks in Beijing), in Gao Xingjian, *Dui yizhong xiandai xiju de zhuiqiu* (In search of modern theatre), Beijing: Zhongguo Xiju Chubanshe, 1988, p. 215.

[2] Gao Xingjian, "Some Suggestions on Producing *The Other Shore*", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, trans. by Gilbert C.F. Fong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2000, p. 44.

is consistently able to find a partner to communicate with him, his performance will always be positive and lively, and he will be able to gain a real sense of his own self, which has been awakened by action, and which is alert and capable of self-observation."[3] The liveliness of the show is determined by the intensity of the intuitive and improvised element. Gao prioritizes the intuition and physicality of an actor over a logical, analytical approach to the part. He also says: "On the stage as in real life, the actor sees with his eyes, hears with his ears, and captures his partner's reactions with his free-moving body. In other words, a performance can only be lively without the use of intellect."[4]

In *The Other Shore* stage props perform a particularly important function in establishing interpersonal relations. The play requires no setting. In tune with Gao's suggestions, it can be acted anywhere: in a theatre, rehearsal room, circus tent, gym hall or in any empty space if it can accommodate an appropriate lighting and sound system. This empty space – in a sense following the example of the Beijing opera – burdens the actor and the stage props, brought to life by the physical activities of the actor, with the task of creating imagined worlds. The stage prop is not just a lifeless item or decoration, but a partner to the actor and a catalyser of his activity on stage, a support for the imagination of actors and their audience.

Gilbert C.F. Fong is right when he focuses our attention on the concept of neutral actor present in the play, although naturally one may argue against his statement that "the play is also the first piece of work by the playwright embodying his idea of the neutral actor."[5] *Monologue* (*Dubai*, 1985) and even *The Bus Stop* (*Chezhan*, 1983) seem to prove just the opposite.[6] However, it is true that this concept, in the form of in-depth theoretical considerations seems to have been crystallized in the second, and not in the first half of the 1980s. Fong quotes a fragment of the commentary by Gao Xingjian – provided after *The Other Shore* was staged by the Hong Kong Academy for Performing Arts (1995) – concerning the initial episode of the play in which actors who play with ropes cross to the imagined other side and begin to act the part of the Crowd: "After the rigorous movements of playing with the ropes and rapidly exchanging partners, the actors relax their bodies and lie on the floor to listen to the music. As they let the music evoke their feelings, their bodies are not motivated by ideas. This is a process of self-purgation."[7] In the course of this process, the actors seem to forget about themselves and enter the stage of conscious development of the part. Careful observation of their own bodies and listening to their own voices allows them to enter the parts freely.[8] Reflections related to the concept of neutral actor lead to the introduction of the part of the Shadow. Gao explains the dramatic function of this character in the following manner: "(…) I am not making the Shadow an imitator of

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[3] Ibid., p. 43.

[4] Ibidem.

[5] Gilbert C.F. Fong, "Introduction", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 29.

[6] See Chapter II and Chapter IV.

[7] Gao Xingjian, "*Bi'an* daoyan houji" (Written after directing *The Other Shore*), quoted after Gilbert C. F. Fong, "Introduction", p. 29.

[8] Gao Xingjian, "*Bi'an* daoyan houji" (Written after directing *The Other Shore*), in Gao Xingjian, *Meiyou zhuyi*, Xianggang: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1996, p. 225.

the Man, but I allow the actor performing the part of the Shadow to retain all the time the status of the neutral actor, who observes, evaluates and ridicules the Man."[9] The distanced and critical Shadow who at times resorts to irony or plain ridicule, serves as a contrast to the Man. In spite of the fact that the Man belongs to the order of reality, while the Shadow – to the order of fiction, the presence of the Shadow makes it possible to question the rules of reality and to strip them of their apparent, obvious quality, ascribed to the human world by logic and common sense. Irony prevents us from sentimentalism, which is not desirable in the circumstances, and again proves to be fully reliable when critical distance is needed.

The Other Shore is still another proposal of Gao, aiming at the departure from the traditional approach to the categories of the characters and the plot. The playwright has called his work a contemporary poetical drama[10] or just plainly calls it a poem.[11] By this, he does not mean a stereotypical understanding of the lyrical, but rather the creation of poetical quality through images built of verbal matter.[12] Gao would like to reinstate this affinity of theatre and poetry, characteristic of numerous theatrical styles and trends, starting from ancient Greece and ending with the symbolists, and so painfully absent in the theatre of today. However, he is aware that such reinstatement requires a radical renewal of language and the art of acting.[13] He says that he wrote the play intending to create a "pure drama", following the example of "pure music": "*The Other Shore* is different from conventional drama. One of the differences is that the play does not attempt to put together a coherent plot. I only intend it to be a revelation, to portray some of life's experiences and feelings in a pure dramatic form, i.e., in the same way that music is pure."[14] It would not be unjustified to describe *The Other Shore* as a series of poetical images. The plot, in the traditional sense of the word, is replaced in the play by a well-thought-out system of images, carefully arranged visually and acoustically. Individual images resemble ideograms in the theatrical space, as they are equipped with physical shape and sound. One may analyze them as individual units of meaning, but they also form longer and more complex sequences of meanings. Their combination and interpretation depends only on the invention of the interpreter. The author's play with the imagination of actors and the audience results in creating numerous potential meanings in place of a single, final point. In this context, Fong's words seem to carry a warning when he says that "we are treading on dangerous ground in attempting to interpret the unity and the meaning of the play."[15]

However, it is tempting and necessary to seek the principles of coherence present in *The Other Shore*. The author is again providing certain hints: the structuring of images into larger sequences has to be subject to the rules governing the theatre, where key concepts are the action (*dongzuo*) or process (*guocheng*) and resulting ideas of contrast (*duibi*),

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[9] Ibid., p. 226.

[10] Ibid., p. 225.

[11] Gao Xingjian, "Jinghua yetan", p. 226.

[12] Ibid., p. 227.

[13] Ibid., p. 228.

[14] Gao Xingjian, "Guanyu *Bi'an*" (About *The Other Shore*), quoted after Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 27 (Gilbert C.F. Fong, "Introduction").

[15] Gilbert C.F. Fong, "Introduction", p. 29.

discovery (*faxian*), metamorphosis (*bianhua*) and wonderment (*jingqi*).[16] The play, says Gao, is a presentation of a process (*guocheng*). The concept of a process is fundamental in Gao Xingjian's aesthetics, as it is a quality ascribed not only to a theatrical play, but also to reality. The characteristic of unceasing metamorphosis is immanent for both; they are not characterized by states and permanent forms, but by never ending dynamic transformations. "The theatre of today has rediscovered the fact that process is the theatre. Action always manifests itself as a process. Events and internal experiences or emotional changes are all characterized as processes; therefore, it is enough to present actions of the characters and the process of their psychological or emotional metamorphosis to bring theatre into existence."[17] The approach of treating theatre as a process affects the structure of the dramatic work, which remains purposefully "ajar." The discussed play, along with some other works by Gao, lacks an ending or has an ambiguous ending. This allows the playwright to resist the convention which demands that a finished work should be presented. Completion of the whole is a task left for the audience or readers. Therefore, the number of proposed endings can equal the number of spectators or readers. It is not without reason that Gao, discussing theatre as a process, refers to the theatrical concepts of Tadeusz Kantor[18] who, in his "Ideas of Cricot 2 Theatre. Revindications" discusses a work of art which ceased to be an object for viewing and became a process.[19] Kantor also emphasizes that: "Cricot 2 Theatre restored the rules of strong metamorphosis in acting which are of capital importance for theatre; while building the spectacle and the acting part it used poetical metaphor and distant associations."[20] It is worth mentioning that in 1985 Gao Xingjian saw in Paris *Let the Artists Die* performed by Kantor's theatre; he refers to this performance when discussing the process and action.[21]

I do not intend to determine here to what extent Kantor's theatrical concepts affected Gao Xingjian; my aim is rather to point out the similarities in the direction of their thinking

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[16] Gao Xingjian, "Jinghua yetan", p. 227, see also Gao Xingjian, "Wo de xijuguan" (My idea of a theatre) and Gao Xingjian "Yao shenmeyang de xiju" (What kind of theatre do we need?) in Gao Xingjian, *Dui yizhong xiandai xiju de zhuiqiu*, 49, 64.

[17] Gao Xingjian, "Juchangxing" (Theatricality), in Gao Xingjian, *Dui yizhong xiandai xiju de zhuiqiu*, p. 20.

[18] Ibid., p. 20. Tadeusz Kantor (1915–1990), Polish scene designer, director and visual artist; graduated from the Cracow Academy of Fine Arts in 1939. "Dissatisfied with institutionalized avant-garde he organized his own theatre in 1956 with the group of visual artists, calling it Cricot 2, to mark the continuity with the painters' theatre Cricot from the 1930s. In the 1960s Kantor produced happenings, exhibited widely, and traveled with his company, creating an autonomous theatre in which actors are used as props and manikins, and the text […] exists as an object on a par with other components of the production. In the 1970s he developed 'The Theatre of Death', where time, memory and the interpenetration of life and death hold sway, and Kantor himself appears as a master of ceremonies at the seance." [Daniel Gerould, "Tadeusz Kantor", in Martin Banham, ed., *The Cambridge Guide to World Theatre*, Cambridge, New York, New Rochelle, Melbourne, Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 540.]

[19] Tadeusz Kantor, "Idee Teatru Cricot 2. Rewindykacje", in Tadeusz Kantor, *Teatr Śmierci. Teksty z lat 1975–1984* (Theatre of Death. Texts written in 1975–1984), Krzysztof Pleśniarowicz, ed., Wrocław: Ossolineum, 2004, p. 429.

[20] Ibid., p. 428.

[21] Gao Xingjian, "Jinghua yetan", p. 203.

about this art. Both Gao and Kantor are painters convinced that the visual in theatre consists in the minimalism of the means and not in the richness of setting and costumes. Kantor writes: "I am sure that greatness lies in the restriction of means. I think that the main element in the theatre is action, which expresses the whole emotion which I wish to convey to the spectator […] The most important element is the actor, who brings in all his past and individuality and develops his own 'plot'."[22] Gao presents the following project of theatrical renewal: "I would like to restore this original simple action on the stage of a modern theatre […]."[23] Providing a more detailed definition of his idea of the Modern Eastern Theatre, he says that such theatre "following the model of the traditional music drama, freely presents time and place on the empty stage, being based only on the acting."[24] There are many other similarities of this type, such as the approach of both artists to the stage prop enlivened by acting and to mannequins who carry the message of Death, or even to imagination, which is seen by both as the key factor in art, and to unceasing oscillation between illusion and reality, which is the very essence of the art of theatre; another common area is their struggles with memory and inevitable departures. Both Kantor and Gao see the theatre "as a ford on the river (he must have meant the Styx) which the dead (according to him, all characters in written plays are [the] DEAD) cross, coming from the other side to the one where we are".[25]

The Other Shore presents the process of getting from one shore to the other, from this world to the other one. The "other shore" in the title is not an unambiguous concept, as it refers, among other things, to Buddhism and to the concept of *paramita* or "the thing which reaches the other shore". *Paramita* interpreted as "perfection" means virtues such as generosity, modesty, patience, effort, meditation and wisdom cultivated to perfection, which finally leads to freeing oneself of the desire of possession, to the annihilation of passion, to understanding the reason for all things, to liberating oneself from the prison of "self" and to experiencing the live bond with other beings.[26] In the drama, a group of persons crosses the river which seems to separate the world of the living from the world of the dead; the characters cross the dead water, the water of oblivion, aiming towards a place of no return, the land of darkness. Perhaps they wish to check whether it is possible to break free from the torments of this world.

The story is constructed of a number of independent images - symbols, bonded by the character of Man who appears in the images in his various impersonations: of a Young Man, Shadow and abstract Heart. These different impersonations refer to various stages of human existence: youth, maturity and old age. They are also records of a process of

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[22] Tadeusz Kantor, "Moja droga do Teatru Śmierci" (My Path to the Theatre of Death), in Tadeusz Kantor, *Teatr Śmierci, Teksty z lat 1975–1984*, p. 465.

[23] Gao Xingjian , "Jinghua yetan", p. 161–162.

[24] Gao Xingjian, "Xiqu buyao gaige yu yao gaige" (The pros and cons of the reform of traditional music drama), in Gao Xingjian, *Dui yizhong xiandai xiju de zhuiqiu*, p. 74.

[25] Tadeusz Kantor, "Mówić o sobie w trzeciej osobie" (To talk about oneself in the third person), in Tadeusz Kantor*, Teatr Śmierci. Teksty z lat 1975–1984*, p. 437.

[26] See "Paramita", in *Encyklopedia mądrości Wschodu* (original title: Lexikon der östlichen Weisheitslehren), eds. Stephan Schuhmacher, Gert Woerner, trans. from German by Mieczysław J. Künstler, Warszawa: Warszawski Dom Wydawniczy, 1997, p. 252. See also Gilbert C.F. Fong, "Introduction", p. 27.

achieving knowledge of oneself. Gao Xingjian also uses there another characteristic dramatic principle – the contrast (*duibi*). One is liberated from the illusion in the process of constant confrontation of the Man with others, who are the Crowd, the Card Player, the Father, the Mother, the Young Girl and the Mannequins. Each of the scenes/images is a separate study of the Man, struggling helplessly against restrictions enforced by others, powerless against the rule of language and manipulators of various types juggling with words, and also of objects which set themselves free from the human rule and begin to live their own, dangerous lives. Succesive episodes disclose various mechanisms of manipulation, including the opening scene which involves actors before they take on their parts. This scene shows how easy it is to turn an innocent, childish rope game into a dangerous game of the adults, which leads to enslaving some beings by others:

> Actor playing with ropes: […]
> Now I want all of you to hold on to one end of your rope and give me the other end. This way you'll be able to establish all kinds of relationships with me, some tense, some lax, some distant, and some close, and soon your individual attitudes will have a strong impact on me. Society is complex and ever-changing, we're constantly pulling and being pulled. (*Pauses.*) Just like a fly that's fallen into a spider's web. (*Pauses.*) Or just like a spider. (*Pauses.*) The rope is like our hands. (*He lets go one rope and his partner also lets go. The rope falls on the ground.*) Or like an extended antenna. (*He lets go another and his partner follows.*) Or like the language we use, for instance when we say "Good Morning!" or "How are you!" (*Another rope falls to the ground.*) Or perhaps it's like looking at each other, (*Replaces another rope.*) or like the thoughts in our minds.[27]

The merciless mechanism of manipulation and enslavement of man involves, most of all, the language. This discloses the ambivalent character of language. On the one hand, the knowledge of language allows the mute group remaining on the "other shore" to regain human identity, to divide things into categories and to name them. On the other hand, it shows how faint the boundary between good and the evil is, how close hate is to love and how near beauty is to ugliness and crime. One can turn into the other just in a flash, in the briefest moment when one pronounces a word. And the word, depending on who pronounces it, can have the power to destroy or to create. The scene with the Card Player discloses the mechanism, common in social circumstances, of enslaving the innocent community by a cunning player who uses relatively primitive but effective methods: marked cards, smooth words, pretended soft persuasion or – just the opposite – brutal intimidation. The sequences which follow are a specific study of the mob and an individual confronted by it, trying to save his/her distinctiveness, uniqueness, sense of criticism and resulting freedom. In spite of attempts to resist and to retain common judgement, the Man suffers a defeat and the Crowd performs a horrifying dance of triumph over him. The peculiar relations between the Young Man and the Father and the Young Man and the Young Girl are yet another proof of

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[27] Gao Xingjian, "The Other Shore", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 4.

failure. Language seems to fail also as a tool used to establish close and durable contacts with one's family. *The Other Shore*, as Henry Y. H. Zhao rightly noted, "inveighs against any effort of collective discourse which, the play shows, can only lead to tyranny. Ultimately, the other shore is unreachable because human beings have to use language to form relationships, and are thus predestined to destroy individual thinking, because language has to be based on socially-accepted codes. In other words, to associate with other people is to associate with coercion, violence, and degeneration."[28]

As others are invariably the source of disillusionment or torment, the only chance to create reality in tune with some pre-developed concept is to resort to the world of mannequins. The Man enters that world and tries to organize it as if he were a demiurge. He puts them together, arranges, rearranges them and communicates with them in a characteristic language of shouts. Finally they slip away from his rule and begin to live their own, dangerous lives and leave the exhausted, powerless Man, unable to rule his own creation. The Man, who tried to get free of mechanisms of violence, created another such mechanism himself, using objects which seemed to be lifeless, and in addition, he had to accept its superiority. Paradoxically enough, it proved that objects had more independence than a human being. When Gao was writing *The Other Shore*, and also at the beginning of the 1990s, the playwright seemed to be fascinated by mannequins, by the new prospects for using stage props in the theatre, by partial reification of a live actor on stage; this is confirmed also by fragments of *Between Life and Death* and *Dialogue and Rebuttal*. It might have been inspired by Gao Xingjian's contact with Kantor's theatre, with the latter's bio-objects and reflections on mannequins, which seems to be confirmed by numerous references which Gao made at that time to the Polish artist.[29] Kantor wrote: "An actor achieves his ultimate perfection in acting by means of a mannequin. This is my credo. I do not mean actors imitating automatons; this is very easy and actors do not do it. But the extremely perfidious involvement of mannequins into the play which is progressing there creates an atmosphere necessary for the acceptance of death. Yes – the acceptance of death!"[30] A mannequin made in the likeness of man, although devoid of life and consciousness, was perceived by Kantor "(…) as a manifestation of this Dark, Nightly, Rebellious side of human activity. Crime and the Trace of Death as the source of knowledge,"[31] and also the ideal figure of theatre. He also wrote: "Its [the mannequin's] appearance agrees with my growing conviction that l i f e may be expressed in art only by the l a c k o f l i f e , by referring to DEATH, by PRETENCES, by EMPTINESS and lack of MESSAGE. The MANNEQUIN in my theatre is to become a MODEL which conveys a strong sense of DEATH and the condition of the Dead. It is to be a model for the Live ACTOR."[32]

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[28] Henry Y. H. Zhao, *Towards a Modern Zen Theatre. Gao Xingjian and Chinese Theatre Experimentation*, London: School of Oriental And African Studies, 2000, p. 131.

[29] See especially Gao Xingjian, "Wo de xiju he wo de yaoshi" (My theatre and my key), in Gao Xingjian, *Meiyou zhuyi*, pp. 235–252. This text was written in 1991.

[30] Tadeusz Kantor, "Moja droga do Teatru Śmierci", in Tadeusz Kantor, *Teatr Śmierci. Teksty z lat 1975–1984* p. 464.

[31] Tadeusz Kantor, "Teatr Śmierci" (Theatre of Death), in Tadeusz Kantor, *Teatr Śmierci. Teksty z lat 1975–1984*, p. 18.

[32] Ibidem.

Journey to the "other shore" does not lead to a discovery of a new, better world with a fairer and wiser order. The other world is made in the likeness of this shore, with all its suffering and imperfections. The end of this quest in vain could be just death, but paradoxically enough, it is not certain whether death can end anything. The characters have crossed dead waters only to see that neither the torment of their quest, nor violence, nor attempts to enslave others come to an end at the other shore. However, this quest, like any other journey within oneself, finally leads to wisdom - to the identification of one's limitations and to recognizing that the hardships of the quest have been in vain. At the same time, we begin to suspect that things which are really meaningful are always hidden beyond the pronounced words. The audience is reminded about it by the Monk, who serves as still another contrast to the Man and his world built of tiny fragments of the past, blurred particles of memory, tormenting recollections and random fragments of the present combined into a dreadful inferno which we feel in the presence of others. The Monk symbolizes the type of knowledge which is well owned, secure and opposite to things for which we search, although they still seem volatile and out of reach. Gao Xingjian has often explained his understanding of Zen in his theoretical works and in interviews. He sees Zen as one of the pillars of the spiritual culture of China, and also as a way to understand the world and man, in addition to being a belief.[33] In *The Other Shore*, Gao treats the Monk not only as a character, but also as an effort to break free from the torments of human existence, in tune with his own understanding of Zen, or a method of self-cognition and of seeking equilibrium in relationships with the world at large. One may liberate oneself from the burdens of everyday life also by stepping outside the "self."[34] The reference to Zen is also a sign of turning towards intuition and trusting the things which are natural and unconstrained.

The playwright suggests that actors, while working on the performance, should avoid any reliance on things which are within the sphere of rationality; instead, they should trust their imagination. "Even though our play is abstract, the performance should not aim at sheer conceptualization in the stark fashion of the play of ideas. Our aspiration is to achieve a kind of emotive abstraction through performance, i.e., a non-philosophical abstraction. The play seeks to set up the performance on the premise of non-reality, and to fully mobilize the imagination of the actors before evoking abstraction through emotion."[35] The quoted fragment helps to understand the special privileged position given by Gao to dreams and oneiric poetics. The dreams – as Olga Tokarczuk, a Polish contemporary prose writer, said – embarrass the rational mind.[36] Things which are abstract, symbolic and unreal in the play, are rooted in the hard soil of reality; yet this reality is subjected to the procedure of alienation. This complies with the rules of dreams, because: "The basic convention of a dream is by no means the grotesque, but just its opposite – the naturalness of things which are most queer and derive from various spheres of reality or the psyche. The dream

[33] Gao Xingjian, "Jinghua yetan", p. 179.
[34] Ibid., p. 196–197.
[35] Gao Xingjian,"Some Suggestions on Producing *The Other Shore*", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 42.
[36] "Czas Olgi" (Olga's time), Anna Sobolewska's conversation with Olga Tokarczuk, *Życie* 1997, no. 214, p. 10.

does not use a surrealistic shock, but creates the sense of obviousness of all things absurd."[37] Scenes from the "other shore" present an image of the world which seems to be well known, but which at the same time slips away from the commonsense cognition. There are many ways to alienate it and to set it at a distance, in order to be able to see it from a different perspective. One of such techniques is to use the framework structure which is among typical metadramatic techniques. The framework is constructed of initial scenes before actors take up their parts, and of final scenes when they return to their acting identities and random phrases from everyday conversations are interspersed with sounds of a child's cry and a car engine starting. The final words: "It's so bad, what kind of stupid play is this anyway?",[38] leave no doubt that everybody is already on "this shore."

The "other shore" is governed by a different set of rules. Its language is similar to ours but different in its essence, because in addition to elegant and fluent dialogues, it is full of unfinished sentences torn out of their context, marked by strange syntax, or sentences which are correct grammatically but astonishing or absurd as far as their sense goes; what is more, they neighbour with some other sentences which we begin to inspect in greater detail and discover, under their banal appearance, a deeper sense which has been camouflaged on purpose. *The Other Shore* is a text of diverse linguistic structure, both with respect to style and to sound. An everyday conversation is set beside a poetic monologue, and a monologue can be orchestrated into a number of voices – such as in the scene featuring the Man and the Shadow – and possess characteristics of an automatic record which registers thoughts in the shape and order of their development in the mind, that is, as a series of unfinished thoughts which are not coherent but free from the bonds of logic. It can also be the language of holy books, difficult and incomprehensible for lay people, rich in symbols, metaphors and references to things which are alien to the audience/reader. In addition, lack of language can serve as language, just as can the silence in the scene with mannequins, slowly filled in with inarticulate sounds, cries, sighs and murmurs. Gao Xingjian aims at expanding the expressive potential of language and going far beyond the composition of skilful dialogues. His primary aim is to restore to language the fullness of its sound value. "In this play," says Gao in his remarks on staging *The Other Shore*, "all the sounds uttered by the actor in the prescribed circumstances are also voiced language. If an actor has learned to communicate using fragmented language which features unfinished sentences, disjointed phonetic elements, and ungrammatical constructions, he will be better able to make the unspoken words in the script come to life as voiced language."[39] An ideal performance should aim at a perfect balance of the visual values – related to the physicality of the actor and the movement of his body in space – with the acoustic values of language. Gao warns against separating language from movement, both during rehearsals and performances.[40]

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[37] Anna Sobolewska, "Jak sen jest zrobiony? Poetycka materia snu" (How is a dream made? Poetical substance of dreams), in eds. Ilona Glatzel, Jerzy Smulski, Anna Sobolewska, *Oniryczne tematy i konwencje w literaturze polskiej XX wieku* (Oneiric themes and conventions in Polish literature of the 20th century), Toruń: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika, 1999, p. 21.

[38] Gao Xingjian, "The Other Shore", p. 41.

[39] Gao Xingjian, "Some Suggestions on Producing *The Other Shore*", p. 44.

[40] Ibid., p. 42.

Language is placed in a diametrically different position when it serves as an "advertising tool" in the scene with the "Dogskin" Plaster Seller and as a method of mastering the minds of other people (in the scene with the Card Player). In such circumstances, language may turn into funny prattle, more or less sophisticated persuasion, a terrorism of words which begin to stick around man, to choke him, shout him down and finally, dominate him. However, each time again language exposes its own imperfection and unreliability. It proves useless whenever one seeks the essence of things, the sense of existence, the true value. Nevertheless, getting rid of language is not a solution, either. Once again, the ambivalent nature of language is displayed; it is useless, but we have nothing else.

Scattered Identity

The Other Shore, *Between Life and Death* (*Shengsijie,* 1991) and *Nocturnal Wanderer* (*Yeyoushen,* 1993) are invitations to enter a dream permeated with magic, mystery and horror. They study the dark and fearful side of man's internal world and the world outside, which surrounds him, or rather is created by him in the oneiric convention. The plays are focused on boundary states and situations located in the intangible realm between life and death, reality and illusion. Reality is in these plays just a starting point, or a point of transition to the sphere beyond reality, hidden behind the realistic façade. According to the playwright's intentions, these plays aim at catching the internal psychical experience in all its nakedness, with no redundant ornaments, in order to see the man in full, in his human dimension.[41] An attempt to understand such a dream is also an attempt to understand oneself, in the hope of acquiring knowledge slightly broader than individual one, as the dreams record universal experiences common to the whole mankind.[42] However, "dreaming" – as Milan Kundera says in *The Unbearable Lightness of Being* – "is not merely an act of communication (or coded communication, if you like); it is also an aesthetic activity, a game of imagination, a game that is a value in itself."[43]

The aesthetic rules of this game result from redefinition of the concept of dramatic plot and character. The key to the interpretation of these plays could be the concept of metamorphosis in the sense described by Hans-Thies Lehmann, for whom the heart of acting is certainly not the transfer of meanings, but rather the archaic fear and pleasure derived from the play, from the metamorphosis as such. The pleasure derived from hiding oneself under a mask is paired with some other, equally strange pleasure; the looks cast from under a mask see the world transposed, totally strange, seen at an angle yet unknown. Whoever looks at the world through narrow slits in the mask, acquires the perspective of an animal, a camera, a being unknown to himself and to the very world. The theatre is a metamorphosis, a change in all its aspects. Therefore, one has to take into account a hint given by anthropologists of theatre, who say that every known model of plot hides a more basic structure of metamorphosis. This explains the fact that the farewell paid to the "mimesis of plot" does not by any means signify the end of the theatre. Focusing on the processes of metamorphosis

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[41] Gao Xingjian, "Ling yizhong xiju" (Another kind of drama), in Gao Xingjian, *Meiyou zhuyi*, p. 191.

[42] Anna Sobolewska, "Jak sen jest zrobiony? Poetycka materia snu", p. 11.

[43] Milan Kundera, *The Unbearable Lightness of Being,* trans. by Michael Henry Heim, New York: Perennial Classics, 1999, p. 59.

emphasizes the existence of a different principle of credibility, in which the recognition is continually interrupted by a play of surprises, not rooted in any order of probability.[44] Gao Xingjian is fascinated not only by the technical and aesthetic dimension of the metamorphosis of an actor into a character, of a character into an object, of reality into illusion – which are issues of fundamental significance for his idea of theatre – but also by the ethical aspect of the transformation of good into evil, beauty into ugliness, love into hate and, finally, by this ultimate and irreversible metamorphosis: life turning into death. *Shengsijie* is a story about dying in the literal and metaphorical sense: about the aging of the body which turns into its reification, about the impoverishment of the emotional sphere and the progressive degradation of feelings, about the withering of the spiritual bond with others and the coexistence with others which irrevocably turns into the dreaded loneliness.

The non-realistic tendency in *Between Life and Death* is suggested in the author's stage directions. The search for a modern form of performance is achieved by returning to the concept of the traditional Chinese theatre. However, the point is not to intercept selected ideas and techniques of that theatre, but rather to use the general idea of that art, which in its essence does not aim to develop on stage a *simulacrum* of the real world, but to emphasize the theatricality, playing and pretending. The bond with the traditional theatre is underlined by the coexistence of tragic and comic elements in the play, and by using elements of acrobatics, mime show, dance and almost magical effects.[45] Acting, setting and language of the play are liberated from the restrictions of realistic convention and the excess of reality. The empty stage hosts but a few stage props, which acquire symbolic significance in the process of acting performed by the Woman, who grinds out her long monologue. The key stage props are male clothes, a house of building blocks, a mannequin, and a jewellery box. The murdered husband turns into a heap of folded clothes, a house of building blocks triggers a series of recollections related to the home of childhood and fragments of the mannequin symbolize physical and mental disintegration of a person; the jewel box turns into a sarcophagus into which the Woman deposits, together with her jewellery, all her past and womanhood.

Between Life and Death is a detailed study of the human psyche, examined in relations with the husband, parents, strangers and in reactions to loneliness, rejection, betrayal, aging and death. It is an analysis of identity, of the essence of "self", its boundaries and the potential of cognition. The Woman asks:

> Is this about him, about you, about me, about her who is that girl, about her but not her, not about you, not about me, and not about you or all of you, just as what you all see is not her, not me, and not you, it's merely the self, but the me you all see is not me, not her, it's only that so-called self looking at her, what more can you or I say?[46]

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[44] Hans-Thies Lehmann, *Teatr postdramatyczny* (original title: Postdramatisches Theater), trans. from German by Dorota Sajewska, Małgorzata Sugiera, Kraków: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2004, p. 117.

[45] Gao Xingjian "Some Suggestions on Producing *Between Life and Death*", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 80.

[46] Gao Xingjian, "Between Life and Death", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 78.

Let us add that no direct answer to this question has been given, and it seems that it cannot be given at all.

The monologue-like structure of the drama allows Gao to use the technique of the stream of consciousness and – as the playwright describes it – the technique of the stream of language (*yuyanliu*). The stream of consciousness, used successfully by writers representing various literary traditions and languages is, according to Gao, one of narrative methods which proved to be particularly useful in modern times. It was inspired by research and efforts of modern psychology. The shift of the focus from the exploration of objective rules of the external world to learning the internal world of man, along with the discovery that the inner world is not governed by simple rules of logic and that it is a meeting place for the consciousness and subconsciousness, thoughts, feelings, desires and memories, was reflected in the narrative prose which gradually took more interest in the hidden, dark inside and in the external world seen from the perspective of a character.

> The point of departure for the stream of consciousness is the concrete perception of the 'self' of a character. If an author is able to capture authentic perceptions of the described character, it will not be difficult to feel its pulse. This type of language is particularly attractive, it can encourage the reader to explore the internal experiences of the character. Therefore one may say that the stream of consciousness is a kind of artistic language which leads the reader to the experience of 'self'.
> This kind of narrative language does not care about the sequence of time, it can combine recollections and reality, the past and the imagination. Naturally enough, it is also able to break any established constraints of space. A single chapter or even paragraph can be an intertwining of illusion, dream and reality.[47]

Such a narrative method has the advantage of focusing on the presentation of the inner experience of a character and at the same time, it provides an image of the external world, which is always perceived by the mind and senses of a character. The method slips away from the rules of rationalism and logic; it is more interested in the thinking and perceptive processes as such. In order to define the stream of consciousness in a more precise way, Gao resorts to a metaphor derived from painting. The stream of consciousness is not in any way similar to classic Chinese ink painting based on precise lines; it rather resembles the technique of Western oil painting which uses colour spots that turn into a discernible contour only when seen from a distance.[48]

The combination of planes so divergent as reality and illusion, recollection and dream within the stream of consciousness means an intermingling of the past, present and future, as well as the coexistence of different spaces. Breaking the limits of time and space results in the need to find new forms of expression for the incessant interchange of places and moments. Certain solutions with regard to narration are also provided by film. Some of its techniques can be translated into an appropriate narrative style. It is quite an interesting

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[47] Gao Xingjian, "Tan xiaoshuoguan yu xiaoshuo jiqiao" (On the idea of fiction and writing technique), *Zhongshan*, 1982, no. 6, p. 238–239.

[48] Ibid., p. 238.

idea to replace the changing speed of images, typical of film, with literary changes in the rhythm of sentences, where short sentences are to accelerate the speed, and long sentences – to reduce it. Complex psychological processes are reflected by images and rhythm of the narrative language. The nature of images can be diversified. Some may provide objective depictions of the external life, others can be subjective creations of the psyche. A writer is fully authorized to combine the perspective of the narrator with the perspective of the character, the objective reporting with subjective perception. He may disturb the traditional time and space relationships and create new ones, for the purpose of a specific work.[49] The margin of writer's freedom has expanded considerably, but the search for new means of expression is not an aim in itself. According to Gao, the formal aspect of a work is the external manifestation of its subject matter.

In *Between Life and Death*, the reality is seen and analyzed from the point of view of the Woman who does the talking. However, the Woman is not only a dramatic character. The talking Woman and the woman who is the main character in the story are by no means bound by a simple relationship of identity. Gao explains the complexity of relationships between the writer, narrator and the character, as well as his own attachment to pronouns, in the following way:

> Borrowing from Descartes, it could be said of the writer: I say therefore I am. However, the I of the writer can be the writer himself, can be equated to the narrator, or become the characters of a work. As the narrator-subject can also be he and you, it is tripartite. The fixing of a key-speaker pronoun is the starting point for portraying perceptions and from this various narrative patterns take shape. It is during the process of searching for his own narrative method that the writer gives concrete form to his perceptions.
> In my fiction I use pronouns instead of the usual characters and also use the pronouns I, you, and he to tell about or to focus on the protagonist. The portrayal of the one character by using different pronouns creates a sense of distance. As this also provides actors on the stage with a broader psychological space I have also introduced the changing of pronouns into my drama.[50]

Gilbert C. F. Fong writes that "Gao Xingjian's experiments in the narrative modes of drama may have been inspired by the special features in the Chinese language. Many times he has commented that the Chinese language, being an uninflected language, facilitates shifting the 'angle' or perspective of narration."[51] However, the new prospects which opened for the narrative in the novel as the result of using various personal pronouns, were noticed some decades before Gao by creators of the *nouveau roman*. Michel Butor, in his essays devoted to modern narrative prose, discusses the play of pronouns which not

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[49] Ibid., p. 237.
[50] Gao Xingjian, "The Case for Literature", trans. by Mabel Lee, *The Stockholm Journal of East Asian Studies*, 2000, vol. 11, p. 8.
[51] Gilbert C.F. Fong, "Gao Xingjian and the Idea of the Theatre", in Kwok-Kan Tam, ed., *Soul of Chaos. Critical Perspective on Gao Xingjian*, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2001, p. 151.

only places characters in mutual relations, but also relates them to the reader, allowing differentiation between various levels of consciousness. Butor notices advantages of the presence of various narrative situations in a work which, for instance, has a main character whose story is narrated, but which can also accommodate a representative of the author, telling his own story as the "I" or a representative of the reader – a person to whom the author narrates its own story. He is right in noting that the use of the third person leaves us outside, while "I" introduces us inside.[52] Gao's arguments seem to head in the same direction: the subjectivity of expression resulting from using the "I" can be easily made objective, by changing the pronouns. The transformation of "I" into "he/she" results in adopting the attitude of uninvolved observation.[53]

The Woman of *Between Life and Death,* who tells a story about somebody's life, tells it in the third person. She names the object of her story "she", which makes an impression of distancing herself from the character about whom she talks. However, her emotional involvement in the story makes us doubtful of her status as an unemotional observer who passionlessly analyzes the character and events involving the character. The specific type of narrative leads to the development of dramatic relationship between the storytelling Woman and the woman about whom the story is told. According to Sy Ren Quah: "The coexistence of the third-person narrative and the required emotional engagement, however, induces a seemingly irresolvable tension in the performance of the neutral actor. In other words, as she maintains the state of neutrality, she shifts freely between the objectivity of the narrative and the subjectivity of the character's world, and the conflict between the two creates a dramatic tension."[54] At times, the boundary separating them is hardly discernible, only to appear very clearly in the very next moment. The actress keeps telling the story, but at the same time it seems that the woman is "being told" by her "self" which becomes separated from her and joins the spectator, aware that he views a performance, or the actor, aware that he is acting a part. Gao himself hints again that: "The narrator in the play, i.e., Woman, should not be regarded as the same as a character. She is both in and out of the character, but still preserving her status as an actress."[55] However, the actress performs also the part of the narrator. Gao purposefully transfers to the play the technique characteristic of narrative prose. He is alternately amplifying and reducing the involvement of the Woman/actress/narrator in her story, skilfully disrupting the convention of a cold, and seemingly indifferent narrative. This ambiguous status of the Woman in the drama becomes an excellent opportunity to present again in practice what the concept of neutral actor is, and what prospects it opens for the actors and the audience, particularly with respect to constant metamorphoses of characters, new impersonations of actors and new realms which open for the interpretative invention of the audience. Now, instead of following intricate plots, the audience focuses rather on examining the internal pulsation of the metamorphoses and transformations.

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[52] Michel Butor, "Recherches sur la technique du roman", in M. Butor, *Répertoire II. Études et conférences 1959–1963*, Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1964, p. 97–98.

[53] Gao Xingjian, "Wenxue yu xuanxue: guanyu *Lingshan*" (Literature and metaphysics: about *Soul Mountain*), in Gao Xingjian, *Meiyou zhuyi*, p. 174–175.

[54] Si Ren Quah, *Gao Xingjian and Transcultural Chinese Theater*, Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2004, p. 138.

[55] Gao Xingjian, "Some Suggestions on Producing *Between Life and Death*", p. 80.

The process of discovering the "self" is a never-ending struggle against one's own memory, a silent partner and one's own illusions and biases; it is a series of pathetic attempts to separate illusion from reality and truth from falsehood; it is a vain search for evidence to confirm one's own existence, an unending effort to break free from the enclosure, from the prison of obsessive thoughts, fears and delusions: "She's too hurt to free herself from suffering now, but she still keeps on analyzing herself in the desperate pursuit of her true self, to find out for sure if she's real or just a body without a soul."[56] As if an analytical thought, discursive language and being true to logic could save her, introducing order in the immense chaos which surrounds her from outside and reigns within. However, even these supports disclose their unreliability, when one has to use them in order to get hold of things which slip away from reason. Even the recollections from the past cannot bring any comfort and confirmation of her own reality, as they also intertwine facts with illusion.

Zygmunt Bauman provides a penetrating insight in the problems which modern man has with his identity:

> Like everything else, the self-image splits into a collection of snapshots, each having to conjure up, carry and express its own meaning, more often than not without reference to other snapshots. Instead of constructing one's identity, gradually and patiently, as one builds a house – through the slow accretion of ceilings, floors, rooms, connecting passages – a series of 'new beginnings', experimenting with instantly assembled yet easily dismantled shapes, painted one over the other; a *palimpsest identity*. This is the kind of identity which fits the world in which the art of forgetting is an asset no less, if no more, important than the art of memorizing, in which forgetting rather than learning is the condition of continuous fitness, in which ever new things and people enter and exit without much rhyme or reason the field of vision of the stationary camera of attention, and where the memory itself is like video-tape, always ready to be wiped clean in order to admit new images, and boasting a life-long guarantee only thanks to that wondrous ability of endless self-effacing.[57]

The world which, according to Bauman, is characterized by constant insecurity, the lack of fixed and stable points of support, the breakdown of the opposition between reality and simulation and thing and its representation, the world where any kind of knowledge has the same value, lacks "a tough canvas in which one could weave one's own life itinerary."[58] This world, says the philosopher, lets human relations break down into series of encounters, lets identities break down into a collection of masks worn one by one, the story of life – into a collection of episodes with their sense reduced to memories, as elusive as the memory itself.[59]

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[56] Gao Xingjian, "Between Life and Death", p. 56–57.
[57] Zygmunt Bauman, *Postmodernity and its Discontents*, Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997, p. 24–25.
[58] Ibid., p. 24.
[59] Ibidem.

The very structure of the story of the Woman who has to construct and reconstruct her identity by unending review of the tapes of her memory with recorded, overlapped or blurred, incoherent fragments of her own life and the life of some other person, reflects the lack of coherence, continuity and order, typical of the modern identity. The stream of her history, the stream of language carries rubbish and treasures alike, and the former are inseparable from the latter. There is no whole, no completeness or unity; man and the surrounding world are a mosaic of particles, bits and pieces; we can only try to match them together without hope to make a harmonious image. According to Aleksandra Kunce, the identity of modern man is scattered, broken down into details which must be collected painstakingly. Kunce has noted that the phrase "man is …" has been replaced by another descriptive option: "a man without something/anything," "a man without man" , "a man without characteristics":

> It is important that individual experiences stubbornly disclose the momentary character of identifications, their contextual features and the impotence of the "self." It is a reminder of incessant rotation in one place, postponement, slowness, procrastination - in the end, nothing is able to reveal anything.
> Such movement of identity/non-identity is performed by the multitude of things which create it/not-it, by the endless e x c e s s. On the other hand, such movement of identity is characterized by the i m p o v e r i s h m e n t of the thing which is/is not the self-identity, unable to appoint an integrated "self." The way towards describing identity/non-identity of man leads through o r n a m e n t s, through things which amass in the course of living, through the constant lack of any things which could lead towards the self. One is orchestrated by actions, one remains in the m u l t i t u d e of things, one is full of non-self.[60]

The last words pronounced by the Woman on stage are: "What is the self? Besides these words, these empty, hollow words about nothing, what else is left?"[61] Terry Siu-Han Yip and Kwok-Kan Tam suggest that in his later plays Gao Xingjian "seeks to return to the originary self as a way to explore human existence in its primordial state. […] He sees the role language plays in the formation of the self, but he attempts to go beyond language to uncover the preconscious mode of self that is lost in such a formation. Gao believes that the true self lies in the prelinguistic state of human consciousness."[62] The critics see a similarity between Gao's approach and " the Daoist concept of intuition that emphasizes the non-linguistic and non-intellectual state of being".[63] They also shed new light on Gao's specific narrative strategy, that is, the use of pronouns, and the method of "self-transcendent observation":

> In Gao's theatrical experiments, the self is presented as both the perceiving subject as well as the perceived object. By adopting the method of 'self-transcendent

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[60] Aleksandra Kunce, "Zlokalizować tożsamość" (To localize the indentity) , in Wojciech Kalaga, ed., *Dylematy wielokulturowości* (The dilemmas of multiculturalism), Kraków: Universitas, 2004, p. 90.

[61] Gao Xingjian, "Between Life and Death", p. 78.

[62] Terry Hsiu-Han Yip, Kwok-Kan Tam, "Gender and Self in Gao Xingjian's Three Post-Exile Plays", in Kwok-Kan Tam, ed., *Soul of Chaos. Critical Perspective on Gao Xingjian*, p. 217.

[63] Ibid., p. 217–218.

observation' (*choushen jingguan*), which he took from Chinese Zen Buddhism and used in his middle and later plays, Gao shows a prelinguistic state in which the self is presented in a state of primordial non-distinction. The self is thus represented in a dualistic state of being as both the subject and the object. In such a state, the self is at the same time 'subject-in-object' and also 'object-in-subject'. This dualistic self as 'subject-object' that transcends mere bodily experience is what Gao considers as the originary self.[64]

Between Life and Death is structured in tune with the poetics of a dream, in contrast to the logic of everyday life. The counterpoints for the story of the Woman, which by no means lacks horror, unearthly atmosphere and amazing moments, are equally mysterious and disturbing visual scenes involving some strange, unreal characters. From time to time, the stage is crossed by a clown with a rat led on a string, a woman with an umbrella, a woman with her head bandaged, a man wearing a mask and black clothes who gives warning signals with a red flag, a Buddhist nun who disembowels herself with scissors, a thin man on stilts, with a large eye painted in his palm, watching the Woman, and a headless woman. We do not know for sure what these characters stand for; they may just as well symbolize nothing. Critics offer various explanations for the scenes featuring these unnerving characters, trying to find logical justification for their presence. Gilbert C.F. Fong describes them as "sideshows which accompany and complement the main action. [...] These 'sideshows' enrich the main action, sometimes providing commentary, sometimes serving as a stimulus for the audience to think and feel for themselves."[65] Following this line of thought, the bandaged woman becomes a memory of the mother who was injured in an accident (according to the story of the Woman), the headless woman is interpreted as a symbol of soul leaving the body and the image of the Buddhist nun disembowelling herself and washing her entrails may be referred to the *Soul Mountain*, where another story of this character is told. These characters seem to be the projections of the Woman's mind, which is involved in constant analysis. Naturally, one may seek much deeper into Chinese tradition for explanations for these symbolic images. Some of these strange characters seem to come from folk tradition of popular forms of village or ritual theatre. Such queer characters dwell in the folk imagination, in myths, legends and fairy tales of ethnic minorities in southern China, and they reappear in various seasonal shows which feature actors on stilts, characters in strange costumes and persons with unnatural proportions of their bodies. Entering the common life, they bring a reminder of the carnival, the folk culture of laughter, the sneer against deadly seriousness; they suspend the norms of everyday life and principles of the world in which we live. Such characters are at the same time demonic and funny, as if reminding us about the basic, deep truth that seriousness is always lined with mirth. The story about the woman should therefore be perceived in two complementary dimensions: tragic and comic.

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[64] Ibid., p. 218.
[65] Gilbert C.F. Fong, "Introduction: Marginality, Zen, and Omnipotent Theatre", in Gao Xingjian, *Snow in August*, trans. by Gilbert C.F. Fong, Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2003, p. 14–15.

However, these "sideshows" may be seen in yet another way, from the perspective of their purely performance-oriented function. Henry Y. H. Zhao writes: "*Between Life and Death* is Gao's boldest experiment in theatre technique, as it incorporates all kinds of stage performing arts – mime, dance, magic, shadow play, acrobatics – all kinds of 'body language' and 'environmental support'. […] And what is marvellous with his new experiment is that the body-language performances do not serve as illustrations of the monologue. Often, they are independent, sometimes as its counterpoint, sometimes as its contrast, but more often as its negation, as if to say that what is being talked about is better left uninterpreted."[66] The dominating means of expression in the Woman's story is the word which not only brings messages but also possesses a musical quality; on the other hand, the mute scenes which serve as counterpoints for the text are dominated by the clothes, stage props, colours, lighting and gestures which make up the visual aspect of every sequence. The collision of those diverse sign systems - words and images - gives rise to a new situation. These two sign systems alternately approach each other and move away. Each seems to add light and meaning to the other, but this mutual complementation, paradoxically, in no way leads to a greater transparency of meanings. On the contary, there is an increasing impression of complexity and ambiguity of the world, in which we begin to see another bottom and which seems to be the plane of action for great powers which skip our definition, but whose relentless pressure on our reality is clearly felt. Characters seem to be just puppets or mannequins manipulated by someone else, which was perfectly well reflected in Alain Timar's performance of the play,[67] particularly with respect to the Man, tied down and able to move only as much as the ropes let him. The identity of the Man is not built by himself, but it is put together by the Woman from pieces of her subjective impressions, superstitions and her own illusions; actually it is not the Woman, but the voice which sets itself at a distance from her figure; a voice, which tells a story full of shifts, gaps and blank spots, describing a surprisingly strange life story, which, actually, is not a story of a stranger.

In the final scenes, the Woman sees herself as a person who crossed the boundary between life and death. She is deserted by thoughts, she no more needs her analyses, she is free from words and feelings. All seems to get immersed in the primordial chaos and to return to non-existence. But it is just an appearance. After a moment, the world reappears in its duality, at once great and small, finite and infinite, noisy and monotonous. The basic question of "what is the 'self'?" remains unanswered. The only answer is the gesture of the old man who tries to catch with his hat a falling snowflake – something as volatile and elusive as the scattered "self."

On the Boundary between Night and Day

In the *Nocturnal Wanderer*, Gao Xingjian keeps experimenting with narrative techniques used earlier in *Between Life and Death* and *The Other Shore*. One may also notice the topical continuity: the desire to explore the essence of the "self", the problem of relationship between an individual and the others, the relationship between the real and the imagined,

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[66] Henry Y. H. Zhao, *Towards a Modern Zen Theatre*, p. 145–146.
[67] Gao Xingjian, *Au bord de la vie*, dir. by Alain Timar, DVD recording of the performance presented at the Festival d'Avignon in 2001, SOPAT 2003.

the issue of language being an unreliable medium of expression and communications. However, the playwright turns our attention also to new motives: the relationship between God and Satan, the good and the evil, the suffering and the salvation.[68]

The play continues the search for ideal acting and the essence of theatricality. Similarly to *Between Life and Death* and the *Dialogue and Rebuttal*, Gao aims at balancing the real and unreal element, the naturalness and convention, which is also enforced by the subject matter itself. Gao writes: "The play's subject matter is a nightmare. Naturally it should avoid real life situations and a naturalistic presentation; on the other hand, neither should it resort to the bizarre. The pursuit of psychological reality and that of theatricality are not mutually exclusive; in fact they are to be equally emphasized for the reason that their interaction also contributes to the tensions in the play. It is hoped that the actors can first build up their neutrality on the stage before they start to listen, narrate and play the roles. This kind of actorial neutrality also helps them to achieve a balance between experiencing the character's inner feelings and their awareness of being performers on the stage."[69] This task is made easier for the actors by the two-layer structure of the play, by the story within the story. The nightmare seems to be a long excerpt from a book read by the Traveller, which allows for a smooth shift of the narrative levels. The travellers on the train have their counterparts in the book. The alter ego of the Traveller is the Sleepwalker who, in turn, has another double – a man who steps into his way at the end of the story and who forces him to join in his last fight of life and death.

The rapid, dramatic dialogue is interlaced with substantial monologues written in the stream of consciousness technique. The Sleepwalker speaks in the second person singular, while other characters mainly use the first person form; the Prostitute combines the first and the third person. These pronouns allow the performer to stay at a distance from the character which he/she impersonates and to adopt the perspective of an observer. "Just as he demands that his actors be neutral observers of the performing self, Gao Xingjian also insists that his characters should observe themselves as the other through shifts in narrative mode."[70] The separation of the speaker from the contents of his utterance is a step towards the ideal of the neutral actor who builds his part on the constant tension between his emotional identification with the character and uninvolved observation, between entering the role and leaving it. The "you" form not only places the actor away from the character, but also sets the character closer to the audience, as the "you" has the potential to accommodate any spectator.[71]

In the theatre of this type everything is based on perfect acting, although no one neglects an opportunity to use the props or to manipulate the lighting. The props undergo a metamorphosis in the process of acting; they lose the status of ordinary things, of just elements of a modest setting, but they actively participate in creating dramatic situations. "Once the actors make the shoes, the suitcase, the cardboard boxes, the heads, and the

[68] Gao Xingjian, "Some Suggestions on Producing *Nocturnal Wanderer*", in Gao Xingjian, *The Other Shore. Plays by Gao Xingjian*, p. 189.

[69] Ibidem.

[70] Gilbert C.F. Fong "Introduction", p. 38.

[71] Gao Xingjian, "Juzuofa yu zhongxing yanyuan" (Dramaturgical method and the neutral actor), in Gao Xingjian, *Meiyou zhuyi*, p. 263.

doors come alive, the performance will be enriched and the longer monologues will not be relegated to the status of mere recitations."[72] In the play, things become "actors" of a peculiar type; they partner living actors, they participate in creating the nightmarish atmosphere. The theatrical treatment of the props again echoes with Gao Xingjian's interest in the theatre of Tadeusz Kantor. Gao is fascinated by Kantor's ability to bring things to life and to reify the man.[73] Closed suitcases with unknown contents, doors slightly ajar, with dark and threatening space hidden behind them, human heads rolling on the cobblestones, streets filled with fog in a rainy night, are perfect elements for the construction of the terrifying world of nightmare, which is the alienated reality. The things, torn away from their everyday locations, stripped of typical useful functions, uncannily separated and transposed in the order of things, begin to assist the actors in their magical transformations which are plentiful in Gao Xingjian's play, and which affect not only things, but also people.

The magical quality is immanent in the play, constructed according to the rules which govern oneiric imagination. "Its many tricks and uncanny transformations bring about surprises for the audience and help to enhance the play's dramatic effect."[74] What is more, the play requires no sophisticated setting or special light effects. Unexpected metamorphoses of the characters, sudden shifts in their mutual relationships, surprising changes in the course of the plot occur following the principles of the poetics of a dream, and therefore they are not obliged to respect the rules of probability. "The realm of dreams suspends the principle of identity. In a dream, one can exist and not exist, eat and not eat, be dead and alive at the same time."[75] For this very reason, the Prostitute shot in one scene comes back to life in another one, and the Sleepwalker who rambles aimlessly, free of problems and worries, changes into a man hemmed in and finally turns into a murderer without any scruples. The aggregation of unexpected transformations amplifies the sense of artificiality and theatricality of the situation. As a result, the spectator's attitude remains distrustful and doubtful, as he retains his emotional and intellectual distance. This is also enhanced by the acting style, oscillating all the time between cold distance from the part and the impersonation of a character.

The *Nocturnal Wanderer* provides a meeting platform for various oneiric, painting and poetical techniques. Although the word remains there the dominating means of expression, the visual quality of the sequences is by no means neglected. This time, the picture is painted in various shades of black. However, the absolute minimalism of the means of expression still remains obligatory. The painting effect is not achieved by an easy contrast of black and white, but by subtle emphasis on the nuances of blackness, achieved by means of carefully applied lighting. The poetical quality of the play results from using the convention of a dream – dreams just have the poetic structure – but, in addition to that, certain monologues of the Sleepwalker also have high poetic quality, which is emphasized by their clash with commonplace, brutal or just primitive dialogues involving other characters. The heterogeneous character of the verbal substance used in the play splits it

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[72] Gao Xingjian, "Some Suggestions on Producing *Nocturnal Wanderer*", p. 189.
[73] Gao Xingjian, "Wo de xiju he wo de yaoshi", p. 248.
[74] Gao Xingjian, "Some Suggestions on Producing *Nocturnal Wanderer*", p. 189.
[75] Anna Sobolewska, "Jak sen jest zrobiony? Poetycka materia snu", p. 23.

into different languages which, in turn, frequently break into diverse, often contrasting variations.

The poetics of a dream not only determines the structure of the plot in the play, but also shapes the features of characters. These characters, who are closer to archetypes than to individuals – the Traveller, the Old Man, the Young Woman, the Young Man and the Ticket Inspector - are travelling by train, somewhere in Europe. The book read by the Traveller is used as a means to transfer the persons travelling in one compartment into the world of the Sleepwalker, who seeks refuge from the daily noise and everyday limitations in the cool atmosphere of a sleeping town. His desire to break free from everyday standards seemingly lets him taste the absolute freedom. However, we are beginning to suspect, uncomfortably enough, that the night is not the reverse of the day but probably its distorted copy, a hyperbolic repetition of daily mechanisms of control, manipulation and violence.

Nocturnal Wanderer is a study of evil, shaped as a dramatic record of a nightmare, disclosing the true and fearsome face of the so-called man in the street, which he hides during the day under his mask of conventional behaviour, good manners and acquired reactions. The play also discusses the death, stripped of the majestic atmosphere of dying, devoid of grandeur, a sudden unexpected death, death which is cruel because of its random character, which is appallingly commonplace and sometimes even strangely comical, similar to the death from cheap thrillers where people only pretend to die. Moreover, the play offers a deep philosophical reflection on loneliness, fear and the limits of humanity. The night scenery provides a setting for the act of transgression. The transgression from light to darkness means getting rid of the constraining mask, the slow rejection of basic reactions of decency and compassion, the increasing pleasure in provoking disaster, committing evil, playing with human life just for fun, and playing with death. During his night ramblings, the Sleepwalker meets the others, witnesses acts of violence and participates in them, is instrumental in killing the Prostitute, murders the Thug who threatens him and strangulates the Tramp who did him no harm. All this happens in tune with the logic of dream, where we constantly encounter the hyperbolizing of desires and fears. "In a dream, a small conflict can easily turn into a premeditated murder."[76] The inimitable laughter of the Tramp which is his individual reply to the absurdity of the world, becomes an excuse for murder to a man who seems unable even to smile. Each of these criminal acts is a dangerous game of sorts, which brings pleasure and a promise of sudden illumination in return for violating a standard. Travelling on the narrow margin which separates day from night, reality from dream and life from death is as exciting – to quote the words of the protagonist – as opening boxes which we are forbidden to open. The only thing that counts is the moment of brushing oneself against the mystery, the brief moment just before the opening, and not the finalized action:

> Now only when you're face to face with evil, is the excitement enough to satisfy the evil in your heart, you're that close to death and you're playing a death game. You know it well, over there on the side of death there's nothing, nothing can possibly exist.[77]

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[76] Ibid., p. 22.
[77] Gao Xingjian, "Nocturnal Wanderer", p. 172.

The interest in borderline states arises from a suspicion that they hide the key to the riddle of the "self" and provide a chance to separate truth from falsehood and confabulation from facts; this chance by no means turns into certainty, because the "self" is travelling through domains between which one can hardly discern. Reality and illusion keep permeating each other incessantly, transgressing their spaces, disrupting them and adopting them under their own terms and conditions:

> You can't map out the border between memory and imagination, if memory is real and imagination is mere fantasy, how can you tell how much reality actually resides in memory, which has already been processed by imagination, and how much of it is not mere fantasy? In the final analysis you can't return to the reality which has elapsed, and you're destined to live in the here and now.
> […] You know that right now you're sleep-walking, living in a world between dream and reality, and you can't be sure whether the reality you're in is merely your memory or imagination. You don't even have the courage to disturb your dream, is it because such a disturbance would mean the death of your self? There's no way to detect whether you, your self, are real or fictitious.[78]

Once again it proves that such problems are not solved by the never-ending analytical activity of the mind, using language as its tool. The mind's eloquence can only hide its impotence. The creation of still new combinations of words is just the multiplication of nonsense. The knowledge about the essence of the "self" remains out of our reach. Finally, the "self" is created by the very activity of speaking. Also, it is irrelevant whether someone talks wisely or stupidly .

The mind proves to be helpless in the world of evil, of blurred divisions and undermined values. The symbolic gesture of treading on the head questions the usefulness of rational thinking. In such a world, a rationally thinking man ceases to be the benchmark of things and the point of reference. The Sleepwalker, followed everywhere he goes by "a pair of inquisitive big eyes"[79] (as he describes them), falls into a trap from which there is no exit: "You really can't get away from this trap they've laid for you, either someone'll push you down or you'll fall down there yourself. It's a futile struggle, you've tried to pitch evil against evil, anger against brutality, you've tried destroying others to save your own skin, but in the end you still can't help falling into their trap."[80] Evil is a feature of individual man, inasmuch as it is a feature of the surrounding world. What is more, it is as tempting as Satan. The absurd, unjustified acts of evil committed by the Sleepwalker are the reply to the absurdity of the existence, and a sign of rebellion against the mechanisms which slip away from our power but they also serve as the only means of exploring the boundaries of the "self" which shirks any definition and cognition. While strangulating the Tramp, the Sleepwalker, rambling in the darkness, makes a meaningful comment:

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[78] Ibid., p. 173–174.
[79] Ibid., p. 187.
[80] Ibidem.

You can't stand this kind of taunting any more, you've got to let him know that you're not such a coward. You're alive and kicking, you're not a shadow of other people, you're real and you really exist. You may be equally as meaningless as this meaningless world you're in, but your meaningless resistance against this meaningless world more or less proves your meaningless existence![81]

The darkness of the night and the dream serve as the setting for an act of initiation of sorts, which leads to the confirmation of one's existence as a result of a confrontation with the others who threaten the "self" and of eliminating them. On the threshold of the day, the Sleepwalker sets on his way back as if nothing had happened, heading towards the realm of light and rational mind. However, it remains unknown whether he will be able to reach that realm. Suddenly, he is stopped in his tracks by a figure similar to himself, forcing him into a deadly fight. Then, the sound of an approaching train is heard in the darkness, followed by a piercing cry. We are left with an uncanny supposition that our life is also a tormenting nightmare with no way out, which we have to dream on in rainy and foggy darkness, suffering the eternal fear of something indefinite, something which imprisons us and sticks to us until we choke. In such circumstances, the following words sound more like a sneer than a comfort: "Then you'll take a beautiful hot bath, you will be clean all over, and you'll lie in your bed without a single worry in the world. You don't need to think about it any more, your nightmare will be over and gone for good."[82] But we have no guarantee at all to believe that this nightmare will ever end.

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[81] Ibid., p. 186.
[82] Ibid., p. 188.

QUANG THUAN NGUYEN

Vietnam–Poland Relations in the New International Context

Vietnam–Poland relation has a long lasting tradition and vigorously developed during the existence of the COMECON. In the wake of the collapse of the Socialist system in the Soviet Union and in Central Europe, this relation has undergone fundamental changes, shifting from a relationship based on the principles of socialist internationalism to those based on market mechanism, equal-footing cooperation and mutual benefits. In the new international context of the early 21st Century, particularly when Poland became a member of the EU and Vietnam joined the WTO, a new foundation is being formed for the development of relations between these two countries. This paper will attempt to analyze the Vietnam-Poland relations in this current international context.

1. Vietnam–Poland Relations in Retrospect

In February 1950, Poland established official diplomatic relations with Vietnam. As a follow-up, on the 7th February, 1956 the First Economic and Trade Agreement between Vietnam and Poland was signed. In the initial stage, Vietnam–Poland relations were insignificant. However, towards the end of the 1970s, particularly since Vietnam became a full member of the COMECON 91978, Vietnam–Poland relations entered a new stage of remarkable development. It can be said that the relation between Vietnam and Poland from the establishment of official diplomatic relations between the two countries up to the 1980s was based on the principles of proletariat internationalism characterized by mutual aid and assistance. Since the 1990s Vietnam and Poland have entered a new stage of bilateral relations which are based on the principles of market forces, equality and mutual benefits. In the early years, the relation between the two countries witnessed a dramatic decline. However, in the later years, it started to develop in response to the needs and benefits of both sides. An important event that stimulated the rejuvenation and development of relations between Vietnam and its traditional partners in the wake of political upheavals in the Soviet Union and the Central Europe was the visits to 4 central European countries by the then Vietnamese Deputy Prime Minister, Tran Duc Luong. During his visit to Poland on 28th to 31st September, 1992, important agreements between the two countries were signed, namely Investment Assistance and Cooperation Agreement, Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Income Tax Evasion. During that official visit, the Polish side initiated various recommendations to promote cooperation between the two countries. Polish firms showed interest and willingness to cooperate with Vietnam to expand and modernize factories equipped by Poland earlier and to engage in infrastructure and industrial development in Vietnam.

The official visit to Vietnam from 5th to 8th December, 1995 by Polish Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance Grzegorz W. Kołodko further pushed forwards the cooperation between Vietnam and Poland. During that visit, the two sides signed an Agreement on Maritime Transport. In addition, relevant bodies of the two countries signed MOUs of cooperation in upgrading and building a new sulfuric acid plant, a coal selection plant, supply of static electric technology for dust filtering system of coal-fired power plants, etc. A Minute of Agreement with specific conditions on the upgrading of Ha Long shipyard from 1996 to 2002 with a credit of 185 million US dollars was signed and delegated to VINASHIN AND CENZIN for implementation.

An important landmark in the relations between the two countries in the 1990s was the official visit to Poland by the then Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, from 20 to 22nd May, 1997. On this occasion, the two sides confirmed that their bilateral relations were developing in favorable conditions. The Vietnamese side requested the Polish side to assist the former's ship-building industry, provide supplies of fishing equipment, training of ship crew, assist Vietnam's coal industry, chemical industry and consider imports to Poland of commodities that Vietnam can export, such as rice, rubber, coffee, tea, textile and garments, etc. The Polish side confirmed its interest in cooperation with Vietnam. It also recognized that the relations between the two countries were still below potentials and did not meet the requirements of both sides. The Polish side confirmed its commitment to provide finance for projects of cooperation in the field of ship-building, power generation, coal mining, fishing, food-processing and providing equipment, etc.

Vietnam-Poland relations continued to be consolidated by visits to Vietnam and summit meetings by Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski in 1999, the Chairman of the Senate in 2003, the Secretary of State in the President Chancellery in Charge of Foreign Relations in August 2002, the visit to Poland by Deputy Prime Minister Tran Duc Luong in October 2003, etc. The two sides have signed Protocols to review Agreements signed earlier (in 2000); Agreement of Cooperation in Fighting Organized Crimes (in July 2003); Agreement on Repatriation of Citizens (April 2004). These events were followed by the visit to Vietnam by the Polish Prime Minister in January 2005 which was a vivid manifestation of the traditional and friendly relations between the two countries. The two sides discussed ways and means to further strengthen the bilateral multifold relations, particularly in the field of trade, education and training, and other areas of common concern. The agreements of cooperation in the field of agriculture were signed on rural and agro-product market development (January 2005); Cooperation Agreement on Education and Training between 2005–2008. It can be said that those agreements served as important foundation for promoting Vietnam–Poland cooperation.

Cooperation in trade: cooperation between Vietnam and Poland dropped dramatically in the first years of transition. Main explanation for this were economic difficulties and the changes in the goals as well as in the cooperation mechanism between the two sides. When the reforms in Poland achieved good results, the cooperation between the two countries gradually regained its momentum. Poland continued to consider Vietnam as its important partner in Southeast Asia. Therefore, bilateral economic and trade relations developed day by day. Bilateral trade volume has seen tremendous growth over the last years and with trade surplus on the Vietnam side by and large. Trade volume reached 242.5 million USD in 2005, of which Poland exports to Vietnam were registered at 53.4 million USD

and imports from Vietnam at 189.1 million USD. Trade volume continued to rise in 2006 to 330 million USD. It is estimated that trade volume could hit 350 million USD in 2007. Most of exports from Vietnam to Poland are garment, agricultural products, foods, etc. Exports from Poland to Vietnam include powder milk, medicines, machinery and mechanical equipment for coal mining, steel production and consumer goods, foodstuffs.

Table 1. Vietnam–Poland Trade

Year	1992	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006
Volume	20,0	117,9	130,0	125,0	142,9	176,0	220,0	242,5	330,0

Source: Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Table 2. FDI from the EU to Vietnam in 1988–2006
(Only projects valid as of 18th December 2006)

No.	Country	No. of projects	Total investment	Legal capital	Implemented capital
1	Holland	74	2.365.339.122,0	1.373.473.674,0	2.029.343.440,0
2	France	178	2.197.723.735,0	1.339.935.010,0	1.128.417.648,0
3	UK	79	1.360.181.531,0	642.559.051,0	643.131.433,0
4	Germany	80	368.754.832,0	15.009.445,0	160.110.013,0
5	Denmark	35	178.794.364,0	87.648.929,0	83.545.388,0
6	Poland	8	92.721.948,0	32.654.000,0	13.903.000,0
7	Belgium	27	80.349.379,0	38.607.606,0	60.730.558,0
8	Italy	21	55.738.988,0	26.000.826,0	27.439.591,0
9	Sweden	11	36.693.005,0	17.285.005,0	14.091.214,0
10	Czech	8	36.628.673,0	14.128.673,0	9.322.037,0
11	Finland	3	16.335.000,0	5.350.000,0	6.006.758,0
12	Austria	10	12.075.000,0	4.766.497,0	5.245.132,0
13	Spain	5	6.889.865,0	5.249.865,0	195.000,0
14	Hungary	3	1.806.196,0	1.007.883,0	1.740.460,0
15	Slovakia	1	850.000,0	300.000,0	–
16	Bulgaria	1	720.000,0	504.000,0	–
17	Cyprus	1	500.000,0	200.000,0	–
18	Ireland	1	200.000,0	200.000,0	–
19	Romania	1	40.000,0	40.000,0	–

Source: Foreign Investment Department – Vietnamese Ministry of Planning and Investment.

Investment: direct investment from Poland to Vietnam is far below potentials and cooperation needs of the two countries. In this regard, Poland currently ranks 32nd out of 78 countries and territories, having 8 FDI projects being implemented in Vietnam with 13.9 million USD capital already implemented out of 92.7 million USD commited. Most of Polish investment go to coal mining and ship-building. This focus is in line with Poland's strengths and facilitated by the credit of 70 million USD funnelled to the ship-building development of the 1999–2005 period.

It is clear that investment from Poland is still very little against the potentials for cooperation of the two sides and Vietnam's expectations. This has been re-affirmed by H.E Zbigniew Pawlik, Trade Councillor of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Hanoi: "Up to this moment, there's still a lack of interest of Polish companies in investing in Vietnam. However, we have seen indications of increased investment on a large scale by Vietnamese living in Poland".[1]

Official Development Assistance: Poland is one of Eastern European countries that provide ODA for Vietnam. In 2000, Poland provided Vietnam with ODA of 0.2 million USD. In Donors Conferences in 2005, 2006 and 2007 held in Hanoi, Poland decided to increase its ODA for Vietnam up to 0.3 million USD/per year. Poland's ODA is budgeted for training of personnel, restoration of Imperial Relics in Hue, Cham Tower in Binh Thuan, Cu Chi Tunnel, etc. Poland continues to provide ODA for Vietnam in training, upgrading projects previously built with Polish assistance, such as Poland-Vietnam Friendship Hospital.

Cooperation in Education, Training and Culture: Poland has trained for Vietnam over 4,000 university students and professionals; more than 3,500 skilled workers, mostly in coal industry, wagon construction and ship building. Currently, Poland provides 10 scholarships for university students and post-graduates until 2008 as a follow-up of the visit to Vietnam by the Polish Prime Minister in January 2005. Vietnam has funded 6 Polish interns for 10 months. Vietnam is expecting an agreement between the two countries on mutual recognition of education degrees. Both side wish to increase tuition education and training activities. In addition, Poland has also helped Vietnam in training students, interns of music and cultural, literature, translation associations of the two countries have maintained very close contacts and cooperation. High cooperation efficiency has been achieved in the field of restoration of historical relics, education, vocational training, assignments of professionals and experts to work in Vietnam, hiring Vietnamese labor and provision of financial support (e.g. 1 million USD for the restoration of Hue Citadel, Cu Chi Tunnel and Cham Thower). Poland was also one of the countries which wrote off old debt for Vietnam and provides concessional credits for Vietnam's ship-building and energy industry.

In short, Vietnam and Poland are bonded in a long-standing relation. In spite of upheavals after the change of political system in Poland, this relationship has been restored quickly and is developing. At the threshold of the 21st Century, changes in international arena and in each country have created new conditions for the development of the relations between these two countries.

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[1] Thu Ha, *Cooperation between Vietnam and Poland will develop continuously,* http://irv.moi.gov.vn/sodauthang/quocte/2006/5/15798.ttvn, 3.08.2006.

2. Vietnam–Poland relations in the new international context

Vietnam–Poland relations enjoy rich potentials, not only in economic, trade, investment, science and technology, military technology fields but also in cultural and training-education areas. In the new international context, the fast-moving globalization process and the trend for enhanced multilateral, bilateral and regional cooperation new opportunities are being created for continuous development of relations between Vietnam and Poland. Especially Poland's full membership of the EU in 2004 has given rise to new opportunities for further development of Vietnam–Poland relations. The recent expansion of the EU with the admittance of various former East European socialist states, traditional friends of Vietnam, has brought about a new chance for the development of Vietnam–EU relations in general and for Vietnam–Poland relations in particular. Vietnam can make the best of its relations with Poland to further enhance its relations with the EU and on the other hand, the EU and Poland can build on their relations with Vietnam to further enhance cooperation with ASEAN in particular and with Asia in general. Furthermore, the results of Vietnam's reform over the past 20 years has placed Vietnam in a new position with new strengths which allows it to expand its international cooperation in service of national development. Particularly, in the capacity of a full member of the WTO, Vietnam enjoys new opportunities to enhance its international relations in general, with the EU and Poland in particular. During his visit to Poland in September, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung re-affirmed that Poland is Vietnam's trade partner number 1 in East Europe. The two countries are actively promoting cooperation in areas where both sides have advantages, such as ship-building, mining, agricultural production and processing. In the talks between Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung and his Polish counterpart, the two parties discussed ways and means to further strengthen bilateral relations in political, diplomatic, economic, trade, tourism, cultural, scientific and technological, education and training, defense fields as well as in issues relating to the Vietnamese community in Poland. The two Prime Ministers reached a high degree of agreement on all bilateral and multilateral issues of common concern. Speaking at the joint Press Conference, the Polish Prime Minister confirmed that Vietnam is an important partner of Poland, playing a significant role in Asia and the world. During the talks, the two parties agreed upon an early discussion on opening direct air routes between the two countries in order to push up investment, trade and tourism. The two parties will further discuss amendments to the Legal Assistance Agreement, creation of conditions to develop bilateral relations and start discussion on an agreement on information exchange and information security. The two parties confirmed that bilateral trade should be boosted in the coming years in an effort to achieve bilateral trade volume of 500 million USD. At present, Poland is Vietnam's largest trade partner in Eastern Europe. During this visit, the Polish side endorsed a soft credit of 300 million USD for Vietnam's Vinashin Corporation to develop ship-building in Vietnam. In general, in the new international context, Vietnam–Poland relations are enjoying favorable conditions for further development:

First, Vietnam continues its policy of economic integration with the world, particularly with the EU and its members. The Political Report of the Central Committee of the Party at the 10th National Congress declared: "to actively carry out international economic integration according to the roadmap and in accordance with the Strategy for National Development from present to 2010 with a vision to 2020". The Report also stressed: "To render our

international relations deeper, stable and lasting. To develop relations with all countries, territories and international organizations on the basis of respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-interference in the internal affairs of each country; without the use or threats to use force; to solve differences and disputes by means of peaceful talks, mutual respect, equality and benefits".[2]

Regarding relations with the EU, on the 14th June, 2005, the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 143/2005/QD-TTg on the Action Plan and Program of the Government on the development of Vietnam EU relations to 2010 and with an eye to 2015. Thus, Vietnam has given special importance to its relations with the EU, guided by the motto: "Equal-footing partnership, comprehensive cooperation, lasting and for peace, development" and "Linkage bilateral cooperation with each member of the EU with multilateral relation with the whole EU". Therefore, Vietnam has taken proactive approach in its relations with the EU in general, and attached special attention to developing relations with individual traditional partners, for example Central and Eastern European countries, and Poland in particular. Poland became official member of the EU on 1st May, 2004, and as such it is obliged to implement goals, commitments, agreements that the EU has signed with its partners, including ASEAN. On the other hand, it is Poland's policy to expand its relations, especially economic and trade ones, with countries in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly those with traditional relations with China, Japan, India and ASEAN. Therefore, Poland is strengthening its bilateral cooperation with Vietnam. This was confirmed by the Polish Prime Minister during his visit to Vietnam in January 2005: "Since its admittance into the EU, it is Poland's policy to broaden its relations outside Europe and of course in Asia Vietnam is among the most important countries. We are aware that in remote Asia, we have a traditional friend which is Vietnam".[3]

Second, Vietnam-Poland bilateral relation is based on the framework of regional EU–ASEAN cooperation and ASEM. In furtherance of the EU's New Asia Strategy, in July 2003, the European Commission advanced the trans-regional trade initiative in an effort to further promote investment and trade between the two regions. Therefore, in the new international context, ASEAN members, on the one hand strengthen regional linkage by implementing and perfecting the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and ASEAN Investment Area (AIA), on the other are negotiating and signing bilateral agreements with countries in the region, namely China, Korea, Japan, India, Australia, the US, New Zealand. In the meantime, ASEAN and the EU are working on a bilateral agreement – FTA. The goal of those bilateral agreements is to set up a free trade area which would be one of the favorable conditions for the development of a East Asia free trade zone in the future. As a member of ASEAN and ASEM, Vietnam is endowed with numerous opportunities to develop its relations with the EU within the framework of this strategy. At the same time, Vietnam can serve as an important bridge to enhance mutual cooperation and understanding between Vietnam and Poland within the framework of EU–ASEAN and ASEM cooperation. Likewise, within these forums, Poland has opportunities to engage in cooperation and dialogue with Vietnam and ASEAN in all fields: security, politics, culture.

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[2] http://www.cpv.org.vn/details.asp?topic=157&subtopic=287&leader_topic=717 &id=BT670636280, 17.11.2007.

[3] Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/vi/nr040807104143/ nr040807105001/ns050118095126, 29.08.2007.

   Third, the traditional friendship and cooperation between the two nations over the last 55 years is a prerequisite for all-sided cooperation between Vietnam and Poland in the future. The traditional friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and Poland was established in the 1950s. The upheavals in the wake of the crisis in the Soviet Union and East European countries yielded strong impacts on Vietnam–Poland bilateral relations. This relationship has been gradually restored over the recent years, particularly since the visit by Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dzung to Russia, Czech Republic and Poland on 9–15 September, 2007. This confirmed the importance of those countries in the open-door foreign policy of Vietnam, aimed at strengthening relations with traditional partners and Poland is one among them. The strengthening of all-sided cooperation with Poland will bring important opportunity for the export of Vietnamese commodities to the EU market.

   Finally, the Vietnamese community is a factor to boost up Vietnam–Poland relations. About 40,000 Vietnamese are living in Poland who play a significant role in socio-economic development of Poland and promote economic-trade relations between the two countries. There's a trend among the Vietnamese community in Poland to invest in Vietnam. This is also an important channel for Polish goods to enter Vietnam's market. Therefore, both sides wish to work together in order to create conditions for this Vietnamese community to reside and work legally in Poland and to see the Vietnamese in Poland contribute positively to the strengthening of the traditional friendship and cooperation between the two countries in the future.

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ROMAN SŁAWIŃSKI

Taiwanese Traditional Religions

Post-war Taiwan has been the depositary of traditional Chinese culture. There are many reasons for it.

First of all, expecting the Japanese occupation in the 1930s, the Chinese government had organized the evacuation of Chinese relics of art, including the most valuable ones, gathered in the Palace Museum in Beijing. Initially, they had been taken to Nankin, but when Nankin was also endangered by the invasion of the Japanese army, they were moved to Chongqing. Soon after the Second World War, another military conflict emerged between the two most powerful political parties: the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. When the Kuomintang suffered a defeat on the Chinese Mainland the exodus of 2 million people to Taiwan took place. It was connected with taking out on the island the most valuable relics of the Chinese culture that found their place in the new-built National Palace Museum in Taiwan. The Academy of Science, called Academia Sinica and established in 1929, was also moved to Taiwan. The elite of Chinese intelligence of the 1950s moved to Taiwan and made a remarkable contribution to the building of an educational system of a very high level. Undoubtedly, the migration of Chinese intelligence of those days contributed to the continuation of traditional culture on the island. Cultivating the Chinese language and keeping the traditional hieroglyphs, simplified in the Mainland, may be a good example.

In the Mainland, the essential changes were introduced, also in the field of culture. According to the declared in China, *nota bene* borrowed from Russia, allegedly universal conception of five stages of the mankind's development, the traditional Chinese culture was recognized as "feudal". Under the change of the system, it was supposed to be modified, at first as the so called "new-democratic" culture, designed for "workers, peasants and soldiers", as it was formed in the 1940s in Yan'an. Traditional Confucian culture was treated as a relict of the past, associated with the defeated bourgeois classes. Therefore, in the simplified way, ancient Confucian ideas of humanity (*ren*) and justice (*yi*) were put under the same label with much more later degenerations connected with Neoconfucianism. However, the chief aim was to discredit all the ideas incompatible with the propagated and continually sharpened ideology of the class fight. In consequence, Confucianism as a philosophical and religious system was forbidden and attributed to the opponents as a contemptuous label during Mao's lifetime. For this reason, in one ideological campaign, Confucius and Lin Biao, the figures that had nothing in common, were fought down. In Taiwan, on the contrary, Confucianism, and particularly its ethics, was recognized as worth to be continued and reconstructed through publishing classical literature, reconstruction of ancient music and rituals connected with the cult of Confucius, etc. The patron of those activities became the Council for Chinese Culture Reconstruction, an institution subordinated directly to the president.

The next reason for development of the Chinese culture in Taiwan is the fact that all religions of the Mainland China – "classical", traditional, and the subsequent ones, connected with sects and folk societies, were fought down as different, competing outlooks on the world. In 1950, persecutions of the syncretic belief called *Yiguandao* (the Unity Sect) started, for opposing the land reform. This religion has survived in Taiwan and it is at the third place after Taoism and Buddhism among the religions with the greatest number of believers.

In 1958, the madness of the Great Leap started, including the insane campaign of melting steel in primitive conditions. Steel was not obtained, but everything that could be found in the villages was being melted, including bells and censers from the temples. Buddhist and Taoists monks were sent to do physical work.

As a result, thanks to the systematic propaganda of atheism, the three main religions: Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism, suffered great losses, as well as Tibetan Lamaism and Christianity. It was particularly true of the Tibetan monasteries that were destroyed after the successive uprisings.

A thaw in the approach toward religion occurred with the rejection of the extreme Maoism by Deng Xiaoping's reformists. The government permitted studying Confucianism, reconstructing the Mosque in Ürümqi and a few most important monasteries in Tibet, there also appeared new Buddhist and Tibetan monks. However, the possibility of a submission of the Chinese Catholics to the Holy See was still being rejected.

The new-born Falungong sect was persecuted, although the key contribution to its establishing was the propagation by the authorities of the traditional gymnastics *qigong*. Falungong gathered 100 million of believers, who were afterwards forced to emigrate or to go underground. The sect still exists in Taiwan and among the overseas Chinese in the Western countries. In 2007, during the parade of the representatives of Chinese communities in Chinatown, Los Angeles, which was organized a week after the celebration of the Chinese Year of the Pig, the authorities did not permit a group of Falungong believers to participate in the event. Dressed in traditional yellow robes, they were only permitted to follow the route of the parade on the pavement, when it had been finished.

In the history of China some religions were favoured, for example Buddhism was favoured by empresses Wu, Hu and Wu Zetian; this religion achieved even the status of the state religion. However, most often the authorities treated the monks with reserve. The Buddhists were the animators of the traditional secret societies under the sign of White Lotus, which overthrew the reign of Mongols in China. Taoists usually represented an asocial attitude and therefore they were treated with mistrust. There were also religious persecutions, for instance the persecutions of Christians during the famous Boxer Uprising at the turn of the 19th and 20th century. But there were no big religious wars in China, as it used to be the case in the Medieval Europe. One of the characteristic features of traditional Chinese religions, as well as new-born Taiwanese ones, has been their syncretic character.

The Characteristics of the Religious Syncretism in China and in Taiwan

It seems that religious syncretism in China and in Taiwan has several aspects, which can be described as follows:

1. Historic syncretism. Despite the many-century-long competition between the native Taoism and foreign Buddhism (brought from India via Central Asia), the former borrowed

its Chinese terminology from the latter, though interpreted in a bit different way (after previous unsuccessful attempts of transcribing the foreign notions from Sanskrit or Pali) in order to make the communication and expansion of Buddhism in China possible, as was also the case in Korea and Japan. An additional result was the Sinicization of Buddhism under the emerging *chan* Buddhism, in the Western world known better under its Japanese name *zen*. The insularity of traditional Chinese culture made it necessary for foreign ideas to be Sinicized before they could be understood by the Chinese people. Sinicization of Marxism in Maoism constitutes another historic example of that process.

2. Religious syncretism. One of its characteristics is the fact that the same person may be a believer of the Confucian ancestor cult, may attend a Buddhist temple in order to obtain grace of Goodness of Mercy Guanyin, and may invite the Taoist monk for a funeral to provide the proper exorcist ritual, and after that, as an animist, may burn the sacrificial "notes", assigned to be used by the "ghost of the dead" in the spiritual world.

3. Contemporary syncretism. It is based, among others, on the fact that a significant part of the so-called "new religions" draws extensively on the existing cults, adjusting them to the contemporary needs, thanks to the charity, publishing, educational activities and even nutritional activity of the Buddhist and Taoists vegetarian eating-houses. New religions are looking for their way to face the fears of their believers concerning the world of wars, aggression and the perspective of destruction of the world. Moreover, none of the religions (except for the Falungong) does impose on a neophyte the rejection of the belief or beliefs cultivated up till now.

It also seems that with such complex syncretism of the major religions – Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism – primordial, animistic beliefs could absorb many elements of the above mentioned religions and in this way the so-called traditional folk religions have emerged, which have lasted in Taiwan up until now. There are, furthermore, new beliefs that are emerging at the moment and could be described as contemporary folk religions. This situation is opposite to the case of the so-called "new Christianity", when, in the process of Christianization of the Middle Europe, Christianity absorbed many pagan elements of culture, and simultaneously forbade practicing different religions.

Taiwanese Folk Religions

In the case of Taiwan, the animistic folk religions were enriched by elements of Confucianism, the *chan* Buddhism and Taoism, brought by Chinese immigrants. This process was long-lasting and slow, because Taiwan was recognized in China as a very difficult land for colonization. The attempts to capture the island usually met with fierce resistance of the native inhabitants, the so-called Taiwanese aborigines. Acceleration of this process occurred in the 17th century, when under the pressure of the Manchu, the Ming dynasty was withdrawing further and further to the south. Then it obtained for some time the support of Coxinga,[1] who at last had to surrender and to withdraw from the coast of

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[1] Coxinga is the Latinized form of the title referred to Zheng Chenggong. In the Chinese language it was Guoxinye.

Southern China to Taiwan, after previously expelling the Dutch colonists. During the Manchu rule (1644–1911), Chinese colonization oscillated from the prohibition of moving to Taiwan to the planned sending of the settlers. When the Japanese competitor appeared on the horizon Taiwan, thitherto a part of the Fujian province, ruled by its governor, became a separate province of the Empire. Yet the Empire, weakened during the opium wars, was not able to oppose the Japanese invasion, and in 1885 Taiwan was handed over to Japan. But before this happened, the settlers from Fujian and Guangdong had been bringing wax figures of their gods and building temples in Taiwan. These were normally Buddhist, Taoist and Confucian temples, most of them being small family temples belonging to the most important families. The new gods also appeared, like the above mentioned Coxinga, who had won the divine status and was called Kai Tai Shengwang (the Saint Pioneer-King of Taiwan).

Thus a whole system of traditional folk religions of Taiwan was established. It consisted of cults of gods of Heaven and Earth, gods of Hades, as well as astral gods and folk gods.[2] It is worth mentioning that although many gods are attributed to different spheres: Heaven, Earth or Hades, they constitute, in sum, a complex, hierarchic system, bearing a striking resemblance to the Chinese imperial court. Whereas the figures of Buddhist or Taoist pantheon and sanctified Confucians are generally well-known, we know much less about the ancient animistic beliefs.

Animistic Beliefs

According to the typology of a Taiwanese ethnologist, Professor Juan Ch'ang-rue, those beliefs embrace four spheres: the ghost cult, the nature cult, the cult of magic objects, and taboo. In the ghost cult people and things are only tools of a ghost or a demon who is the real master of life. Ghosts are divided into three categories: the ghosts of outstanding personages (*weiren*), ghosts of the dead ancestors (*zuxian*), and demons (*yougui*). The nature cult concerns the astral gods (*tianshen*), earthly gods (*dizhi*) and the spirits of things (*wugui*). The cult of objects includes also artefacts. Magic and taboo aim at controlling nature.

The above mentioned cult of demons embraces two particular categories: the ghosts of people who died of natural causes, called lonely or "wild" demons (*yegui*), and the ghosts of people who didn't have a "good death" (e.g. they died in an execution or in an accident), called spectres (*ligui*). Like the ghosts of the ancestors, they are also made offerings to on the 1st and 15th day of a month according to the Chinese calendar, based on the solar-lunar system. On a daily basis, it is enough to have a domestic altar with nameplates of parents or grandparents, lampions, candles, three (theoretically it should be five) small bowls filled with water or tea, sacrificial fruits, cookies and fragrant joss sticks, necessary for making an offering to gods.

Heaven and the Earthly World. Hades

The seat of the highest god – the Great Nephrite Emperor (Yuhuang Dadi) and his court is the Heavenly World (*tianjie*). Religious people and outstanding personages may after

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[2] An ambitious attempt at typology of those beliefs: Juan Ch'ang-rue, *Tradycyjne wierzenia Tajwanu* (Taiwan minjian xinyang)*, trans. by R. Sławiński, Cracow: Księgarnia Akademicka, 2007.

death go to Heaven and become gods, as for example the legendary rulers Yao, Shun and Yu, who became even Princes of the Three Worlds (*Sanjiegong*).

The Earthly World, also called "the sphere of light" (*yangjie*), is filled with all things and spirits of alive people (*shengling*). This world is controlled by various gods who make reports to Heaven (on which their fate depends). An example can be the God of Kitchen (*Zaojun*), whose representations are glued to the wall next to a kitchen oven, or the All-Seeing One (*Qianliyan*, literally "the eye which sees one thousand *li*"), and the All-Hearing One (*Shungfeng'er*, literally "the ear which hears what the wind brings"). Their large figures usually accompany the main god in the temples.

Hades, actually in Sanskrit described as *Naraka*, has different names in Chinese, but it is most frequently described as a "twilight zone" (*yinjie*). That place of rest for demons and the seat of spectres is also a place of punishment for offences. Good ghosts can bring well-being to their descendants, and that is why they should be made various offerings to, e.g. burning the "sacrificial notes". The sacrificial rituals are also due to the spectres, for example to suicide ghosts, who cannot come back to the human world for a New Year, but may be harmful, bringing diseases, plague, etc. Hades consists of 10 palaces of the ruler of Hell, Yanluo, and 18 floors of Hell. For instance, the Second Palace contains: the First Hell – Hell of Cutting off a Tongue, designed for lies in result of which someone was punished or as a punishment for court litigiousness; the Second Hell – Hell of a Scissors, used for cutting off the fingers of people who forced others to prostitution; the Third Hell – Hell of the Iron Gallows, where those who lost their feelings towards a father and the respect for their older brothers are supposed to hang upside down. The further, the more dreadfully. For good acts, after the sentence passed in the Tenth Palace, it is possible to get to the Paradise, i.e. to the Western Land.

The Most Important Gods

There is a whole impressive cast of gods that come from main traditional religions and have become a part of the so-called folk religions (*minjian xinyang*).[3] Gods connected with Buddhism are obviously the historical Buddha Śakyamuni (Shijia Fozu), bodhisattva Avalokiteśvara (The Goddess of Mercy Guanyin pusa) or 18 arhats (Shiba luohan).[4] Taoists provided, among others, their first saint – Laozi. Confucians – on the other hand – offered Confucius and the God of War, Guangdi. Both Taoism and Confucianism include the figure of a legendary Yellow Emperor, as well as cosmogonist gods, like Pangu or Nüwa. Furthermore, there occur the meritorious generals and courtiers, skilful professionals, obedient and chaste women, heroes and seven immortal ladies (*Qi xian nü*).

Progenitors of the particular families also occupy a prominent place in folk religions which had settled in Taiwan, as the Pioneer of the Continent (*Kaizhang shengwang*)[5] and

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[3] Some authors, e.g. Paul Katz, describe folk religions as "local religions". In view of the emerging new syncretic beliefs, in Taiwan above all, I propose, when talking about the "classic" folk religions to add the adjective "traditional". Significant dissimilarity of those beliefs, traditional religions being mainly practiced in the rural areas, while the new ones – in the city, seems to justify this.

[4] Two Chinese men were also numbered among the circle of the most true Buddha's disciples.

[5] He was a historical figure, called Chen Yuanguang. He rendered considerable services to human beings in making life better in seven districts located in Zhangzhou, during the reign of emperor Xizhong from the Tang dynasty, who ruled in the years 874–879. He has been particularly revered by the refugees from Zhanzhou.

the Pioneer of Taiwan (Guioxingye, i.e. Coxinga),[6] as well as figures connected with religious Taoism, like the Kings of Five Families (Wangye) or the demon Youying Gong. Last but not least, numerous gods of nature are also objects of cult: the Real God Fude, also called the God of Earth;[7] astral gods: the Master of the Sun Star Taiyanggong, the Lady of the Moon (*Taiyin niangniang*) and gods of various constellations, as well as gods of mountains, fire, sea, wind, rain, thunder, etc. There exist, moreover, cults of selected animals and plants, mainly trees.[8] Eventually, we have the well-known God of City (Chenghuang) and the gods related to the domestic place: Gods of Doors (Mensheng), God of Kitchen (Zaojun), Master of Foundations (Diji zhu) and many more.

What is a significant, specific feature of Taiwanese folk religions is the fact that many of them have come from the Mainland, because they were brought by immigrants from Fujian and Guangdong. However, it became popular over time to put many figures of different sizes of the same god (*fensheng*) on altars, together with a syncretic adoration of the Buddhist and Taoist gods in the same temple.

The Cult of the Goddess of Seas – Mazu

Especially worth noting is the cult of the Goddess of Seas, Mazu.[9] Admittedly, as most of the gods, she comes from the Mainland, but because of the extraordinary difficulties of passage from the continent to the island through the disquiet Taiwan Strait, especially in the times of the Manchu bans for setting sail in the Strait and settling on Taiwan, the cult of Goddess of Seas became very common and well-established, not only among the "sea people".

An example can be the temple sacrificed to her which is located in a fishing harbour in Suao on the Pacific cost. This unique temple has a big statue of Mazu on its second storey. The statue was founded by Canadian immigrants and made of one block of nephrite. On the third storey, there is also a great golden statue founded by local fishermen (in 1995). Taiwan is proud of possessing the oldest statue of Mazu, so-called Er Ma, i.e. the Second Mother. The first one was destroyed in Fujian by Hongweibings, during the infamous

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[6] He was born in 1624, in Japan, died in 1662. Although he was a son of a pirate, as a great patriot, the defender of the Ming dynasty from the Manchu, and the conqueror of the Dutch in Taiwan, he became an object of cult during the reign of a Manchu ruler, emperor Guangxu, when in 1875 the first temple was built for him in Tainan.

[7] The God of Earth (Tudi Gong) is also called Houtu. This was the name of a son of Zuo Chuanxu, a legendary ruler who reigned in the 3rd millenium B.C., and was supposed to divide the plough into nine categories.

[8] Very old trees, girded with a red ribbon, are object of cult in Taiwan for people striving for descendants.

[9] Mazu (literally "Mother of Family") is a historical figure. The daughter of a courtier, Lin Yuan, and the mother called Wang, she was born on 23rd day of the 3rd month of the year 960 year and lived 28 years. A fervent Buddhist, Mazu became the example of virtue of obedience, according to the Confucian canon. She saved her brother from a surge and pulled to the shore the body of her dead father. She is held up as a model of the child's sacrifice for the parents. Numerous miraculous savings on the sea are attributed to her attention. Even a resignation by the American aircraft from bombing of Taipei in 1945 might have been the result of covering the city with dark clouds by Mazu, which made the military operation impossible.

"cultural revolution". The figure of chronologically second Mazu with a black face (from candles and incenses) is in Lugang (middle Taiwan). In 2004, the solid and rich-illustrated study on that temple was published (*Lugang Tianhougong zhi*), thanks to the efforts of the local authorities.

Auguries, Magic and Exorcisms

Old as the civilization, fortune-telling has manifested itself in different forms. In ancient times, it was the fortune-telling from milfoil, or made by burning with a rod a turtle shell or an ox, in order to predict from the lines of break of a bone covered with signs. Contemporarily, such forms like fortune-telling with pulling out or shaking out of the bamboo sleeves the jackstraws (*qianshi*) with signs or numbers referring to the particular prediction on them, or throwing fortune-telling scones on a temple floor (*beijiao*) have survived in Taiwan. After asking a question to the god, the answer is read from the position of the previously thrown scones: up with convex side is the best augury. The configuration of two scones up with convex side means the necessity of repeating the augury. Moreover, most of the presented sentences are favourable for the seeker of an answer.

Shamans, called *wu*, and magicians, called *xia*, soothsayers (*luanzhan*), psychics falling into trance (*zhantong*), exorcists (*fashi*), wizards using their amulets (*fufashi*) and spiritualists (*anyi*) are the group of Taoists who mediate between the world of human beings and the world of demons. Using exorcisms and making offerings to gods and demons, they make an effort to force back the spectres. Bequeathing "miraculous" receipts, they enlarge the clientele of the traditional medicine. Fear of diseases and natural disasters, common in Taiwan, is conducive to their popularity.

Social Changes and the Religions of the Taiwanese

The post-war social and economic reforms of Taiwan have been very deep. There has been, among others, a land reform conducted in a Sun Yat Sen's manner. The state was buying land from important landowners for bonds and then the government was dividing it among the leaseholders in exchange for the repayment in 10 years with manufactured products. This is how a major part of the countryside population could move to the cities to find employment in the developing industry. The inner migration did not result in the weakening of religiosity or in a decrease of the number of temples.

Among the many factors three seem to be of extreme importance for the nature of religions of the Taiwanese: persecution of the beliefs of Chinese origin and destroying the figures of gods during the Japanese reign (1895–1945), and in the post-war period – the uncertainty of existence resulting from the special legislation introducing the Martial Law, which was in force for 37 years, and the uncertainty of the political status of Taiwan. The official promotion of the reconstruction of Confucian culture and ethics, or the attachment to the tradition of the ancestor cult is also of a considerable importance. The first bore fruit with building temples of Confucius by the state, the second resulted in reconstruction of temples of families, destroyed during the earthquakes (e.g. temple of the Liu family in Shigang, Middle Taiwan, which since the times of Manchu had been located on the "hot" dividing line between aborigines and the Hakka people, completely ruined in result of a strong earthquake).

The number of believers and temples, according to the official census, is continuously increasing. What is more bizarre, Taoists' influences also increase. It is probably not only

the effect of popularity of the philosophy of nature and ecological behaviours. Auguries, calendars with predictions, amulets, exorcisms, burning the sacrificial notes, not only within the area of temples, but also in the streets and on squares, are still very popular.

Following the spirit of the time, a well-known fortune-teller from Taipei was using a computer for telling fortunes! Her prognosis for elections was even used by journalists of Taiwanese TV stations. In private matters, she was using the horoscopes created by a special computer software, she was also telling fortunes with throwing the coins (avers, reverse) and with fortune-telling scones.

The Genesis and the Future of New Religions

The uncertainties of the future as well as everyday problems, which cannot be solved by the social system, make for both the blossoming of traditional folk religions and the emergence of new ones, also among educated persons. The promoted ideas usually have a syncretic character and they refer to ecology, to the threat of the nuclear war or to the social alienation of elder, ill and helpless people. The main are:

Religion of the Yellow Emperor (Xuayuanjiao), called so after the legendary Yellow Emperor, the symbol of excellence, was established in Taiwan in 1957 by Wang Hansheng. Viewing the lack of the national spirit as the main cause of losing of the continent by Kuomintang, he decided to renovate it through the cult of the Yellow Emperor as a source of sanctity that could be achieved through the spiritual self-cleansing, self-cultivation and helping others.[10]

The True Buddha School (Zhengfo Zongjiao) was established by Yang Shenglu in 1971. He was a Christian who at the age of 26 experienced a revelation in Taichung; he saw the Golden Mother, and next, under the influence of Taoist and Buddhist masters, he came to the conclusion that he himself was an emissary of Siakjamuni, sent to the Earth as a Living Buddha Liangsheng. The faith has 30 main temples, where his statues as the founder of True Buddha School are placed. In Taipei, one of the temples was visited by the present president of Taiwan, Chen Shui-bian. The School has about 4 million believers (the founder himself is living in Seattle).

International Association of Qinghai was founded in 1984, by a woman, Sima Qinghai (Hue Dang Trinh), who came from a traditional Catholic Vietnamese family. Sima Qinghai is considered to be a reincarnation of Buddha and Jesus, and puts an emphasis on contemplation of the Inner Light and Sound. She gained popularity among technologists in Hsinchu Science Park. In 1997, she had about 300 thousand believers in Taiwan and about 100 thousand of them in USA.

The Children Way (Haizi Dao) is a Taiwanese religion which emerged in 1984. Its founder was Li Jixiong, presenting himself as a reincarnation of Laozi. He proclaimed himself Laozi's son, professing that the Earth shall be protected from annihilation by Master the Sun and Master the Moon, which are children yet. Although the founder of the religion refers to the Bible as well as to *Daodejing*, his followers worship mainly many Chinese folk gods and the founder himself, who allegedly has the power to heal from a distance. In 2006, the official statistics showed 39 thousand believers.

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[10] Cf.: *Huang Di jing* (Book about the Yellow Emperor).

The religion of the Emperor Heaven (Tiandijiao), established in Taiwan in 1985 by Li Yujie (1901–1994), recommends meditation and healing with *qi* energy, and saying the Mantra of 20 Words, which shall facilitate becoming a medium. Li Yujie proclaimed himself the main emissary of the Emperor Heaven – Tiandi, who offers the salvation by his mediation. The doctrine has been developed by his son, Li Weisheng, who called it the New Philosophy of Religious System. It claims complying with the commandments, meditation and confessions. In 2006, the total number of believers was estimated as above 298 thousand (also in Los Angeles and in Tokio). Li Weisheng is in favour of peaceful reunification of Taiwan and China, in fear of the danger of a nuclear attack.

Falungong is the most famous religious organization, described by David Ownby as "Chinese folk fundamentalism". Established in 1992, it is connected with *qigong*, which at first was propagated by the government itself. The founder of the organization, Li Hongzhi, acting in the Mainland China, popularized the rules in his *Zhuan fa lun* (Turning the Wheel of Law). After the split in the Falungong Research Association and changing its name into Falun Dafa Research Association, he did not gain the acceptance of the PRC's government. After the unexpected mass manifestation of 10 thousand members of the Association under the public buildings on 25 April 1999, the silent actions raised the anxiety of the government, probably for its great numbers, estimated even as 100 million people (which outnumbers the number of members of the ruling party). The Association was banned by the parliament and in result of repressions it has become an underground movement. Like other syncretic religious organizations of this type, Falungong refers to folk religions, Buddhism and Taoism, and proclaims the striving for the gradual enlightenment that can be achieved only in the presence of Li Hongzhi. Its believers are recruited mainly from the "cultural revolution" generation. The Association – unlike other new religions – does not accept the continuity of the hitherto prevailing belief. Since 1989, the founder of the Association has been a USA resident and his followers are operating in Taiwan, although they are not officially registered.

The True Way (Zhendao) – a religion established by the sociologist Hong Mingzhen, called also the Church of God the Saviour – combines elements of Buddhism, Taoism and Christianity. It was established in Taiwan in the mid-1990s and was known in USA as *God's Salvation Church*. Hong was calling to escape to USA, in order to avoid the expected apocalypse. He was using children, Jesus' and Buddha's reincarnations. After unsuccessful announcement of God's appearance on a TV channel, most of the believers came back to Taiwan.

Forshang Buddhism (Fochengzhong) is a sect connected with the *chan* Buddhism, but proclaiming the faith in UFOs. It was established in 1993, by Li Shundon (Li Shundan), the trainee of *qigong*, referring to the Buddhist sect Huayan; he proclaimed that Christ had spent 18 years in India. He practices the Siakjamuni's cult, recommends *qigong* and meditation. He has many well-educated followers.

Summary

1. It seems that since the emergence of *chan* Buddhism, new religions have been of a decidedly syncretic character. Besides restoring the worship of the "classical" Buddhist and Taoist gods, and the worship of figures connected with Confucianism, their main feature was, on the one hand, the domination of elements of folk religions, and the link with everyday life and spiritual needs of the natives on the other.

2. Therefore, syncretic cults emerged and gained many believers in Taiwan. Those cults, e.g. Yinguandao, have shown a great concern for everyday life of their believers or they have made themselves known as charity organizations. The above mentioned Unity Sect took the third place in respect of the number of its believers (after Taoism and Buddhism) and the first place in respect of the number of schools and hospitals.

3. It seems necessary and useful to make a terminological distinction between traditional folk religions and new folk religions. The significant difference between them concerns not only the chronology, when the turning point could be 1950, but also the fact that traditional religions were recognized as capable of changing human fate, determined by Heaven, by using magic and exorcisms, whereas in the new folk religions the emphasis is put on self-improvement in order to avoid the apocalypse. This has probably been an effect of the considerable participation of well-educated people in those organizations.

Both the traditional folk religions and the new ones can boast of constant proliferation of temples and believers, which proves their popularity among the Taiwanese. It may also be a sign of the social enthusiasm for charity, on which the new religions have founded their mission, thus successfully filling the gap in the social activities of the modernized Taiwanese society.

STANISŁAW TOKARSKI

A Global Identity – the Indian Dilemma

India – a Global Partner in the New World Order

"For many years", wrote Nalin Surye seven years ago, "the international media and international economists were so taken in by the phenomenon of the so-called tiger economies that they ignored the rapid strides that the Indian economy has been making over the last two decades in particular. While some analysts and respected financial papers such as the *Financial Times* and the *Economist,* both of London, had begun to highlight India's achievements much earlier, it is the combined impact of India's ability to sustain the South East Asian crisis of 1997 and the subsequent affect of Russian crisis that drew the attention to Indian economy". "India's chosen path of development has been steady. Indeed, given the size of the Indian population, the complexities of India and the fact that we are the country firmly rooted in democracy and free market, I would even say that our progress has been close to spectacular."[1]

For a majority of scholars dealing with the globalization of rapidly developing countries it means coming closer to one another through international economic relations in terms of international trade and investment. Thus the available resources in the world economy would be better utilised, compared to what would have been possible in a less internationalized world economy. The potential gains would bring the increased standard of living coming with various international trade agreements and regional economic integrations. It implies the need for further coordination and harmonization of the international economic policy. For the critics of the whole process, it creates a challenge and a threat for the national autonomy.[2]

India is the best example in point. For some scholars, opposing the globalization on the ground of Indian identity, it means the "cloning of America", the danger of losing national coherence. In this view, globalization creates a trap for old civilisations, an attack on democracy and national well-being.[3] On the other hand, for big countries like India it is a rare opportunity for rapid modernisation and economic prosperity, bringing about

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[1] Nalim Surie, *Indian Economy: Its Performances and Prospects*, Warsaw 2000, p. 1–2; Nalim Surie, *Indian Economy: Recent Performances and Prospect*, Warsaw, 2000, p. 1–2.

[2] G. Hanson, „Internationalisation, Economic Integration and National Autonomy", in B. Wawrzyniak, ed., *Globalisation and Change*, Warsaw, 2000.

[3] H. Schuman, *Die Globalisierungsfalle*, Hamburg, 1996.

unavoidable cultural changes as well. This process has been widely debated in Indian media and has been analyzed at Indian universities.

The range of Indian cultural change has been discussed in a book written by Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimension of Globalisation*.[4] The author is a scholar well-known in Indian diaspora, an Indian-born professor of American university, for several decades living in USA. Arjun Appadurai analyzes the ways of adaptation of some Asian countries to many globalization issues. In this respect, the example of India is most instructive.

For more than a hundred years India has been a scene of confrontation of cultures. The phenomenon of offshoring, the IT revolution, and rapid increase of high technology regions are the last phases of the process that began with the colonization, at the time of the British Raj. The Bollywood productions give evidence to the impact of the Indian diaspora in Europe and America. They illustrate the changes of Indian identities resulting from traveling abroad. The increasing cosmopolitism of Indian elite is one of the most important components of the identity of Indian business class. Living abroad and business travels have become a part of a new style of life. The traditionalists, feeling endangered, look for the milestones of Indian identity. Paradoxically, the part of its formation has been the belonging to the University cricket team. The attraction of cricket, which has become "the new religion" of recent generations, has been a part of anthropological analysis. Arjun Appadurai writes about "decolonization of cricket", now the Indian national sport, calling it the important part of "the play with modernity".[5]

For Indian compatriots the globalization creates the fundamental dilemma – to be a nationalist or not? That question has been the foundation of the Indian independence. They say that the Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru invented the Indian nation or simply "made India" (see M.J. Akbar, *Nehru, the Making of India,* Delhi: Lotus Collection, 2002) as the pattern of integration based on the unity of diversities. Federal system united the Indian mosaic into one integral structure. The balance has been the principle of democracy and secularization of politics. Nehru was not afraid of Islamic fundamentalists, who formed in India a minority of 100 million people, but of Hindu fundamentalists, dangerous for the process of de-colonization. The last victory of Congress Party coalition (see Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India,* New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000) means the globalization orientation of the winning elites.

It has been backed up by the reform of Indian education. The critics of Indian universities observe that migrations of persons with university education take a specific character, referred to in the literature of the subject as the *brain drain* or *the brain flight.* To attract the attention of the scientific elites, India creates some complex IT zones where opportunities of studies for gifted Indians have been strictly connected with opportunities to work in India. The global character of these investments is recognized at once as the "IT revolution" based on international cooperation. India's orientation towards high technologies has the same roots. It has its foundations in Indian democratic pattern modelled on Western design.[6]

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[4] Arjun Appadurai, *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimension of Globalisation*, University of Minnesota, 1996.

[5] Ibid., p. 133–168.

[6] Sunil Khilnani, *The Idea of India*, New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2000.

The Indian presence in the new global order has a considerable impact in the theoretical dimension. Traditionally, the Indian civilisation has been "the light of Asia", proclaiming the soft power for its external influence since the times of Buddhist empire of Aśoka. The colonization of India acquired mainly the religious or cultural dimension. The same can be said of adopting the global economy in India, where the trade has been preceded by the creation of some cultural fashions. The Indian's appeal for the "human face of globalization" is also found, to my surprise, in some modern Chinese writings.[7]

Growth accompanied by social justice and alleviation of poverty have been primary objectives of Indian planning since its inception in 1951. Several anti-poverty measures have been in operation for decades, focusing on the poor as the target groups. These include programmes for the welfare of weaker sectors, women and children, and a number of special employment and self-employment programmes in rural and urban areas.[8]

Since the beginning of Independence the Indian transition has aimed at several dimensions: transformation of administration, change of the political system, and the quest for a new identity. Postcolonial relicts could not be removed without the sound Indian middle class, and this was born at the time of the British Raj. To these groups appeal the Indian technocratic elites proclaiming the Indian presence in the globalization. The Indian zones of rapid modernisation are the area of the day by day richer and better educated middle class, both in India and abroad, as a part of Indian diaspora of over 20 million emigrants.

The global dimension of Indian foreign policy

Indian elites tend to support the view that economic partnership in the global order is the key to foreign policy. Therefore they would prefer to deal with Pakistan and China through territorial promise and negotiation, displaying military power only to supplement diplomacy. They suggest that the nuclear programme has been important mainly for energetic reasons, and are more and more inclined to accept its marginal role. They envision a peaceful change in the politics of India's neighbours. For the same reasons they have been eager to protect minorities in India and in neighbouring countries, treating them as an important part of the Indian connections with the world.

On the other hand, the army enjoys a great respect, though many retired officers have spoken publicly in favour of peace and disarmament in South Asia. They believe that nuclearized South Asia is both risky and unnecessary. A high level of defense spending slows down the pace of economic growth of very big countries, brings poverty and instability for the small ones.[9]

Almost every member of the Indian elite thinks that Indian diplomacy draws on the country's ancient wisdom, Indian economic accomplishments have been melted with civilizational impact and democratic orientation is considered more non-violent. Seen in this perspective, Indian festivals organized in America attempt to create a favourable image of Indian politics. Indian considerable scientific capabilities are becoming symbols of

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[7] See Zhang Shaohua, *My Thoughts on Globalization*, Sydney, 2001.

[8] See Surie, *Indian Economy: Recent Performances and Prospect*, p. 14.

[9] See L. Chibber, „Indo-Pakistan Relations, The Impact on International Security", in *South Asia After the Cold War*, eds. K.P. Bajpai & S. Cohen, Boulder: Colorado Press, 1993.

civilizational capacities. A similar approach is observed in India, where we see Arjun tanks, Agni missiles. The names derived from Sanskrit and Indian religions make these attempts manipulated public opinion.

For many foreign diplomats dealing with India, the idea of flexible non-alignment was a pretext for a close relationship with the Soviet Union. Indian diplomats seemed compelled to lecture their Western counterparts on the evils of the Cold War. This combination of arrogance and ethics was inherited from the British Raj. Gandhi's attitude was combined with the British experience in the times of Nehru. To continue this line after half a century is difficult. With the advent of economic liberalization and the privatization of government corporations, this system has become disfunctional. In search of a new strategy, Indian foreign policy finds it difficult to compete abroad.

Leaders of the Global Way

A new generation of leaders has been born for whom impacts of various cultures are not so uncomfortable. One of them is Sonia Gandhi, the author of the last victory of Indian Congress Coalition. It has been called (see the cover of *Outlook,* 22 March 2007) *Sonia's rope trick.* (You throw three parts of a rope in the air and observe the alive snake coming back.) It is a rule that whenever the Congress forms the Government at the Centre, priority is given to loyalty to the Nehru-Gandhi family.[10] A part of Sonia strategy has been the resignation from the leading position. After the nomination of the new Prime Minister, Rammohan Singh, the Hindu fundamentalists could not revoke the issue that Sonia had been a foreigner. In fact, more than a quarter of century ago she came to India from Italy with her husband, as a wife of prime minister from the Gandhi-Nehru family.

Another good example is the Indian President, Dr. Abdul Kalam. His position for renomination has been discussed in *The Week* in the article "Salam Kalam, now is our term". His religion is Islam and his first vocation has been the nuclear physics. They have called him the godfather of Indian atomic bomb. Because of this double background, as a scientist and a Muslim, he understands perfectly the problems of fundamentalisms, both Hindu and Muslim, although he gives the priority to scientific wisdom in the complexity of issues of Indian modernisation. He has always been the best choice for India, as a politician with the exemplary background of the cross-cultural dialogue. In the beginning of his presidency Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam spoke about his vision of India 2020. He opted for a more integral India, based not only on a sound political order but also on a strong and developing economy. Politicians cannot forget about the pace of growth. The emergence of multi-party coalition as a regular form of government brings about many challenges (*The Week,* May 27, p. 37).

An important leader of the new Indian order is the Prime Minister Rammohan Singh. He strongly believes in a transition connected with foreign investments, but also with financial strategy of Indian banks. India's federal structures are an important part the new economic order in this country. Many reforms have been done in India, but there is still a lot to be done. Singh does not believe in technocratic utopia, he knows that transition has to be done by many channels of transfer of power. He also looks for allies in USA, Great Britain, UE and China.

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[10] See "Embarrasing choice", *India Today,* July 9.

The advent of global order in India has been often connected with the new generation of Indian political elites. For S. Bhutani, globalization fosters democratization, democratization fosters globalization.[11] This is obvious in South India, especially in Bangalore. Every year the Indian universities give their diplomas to hundreds of thousands of students who start working in highly specialized gigantic international institutions that are a part of the new global order. These "new Indians" have a rare opportunity to work in India and abroad in the most developed countries. Their experience in the new technologies is an important part of the globalization and is highly appreciated all over the world. That has created a special kind of Indian cosmopolitism. Because of the weak governance, for some of them, the state is the main obstacle in the process of reform leading to modernization of India. The political weight of democracy is so heavy that an economic price is paid at every step.

 "Over-politisation of the polity", writes S. Bhutani, "is the end result. A politician in India is not prepared to take any risk where he can lose his power in the next election. Hence the pace is very slow. Over the years the system has become too fragile and population explosion has taken a heavy toll of the already over-burdened infrastructure. The only saving grace is that India has sufficient foreign exchange reserves of 66 billion dollars. It seems that the bulk of money of the Indians and NRIs (non-resident Indians) which was lying in foreign banks has come back to India, as the rate of interest is at present better in India than in Western banks. But it is not hot money mostly and with the flick of mouse of the computer can go back to Western banks if political, economic, and social situation become grim".[12]

Western investments in India have been an important condition not only for the globalization of India, but for the global order of our new world. The first to express this opinion was the US President Bill Clinton. We cannot afford to have India poor, he said. As the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing strategy to neutralize, contain and through selective pressure, perhaps eventually to transform some backlash states into constructive members of the international community. The main reason is a huge possibility of the Indian market, if the middle class of this country increase its possibility of payment and buying power.[13] Since the end of the second millennium there has been a race between China and India, a race between the largest democracy of the world and the largest authoritarian economy in the world. Blocking India and helping China is the wrong choice for the Western democratic world. It would mean that post-Communism may prevail in the new world order at the times of globalization.

Considering the new situation India has to rethink its national economic strategy. In a democratic country where 200 million people are very poor (one man, one vote) the choice is not easy, especially if the Indian Congress Party makes the coalition with some parties of the social Left. "The rolling back of state on the economic issues", writes R.B. Jain,

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[11] See *Hemispheres*, 17/2002.

[12] Surender Bhutani, "Globalisation and Challenges for Global Power. India as a Case Study", in *Hemispheres*, 17/2002, p. 23.

[13] As quoted by Prem Shankar Jha, "Democracy, Globalisation, and War", in *World Affairs. The Journal of International Issues*, April 2001, p. 26. This was an opinion of Anthony Lake, Clinton's National Security Adviser.

"necessitates a re-defining of its new role and a re-examination of its structure and processes. It may be no longer remain the owner of strategic industries, but it is still pro consumer regulator that oversees and prevents the abusers of the market, and provides the legal, physical, and human infrastructure. It has to concentrate on «development dynamics» that would primarily benefit the poor and the disadvantaged".[14]

Three slogans are popular in India: 1. India is the greatest (or the largest) democracy in Asia and in the world; 2. It is potentially the greatest reserve of human resources, with cheap but highly qualified labour; 3. This country is a great opportunity for the middle class. Underlying all these statements is demography. Politicians go to campaigns with the words "India Now". In 2020 most of the Indians (820 million) will be in the productive age. For many other countries the demographic explosion would be a total disaster. Not for India. During half a century the number of India's inhabitants was doubled. In that period the Indians had three peaceful revolutions. The green revolution provided India with food to such an extent that it does not import the grain of any kind. The non-violence revolution gave it freedom and a democratic system capable of keeping pace with the biggest countries of the world with the highest rate of growth.

The IT revolution created for Indian students the opportunity to work in India and abroad. They are the richness of India, a real human resource. This looks like a miracle. The Indian IT experts, as well as Indian experts on high technologies, medicine, physic, mathematics, astronomy, film making, music, are welcome all over the world. This is the first step to globalization of the Indian mind.

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[14]   R.B. Jain, "Globalisation, Liberalisation, and Human Security in India", in *The Journal of Developing Societes*, vol. XVII, p. 111–128.

KARIN TOMALA

Die Frage der Menschenrechte und der Wandel des Zivilisationsbewusstseins im heutigen China

*China ist für den Westen Synonym für Menschenrechtsverletzungen-
doch die Chinesen kümmern sich wenig um diese Empfindlichkeiten.
Die Entwicklung und somit auch der Wandel bewegen sich zwischen
der großen Tradition und den Erfordernissen der Moderne.*

Einleitung

Alles ist im Wandel begriffen, auch das chinesische Menschenrechtsverständnis und die Wahrnehmung der eigenen kulturellen Identität unterliegt diesem Wandel, obgleich für den westlichen Beobachter im „Reich der Mitte" weiterhin alles fremd anmutet. Der Westen kritisiert Chinas Menschenrechtslage, doch die meisten Chinesen verstehen das nicht. Wieder entdeckt werden dagegen die konfuzianischen Klassiker, die als Quelle für wahre Menschenrechte gesehen werden.[1] Im Konfuzianismus wie auch im maoistischen Kommunismus standen die Pflichten weit vor den Rechten. Heute ist die Tradition wieder erwacht doch angesichts der Globalisierung führt zweifelsohne kein Weg in die alte Zivilisation zurück.

Angesichts der dramatischen Erfahrungen im 20. Jahrhundert mit Bürgerkriegen, Terror, Hungersnöten und Zwangskollektivierungen glauben heute die meisten Menschen in China, über ihr eigenes Leben freier entscheiden zu können als je zuvor. Und wer unter Experten die Entwicklung in China seit einem längeren Zeitraum beobachtet, muss, ob er will oder nicht, eingestehen, dass Chinesen ihre persönlichen Rechte, die sie nun in vielen Bereichen besitzen, emsig nutzen, um ihr Leben in die eigenen Hände zu nehmen, doch auch gleichzeitig von dem Wunsch getragen werden, einen Beitrag zu leisten für ihr Land, damit es im 21. Jahrhundert zu einer mächtigen Macht in der Welt aufzusteigen vermag.

In dieser Studie wird der Versuch unternommen, den Wandel des Menschenrechtsverständnisses und damit den Wertewandel, der sich insbesondere in den letzten Jahren vollzieht, zu untersuchen, wobei gleichzeitig das pragmatisch-kulturelle Herangehen politischen Handels aufgezeigt werden soll. Dabei stützt sich die Autorin auf zahlreiche Neuerscheinungen in der Konfuziusforschung, die sie während ihrer letzten Studienaufenthalte erwerben konnte.

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[1] Eds. Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuhua, *Rujia chuantong yu renquan. Minzhu sixiang* (Konfuzianische Tradition und Ideen zu Menschenrechten und Demokratie), Jinan: Jinan shushe Chubanshe, 2004, p. 4.

Über die Frage der Menschenrechte hat die Autorin bereits in zahlreichen Studien geschrieben, wobei die Entwicklung verschiedener Menschenrechtspositionen vor dem Hintergrund des sich vertiefenden Globalisierungsprozesses dargestellt wurde.[2]

Zum besseren Verständnis scheint es jedoch wichtig zu sein, einige grundlegende Begriffe, wie sie im chinesischen Selbstverständnis verstanden werden, zu erläutern.

Im Mittelpunkt dieser Studie steht der komplizierte Wandel kultureller Selbstwahrnehmung von Personen, Staat und Gesellschaft, die mit zahlreichen neuen Merkmalen, natürlich unterschiedlich in der Perzeption, voranschreitet und auch im differenzierten Menschenrechtsverständnis seinen Ausdruck findet. Trotz Wandel beruft man sich in der großen Politik sowie auch in den Wissenschaften wieder gern auf die Bedeutung der konfuzianischen Klassiker.

Doch man kann sich nicht des Eindrucks erwehren, dass man in China dabei ist, ein Gegenmodell zur abendländischen Zivilisation zu schaffen.[3] Dabei lässt man sich von der weisen Maxime leiten, die einst der große chinesische Denker Konfuzius formulierte, dass sich die Menschen gleichen, doch sich aufgrund der Gewohnheiten in ihrem Denken und Handeln auseinander entwickeln. Das ist auch die Essenz des Menschenrechtsverständnisses.

Mit der beschleunigten Entwicklung des Landes wandeln sich auch traditionelle Lebensentwürfe, und es entstehen neue Lebensmodelle, Mentalitäten und Gewohnheiten. Damit einher gehen die Veränderungen von zivilisatorischen Identitäten und althergebrachten Verhaltens- und Denkweisen in den verschiedenen Bereichen des gesellschaftlichen Lebens. Doch in der Menschenrechtsfrage beruft man sich auf das Theoriengerüst von besonderen Entwicklungsbedingungen und den kulturellen Ausprägungen der Tradition.[4]

Wenn wir die Menschenrechtsfrage untersuchen, so gilt zweifelsohne, dass das Subjekt sowohl der Mensch als auch die Gesellschaft sowie die die Gesellschaft prägende Kultur ist. Doch auch hier ist immer wieder zu bedenken, dass nichts statisch bleibt, auch nicht die zivilisatorische Identität, sondern sie unterliegt ebenfalls dem Wandel.

In der Arbeit wird ein politologisch-soziologischer Ansatz verwendet, wobei sich die Analyse auf die Wechselwirkung zwischen politisch-ökonomischer Entwicklungsstrategie und sozialem Wandel stützt.

1. Das „kulturelle China" – zu einigen Begriffserklärungen

1.1. Was verstehen wir unter Identität und dem chinesischen Selbstverständnis?

Begriffe wie Identität, Kultur, Tradition oder auch Modernisierung können wir nicht nach westlichem Verständnis definieren, sondern wir müssen versuchen, das chinesische Verständnis wiederzugeben, zu erläutern, was man in China darunter versteht. Es macht ebenfalls wenig Sinn, nur über die Entwicklung in China zu sprechen. Wichtig ist es für den

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[2] Karin Tomala, „Gesellschaft und Menschenbild im 21. Jahrhundert. Der Westen und China", in *Hemispheres*, No. 17, 2002, p. 79–91.

[3] Liu Zongzhi, *Cai Dechong, Dangdai dongfang ruxue* (Die Bedeutung der konfuzianischen Klassiker für den heutigen Osten), Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2003, p. 3–5 and 496–500. [Unter Osten werden die nichteuropäischen Kulturen in Asien und Afrika verstanden. K.T.].

[4] Ibidem, p. 502–503.

Westen, sich in dieser Entwicklungskonfrontation selbst besser zu erkennen und sich global einzuordnen, die strittigen Anschauungen über die so unterschiedlichen Menschenrechts- und auch Identitätskonzeptionen neu zu reflektieren.

Chinesisch wird der Begriff „Identität" mit *tongyixing* wiedergegeben, was so viel bedeutet, wie gleich sein mit der Natur oder auch gleich sein im Wesen. Man könnte viele Definitionen anführen, was in den verschiedenen Wissenschaften unter „Identität" verstanden wird. Das würde jedoch über den Rahmen dieser Arbeit hinausgehen. Zu betonen gilt, dass der Begriff „Identität" ursprünglich aus der Philosophie kommt und sowohl als die Wahrnehmung eines Wechselverhältnisses zwischen Personen und Dingen als auch als konkreter Inhalt der jeweiligen Beziehung verstanden wird.

1.2. Chinesische Zivilisationsidentität

In dieser Studie lasse ich mich von dem Verständnis leiten, dass die Herausbildung eines Identitätsbewusstseins vor allem von der Kultur geprägt wird.[5] Deshalb spreche ich auch von einer Zivilisationsidentität, die in China bis auf den heutigen Tag auch die nationale Identität beinhaltet.

Die Verbindung, die das so unterschiedliche Wechselverhältnis ausmacht, stützt sich auf bewusste oder auch unbewusste Haltungen eines Menschen gegenüber eines anderen Menschen, einer Gemeinschaft, der Gesellschaft, der Kultur und ihrer Tradition, wie auch der Gesellschaft im Wechselverhältnis zur Kultur und zum Einzelnen.[6] Doch wichtig ist dabei zu untersuchen, wie tief dieses Bewusstsein über das Vorhandensein dieser Wechselbeziehungen ist. Ausdruck dieser Beziehungen finden wir dann in der Mentalität, in den Emotionen und im zwischenmenschlichen Verhalten sowie im Verhalten gegenüber der Gesellschaft, was insgesamt den Identitätsstand des Einzelnen und der Gemeinschaft im gesellschaftlichen und kulturellen Umfeld kennzeichnet.

Erinnern wir daran, wenn wir über die kulturelle Identität sprechen, dass sich die chinesische Hochkultur über zwei Jahrtausende lang ohne einen ernst zu nehmenden Gegner an seinen Grenzen herausbilden konnte. Obgleich es an gewaltigen Wechselfällen in der Geschichte des chinesischen Kaiserreiches wahrlich nicht fehlte, wurde immer wieder demonstriert, wie die Identität chinesischer Staatlichkeit zivilisatorisch behauptet wurde. Die strukturelle Identität wurde in den Institutionen verfestigt und konnte bis zum Sturz der letzten Dynastie im Jahre 1911 stets fortgeführt werden, wobei die Staatsbürokratie die Grundlage des Herrschaftssystems darstellte und die konfuzianische Lehre wie eine Fessel die bereist im 19. Jahrhundert begonnenen Emanzipationsbestrebungen umspann.[7] So wundert es nicht, dass Begriffe wie Freiheit und Menschenrechte zum ersten Mal erst Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts in die chinesische Ideenwelt aufgenommen wurden.

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[5] Compare with: Erika H. Erikson, *Identity and the Life Cycle*, New York, London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1980.

[6] Anna Gałdowa, ed., *Tożsamość człowieka*, Kraków: wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2000, s. 11.

[7] Compare with: Karin Tomala, „Próby modernizacji gospodarki za Mandżurów – blaski i cienie modernizacji pod wpływem Zachodu", in Roman Sławiński, ed., *Historia nowożytnych Chin*, Kraków: wyd. Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, 2005.

1.3. Das moderne chinesische Selbstverständnis

Bereits mit den revolutionären Veränderungen in China Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts hatte sich auch das chinesische Selbstverständnis verändert. Es war die Infragesellung und die aufkommenden Zweifel an der traditionellen und sozialen Ordnung. Hinzu kam das erlebte Trauma der chinesischen Elite, dass sie infolge der Demütigungen als stolze Kulturnation durch die westlichen Industriestaaten erfahren hatten. Trotz Zweifel und Demütigungen blieb für die moderne Elite das verpflichtende traditionelle Ethos in seinen Grundstrukturen bestehen. Unter richtigem Handeln verstand man die Maxime, nach der staatliche Politik zum Wohlergehen von Staat und Gesellschaft führen sollte. Dieser ehrenwert beschriebene Anspruch verblieb jedoch nur als Maxime im Tugendkatalog. Doch schon in dieser Zeit der Umbrüche meldeten sich Kritiker zu Wort, die zwar die nationale Strategie „richtigen Handels" befürworteten, doch Zweifel anmeldeten ob ihrer Realisierbarkeit. Das Grundübel der konfuzianischen Tradition erblickten sie in der Autoritätshörigkeit, die bis heute ein wichtiges Element des chinesischen Zivilisationsbewusstseins darstellt.

Nach der Gründung der Volksrepublik China und der Errichtung eines totalitären Herrschaftssystems wurde der Konfuzianismus in die Requisitenkammer der feudalistischen Ausbeutung verbannt. Doch im Kern stützte sich die neue politische Elite auf das Grundgerüst des Konfuzianismus, nur unter anderen begrifflichen Vorzeichen. Die Unterordnung und Einordnung des Einzelnen in das Klassensystem wurde zur Grundvoraussetzung für das kommunistische Regieren. Die Kommunistische Partei Chinas legitimierte ihren Herrschaftsanspruch nach der traditionellen Doktrin, Wohlstand für das ganze Volk zu schaffen. Sie sah sich auch aufgrund ihrer revolutionären Erfahrungen in der chinesischen Geschichte berufen, die Macht auszuüben.

Die Verwendung traditioneller Begrifflichkeiten wie Staat, Nation, Gemeinwohl, Autorität oder auch Pflichterfüllung wurden wie zu alten Zeiten als Integrationsinstrument benutzt. Sie wurden zum Schlüssel chinesischen revolutionären Zivilisationsverständnisses in Zeiten des Klassenkampfes.

1.4. Stellenwert der chinesischen Zivilisation

Die Debatte über den Stellenwert der chinesischen Zivilisation, die seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts in China anhält, und heute wieder aufgegriffen wird, findet ihren Niederschlag im Konzept *zhongti xiyong*, was soviel bedeutet, wie im Kern an der chinesischen Zivilisation festhalten und alles für China Nützliche vom Westen übernehmen. Was bedeutet aber, am Kern an der chinesischen Zivilisation festhalten? Es bedeutet die Orientierung am traditionellen Wertesystem und damit an den althergebrachten Begrifflichkeiten, wie *ren* Menschenwürde, die man erst auf dem Wege der eigenen Vervollkommnung erreicht, in einem System der Ein- und Unterordnung.

Dieses Wertesystem prägt zweifelsohne die chinesische Kultur. In der Publikation A *history of Chinese educational thought* wird diese Tradition in ihrem geschichtlichen Verlauf skizziert und gleichzeitig auf ihre Bedeutung für die Globalisierung verwiesen. So kommt auch der bekannte britische Historiker Arnold Joseph Toynbee zu Wort, der die Ansicht vertritt, dass die konfuzianischen Tugenden von Liebe und Wollwollen heute in Zeiten der Herausforderungen der Globalisierung als universale Ethik in modernen Gesellschaften anerkannt werden müssten. So eine Ethik könnte die Gefahr eines globalen

Chaos verhindern. Verwiesen wird ebenfalls auf das Ende 1998 in Peking durch die UNESCO organisierte internationale Symposium, das zum Thema ***Diskussion on education for the 21 st Century*** stattfand. In der „Abschlußresolution Learn to be concerned about each other" wurde hervorgehoben, wie wichtig es gegenwärtig sei, sich doch wieder auf traditionelle Elemente zu besinnen, wie die Bedeutung der Familie, Freunde, Gemeinschaft, Land. Wichtig sei es, die Erde als ganzen, einheitlichen Globus wahrzunehmen. In dieser Arbeit werden auch die Worte von Nobelpreisträger zitiert, die in einer globalen Besinnung auf den Tugendkatalog von Konfuzius die Rettung für unser 21. Jahrhundert sehen.[8]

Doch neben diesem Diskurs werden auch Debatten geführt, die neue Akzente setzten, und den Konfuzianismus und das Konzepts ***zhongti xiyong*** als Instrument für die Moderne als trügerisch ansehen. Andere wiederum, wie die Philosophen Liu Zongjian und Cai Degui betonen in ihrer Arbeit über den Konfuzianismus, dass China heute eine gegenseitige Interaktion mit dem Westen bräuchte. Sie befürchten, wenn die Realitäten verzerrt wahrgenommen werden, die großen Zielaufgaben, die man sich für das 21. Jahrhundert gestellt hat, zu verpassen.[9]

1.5. Humanisierung der Globalisierung

Angesichts der neuen Herausforderungen müssen grundlegende ethische Fragen global neu beantwortet werden. Über das Buch des deutschen Theologen Hans Küng *Weltethos für Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft*[10], inzwischen in mehreren Auflagen erschienen, wurde im Westen heiß debattiert und es fehlte nicht an Kritikern, die seine Vision als unrealistisch verwerfen. Auch in China wird so eine Debatte geführt und die *Stiftung Weltethos* gegründet, die sich am ***First World Congress of Global Civilization*** in Sudnej 2001 beteiligte. Interessant sind die Reflexionen des Präsidenten der chinesischen Stiftung Zhang Shaohua, der auf diesem Kongress von der Dringlichkeit der Humanisierung der Globalisierung sprach.[11]

Wenn es um die Humanisierung der Globalisierung geht, so denke ich, sollten auch solche fundamentalistischen Konstrukte kritischer hinterfragt werden, mit denen die Schaffung eines notwendigen neuen Völkerrechts begründet werden soll, wonach Kriegsführung als Prävention und zur Errichtung von Demokratien (wie die Doktrin zur Rechtfertigung des Irakkriegs) gesichert werden könnten. Die Forderungen nach Humanisierung der Globalisierung setzen neue Akzente. Hierbei geht es nicht nur um die kritische Überprüfung von Wahrheitsansprüchen zur Gesundung der Welt

In diesem Zusammenhang bedarf es einer kritischen Überprüfung solcher Alleinvertretungsansprüche. In Erinnerung sei gerufen, dass doch Demokratie und Freiheit als Ordnungsmuster auch in westlichen Gesellschaften immer häufiger im Widerspruch zu ihren Grundkatalogen stehen. Obgleich in der westlichen Welt der Gedanke des

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[8] Guo Qijia, *A History of Chinese Educational Thought*, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2006, p. 588–589.

[9] Eds. Liu Zongjian, *Cai Degui*, op. cit., p. 180–192.

[10] Hans Küng, *Weltethos für Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft*, München, Zürich: Piper Verlag, 1998, 3. Auflage.

[11] Zhang Shaohua, *My Thoughts on Global Civilization*, Sydney: Secretariat of Organization for Promoting Global Civilization, 2001, p. 30.

Menschenrechts als angeborenes, unveräußerliches und unantastbares Recht des Menschen als moralische Grundlage staatlicher und rechtlicher Ordnung gilt, und daraus sich die grundlegenden Identitäten der Menschen im Abendland herausgebildethaben, bedeutet das nicht, dass die gesellschaftliche Entwicklung in einer für immer festgeschriebenen Eigendynamik im Selbstlauf verläuft und keine neuen Gefahren drohen. Die Humanisierung der Globalisierung bedeutet auch, eine sozialverträgliche Entwicklung anzusteuern.

Die Frage der Menschenrechte wurde in China seit der Öffnung des Landes und der Inangriffnahme von Reformen Ende der 70er Jahre zu einem Schlüsselfaktor politischer und ökonomischer Strategie zur Entwicklung des Lande wie aber auch zu einem Kernpunkt in den internationalen Beziehungen. Gewiss, der Globalisierungsprozess vertieft sich auch in China. Doch das bedeutet nicht automatisch, dass das traditionelle Wertsystem beseitigt wurde. Die großen Zivilisationen, die die Menschheit hervorgebracht hat, das gilt sowohl für die konfuzianische wie auch für die abendländische Zivilisation stehen vor der großen Herausforderung, über Wege in eine zukunftsfähige gute Gemeinsamkeit menschlicher Gemeinschaften nachzudenken. Das kann nicht in einer törichten Gegnerschaft geschehen.

1.6. Chinesische Elite setzt eigene Scherpunkte

Die Problematik der Menschenrechtsfrage und der Identität von Staat, Gesellschaft und Individuum kann nicht allein vor dem Hintergrund politischer und rechtlicher Kategorien analysiert werden, sondern die zivilisatorische, d.h. die kulturelle Perspektive, sollte als Erklärungsansatz mit einbezogen werden, um eben die andere historische und ideelle Verständnisperspektive aufzuzeigen vor dem Hintergrund der Herausbildung politischer Handlungsziele, wie aber auch pluralistischer Lebensformen, die neue Identitäten, Freiheiten und Unfreiheiten schaffen.

Die Anerkennung der Universalität der Menschenrechte durch die internationale Staatengemeinschaft, auch durch China, gehört zu den großen Errungenschaften des 20. Jahrhunderts. Das bedeutet jedoch nicht, dass die Würde und Freiheit des Menschen, die Kernaussage der Menschenrechtsidee, menschliches Dasein in unserer Welt charakterisiert. Die Streitfrage geht weiter darum, ob ein Menschenrechtskatalog in unterschiedlichen Kulturen unter verschiedenen Entwicklungsvoraussetzungen universal definiert werden kann. Die chinesische politische Elite setzt in der Menschenrechtspolitik ihre eigenen Schwerpunkte. Auf die Frage, warum die Werte chinesischer Ideengeschichte in China so präsent seien, erhalten wir die Antwort, weil diese Ideengeschichte so tiefgründig und allumfassend wäre. Kern sei die Gerechtigkeit für alle.[12]

Wir müssen also festhalten, dass die chinesische Identität in ihrer Essenz noch immer durch die konfuzianische Ethik geprägt ist, in deren Mittelpunkt das enge soziale Beziehungsgeflecht zwischen den Menschen (*renmen*) steht und dem sittlichen, tugendhaften Herrscher, der dazu berufen sei, den Staat zu regieren (*zhili guojia*).[13]

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[12] Wang Zhengping, *Zhou Zhongzhi, Xiandai Lunli xue* (Über Fragen der heutigen Ethik), Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexueyuan, 2002, p. 367–377.

[13] Chen Ying, ed., *Zhongguo lunli sixiangshi* (Zur Ideengeschichte chinesischer Ethik), Jinan: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe, 2004, p. 7–9.

2. Rezeption der Menschenrechtsidee in der chinesischen Tradition

2.1. Konfuzianisches Konzept vom Menschen und dem Ordnungsprinzip

Zum besseren Verständnis des chinesischen Menschenrechtsverständnisses ist es notwendig, die Grundstrukturen sozialphilosophischen Denkens der chinesischen Zivilisation kurz zu skizzieren. Im Konfuzianismus galt nicht die Allvernunft der menschlichen Autonomie, sondern ein hierarchisches System der Einordnungen und Unterordnungen als Grundlage der Gesellschaft. Das traditionelle sozialphilosophische Denken basierte auf der Vorstellung, dass alles Handeln von der Quelle einer guten Autorität ausgehen müsste.[14]

Die oberste Pflicht der Herrschenden bestand darin, der Gesellschaft sozialen Frieden und Harmonie zu sichern. Dabei wurde an die uralten Erkenntnisse angeknüpft, dass sich Stabilität nur bewahren ließe, wenn die materiellen Grundvoraussetzungen gegeben sind. Das Primat der politischen Ordnung durch einen guten Herrscher stand im Vordergrund und diente zur Legitimation despotischer Herrschaft.[15] Der Philosoph Chen Ying erklärt damit das Fehlen einer Rechtskultur, die sich auf dem Fundament der Menschenrechtsideen im Westen herausgebildet hat. Damit wurden auch keine Werte geschaffen, die zur Sicherung individueller Freiheiten geführt hätten.[16] Herrschaft wurde aufgrund von Ethik und Moral definiert. Das anzustrebende Ideal im traditionellen China bestand nicht darin, die Rechte des einzelnen zu garantieren, sondern es ging um die Nutzbarmachung des Individuums für die Gemeinschaft.

Der Begriff „ren", der ethische Kerngedanke des Konfuzianismus, beinhaltet die Werte Menschenwürde, Menschlichkeit oder auch Pietät, die in eng verflochtenen, wechselseitigen Beziehung zwischen Menschen in der Gesellschaft gelebt werden sollten. Das bedeutet, dass der Mensch nur als Mensch definiert werden kann, wenn er eine ethisch verpflichtende Beziehung *ren yi* zu einem anderen Menschen eingegangen ist, eingedenk der hierarchischen Pflichten, wobei die Familie im Zentrum der Beziehungen steht.[17] Nach dieser Vorstellung stellt die Familie eine Art Brücke dar zwischen dem Individuum und der Gemeinschaft. So war im chinesischen Denken vorwiegend der Mensch und nicht das Individuum von Interesse. Aufgrund dieses konfuzianischen Konzepts vom Menschen haben sich die grundlegenden Strukturen der chinesischen Gesellschaft herausgebildet.[18]

Im Konfuzianismus finden wir jedoch auch Kategorien zur Machtbegrenzung und Menschenwürde. Galt das „Mandat des Himmels" zwar als unteilbar, so verwirkte der chinesische Herrscher sein Mandat, wenn er nicht vermochte, das Wohlergehen von Staat und Volk zu sichern. Diese Art von Widerstandsrecht gegen Willkür und einen tyrannischen Herrscher wurde zu einer der Wurzeln der Idee vom Menschenrecht in China.

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[14] Zhang Huanwen, „Zhonghua chuantong wenhua yu renquan", in *Shijie renquan zongheng* (Über die Menschenrechte in der Welt), Beijing, 1993, s. 205–207.

[15] Chen Ying, *Zhonguo lunli sixiang shi* (Zur Geschichte der Ethik in China), op. cit., p. 219–229.

[16] See: Benjamin J. Schwarz, *The Primacy of Polical Order in East Asian Societies*, in S.R. Schram, ed., Hongkong: Foundation and Limits of State Power in China, 1987.

[17] Chen Ying, *Zhonguo lunli sixiang shi* (Zur Geschichte der Ethik in China), op. cit., p. 81–83.

[18] Xia Yong, „Renquan yu zhongguo chuntong", in Liu Nanlai, ed., *Renquan de pubianxing he tezhuxing* (Allgemeingültigkeiten und Besonderheiten der Menschenrechte), Beijing, 1996, p. 67.

2.2. Das Prinzip „Herrschaft des Volkes" minzhu

Die „Herrschaft des Volkes" bedeutete „Souverän", der die höchste politische Autorität darstellte, mit dem Himmel verbunden und deshalb mit menschlichen Eigenschaften und moralischem Wille ausgestattet war. Man glaubte, dass er befähigt sei, „die Interessen des Volkes" zu erkennen und sie auch zu gewähren.[19] Dieses Prinzip stand in enger Verbindung mit dem traditionellen Prinzip *minben* („Das Volks als Grundlage).[20]

Auch der Begriff Demokratie oder Volksherrschaft *minzhu* wurde in Anlehnung an das traditionelle Weltbild interpretiert.

Als im 19. Jahrhundert Kaufleute nach China eindrangen, brachten sie auch westliches Ideengut ins Land. 1864 wurde der Begriff Menschenrechte zum ersten Mal aus dem Englischen *human rights* ins Chinesische übersetzt. *Ren quanli* bedeutete soviel wie Menschen und Rechte. Diese Übersetzung entsprach nicht dem traditionellen Verständnis von Herrschaftsanspruch und Rechten. Der Mensch besaß als Person keine Rechte. So wurde ein neuer Begriff *renquan* geschaffen, der soviel wie Mensch und Macht bedeutet. Hierbei ging es nicht um die Relativierung der Menschenrechte, sondern um ein anderes Verständnis des Verhältnisses zwischen Individuum und Staat.

In der modernen chinesischen Geschichte wurden Demokratiemodelle vor allem als ein politisches Konzept zur nationalen Stärkung, zur Erlangung der nationalen Unabhängigkeit im Kampf gegen die westlichen Eindringliche betrachtet.[21] Die Forderungen des Primats der Freiheit der Nation vor den Individualrechten macht das traditionelle Grundprinzip von *minzhu* (Herrschaft des Volkes) aus. Der Staat muss die Verantwortung für die Grundbedürfnisse des Einzelnen übernehmen und ihn mit Nahrung, Kleidung, Unterkunft versorgen. Das heutige „sozialistische Demokratiekonzept" zeigt viele Ähnlichkeiten.

2.3. Erinnerung an Unrechtserfahrungen

Als die westlichen Kolonialmächte China gewaltsam öffneten und dem Land die zahlreichen „ungleichen Verträge" aufzwangen, geschah das nicht im Geiste der Menschenrechtsidee. Diese Unrechtserfahrungen prägten zweifelsohne auch das chinesische Menschenrechtsverständnis in der neueren Geschichte. In der chinesischen Historiographie wird von einer doppelten Moral gesprochen, die die Moderne gezeigt hätte. Mit Nachdruck wird in der öffentlichen Debatte daran erinnert, dass bis zur Verabschiedung der Allgemeinen Erklärung der Menschenrechte 1948 die Universalität der Menschenrechte zwar immer wieder gepriesen, jedoch von den westlichen Staaten selbst nicht befolgt wurde. Das, was die Weltpolitik bestimmte, sei eher eine faktische

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[19] Li Cunshan, „Development of Democratic Concepts", in *Social Sciences in China*, 1998, No. 2, p. 68–69.

[20] Jun Tiengen, „Lun ruxue zhong minzhu de kenang yu fou" (Über die Möglichkeit von demokratischen Ansätzen in den konfuzianischen Klassikern), in Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuhua, *Rujia chuantong yu renquan. Minzhu si xiang*, op. cit., p. 48.

[21] Xia Yong, „Renquan yu zhongguo chuntong", in Liu Nanlai, ed., *Renquan de pubianxing he tezhuxing* (Allgemeingültigkeiten und Besonderheiten der Menschenrechte), Beijing, 1996, p. 65.

[22] Liu Nanlai, *Developing Countries and Human Rights*, in P.R. Baehr, ed., Human Rights: Chinese and Dutch Perspective, Amsterdam, 1996, p. 104.

Ignorierung der Ideale gewesen. Hinzu käme, so der Vorwurf an die Adresse des Westens, seien die Menschenrechte auf die Menschen europäischer Abstammung und männlichen Geschlechts beschränkt gewesen. Liu Nanlai, Rechtswissenschaftler an der Chinesischen Akademie für Sozialwissenschaften, bezeichnet die Menschenrechte, die in Nordamerika und Europa eingefordert wurden, die Menschenrechte der Kolonialisten. Chinesen wurden doch nicht als menschliche Wesen betrachtet, schreibt er in einer seiner Arbeiten, wenn in Shanghai auf einem Parktor groß geschrieben stand „Für Chinesen und Hunde verboten".[22]

In einer anderen Publikation betont derselbe Autor, dass diese immer wieder thematisierten Unrechtserfahrungen gewiss auch ein Grund dafür seien, dass in China die Konzepte über unveräußerliche und individuelle Menschenrechte nicht entstehen konnten.[23] In der Menschenrechtsdebatte, die im Westen geführt wird, finden diese Aspekte allerdings wenig Verständnis, obgleich sie doch mehr Beachtung finden sollten.

3. Kulturelle Identität begründet Menschenrechtsverständnis

3.1. Zwischen Tradition und Moderne

In keinem Land der Erde hat es über einen so langen Zeitraum hinweg eine Kontinuität der kulturellen Identität gegeben wie in China, auch wenn es an Brüchen nicht fehlte. Über vier Jahrtausende reflektierte man nach einem kosmischen Verständnis, nach dem China als „Reich der Mitte" und als Land der Zivilisation den Auftrag zu erfüllen habe, den nicht zivilisierten Völkern und Ländern chinesische, also wahrhafte Zivilisation, zu vermitteln. Dieser Anspruch ist freilich, was die Gegenwart betrifft, verblasst. Doch wenn es um die Zukunftsvisionen geht, so wird das nationale Bewusstsein der chinesischen Elite, der chinesischen Intelligenz, von der Vision bestimmt, eine Mission vollenden zu müssen. Man kann sich nicht des Eindrucks erwehren, dass nicht wenige chinesische Wissenschaftler in ihren Publikationen mit Stolz von der eigenen glänzenden Zivilisation sprechen und die Hoffnung haben, auch in Zeiten der Globalisierung wieder eine wahre nationale Solidargemeinschaft Schaffen können.[24]

Stolz auf die Erfolge, die China in den Reformjahren erzielen konnte, wächst das Selbstgefühl und Selbstbewusstsein im Lande. Die Publikation „China kann Nein sagen" (zu dem, was der Westen fordert) verdeutlich das eindrucksvoll.[25] China bewegt sich in seiner geistigen Auseinandersetzung zwischen der großen Tradition des Sinozentrismus und den Erfordernissen der Moderne, in der es eines Konsenses und der Zusammenarbeit bedarf.

3.2. Streit um den Stellenwert der Tradition

In de Debatte über die chinesische Zivilisation streiten sich die Schulen und es gibt die unterschiedlichen Bewertungen der eigenen Kultur und der Entwicklungskonzeptionen für den Modernisierungsweg des Landes. Es geht, wie auch in den vorhergehenden

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[23] Liu Nanlai, ed., *Renquan de pubianxing he tezhuxing* (Allgemeingültigkeiten und Besonderheiten der Menschenrechte), op. cit., p. 4–5.

[24] Luo Rongqu, „The Historical Definition of Modernization and a New Understanding of Modern Worlds Development", in *Social Sciences in China*, Peking, No. 3/1996, p. 92–102.

[25] Zhang Xueli, *Zhongguo keyi shuo bu* (China kann nein sagen), Peking, 1996.

Reformdebatten, um die Klärung der Frage, ob und inwieweit die Tradition auf die Gegenwart nachwirkt, wie sie für die Gegenwart genutzt werden kann oder aber auch, inwieweit die Tradition für die prekäre Situation der Rückständigkeit im Lande mitverantwortlich zeichnet, ob die „Verwestlichung" der Macht- und Wirtschaftsstrukturen wirklich die einzige Rettung für China sei?

In der Modernisierungsdebatte hatten sich in den 1980er Jahren drei Positionen herauskristallisiert. Da waren einmal die offiziellen Meinungsträger um die herrschende kommunistische Elite, die danach strebten, an der führenden Rolle der KPCh festzuhalten und tiefgehende Reformen des Systems ablehnten; da gab es den gemäßigten Reformflügel, der mittels politischer und ökonomischer Reformen in enger Anlegung an die chinesische Tradition auch für China eine „friedliche Revolution" herbeizuführen wünschte; drittens hatte sich eine radikale Orientierung herausgebildet, die die chinesische Tradition verwarf und die Modernisierung des Staates einzig und allein mit Hilfe der „Verwestlichung", also der Einführung westlicher politischer und ökonomischer Strukturen für möglich hielt. Sie postulierten den Bruch mit der eigenen Tradition und die Errichtung einer demokratischen und pluralistischen Herrschaftsform. Einige junge Intellektuelle gingen in ihrer Wertung der Tradition so weit, dass sie allein im Bruch mit der Tradition die weitere Modernisierung des Landes für möglich hielten. Doch Ihre Zahl blieb im Vergleich zu den beiden ersten Gruppen verhältnismäßig gering.

Bei den Debatten ging es also um den Stellenwert der chinesischen Tradition und Kultur und ihre Anwendung für die Moderne, um Fragen des Sinozentrismus, der Konfuziusforschung, um die Rolle des Individuums in der Gemeinschaft, den Humanismus in der europäischen und chinesischen Philosophie, um Moralsysteme sowie ihre Bedeutung für den gesellschaftlichen Fortschritt. An kritischen Stimmen fehlte es nicht. Vor allem die in der Akademie der Gesellschaftswissenschaften initiierte Diskussion über den Inhalt einer sozialistischen Gesellschaftsformation führte zu heftigen Streitgesprächen über Begriffe wie Demokratie, Menschenrechte, Freiheit und autoritäre Machtstrukturen.[26] Zu einem der bekanntesten Reformvertreter gehörte der Direktor des Akademieinstituts für Marxismus-Leninismus, Su Shaozhi, der sich für die Realisierung eines „humanen Sozialismus" einsetzte und sich gleichzeitig dagegen verwehrte, solche Begriffe wie „humaner Sozialismus" als „bürgerliches Gedankengut" abzutun. Su Shaozhi sprach sich dafür aus, solche Ideen wie Demokratie und Freiheit nicht ideologisch zu werten und ihnen universelle Gültigkeit zuerkennen.[27] Gefordert wurde Demokratie als Grundlage des Sozialismus.[28] Vertreter radikaler Reformideen, wie der bekannte Dissident Fang Lizhi sprachen sich offen gegen die Parteidiktatur aus. In einem Interview für die Zeitung *Guangming Ribao* betonte er, dass in einer modernen Gesellschaft die Technik und wissenschaftliche Informationen wichtige Triebkräfte für die Gesellschaft seien. Diese Entwicklung werde zu einer veränderten Auffassung führen, wem die führende Rolle in der Gesellschaft zukäme.[29] Die Vertreter der antitraditionellen Strömung lehnten jegliche

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[26] See: das Diskussionforum mit Mitarbeitern der Akademie für Gesellschaftswissenschaften über den „Sozialismus chinesischer Prägung", in *Zhongguo shehui kexue*, Nr. 4/1986, p. 48–64.

[27] *Renmin Ribao*, 15. August 1986.

[28] An Zhiguo, "Die Demokratie macht Fortschritte", in *Beijing Rundschau*, Nr. 41/1986, p. 4.

[29] *Guangming Ribao*, 22.9.1986.

Neuinterpretation des alten Systems ab und forderten dessen Überwindung. Wie in der „Neuen Kulturbewegung" Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts wehrten sie sich gegen traditionelle Gemeinschaftsideale, die die Entwicklung nur hemmen würden.

3.3. Kulturelle Identitätskrise

Das Grundanliegen der Modernisierung, die Ende der 70er Jahre eingeleitet wurde, besteht darin, das Land zu modernisieren und stark zu machen (*fuqiang*). Gleichzeitig sollen damit die Grundlagen gelegt werden, ein neues Gleichgewicht in der ungleichen Kräftekonstellation mit den westlichen Industrieländern zu finden, damit China eine Konfrontation oder auch Auseinandersetzung mit dem Westen nicht mehr zu befürchten braucht.

Doch welche Wahrnehmungen herrschten in den ersten Reformjahren vor? Glaubte man an die Kraft der chinesischen Zivilisation, mit der solche Zielsetzungen erreicht werden können? Nach der Kulturrevolution war die Aufbruchsstimmung unverkennbar. Doch Zweifel an der eigenen Kultur begleiteten sie. In den 80er Jahren begann in China neben den Wirtschaftsreformen der Ausbruch eines neuen „Kulturfiebers" (*wenhua re*), das sich in einer Art Identitätskrise niederschlug. Einige Intellektuelle strebten den völligen Bruch mit der Tradition an, um Freiraum für das westliche Zivilisationsmodell zu schaffen. Die Gegenströmung ließ nicht lange auf sich warten. Doch infolge der kritischen Betrachtung der eigenen Kultur und der daraus herrührenden Selbstreflexion wurde es möglich, im breiteren Rahmen den Unterschied zum Fremden zu erfahren, was zu einer gewissen Identitätskrise führte.

3.4. Die Debatte um die Fernsehserie Heshang

Ausdruck dieser Identitätskrise war die große Debatte über die chinesische Zivilisation. In China hat das Streiten von Schulen auf der Suche des „Königsweges" eine lange Tradition. Neben dem Konfuzianismus kamen immer wieder neue Schulen hervor, die sich jedoch gegenüber dem Konfuzianismus als zu schwach erwiesen, als dass ihre Ideen zum tragenden Element der Gesellschaft werden konnten.

Die Debatte um die Fernsehserie *Heshang* (Flußelegie) zeigte, wie unterschiedliche die Haltungen zur eigenen Tradition waren.[30] In der Fernsehserie wurde die „gelbe Kultur", die chinesische, als eine konservative, durch die große Mauer beengte Zivilisation beschrieben, die aus „zivilisatorischem Hochmut" gegen alles Fremde, Nichtchinesische, Nichtzivilisatorische den Anspruch erhoben habe, sich abschotten zu müssen. In diesem Grundverständnis der chinesischen Kultur erblickten die Antitraditionalisten Gründe für die Entwicklung einer verfestigten Bürokratie, die nicht nur zu erbarmungsloser Korruption, sondern zu Enge und einer stagnierenden Kultur geführt hätten. Die Anspielungen auf die gegenwärtige Situation waren dabei nicht zu übersehen. Mit der Präsentation der „blauen Kultur", der maritimen oder auch der westlichen Kultur, versuchten die Filmemacher den „positiven Charakter" dieser Kultur nachzuzeichnen. Der Autor des Fernsehfilms „Flußelegie" betonte in einem Interview, dass das Anliegen dieses Films darin bestanden hätte, dem Volk Realitäten zu spiegeln und es aufzurütteln, damit eine neue Zivilisation geschaffen werden könnte.[31]

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[30] Christina Neder, *Flusselegie. Chinas Identitätakrise. Die Debatte um die chinesische Fernsehserie Heshang 1988–1994.*

[31] *Xinhua*, 29.6.1988.

3.5. Gegenaktion – Kampagne gegen die „geistige Verschmutzung"

Angesichts der zahlreichen „westlichen Ideen" und Menschenrechtsforderungen, die Eingang in das gesellschaftliche Bewusstsein vieler Chinesen gefunden hatten, sah sich die politische Führung bereits Anfang der 1980er Jahre gezwungen, eine Kampagne gegen die „geistige Verschmutzung" zu starten. So war es Deng Xiaoping, der auf der 2. Plenartagung des XII. Zentralkomitees der KPCh den Kampf gegen die „geistige Verschmutzung an der ideologischen Front" ankündigte.[32] Auf der 6. Plenartagung des XII. Parteitages wurde die „Resolution des Zentralkomitees der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas über die Führungsprinzipien für den „Aufbau einer sozialistischen geistigen Zivilisation" angenommen.[33]

Unter „geistiger Verschmutzung" wurde die Infiltration „falscher Theorien" verstanden, so die Theorien über den allgemeinen Humanismus und der Menschenrechte. Kritisiert wurde die Theorie des Existenzialismus und der individuellen Selbstverwirklichung (*ziwo shixian*), die Ideen von politischer und ökonomischer Freiheit, die besonders in den Werken des französischen Philosophen Jean Paul Satre gefordert wird. Die „Bewegung zur Bekämpfung der geistigen Verschmutzung" ähnelte in ihren Zielsetzungen und in ihrem Inhalt der Bewegung „gegen die bürgerliche Liberalisierung", die im Sommer 1981 gestartet wurde. In einem Leitartikel der Parteizeitung *Renmin Ribao* lesen wir u.a., dass das Wesen der „geistigen Verschmutzung" in der Propaganda aller möglichen Arten von dekadentem und zum Sterben verurteiltem Gedankengut der Bourgeoisie und anderer Ausbeuter bestehe, deren Ziel es sei, Vertrauen am Sozialismus, Kommunismus und der Kommunistischen Partei Chinas zu verlieren.[34]

Die Parteipropaganda vermochte nicht die Debatten über Freiheit und Menschenrechte, die unter Studenten und Akademikern geführt wurden, zu unterbinden. Beunruhigt über die „Disziplinlosigkeit" unter den Jugendlichen wurden Anfang 1989 in einer Verordnung des Zentralkomitees der KPCh die „Anleitungen zur moralischen Erziehung" herausgegeben. Junge Menschen wollte man damit überzeugen, sich wieder gesellschaftlich mehr einzubringen.[35] Die Partei hoffte, mit diesen Kampagnen wieder alles in Griff zu bekommen. Doch die Debatten eskalierten und die „Erziehungskampagnen" wirkten nicht mehr wie zu alten Zeiten. Es kam zur großen Aufruhr auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens, auf dem neben vielen Forderungen auch die Forderung nach Achtung der Menschenrechte gestellt wurden.

4. Kultureller Ansatz als Verständnisgrundlage

4.1. Menschenrechte als Ergebnis historischer Entwicklungen – Unterschiedliche Perspektiven

In der Studie wird die zivilisatorische, d.h. die kulturelle wie aber auch die politisch-globale Perspektive als Erklärungsansatz benutzt, um eben die andere historische und

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[32] *Renmin Ribao*, 25.10.1983.
[33] *Renmin Ribao*, 30.9.1986.
[34] *Renmin Ribao*, 16.11.1983.
[35] *Renmin Ribao*, 17.1.1989.

ideelle Verständnisperspektive in Zeiten der Globalisierung aufzuzeigen, die bei uns im Westen oft negiert oder als Legitimationsgrundlage des Herrschaftssystems kritisch betrachtet wird.

Wenn wir über Menschenrechte sprechen, ist es wichtig, sich immer wieder bewusst zu machen, dass sie als normative Ordnungsfaktoren nicht in einem Raum jenseits von Tradition und historischen Erfahrungen geboren wurden. Und dieser Ansatz hat wohl nicht im geringsten mit kulturellem Relativismus zu tun, wie es oft den Kulturwissenschaften vorgeworfen wird, sondern allein mit unterschiedlichen Sichtweisen von Lebens- und Ordnungsmodellen, die sich historisch in der jeweiligen Ideengeschichte der Zivilisationen entwickelt haben. Doch auch die sind im Wandel begriffen.

4.2. Differenz zwischen chinesischem Zivilisationsbewusstsein und dem europäisch-angelsächsischer Kulturen während des Modernisierungsprozesses

Wichtig scheint es mir zu anfangs zu betonen, dass Grenzziehung zur Sicherung der eigenen Identität notwendig ist. Die zivilisatorische Abgrenzung zum Fremden konnte auch infolge des Modernisierungsprozesses in China nicht aufgehoben werden. Fremdes dagegen wurde in unterschiedlichen Formen und Inhalten selektiv aufgenommen und in Eigenes verwandelt. Die Abgrenzung zum Anderen bleibt, wie uns historische Erfahrungen lehren, eine wichtige Quelle der Kohärenz und somit auch der sich daraus ergebenen Identität jedes Gemeinwesens und jedes Einzelnen. Nach der Überwindung totalitärer Strukturen, war es notwendig geworden, sich eine neue politische Identität zu schaffen. Dabei erfährt die Reinterpretation der eigenen Kultur an Bedeutung. Damit ist auch eine neue Situation entstanden, China und die Chinesen sind nicht mehr nur die Rezipienten von Interpretationen, sondern sie werden zum Subjekt, das neu interpretiert und neu schafft. Andererseits wird die chinesische Kultur nicht mehr nur einseitig von der westlichen Wissenschaft beurteilt, sondern von den Chinesen selbst.

Trotz aller Verflechtungen, Grenzüberschreitungen, Überschneidungen wie auch ersten geistigen Durchdringungen bleibt die ausgeprägte Differenz zwischen dem chinesischen Zivilisationsbewusstsein und dem der europäischen und angelsächsischen Kulturen erhalten und mit neuen Aspekten erfahrbar. Erinnern wir an die Stereotypen, die Halbwissen oder auch Unwissen über eine Zivilisation hervorgebracht haben. Wurden doch auf diese Weise falsche Wahrnehmungen projektiert.

4.3. Verflechtung und Differenz der Kulturen

Bisher gibt es wenig Zeichen dafür, dass der Marktwirtschaft, die sich seit über 20 Jahren in einem beschleunigten Tempo entwickelt, die Demokratisierung politischer Strukturen und die Gewährung von politischen Bürgerfreiheiten folgen könnten. Doch durch das Festhalten am eigenen Entwicklungsmodell wird die Welt natürlich noch längst nicht chinesisch, wie es in Unkenrufen zahlreicher Bedrohungsszenarien apostrophiert wird. Infolge der Modernisierungsbewegung sind heute in China sowohl Differenz wie auch Verflechtung mit der westlichen Kultur zu neuen Bestandteilen der Identität geworden.

In der Studie wird die These aufgestellt, dass die rapide Entwicklung Chinas neue Signale setzt. Ein Gegenmodell zu westlichen Wirtschafts- und Sozialordnungen, angefüllt mit Elementen aus diesem Modell, ist im Entstehen begriffen. In diesem Modell, obgleich es in seiner konkreten Umsetzung auch von der Maximierung des Profits, der Jagd nach mehr

Reichtum und Konsumzwänge gekennzeichnet ist, hat das traditionell eingeübte Verhältnis zwischen Individualität und Gemeinschaft in Politik und Gesellschaft kaum etwas an Bedeutung verloren. Nach den Jahren erfolgreichen Wirtschaftswachstums, wo sozialverträgliche Entwicklungsaspekte nur politische Zielkataloge blieben, zwingen die Kassandrarufe die Herrschaftselite dazu, in die Politik die Harmonierung der Gesellschaft als Modernisierungsziel aufzunehmen.[36]

4.4. Das „kleine Ich" und das „große Ich"

Zweifelsohne hat sich die chinesische Kultur, insbesondere in den letzten 200 Jahren, auch unter dem Einfluss des Westens in ihrer Geschichte verändert. Zu nennen seien hier Wissenschaft, Politik- und Sozialorganisation, Wirtschaft, Architektur, politische Theorien oder auch literarische Werke, die sie beeinflussten. Dies hat jedoch nicht bewirken können, das Essenzielle, das Verhältnis zur Gemeinschaft und zum Staat aufzugeben. Chinesische Wissenschaftler sprechen von dem „kleinen Ich", was sich in China infolge des Wandels herausbildet hat im Unterschied zum „großen Ich", das im Westen die Gesellschaften prägt. Der Unterschied zwischen China und dem Westen bestände in der Quantität und Qualität des Ichs.[37]

In der chinesischen Tradition sind, wie wir wissen, auch Ansätze menschenrechtlichen Denkens wie im Abendland zu finden, jedoch hatten die Ideen vom Widerstand gegen die „Herrschaft des Himmels", wenn sie ihre Pflichten nicht erfüllt, wenig Chancen im politischen und rechtlichen System des traditionellen wie auch im modernisierenden Chinas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert sich zu entfalten. Im Reformchina, wo heute junge Menschen und Intellektuelle nach mehr Freiheit und mehr Individualität streben und sich gegen die Willkür von Macht auflehnen, breitet sich wohl das kleine Ich weiter aus. Doch zum „kleinen Ich" gehören gleichfalls, sich für den Wohlstand der Nation und die Stärke des Landes zu engagieren. In so einem Verständnis werde auch die Grundlage für die Menschenrechtspolitik in China gesehen, schreibt der Politikwissenschaftler Chen Ying in einer seiner Abhandlungen über die chinesische Ideengeschichte.[38] Dieses Argumentationsmuster ist in China weit verbreitet und wird von der Mehrheit der Bevölkerung, darunter auch den Intellektuellen akzeptiert. Es erklärt, warum wir bis heute noch vielerorts traditionelle Einstellungen vorfinden, die autoritären Herrschaftsstrukturen im Modernisierungsprozess nicht in Frage stellen.

4.5. Die westliche Kultur ist keine universale Kultur

Obwohl im Westen die meisten Menschen von der Überlegenheit der eigenen Kultur überzeugt sind, ihre Zivilisation als den Haupttrend in der Geschichte sehen, wird die westliche Zivilisation damit noch nicht zur universalen Weltkultur. In Erinnerung sei gerufen, dass doch alle großen Zivilisationen von dem Anspruch ausgehen, dass ihre Kultur letzt endlich die beste sei. Wenn die politische Elite in China heute dem interkulturellen Dialog über essentielle Fragen des zukünftigen Menschseins offen gegenübersteht, bedeutet das

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[36] Liu Hainian, ed., *Yifa zhiguo yu kangzheng jianshe* (Gestützt auf das Recht regieren und eine gesunde Regierung schaffen), Beijing, 1999, p. 471–479.

[37] Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuhua, *Rujia chuanton yu renquan. Minzhu si xiang*, op. cit., p. 160–163.

[38] Chen Ying, ed., *Zhongguo lunli sixiangshi*, op. cit., p. 587.

wahrlich eine Herausforderung für das „christliche Abendland", mit dessen Ideen sich die „westliche Zivilisation" identifiziert. Die Modernisierung der Gesellschaft nach westlichem Vorbild ist in China eine umstrittene Entwicklungskonzeption.[39] Umstritten bleiben somit auch universelle Modernisierungsgesetze, weil der Traum von der Moderne viel an seiner Plausibilität verloren habe. Seit mehr als 150 Jahre hält nun in China bereits die Debatte an, welchen Weg China beschreiten müsste, um seine Gesellschaft zu modernisieren.[40] So einig man sich über das Ziel ist, China als Staat und Kulturgemeinschaft seine verlorene Größe wiederzugeben, so umstritten bleiben weiterhin die Mittel und Wege.

5. Selbstfindung durch „Wiedergeburt" der Tradition

5.1. Tradition wird neu entdeckt

Selbstfindung in den Reformbewegungen wie in den seit Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts immer wieder in Angriff genommenen Versuchen, das Land zu modernisieren, versteht man auch die neue Modernisierungsstrategie, und zwar traditionell nach dem „ti-yong" Prinzip. In der Modernisierungsstrategie geht es um die Stärkung der eigenen Nation und der Selbstfindung der Gesellschaft in Zeiten der Globalisierung.

5.2. Kritische Übernahme der eigenen traditionellen Werte?

Wenn es um die Kulturen geht, so unterliegen alle Kulturen dem Wandel in Zeit und Raum durch unterschiedliche Einflüsse, wie Migration, Außeneinwirkungen und Öffnung nach außen. Die chinesische Hochkultur, auch als Nationalkultur verstanden, erfährt trotz zahlreicher Brüche eine bemerkenswerte Kontinuität, und das in Bereichen der Schriftsprache, der Bildung im kanonischen Schrifttum, Dichtung und Malerei, Zentralismus von Verwaltung und Institutionen sowie im Familiensystem.

Seit Mitte der 90er Jahre hat die neu entdeckte Tradition in China wieder Konjunktur, und das in politischen, sozialen und gesellschaftlichen Bereichen. Als elitärer Bildungskanon gilt das Besinnen auf die Hochkultur, die zu Zeiten Mao Zedongs als feudal und rückständig verworfen war. Der chinesische „Sonderweg" wird als Widerspiegelung chinesischen Denkens gesehen. Doch diejenigen, die wagen, kritisch mit den Inhalten kulturellen Gedächtnisses umzugehen, wie in den 80er Jahren, ist nicht groß. Doch die Kassandrarufe, dass die chinesische Kultur aufgrund der Rückständigkeit des Landes zum Untergang verurteilt sei,[41] sind gegenwärtig längst verhallt, nachdem China zur Wirtschaftsgroßmacht aufgestiegen ist.

Man sollte sich bewusst machen, dass Chinesen sich heute stärker als zu Beginn der Reformen durch ihre Kultur definieren, ob es uns genehm ist oder nicht. Nicht nur die Zubereitung der Tasse Tee in den neu entstandenen Teehäusern, das Angebot von verschiedenen Utensilien zur Zubereitung in den Teegeschäften, die Wiederbelebung lokaler

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[39] See: Zhang Liwen, *Chuantong wenhua yu xiandaihua* (Traditionelle Kultur und Modernisierung), Beijing, 1987.

[40] Luo Rongqu, ed., *Cong xihua dao xiandaihua – wu si yilai youguan. Zhongguo de wenhua qu xiang he fazhan daolu lunzheng wenxuan* (Von der Verwestlichung zur Modernisierung – ausgewählte Schriften zur Diskussion über Tendenzen und Entwicklungswege der chinesischen Kultur seit dem 4. Mai), Beijing, 1990, p. 30–35.

[41] Jonathan Unger, *Using the Past, to serve the Present – Historiography and Politics in Contemporary China*, New York: Armong, 1993, p. 124–150.

Theaterstile und regionaler Kochrezepte sowie Pilgerfahrten zu traditionellen Kultstätten, wie die Heiligen Berge oder auch zu dem Geburtsort von Konfuzius, Qufu, stehen hoch im Kurs. In den bisherigen Wirtschaftserfolgen sieht man eine Bestätigung des positiven konfuzianischen Denkens und Handels.

Nach klassischem Muster – in ein traditionelles Gewand gekleidet und im traditionellen Duktus vorgetragen – werden Entwicklungsprobleme analysiert. Der Konfuzianismus wird als eine Art Hilfs-Ideologie für die Probleme der Gegenwart genutzt, da er sich, wie betont, stets entsprechend der neuen Situation als eine anpassungsfähige hilfreiche Ideologie erwiesen habe, ohne dabei sein Wesen von *ren* (Menschlichkeit) aufzugeben.[42] In der offiziellen Sprachregelung wird das mit der „kritischen Übernahme der eigenen traditionellen Werte" umschrieben. Anarchie gilt nach wie vor als das schlimmste Unheil, was China begegnen könnte. So wird man nicht müde, darauf zu verweisen, dass das weitere Schicksal Chinas davon abhängen werde, in wie weit konfuzianische Wertvorstellungen, insbesondere die Normen zhong „von Maß und Mitte", die die Voraussetzungen für die Stabilität sei, ihre Widerspiegelung in der Praxis finden.[43] Wie weit verbreitet das Bedürfnis nach Harmonie und Ausgleich verbreitet ist und noch immer zum Lebensgefühl eines großen Teil der chinesischen Intelligenz gehört, zeigt die Konfuziusdebatte. Stabilität, so kann man in offiziellen Verlautbarungen vernehmen, könne nur unter der Führung der Kommunistischen Partei aufrechterhalten werden.

5.3. Konfuziusforschung

Im Herbst 1987 fand in Qufu (Provinz Shandong), dem Geburtsort des großen Philosophen und Staatsmannes Konfuzius, eine internationale Konferenz über den Konfuzianismus statt, die erste dieser Art nach der Gründung der Volksrepublik China. Eine Verwestlichung Chinas wurde verworfen, weil, wie in den Vorträgen betont, kein Land, insbesondere eine Nation mit einer so langen Tradition, seine Tradition zur Seite legen und eine fremde übernehmen könne.[44] Doch Modernisierung und Globalisierung ohne ethische Regeln könnten zu einer Falle werden. Die konfuzianischen Klassiker seien heute mehr als je gefragt, da die ethischen Regeln Lösungsansätze für zahlreiche Probleme, die in der Gegenwart entstanden sind, anbieten. Die Moderne müsse zu gesunden.[45]

Die Konfuziusforschung blüht, besondere Zentren und Lehrstühle wurden eingerichtet, da heute in China die allgemeine Ansicht vertreten wird, dass die konfuzianische Lehre nicht nur für China eine wichtige Ethik sei, sondern für die gesamte Welt. Moralische, altruistische und politische Aspekte stehen hier im Vordergrund wie *ren* (Menschlichkeit) oder *cheng* (Aufrichtigkeit), nach denen der Wohlstand für alle vor der persönlichen Bereicherung Priorität haben sollte.[46]

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[42] See: Zhongguo Kongzi jijinhui xueshu weiyuanhui, ed., *Jin si shi nian lai Kongzi yanjiu lunwen xuanbian*, Jinan, 1987.

[43] Luo Zuji, *Zhongyong shehui zhunze shuo. Jian lun zhongyong zhi dao yu zhezhongzhuyi*, in Luo Zuji, ed., Jinan: Kongzi sixiang yanjiu lunji, 1987, p. 160–163.

[44] *Guangming Ribao*, 1.09.1987.

[45] Zhang Xiaowei, „Xiandaihua de xianjing" (Die Falle der Modernisierung), in Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuma, *Rushang yu er shi shiji*, op. cit., p. 377–380.

[46] Na Kai, „Lun Ruxue zai quanqiuhua jingcheng Hong de zuoyong" (Bedeutung der konfuzianischen Forschung für den Gobalisierungsprozess), in Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuma, *Rushang yu er shi shiji*, op. cit., p. 491–505.

5.4. Neuer, alter Wertekanon

Im Zuge der „Modernisierung" haben sich gewisse moralische Einstellungen und Verhaltensweisen natürlich rapide verändert und das „kleine Ich" ist weiter im Vormarsch, sich zu vergrößern. Mit einer Art gesteuerter Rückbesinnung auf „positive" Elemente der konfuzianischen Tradition versucht die politische Elite die Tradition zu instrumentalisieren und auf das Bewusstsein der Gesellschaft einzuwirken. Hierbei geht es um solche moralischen Werte, die in den neuen Katalog aufgenommen werden sollen, damit die Regierung wieder leichter regieren kann. Im Vordergrund stehen hier solche Werte wie: Menschlichkeit *ren*; Gerechtigkeit *yi*, auch als chinesische Demokratie verstanden; Pietät *xiao*, die Achtung vor den Eltern und den Älteren, Hochachtung gegenüber den Ahnen und politischen Autoritäten; Maß und Mitte *zhong yong*, Bescheidenheit, Ausdauer, keine maßlosen Forderungen stellen; Güte, Gelassenheit *zhongshu*, nicht revoltieren und keine Aggressionen zeigen; Sparsamkeit *jian*, nicht verschwenderisch umgehen; Fleiß *nuli*, die Arbeit lieben.

Bei diesem neuen Wertekatalog, der als politisches Hilfsinstrument Verwendung findet, geht es nicht nur um die Gesundung der sich vertiefenden gesellschaftlichen Probleme, sondern vor allem auch um die Humanismus- und Demokratiedebatte, um den so genannten Unterschied zwischen einem „bürgerlichen" und einem „sozialistischen" Humanismus" sowie zwischen „bürgerlicher" und „sozialistischer" Demokratie. Menschlichkeit, als Menschenliebe nicht nur gegenüber den Blutsverwandten, sondern als Liebe zum ganzen Volk verstanden, wird nicht nur als Kerngedanke des Konfuzianismus gesehen, sondern als universeller Begriff für Menschlichkeit und Humanität,[47] als universeller Humanismus interpretiert, womit gesagt werden soll, dass in China die Idee des wahren Humanismus schon viel länger existiere als im Abendland und heute wieder darauf zurückgegriffen wird.

5.5. Recht und Ethik

Der Stellenwert der Ethik, die nach dem Sinn und der Richtigkeit von menschlichen Handlungen fragt, scheint sich bei der Herausbildung neuer Identitäten, Doppelidentitäten und neuen Lebensinhalten in einigen gesellschaftlichen Gruppen zunehmend zu verflüchtigen. Konsumangebote und Konsumzwänge beschleunigen in der Digitalwirtschaft Lebenstempo und die Begierde nach dem Erleben des Augenblicks. In der Erlebnisgesellschaft geht es wohl weniger um ethische Normen und bisher traditionelle gemeinschaftsbezogene verantwortliche Verhaltensweisen. Im Zuge der Computerisierung, Automatisierung, der Innovation steht oft das eigene Selbst im Vordergrund. Die Selbstverwirklichung der eigenen Person oder auch einer sozialen Gruppe gehören zu neuen Identitätstendenzen in China. Postmodernistische Tendenzen, in dem man sich vollkommnen dem Gefühl der Selbstverwirklichung hingibt, führen zur Subjektivierung der Person, die die Wirklichkeit durch eigene menschliche Erfahrungen schaffen will. Besonders in den großen chinesischen Metropolen kann man heute immer mehr Menschen begegnen, die sich von traditionellen

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[47] Fu Shufang, „Positive Faktoren in den Gedanken des Konfuzius", in eds. Silke Krieger, Rolf Trauzettel, Mainz: *Konfuzius und die Modernisierung Chinas*, 1990, p. 217.

Zwängen zu befreien suchen. Augenfällig ist das nicht nur in neuen Lebensformen, sondern auch in einigen Bereichen der Kunst.

Wenn es um die Suche einer neuen Identität geht, so verläuft der Prozess vielschichtig und mehrgleisig. Die Legitimation von Herrschaft und die staatspolitische Identität, die damit zusammenhängt, wird auch nach fast 30 Jahren, nachdem sich China geöffnet hat, nicht nach dem Recht, sondern aufgrund von zivilisatorischen Aspekten der chinesischen Ethik definiert. Und es sollte trotz allen Aufbruchs und Wandel immer wieder daran erinnert werden, dass die chinesischen Traditionalisten, die geistige Debatte über das zukünftige Menschenbild im Lande versuchen zu steuern, da sie, wie in alten Zeiten, dem Irrglauben verhaftet zu sein scheinen, dass aufgrund des Stellenwertes der Ethik in der chinesischen Kultur diese höherwertig als die abendländische Zivilisation sei. In der westlichen Kultur, so wird betont, sei der Mensch zum ökonomischen Subjekt erniedrigt worden,[48] ohne die pragmatische einseitige Wachstumsstrategie seit Beginn der Reformen, die zu riesigen Entwicklungs- und Einkommensgefällen in der chinesischen Gesellschaft geführt haben, genauer zu hinterfragen.

5.6. Entzauberung von Mythen und die Herausbildung pluralistischer Lebensformen

In der chinesischen Gesellschaft sind die Menschen dabei, eine neue Identität zu finden. Dabei werden alte Mythen von vollkommenen Menschenbildern, und das betrifft nicht nur die Zeit der totalitären Herrschaft unter Mao Zedong, sondern auch die traditionellen Utopien, entzaubert. Wir beobachten einen Paradigmenwechsel, in dem die Gesellschaft vor die Alternative gestellt wird, sich von Zwängen zivilisatorischer Ansprüche zu befreien. Damit gehen Ausgrenzung, Entgrenzung der Normen und die Herausbildung vielfältiger, pluralistischer Lebensformen einher, die sowohl neue Freiheiten wie auch neue Unfreiheiten schaffen, wie die Verfügbarkeit und Uniformierung jedes einzelnen. Das gilt nicht nur für die entwickelten Industrieländer des Westens. Entgrenzung und Verfügbarkeit der Person sind auch in Chinas zu einem bedrohlichen Gesellschaftsphänomen geworden. Obwohl Symptome der Entgrenzung doch Folge eines neuen neoliberalen Wirtschaftsgeistes gehören, sind sich die meisten Menschen dieser neuen Vereinnahmung und deren Folgen kaum bewusst, sondern empfinden es vor allem als Freiheitsgewinn.

5.7. Herausbildung persönlicher Identitäten von Gewinnern und Verlieren

Die rasante Wirtschaftsentwicklung hat in China Gewinner und Verlierer hervor gebracht, die eine unterschiedliche persönliche Identität entwickelt haben. Die Gewinner unterschiedlicher Couleur identifizieren sich vor allem als Person infolge ihres Erfolgs und des erzielten Wohlstands. Zur neuen Identität gehört in gewissen Wohlstandskreisen auch Hedonismus, der hier im Kommen ist mit neuen Lebensmodellen, die von Spaß, Genuss, Komfort und grenzenloser persönliche Freizügigkeit gekennzeichnet sind. Mit der persönlichen Freiheit erfasste auch die Droge des Glückspiels wieder die Herzen vieler Chinesen.[49] Unter Mao Zedong war die Spielleidenschaft der Chinesen als Laster des alten

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[48] Werner Meißner, „Intellektuelle im Zwiespalt", in eds. Karl Hein Pohl, Gudrun Wacker, Liu Huiru, *Chinesische Intellektuelle im 20. Jahrhundert zwischen Tradition und Moderne*, Hamburg, 1993, p. 126–127.

[49] Erst unlängst wurde eine Kampagne gegen menschliche Laster, Kampf gegen Spiele in Kasinos ins Leben gerufen.

Chinas verpönt. Heute ist es zu einem neuen Laster geworden. Viele Arten des Glücksspiels gibt es in China, dazu Sportwetten, die abgeschlossen werden, inzwischen auch auf der Webseite. Viele meinen, es gehöre zur chinesischen Mentalität. Die Spielleidenschaft kostet Geld, und das holt man sich aus illegalen Geschäften und der Grauzone. Offiziell wird beklagt, dass mit der zunehmenden Korruption auch die Branche des Glücksspiels wuchs. Es wird als das Opium des 21. Jahrhundert gebrandmarkt.[50] So locken Touristikangebote, indirekt auch die Möglichkeit anbietend, in Grenzkasinos spielen zu können. Zu Spielplätzen für Chinesen vom Festland sind Macao und Hongkong, aber auch die Nachbarländer Süd-Korea, Nordkorea, Russland, aber auch Macao und Hongkong geworden.

2004 gab die Parteizentrale diesbezügliche Vorschriften für ihre Mitglieder heraus. Danach werden Parteimitglieder aus der Partei ausgeschlossen, wenn sie spielen. Landesweit ist das Ministerium für öffentliche Sicherheit beauftragt worden, dagegen anzukämpfen. Mit Sonderkommandos und Informationen auf Webseiten soll dagegen vorgegangen werden.[51] Es wird berichtet, dass innerhalb sechs Monaten die Polizei während dieser Kampagne 281 Mio. US $ Glücksspielgelder beschlagnahmen sowie 77.000 PC und Videogeräte sicherstellen konnte.[52]

Auf der anderen Seite nehmen solche Erscheinungen wie Armut, Ausgrenzung und eine rücksichtslose Versklavung der Schwachen zu. Der Arme und Schwache sieht sich als Ausgegrenzter an, obgleich auch er auf eine rettende Hand der Marktwirtschaft gewartet hatte. Sie betrachten sich nicht als Gewinner der neuen Reformpolitik, obgleich sich auch ihre Lebensverhältnisse insgesamt verbessert haben. Sie sind enttäuscht und identifizieren sich als Verlierer und Opfer.

Gewiss menschliche Begierden gehören zum Menschsein. Auch wenn in der konfuzianischen und buddhistischen Lehre das maßlose Streben des Individuums nach Befriedigung seiner Begierden als Wurzel allen menschlichen Elends gesehen wird, so vermochte der zivilisatorische Anspruch, Genügsamkeit zu pflegen, nicht verhindern, dass auch in China die Befriedigung der Begierden zum Menschsein gehörte. Der Mensch mit seinen ideellen Bedürfnissen rückt in den Hintergrund. Die Befriedigung der materiellen Bedürfnisse werden zum Identifikationsmotor von Entwicklung und eines menschenwürdiges Daseins erklärt. Wir sind jedoch Zeugen, wie auch in China das menschliche Dasein zunehmend durch den Konsumterror kommerzialisiert wird.

6. Wandel in der Menschenrechtsauffassung

6.1. Menschenrechte – vom imperialistischen Werkzeug zu allgemeinen Menschenrechten

Unter Mao Zedong wurden Menschenrechte als imperialistisches Werkzeug im Kampf gegen den Sozialismus betrachtet. Seit der Proklamierung des Reformkurses im Jahre 1978 werden sie nicht mehr verworfen, sondern sind zu einem positiven Begriff geworden, obgleich sie nach eigenen Besonderheiten kulturspezifisch interpretiert werden.[53] In dieser

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[50] *Renmin Ribao*, 2. February 2005.

[51] *Xinhua*, 25. May 2005.

[52] *Xinhua*, 14. July 2005.

[53] Chang Jian, *Renquan de lixiang, beilun, xianshi* (Theorie, Widersprüche, Praxis der Menschenrechte), Chengdu, 1992, p. 134–136.

Zeit beginnen zum ersten Mal Debatten über allgemeine Menschenrechtsfragen. Zur theoretischen Begründung wird der Wandel des bisherigen Menschenrechtskonzepts als ein „notwendiges Ergebnis der Entwicklungslogik" unserer Zeit bezeichnet.[54] Betont wird, dass trotz zahlreicher Menschenrechtskonventionen, die von der UN verabschiedet worden seien, es noch keine einheitliche Menschenrechts-Theorie gebe. Fehlen würde auch ein einheitlicher Maßstab zur Beurteilung dessen, was zu den Menschenrechten in einer historischen Etappe gehöre oder nicht.[55] Das bedeutet, dass es eben in der Praxis noch keine Universalität gebe, sondern nur „relative und konkrete Menschenrechte".[56]

In der Politik und Wissenschaft wurde das Konzept der „drei Generationen" aufgestellt – der politischen, sozialen und kollektiven Menschenrechte-, die in der „Deklaration der Menschenrechte" ihren Niederschlag gefunden hätten, da hier in Visionen aufgezeigt worden sei, wie man global und national zu einer wahren Solidargemeinschaft kommen könnte.[57]

6.2. Traditionelle Weisheit ist neu zu erkunden

Trotz positivem Wandel in zahlreichen Bereichen der Menschenrechte ist das chinesische Menschenrechtsverstandnis weiterhin von historischer Kontinuität geprägt. So kann man häufig vernehmen, dass das heutige China nichts anderes sei als die Widerspieglung der historischen Entwicklung des Landes. Deshalb stütze man sich auch beim „Aufbau der geistigen Zivilisation" des Sozialismus mit chinesischen Besonderheiten, auf die traditionelle moralische Weisheit, die man neu erkunden müsse.[58] Diese Position wurde bereits auf der 2. Menschenrechtskonferenz in Wien 1993 vertreten, auf der zum erstenmal das westliche Menschenrechtsverständnis global zur Debatte stand. Die chinesischen Vertreter legten ihr eigenes Menschenrechtsverständnis vor und traten gleichzeitig in der Rolle eines Anwalts der nichtwestlichen Staaten auf. Entwicklung, so der chinesische Vertreter, sei die wichtigste Voraussetzung für die Realisierung von Menschenrechten.[59] Indirekt verwies er damit auf die Geschichte des Kolonialismus, als zahlreichen Völkern die Möglichkeit verwehrt wurde, sich zu entwickeln.

In diesem Kontext sei ebenfalls daran zu erinnern, dass bereits 1986 unter Druck der chinesischen Politik das *Recht auf Entwicklung* als kollektives Menschenrecht in der UNO verabschiedet werden konnte. Auf Initiative Chinas wurde am Rande der 2. Menschenrechtskonferenz, die *Bangkok Declaration of Human Rights* unterzeichnet. Hier wurde mit allem Nachdruck auf die besonderen historischen, kulturellen und religiösen

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[54] Ibidem.

[55] Xu Weidong, Shen Zhengwu, Zhen Chengliang, Ideological and Legal Criteria for Human Rights, in *Social Sciences in China*, Summer 1993, p. 76.

[56] In einem Interview für die *Washington Post* benutze der Generalsekretär der KPCh Jiang Zemin diese Begriffe, als er betonte, dass das Konkrete darin bestehe, dafür zu sorgen, dass das Volk genügend Nahrung, Kleidung und Arbeit habe und Stabilität im Staate herrsche.

[57] Luo, Rongqu, The Historical Definition of Modernization and a New Understanding of Modern Worlds Development, in *Social Sciences in China*, No. 3/1996, p. 92–102.

[58] S. Wang Zhengping, Zhou Zhongzhi, *Xiandai lunlixue*, Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue Chubanshe 2001, p. 18–19.

[59] Kommentar zur Wiener Menschenrechtskonferenz in *Renmin Ribao*, 26.06.1993.

Bedingungen eines Landes verwiesen, die bei der Entwicklung zu berücksichtigen seien.[60] Zu den globalen Menschenrechten zählt man heute in China ebenfalls die Erhaltung des Weltfriedens und die faire internationale Zusammenarbeit, die durch souveräne Nationen realisiert werden sollten.

China wurde von den westlichen Staaten vorgeworfen, auf der Menschenrechtskonferenz in Wien, zusammen mit einigen anderen asiatischen Staaten, wie Indonesien und Malaysia, die Kontroverse über die Universalitat der Menschenrechte als eine Ersatzdiskussion an Stelle des bisherigen Ost-West-Konflikts entfacht zu haben.[61]

6.3. Was ist nun das Besondere an der chinesischen Entwicklung?

In der heutigen Entwicklungsetappe, die die chinesische Gesellschaft zu kleinem Wohlstand zu führen soll, gewinnt die Tradition an Bedeutung. Doch was ist das Besondere daran? Die bekannte Konfuziusforscherin Chen Qizhi antwortet auf die Frage, was wohl das Besondere am chinesischen Entwicklungsweg, der sozialistischen Marktwirtschaft mit chinesischen Merkmalen, ausmachen würde, wie folgt:" Die so genannten chinesischen Besonderheiten haben ihren Ursprung in den traditionellen Besonderheiten der hervorragenden chinesischen Kultur und hervorragenden chinesischen Geschichte, wobei die konfuzianische Tradition den Kernpunkt dieser Zivilisation ausmacht."[62]

7. Weißbücher über die Menschenrechtslage in China

7.1. Das erste Weißbuch über Menschenrechte

In den vorgehenden Kapiteln wurde aufgezeigt, wie mit der Öffnung des Landes eine umfangreiche Debatte über Menschenrechtsfragen in den verschiedenen Wissenschaftsbereichen einsetzte, die das theoretische Gerüst für die politische Argumentation lieferten. Gab es bisher nur offizielle Stellungnahmen chinesischer Politiker, so veröffentlichte das Informationsbüro des Staatsrates 1991, zwei Jahre nach der Niederschlagung der Protestbewegung 1989, das erste Weißbuch über die Menschenrechte in China. In gebündelter Form wurde hier das chinesische Menschenrechtsverständnis als eigene Wertekonzeption vorgelegt. So lesen wir bereits im Vorwort, dass zwischen einem „universalen Ideal" und „umfassenden Menschenrechten" und denen, die in der Wirklichkeit respektiert werden oder respektiert werden können, doch große Unterschiede bestanden.[63] Mit der Dialektik der Widersprüche wird das Wesen des chinesischen Menschenrechtsverständnisses erklärt. Sie seien sowohl universal wie aber auch gleichzeitig spezifisch. Wenn unterstrichen wird, dass in der chinesischen Verfassung

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[60] Jin Deyue, „Rujia de renquan sixiang", in Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuhua, *Rujia chuan tong yu renquan. Minzhu sixiang*, op. cit, p. 180.

[61] Karin Tomala, *Das chinesische Selbstverständis und die Frage der Menschenrechte*, Warschau, 1993, p. 41–43.

[62] Chen Qizhi, „Rushang de xiandai yiyi weilai zuoyong" (Die heutige Bedeutung und zukünftige Rolle der konfuzianischen Schule), in Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuma, *Rushang yu er shi shiji*, op. cit., p. 30.

[63] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed., Human Rigths in China, Beijing, 1991, p. 1.

und in den Gesetzen die Menschenrechte an erster Stelle ständen und auf deren Unverletzlichkeit geachtet werde, so kann man daraus ersehen, wie „spezifisch" das Menschenrechtsverständnis konzipiert wird. Diese Dialektik ist ein Gegenpol zum westlichen Verständnis, nach dem in China die Menschenrechte eben nicht in Gestalt verfassungsmäßiger Grundrechte positiviert sind, da es den demokratisch legitimierten Gesetzgeber nicht gibt.

Das „*Recht auf Leben*" wird als das wichtigste Menschenrecht bezeichnet. Bereits in den konfuzianischen Klassikern stellte das Recht auf Leben die Grundlage gesellschaftlichen Handelns dar.[64] In der chinesischen Menschenrechtspolitik bedeutet danach die Gewährung der Sicherstellung der grundlegenden Existenzgrundlagen das wichtigste Menschenrecht. So heißt es im Weißbuch, wer kein Recht auf Leben habe, für den seien alle anderen Menschenrechte bedeutungslos.

Behandelt werden auch Fragen der Religionsfreiheit, der Nationalen Minderheiten und der Familienplanung. Mit allem Nachdruck wird aber auch darauf verwiesen, dass die Interessen des Staates vor den Interessen des Individuums Priorität hätten. Wer die Interessen des Staates verletze, Anschläge auf die Regierung plane, die Spaltung des Landes anstrebe, wer Menschenansammlungen zur bewaffneten Aufruhr aufwiegle, werde nach dem Strafgesetz von 1979 als „konterrevolutionärer Verbrecher" klassifiziert und bestraft. Nach dieser Auslegung gibt es im chinesischen Recht keine Kategorie für politische Häftlinge, wie wir es im Westen kennen, sondern nur die Kategorie der „Konterrevolutionäre".

7.2. „50 Jahre Entwicklung der Menschenrechte in China"

Im dritten Weißbuch (2000), das unter dem Titel erschien *50 Jahre Entwicklung der Menschenrechte in China*,[65] wird die Entwicklung der Menschenrechte in den letzten 50 Jahren als „großer historischer Sprung" in der chinesischen Geschichte gewertet. Zweifelsohne hat sich das Antlitz Chinas verändert „Das einst schwache, arme und gedemütigte China" habe sich in einen „unabhängigen und prosperierenden Staat verwandelt". Die Etikette des „kranken Mannes in Ostasien" habe China abgelegt und führe ein wohlhabendes, zivilisiertes, gesundes Leben und genieße Freiheiten und demokratische Rechte wie nie zuvor".[66] „Grosse Fortschritte", so das Weißbuch, seien im Bereich der bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte zu verzeichnen, da „Demokratie an der Basis" (gemeint sind die Dorfwahlen) eingeführt und die Verfassung novelliert worden seien. Dann wird mit allem Nachdruck darauf verwiesen, dass China aufgrund der „Rückständigkeit des Landes" und „als Entwicklungsland des Ostens" erst einmal andere Prioritäten als die Industrieländer setzen müsste. Vorrang besäßen deshalb auch im 21. Jahrhundert die „Rechte auf Leben und Entwicklung". Doch wie bereits im ersten (1991) und zweiten Menschenrechtsweißbuch (1996) wird auch im dritten die Bereitschaft der chinesischen Führung zum internationalen Dialog erklärt, gleichzeitig aber unterstrichen, dass in China die westlichen Menschenrechtsauffassungen nicht einfach kopiert werden könnten.

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[64] Chen Qizhi, „Ruxue de renquan yu minzhu sixiang", in Chen Qizhi, Zhang Shuhua, *Rujia chuangtong yu renquan. Minzhu sixiang*, op. cit., p. 112.

[65] „Presseamt des Staatsrates der Volksrepublik China", Februar 2000; *Beijing Rundschau*, 2000, No 11.

[66] Ibidem.

7.3. „Der Staat respektiert und gewährt Menschenrechte"

Im vierten Weißbuch (2004) erklärt man mit gewisser Genugtuung, dass in die Verfassung der Passus aufgenommen wurde „Der Staat respektiert und gewährt die Menschenrechte".[67] Der chinesische Volkskongress würde den eingereichten Petitionen große Aufmerksamkeit widmen. So gab es 2003 über 31. 000 Besuche und 57.000 Eingaben. Auch bei der Einführung dörflicher Direktwahlen seien große Forschritte zu verzeichnen. Zahlreiche Unregelmäßigkeiten wären in der Justiz aufgedeckt worden. Hervorgehoben wurde auch, dass für die Sicherung der Rechte der Frauen und Kinder entsprechende Maßnahmen eingeführt wurden.

Festgehalten wird an der Argumentation, eigene Wege in der Menschenrechtspolitik umzusetzen, da China ein Entwicklungsland mit einer großen Bevölkerung und einer langen eigenständigen Zivilisation sei. Damit wird auch begründet, warum das „Recht auf Leben und Entwicklung" in der augenblicklichen historischen Phase vor politischen Bürgerrechten stehen müsste. Trotzdem lässt sich eine gewisse Akzentverschiebung beobachten. Es werden nicht nur „Fortschritte der bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte der Bürger" angemerkt, sondern die Notwendigkeit der Verbesserung des Rechtssystems gefordert.

7.4. Menschenrechte in Tibet und Xinjiang

Die Minderheitenpolitik Chinas, vor allem gegenüber den autonomen Regionen Tibet und Xinjiang, gehören zu den bedeutenden Kritikpunkten der westlichen Menschenrechtspolitik gegenüber China. Im Jahre 1992 kam ein *Weißbuch über die Menschenrechte in Tibet*[68] heraus, das zweite im Jahre 2002, und im Jahre 2003 wurde ein *Weißbuch über die Geschichte und Entwicklung von Xinjiang* veröffentlicht.[69]

Der Soziologe Zhao Zhidong von der Universität in Macau, der sich mit dem Phänomen der kritischen Intelligenz in China befasst hat, zeigt an Hand von Beispielen, wie kompliziert sich doch die Minderheitenfrage für Chinesen darstellt. So gebe es bei Wissenschaftlern volles Verständnis bezüglich der Frage der Unabhängigkeit von Volksgruppen, die von der chinesischen Regierung abgelehnt werde. Doch er verweist auf kritische Stimmen, die man ebenfalls ernst nehmen müsste, da mit Tibets Unabhängigkeit China ein Viertel seines Territoriums verlieren würde. Andere Völker, wie die Mongolen oder die Muslime könnten nach so einem Fallbeispiel gleichfalls danach trachten. China verlöre dann über die Hälfte seines gesamten Territoriums. Deshalb sei es undenkbar für China und Chinesen diesem zu zustimmen, auch wenn China ein demokratischer Staat werden würde.[70]

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[67] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed., „Tibet – Its Ownership and Human Rights Situation", Beijing, 1992; Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed., *Tibet's March toward modernisation*, Beijing, 2001.

[68] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed., *History and Development of Xinjiang*, Beijing, 2003.

[69] „Xizang: Ershiyi shiji zhongguo de ruanlei" (Tibet: the soft rib of the twenty-first century China), *Da Gongbao*, March 31.1999, cit. from: Hao Zhidong, „Mainland China vs Taiwan: The Role of Intellectuals", in *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensia,* No. 17, 2004, p. 45.

[70] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed., Beijing: The Situation of Chinese Women, 1994.

7.5. Frauenrechte sind Menschenrechte

1994 erschien das erste *Weißbuch über die Situation der Frauen in China*.[71] Angesichts der Vorbereitungen der Internationalen Frauenkonferenz in Beijing war dieses Weißbuch als eine Art Rechenschaftsbericht über die Situation der Frauen im Lande herausgekommen. Man wollte auch aufzeigen, wie viel wichtige Gesetze zum Frauenschutz inzwischen verabschiedet wurden. Die Situation der Frauen hat sich zweifelsohne seit 1949 verbessert und die chinesische Regierung kann, wenn es um die Gleichberechtigung und ihren Status in der Gesellschaft geht, Erfolge aufweisen. So nimmt sie in der internationalen Gemeinschaft an allen Arbeiten über Fragen der Gleichberechtigung von Frauen in der Gesellschaft teil. Frauenrechte sind Menschenrechte, die zu achten seien, heißt es in der offiziellen Politik. Doch aufgrund traditioneller Verhaltsweisen wie auch der neuen Wirtschaftspolitik sind in vielen Bereichen neue Probleme und zahlreiche Verstöße sowohl in der Gesellschaft als auch in der Familie zu beobachten. So sah man sich gezwungen, im Jahre 2005 das zweite *Weißbuch zur Gleichberechtigung der Frauen* herauszugeben.[72] Eine besondere Rolle beim Schutz der Frauenrechte, die gesetzlich verankert sind, spielen die regierungsnahen NGOs, insbesondere der Frauenverband. Seit 1949, so das Weißbuch, sei eine Anzahl von Gesetzen zum Schutze der Frauen erlassen worden. Aufgrund der zahlreichen Probleme sowohl bei der Beschäftigung, in der Gesundheitsfürsorge wie auch bezüglich der Gewalt gegen Frauen in der Familie hatte das Ständige Komitee des Nationalen Volkskongresses im August 2005 eine Novelle zum „Gesetz zum Schutz der Rechte und Interessen der Frauen" verabschiedet, die am 1. Dezember in Kraft trat. Xinhua meldete, dass in 30% aller Familien Gewalt auftreten würde und dabei die Frauen zu über 90% die Opfer seien.[73] Über Gewalt in der Familie wurde in China lange geschwiegen. Zum ersten Mal fand dieser Aspekt seinen Niederschlag in der Novelle des Ehegesetzes im Jahre 2001.

7.6. Weißbuch zur politischen Demokratie

China ist kein demokratisches Land. Die „sozialistische Demokratie" hat jedoch bereits zum Wandel in den Machtstrukturen geführt, wenn auch nicht in den substantiellen. Bemerkenswert ist die Beschäftigung mit Problemen der Demokratie in China. Die Gesellschaft schafft an der Basis Institutionen, die Bürgercharakter haben. Offiziell wurde in einem Weißbuch im Oktober 2005 zu dieser Entwicklung Stellung genommen. Der Herausgeber ist bei den anderen Weißbüchern das Informationsbüro beim Staatsrat. Der Titel der Veröffentlichung lautet: *Aufbau von politischer Demokratie in China*. Wenn man den Inhalt des Weißbuches analysiert, so finden wir darin eigentlich keine bedeutenden neuen Erkenntnisse, wenn es um die Wertung des Ordnungssystems im Lande geht. Ähnlich wie in den Weißbüchern über die Menschenrechtslage in China wird in dieser Broschüre auf die besondere Situation des Landes verwiesen, infolge der China seinen eigenen Entwicklungspfad beschreiten müsse. Interessant ist jedoch in dieser Publikation, dass auf die Notwendigkeit hingewiesen wird, Erfahrungen, die in anderen Zivilisationen gemacht

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[71] Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China ed., The Situation of equality of Chinese Women, Beijing, 2005.

[72] *Renmin Ribao*, 14.9.2005.

[73] *Xinhua*, 19.10.2005; http://english.people.com.cn/20051019/eng20051019-215257.html.

worden seien, mit zu berücksichtigen. Interessant ist auch die Akzentverschiebung bezüglich der Führungsrolle der KPCh. So heißt es u.a., dass die Partei solange als Führungskraft die Geschicke Landes in der Hand halten werde, bis die Menschen gelernt hätten, ihre Geschicke selbst in die Hand zu nehmen. Wann dieser Zeitpunkt eintreten könnte, hängt dementsprechend vom Willen der KPCh selbst ab, denn sie entscheidet, wie die Lernerergebnisse zu beurteilen sind. Dargestellt werden die politischen Veränderungen am Beispiel der Wandlung des Funktionierens des Volkskongresses. Verwiesen wird auf das „Mehrparteiensystems unter der Führung der KPCh" und den Aufbau der Demokratie auf unterster Ebene in den Dörfern. Ende 2004 seien in fast allen Landesstrichen, nämlich zu 80%, die Selbstverwaltungsorganisationen errichtet. Landesweit gebe es über 640.000 Dorfkomitees. Hier werde demokratisch gewählt, demokratisch entschieden, demokratisch kontrolliert, so dass die Dorfbevölkerung ihre Angelegenheiten selbst in die Hände nehmen könnten, heißt es im Weißbuch.

Mit der komplizierte Frage der Menschenrechte in China befasst sich Kapitel 7. Betont wird, dass auf Antrag des Volkskongresses im März 2004 in die chinesische Verfassung ein Kapitel über die Sicherung von Menschenrechten aufgenommen worden sei, in dem der Staat sich verpflichte, die Menschenrechte zu achten. Es wird darauf verwiesen, dass heute die chinesische Verfassung und das Rechtssystem den Bürgern viele Freiheiten gewähren, wie Religionsfreiheit, Redefreiheit, Pressefreiheit und Versammlungsfreiheit. Die Bürger hätten wieder das Recht erhalten, Eigentum zu besitzen und den Bürgern werde die Sicherheit ihrer Person garantiert. Garantiert seien auch viele Rechte, wie das Recht auf Arbeit, auf Erholung, Geschlechtergleichheit, gleiche Bezahlung für gleiche Leistung, Sicherung des geistigen Eigentums, der Sozialfürsorge, Gesetze, die die Regeln in der Ehe und für die Scheidung bestimmen. Doch in der Praxis heißt es, sei es nicht leicht, diese Rechte umzusetzen. Es ist eher ein Katalog von Wünschen, der in dieser Form nicht umzusetzen ist.

Betont wird, dass China bisher 21 internationale Menschenrechtskonventionen unterzeichnet habe. Es fehlt aber auch nicht die Beteuerung, dass der Aufbau der „sozialistischen Demokratie" Chinas sich immer von den Prinzipien der marxistischen Theorie im Verbund mit Chinas Wirklichkeit habe leiten lassen, wobei demokratische Elemente chinesischer Kultur und nützliche Elemente aus dem Schatz der Errungenschaften der politischen Zivilisation der Menschheit übernommen worden seien. „Sozialistische Demokratie" bedeutet also nach diesem Verständnis, dass nur die KPCh garantieren könne, die Chinesen zu befähigen, ihr Land weiter zu entwickeln. Der staatliche Sektor in der chinesischen Wirtschaft sei die Grundlage für das sozialistische Marktsystem in China. So lesen wir, dass in der ersten Stufe des Sozialismus eben gerade der Staat in der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Eigentumsformen noch eine entscheidende Rolle zu spielen habe. Die Forderung steht im Raum, dass Chinas Demokratie nicht vom Kapital manipuliert werden sollte. China sei keine Demokratie für eine kleine Minderheit, die Kapital besitze. Deshalb wende man sich gegen solche Parolen, Demokratie für alle, die Anarchie bedeute. Chinesische Demokratie sei Zentralismus.

Das Weißbuch ist konzipiert als Leitfaden zur ideologischen Arbeit, um die offiziellen Leitlinien zur Menschenrechtspolitik zu vermitteln. Obgleich es an ideologischen Schulungen nicht fehlt, zeigt die raue Wirklichkeit der Reformbewegung andere Verhaltensweisen, die sich in der Gesellschaft verbreiten. Geld ist zum neuen Gott geworden, die Jagd nach der Profitmaximierung und dem Konsumrausch gehört in der anwachsenden Mittelschicht mit zum chinesischen Alltag. Im Weißbuch erfahren wir wenig über die

Probleme der chinesischen Entwicklung, über die Einkommensgefälle, das Heer der Arbeitsuchenden und der Ausgrenzungen aus der Gesellschaft, wichtiger erscheint immer noch, in der Politik mit Doktrin zu argumentieren, konkret vor allem mit der Theorie, die die Entwicklung im Lande aufgrund der „chinesischen Besonderheiten" zu erklären versucht und die vom Ausland als Weiterentwicklung der Modernisierungstheorie endlich anerkannt werden sollte. Anders als im Westen, wo unter Moderne vor allem die gesellschaftliche Gewährleistung individueller Freiheiten, Autonomie und Herstellung von sozialer Gerechtigkeit verstanden wird, versteht man in China Moderne als Modernisierung des eigenen Landes, die den Staat stärken und den Menschen eine Gesellschaft in Wohlstand bringen soll.

8. Das chinesische Ordnungsprinzip

8.1. „sozialistische Demokratie"

Der Begriff „sozialistische Demokratie" hat wenig mit dem westlichen Demokratieverständnis zu tun. Diese Art von Demokratie beinhaltet den uneingeschränkten Machtanspruch der KPCh, das Land zu regieren, auch wenn einige Strukturen im Ordnungsprinzip aufgelockert wurden. Der Machtanspruch kommt nicht mehr aus der Klassenanalyse, wo sich einst die KPCh als Avantgarde der Arbeiterklasse und Bauern verantwortlich für die Entwicklung fühlte. Heute legitimiert sich die politische Elite mit Wirtschaftswachstum, das nur unter stabilen Verhältnissen kontinuiert werden könnte. Aber es ist doch nicht mehr zu übersehen, dass die Entwicklung zu großen Ungleichgewichten und Unzufriedenheiten geführt hat.[74] Obgleich die Partei in der letzten Zeit immer häufiger mit zahlreichen Krisensymptomen konfrontiert wird, die die Entwicklung gefährden könnten, gibt sie sich optimistisch. Nach traditionellen Mustern verkündet sie Wohlstand für die Bevölkerung und Harmonie für die Gesellschaft. So heißt das neue Entwicklungskonzept „Harmonische Entwicklung" in der Wirtschaft und der Gesellschaft.

8.2. Harmonisierung der Gesellschaft als Ordnungsmodell

In der konfuzianischen Gesellschaftslehre, als Staats-, Moral- und Lebenskodex verstanden, kommt der Harmonie eine besondere Stellung zu. Nach diesem Verständnis wurde das Vorhandensein von Harmonie in der Familie als Grundlage für die Harmonie und Ordnung in der Gesellschaft und im Kosmos betrachtet. Damit waren dem Individuum, der einzelnen Person, Grenzen gesetzt. Nur innerhalb dieser Grenzen, also in der Familienstruktur, in der Gemeinschaft, war es erlaubt, sich nach den moralischen Grundsätzen zu bewegen. Danach stand es dem Individuum nicht zu, Eigeninitiative zu selbstsüchtigen, eigenwilligen Absichten außerhalb der Gemeinschaftsstrukturen zu ergreifen. Nach den ethischen Moralprinzipien galt das als verwerflich. Es galt der Moralkodex, dass „der Edle kein eigenes Ich" besitze. Das traditionelle chinesische Ordnungsprinzip war also nichts anderes als die grundlegende Funktion für menschliches Verhalten. Zweifelsohne ist die konfuzianische Maxime nach wie vor allgegenwärtig, doch die Entwicklung im Lande zeigt andere Tendenzen. Liberale Denker in Europa, wie Ralf Dahrendorf, warnen heute davor, dass die Entwicklung

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[74] Siegmar Mosdorf, „Ligaturen moderner Ordnungspolitik", in *Neue Gesellschaft*. Bonn: Frankfurter Hefte, 11/2005, Dietz Verlag, p. 32.

vom Ökonomischen bestimmt werde. Das reicht nicht aus, um ein funktionierendes Gemeinwesen zu begründen.[75]

Die politische Führung ist sich der zahlreichen Widersprüche, die mit der Entwicklung und Modernisierung des Landes zum Vorschein kommen, immer mehr bewusst. So sucht sie nach neuen Lösungen, um die Stabilität im Lande zu bewahren. Wie zur Gründerzeit in den westlichen Industrieländern bestimmen in der chinesischen Modernisierungsentwicklung der Markt und das Wirtschaftswachstum die Prioritäten. Entgegen den Deklarationen vollzog sich jedoch alles nach dem Primat der Ökonomisierung. Jetzt soll die Kehrtwende vollzogen werden, damit das Gemeinwesen auch zukunftsorientiert funktionieren kann.

8.3. Harmonisierung der Modernisierung

Das Konzept zur „Harmonisierung der Gesellschaft wurde zum ersten mal vom chinesischen Ministerpräsidenten Wen Jiabao Ende 2004 vorgelegt und im Februar 2005 auf dem Nationalen Volkskongress vorgetragen. Harmonische Entwicklung – unter der Führung der Partei – das war die Parole, unter der der 11. Fünf-Jahresplan (2006) auf dem 5. Plenum des ZK der KPCh im Oktober 2004 angenommen wurde. Im offiziellen Kommunique wird offen über die Schattenseiten, die die Entwicklung begleitet, gesprochen. So wird gefordert: neue Arbeitsplätze zu schaffen, die Lebensbedingungen der Landbevölkerung zu verbessern, sich intensiver mit dem Umsetzung des Umweltschutzes zu befassen. Doch die Wirtschaftsdynamik soll beibehalten werden. Wie dieser Widerspruch zu lösen ist, erfahren wir nicht. Auf dem Lande kam es in letzter Zeit immer öfter zu Protesten gegen die Arbeits- und Sozialpolitik der Lokalregierung. Die Menschen schauen heute kritischer auf die Politik der gewählten Vertreter. Als Ursachen von Konflikten gelten: Nepotismus der ländlichen lokalen Behörden, Landnahme der Bauern ohne entsprechende Entschädigung, Korruption, illegale Finanzgeschäfte, Bürokratie, Vetternwirtschaft und Korruption der Finanzinstitute, mangelnde Versicherungssysteme, mangelnde Bildungsstruktur auf dem Lande. Konflikte entstehen auch beim Abreißen der alten Wohnsiedlungen, weil die Einwohner keine entsprechende Entschädigung erhalten, wofür sie sich eine neue Wohnung kaufen könnten.

Auf die Dringlichkeit der Harmonisierung der Modernisierung eingehend, verwies der chinesische Ministerpräsident Wen Jiabao auf der 3. Tagung des 10. Nationalen Volkskongresses im Frühjahr 2006 erneut auf die dringende Lösung der anstehenden Probleme, die infolge der Modernisierung des Landes entstanden seien. So betonte er, obgleich die neue Entwicklung zum Wachstum der Wirtschaft beitrage und einem Teil der Bürger Wohlstand bescherte, gebe es noch zahlreiche gesellschaftliche und soziale Faktoren, die gelöst werden müssten, um eine harmonische, sprich stabile Gesellschaft zu schaffen. Er musste eingestehen, dass die Unzufriedenheit in der Gesellschaft genährt werde durch die Korruption, das große Einkommensgefälle in den einzelnen Regionen, zwischen Stadt und Land, Arbeitslosigkeit, Armut, schwache Sicherheitsstrukturen der Produktion und der Umweltverschmutzung. Zu den dringendsten Problemen gehöre jedoch die Ausbildungssituation auf dem Lande und das Fehlen eines komplexen Sicherheits- und Gesundheitsfürsorgesystem im Lande.

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[75] Peter Schumpeter, „Über den Kapitalismus", in eds. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, Ingold Pernice, Ulrich Halton, *Europawissenschaft*, Verlag Nomos, September 2005.

Nach einem Jahrzehnt stürmischen und chaotischen Wachstums soll der neue Entwicklungskurs mehr auf Nachhaltigkeit und sozialen Ausgleich ausgerichtet werden. Die Partei spricht in diesem Kontext nicht mehr von Plänen (*jihua*), sondern von Richtlinienzielsetzungen (*guihua mubiao*).

8.4. Kassandrarufe

Das Modell der harmonischen Entwicklung greift auf die konfuzianische Traditionen zurück, wonach das oberste Ziel der Politik darin bestehen sollte, für Harmonie in der Gesellschaft zu sorgen. Wurden in China mit dem Reformprogramm der eigene Gewinn und die persönliche Bereicherung als die wahren Motoren für die stufenweise Entwicklung angesehen, steht gegenwärtig das öffentliche Wohl nach dem alten Grundsatz salus publica suprema lex wieder im Mittelpunkt öffentlichen Interesses.

Harmonisierung der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung ist heute global gefragt. Nachdenklich stimmen die Kassandrarufe von P. Schumpeter, der in seiner „Kapitalismuskritik", die Zerstörung von Gesellschaften an den äußeren Erfolgen des Kapitals festmacht. Der Kapitalismus, so Schumpeter, werde an seinen äußeren Erfolgen zu Grunde gehen, da er nach keinem Wertesystem handle. Er sehe sich aber durch den Erfolg gezwungen, seine marktwirtschaftlich organisierten Prinzipien in solche Bereiche auszudehnen – wie Familie, Religion und Wertesystem, die die Gemeinschaft aufbrechen und lebensuntüchtig machen.[76] Das ist gewiss nicht nur eine Kritik an der Entwicklung im Westen, sondern global, die auch auf die Entwicklung in China zutreffen könnte, wenn der Raubtierkapitalismus im konfuzianischen Gewandt fortgeführt wird.

8.5. Protestbewegungen und die Menschenrechtsfragen

Bei den Protestbewegungen, die die politische Elite stets verunsicherten, ging es immer auch um Menschenrechtsfragen. Zu erinnern sei an die „Hundert-Blumen-Bewegung" 1957, wo eine Grundsatzdiskussion über Herrschaftsformen und Legitimität des Führungsanspruchs der Partei gefordert wurde. Nach der Beendigung der „Kulturrevolution" (1966–1976) ergossen sich in vielen Städten des Landes große Protestbewegungen (1976; 1978–1979) gegen die Diktatur des Regierens. Was in dieser Zeit auch immer unter dem Begriff „Demokratie" verstanden wurde, so entfachten die Bewegungen und die geführten politischen Debatten neue Funken. Zu erinnern sei, dass die „Vereinigung für die Menschenrechte" in dieser Zeit gegründet wurde. Gefordert wurden die Freilassung politischer Gefangenen, die Freiheit, sich frei im Lande bewegen zu können, Meinungsfreiheit und Redefreiheit.[77] Der Oppositionelle Wei Jingsheng, der bald zum führenden Sprecher der Menschenrechtsbewegung wurde, forderte die „Fünfte Modernisierung", die politische.[78] Solche Forderungen gingen weit über den politischen Reformrahmen hinaus. Er wurde wegen „Verrat von Militärgeheimnissen"

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[76] „Manifesto of the Alliance for Human Rights in China", Index on Censorship 8, September–October 1979: 3–6, cit. from: Roberta Cohen, „People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception", in *Contemporary Asian Studies*, 1988 (86), No. 3, School of Law University of Maryland.

[77] Wei Jingsheng, „The Fifth Modernization: Democracy", Index on Censorship 8, September–October 1979: 9–11, cit. from: Roberta Cohen, op. cit., p. 68.

[78] *Renmin Ribao*, 30.9.1989.

angeklagt und zu langjähriger Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt. Wie hart man mit der Opposition, die sich in der Protestbewegung von 1989 (4. Juni) etablierte, umzugehen beabsichtigte, zeigte das Massaker auf dem Tienanmen-Platz. In der offiziellen Sprachregelung wurde die Niederschlagung als Sieg gegen die „friedliche Revolution" und die „bürgerliche Liberalisierung" gefeiert. Es hieß, dass der Kampf zwischen der „friedlichen Evolution" und der „antifriedlichen Evolution" noch eine lange Zeit andauern würde.[79] Der Westen wurde beschuldigt, mit seiner „hegemonalen Menschenrechtspolitik" auch in China das „Feuer der osteuropäischen Freiheit" zu legen.[80] Interessant ist hier die spätere Analyse des Literaturkritikers und führenden Dissidenten jener Zeit Lu Xiaobo, der in die USA emigrierte. Er korrigierte seine Ansichten von damals. In einem Essay schrieb er, dass führende Dissidenten damals nicht begriffen hätten, dass die Gesellschaft vor allem besser leben und mehr verdienen wollte, dass sie lediglich an wirtschaftlichem Wachstum interessiert gewesen sei. Man sah demonstrierende Massen, schreibt er, ohne redlich zu analysieren, wie viel davon wirklich für Demokratie in China stritten. Auch wurden die Folgen nicht bedacht, als man mit ständig neuen Forderungen an die Regierung herantrat, die außerhalb der politischen Realität standen. Die 4. Juni-Bewegung 1989, so Lu Xiaobo, sei durch die Demokratisierungswellen in der Welt inspiriert worden und so ging die chinesische Opposition, die engen Kontakt zu Vertretern der Menschenrechtsbewegung des Westen unterhielt, davon aus, westliche Demokratien würden sie schon schützen. Man kann dem Autor bei seiner Analyse nur zustimmen, dass heute in China wahrlich noch immer die entsprechenden Bedingungen fehlen, um Demokratie und Menschenrechte nach westlichen Standards umzusetzen, weil eine breite Zustimmung in der Bevölkerung zu solchen Prioritäten noch fehlen.

8.6. Lehren aus dem traditionellen Herrschaftsmodell

Wie wir aus dem oben Dargestellten ersehen können, wird die Legitimation der Herrschaft auch nach fast 30 Jahren, nachdem sich China geöffnet hat, nicht nach dem Recht, sondern aufgrund von zivilisatorischen Aspekten der chinesischen Ethik definiert. So findet eine Position ihre Befürworter, obgleich es an verhaltender Kritik fehlt.

In der Publikation „Zur heutigen Wissenschaft der Ethik" wird betont, dass nach chinesischer Tradition das Regieren von einem sittlichen Herrscher *dezhi* ausging. Diese Art des Regierens führte dann zum Regieren auf der Grundlage des Rechts *fa zhi*. Recht entstand somit infolge von Sittlichkeit. Die beiden Autoren dieser Publikation geben ihrer Überzeugung Ausdruck, dass man in der heutigen Zeit aus diesem so weisen traditionellen Zivilisationsverständnis Lehren ziehen sollte. Der Moral sollte genau so große Aufmerksamkeit erwiesen werden wie den Gesetzen gegenüber.[81]

Protestbewegungen richten sich heute gegen Machtwillkür und fordern Kontrolle über die Amtsgeschäfte von Entscheidungsbefugten. Es mehren sich die Stimmen, die dafür plädieren, sowohl aus der chinesischen Tradition wie auch von westlichen Rechtsauffassungen

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[79] Zhou Jirong, „Zhongguo mianlin de renquan douzheng xingshi" (Die gegenwärtige Situation des Kampfes um die Menschenrechte in China), in *Shijie renquan zongheng* (Über die Menschenrechte in der Welt), Beijing, 1993, p. 313–314.

[80] Wang Zhengping, Zhou Zhongzhi, Xiandai lunlixue, op. cit., p. 37–38.

[81] Li Buyun, „Development of Jurisprudence in the New Era", in *Social Sciences in China*, 2000, Sommer, p. 99–100.

zu lernen. Das sei auch der bisherige Wege in der Menschenrechtspolitik gewesen, einige Dinge anders als früher zu sehen.[82] Zu erwähnen wäre in diesem Zusammenhang, dass zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte der Partei „die Achtung und der Schutz der Menschenrechte" im Bericht des 15. Parteitag der KPCh im Jahre 1997 aufgenommen wurde. Wurden Menschenrechte anfangs noch sehr „spezifisch" wahrgenommen, indem das Recht mit der weisen Rührung der Parteiführer gleichgesetzt wurde, so spricht man heute von der Herrschaft des Gesetzes. Doch die führende Rolle der Partei wird dadurch nicht negiert, aber in Schranken gesetzt.[83]

Von Thomas Hobbe stammt der Satz, dass Autorität und nicht Wahrheit ein Gesetz gültig macht. In China richten sich Richter und Staatsanwälte immer noch zu wenig nach Regeln und Gesetzen, die Gebote der von der Partei verkündeten Sittlichkeit und Moral, Recht zu sprechen, stehen im Vordergrund. Ohne Übertreibung kann man sagen, dass für die chinesische politische Elite, wenn es um Systemfragen geht, ein eigenes Rechts- und Moralverständnis gilt, obgleich in der Wirtschaft recht pragmatisch westliche Rechtsstandards eingeführt werden, um Investoren ins Land zu locken.

9. Neue Bedeutung de Menschenrechtspolitik

9.1. Schlüsselfaktor internationaler Beziehungen und strategischer Entwicklungskonzeptionen

Seit Beginn der großen Reformbewegung vernehmen wir in der chinesischen Politik das Bekenntnis über die Dringlichkeit der Umsetzung der Menschenrechte. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Menschenrechtsfrage zu einer Schlüsselfrage in den internationalen Beziehungen geworden ist, kann sich heute kein Staat in der Welt mehr erlauben, vor allem nicht die VRCh, dem Schutz der Menschenrechte auf der internationalen Bühne nicht volle Unterstützung zu erweisen. Allerdings sollte man sich bewusst machen, dass hinter allgemeiner Zustimmung zahlreiche partikulare Konzeptionen verborgen bleiben.

Seit der Öffnung des Landes wurde die Menschenrechtsfrage zum ersten Mal in der Geschichte Chinas zu einem so bedeutenden Schlüsselfaktor in den internationalen Beziehungen. Wir können diesen Wandel nur vor dem Hintergrund des sich vertiefenden Globalisierungsprozesses nachvollziehen. Bei der Beurteilung sollten wir jedoch nicht dem Irrglauben verfallen, dass sich China in seiner Entwicklung bereits auf dem Wege zur Verwestlichung befindet. Wenn in China über Menschenrechte gesprochen wird, steht dahinter das eigene Menschenrechtsverständnis, das in den wichtigsten Fragen ein Gegenpol zum westlichen Menschenrechtsverständnis darstellt, und das sowohl im internationalen Völkerrecht als auch bezüglich der eigenen Entwicklungskonzeptionen.

Wenn es um die internationale Rolle geht, so sei daran zu erinnern, dass China, nachdem es Anfang der 70er Jahre zur großen diplomatischen Anerkennungswelle gekommen war,

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[82]	ibidem, p.102

[83]	Artur Gradziuk, „Unia Europejska jako inicjator w stosunkach z Chińską Republiką Ludową", in *Polski Przegląd Dyplomatyczny*, Nr. 5, 2004, p. 98. Ist der größte Handelspartner Chinas, das Handelsvolumen betrug 2004 174 Mrd. US D, die Investitionen betragen 35 Mrd. Seit 1978 hat sich das Handelsvolumen 40 mal vergrößert.

Bereitschaft zeigte, an Arbeiten über Menschenrechtsfragen teilzunehmen (1974). 1981 wurde China zum Mitglied der UN-Menschenrechtskommission in Genf gewählt, in deren Nachfolgeorganisation die chinesischen Vertreter eine aktive Politik betreiben. Inzwischen hat die VRCh zahlreiche Menschenrechtskonventionen unterzeichnet. Von besonderer Bedeutung ist die Unterzeichnung des „Internationalen Pakts über wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte" (1997) sowie des „Internationalen Pakts über bürgerliche und politische Rechte" (1998). Obwohl auch die Unschuldsvermutung im chinesischen Recht verankert wurde, wäre zur Verbesserung der Menschenrechte ein faires Rechtssystem und Kontrollinstrumente vonnöten, wie z.B. die Individualbeschwerde. Diese gibt es bis heute noch nicht im chinesischen Recht.

9.2. Zusammenarbeit mit der EU

Auf internationaler Ebene entwickelt sich eine breite Zusammenarbeit beim Schutz der Menschenrechte. Hier sei vor allem die Zusammenarbeit und der Dialog über Menschenrechtsfragen mit der Europäischen Union zu erwähnen. Die Kooperation erstreckt sich auf die verschiedenen Gebiete, wie im Rechtswesen, in der Kommunalpolitik und Umweltpolitik. Die Beziehungen zur EU wurden im Jahre 1975 aufgenommen und haben sich in den folgenden Jahren stetig entwickelt, als von Seiten der EU Konzepte zur Entwicklung der Zusammenarbeit mit China verabschiedet wurden. Im Dokument „Building a comperehence Partnership with China", wurden von Seiten der EU die wichtigsten Schwerpunkte für die kommende Kooperation festgelegt. 2001 wurde ein neues Dokument „EU strategy towards China. Implementation of the 1998 communication and future Stepps for more effective EU-policy" veröffentlicht, in dem die bisherige Zusammenarbeit eine positive Bewertung erfuhr.[84]

Für die chinesische Außenpolitik, die eine multilaterale Weltordnung anstrebt, bedeutet die EU ein besonderer Partner in der Weltpolitik, mit dem sie die politischen und ökonomischen Beziehungen entwickeln und festigen möchte. Anders als die US-Administration, die von der globalen Konstellation, vor allem jedoch in der Taiwan oder Tibetfrage abhängig ist, China Unterstützung verspricht oder verwehrt, hat die EU-Politik einen eindeutigen Standpunkt eingenommen und unterstützt die offizielle Ein – Chinapolitik und unterhält seit Jahren in vielen Bereichen kooperative Zusammenarbeitsprojekte, wie bei der Unterstützung von Demokratisierungsaufgaben, bei der Schaffung eines mehr offenem Rechtssystems oder der Ausbildung von Juristen. Nach dem Massaker auf dem Platz des Himmlischen Friedens (1989) hatten sich die Staaten der EU entschlossen, ein Waffenembargo gegenüber China zu verhängen, über dessen Aufhebung gerade in der letzten Zeit heftig gestritten wird.

Auch die Debatten in der EU, vor allen in Deutschland und Frankreich, über die Aufhebung des Waffenembargos gegenüber China zeigen, wie sich die Beziehungen verändert haben.

In den letzten Jahren versucht China sich auch außenpolitisch der EU weiter anzunähern, um sich der amerikanischen Umklammerung zu entziehen. China versucht, die EU als internationalen Akteur in der Welt zu unterstützen. In dem im Oktober 2003 veröffentlichten

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[84] „New York Times", 3.12.2000, cit. from: *China aktuell*, Hamburg, November 2000, p. 263.

„EU Weißbuch", das erste dieser Art, bringt die chinesische Regierung nicht nur ihre Anerkennung gegenüber den Wirtschaftsleistungen der EU zum Ausdruck, sondern verweist auch auf die besondere Sicherheitsrolle, die die EU bei der Schaffung einer multilateralen Weltordnung spielen könnte. Zweifelsohne besteht nach wie vor ein essenzielles Interesse von Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Lande, die Modernisierung unter Bedingungen eines günstigen internationalen Umfelds fortzuführen.

In den Jahren 1990–1996 standen in Genf in der UNO-Menschenrechtskommission Anträge zur Verurteilung Chinas wegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen zur Debatte, die die EU zusammen mit den USA jährlich eingebracht hatten. Da China jedoch in den letzten Jahren immer mehr Bereitschaft zum Dialog und zur Kooperation zeigte, haben die EU-Länder darauf verzichtet, solche Eingaben vorzubringen. Sie unterstützten somit auch nicht mehr den Antrag der USA zur Verurteilung der Menschenrechtslage in China. Bereits auf der 56. Sitzung der UNO-Menschenrechtskommission am 18. April 2000 mussten die USA zum neunten Mal erleben, dass ihr Antrag, eine Debatte über die Menschenrechtssituation in China zu führen, mit Stimmenmehrheit abgelehnt wurde. Dieses Abstimmungsergebnis wiederholt sich nun Jahr für Jahr. Zu erwähnen wäre, dass die polnische Regierung noch im Jahre 1999 den Antrag der USA zur Verurteilung Chinas voll unterstützte.

Immer wenn im März in Genf die Tagung der UN Menschenrechtskommission bevorstand, gab es zahlreiche Verlautbarungen, vor allem aus den USA, dass sich die Menschenrechtssituation in China verschlechtert habe. Die chinesische Regierung reagierte dann auf die Jahresberichte über die Menschenrechtslage in China mit einer massiven Gegenattacke. Seit dem 11. September hat sich das Klima verbessert. China ist Mitglied des Antiterrorbündnisses geworden, und die USA haben im April 2005 in Genf dem chinesischen Partner zuerkannt, dass bedeutende Schritte bei der Verbesserung der Menschenrechtslage zu verzeichnen seien.

9.3. Rechtstaatlicher Dialog und Zusammenarbeit beim Schutz der Menschenrechte

Es geht bei der Partnerschaft zwischen der EU darum, die Anliegen gegenüber China nicht nur in kurzfristiger, sondern auch langfristiger Zeitperspektive zur Geltung zu bringen. Diesem Ziel soll auch die im Jahre1999 abgeschlossene Vereinbarung über einen rechtsstaatlichen Dialog dienen. Chinesen denken in langfristiger Perspektive, da lohnt es sich, von China zu lernen. Beim Menschenrechtsdialog sollten unsere Werte plausibel gemacht werden. Oft hört man von Politiker, wir wollen, dass sich China vernünftig entwickelt. Doch was ist vernünftig?

Das chinesische Außenministerium und die UN-Hochkommissarin für Menschenrechte, Mary Robinson, unterzeichneten im November 2000 in Beijing ein Memorandum über die Zusammenarbeit beim Schutz der Menschenrechte. Hierbei geht es vor allem um Kooperationsprogramme, deren Aufgabe darin bestehen soll, mit westlicher Hilfe chinesische Richter, Staatsanwälte wie auch Akademiker fortzubilden. Vertreter von Human Rights Watch werteten diesen Besuch äußerst kritisch, da sich die UN-Hochkommissaren für Menschenrechte zu kooperativ gezeigt und zu wenig Kritik geäußert hätte.[85] Es ist unverständlich, wie eine Zusammenarbeit auf diesem so wichtigen Gebiet abgelehnt werden

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[85] *Xinhua*, 16.09. 2005.

kann, werden doch erste Schritte getan. Ein konstruktiver Dialog und konkrete Hilfe, wie bei der Weiterbildung von Juristen führen im Endeffekt doch weiter als eine konfrontative Politik.

9.4. Unterschiedliche Positionen in der internationalen Gemeinschaft

In den vergangenen Jahren haben sich in der internationalen Gemeinschaft zwei verschiedene Positionen in Fragen der Zusammenarbeit mit China herausgebildet. Fordern die einen, eine geschlossene Strategie der Konditionalität zu entwickeln, d.h. Entwicklungshilfe an menschenrechtliche Bedingungen zu binden, um China unter Druck zu setzen, so geht die andere Position darauf aus, aktuell scheint sie sich in der internationalen Gemeinschaft durchzusetzen, dass die wachsende Wirtschaftsgroßmacht nicht erpressbar sei. Prognostizierte man doch im Westen nach der Niederschlagung der Studentenbewegung Stagnation und Terror, der das Land wieder übersäen würde, so zeigte die Entwicklung, dass es keine Stagnation gab. Doch das autoritäre Herrschaftssystem in China steht vor der Herausforderung, in die Politik Transparenz zu bringen. Statt einem Rückfall in die Planwirtschaft, wie düstere Prognosen voraussahen, werden weiter hin hohe Zuwachsraten verbucht, wie die Presseagentur Xinhua[86] stolz vermeldete, auch wenn immer mehr Problemfelder die Entwicklung begleiten. Damit hat sich weder die Konzeption, politische Demokratisierung als Vorbedingung für effektive Wirtschaftsentwicklung, noch die Politik auf eine Demokratisierung zu verzichten, als fruchtbar erwiesen. Mag man auch im Westen die universale Geltung der Menschenrechte beanspruchen, so müssen wir uns bewusst sein, dass sie sich einer universalen Lesart nicht so schnell erfreuen wird.

Viele Chinabeobachter stimmen darin überein, dass eine Ausgrenzung Chinas, welcher Couleur auch immer, zu einer negativen Sprengkraft werden könnte. Wichtig ist, den Dialog und die Zusammenarbeit in der Menschenrechtsfrage fortzusetzen. Doch wichtig ist ebenfalls, den Dialog nicht allein aus einer westlichen Missionshaltung heraus zu führen. Zentrales Anliegen sollte die Entwicklung und Förderung des politischen Wandels zu Rechtsstrukturen und die Verbesserung des Schutzes der Menschenrechte darstellen. Eine einseitige Gesinnungsethik wird sich als kaum hilfreich erweisen. Immer mehr setzt sich die Überzeugung durch, dass alle Kulturen Konzepte über die Würde des Menschseins beinhalten. Mit dieser Erkenntnis sind auch Voraussetzungen entstanden für einen dialogfähigen Menschenrechtsbegriff.

Die Modernisierung Ostasiens, die sich nicht nach westlichen Standards vollzieht, bedeutete zweifelsohne für den Westen eine Herausforderung.

9.5. Menschenrechtssituation in China

Trotz aller „Besonderheiten", auf die die chinesische Elite bei der Menschenrechtsfrage pocht, beobachten wir einen sanften Wandel in der Menschenrechtssituation. Hierbei geht es nicht um die Gewährung zahlreicher Rechte, die in der chinesischen Verfassung aufgelistet sind, Das muss im Lichte der Präambel bewertet werden. Sie sind den Prinzipien der Kommunistischen Partei und ihrem theoretischen Entwicklungskonzept vom Aufbau des Sozialismus mit chinesischen Besonderheiten untergeordnet. Zu erwähnen seien

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[86] *Xinhua*, 16.09. 2005

aber der Aufbau eines Rechtssystems in Zusammenarbeit mit dem westlichen Ausland, die Zuerkennung der persönlichen Freiheiten für die Bürger oder auch die Bemühungen in der Umweltpolitik. Aktuell hat die Regierung beschlossen, das diskriminierende Haushalsregistrierungssystem für die Landbevölkerung als probeweise in 23 Provinzen abzuschaffen. Damit erhalten die Wanderarbeiter die Chance, sich im Ort ihrer Beschäftigung registrieren zu lassen und gleichberechtigte Bürger zu werden. Das sei ein weiterer Schritt zur Verbesserung der Menschenrechtslage in China.[87]

Nachdem die chinesische Regierung UNO-Experten freien Zugang zu Haftanstalten erteilt hatte, um Folterpraktiken im chinesischen Haftsystem zu untersuchen, kam der Vorsitzende und Sonderbeauftragten der Menschenrechtskommission der UNO Manfred Nowak zu dem Ergebnis, dass man China von dem Vorwurf systematischer Folter zu entlasten sei. Die internationale Reaktion darauf fiel dagegen sehr verhalten aus.[88]

Bei aller Anerkennung des positiven Wandels im Bereich der Menschenrechtspolitik, muss man jedoch betonen, dass in China noch immer zahlreiche Menschenrechtsverletzungen an der Tagesordnung sind. Die Liste der Menschenrechtsverstöße ist lang: Die Todesstrafe wird immer noch zu schnell verhängt, obgleich ein stärkeres Kontrollsystem eingeführt wurde. In der Haft wird gefoltert, Andersdenkende sitzen ohne Gerichtsverfahren im Gefängnis oder verbüßen eine Strafe im Arbeitslager. Beklagt werden Zwangsarbeit und Verfolgung von religiösen Würdenträgern, Glaubensgemeinschaften, Angehörigen Nationaler Minderheiten wie in Tibet oder auch Xinjiang. Es gibt weiterhin Berichte über die Tötung weiblicher Säuglinge und über den Organhandel. Dissidenten oder „Separatisten" werden als Landesverrätern verurteilt, die die ganze Härte des Strafrechts trifft. Trotz allem Fortschritt bezüglich bestimmter Menschenrechte gibt es keine unabhängige Justiz und die Tradition der Abschreckung gilt immer noch als eines der wichtigsten Mittel zur Kontrolle der Bevölkerung.

Abschließende Bemerkungen

Die politische Elite bedarf bisher keiner demokratischen Legitimation, weil sie sich berufen fühlt, Volkswohl zu schaffen, die Grundbedingungen für eine menschliche Existenz mit Hilfe von Wirtschaftsentwicklung und sozialer Modernisierung zu legen. Wirtschaftswachstum legitimiert sie bis jetzt. Als das wichtigste und erste Menschenrecht gilt wie zu uralten Zeiten das „Recht auf Leben und Existenz", um das das chinesische Volk lange Jahre gekämpft hätte und nun besitze.

Die VRCh versucht in der Menschenrechtsfrage weiterhin ihren „Sonderweg" zu gehen, obgleich auch dieser nicht statisch ist. Die Modernisierung des Landes in Kooperation mit den westlichen Industrieländern wird unweigerlich Auswirkungen auf den Kurs des „Sonderwegs" zeitigen und das rechtliche, politische und gesellschaftliche System weiter verändern.

Als abschließende Reflexion sei die Frage in den Raum gestellt, mit welcher Begründung die bestehenden Menschenrechte einen universalen Anspruch erheben. Ich denke, die Antwort kann nur lauten, dass der Anspruch nur dann gerechtfertigt ist, wenn alle Kulturen ihren Beitrag zum Menschenrechtsverständnis geben. Nur langsam scheint sich die Überzeugung herauszubilden, dass es weder für die Entwicklung noch für die Modernisierung noch für den Aufbau von Herrschaftsstrukturen einen universellen Weg

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[87] *China aktuell*, 6/2005, p. 61.

geben kann. Jeder Modernisierungsprozess ist kulturell und traditionell in die eigene Geschichte eingebunden. Aus der Geschichte der unterschiedlichen Zivilisationen wissen wir gut, dass die großen Utopien der Menschheit, sich aus der Herrschaft des materiellen Daseins zu befreien, in Kriegen und unzähligen Versprechungen, die Welt zu gesunden, untergegangen sind. So verschieden auch die Wertung des Anderen sein mag, so wird in den Kulturen jedoch weiterhin der Wunschtraum einer Identität vom neuen Menschsein in einer menschlichen Gesellschaft geträumt. Bedeutete im 20. Jahrhundert die Tradition eine Last, so entdeckt man sie heute in China als kostbares Erbe, das China auf seinem Wege zu einem modernen Staat verhelfen könnte.

Zur chinesischen Identität gehört, sich zu vervollkommnen, wie es Konfuzius lehrte, d.h. immer wieder bestrebt sein, etwas Großes zu vollbringen. So gehört China inzwischen zu den Nationen, denen es gelungen ist, einen Mensch ins All zu schießen. Taikong – das All – soll auch mit chinesischen Taikonauten (nicht Astronauten wie in den USA oder gar Kosmonauten wie in Rußland) erobert werden. Für 2010 ist die erste bemannte Mondlandung geplant. Wenn das gelingen sollte, dann möchte China zum 60. Jahrestag der Gründung der VRCh seinen Glanz aus alten Zeiten in ehrenwerter Größe wiedererlangen.

BOGDAN S. ZEMANEK

The Taiwanese Self-image in the Presidential Campaign of 2004: Political Rhetoric and Creation of a New Identity

1. Introduction

Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait are considered to be one of the world hotspots, because of the strong political movement on the island, whose aim is to declare formal[1] independence. This movement meets with equally strong opposition from the People's Republic of China (PRC), who is willing to tolerate actual independence of Taiwan as long as the legal fiction of "one China" is preserved, but threatens to use force if formal separation is declared – this position being aditionally strengthened by adoption of the so-called "Anti-Secession Law".[2] Taiwan's pro-independence leaders assert that the Taiwanese people have as much right for self-determination as any other nation. But do the Taiwanese form a nation? The group of people declaring themselves 'Taiwanese' (as opposed to e.g. the Chinese living in Taiwan) is certainly increasing [Sławiński, 2002, Ho and Liu, 2002],[3] and so is the number of people who actively promote their views of the Taiwanese being different from the Chinese and not merely 'overseas compatriots'. The media allied with these elites also grow in importance [Wang, 2003b] and researchers discuss the question of Taiwanese nationalism [Shih, 2003]. The aim of this study is to describe how the media allied with the pro-independence elites describe the Taiwanese, what image of their own group they

[1] The discussion whether Taiwan (or more precisely Republic of China on Taiwan) is an (independent) state is still ongoing, mainly due to the extraordinary political sensitivity of the question. The legal and historical aspects of this question I have discussed elsewhere (M. Kłaczyński, B.S. Zemanek, "The Status of the Taiwanese State in the Light of International Law", *Acta Asiatica Varsoviensa*, no 18, p. 7–19).

[2] Adopted at the Third Session of the Tenth National People's Congress on March 14, 2005. The article 8 states: "In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity." URL: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html, retrieved on 2007-10-17.

[3] Even more pronounced is the decline of "Chinese only" choice. Data compiled by the National Zhengzhi University for the years 1992-2007 show that the number of people choosing the latter position dropped from 26.2% to a mere 5,5%; at the same time the number of respondents choosing 'Taiwanese only' identity grew fom 17.3% to 43.7%. Election Study Center, N.C.C.U., *Important political attitude trend distribution*, URL: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/eng/data/data03-2.htm, retrieved on 2007-10-17.

create. Such a self-image plays both a social and a political role, and since the question of the Taiwanese identity is a complicated one, it is certainly worth studying [Wachman, 1994a]. It is important to note that although only the media of a certain political orientation were analysed, they described the Taiwanese people as a whole, not a separate group of pro-indenpedentists or Pan-Green followers.[4]

The research was conducted during the presidential campaign of 2004. I hoped the debate would bring to the surface many issues, such as those of identity – usually not discussed, as they are taken for granted. Two coalitions competed in this election: the Pan-Blue coalition of two parties: the Kuomintang (*Guomindang*, KMT) and the People's First Party (*Qinmindang*, PFP), whose candidates were Lien Chan[5] and James Soong; and the Pan-Green coalition, built around the Democratic Progressive Party (*Minjindang*, DPP), with Chen Shuibian and Annette Lu as candidates. The two sides (subsequently referred to as the Blue and the Green) were also identified as 'pro-unification' and 'pro-independence', respectively. The so-called[6] independence vs. unification issue turned out to be the most important point of divergence during the whole campaign. The economical or social views of the contestants were relatively similar, so the question of independence gained even greater additional importance. The similarity in other areas also caused the campaign to be much concentrated on personal issues, with lots of mud-slinging from both sides – which was very unfortunate for my research, as personal attacks replaced more in-depth discussions.

I focused on the pro-independence side, because I believed that it was this wing who had shaped the political discourse for more than a decade. To legitimize their claims for a separate state, they 'had to have' a nation, which meant they had to find ways to unite the Taiwanese society, hitherto divided throughout its history. To achieve this goal they introduced new ways of thinking and speaking about the people of Taiwan, different from the earlier ethnic denominations. Such nation-building process is well-described in theoretical literature [Anderson, 1991, Gellner, 1983]. The fact that no-one even attempted to openly oppose their statements about the existence of the Taiwanese nation, is undoubtedly their greatest success.

The pro-indenpedence side suffered great political losses during the second term of Chen Shuibian's presidency, mainly because of the corruption scandals. Viewed as a political device, the "nation-unifing" rhetoric, which – election-wise – proved barely sufficient in 2004, may not be sufficient at all in the incoming 2008 presidential elections. The results presented below may serve as a reference material for analyses of current political rhetoric, creation and (re)construction of Taiwanese ethnic and national consciousness.

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[4] In this paper I omit the methodological issues of self-stereotype and self-image, preferring to present more of the actual contents of the Taiwanese self-description.

[5] The names of the parties and people I gave in the form which appear most often in the English language literature and which they themselves use; they are not uniform with regard to the Romanisation, although *hanyu pinyin* equivalents are usually given.

[6] In fact neither side declared the will to unite with PRC or claim formal independence immediately.

2. Research Method and Materials

The materials came from the two main pro-independence dailies, the Chinese language *Ziyou Shibao* (*Liberty Times*, abbreviated to ZS in this paper) and the English-language *Taipei Times* (TT). Both are mainstream media, which are supposed to represent popular opinions and not the views of some marginal, extremist groups; they also enjoy wide readership and are the most influential. I collected the editorials representative of the main ideological line of the papers, which discussed the most important matters [Dijk, 1996]; they were also consistent in form. Because I was interested in the way the Taiwanese see themselves I excluded all articles written by foreigners or overseas Taiwanese, even if they were perfect illustrations of the newspapers' line. I planned to compare two samples, one from the presidential campaign (the three months before the elections: December 20th 2003 to March 20th 2004) and the 'control' sample, from a similar period after the elections (March 21st to June 20th 2004). However, because of the post-election political crisis, the political debate did not cool down and the material turned out to be very uniform.

I used two newspapers in different languages in order to check whether any noticeable differences can be discerned in the presentation of the same issues for local (ZS) and foreign (TT) readers. I did not notice any major discrepancies – that is also why most of the quotations below are from the *Taipei Times*. They present the same views as the other paper, but the *Taipei Times* English is better than my own translations from the Chinese. These quotations are representative as 'the best, the most clear examples' of the issues discussed and not as 'the most frequent occurrences'.

The method used was that of discourse analysis. I chose this qualitative method, as I was mainly interested in the contents of the discussion, in understanding its meanings, which is exactly the goal of discourse analysis. The main feature of discourse analysis is analysing the texts by placing them within a broader context, which is deemed crucial for understanding them properly [Dijk, 1997, Sandig and Selting, 1997]. There can be many contexts for any utterance: sociological, political, linguistic etc. I decided to use three contexts: historical, ethnic and political. All of them are very important to the creation of the nation. Theoreticians of primordial school stress these three fields as real constituents of a nation (a common ethnicity//culture, a common history of the given community and the existence of a political unit which encompasses it), while the more constructivist-oriented ones enumerate them as nation's perceived constituents, on the basis of which the concept of nation is created [Brass, 1991, Gellner, 1983].

3. The Three Contexts

3.1. Historical Background

The history of Taiwan has several particular features which set it apart from other regions of the broadly-defined Chinese world. One of these features is that the Han Chinese, who now constitute 97% of the island's population, came there in several migration waves in relatively recent times, i.e. the last 400 years; the original inhabitants, the so-called Taiwanese Aborigines, were gradually marginalised and ended up either fully assimilated or as dwellers of high mountains, of little economical and political importance. The other is that the island used to be a foreign colony. Both these factors caused the division of

political power among various ethnic groups, which was typical of Taiwan's history, although the lines of division were different in different periods. The history of Taiwan is well described elsewhere[7], so I shall mention only those elements that may be perceived as distinct and/or constitutive of the Taiwanese consciousness.

Prior to the arrival of the Dutch in 1624, the Aborigines were sole masters of the island. Despite its close proximity to the China coast, the Chinese did not manifest much interest in this territory. Only after the Dutch colony was established, the Chinese immigrant workers arrived in larger numbers; next wave of the Chinese immigration was at the time of Zheng Chenggong's invasion (1661), which ended the Dutch rule. The Qing dynasty managed to establish its control in 1683; during 212 years of its rule the immigration policies varied, but the Chinese population increased, effectively absorbing the Aborigines [Chen, 1994]. In 1895 the island passed into the hands of the Japanese, who were the first to establish full and effective control on the entire territory, subjugating the last independent Aborigines [Barclay, 1999] and the Chinese; they also developed local economy. In 1945 the Republic of China, led by the Kuomintang, took over power; unfortunately, the Chinese misrule caused widespread tensions, which erupted in the February 28 Uprising of 1947 (known as the 2–28 Incident) [Lai et al., 1991]. A lasting effect of the bloodily supresed rising was the rift between the *benshengren* (literally 'locally born') – people whose forefathers came before 1895 – and *waishengren* ('born outside'), recent newcomers from the mainland, mainly KMT followers and soldiers. The *waishengren*, who escaped to Taiwan after the KMT had lost the war with the Communists on the mainland, established themselves as the ruling elite and their military regime lost its rule only after the democratisation of the country in the 1980s and 90s. In 2000, the opposition, grouped around the DPP, which mainly appealed to 'local people', won the elections and ended the half a century of KMT rule.

3.2. Ethnic Background

The first people on Taiwan were the ancestors of the Aborigines. Despite being relative latecomers, Han Chinese were able to quickly gain numerical superiority, thanks to the more intensive agriculture, capable of sustaining more people. The Hans were divided into people from the Fujian province, speaking the *minnan* language, called Hoklo (Holo; pronounced Fulao in the standard Mandarin Chinese), who were further divided into people from the Quanzhou and Zhangzhou regions; and Hakka people from the Guangdong province. Until 1949, these three groups constituted 98% of the Chinese population [Chen, 1987]. Throughout the 18th and 19th centuries (at least until 1860s), these groups frequently fought each other (and also within themselves), which caused the settlement to be divided into discreet, almost ethnically uniform, territorial units [Shepherd, 1993]. Apart from these sub-ethnic fights, there were conflicts between the Hans and the Aborigines, mainly caused by Chinese encroachment on Aborigine land, and conflicts between the Hans, Aborigines and the colonisers, first Dutch, later Japanese. It made the island a very unstable place, especially during the Qing rule [Lamley, 1981].

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[7] See for example J.W. Davidson, *The Island of Formosa, Past and Present. History, People Resources and Commercial Prospects*, Taipei: Southern Materials Center, Inc., 1903, 1988); M.R. Sławiński, *Historia Tajwanu* (History of Taiwan), Warszawa: Elipsa, 2000; W. Zhou, *Taiwan lishi tushuo* (Ilustrated history of Taiwan), Taipei: Lianjing Chubanshe, 2004.

The Japanese period brought about important changes in the ethno-cultural situation of the island. First, the Aborigines were totally subjugated for the first time. Second, among the Chinese there emerged new elites, influenced by modern political thought. During the relatively liberal Taisho era there was quite a lot of political activism among the Taiwanese. Some of them tried to develop a modern form of Chinese patriotism, some leant towards 'localisation' and Taiwanese consciousness, and finally, many of them became partially Japanised (sometimes to a large degree) [Chen, 1972]. The primeval (sub)ethnic backgrounds (Hakka or Hoklo and then Zhangzhou or Quanzhou) started to ebb slowly, because the modernising society was becoming more uniform. Most importantly, all these people shared the same experiences, radically different from those of the mainland Chinese.[8]

The clash between the two world-views of the local inhabitants and the KMT ruling elites, who came in 1945, formed a deep background for the incidents of 1947. Afterwards the *benshengren/waishengren* conflict superseded all earlier ones. The tensions united the Hoklos (70% of population) and the Hakkas (15%) into one group of *benshengren*, and the Mainlanders (who came from many provinces and were a very diverse group) into relatively uniform *waishengren* – 13% [Chang, 1994]. The *waishengren* assumed not only political, but also cultural dominance [Cheng, 1994]. After 60 years, although less pronounced thanks to uniformisation and intermarriage, the conflict still goes on. A good example of it were the political tensions over the issue of introducing the local languages into schools and/or as the second official language, alongside the standard Chinese (*guoyu*, Mandarin), the mother tongue of the *waishengren* [Shih, 2002].

3.3. Political Background

The imminent political background of the campaign was the competition between the mainly Hoklo-based DPP and the *waishengren*-supported KMT inside the country; and on the other hand, the competition between the PRC and the Republic of China (ROC on Taiwan) on the international scene.

After the KMT lost the civil war on the Chinese mainland, it withdrew to Taiwan, established a military, authoritarian state and efficiently controlled the local population, although its direct supporters were a minority. Only in the late 1970s, when it was obvious that reconquering China was impossible, the ROC lost its place in the United Nations and became more and more politically isolated, the KMT leadership decided to attract more *benshengren* into the Party and then gradually democratise the state. In 1986, after 38 years, the martial law was abolished. On the base of previous *dangwai* ('outside the party') activists, the DPP was formed. In 1996 the first direct, free presidential elections were organized.[9] At the time, the

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[8] Many researchers point to the Japanese period as formative for the Taiwanese consciousness; see e.g. A. Hsiau, *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism*, London and New York: Routledge, 2000.

[9] This period is much analysed and described. See for example: T. Cheng–j., Haggard S., *Political change in Taiwan*, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992; Y. Chu, *The Challenges of Democratic Consolidation*, p. 149–167, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999; B.J. Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan. The Adaptability of Leninist Parties*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997; C.S. Meaney, *Liberalization, Democratization, and the Role of the KMT*, p. 95–120, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1992; S. Tsang, H. Tien, *Democratization in Taiwan. Implications for China*, London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999; A.M. Wachman, *Taiwan. National Identity and Democratization*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1994.

PRC, which for the previous two decades had been too absorbed with its domestic trouble, started to pay more attention to the ROC and tried to intimidate Taiwanese voters by launching missiles close to the island. The tactic misfired and the moderate pro-independence candidate, Lee Teng-hui, won.[10]

During the 1990s, several more political reforms took place, streamlining political organization of the state and forming a stable legal basis for multi-party democracy. The following elections were won by Chen Shuibian, the DPP candidate, mainly thanks to the split votes of the KMT followers. Some of them voted for the main KMT candidate and some for the former KMT member, later a leader of his own People's First Party, James Soong. The first term of Chen's presidency was marked by further reforms, although he did not attempt to change the constitution, which is still written for the ROC encompassing the entire territory of China; such movement would be tantamount to declaring Taiwan's formal separation from mainland China.

During the last two decades, the PRC maintained steady political pressure on the island, backed up by military build-up [Joffe, 1997, Shambaugh, 1998, Yu, 1997]; at the same time, it attracted Taiwanese investors and visitors [Yang and Hung, 2003]. The PRC enjoyed huge economic growth and the contacts and economic exchange across the Taiwan Strait are also growing fast, although neither of the states legally recognizes the other and the political tensions grow rather than diminish. At the moment the situation in the Taiwan Strait is a stalemate: China wants to incorporate the island and hardened its position by withdrawing from Deng Xiaoping's "one nation, two systems" plan (on which Hong Kong-style autonomy is based) and adopting the already mentioned "anti-secession law". Taiwan wants to remain separate, either preserving the status quo or declaring formal independence.

4. Discussion

The heated atmosphere of the 2004 presidential campaign certainly did not facilitate in-depth reflection on the subject of identity.[11] The descriptions listed below were fished from among personal attacks and vehement political diatribes. The temperature of debate caused the political element to overshadow the other two. In this paper I have alotted almost equal space for each of the three areas discussed, but in articles I read the political aspect occupied far larger space. Also in the discussion I often refer to the articles about Taiwan, and not the Taiwanese people. However, Taiwan was often used as a metonymy for its inhabitants and was described with such personal attributes like 'courage' or 'wisdom'.

4.1. The Taiwanese – a General Description

The Taiwanese were described mainly through their latest achievements, among which democracy was the dominant theme. They were depicted as supporting democracy, loving

[10] This so-called "Third Taiwan Strait Crisis" and its political and social effects have been extensively discussed (R.S. Ross, "The 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and Use of Force", *International Security*, no. 25, 2000, p. 87–123, includes a detailed description of the events).

[11] Dr Hermann Halbeisen from Cologne University, who has been following the developments of Taiwanese press for a long time, noted in his comments on the earlier version of this paper that the press in Taiwan is so deply entrenched in political divisions that such discussions are usually relegated to the books or other non-periodical publications. Therefore the quotations below can be regarded more as a political rhetorhic. I hope they are still interesting, at least as a view on a certain political project.

freedom, acting legally, but lacking dignity, denied to them by the PRC and the international community, which believed in the PRC's lies.

Wisdom and rationalism were the central personality traits attributed to the Taiwanese. Their courage, which was also underlined, was tempered by wisdom. Thanks to these characteristics the islanders were able to cope with crises: "Although Taiwan was in an unfavourable position and faced various threats, the Taiwanese people successfully resolved the difficulties with their rationality and wisdom." Some of their wisdom had been gained in a hard way: "baptised by a long period of vicious partisan wrangling, voters have gotten smarter. They will not be easily manipulated by partisan propaganda" [TT 2003-12-18]. Wisdom is usually attained with maturity and indeed, such a trait was also listed as typical: "the people of Taiwan and Taiwanese democracy are already quite mature". This enabled them to finish the elections despite the assassination attempt directed at Chen Shuibian [TT 2004-03-22].

These traits were sometimes juxtaposed with the politicians' character, seen as not always rising to these standards. They "underestimated the voters wisdom" [TT 2003-12-18]. In fact they sowed distrust among the people, and their manipulations and quarrels tired the population: "exhausted by partisan disputes, ethnic divisions and extremism on both sides of the unification-independence dichotomy, the country wants political leaders to resolve their differences" [TT 2004-05-01]. From this we can infer that the Taiwanese used to be a trusting people with no love for conflicts. Although not directly stated, such a description is consistent with their love for peace and warm-heartedness, depicted elsewhere.

Let us now see what the situation looks like in more specific contexts.

4.2. The Taiwanese throughout the Ages

Historical references were relatively numerous, but mostly limited to modern history and more often served as vehicles for political attacks rather than as illustrations of the Taiwanese character. Typically they recalled the "five decades of authoritarian rule and 'black gold' politics" [TT 2004-02-28], during which the "[KMT acquired] expertise in the dark arts of vote-rigging" [TT 2004-05-10]. The times of the Dutch and Japanese colonisation, the latter formative for the Taiwanese consciousness, were hardly mentioned. The problem was that although this period was so important and on the whole not too negatively perceived by the *benshengren*, praising foreign occupation was not a good policy for a pro-independence party. Attacks on Japan were also not a viable option, since the Green coalition was (and still is) very interested in maintaining good contacts with the Japanese, for economical reasons. The political rhetoricians had to choose a very narrow path here.

In the historical context *Ziyou Shibao* mentions Japan twice in six months. First, when developing a lengthy parallel between Japan and the KMT, with a conclusion that although "love for Taiwan" was always in the mouth of the Japanese, their acts showed only self-interest – their falsehood was equal to the Chinese Kuomintang's [ZS 2004-04-21]. The other article lists the foreign occupants whom the Taiwanese had to endure: the Dutch, the Japanese and "Chiang Kai-shek's regime". Two points should be addressed here: first, all three rulers are put on equal footing (which is consistent with other articles calling the KMT's government "alien" and "colonising"); second, the text introduces a mythical figure of the Taiwanese, who survived their rule and learned how to love his country. Similarly, when saying that "the Taiwanese [...] is a person who embraces what Taiwan represented for the last 300 years" [TT 2004-03-01] the article leaves it up to the readers to decide what exactly "Taiwan" did represent.

We may guess the author of the article would rather choose the freedom and new possibilities for the Chinese immigrants and not banditry, abuse of Aborigine rights and ethnic warfare, which were equally (if not more) typical of historical Taiwan.

The other not much discussed part of the island's history was – which may appear surprising – the democratisation process of the 80s and 90s. The KMT (or Chiang Kai-shek's) dictatorship and the current democracy were both mentioned, but usually in general terms. Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Teng-hui, the former ROC presidents responsible for initiating and then continuing the democratisation process [Cheng and Haggard, 1992], were remembered favourably, but not much more was said about them. Obviously, the Green elites are more future-oriented and they stick to the policy of no reprisals, which allowed the KMT to retain its huge property, in exchange for peacefully stepping down from power. I guess that was the reason why there were no "combatant stories" in the newspapers. The general tone towards history was reconciliatory – in the words of vice-president Annette Lu, talking about the 2–28 Incident, "the tragedies of history can be forgiven, but they cannot be forgotten" [TT 2004-02-29].

Both the relative scarcity and the contents of the historical remarks are consistent with Gellner's and Anderson's "forward-oriented" theories of nation building, which stress the importance of education and the press (or media) in reconstructing nation's history.[12]

4.3. The Issues of Ethnicity

The most important point – the very existence of the Taiwanese nation – was actually never discussed. The nation's ethnic diversity/unity were discussed, but the question whether such entity exists at all was never raised.

The following quotation is representative of the way ethnic issues were presented: "Ethnic issues involve vested interests, the power to interpret history, the power to guide culture and the power to allocate resources over the past half century, as well as Taiwan's ultimate problem – a review of national identity" [TT 2004-01-15]. As we can see, the articles discussed what constitute the national identity, but they assumed all the time there was a national identity.

The ethnic diversity was not discussed in great detail – much more stress was placed on the national unity.[13] The Pan-Green coalition, often accused of being a party of the Hoklos, acknowledged it ("DPP obviously can win an election on Hoklo votes alone" [TT 2004-03-01]), but stressed that it was the other side who tried to play dirty with ethnicity and spread discord ("KMT insincere on ethnic harmony" said a headline [TT 2004-01-15]). The Chinese Kuomintang (using the whole name was a way to show that it was not a true local Taiwanese party) was presented as an alien rule, which exploited the local ethnic divisions and relied on the Aborigine minorities and the Hakkas, just as the Qing dynasty government used to do (the author even used the word *yimin* ("loyal people"), meaning the Hakkas' militias who supported the Qing [TT 2004-04-22]). The reason the *waishengren* supported the Blue was because these politicians "had always used ethnic campaigning to reinforce

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[12]   Such reconstruction demands quite a lot of remembrance and of forgetting (as easily seen in the above mentioned omissions of important historical facts), which puts vice-president Lu's words in somehow ironical light.

[13]   Some articles openly stated the ethnic problem was not so significant: the weakening of people's trust because of the partisanship and political quarrels was much worse [TT 2004-04-21].

this by playing up a siege mentality among the Mainlanders, frightening them with tales of a vengeful Hoklo-dominated DPP" [TT 2004-03-01].

The proposed cure for all these ills was ethnic unity: "If we want to thoroughly break the curse of ethnicity [...] we need an ethnicity-transcending political platform and mind-set. Only by uniting under the banner of national consciousness can we become one instead of fragmenting into different ethnic groups" [TT 2004-04-22]. To achieve this, the authors tried to develop new, all encompassing definitions of the "Taiwanese". The simplest one was presented by the article about the rally commemorating the 2–28 Incident: "Everyone who lives here is Taiwanese." The same text stated that:

> in the past many people in Taiwan perceived the 2–28 Incident as a massacre of native Taiwanese by the ruling Chinese regime, [now] people in Taiwan – across all ethnic groups – have come to realize that such an interpretation is an over-simplified depiction of the tragedy.[...] it was the intention of the organizers to highlight the theme of ethnic harmony and unity through this rally – as demonstrated by the participation of people from every ethnic group [...] and the invitation of representatives from the five major ethnic groups in Taiwan to stand next to [the president] [TT 2004-02-29].

It was not clear what five groups were refered to (the usual number is four: the Aborigines, Hakka, Hoklo and *waishengren* [Wang, 2003a]), but it should be noted that using the event which created a rift between the *ben-* and *waishengren* groups as a symbol of unity was a powerful rhetoric device.

Another article went further and incorporated in the discourse the concept of the "New Taiwanese" originally coined by Lee Teng-hui and sometimes criticised for being a tool for winning Hoklo support for the KMT. The author explained:

> After all, this is why any person of Han origin is in Taiwan. It doesn't matter if they came to Taiwan in the 1630s to work for the Dutch, the 1940s to escape the Communists or yesterday as an illegal immigrant to escape the hellhole that is China today. All came to Taiwan to get away from China.
> Turning your back on China and turning toward the opportunity that for 300 years Taiwan has represented – that is a pretty good definition of what it means to be a New Taiwanese [TT 2004-03-01].

The main point here is the opposition between Taiwan and China, an opposition which was even more pronounced in the politically-minded texts. To be a Taiwanese it is necessary to declare oneself as not-Chinese.

Interestingly, the Aborigines and their relations with the Hans were almost left out of the picture. One possible explanation is their small number;[14] the other one is that they usually support the KMT, so it was probably taken for granted that the Green politicians

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[14] Despite reforms, the Aborigens are still a weak minority in Taiwan. Cf.S. Hsieh, "From Shanbao to Yuanzhumin: Taiwanese Aborigines in Transition", in M.A. Rubinstein, ed., *The Other Taiwan. 1945 to the Present*, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994, p. 404–421; F. Wang, *Dangdai Taiwan shehui de zuqun sixiang* (Ethnic Imagination in Contemporary Taiwan), Taipei: Zuxue Chubanshe, 2003.

could not influence their political options. *Taipei Times* acknowledged that "indigenous people" [...] land has been exploited by the Hoklo' so they may feel resentment, but *Ziyou Shibao* reminded that during KMT rule the Aborigines had been doubly denied their identity: first because the regime decreed they were all members of one nation, together with all other people of China; and that it was Chinese (Han) nation [ZS 2004-02-16].

4.4. Politics: the Central Theme

The Taiwanese were most thoroughly discussed, defined and re-defined in the context of politics. The dominant theme was Taiwan's relations with the PRC. In short, Taiwan was depicted as everything the PRC was not; there was a polar opposition between the images of the two states: democratic – autocratic, peaceful – warlike, benevolent – malevolent, open – close minded. Most of the texts focused on the states (PRC and ROC/Taiwan respectively) and not on the people, but as I have already noted, in this discourse the states and the people were used interchangeably.

The issue placed above all others was that of Taiwan's sovereignty, which "can never be laid aside" [TT 2004-02-17], because without it human rights, property rights etc. could not be protected (which leads the readers to infer that the Taiwanese now enjoy and should enjoy these rights). As a separate country, Taiwan has the right to establish normal international relations [ZS 200405-02]; the division between the PRC and ROC was depicted as a fact and the Taiwanese accepted the existence of two states on the two sides of the Strait (which China was unable to do) [TT 2004-06-08]. In the context of the elsewhere noted "pigheaded obstinacy" of the Beijing leaders, we can derive here the opposition between the Taiwanese (realists) and China (not willing to face the facts).

The texts noted that the fact that the Taiwanese considered the PRC to be a separate state did not mean they were hostile towards it. On the contrary, they supported the dialogue, but only on condition of maintaining their sovereignty and under supervision of the international community – otherwise they would have no reason to trust the PRC [TT 2004-01-18]. They were too wise to trust blindly and in the past they had learnt the costs of the authoritarian rule – the 2–28 incident taught them how cruel the dictatorship of a single party was. They observed the situation in Hong Kong under the Chinese rule and decided that the "one country, two systems" deal proposed by the PRC, "bankrupted [...] and is looked upon with contempt. [...] That's why the Taiwanese stubbornly stand by independence and sovereignty" [ZS 2004-04-03].

The Taiwanese were not hostile towards China, but the same could not be said about the other side. The PRC was described in unequivocal terms as "alien, hostile regime" [TT 2004-02-11], "sucking Taiwanese capital and vitality" [TT 2004-01-13], which attacked businessmen, which supported the Green during the elections [TT 2004-06-08] and whose tactical missiles aimed at Taiwan were a menace hundredfold worse than SARS and could cause the Taiwanese state to "die young" [ZS 2003-12-21]. The PRC did not show any respect for the democratically elected president of the ROC [TT 2004-04-10] and although its leaders claimed they wanted to listen to "the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese" [TT 2004-03-19], their opposition towards any referendum on the island proved they did not really mean it. China used all means to hurt Taiwan e.g. "buying Taiwan's friends" (allies) [TT 2004-04-10] and blocking Taipei's effort to join the international organizations. The Beijing regime often acted treacherously and the islanders needed to be on guard, because although the PRC may "sweeten its poison", if they got fooled by it they would be no more than "meat on a Chinese chopping block" [TT

2004-02-04]. Yet they were experienced in dealing with dictatorships and were only disgusted by "Beijing's dirty propaganda tricks" [TT 2004-04-15].

The Taiwanese response to all these threats was peaceful: it was emphasized that Taiwan had no offensive weapons which could be used to attack the mainland. "Against Chinese missiles the Taiwanese present only deep wishes for peace, coming from the bottom of their hearts" said *Ziyou Shibao*. The voting ballot was their single weapon against Chinese missiles, a "weapon" not dangerous to the PRC, since it could not reach the continent [2004-01-02]. It is important to note that the Taiwanese were presented as opposed to the Beijing regime, and not to Chinese people. This meant that the people of Taiwan had their own voice, were free to speak for themselves and they were not enemies of mainland Chinese, who were not allowed to express their opinions freely, but only of the oppresive PRC's governement.

The wisdom, level-headedness and maturity of the Taiwanese were asserted again: indeed these very characteristics, together with their courage enabled them to face both the crisis of 1996 and the current threats. They acted of their own will and the results of their voting were very different from what Beijing would wish for [ZS 2003-12-23].

The Taiwanese represented the "soft power" of morality against brute force. Their human chain across the island (commemorating the 2–28 Incident) was called their "Great Wall": not made of stone like the more famous symbol of Chinese isolationism, but of real people. The Taiwanese people were described as victims of many-sided Chinese aggression, but they were not helpless victims: they were a proud, wise and brave people, peaceful and open-minded, but unwilling to become subjects of an alien rule again. Their love for their country and freedom were underscored, but there were no voices suggesting the Taiwanese people were ready to fight for it. This would undoubtedly be called war-mongerism and would rather frighten away the voters than rally them.

4.4.1. *Democracy and the Feelings of Identity*

These two issues were often discussed together; in fact the texts openly suggested that the latter resulted from the former. "The feelings of community and identity became key values of democratic Taiwan" [ZS 2004-03-04]. Not only such feelings existed and were treasured at the national level, but they were also typical of democratic Taiwan (as opposed to the previous, authoritarian era). The difference between the Chinese and the Taiwanese was stated very clearly:

> [it is] an ironclad fact: While there are still a few people who regard China as their motherland, there are more and more people in Taiwan who see this nation as their one and only homeland. [...] Apparently, like it or not, 'our group versus their group' and 'Taiwan versus China' have gradually become mainstream opinion.[...] Simply put, it is not so much about how politicians manipulate the people but rather how people might and should dictate to the politicians.[...] After decades of separation of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, and due in large part to the democratization of Taiwan, this country has developed its own ethnically and politically unique identity [TT 2004-03-19].

The articles repeatedly reminded that Taiwan was a democracy, sometimes with much pathos: "great phrases of that purpose [with which Taiwan's democracy was founded] still

sound in every Taiwanese person's heart" [TT 2004-02-28]. The Taiwanese value their democracy so much that they "will never give it up and subject themselves to the Beijing's regime" [TT 2004-02-29]. They could count on the international community, which was impressed by their achievements on the road to democracy and in building a free, law-abiding state. However, the tone of the articles was slightly bitter when they discussed the international reactions to the Taiwanese issue. The world was not really ready to accept the Taiwanese democracy, although it was the only true one in the region [TT 2004-03-19], and was easily fooled or blackmailed by the PRC. The people of Taiwan were often left alone despite their great achievements and were denied proper recognition.

5. Concluding Remarks

I have not listed all the characteristics of the Taiwanese which can be derived from the texts, preferring to let the quotations to "speak in their own words" as much as possible. Obviously, if the Taiwanese are denied dignity and recognition it means they are people worth of both dignity and recognition. By the same token, we can easily reconstruct the Taiwanese features, on the basis of the negative descriptions of the PRC. Simply, the islanders were not "treacherous", "aggressive", "sneaky" etc.

The lack of cultural markers of identity was noticeable – an attempt to create them would be just too risky. Culturally the predominant majority of the Taiwanese are Han Chinese, or, on the sub-ethnic level, Hoklo, Hakka etc. These were the very categories the Taiwanese nationalists wanted to do away with. Although we can already sensibly speak about the separate Taiwanese culture [Bosco, 1994, Hsiau, 2000], it is a relatively recent phenomenon, characterised by many borrowings from the neighbours' cultures; therefore it is difficult to define it very clearly, especially because it lacks a distinct language, the most obvious cultural feature.

Seen as an active attempt of group (nation) building, the analysed texts fit better these national identity theories which (like B. Anderson's or E. Gellner's) stress the *creation* of a nation, which (like A. Smith's, 1998) focus on ethnic and cultural core of the group. Following Smith's definitions the Taiwanese are very much a "civic" nation: they have a common state (with the historically defined, but at the same time contested, territory), economy, legal rights and duties; whereas their common ancestry, history, myths are less clearly defined – in fact, less clearly "common". This, in due course, may change: the Taiwanese are situated outside of scope of the PRC's cultural, historical and ethnic narratives and inside ROC's scope of such narratives; no matter who will be in power in ROC (which *functionally* is a Taiwanese state), such Taiwanese narratives will be present there, and may infuse the islanders with the "common ancestry and history" feeling and knowledge [Brown, 2004].

The Taiwanese, at least at present, appear to be a politically defined group. Defined from outside, their national identity fits S. Verba's and L. Pye's definition: "[national identity] is a set of individuals who fall within the decision-making scope of a state" [Dittmer and Kim, 1993, p. 6]. At the same time they show at least three of four Pye's "fundamental forms" of the national identity crisis. Their territory in legal and real sense does not overlap; they are ethnically divided and their historical-cultural exclusiveness is hard to pinpoint correctly.[15]

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[15] The fourth type – a class-conflict is not much pronounced in Taiwanese society, eds. L. Dittmer, S.S. Kim, *China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993, p. 7).

The quoted press material shows clearly that attempts to resolve these crises focus on politics: even the personal traits underlined as important for the Taiwanese have political flavour, e.g. love for freedom or pride in democracy.

Therefore, since the culture cannot be used as a group marker, the boundary between them and the Chinese had to be built on something else. The creation of a boundary may be even more important to the group existence than the definition of its core values [Barth, 1969]. This boundary is in this case created between the Chinese and the Taiwanese, following the *de facto* (but not *de iure*) political border betwen the PRC and ROC.

It seems that history repeats itself: in 1945 the *benshengren*, although set apart by their experience of Japanese rule, were quite willing to re-unite with China – but the events of the political history, mainly the 2–28 Uprising, "pushed" them into "local consciousness". Nowadays the Taiwanese are – at least to some extent – "pushed" into nationalism by the PRC's attempts to intimidate them. The threats show the people of Taiwan that the state on the other side of the Straits is not theirs, in fact it appears to be their enemy. In the eyes and speech of pro-indenpedence party they need to differentiate from it and so the PRC becomes a "measure of the Taiwanese identity".[16] In the words of *Taipei Times* [2004-04-11]:

> Beijing need to come to grips with the fact that in this increasingly globalized world, where people give high priority to fundamental values such as human rights, democracy and freedom, the people of Taiwan are no longer happy with undignified isolation and demeaning treatment from the international community – particularly from China. It is isolation and poor treatment that have stimulated the growth of Taiwanese national pride and Taiwanese identity.

Whether this "growth" will bear any fruits remains now an open question in the current global political situation.

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16 It is sometimes called the "reference group" (E. Lewandowski, *Syndromy etniczne społeczeństw* (Ethnic Syndrome of the Societies), Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 1996).

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BOOK REVIEWS

Edward Luce, *In Spite of the Gods: The Strange Rise of Modern India* (London, 2006) 388 pp.

Suddenly there is an upsurge about India among the scholars and journalists and everyone is curious to find out what is the "reality" about this phenomenal progress in the subcontinent polity called India. Big slogans have emerged, such as "India Is Shining" and "Incredible India". Edward Luce who was *The Financial Times* correspondent based in New Delhi for five years (2001–2005) has felt brave enough to write this entertaining book. No wonder it is not only fun to read, but offers also a deeply insightful account of contemporary India. The book may serve both as a fine introduction for unrelated outsiders and as a mature scrutiny that is bound to stimulate insiders like the present reviewer. Luce has proved himself an affectionate and perceptive observer of the contemporary Indian scene. The book may become a reference to those who want to interpret Indian scene, which is very often chaotic, but has a historical continuity to preserve its civilizational synthesis despite many constraints and challenges of modernization. Indian polity today has crossed more than a billion population and the way it is increasing its population it is going to surpass China in the next 25 years or so. It has 350 million of strong middle class which is more than the middle class number of the whole European Union. It has exactly the same number of people who are earning less than a dollar a day. Thus India is a thriving paradox.

The muting numbers speak for themselves and no great economist from Noble Laureate Amartya Sen to Jeffrey Sacks has any magic flute to wish them away. As to the way India works, famous American economist Professor John K. Galbraith called it a functioning anarchy. "How is India being ruled?" This question exposes the believers and non-believers and the latter category is inclined to say, "Only God can rule this country." It is no surprise that Luce entitled his book as he did, and he himself says that to some extent he was inspired by India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. It was "Nehru's contention that India's greatest strengths are not exclusively, or even necessarily, located in its religious traditions. India's advantages are found in its vibrant democracy, which has confounded expectations by not only surviving but entrenching itself deep within India's culture" (p. 18). India is still kicking and for the past seven years it has been maintaining a healthy rate of growth of seven to eight per cent annually; the future projections are also quite rosy, optimistically speaking. The over-ambitious spin doctors, including many Western and Indian economists, think that India is booming, poised to become one of the world's largest economies in the next generation and to overtake China by 2050.Yet, the spectacular growth is taking place against the backdrop of a society that has still fully to come to terms with liberal modernity. With an enduring anti-materialist philosophy it plays host to some of the world's most cutting-edge research and development, and still is home to one of the

intolerant, religious chauvinist movements in the world. And India is a nuclear weapon power state.

It is always quite difficult to structure a book like this one, but Luce has managed well by breaking up the narrative into well-defined chapters, each dealing with a difficult theme and each capable of standing on its own feet. His introductory chapter is a masterpiece essay where he maps out the skeleton of his book. Like all good writers he traces the value of Indian philosophy, culture and tradition of interpreting human life on this planet. He quotes many Western seekers of truth and the meaning of life who adopted India as their spiritual home, as e.g. Andre Malraux, a French novelist who wrote: "Remote from ourselves in dream and in time, India belongs to the Ancient Orient of our soul", or Arthur Schopenhauer, a German philosopher who said that the Christian New Testament must have come from India since it had the gentlest civilisation. On the other hand, Lord Macaulay, who authored India's first national penal code, infamously wrote that the entire corpus of Indian philosophy and literature was not worth a single bookshelf of Western writing, and British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill said India was "a beastly country and a beastly religion" and that it was "no more a country than the Equator" (p. 4).

To an extent, Rabindranath Tagore, perhaps India's greatest poet who won the Noble Prize for literature in 1913, aptly described the so-called Western fascination with Indian philosophy when he said: "To a Western observer our civilisation appears as all metaphysics, as to a deaf man piano playing appears to be mere movements of fingers and no music". The fact of the matter is that comprehending Indian philosophy and India is a complex problem. When things look simple they are not that simple and when things look too difficult they are not that difficult. If Indian religion is a way of life, so is its politics. It may appear cumbersome and chaotic, but to Indians it is quite natural and liveable. As Amartya Sen rightly observed: "'The European exoticisms' interpretations and praise found in India an army of appreciative listeners, who were particularly welcoming given their badly damaged self-confidence resulting from colonial domination" (p. 5). Powerful new images of India have emerged in the last decade or so, fed mostly by its success in information technology and offshore call centres, the growing reach of Bollywood abroad - popularised in part by the increasing wealth and visibility of Indian diaspora in the United States, Britain and in the Arabian Gulf – and by India's much-analyzed nuclear weapons programme which was openly declared in 1998 and later on by a nuclear deal with the United States in order to contain China in the distant future. Thus India is rightly and truly on the radar screens of global politics. In India things happen when one least expects them. And vice versa. It is a constant source of both delight and frustration.

That is how Luce felt living in India. His book grapples with some of major vulnerabilities or faults which India is facing squarely these days and what has gone by in the last sixty years. He redesigns a new agenda for India for his readers and he does not let them down when he goes into minute details. He is brilliant in his details and has done tremendous homework before he penned this valuable book. Much of it consists of interviews and colourful vignettes intended to illustrate the myriad statistic that can numb the mind. The blend of anecdote, history and economic analysis makes an endlessly fascinating way to catch up on a very big story which is being unfolded.

Luce's first chapter deals with Indian economy which he terms as schizophrenic as it is still global as well as medieval when one compares it with that of other developed countries.

It is to the side of the new express ways in the glaring billboards advertising mobile phones, iPods and holiday villas and in the shy gas stations with their air-conditioned mini-supermarkets that the global aspect is visible. Behind them, around them and beyond them open unending vistas of the India where 68 per cent people live, of yoked bullocks ploughing the fields in the same manner they have for three thousand years and the primitive brick kilns that do the endless patchwork of fields of rice, wheat, pulses and oilseed. Contrast is visible though the rural India is gradually changing its face. Luce defends the economic policies of Jawaharlal Nehru as now it has become fashionable to criticise him for socialist and semi-command policies. The critics forget that Nehru had to face the consequences of two hundred years of the British colonialism when the rate of growth was hardly one percent and there was no internal and global capital available to finance Indian economy. Besides, Nehru passed away in 1964 and what did his successors do for the next 36 years to alter the direction of the policy? It was only in 2000 that Indian economy started picking up its momentum and the people's perception changed drastically. Now there are 220 million mobile phones in use and 200 million people have TV cable network and Internet connections. Basically, it is the Information Technology (IT) which has changed the face of Indian economy and this sector enhanced performance in its export, which passed the magic figure of $ 25 billion in 2006. On the whole, this chapter is written purely in a journalistic style which Luce has padded with his personal interviews and it lacks a scholarly presentation.

He has adopted the same technique in the second chapter where he discusses Indian bureaucracy and its long tentacles in the Indian state. If on the one side the bureaucracy works as a glue to keep the subcontinent a unit, on the other it has become almost a total corrupt organisation where without bribery nothing works from the low to the high level. A big part of the blame should be put on the poor quality of Indian politicians who have promoted corruption at each and every step in the system. The efficiency of the bureaucracy is a laughing stock and the joke is they pretend to work and they are doing handsomely. The bureaucracy and their political masters are eating up the eighty percent of the budget through pay, allowances, and pensions.

The third chapter deals with the rise of the Indian lower classes. This ancient civilisation is a victim of its own caste system which has been bordering on the ancient slave system. It was Mahtama Gandhi who first tried to do the social engineering with his non-violent means and he partially succeeded. After the independence the lower caste leader Ambedkar, who incidentally wrote and guided the constitution of the Indian Republic in 1950, brought this issue as one of the main agendas for social equality. It was only in the 1990s that the true dimensions of the lower classes became visible when they started cashing their value of the vote in political elections and gradually started acquiring political power. The truth is no single major party at the national or state level can ignore their strength. Today Ambedkar's statues are visible in all corners of India and they are no less numerous than those of Gandhi. The only big problem has emerged that there is now a big competition between the lower castes and other backward classes which often turn into bloody clashes. At the same time the silent Muslim community (of 160 million people) has also joined the bandwagon with these groups as they got disillusioned with two main national parties, the Indian National Congress and the Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP). As Sir Vidya S. Naipaul noted, "India has become a land of a million mutinies; some are mutinies of lower orders

against the upper orders, but there are also mutinies of upper orders against Muslims, and mutinies of lower orders against each other and upper orders against each other" (p. 115).

In his fourth chapter, which is probably the best one in the book, Luce describes the continuing threat of Hindu nationalism. The Hindus have got power after one thousand years at the national level, as first the Muslim invaders were ruling for eight hundred years and then the British imperialists ruled one India for two centuries. In 1947, though India was divided into two countries by the Britishers who had prompted the Muslims to ask for their state on religious basis, still millions of Muslims preferred to live in a secular India as they did not accept the two-nation theory along with the Congress Party led by Gandhi and Nehru. Initially, a small section of the Hindu society was opposed to the presence of Muslims in India as they had wished to see a Hindu India rather than a secular and democratic India where everyone will have the freedom to practice his or her own religion. But over the past two decades, like the Muslim fundamentalism in other parts of the world, Hindu nationalists have become very aggressive and they are trying to mobilise their co-religionists to see Muslims as second rate citizens. Now their voices have become more and more shrill and they are harping on the basis of their old civilisation. As one Hindu ideologue put it, "Civilisation was born in India at least ten thousand years ago and from India it spread to the rest of the world. Hindustan is a microcosm of the universe. It contains every contradiction and tendency. Now history has turned full circle. Once again India is in a position to help the world" (p. 146). With the support of various Hindu fundamentalist groups, the BJP under the leadership of Atal Bihari Vajpayee could rule India for six years from 1998 to 2004 and it tried its best to sabotage India's secular agenda but it failed to repeat its performance. During this period a Muslim carnage took place in BJP-ruled Gujarat state. Nonetheless, Luce's contention that "the era of Brahmin-dominated politics in India is dead" is very debatable. He is of the opinion that "the upper-castes cult of material sacrifice and self-denial is losing relevance in a country where consumer values are spreading among all castes in the urban cities. People no longer automatically associate Hinduism with poverty and celibacy" (p. 181). The fact of the matter is one can be a fundamentalist and still enjoy the fruit of science and technology in a materialistic way.

In the very interesting fifth chapter Luce describes the Congress Party's continuing love affair with the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. This family, starting from Nehru to his daughter Indira Gandhi and then to her son Rajiv Gandhi and now Rajiv's widow, Italian born Sonia Gandhi, has been ruling the largest democracy for 42 out of 60 years of modern Indian history. Cynically, Luce entitles this chapter "Long live the sycophants". All these leaders in their lifetime and even after death have met with much adulation and hatred in equal measures. This is a curious phenomenon of the Congress Party that its workers tend to seek shelter under the charismatic leaders. The bankruptcy of the Congress politicians and workers is a true reflection of Indian society which loves to adhere to its modern day gods. This is partly related to the Indian habit of making myths. Much of the space is devoted to dissect Sonia's phenomenon: how this foreign lady has been accepted as unchallenged leader of the oldest party. Luce makes a very perceptive remark about Sonia when he writes, "she often appears to be a prisoner of the Congress Party network of advisers, courtiers and carpet-baggers whose efforts have helped to destroy her party's creditability in large tracts of India over the last generation" (p. 198). He also sees the

prospects of Sonia's son Rahul to maintain the rule of the dynasty in the near future, for he is now in the limelight and still offers fairy-tale glory and adulation. "He has to fend off sycophants wherever he goes. He must also try to ignore the possibility of that assassin's bullet" (p. 220), adds Luce in a paternalistic way. After all, Rahul's father and his grandmother were assassinated and the dynasty paid a heavy price to remain in the glory. But dynasty is not confined to the Congress Party and gradually most of the politicians of other parties, barring the two Communist ones, have started behaving in the similar fashion. Every retiring or dying politician wants to be succeeded by his off-springs or by his widow. A new feudal system has arrived in Indian politics and much blame should be put on the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty. The only redeeming feature is that this dynasty at least produced outstanding leaders, like Nehru and Indira Gandhi, whereas other families have not done anything worthwhile. India is certainly a plural country, but pluralism is not the same thing as liberalism. This message has to get to the elite of the country which is not playing its political knowledge well enough; it has got busy in money making in this globalised world instead. The result is that the best minds are not going to politics and thus Indian politics is in the hands of cheap and corrupt people.

In the sixth chapter Luce very sensibly highlights the plight of a section of the Muslims in the Indian sub-continent. Being a Muslim is just one of the attributes in the complex menu of identities available to most of Indians. Nehru once described India as a palimpsest. It was his way of illustrating the large accumulation of histories and cultures that had left their mark on the country, none of which had been fully erased (p. 250). One of the worst tragedies of Indian partition has been the fate of both the Muslims in India and the migrants who went to Pakistan of their own will. Muslims went to Pakistan in the hope that they would have a better share of opportunities to rule the newly created state as they had sacrificed so much for the creation of an Islamic state. The irony is that even after sixty years these migrants are still regarded as Mohajarin (refugees) and have been relegated to the status of second rate citizens by the dominant Punjabi and Sindhi communities in Pakistan. And Muslims who remained in secular India are living under the cloud of suspicion which has never entirely lifted. Today their number is bigger than that of the Muslims of Pakistan and Bangladesh taken together. In his masterly display of analysis, Luce shows how this Muslim minority of 160 million people, a population second to Indonesia, has been left behind in the educational and financial sectors. The Muslim leaders in both India and Pakistan played deliberately a policy of artificially induced hatred and this self-perpetuating enmity has cost generations to suffer. Consequently, both India and Pakistan instead spending more money on human resources development, opted for an unproductive arms race which has now become a nuclear race as well. The two countries have fought three futile wars and many small battles in their history of sixty years of hatred and enmity. At the same time Pakistan is posing an existential threat to India's secular identity. Luce is right in noting: "No matter how stable relations are between the two countries, in the Indian mind the existence of Pakistan will always have the potential to divide the loyalties of India's Muslim minority" (p. 240). India's Muslims are a "disappointment" both to Pakistan, where hawkish types look for signs of oppression of Muslims as something that would reaffirm the logic of their own existence, and to the Hindu communalists, whose ideology tells them that it is impossible to be both a true Indian and a devout Muslim. About the Pakistani mindset Luce observes: "In contrast,

for Pakistan's military-bureaucratic establishment, India is a migraine that overweighs all its other headaches put together. This perceived threat from India and the need to secure Kashmir provided the principal justification for military rule in Pakistan for more than half of the country's history" (p. 242). In passing he touches on the thorny issue of Kashmir between India and Pakistan but suggests no solution of this problem. The Kashmir tragedy which is bleeding both India and Pakistan along with the local population of Kashmir, is becoming more acute with the passing years. It seems it has become a domestic issue for the ruling Pakistan military establishment which is keen to perpetuate its rule in Pakistan.

In the seventh chapter the author discusses the relationship among the three important countries, the USA, China and India, and how this triangular dance is going to shape the first quarter of the 21st century. The two emerging economic giants in Asia, China and India, have made the USA take them very seriously. This engagement has the far-reaching consequences for the rest of the world. The topic is very contemporary and very relevant for the decision makers in these three countries as well as in other countries, such as the Russian Federation, Japan and Pakistan (which has been the closest ally of China for the past 45 years and a member of the US-led alliance system during the Cold War era), and also in European Union. Kissinger once said, in a polite phase of his career, that "India lives in a dangerous neighbourhood". India, being itself a democracy, borders with two dictatorships. Luckily, China – seeking a normality to become an economic power – has made a perceptible change in its policy towards India. Now India and China have annual trade of more than $ 8 billion in 2006 as compared to $ 2 billion in 2001. Does this mean China and India have re-entered a genuine era of friendship? No. "No mountain can accommodate two tigers". This aphorism has some validity but in the changing international climate things can improve of their own because of economic reasons. One thing is clear: for the first time the United States has genuinely started wooing India as a counterbalance to China. The nuclear agreement with India is a clear indication of US interests to prop up India in a big way. The strategic decision made by George Bush during his visit to India in March 2006 has reversed the anti-Indian policy of the successive US administrations during the Cold War years. Now the Cold War has been replaced by a new Energy War, searching for energy sources from the different parts of the world, particularly in the Middle East, Russian Federation along with erstwhile Central Asian Republics which have become free and sovereign states in 1991.How India is going to play a role of a junior partner to the United State and with what sophistication, remains to be seen. To what extent the USA will allow to play India its own independent role with other big powers, particularly with Iran and Pakistan, is also an interesting problem.

In the eighth chapter Luce describes the many-layer character of Indian modernity. It is written from a purely journalistic point of view and the comparison of the new India with the old India is unconvincing. Luce is of the opinion that Bollywood films help to understand the society's attitudes towards women's sexuality. For him, "The typically Bollywood film is a blend of brilliantly choreographed titillation, which goes down with much of the male audience, and a resolutely conservative ending, which meets with the approval of their mothers and wives" (p. 319). Then he quotes a Bollywood's megastar, a larger than life figure, Amitabh Bachchan, who dutifully says Indian cinema is an escapist cinema. "Why should somebody pay to see film with poverty in it when they see poverty in their neighbourhood everyday! People don't want to be reminded where they live" (p. 323).

After reaching a conclusion that "The rest of the world should learn a lot from India, among which tolerance, the management of diversity and the rooting of democracy in a traditional society loom large" (p. 332), in his next breath Luce adds: "But in practice India falls short of the claims it makes" (p. 333). The fact of the matter is India was and is not making big claims as portrayed by Luce. It is only Luce himself who is making claims on behalf of India and he himself is negating them. Most of Indians know pretty well about the shortcomings of India and they are not romantics like Luce.

In the concluding chapter Luce writes about India's huge opportunities and challenges in the 21st century. To him, India appears to be highly unpredictable. He makes a balance-sheet of the chances that India will make up or will break-up. If intentions can be ascribed to nation states, you could say India has given a higher priority to stability than it has to efficiency. Myron Weiner, a great political scientist, once said India moved slowly because it was diverse. He wrote: "India is like a lorry with twelve wheels. If one or two punctures, it does not go into ditch" (p. 337). The division in India, and elsewhere, is too often between those who believe the state should dominate all aspects of life and those who believe it should play virtually no role beyond defence and law and order. It is in the interest of all people, rich or poor, right wing or left wing, for India to develop a more responsive and modern state. Like all good wishers for India Luce too has made his own catalogue of things which India should do urgently in order to overcome its massive shortcomings, such as reform its labour law; prevent environmental degradation, defeat the HIV/ AIDS epidemic and protect and strengthen its liberal democracy. According to him, the most coherent threat to India's liberal democracy is Hindu nationalism (p. 353). Though Hindu nationalist forces suffered a setback when the BJP lost the power at the centre in the 2004 elections, this party still remains one of the two main parties which could not be wished away. Luce is also worried about an Indian tendency to shoot itself in the foot. As the joke goes, "India never misses an opportunity to miss an opportunity" (p. 359). In a nutshell, the book does not actually say things that are new or unknown, but it deserves to be read thoroughly, because every now and then Indian elite should be told that it has failed their people and brethren despite the fact these 350 millions have done very well to shine themselves at the cost of 350 million people who are almost left out in this race. Luce asks a very pertinent question: Of what use is India's democracy if so many millions still lead impoverished lives, remain illiterate and have very little chance of ever improving their plight in a country whose social system still frowns at social mobility of the worst off? Asking the question is very easy but there is no ready-made answer to satisfy the bulging demands of the teeming millions. There is a population explosion and Luce has not even touched upon this crunching problem. It is either a journalistic overlook or a deliberate error. How come that India which had 330 million people in 1947 has crossed the magic number of one billion in 2005 and still there is no roadblock to stop this mad race of producing unwanted children? Had this population bomb diffused at the right time, the bulk of Indian problems would not have surfaced and Luce would not have written a bleak history. It must be said, however, that he managed to understand and analyze quite a lot about India during the years he spent there.

Surender Bhutani

Jagat S. Mehta, *Negotiating for India: Resolving Problems through Diplomacy* **(Delhi, 2000) 296 pp.**

This is a very important book for those who want to understand the few critical issues which India faced in the first thirty years of its existence. The author is a professional diplomat who had spent thirty three years in Indian foreign service and had retired as the foreign secretary of India. Later on he was a visiting professor to some American universities and thus became well versed in writing academic works. The book helps the students and scholars concerned with South Asia in general, and India in particular to grasp the recent history behind the scenes. Mr Mehta to his unknown admirers and critics and Jagat to his patrons and friends, is a force to reckon with when speaking about Indian diplomacy. One of his patrons in the initial years was India's first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who made him take interest in China, which then was emerging as a big power in Asia. At that time China was also a principal adversary to the United States and a close friend of India. Nehru wanted India and China to occupy an important place on the global map and he wished to re-establish the importance of Asian civilizations in a proper perspective to face the onslaught of the technologically advanced West. Jagat Mehta tried to understand the nuances of Nehru's vibrating mind and to put forward Indian interests in a complicated world.

The book is pegged around seven cases where the author had the responsibility to negotiate on behalf of India. In his introduction Mehta maintains that diplomacy is always plurality of sovereignties and compromise in conflict resolution. To him "India's civilizational personality with its old salad bowl of faiths and tradition of toleration, and its more recent pioneering role in decolonization should have given the country a natural advantage in diplomacy in contemporary world" (p. 15). In this context the role of Mahatama Gandhi and Nehru had been a moral force in the community of nations. But unfortunately the partition of the country into India and Pakistan by the departing British colonialists left a painful legacy which till this day is a bleeding wound. The beginning of the Cold War in the late 1940s coincided with India's freedom. Thus South Asia and India in particular became mired in superpowers' rivalry and the US obsession to contain Communism led to the pacts and alliances. Obviously in that kind of scheme there was no mention of India's democratic adherence for the myopic US policy makers who found virtue in allying with the military despotism. In a way India and the United States found themselves on the different poles. Thus, Nehru's quest for peaceful co-existence met with unnecessary hostility from the Western world dominated by the Unite States. Second, Nehru's early fascination with Communist China came under a minute scrutiny by the Western powers who had then changed their World War II mindset. Nehru had a long-term vision of global politics and China could not have been ignored . But unfortunately Chinese Communists by 1959 started viewing Nehru as their potential rival and later they made him their enemy. This blunder of the then Chinese leaders, Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, proved too costly for global politics in the long run. Had India and China remained steadfast in their friendship the world would have seen less bloodshed in Asia and Africa. Their friendship could have been a model for the other Third World countries. India was allowed to live by its principled internationalism by its erstwhile friends and adversaries.

In the first chapter, Mehta highlights the importance of Nehru's visit to Bhutan in 1958, when there was hardly any road there. Nehru made a journey on horseback and occasionally using a yak to win the support of a landlocked country which was in India's protection. The account

suggests how Nehru was sensitive to a small neighbour which was and still is very strategic to India's defences vis-à-vis China. Unlike China, which had annexed Tibet by force, Nehru saw the virtue in keeping Bhutan independent. Earlier he had turned down a request of the king of Nepal, who was keen to join the Indian federation. Later on, when there was a border war between India and China, there was a move to install US missiles in Bhutan, but Nehru torpedoed that move in order not to escalate tension for a small state. He was keen to preserve the innocence of Bhutan and thus did not allow it to become a centre for the Cold War.

In his most illuminating second chapter Mehta outlines the history of Sino-Indian border question and eventual border war between the two Asiatic giants in 1962. Right at the outset he gives his verdict when he writes: "The India-China war of 1962 should never have taken place; nor for the matter should have been nationwide hypnotic euphoria of Hindi-Chini bhai bhai (Indians and Chinese are brothers)" (p.54). Initially, both Nehru and Zhou had created this euphoria of Asian understanding and it was Nehru who became a principal promoter of China in international forums when a majority of nations had not yet recognized the People's Republic of China and Taiwan still had a seat in the UN Security Council. When there was time to be legal both Nehru and Zhou became emotional and when there was a chance to negotiate with a spirit of give and take they became more political and legal. The result was obvious: a large part of the humankind which inhabited two big states in Asia suffered enormously for decades to come for the misperceptions of their leaders. The bulk of the blame should be put on Mao who had a great ideological ambition to change the course of human history and to develop China boisterously. He seldom valued human rights both nationally and internationally. Even sincerity of Nehru was doubted and eventually Mao made India his enemy without much remorse. Mehta neatly sums up the issue when he writes: "One can be certain that when making the pledge of non-aggression and mutual respect, neither the Indian nor the Chinese Prime Minister had any inkling that the differences in their respective notions of the common frontier carried explosive potential and would make a mockery of their commitments to friendship" (p. 57).When Dalai Lama was forced to flee from Tibet to India, the Chinese regime became furious with India for giving him non-political asylum along with other twenty thousand refugees. The Indian humanitarian act was seen by China as an act of infringement in its domestic affairs. The fact of the matter was that the ruling Communists in China were not prepared to give even a little religious autonomy to the Buddhist leader, who had been performing his religious duties in the autonomous region. The British empire had respected Dalai Lama's stature for more than a century and respected Tibet's autonomy. It was only the Chinese Communists who were not prepared to give religious freedom to anyone in the broad length of Red China. They forcibly suppressed the Tibet revolt in 1959 and killed thousands of Tibetans in their homeland. Mehta discusses Nehru-Zhou talks in New Delhi in April 1960 in a very comprehensive manner and gives the reader almost an inside view. That was a great opportunity for Nehru and Zhou to sort out the border problem amicably, but both became prisoners of their old rhetoric. Nehru was no longer in a position to deliver the agreement as the Indian parliament, media and people at large had become too agitated to make any compromise. A golden opportunity was lost and that led Mao and Zhou to harden their view on India as they were unable to comprehend the trappings of a vibrating democracy. It seems that the leadership in democratic polity should not encourage masses to become so highly emotional as to lose the very sight of reality. That's exactly what happened in October/November 1962 when Chinese forces dealt a serious

blow and humiliated Indian army into retreat and the area of fifty thousand square miles in Aksai Chin remained in Chinese hands as they had quietly grabbed them in the early 1950s when they were talking sweetly to the Indian leadership. As regards China, Mehta concludes: "China remains politically ambitious but militarily prudent" (p.108). In other words, China is able to wait out strategically and improvise tactically. No doubt China's historical self-confidence is unique and how it will master the consequences of science, technology, and political awareness, remains to be seen. Today, political awareness in the modern world empowers people beyond normal control; the Tiananmen Square protest of 1989 is a case in point. On the whole, this chapter is a masterpiece which should be read by all serious China watchers, because a search for a new axis with China (and/or Russia) against the United States is again harking back to wield the capacity of international blackmail. China now outmatches Japan, Russia and European Union and the policy-makers in India have to be more astute and sagacious than ever before.

In the third chapter Mehta gives a full account of how in 1975 he was forced to deal with the Ugandan dictator, General Idi Amin, to get compensation for the Indians whose properties were confiscated and who were expelled from the African state. The story is quite hilarious and in the 1970s Idi Amin was known as a monster and a buffoon in the newly liberated Africa. Indians were the only people who got some compensation from Idi Amin and Mehta was the person who did this job faithfully.

In the fourth chapter, Mehta gives a valuable insight to the process of normalization of India-Pakistan relations in 1976 after the bloody war between the two states during the creation in 1971 of the state of Bangladesh, which was earlier known as East Pakistan. The consequences of creating an artificial state by the departing British colonialists cast a dark shadow over the last six decades. But none was so bloody affair as the liberation war in Bangladesh as the Pakistani forces had committed a genocide by killing two million Bangalis who had opted for an independent state of their own. India had to intervene as ten million Bangali refugees had taken shelter in India in order to save themselves from the brutal Pakistani armed forces. The Shimla agreement between India and Pakistan was to normalize the relations, but the pace was awfully slow as Pakistan under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was dragging its feet. It was not easy for a humiliated country to get prepared to shake hands with its tormentor. At the same time, Bhutto had not fulfilled his promise to prepare the Pakistani public opinion to accept the status of Kashmir. So there were many reservations from the both sides. For decades the leadership of both countries surrendered their independent discretion too readily and got hypnotized by superpower strategies and rival intellectual concepts. Mehta writes, "Both countries became psychologically dependent on external help and beneficence. [...] In the globalized interdependence, beggaring your immediate neighbour invites risks, even more than ever before, of your own house being torched" (p. 193).

In the fifth chapter Mehta dwells on fresh water diplomacy for resource optimization and tells the readers how he succeeded in negotiating the Salal Hydel Project with his Pakistani counterparts. As long as the Indian sub-continent was one unit, there was hardly any problem of water sharing. Once there were five countries the problems became more acute with the rising population and consumption. The British colonialists were the least careful on this sensitive issue. They just drew the lines on the map and left millions of people with inadequate leadership to find their own solution. The fundamental weakness

of Partition was painfully exposed: while a homeland for the Muslim majority had been carved out of a land with historically enmeshed religions and cultures, the geographical interdependence with India could not be undone. Most of the rivers which went to Pakistan have their origins in the Himalayas which lay in India. India could have used water as a weapon against East and West Pakistan by diverting water, but it took an humanitarian stand and gracefully gave enough water to its neighbours. The Indus treaty of 1960 speaks volumes of Indian generosity. Mehta rightly observes, "There is thus no parallel to the Indus accord" (p. 204). The Indus treaty is based on the simple solution of three rivers to each country: it has worked satisfactorily for forty seven years, but it meant India only got 21 per cent of the total waters of the Indus system, even though it has a larger population in the basin. To maintain a benevolent attitude towards neighbours was the basic core of Nehru's philosophy and he always took a long view in history.

The same spirit was shown by India towards a newly created state, Bangladesh, when the two states agreed to share the Ganga Waters at Farakka, in 1976–1977. In the sixth chapter Mehta gives a vivid account of this accord. To him, "Bangladesh cannot be treated as a residuary water taker; its right to a legitimate share of common rivers will have to be recognized. Bangladesh on the other hand cannot lay claim to the historic flows as a matter of unqualified right; it will have to accept the needs of the large upstream population of India.[...] Power and coercion must be subordinated to the beneficial advantages of near and distant neighbour not only now but also in the future" (p. 247–248).

In the seventh chapter, Mehta writes about diplomacy between landlocked and unequal countries and he discusses at length the problems related to transit and trade between Nepal and India. He outlines the profile of Nepal which had started the first phase of total trust in India from 1951 to 1959, only to suddenly change its tune of playing a China card vis-à-vis India, which angered the Indian policy-makers. The rise in anti-Indian feelings was instigated by none other but the Nepalese monarchs themselves, King Mohendra and King Birendra from 1960 to 1989. At the same time the Nepalese elite was involved in a large scale smuggling of foreign goods to India. The role of the monarchy in the last 47 years has been rather shameful as it could not offer a good governance and finally the Maoists in Nepal almost captured power in 2006–2007. Mehta hits the nail in the coffin when he writes, "Future generations will never believe that India could have made such a mess of the era of emancipation in a country which could not be closer or have greater economic potential by steady trust" (p. 273). In other words, the potentiality of Nepal in hydro-electric power is immense and had India taken the advantage the history of development of Nepal and India would have been much faster and would have reduced the width of poverty by miles in these two close neighbours.

The last chapter, which deals with Mehta's contemporaries in various countries, is absolutely superfluous. If Mehta's friends had been great diplomats, he should have written a separate book. These friends do not fit in this book. Otherwise the author comes out as a thinking diplomat and he offers some material to Indian policy-makers and scholars which should help them to reflect on the recent history in a cool manner and not to repeat the old mistakes when dealing with the neighbours.

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3. L. Dimond, "Rethinking of Civil Society", *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 5, no. 3, July 1994, p. 4.
4. Kareen Pfeifer, "Is There an Islamic Economics?", in *Political Islam. Essays from Middle East Report*, eds. Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1977, p. 155.
5. Zygmunt Komorowski, *Kultury Afryki Czarnej* (Cultures of Black Africa), Wrocław: Ossolineum, 1994, p. 89.

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